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THE
PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY by Ted Honderich The
fundamental question to which liberalism, conservatism and other such
things
give answers or should give answers, and arguments for the answers, is
sometimes called the question of justice. It is the question not of
what laws
there are, but of what laws there ought to be, how societies ought to
be.
Better, it is the question of who ought to have what. An answer needs
first to
decide on a prior question. Of what ought who to
have what shares or
amounts? My answers are given in this paper. The first, to the prior
question, has to do with our great
desires, and the wretchedness or other distress of having them
unfulfilled.
Other answers have to do with bad answers to the main question, and
then the
right one. Morality has a majesty. Despite ourselves, and yet to
ourselves, it
stands over the rest of our existence, in particular over our
self-interest in
its various forms. To my mind it is the Principle of Humanity above all
that
has that majesty. For a more recent exposition go to The Principle of Humanity Stated and Defended. There is a little more about it in another older
piece What Equality Comes to -- The
Principle of Humanity and in effect
in what comes before it, What
Equality is Not. There is rather more, of a different kind, in
a later book Humanity, Terrorism and
Terrorist War: Palestine, 9/11,
Iraq, 7/7... .published in the U.S. under the title Right and Wrong, and Palestine,
9/11, Iraq, 7/7.... -------------------------------------- Every
political philosophy, ideology, hope of a people, political movement
and party
creed should begin from a response to the
question of what well-being there ought
to be, and, whether as means or end, what distress.
Evidently an amount of distress can
sometimes be a
means,
a price that ought to be paid in order to avoid
more of it. Some say, differently, in connection with punishment in particular, that others
deserve distress: it is to be imposed not as a means to what will then
happen, but merely for what has already
happened. Also, it may indeed be that to pursue the largest possible amount of well-
Whatever
propositions or complications there are along these lines, it must be that every political philosophy and
the
like should proceed from an explicit response to
the question of the distribution of well-being and distress: who is to
have
what amounts? Answering takes less
time than answering another still larger question, that of actions,
campaigns,
policies, tactics and institutions -- of how to
secure and to hang on to the proper distribution. Still, there is the requirement
of rationality that the
end be given before means are
considered, and therefore the question of distribution comes first. This essay considers it, and what seems to be the
proper and true response to it.
For
a start, we need to give greater content to the fundamental ideas of
well-being
and distress. They are to be understood as two kinds of human experience, those in which
desires are satisfied and those in which desires are frustrated. They
can
in fact be identified
with
the relatively clear ideas of satisfaction and frustration, clear because of their connection with action.
There
is that test of whether someone is satisfied or not. In a different and
secondary usage of a
familiar kind,
we may speak
of degrees of well-being or satisfaction some of which are in fact distress or
frustration, but that will not be
our usual procedure. Desires are to be conceived in so large a way as to
include needs, passions, wants,
commitments, loyalties and felt obligations, life-plans, and more. They then include what in a more
restricted sense of the word
are not or might not be desires: certain feelings for others, keeping faith, a determination to preserve
one's
integrity, being willing to pay a high price
to achieve excellence, and so on. Let us proceed in a way which has not enough
familiarity, by quickly specifying general categories of desire, in this case
six.
They have to do with
subsistence,
further material
goods, freedom, respect, personal relations,
and culture.1
It
is not in dispute, despite the existence of those who give up their lives for various ends, that the
primary
desire is for subsistence, one's
own and that of some other persons, often one's partner and children. This is the desire for that minimum
of
food, shelter, strength, and perhaps
satisfactory activity which will sustain a lifetime. A lifetime is to
be
understood more in terms of an average life- expectancy of 77 years rather than,
say, 40. The desire is
primary in
that there is a wide if limited generalization
to the effect that people, if they must
choose, choose to realize this desire rather than any other. With respect to the desires
to follow, no serious
ranking or ordering is intended.
The
second category, for further material goods, can briefly be described as one realized in much of the rich
world and frustrated in much of the poor world. It includes desires for
income
and wealth, unimportant as ends
and important as certain means. They are means to the other further material goods: relief from pain,
help
with disability, a home and a tolerable wider environment, food and drink above the level of
subsistence,
adequate medical care, material support of
several kinds in adversity and misfortune, means of travel and communication, and a good
deal more. The category includes items in a
small way
denigrated only by those who
possess them, consumer goods.
Thirdly,
we desire freedom and power in several settings. Most important are political and other rights in a
self-determining homeland.
