FAQs: 16 questions on UCL and the IHRA definition of anti-semitism

(1) What’s so wrong with the IHRA definition?

Answer: The key problems with the IHRA definition (identified in the analysis of the Working Group) are that: 1) the definition does not add anything to existing definitions of discrimination in Equalities law and UCL codes of conduct; 2) it is being used as a stand-in for actually enforcing these existing standards on campus (and so genuinely dealing with anti-semitism); and 3) the definition, whilst itself quite vague to the point of being harmful, has been adopted with accompanying examples that turn it into a ready tool for curtailing legitimate speech and debate on Israel. Some of these points have led to even the author of the definition, Kenneth Stern, robustly rejecting its use in a university setting and have now been confirmed by the Jewish Reform movement USA - the largest Jewish denomination in the US, that has produced a statement rejecting the IHRA definition for the purpose of legal enforcements (in UCL’s case, enforcement in policies). The below FAQs substantiate these points, but please do look at the relevant parts of the report itself.

(2) Won’t removing or changing the definition leave Jewish staff and students vulnerable to anti-semitism?

Answer: A recurring argument from Senior Management and those in senior management appointed roles, is that without UCL adopting the specific IHRA definition of anti-semitism in its codes of conduct Jewish students and staff will be subject to prejudice and racist attacks. This is deeply misleading, to say the least, because racism of any kind (including anti-semitism), racially-motivated discrimination, and prejudiced behaviour are already covered by a) Equalities legislation (such as the Equalities Act 2010) and b) by UCL codes of conduct. When challenged at the Academic Board, SMT have not been able to provide a single example of a case of genuine anti-semitism on campus that would not be covered by these codes but would be covered by the IHRA definition.

Indeed, the key problem as the WGRP Report supports with significant evidence (pp. 15-27 and 32) is that the existing and available codes that would address any such racially motivated behaviour are extensive and applicable, but have not been properly implemented by UCL, with enough resources for education, communication, and where necessary enforcement.

Were the IHRA definition to do no harm of its own, it would at best just be a spare wheel prompting the question as to why every racial minority does not have its own bespoke definition of racism on campus. However, as we explain below, it is harmful.

The WGRP Report sets out a number of concrete, practical actions, (pp. 60-63) in addition to potential alternative definitions (pp. 56-58), including the proper enforcement of existing equalities, anti-discrimination, and anti-racism standards and UCL policies. These proposals also include educational and communication measures that, with the codes, would genuinely work to tackle anti-semitism on campus in a way Senior Management have significantly failed to do.

(3) What about the symbolism of getting rid of this definition?

Answer: As we have said, Senior Management and supporters of the definition, have not provided a single example of a case of anti-semitism that definitions in current Equalities legislation and UCL policies would be unable to cover, should UCL choose to enforce them. This leaves, then, only one positive argument for having this definition: the ‘symbolic argument’. At least one Dean stated at Academic Board that “symbols matter” and withdrawing this definition would be problematic from this perspective in terms of what it says about UCL and anti-semitism. And they are right. If all that was in play about adopting the IHRA definition was its symbolism, then we should take the symbolism of gestures very seriously, perhaps even as definitive.

But the problem is that adopting this definition is not just a symbolic gesture, it comes with a sting, in that it defines and constrains the rights of staff and students at UCL to speak about, teach, or research certain topics (consider classes on discrimination and racism, events on contemporary colonialism, and the Modern Middle Eastern History course at UCL). If it curtails Academic Freedom in this way (see below) then the Academic Freedom rights in a university must have priority over symbolic and gestural values. Universities could shut down all kinds of uncomfortable speech, such as research into regimes with which they have concordats (China comes to mind), for symbolic and public reputational reasons. But it must be part of the DNA of university as such that Academic Freedom comes first. Otherwise we pay the symbolic cost of prioritising a politicised definition to regulate speech on campus and publicly giving up on the values of a university.

Note too, that the method by which UCL’s (constitutionally dubious) adoption of the IHRA definition is rectified can positively address the symbolism issue. The definition can be modified, replaced with a superior definition that is not politically tendentious, or moved outside of UCL’s conduct policies, To be used for educational initiatives on campus. The WGRP have discussed a number of these options as possibilities in their report (pp. 64-65).

(4) Are the Working Group a biased rump that is unilaterally trying to remove this policy?

