Theory Seminar - presented by Takuro Yamashita (TSE)
26 February 2019, 4:30 pm–6:00 pm
![theory-seminar](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/economics/sites/economics/files/styles/large_image/public/events/theory_seminars_smaller_1.jpg?itok=4QpA0qhl)
'Optimal student allocation with peer effects'
Event Information
Open to
- UCL staff | UCL students
Organiser
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Department of Economics
Location
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Room 321Drayton House30 Gordon StreetLondonWC1H 0AXUnited Kingdom
Abstract: This paper considers a planner's problem of dividing a unit-mass of students with heterogeneous abilities into a finite number of schools. Each student's final payoff is a function of his own ability and the peer effect, the average ability (or the average of a function of abilities) of the students in the same school. Perhaps due to this endogenous allocative externality, in the literature, the optimal assignment mechanism has been characterized in a relatively restricted set of environments (e.g., with binary ability types or with specific payoff functions such as Cobb-Douglas). This paper characterizes the optimal assignment mechanism with continuously many types and a much milder assumption on the payoff function, which may be interpreted as a monotonicity condition for the planner's preference of having more diversity in each school. The optimal mechanism is shown to have a simple cutoff structure, allowing for clean comparative statics.
About the Speaker
Takuro Yamashita
Professor of Economics at TSE
More about Takuro Yamashita