It would be contentious, in the present discussion, quickly to identify these rights with those realized to
some extent in western
or
liberal democratic states. The question
is difficult, but what
I
have in mind are political and other rights denied by hegemonies,
occupying forces, tyrannies, imperialisms, totalitarianisms, and the like.
We also desire degrees of freedom and power in
lesser
contexts.
Work is perhaps foremost here. There is also
the pursuit of one's individual form of
private life.
Respect
and self-respect, which perhaps are less separable than has sometimes been supposed2,
constitute the fourth category.
We desire standing as
individuals, and some standing as groups. The means to this standing are in part the
possibilities of achievement, at bottom work. The means are in another part
the attitudes of others. It is not enough to
have work, and some limited recognition of personal achievements and virtues, if one
is the victim of racism,
severe class-condescension, denignation for disability, or any other denial of common humanity.
Fifthly,
there is the desire for personal and wider human relationships. What
comes
first here are needs, commitments, and many feelings having to do with the family. There
are counterparts in other personal connections. More
widely, there
are desires having to do with community and
fraternity. We want to live lives which give a large place to connection with a few
others, a connection of intimacy, protection, support, identity of
hope,
and many like things. This connection with
a few others needs the supplement of association with larger groups, notably one's
society. We
desire, finally, the goods of culture. We pursue knowledge, awareness and judgement, and the means to
these,
of which the principal one is education.
No one chooses a general ignorance or incompetence. We want, as well, the
experience of art or the lesser but real satisfaction of entertainment.
Religion
enters here as well,
and also other
greater or
smaller traditions of races, peoples, nations, regions, and places.
These
six categories are indeed under-described: what has been said of them catches very little of the
richness
and wretchedness of human experience. They are given, however,
not in the illusion that they do more than fix attention on the real
subject of our inquiry. That
subject is not caught hold of by way of silent assumption, by any such generic notion as satisfaction or
happiness or indeed well-being or distress, taken by itself, or by any
abstract
account of experience in terms,
say, of preference under conditions of risk. Certainly the categories make evident the interdependence
of
our desires. The first, for subsistence, is
necessary to the rest. Kinds of freedom are essential to respect and self-respect, and to
certain of the goods
of culture.
Respect and self-respect themselves
play a role in the achievement of the goods of
culture. Categories so related do not thereby fail to be categories.
Our
question is this: what is to be the distribution of this well-being and distress, or who is to have what amounts?
The question presupposes that we can characterize possible lifetimes in
terms
of well-being and distress as these have now been conceived. Taken
naturally,
the question presupposes that we can so characterize possible lifetimes in what I shall call a cardinal
rather
than an ordinal way, which is sometimes
doubted. The question presupposes an impossibility if all we can sensibly say
about a pair of possible lifetimes is that one would be of greater
or lesser satisfaction and frustration
than another. There may be a temptation to transfer scepticisms or resistances from other
inquiries to our own, and so to suppose this is all we can say. It seems
evident on reflection, that it is
not.
Consider
three possible lifetimes: one cut greatly short since the person fails to come up to the level of
subsistence: one where the person
comes up to that level and also satisfies the desires of two other categories, perhaps those for further
material goods and personal relations; and one involving satisfaction
of all
six categories of desire; subsistence, further
material goods, freedom, respect, personal relations, culture. Are we
restricted to saying, with good sense, only that the first possible lifetime
involves less well-being
than the second and third, and the
second less than the third? It is essential to see how much less we would have to say
than we can rightly say, how trivial rather than
rightly substantial
our judgement of the three lifetimes would be,
if this were so.
If
we were so restricted, we could reasonably suppose, as rightly we do not, that there was nothing much to
choose
between the three, and no significant
necessity of action, since the differences between the three were insignificant. The
three lifetimes might be related in the way of three payments, of
$5000.00, $5000.01, and £5000.02,
considered only in terms of purchasing power. Again, if we could with good sense make only the
ordinal judgement, we
should have no
reason whatever for thinking it a
bad policy to concentrate entirely on aid
to the second person. This would in fact be reasonable on the supposition that only a
lifetime of the third kind was in fact tolerable, and there was no
possibility of making the first
life better than the second. Other absurd consequences, all conflicting with what evidently is our
situation
of judgement, also follow from the supposition
that we can characterize lifetimes only ordinally in terms of well-being and distress.
