by Ted Honderich 

Excerpts from books   Philosophy of Mind     Determinism & Freedom         Political Philosophy 
Moral Philosophy              Metaphysics

The book is moral philosophy of a kind, about September 11, other terrorism, ourselves and our counter-attack, and what is to be done. For a kind of summary of the book, and a few further reflections, see After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts.

Six of the sixty or so sections. On the protagonist's places in a recent green summer, the philosophical furniture of his mind, daily round, more philosophical furniture, and inner life. Also a start on how get he got there and on the project of explaining a life. Also on hand: author's reviews of the first eight reviews. 


Consciousness as Existence

Consciousness as Existence Again

Consciousness as Existence and the End of Intentionality

Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness

The above related papers are on a novel idea -- since something new and different is surely needed in the Philosophy of Mind. The second paper corrects the first in important respects. Each paper is preceded by an abstract, but for a journalistic glance at this later 'existentialism', English rather than French, click on

Being Aware of This Place You're In

A slight piece of journalism, on Consciousness as Existence

Mind the Guff -- John Searle's Thinking on Consciousness and Free Will Examined

The above paper gives some of the reason for giving up on such traditional accounts of consciousness as Searle's and turning to something radically different -- e.g. Consciousness as Existence. A little more is said of that view.

Consciousness and Inner Tubes -- a critical discussion of David's Papineau's new book and of scientized philosophy of mind generally

The categorical version of the above appears in The Journal of Consciousness Studies for July 2000. In my view, or anyway hope, it demonstrates the need for something new and different  in the current Philosophy of Mind. That subject is in need of reviving by all of us not distracted by the several sciences of the mind.  

Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism and the Champion of Mauve.

This brings together two papers, the first and the last of a vigorous controversy in the journal Analysis. They aren't brand new, but maybe they're still true. 

Seeing Things

Functionalism, Identity Theories, the Union Theory

Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity

The above three papers also went against the current Philosophy of Mind, rightly. But now they are just prehistory  with respect to the idea of perceptual consciousness as existence. They do not contain that novel but arguable proposition about subjectivity. Can some of the positive stuff in them be so reformed as to be made consistent with the novel idea? Turned into propositions on brains rather than consciousness?  

Is the Mind Ahead of the Brain? -- Benjamin Libet's Evidence Examined

Is the Mind Ahead of the Brain? -- Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet

These two papers seem to me grist for my current mill -- the argument that the Philosophy of Mind needs to be more philosophical and less scientific. The two papers question some empirical research, lately also discussed by Daniel Dennett, that is supposed to show that the mind gets ahead of the brain in time. The two papers were originally published in the Journal of Theoretical Biology under the titles 'The Time of a Conscious Sensory Experience and Mind-Brain Theories' and 'Mind, Brain and Time: Rejoinder to Libet'.


Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility -- The Whole Thing in Brief

Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck

Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem

After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

Mind the Guff: John Searle's Thinking on Consciousness and Freedom Examined

Determinism's Consequences -- The Mistakes of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism, and What Is To Be Done Now

The first one of the above six papers, the basis of a lecture or two in foreign parts, is background to the second. The second is a defence (against Richard Double's interesting line and book) of what on a good day still seems to be the resolution of the central philosophical problem of freedom and determinism -- whether freedom is compatible or incompatible  with determinism. The third piece, from Robert Kane's The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, does not break a lot of new ground, except for a little sod at the end, but is confident. The fourth breaks another little sod. The fifth, on Searle, says a thing or two worth saying. The categorical version of the paper appears in the Journal of Consciousness Studies April 2001. The sixth is not greatly more than notes for a conference lecture, but does attend a little to the strong work of Professor Robert Kane, particularly his paper on this website.

These papers, as well as papers by others, some in defence of Compatibilism or Incompatibilism, appear on the Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website.


After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts

What Equality Is Not, Fortunately

What Equality Is

Hierarchic Democracy and the Necessity of Mass Civil Disobedience


After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts

The above is as much moral philosophy as political philosophy .

Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern, and Selfishness

Unlike some other things under my name, the above piece seems to me true -- even though it follows that an awful lot of other writing on consequentialism is wrong. Moral Philosophy is easier  than the Philosophy of Mind, isn't it?


Time -- What Is Real About It?

Time seems to be a matter of the temporal relations, such one event's being before another, and the temporal properties, such as an event's being past. Are only the relations real? Are the properties reducible to the relations?


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