Answer: One of the more offensive insinuations at the Academic Board was that the Working Group on Racism and Prejudice (WGRP) that produced this Report is a biased rump. The idea seems to be that it has no mandate or legitimacy to produce the extensive evidence-based research it has produced (more about that below). Just on the legitimacy front: the composition of the WGRP was agreed by a motion passed without opposition at a well-attended meeting of the Academic Board (Dec 12, 2019). Seats on the WG were majority elected from the Academic Board in an open election.

The candidates elected had declared their approach and perspective on the issue in their personal statements circulated to all those voting. They were elected by sizable and convincing majorities in fair elections by the membership of AB. The non-directly elected seats are those for: a) student reps; b) a member of SMT (Vice Provost); c) a UCU rep; d) a representative from the Centre for the Study of Education in Muslim Contexts; d) a rep from the Faculty of Laws (who was selected by the Dean of Laws); and e) a rep from the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies  (see p. 2 of the Report).

Directly Elected:

• Professor Tamar Garb, Department of History of Art

• Professor François Guesnet, Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies 

• Professor Alan Sokal, Department of Mathematics

• Professor Judith Suissa, Institute of Education

Not directly elected:

• Dr Seth Anziska, chosen by Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies

• Professor Prince Saprai, chosen by Faculty of Laws

• Dr Farid Panjwani, chosen by Centre for the Study of Education in Muslim Contexts 

• Dr Celia Caulcott, Vice-Provost (Enterprise)

• Sandra Ogundele, BME Officer, Students’ Union UCL

• Aatikah Malik, Welfare and International Officer, Students’ Union UCL

• Sean Wallis, Department of English Language and Literature and UCU Branch President

We emphasise the expertise and experience of those elected members of the WG, as the quality of their work was attacked by members of Senior Management without their credentials.

It is significant that the only dissenting view on the Working Group concerning its conclusions is from the Faculty of Laws rep, who was not elected. So, in terms of legitimacy as a Working Group of the Board, this group and its Report has all the bona fides underwritten by the Academic Board itself. Indeed, impugning its legitimacy would seem offensive to the Academic Board as UCL’s entity of academic governance.

(5) But there are no students from the Jewish Student Society on the Working Group?!

Answer: With regard to the IHRA definition, the Working Group’s core mandate was to look at a key matter that Senior Management had failed to look at when they took papers for the adoption of the IHRA definition to Council (without carrying out their duty by UCL’s Statutes to properly consult the Academic Board first). That is the effect of the adoption of the definition on Academic Freedom at UCL. The WG was therefore filling a gap that Senior Management was quite happy to ignore in its campaign to adopt the definition. In doing this, the WG interviewed leaders of different student societies, including JSoc, and integrated their survey research findings, and testimony, into the report.

But note that while the JSoc students support the IHRA definition, their survey and their testimony give no account of how that definition, with its emphasis on criticism of Israel, would a) address their experiences of anti-semitism specifically; and b) generally help to capture acts that are not already captured by definitions in Equalities legislation and UCL policies.

This support of the definition also has a very strange implication: that Jewish students on campus will only be safe if UCL uses a definition that explicitly identifies criticism of Israel among its core examples and thus impacts on academic staff and students who might criticise Israel and or research topics related to its status (e.g., consider research claims about Israel being a settler-colonial state or being structurally racist). That implication goes far beyond any actual experience of anti-semitism reported by students, their representatives, or their survey. It reaches into matters affecting Academic Freedom rights and also the rights of Palestinian students and staff to characterise a state that they see as oppressing them, as racist. No clear connection is provided between the outcome sought and the experiences that are supposed to justify it (see Report pp. 11-14).

(6) Did the Working Group fail to research anti-semitism and the experience of Jewish staff and students at UCL (thus showing bias)?

Answer: This is one of the more crass claims by those criticising the report of the Working Group, as it either means they did not read it or they are wilfully misrepresenting it. As pp. 11-14 of the report amply demonstrate, the Working Group consulted recent in-depth research at UCL on anti-semitism, anti-semitism experiences, and anti-semitic incidents on campus. These studies include an in-depth qualitative study as well as a description and analysis of the Jewish Student Society’s own survey on their members’ experiences. This was in addition to interviewing two presidents of JSoc. The Report surveys and analyses this material as any research using existing primary data sources and secondary literature would. It does not under-play any element of these reports and experiences but provides a clear analysis of their various components, frequencies, and significance for the participants.