At
this juncture it is possible to make a certain mistake, that of identifying judgements of amount, which are
essentially cardinal,
with
judgements only of number. We are all of us in possession of an effective system of non-numerical
classification of amounts of distress
and well-being. In judging a life to be one of wretchedness, we plainly are not only judging it to be of less
well-being than a tolerable life or one of
abundance. We are judging amount of frustration, and the ordinal
proposition is
an entailment of small interest. A life in which only the first
category of
desires is satisfied is one
of great frustration, as distinct merely from being a life of greater frustration than others. In fact we have a
developed conceptual
system for
such judgement of
possible lifetimes, as of much else that engages our attention. To mention only a
few other general conceptions, a possible lifetime
may be one of
wretchedness, subsistence, pain, being crippled, deprivation, poverty,
fear,
sorrow, tolerableness, security, satisfaction, fullness, indulgence, or
satiety. That
there is a vagueness about these
essentially cardinal descriptions, and that we may have recourse to a criterion of action to
fix amounts of well-being
and distress, does not at all establish that all that can sensibly be said about the wretched life of a parent
whose children are starving, or the life of a
brother or sister dying of AIDs, is that it is a life of lesser
well-being than
the lives of people we know better. The
question of well-being, then, does not presuppose what cannot be done. It
presupposes, moreover, what is done all the time, in particular by
governments in the allocation of
resources. The decisions in question are not ordinal and are not dependent on certain small if increasing aids
of
quantification. That
there is a
large need for
old-age pensions as against a small one for certain roads is not merely the judgement
that the first is greater, or has a higher place in an ordinal sequence.
It
is less important, but true, that we can to an extent reasonably assign numerical values to possible
lifetimes.
As remarked, no serious ranking was intended in the listing of the five
categories of desire other than
subsistence. They can reasonably enough be taken as of equal value. There is no error, and some use, in
assigning +1 and -1 to
the
full satisfaction and full frustration of each of these categories of desire. Greater values, +2 and -2 at
least,
can reasonably be assigned to the first
category. This assignment is not made useless by the existence of some individuals who
place different values on, say, art and personal relations, and forego
the
latter for the former.
It is
a recommendation of fixing attention on the categories of well-being and distress, rather than
proceeding
in terms of silent assumption, or only generic
notions, or preference-systems, that it becomes plain that another problem is not
serious. I have in mind interpersonal comparison. It would indeed be
absurd to assume of a rich man and a poor, each
preferring to have another £100, that their satisfaction in having it would be
identical. Here and in some other contexts, it is mistaken to assume that
satisfaction is, so to
speak,
uniform. However,
who will maintain that we cannot usefully inquire into the distribution of well-being
since, say, the
miserablenesses of two physically-like persons, both having only and
exactly the same means to the
satisfaction of the
subsistence-desire, may be so
different as to make the enterprise pointless? Who will maintain that
there may
be nothing to choose or not enough, in terms of 'intensity of experience', between the
life of a weak child who is
satisfying only the subsistence desire
and the life of a lad satisfied or more or less sure to be
satisfied in all of
the six categories?
Still,
the assumption of interpersonal comparability, in connection with well-being and distress, is precisely
that:
an assumption taken to be defensible and made for
a further purpose, in this case inquiry. What is to follow here does not depend on the
assumption's being taken as an exceptionless
general truth.3
Such assumptions are
ordinary and
essential, and
we can be justified in acting on them. For example, some minority of people will
have their lives worsened, for whatever reason, by being entitled to an
old-age pension. This
does
not put in question the propriety of acting on a certain assumption
about need
which is close enough to true. Nor, given our resources, would it be right to invest
heavily in a procedure for finding the exceptions in order to deny them
pensions. To
come to the end of these defences, it is true that the characterization
of the
six categories of desire is a matter of decision as well as perception of fact. This is as it must be.
The characterization
might properly
be said to be
arbitrary if it denied that any other categorial description of desires was
possible. It does not. What is important is that it be clear and arguable,
which I take it to be,
and
that it be useful, which I trust it will be seen to be. There is in fact no great disagreement, at a certain
level of generality, about the
goods of human life.
We
might linger over many things, and hence fail to come to our question. Not to linger, but rather to come
to
it, what are we to aim at in terms of lives of
well-being and distress? The
most developed answers of a traditional kind are principles of utility, all of which can be stated in
terms
of the given conception of
well-being. On the fundamental one, we must secure the distribution
which
produces the best balance of well-being over distress. The Utilitarians did not suppose this could
have a certain consequence,
where the policy producing the best total was such that the well-being went mostly to one minority,
class,
race, or group, and the distress mostly to
another. They did not proceed, either, by thinking of a total population as an entity,
a singular possessor of experience, and of its balance of well-being
as
being decisive. It has
long
been argued, none the less, as already noted, that Utilitarianism may
favour majorities at the expense of
minorities, or some
minorities at the expense of others.
