Theory/Experimental Seminar - S.Nageeb Ali (Penn State)

Title: Agenda Control Confers Dictatorial Power

Abstract: This paper models legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can pro- pose amendments sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot commit to her future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new con- dition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our results overturn the conventional wisdom that voter sophistication alone constrains an agenda setter’s power.

To sign up, please click here

Location: 321 Drayton House, or join via Zoom: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/98871239429?pwd=cVZXMmhsT291K3p2MlNQd0R2UkY3QT09