The Report does not, however, simply accept any conclusion or gloss that any party places on the research, but takes it on face value to provide an evidence-based analysis. It is worth noting that of the appalling anti-semitic incidents reported in the survey and the qualitative research, the vast majority used anti-semitic tropes had nothing to do with Israel or Palestine.

It is clear that what the critics who claim the WGRP did not carry out research really mean is that the Report did not come to the conclusion that anti-semitic experiences at UCL require the IHRA definition as a remedy, which is one of the glosses placed on the JSoc survey in particular. But they have no evidence to support the view that the WG failed to consult relevant primary data or that their analysis of this in the Report is mistaken or deviates from the facts. Either those making the accusation did not read the Report or are banking on others not having read it.

(7) Did the Working Group fail to listen to a minority about the racism they experience?

Answer: Another trope from Senior Management, and those appointed to specific roles by Senior Management, at the Academic Board was that one should always listen to minorities when it comes to evidence of discrimination against them (that the “lived experience” must not be ignored). This was used to argue for upholding the IHRA definition as the definition that Jewish staff and students want. One Dean said:

““The report doesn't involve engagement with the experiences of the members of our community whose well being and inclusion are being addressed by the definition...the specificity of their experiences of racism and prejudice have not been explored.”

Given the above cited research and engagement with members of this community at UCL, this claim is not just false, it verges on defamation. Importantly, there are also two fundamental, and arguably racist, flaws in this progressive-sounding argument. As the Report says (footnote 54, p. 43), while one must always listen carefully and empathetically to the "lived experiences" of members of a minority describing instances of what they view as discrimination or harassment, that means listening to all members of the group, not just to a selected subset whose views are anointed as the "authentic" ones.  But listening carefully and empathetically to someone and reflecting seriously on what they say, does not imply that one is obliged to agree either with their analysis of the situation or with their proposed remedies.  Each person, whether a member of the group or not, is entitled, after listening carefully and empathetically, to use his or her own brain.

Firstly, on the IHRA definition Senior Management have, as in the Dean’s statement above, chosen to listen to only one group as representing the authentic “Jewish community”, as if there had been a unanimous vote on this measure and there were no pluralism of views. Note that the Jewish Reform Movement, USA, the largest Jewish denomination in the US, has come out against codifying the definition into law (and by implication into enforceable codes).  This is both false and arguably racist. It is true that several Jewish student societies around the country have been pushing for adopting this definition in universities *. However, the Jewish community, including students and members of staff in HE, have a variety of views on the matter. Many intellectuals and academic researchers, especially those working in the social sciences and the humanities, who are Jewish have come out against this definition as harmful, divisive, and politically loaded.  The elected members of the WGRP for example, are all from the UCL Jewish community, as are many members of staff who agree with their conclusions. Whilst unelected organisations outside of UCL have exerted pressure for it to adopt the definition (along with Gavin Williamson, the Education Secretary, for the government), branding one group as “mainstream” or “the” community, as members of Senior Management and their supporters have done, thus erasing other members of the community (e.g. Jewish academics who find the definition problematic), is a form of racism. It basically says: as you belong to this minority then you must accept the politics of a section of this group that we favour, or be ignored **. 

Secondly, these arguments about accepting the experience of a minority (which, as we have seen, does not speak with one voice on the matter) are also implicitly racist in that they ignore another oppressed minority whose interests are directly affected. That is the community of Palestinians, including Palestinian students and staff, whose history and lived experience is erased by claiming a politicised definition that constrains their right to speak about their history and the state of Israel in critical ways, and indeed (as with every other state in the world) to allege structural racism, racist violence, and settler-colonialism in their treatment by that state. It also potentially curtails the rights of others whose research and speech focuses on that history and plight as one of experiencing racial mistreatment. Were UCL to adopt the IHRA working definition, it could find itself unlawfully victimising Palestinians for making complaints of racism - complaints that are supposed to be protected by the Equality Act.

* Indeed the Union of Jewish students (to which many JSocs are affiliated nationally)  has been pushing for this and is keeping a tally of universities that have and have not adopted it. Currently, their tally has 29 out of 133 institutions adopting it and 80 not (others are discussing it).

**  The author of the IHRA definition, who rejects its use in university settings, is explicit (in this video clip at 1:32) in seeing this pitting “real” vs “not real” members of the community (on the basis of their political views) as pernicious.

