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Theory seminar presented by Marcin Pęski (U of Toronto)
05 November 2019, 12:00 pm–1:15 pm
Alternating-Offer Bargaining with one-sided Incomplete Information and Mechanisms
Event Information
Open to
- All
Organiser
-
Nikita Roketskiy
Location
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LG10056: Bentham House4-8 Endsleigh GardensLondonWC1H 0EGUnited Kingdom
Abstract.We study an alternating offer bargaining over heterogeneous pie with N parts, with one-sided uncertainty about the preferences over different parts of the pie. Players can offer general mechanisms to determine the allocation. When N = 2 and offers are frequent, there is a unique limit of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcomes: the uninformed player proposes the optimal screening menu subject to the constraintthat each of the types of the informed player gets at least her complete information pay off. When N > 2, there is an equilibrium in which the informed player may receive strictly less than her complete information benchmark.
Paper available
About the Speaker
Marcin Pęski
at U of Toronto