Political Change from the Outside In: US Trade Leverage and Labour-Rights Reform in Mexico

This paper (co-authored with Professor Graciela Bensusán) examines Mexico-US negotiations over labour rights and Mexico’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement in order to assess the character of bilateral interactions, and the ways external actors can influence domestic political change, under conditions of asymmetrical complex interdependence. US pressures caused Mexico to adopt constitutional reforms that strengthened Mexican workers’ ability to form politically independent unions, elect union officials democratically by secret ballot, and protect their rights in collective bargaining. Not only did these changes affect a pillar of Mexican political economy, but they also constituted the only known instance of Mexico adopting constitutional amendments in response to external demands. Putnam’s metaphor of international diplomacy as a two-level game frames the analysis of domestic/international interactions in both Mexico and the United States. Drawing on extensive interview materials to reconstruct these negotiations, we explain how US actors induced the Mexican government to take such momentous steps after resisting for many years international pressures to address labour-rights shortcomings. The conclusion considers the implications of these findings for future bilateral relations, particularly the prospects for expanded external influences on Mexican politics.