(8) But don’t Equalities and anti-discrimination legislation in the UK and existing UCL policies on racist behaviour simply fail to protect racial minorities on campus, hence the need for the IHRA definition?

Answer: A prominent person in a Senior Management-appointed role was insistent at AB with the claim that Equalities, anti-discrimation legislation, and existing UCL policies on racism and conduct covering racism at UCL do not protect students and staff from racism ***. But the logic of this argument applies equally to the IHRA working definition. This is true in the very general sense that any code, and indeed any definition, will not protect anyone if it is not properly applied, enforced, or understood. This has, indeed, as the Working Group identified (pp. 12-27), been the case with anti-semitic incidents on UCL campus that are clearly captured by definitions in existing legislation and UCL policies, if only those were properly applied. As we have said above, those supporting the IHRA definition were unable to offer a single example of a case that the definitions in these codes would fail to capture but the IHRA working definition would. 

This means supporters of the definition, including Senior Management, are unable to say what clear and necessary role it has in tackling anti-semitism. If there is one, then they need to clearly articulate what that is (we’ve addressed the ‘symbolic’ point above, the only positive case they have made), and give clear examples. So far nothing has been produced in writing or otherwise.

This point, it should be noted, elides two different sets of concerns: the ineffectiveness of codes alone (without other measures and resources) to change behaviour and the adoption of a different definition of the behaviour in question. The weakness of Equalities legislation and UCL codes, pre-IHRA definition, does not lie in their definitions of racism (indeed no critique of these definitions and how they affect anti-racism policy has been offered by those making this case), it is rather their use has not effectively tackled racist attitudes and actions on campus. But that is true of any law, and any definition. At the same time adopting a new definition, especially one that prioritises a particular political constraint on speech, does not address that point at all. What tangible matter it does address has not been explained by Senior Management or others. We cannot define ourselves out of racism - application and enforcement must be concrete and tangible in targeting the right things.

Moreover, as a general principle, the crisper and more universally agreed set of principles are employed for conduct, the greater their public support and adherence. A definition that blurs the boundaries between anti-semitism and anti-Zionism (opposition to the political project establishing and maintaining the state of Israel) is more likely to lead to contested cases which expose disagreement about societal norms of accetable behaviour, and it risks increasing anti-semitism in practice. 

*** “The Equality Act does not protect me from racism and it certainly does not protect students and staff from anti-semitism.” (Academic Board 16 December 2020).

(9) Doesn’t UCL’s adoption of IHRA definition come with the caveat that any speech critical of Israel has to have antisemitic “intent” in order to be anti-semitic (so speech without that intent is not curtailed by it)?

Answer: The IHRA definition (and examples) was indeed adopted with two caveats by Council (taken form the Home Affairs Committee): 1) “It is not antisemitic to criticise the government of Israel, without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent” and 2) “It is not anti-semitic to hold the Israeli government to the same standards as other liberal democracies, or to take a particular interest in the Israeli government’s policies or actions, without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent”.

The problem, however, is that the definition of anti-semitic intent itself requires an independent criterion for anti-semitic intention that is not provided by the IHRA definition (indeed all the definition itself says is that anti-semitism is “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews” (our emphasis) - which is a perceptual definition not an intentional one. The “may be” leaves the definition wide open to various and conflicting interpretations ****. It may be taken to be expressed in numerous ways, some of which are politically loaded. Does a rejection of a Jewish state in favour of a secular republic in Palestine constitute anti-semitic intention? Does calling the detention of children a fascist action? In some views, they do because the first refuses Jews a right to set up an ethnically exclusive state, and the second is offensive to the history of suffering of Jews. On another the first does not because it has nothing to do with Judaism but with republican secularism, and the second is a political characterisation of acts with clear criteria. The IHRA definition even with the caveats about intention does not help here. Similar points can be made about the ‘double standards’ caveat (see p. 50 of the report).

Importantly, the additional provision (of intent) does not protect critical speech on Israel at UCL: someone has to decide what intent means and whether critics of Israel have it. Evidence of intent in criminal law refers to outward and objective manifestations of intent. But what are these manifestations with anti-semitism, especially when they refer to a “certain perception of Jews”? The IHRA definition gives no guidance, leaving the threshold of evidence for intent wide open to abuse (and staff and students on campus in a position of indeterminacy about what they may and may not do). Is, for example, inviting a speaker that has been accused of anti-semitism for criticising Israel an expression of anti-semitic intent? Is being extra critical of Israel whilst not talking about, say Myanmar, an expression of anti-semitic intent? In both cases, there are supporters of Israel who argue that it is. The IHRA definition provides them with a tool to hunt such speech.

