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Term 1
Aims:
To provide students with an intellectual framework to
analyse situations in which the behaviour of agents is driven by
strategic considerations and, with a set of analytical tools, to
interpret a wide range of phenomena in the social sciences.
Objectives:
At the end of the module students should:
- Be able to use the concept of Nash equilibrium in simple oligopolistic games, and voting games
- Understand the concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and apply it to games of lobbying and bargaining
- Understand the logic of Bayesian games and use them to analyse real-world selling mechanisms such as auctions
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Taught by: |
Nikita Roketskiy |
| Assessment: | 20 hours of lectures, 4 practical sessions and 4 compulsory tutorial classes. Problem sets will be given out regularly and students have to hand in written solutions. The problems will then be discussed in the tutorial classes and the Practicals. There will be a 2-hour unseen written examination in Term 3. Affiliate students leaving in December will take a 2-hour written examination set up by the Department at the end of Term 1. |
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Suitable for: |
3rd year students with a good mathematical background. |
| Prerequisites: | Although there are no formal prerequisites and the mathematical tools are limited, nevertheless the module requires students to possess a strong ability in logical reasoning. |
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Moodle page: |
ECON3014 |
