Catalysing Action to Tackle Complex Problems: How Everyday Interactions Can Boost Governance Efforts

Daniel Richardson is currently enrolled in the MSc Global Governance and Ethics programme at UCL. His essay won second prize in a GGI student essay competition on biodiversity and climate change.

Climate change and biodiversity loss have one root cause: unsustainable human exploitation of natural resources. In other words, they are fuelled by the economic and political structures that underlie global production and consumption patterns. I will argue that the best way to catalyse action to meet climate change and biodiversity challenges is to recognise them as multi-dimensional political problems situated in complex systems – and tackle them accordingly. This means employing either of two strategies of problem-solving in complex systems: attempting to homogenise system components to reduce system complexity or adapting interventions into systems to accommodate their complexity. I differentiate between complicated and complex systems, outline two complex problem-solving strategies, and finally make recommendations for realising them.

Complicated and complex systems differ in the interrelationship between system components as well as the interaction between components and system dynamics. Complex systems, exemplified by human governance systems, have ‘a large number of elements, building blocks or agents capable of interacting with each other and with their environment’ (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p.14). Within such systems, observing single components reveals little about the overall system, nor can components be fully understood without considering system dynamics. This means that the outcomes of complex systems are hard to “determine”, and their ‘fundamental reality […] is instability’ (Allen, 2016; Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p.13). In contrast, component interaction in complicated systems does not alter relationships between them in variable ways. The nuts and bolts of a car do not change when fitted together. This makes the car a more stable and predictable system than a human governance system or an ecosystem.

Recognition that human governance systems are predominantly complex is important for tackling climate change and biodiversity loss because, according to systems-theory, which problem-solving strategies will be effective varies depending on system type (Allen, 2016). If problem-solving blueprint a is modelled on the facts of system A, but system A is unstable and changes in unpredictable ways into system B, intuitively blueprint a will no longer be ‘fit for purpose’ in system B (Coen & Pegram, 2018). The same goes for an adapted blueprint b when system B unpredictably morphs into system C. Given increasing system complexity within and between governance systems, excessively integrated and centralised global governance is being increasingly criticised for amounting to complicated (blueprint) governance of complex architectures (Kreienkamp & Pegram, 2020).

The alternative, however, is the fragmentation of governance, which is argued to be unsuitable for resolving the collective-action problem of climate change due to insufficient enforcement mechanisms (Gollier & Tirole, 2016). So how can we meet a governance challenge in which governance itself seems unsuitable?

Strategy one avoids the difficulties of problem-solving in complex systems by homogenising, stabilising and reducing the number of system components, thereby reducing system complexity. This is what multilateral treaties are meant to do. By establishing a rulebook for climate conduct among high-level small-n actors like nation-states that have authority over lower-level actors and institutions, system components become less likely to change their conduct as a result of interaction. They become somewhat more predictable and manageable through blueprint problem-solving measures such as the fixed emission targets enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol. A similar homogenisation could result from theories of global justice. If it can be established and widely accepted who is liable for climate change costs, then domain-specific homogenisation of system components may result as attitudes align.

The second strategy focuses instead on tailoring governance to accommodate the nature of a complex system. Instead of comprehensive blueprints, complex-system scholars suggest small-scale, experimentation and transparent systems of feedback and communication as the appropriate policy approach (Kreienkamp & Pegram, 2020). When the system constantly changes, only decentralised, flexible and reactive governance can keep pace.

The first strategy might work on the multilateral level if comprehensive integrated agreements were feasible. But since the system in question is complex to begin with, actors are unlikely to agree on, or comply with, treaties that could significantly lower system complexity (Keohane & Victor, 2011). And because the intractability of the climate change problem has been deemed a ‘perfect Moral Storm’ (Gardiner, 2006), moral theory might even be counterproductive insofar as its inconclusiveness legitimises various stances. The second strategy can contribute with reactive governance if intervention feedback is transparent and fast (Kreienkamp & Pegram, 2020). Its functioning, however, presupposes some success of the first strategy. A ratchet system without enforcement will not generate costly climate action without general global consensus on its importance (Alter & Meunier, 2009).

The advantage of the Paris Agreement is that it allows for a combination of both strategies. It offers an inclusive governance framework to stabilise expectations (as per strategy one) but without specifying static blueprints, thus leaving room for decentralised, adaptive responses to changing system dynamics (as per strategy two). However, in the absence of effective global-level hierarchy, a top-down approach to strategy one is unlikely to be sufficient. My suggestion is therefore to combine global-level climate governance with conscious efforts to homogenise and stabilise components from the bottom-up (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). This necessitates two things. Firstly, we need to keep talking about climate change. Attitude change comes from individuals repeatedly raising issues with family and friends, not from campaigns and speeches (Hayhoe, 2021). Secondly, we need to change the way we talk about climate change. Hayhoe (Ibid.) cites a study which notes that after telling republicans that their energy-consumption is above average, their energy-consumption actually increased – shaming does not work to positively change attitudes. We should therefore leave the blame-game behind, not because it is necessarily fair but because it is practical. By adopting non-judgemental everyday discourse on climate change, sceptics are less likely to resist. Furthermore, by framing climate action as an act of solidarity rather than a concession of guilt we allow politicians the option to spin such commitments to their political advantage.

In conclusion, if we accept that climate change and biodiversity loss are political problems situated in complex systems, that strategies to reduce or adapt to system complexity are more appropriate solutions than blueprint governance, and that the best way to achieve these is through decentralised, flexible governance and the homogenisation and stabilisation of system components, then it makes sense to elaborate Paris-style governance while also pursuing bottom-up strategies to catalyse global change through everyday, non-judgemental conversations about climate change and biodiversity loss.

Bibliography

Alter, K., and Meunier, S. (2009) ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’, Perspectives on Politics, 7 (1), pp. 13-24.

Alter, K. and Raustiala, K. (2018) ‘The rise of international regime Complexity’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 14, pp. 329–49.

Allen, W. (2016) ‘Complicated or complex – knowing the difference is important’, Learning for Sustainability, available at: http://learningforsustainability.net/post/complicated-complex/

Coen, D. and Pegram, T. (2018). ‘Towards a Third Generation of Global Governance Scholarship’, Global Policy, 9, pp. 107-113.

Gardiner, S. M. (2006). ‘A perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption’, Environmental Values, 15(3), pp.397-413.

Gollier, C. and Tirole, J. (2016) ‘Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate Change’, Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 4 (2), pp. 5-27.

Hameiri S. and Jones L. (2016) ‘Global Governance as State Transformation’ Political Studies, 64 (4), pp. 793-810.

Hayhoe, K. (2021). What Climate Change and Coronavirus Have in Common. Available at: https://vimeo.com/507933531.

Keohane, R. and Victor, D. (2011). ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, Perspectives on Politics, 9 (1), pp. 7-23.

Kreienkamp, J. and Pegram, T. (2020). ‘Governing Complexity: Design Principles for the Governance of Complex Global Catastrophic Risks’, International Studies Review, pp. 1-28.