Note that the same Senior Management that is keen on keeping this definition for reputational purposes would be responsible for applying and adjudicating on it (in this case the Provost or the Registrar on his behalf). These officers will have to investigate and make fine legal decisions about intent (with no guiding principles) under reputational pressure, and often at short notice. UCL also has no provisions against vexatious or manifestly ill-founded accusations in its policies. There is also plenty of evidence of a significant willingness of various bodies and individuals on and off campus to launch accusations of anti-semitism against those criticising Israel. See the WG Report’s coverage of this in detail (pp. 37-43).

At the very least the definition sets up a number of ongoing conflicts within the university between those critical of Israel and those who find such criticism offensive or anti-semitic (see WG Report pp. 35 ff.).

This definition, then, provides a ready tool for potentially career-destroying campaigns, complaint pile-ons, vilification, and persistent hunting of speech. Even where targets can ultimately demonstrate no intent, this can easily require extensive processes of complaints panels, tribunals, and ultimately the Courts. This is not trivial. If you know that your class on racism in Israeli laws or your research paper on psychological trauma in Palestinian children who have been detained by Israeli armed forces, will be subjected to scrutiny for your “intentions”, and you will have the burden of proof to disprove this against a notion of intent without criteria, where clearing your name may involve years in Employment Tribunals and Appeals courts, with enormous costs in finance, time, and energy, then you will think twice about whether such work is worth doing. That is what is meant by a “chilling effect” on free speech and Academic Freedom. Senior Management’s failure to take this seriously should be a wake-up call for everyone.

**** This is usefully set out in the Legal Opinion of QC Hugh Tomlinson on the definition, p. 2-4. Tomlinson says the definition “lacks clarity and comprehensiveness...It means that there is likely to be lack of consistency in its application and a potential chilling effect on public bodies which, in the absence of definitional clarity, may seek to sanction or prohibit any conduct which has been labelled by third parties as antisemitic without applying any clear criterion of assessment” (p. 3). The human rights Barrister Geoffrey Robertson QC, from Doughty Street Chambers has also provided an extensive legal opinion showing the confounding nature of the definition and the accompanying examples for regulatory purposes, and the accompanying harms.

(10) Is it not true, as one Dean argued at AB, that “All equality law operates with broad criteria, often unspecific? That is because the values it protects are broad and important, and inherently difficult to define”, and so the vagueness of the IHRA definition is ok?

Answer: This is both a misrepresentation and a rejection of one of the most basic of legal principles: the rule of law, key elements of which include transparency and legal certainty *****. Equalities legislation in the UK is precise and clear on criteria for discrimination and harassment. Where there are indeterminacies, the common law (courts) brings precision and determinacy by establishing principles for interpretation. Law, in this sense, has to be exact in order to prevent people’s rights (and reputations) being decided by mere allegations instead of a transparent set of legitimate criteria. The precision of these standards is amply set out in the legal analysis in the WG Report (pp. 15-27), as is the legal case for the imprecision of the IHRA definition (pp. 43 ff).

Legal and regulatory codification addresses the mischief of lack of certainty in what rights and obligations people have. Refusing to address an identified mischief (in the form of indeterminacy) allows for a clearly identified harm: in this case the openness of a definition to be used to pursue attacks on political opponents. The Equality Act 2010 is supported by a state body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which publishes statutory Codes and Guidance documents (see WG report). The Equality Act itself represents over 50 years of case law since the inception of the Race Relations Act 1968. Alongside the wording of the Act itself, this guidance and case law addresses both the question of a clear delineation of legal tests (what must be established for a finding to be sound) and the intersection between the Equality Act and other legislation, such as the European Convention rights of freedom of speech and Academic Freedom. This case law is critical of attempts to use the Equality Act definition of harassment to stifle freedom of speech preemptively (see e.g. Fraser vs UCU). The EHRC Technical Guidance on Further and Higher Education specifies that the Equality Act definitions of harassment or discrimination may not be used to censor the curriculum:

“Further and higher education institutions are not restricted in the range of issues, ideas and materials they use and have the academic freedom to expose students to a range of thoughts and ideas, however controversial. Even if the content of the curriculum causes offence to students with certain protected characteristics, this will not make it unlawful unless it is delivered in a way which results in harassment or subjects students to discrimination or other detriment (p146).

