The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platforms

COURSE CONVENOR:
Dr. David S. Evans, Co-Director, Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics, and Visiting Professor, University College London

Faculty:

David S. Evans
Martin Cave, Chair, Ofgem & London School of Economics
Henri Piffaut, Adviser, DG-Comp, European Commission

About this course:

All of the “sharing-economy” firms, such as Uber, Airbnb, and BlaBlaCar, many of the biggest companies in the world, including Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, and many of the firms that lead the online economy are matchmakers. These businesses all operate physical or virtual platforms where they connect members of one group of customers, like people looking for a ride, with another group of companies, like drivers. Economists call them “multisided platforms” and have developed a new body of economics that explains how they work and why they are different from traditional firms.

Increasingly this new economics has been applied by courts and authorities to analyze competition policy towards these platform businesses.  Key cases include the U.S. Supreme Court decision in State of Ohio et al vs. American Express, the European Court of Justice’s judgements in European Commission v. Cartes Bancaires and European Commission v. Mastercard, and the Chinese Supreme People’s Court decision in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent.  A number of competition authorities have also relied on the new learning in investigations and decisions.  The new economics is also central to a number of sectoral inquiries around the globe concerning digital platforms.
 
This course will focus on the antitrust analysis of multisided platforms in light of the new economics and the evolving judicial decisions.  
   
The course will consist of three segments each of which will rely heavily on decided cases.
 

1. The New Economics of Multi-sided Platforms.  This will provide students with the tools necessary for applying the new economics, and the court decisions, to cases
2. Market Definition and Market Power.  This will provide students with the tools necessary for determining whether a business is a platform and then the implications of this for assessing market definition and market power.
3. Abuse of Dominance, Coordinated Practices, and Mergers.  This will provide a survey of novel competition issues that can arise with platform businesses, including anticompetitive strategies and possible efficiency justifications.

Given the evolving nature of the jurisprudence, and the cross-fertilisation across jurisdictions, the cases and legal framework will be drawn across jurisdictions, but particularly the EU, the United States, and China.

Who should attend:

The course mainly designed for specialists in competition policy and sectoral regulation (lawyers, economists, and officials) but should also be informative for anyone who works for, invests in, must interact with multi-sided platform businesses.
 
There are no pre-requisites for attending this course. Students are encouraged to purchase David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Harvard Business Review Press, 2016). A suggested reading list will be distributed two weeks before the course.

Fees:

£250 Standard Ticket
£200 Group Ticket / Alumni Ticket
£80 Full time academics / Government Departments / NGOs
£40 non-UCL full time students

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