Have central banks and the regulatory state displaced constitutional democracy?

About the event

Over the past quarter century, more and more big public policy decisions have been delegated by legislative assemblies to agencies insulated from day-to-day politics. While the most obvious examples are the super-powerful central banks, many of our laws are now made by independent regulators and the judicial tribunals that oversee them. It matters whether this form of governance squares with our deep political values: democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Paul Tucker argues in Unelected Power that the problem is serious, and has contributed to a creeping sense of alienation from our system of government. While defending the idea that independent agencies can help political communities commit to the public good, he advocates that constitutional democracies should adopt clearer principles on the delegation of power to unelected technocrats.

Sir Paul Tucker is chair of the Systemic Risk Council, a senior fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government.

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