UCL Faculty of Laws


Liberating the Market for Corporate Control

By Professor Marc Moore, Chair in Corporate/Financial Law at UCL Laws and Bernard S. Sharfman, Senior Corporate Governance Fellow, RealClearFoundation

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22 July 2020

Publication details 

Moore, Marc and Sharfman, Barnard S. (2020) ‘Liberating the Market for Corporate Control’. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3656765


Many years ago, Henry Manne proposed a theory of the market for corporate control that provided a compelling argument for the existence of a vibrant hostile takeover market. He argued that “the control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset” if the acquirer takes control with the expectation of correcting managerial inefficiencies. In this way, it is the hostile takeover market and its lead actor, the hostile bidder, that acts as a corrective mechanism in corporate governance.

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