JOURNALS AND THE LIKE
by Ted Honderich
books Philosophy of Mind
THE 1st CHAPTER OF A BOOK
PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER 2002 -- After the Terror
THE OPENING OF A BOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL
AUTOBIOGRAPHY -- Philosopher: A Kind of Life
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
The above related papers are on a novel idea -- since something new and different is surely needed in the Philosophy of Mind. The second paper corrects the first in important respects. Each paper is preceded by an abstract, but for a journalistic glance at this later 'existentialism', English rather than French, click on
A slight piece of journalism, on Consciousness as Existence
The above paper gives some of the reason for giving up on such traditional accounts of consciousness as Searle's and turning to something radically different -- e.g. Consciousness as Existence. A little more is said of that view.
The categorical version of the above appears in The Journal of Consciousness Studies for July 2000. In my view, or anyway hope, it demonstrates the need for something new and different in the current Philosophy of Mind. That subject is in need of reviving by all of us not distracted by the several sciences of the mind.
This brings together two papers, the first and the last of a vigorous controversy in the journal Analysis. They aren't brand new, but maybe they're still true.
The above three papers also went against the current Philosophy of Mind, rightly. But now they are just prehistory with respect to the idea of perceptual consciousness as existence. They do not contain that novel but arguable proposition about subjectivity. Can some of the positive stuff in them be so reformed as to be made consistent with the novel idea? Turned into propositions on brains rather than consciousness?
These two papers seem to me grist for my
current mill -- the argument that the Philosophy of Mind needs to
be more philosophical and less scientific. The two papers question some
empirical research, lately also discussed by Daniel Dennett, that is
supposed to show that the mind gets ahead of the brain in time. The two
papers were originally published in the Journal of Theoretical
Biology under the titles
'The Time of a Conscious Sensory Experience and Mind-Brain Theories'
'Mind, Brain and Time: Rejoinder to Libet'.
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
The first one of the above six papers, the basis of a lecture or two in foreign parts, is background to the second. The second is a defence (against Richard Double's interesting line and book) of what on a good day still seems to be the resolution of the central philosophical problem of freedom and determinism -- whether freedom is compatible or incompatible with determinism. The third piece, from Robert Kane's The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, does not break a lot of new ground, except for a little sod at the end, but is confident. The fourth breaks another little sod. The fifth, on Searle, says a thing or two worth saying. The categorical version of the paper appears in the Journal of Consciousness Studies April 2001. The sixth is not greatly more than notes for a conference lecture, but does attend a little to the strong work of Professor Robert Kane, particularly his paper on this website.
These papers, as well as papers by others,
some in defence of Compatibilism or Incompatibilism, appear on the Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website.
The above is as much moral philosophy as
political philosophy .
Unlike some other things under my name, the
above piece seems to me true -- even though it follows that an awful
lot of other writing on consequentialism is wrong. Moral Philosophy is
easier than the Philosophy of Mind, isn't it?
Time seems to be a matter of the temporal relations, such one event's being before another, and the temporal properties, such as an event's being past. Are only the relations real? Are the properties reducible to the relations?