UCL policies and codes do not have a “common law” to specify the IHRA definition and constrain UCL officers in applying it in practice so as to fix its vagueness and its quite specific centering of criticism of Israel in the examples. 

The only constraints on how this definition can be interpreted in practice at UCL lie in the definition itself, which at present does not inspire confidence that it cannot be used to hunt and curtail speech, or at the very least chill it with fear of the damaging process into which staff or students may be plunged.

***** See Bradley, A. W. and Ewing, K. D. (2011) Constitutional and Administrative Law (15 ed.), Harlow: Longman, p. 98. For summaries: “The principle of legal certainty means that all laws enacted in the UK must be applied in a precise and predictable manner.” In Brief on the Rule of Law; the World Justice Project includes “clear, publicized, and stable” as part of the rule of law.

(11) Doesn’t other legislation and UCL’s own codes of conduct and Academic Freedom Statute (18) protect staff and students from the misuse of the definition?

Answer: In a court of law, ultimately, applications of the IHRA definition would indeed be looked at in the context of other legislation and UCL codes (such as the Education Act 1986 and its protection of free speech on campus, UCL policies on free speech, and on Academic Freedom, such as Statute 18). However, how tensions between these different provisions are resolved, and how Academic Freedom is interpreted in light of the problems with the IHRA definition, is not clear or settled, and, in cases initially investigated internally, would be in the hands of UCL officers to adjudicate. The resolution of these tensions would depend precisely on interpretation of terms contained within the definition and its accompanying examples. As we have pointed out above, concerning the Caveats to the definition, and in the Mazzig case covered below, there is no set of ready principles for UCL officers to use that guide these interpretations or to prevent the ready use of the definition as a tool to chill speech.

(12) Isn’t having a definition (even a bad definition) better than having no definition?

Answer: As we have said above, Equalities and anti-discrimination laws and UCL policies already define racism and anti-religious prejudice sufficiently to address cases of anti-semitism, the issue is whether UCL is prepared to put resources and energy into applying them properly. The only thing the IHRA definition adds (apart from blurring definitional boundaries) is the centering of criticism of Israel in the examples that are supposed to clarify the definition (and one that is not properly defined). So in this case, having this particular definition is worse than the definitions we already have. There is now ample evidence across the world, where the IHRA has been adopted, of its significant and worrying misuse. From cancelling art exhibitions, to mourning vigils of those killed by Israeli forces, to student reps who have been forced to resign in witch hunts for which no legal case stood. Looking not too far at the situation in Germany, “cultural institutions are increasingly driven by fear and paranoia, prone to acts of self-censorship and to pre-emptively de-platforming and excluding critical positions.”

(13) But, there is no evidence at all that this definition leads to curtailment of legitimate speech?

Answer: Repeating a claim over and over does not make it true. But unlike those claiming that the IHRA definition is necessary to address anti-semitism on campus (and who offer no examples or evidence of cases where Equalities legislation or UCL anti-racism codes would, if applied, fail to cover the matter) the Working Group have provided clear examples of how the definition has in fact been used as a tool to attack free speech and produce free-speech-chilling campaigns on UK campuses. In the UK there have been instances of: the banning of ‘Israel Apartheid’ week at Lancaster University; requiring a Holocaust survivor to change the title of their meeting at Manchester University; seeking action against a professor at Bristol University for her prior research (6 years before her appointment at Bristol) that investigated “governmental” uses of representations of the Holocaust for political purposes (Report, p. 3).

The evidence of the potential harm done by this definition on campuses globally is growing. See examples of its use to hunt speech and attack legitimate views on British, US and European campuses that should give pause for thought. In Germany a petition by over 1000 members of the arts community has been launched in response to the harms of using this definition. And in a state that places a higher premium on free speech, the US, cases and complaints have been launched on the basis, for example, of the idea that saying Israel is an apartheid state is a “demonisation” of zionists and so of Jews, which is therefore anti-semitic. Note how the caveats adopted by UCL on having to show anti-semitic intent, would not help here because firstly, it is the perpetual hunting and persecution of speech that creates a chilling effect on free speech, and secondly, the argument that would need adjudication by UCL officers is whether “demonisting” Israel or its supporters as supporting a form of apartheid exhibits anti-semitic intent. As we shall see in the below question on the Mazzig event, the record of judging such matters by UCL senior officers is not great.

