UCL Department of Economics


Frontiers in Design

14 June 2019–15 June 2019, 10:00 am–6:00 pm


Organised by Vasiliki Skreta (UCL and University of Texas - Austin)

Event Information

Open to

Invitation Only


Department of Economics


Level 38
UCL School of Management
One Canada Square, Canary Wharf
E14 5AA

Frontiers in Design - An ERC funded conference

Conference programme

Friday June 14             

Time slot          Speaker                     Discussant               Title / Co-Authors
10:00-10:30    Arrival and coffee               
10:30-11:30    Ilya Segal (Stanford)    Konrad Mierendorff (UCL)     “Persuasion with Rational Inattention ” (with Alexander W. Bloedel)

11:30-12:30     Laura Doval (CalTech)    Daniel Quigley (Oxford)    “Mechanism design with limited commitment” (with Vasiliki Skreta)

12:30-13:30     Lunch               

13:30-14:30    Rahul Deb (Toronto)    “Our Distrust is Very Expensive”  (with Matt Mitchell and Mallesh Pai)

14:30-15:30     Frederic Koessler (PSE)    James Best (CMU)     “Long Information Design ” (with Marie Laclau, Jerome Renault and Tristan Tomala)

15:30-16:00    Coffee Break               

16:00-17:00     Elliot Lipnowski (Chicago)    Martin Cripps (UCL)    "Fostering Collaboration" (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar) ” 

17:00-18:00     Albert  Marcet  (UCL)     TBC      “Recursive Contracts, A Summary and Users' Guide” 

18:00-19:00     Drinks Reception              
Saturday June 15
Time slot       Speaker                                                 Discussant                 Title /Co-Authors
10:00-10:30    Arrival and coffee               
10:30-11:30    Francoise Forges (Université Paris-Dauphine)    Ronny Razin (LSE)    "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ” 

11:30-12:30    Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)    Ricardo Alonso (LSE)     "Towards a theory of commitment design ”

12:30-13:30    Lunch              

13:30-14:30    Ina Taneva (Edinburgh)    Pablo Schenone (ASU)    “ Information Design in Hierarchies “  (with Laurent Mathevet)

14:30-15:30    Takuro Yamashita (Toulouse)    Balazs Szentes (LSE)    "On the veil-of-ignorance principle: welfare-optimal information disclosure in voting” (with Karine Van der Straeten)"

15:30-16:00     Coffee Break               

16:00-17:00     Gabriel Caroll (Stanford)    Mariann Ollar (Edinburgh)    "Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms"

17:00               Close of Conference

Confirmed speakers and discussants



  • Albert Marcet - University College London
  • Gabriel Caroll - Stanford University
  • Frederic Koessler - Paris School of Economics - CNRS
  • Laura Doval - California Institute of Technology
  • Francoise Forges - Universite Paris-Dauphine
  • Roland Strausz - Humboldt Universitat Berlin
  • Rahul Deb - University of Toronto
  • Elliot Lipnowski - University of Chicago
  • Ina Taneva - University of Edinburgh
  • Takuro Yamashita - Toulouse School of Economics
  • Ilya Segal - Stanford University


  • Mariann Ollar - University of Edinburgh
  • Alp Atakan - Queen Mary University
  • Daniel Quigley - Oxford University
  • Ronny Razin - London School of Economics & Political Science
  • James Best - Carnegie Mellon University
  • Martin Cripps - University College London
  • Konrad Mierendorff - University College London
  • Ricardo Alonso - London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Pablo Schenone - Arizona State University
  • Balazs Szentes - London School of Economics & Political Science