(14) What about the Mazzig campus incident of 2016? Don’t we need the definition to deal with incidents like that (as has been argued by one member of Senior Management)?

Answer: In this incident a demonstration took place against an invited speaker of the Friends of Israel Student Society at UCL who was an ex-member of the Israeli Defence Forces. The demonstration turned physical, and demonstrators trapped the attendees in the hall, one student said they were assaulted, and security staff had to evacuate the room and the speaker. The attendees felt intimidated by the chanting, physical presence, and banging on windows by the demonstrators and attendees reported hostility and intolerance to free speech. 

The key question here, however, is not whether such occurrences are unacceptable, as UCL and UCLU confirmed in a statement and report, but that curtailment of freedom of speech is unacceptable and breaches UCL’s policies. So, clearly, does physical intimidation and assault. The issue is whether a special definition of anti-semitism that highlights political criticism of Israel would make any difference in accountability for such incidents. It is clear that it would not. The only person, as reported in the Jewish Chronicle article reporting this event, to publicly allege anti-semitic actions was Conservative MP Eric Pickles, who was not present. Every action of preventing free speech or intimidating persons on campus at this event would be actionable in UCL’s policies.

UCL’s own report into the incident unearths evidence for a single candidate example of anti-semitism at the event (p. 11), though the report mentions anti-semitism at three other places (pp. 2, 12, and 20), without offering evidence or specific acts beyond this one. The single incident is that:

““While the majority of the chants represented legitimate and legal protest, the investigation notes the use of the chant ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ which was sung several times during the protest...By highlighting the geographic extent of the State of Israel from its eastern (river) to western (sea) boundaries as coextensive with a free Palestine, this chant appears to be calling for the destruction of the state of Israel. This goes beyond calls for a ‘free Palestine’ which can also refer to geographically adjacent states of Israel and Palestine, and if calling for destruction of the state of Israel could be considered anti-Semitic.” 

This is a very important “could” in the last line (in a section with no significant research on the topic by the investigator, a member of Senior Management). The meaning of this chant is contentious. On one interpretation, it identifies a secular state of Palestine (with its Jewish population) as the dream that was lost when the UN decided to partition the region in 1947, on another it means “transformed into a non-racist state”. It is anti-zionist in that sense, but only anti-semitic if one associates anti-semitism with anti-zionism (the idea that Jews must have a Jewish nation state). Consider an alternative chant: “A secular liberal Federation of Palestine, from the River to the Sea!”. Again, this clashes with a zionist perspective, but there is nothing inherently anti-semitic in it.

But let us say that there had been a racist, anti-semitic component to the chant. Say it had been accompanied by expressions of unwillingness to live with Jews or calls for their expulsion or violation of their human rights. Well, in that case evidence of anti-semitism would be objective, and actionable under existing policies and legislation.

Members of Senior Management and supporters of the IHRA definition have expressed regret that the definition was not in place at the time of this incident, because it would have given them a tool to use that they did not have. They have not been explicit as to how. This indicates the kind of use for which they want the IHRA definition (as does the commentary in the UCL report on the incident). 

But it is troubling that students could have faced allegations of anti-semitism (à la Pickles) for demonstrating against Israel, or faced them for chanting in favour of a secular state of Palestine with no evidence of anti-semitic (anti-Jewish or even anti-Israeli citizen) imputation unearthed by those who said it “could” be anti-semitic because it was anti-Zionist (the author of the UCL report). The same Senior Management, note, will be in charge of applying the IHRA definition.

Aside from showing the incapacity of a UCL senior manager to distinguish between two distinct logical propositions (opposition to a state and prejudice against a religion or ethnic group), this incident also demonstrates that caveats of evidence of “intent” are worthless unless they were strictly required, in which case they would require some admission by the participants of such an intent - and this incident could not be classed as anti-semitic by this definition.

(15) What is there to fear?

To show the kinds of threats this poses, consider that one of its key supporters at UCL - Anthony Julius. Phone calls with Julius were offered to Council members by SMT as a source of legal advice on the definition. However, Julius is the lawyer that represented one of the largest public campaigns to try to brand the University and College Union as anti-semitic (and prevent debate on motions calling for an academic boycott of Israel), using the law courts. 

That case (Fraser vs UCU) was fundamentally ill-conceived, and it lost totally, leading to a highly critical, even devastating, finding by the Court. A great deal of money, time, and energy was wasted by this case. But that attempt to brand the UCU and prevent debate relied on an attempt to extend the definition of discrimination, harassment and racism by treating the political project of Jewish state-building, “Zionism”, as a ‘protected characteristic’ (and, thereby, political criticism of it as actionable under definitions of harassment according to the Equality Act ). The court said:

““150. It seems to us that a belief in the Zionist project or an attachment to Israel or any similar sentiment cannot amount to a protected characteristic. It is not intrinsically a part of Jewishness and, even if it was, it could not be substituted for the pleaded characteristics, which are race and religion or belief. Accordingly, if and in so far as the Claimant seeks to base his claim on what might be termed a sub-characteristic (we are bound to say that we remain uncertain as to Mr Julius’s position on this point), we find that it is not open to him to do so. A separate matter, which we will address in relation to the individual claims, is whether the treatment complained of, or any of it, was ‘related to’ his Jewish race or his Jewish religion or belief.”

The Court rightly dismissed this as a disastrous attempt at conflation:

““177. The result is that the proceedings are dismissed in their totality. The Claimant has put before us one claim which, on initial examination, appeared arguable on its merits. Closer scrutiny, however, showed it to be clearly unsustainable...The other nine claims are wholly unfounded...

“178. Lessons should be learned from this sorry saga. We greatly regret that the case was ever brought. At heart, it represents an impermissible attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means. It would be very unfortunate if an exercise of this sort were ever repeated. 

“179. We are also troubled by the implications of the claim. Underlying it we sense a worrying disregard for pluralism, tolerance and freedom of expression, principles which the courts and tribunals are, and must be, vigilant to protect…”

The current attempt to impose the IHRA working definition on UCL staff and students has precisely the same objective: to outlaw critical discussion of a particular nation state, irrespective of the consequences for Academic Freedom and freedom of speech on campus. It must be seen in this context of using inappropriate means to advance and pursue a political perspective. Were UCL to concede this point, it would likely invite attempts to outlaw critical discourse of other nation states (such as China, which has called on Chinese social scientists to “stop vilifying” them) on the grounds that citizens of those states were being racially abused by the existence of such criticism. The logic is inexorable, and to do otherwise would be racist.

This goes to the heart of why the Fraser vs UCU case never had a prospect of success, and why there is a fundamental incompatibility between race and religion or belief (protected characteristics of under the Equality Act, protected in law), and support for a nation state (a political idea, which has no such protection). Those that argue that we can sacrifice a little less Academic Freedom for a totemic inclusion of the IHRA working definition in the name (but not the act) of addressing anti-semitism are failing to see that what is at stake is not accepting a modicum of censorship but ultimately sacrificing Academic Freedom and free speech itself.

(16) Would removing this definition mean that the free speech of Jewish staff and students at UCL would be restricted? 

Answer: There is nothing in the definition that empowers any speech at all. Students and staff have free speech protections according to UCL’s Statutes and codes of conduct (and the law). The IHRA working definition, would if implemented, be a restriction on speech, in particular speech relating to Israel and Middle East politics, not an expansion of what people can say. It only empowers those who wish to apply the restrictions.

The IHRA working definition, however, is an impediment to the free speech of Jewish staff and students, which explains in part the composition of the Working Group. The curriculum taught in the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies, like many curricula in history, politics and international relations, deals with difficult and contentious issues. The IHRA working definition singles them out. It places a burden on staff and students to justify their discussion of these issues in a manner that does not apply to staff and students discussing other nation states and nationalities. Its greatest effect is felt by colleagues and students in that department.

If the matter here is confidence of Jewish students or staff in making complaints about anti-semitic actions or speech that might hide behind criticism of Israel, then as the WG group report sets out, that can be captured by objective criteria under Equalities legislation and UCL policies on racist behaviour, as well as policies on harassment, together with education and communication of these policies (WG Report pp. 27 and 51 ff. A prominent programme educating students on these and their application in specific cases such as this one would be a way to build confidence for those facing this kind of prejudice.