Utilitarianism
has been defended against this by being said to be implicitly egalitarian. I shall not pursue
the argument, which has mainly to do with the utility of justice and
considerations of decreasing marginal utility. If there were no more
than some
considerable doubt about the consequences
of utilitarian principles, it would be a good idea to take up something else, about which there is not a doubt. It is
not as if we knew in
advance that
there is some
special virtue in utilitarian principles, not having to do with equality, which cannot
be preserved in a more explicit principle.
There
is a further consideration. Even if the fundamental principle of
utility, say,
by way of various true minor premises, did preserve what we want of equality, it would
still be unsatisfactory. This has to do with the fact that general
answers to the question of
well-being cannot be regarded as fully articulated major premises to be connected by tight reasoning with
conclusions about particular political,
social, and economic policies. In this world as it is, what may be called the merely logical properties
of
these general answers
are
not of the first importance. This
is so because there is enough complexity
in our situation that the best that can be done is to make judgements directed or guided,
as distinct from
strictly entailed, by an answer to the question
of well-being. An answer can only be a kind of directive. If all possible
precision is important, so is force and emphasis. Principles of utility, as
expressed, do not give a good place,
let alone prominence, to their supposed egalitarian content. A good flag is not of uncertain colour.
Perhaps
understandably, there are no developed answers to the question of well-being in terms of desert or
retribution. The question,
of course, is wider than that of punishment, or punishment and reward. However, I shall in what follows
have something to say of retribution as a maxim
of justice. There are doctrines, primarily about what were called
actions,
tactics, institutions and so on, which bear on the question of well-being, and do have about
them some tang of an idea of desert. One, so
expressed as to make
its bearing clear, is that there ought to be
that distribution of well-being which results from a certain principle of liberty, as it is
called, about the
first-ownership and the transfer of certain fundamental means to
well-being,
notably material goods and labour.4 First-ownership should involve a man's mixing his labour with
something
and in a way not worsening the situation of
others, and any transfer should at least in a very weak sense be voluntary. The
doctrine is badly summed up in
the maxim 'From each as he chooses, to each as he is chosen.' The tendency of this doctrine, in terms of
distribution of well-being, is
not entirely clear. Just the actual distribution which now exists is not favoured, since it is in part the
result
of social and hence governmental interference in
what is defined as liberty. The defence made for the favoured distribution is in
terms of certain desires in but one of the categories of well-being, the
one
having to do with freedoms. I shall not discuss
the doctrine, but something more of relevance to it will be said.
Are
there any developed egalitarian answers to our question? There is nothing to which so much attention
has
been given as to principles of utility. What
will come to mind, although its description as egalitarian can be
disputed, and
will be here, is that there should
be an equal distribution of well-being and distress, perhaps that each individual should have the same
balance of well-being
over
distress. No doubt this has been proposed by some egalitarians, but, if it is not confused with anything
else,
as it can be, it is unacceptable.5 The
short but sound argument against this -- against what can be called the Principle of Any Equality
--
is that an inequality of satisfaction is preferable to an equality of
frustration, an inequality at high levels of satisfaction preferable to an
equality at a lower level. Nor can we take up the Principle of Greatest
Equal Well-Being, which is
open to the same kind of objection. It is that we should pursue that particular equal distribution in which
people have more well-being than in any other equal distribution.
Some
will be inclined to say a word in defence of the mentioned equalities as against the inequalities, or at
any rate the second equality. They may say that
inequality is inimical to self-respect, and hence that an inequality at high levels
of satisfaction is not
preferable to
an equality at a lower level. The
reply must be that while there may be a loss of
self-respect on the part of those who are least well-off, given the inequality,
they remain better off than under the alternative equality. Our subject
matter is well-being, in all
of its categories, and not anything else. It is not to the point that an inequality of material goods, at high
levels, may not be preferable to an equality of
material goods at a lower level, precisely for such reasons as self-respect.
There
is also an answer said to be of an egalitarian kind given to our question by Rawls.6 It is that
well-being and distress in a society are to be distributed primarily according to
one consideration, then according to a second, and then according to
a
third. When there is a conflict, as there will
be, the first wins over the second and third, the second over the third. The first
is the Principle of
Liberty: each person to have that
maximum of rights to liberty consistent with everyone having the same. The second is
the second part of what is called the Difference Principle,
that there is to be an equal opportunity
to get into any superior positions of socio-economic superiority or difference, as defined by such
goods as income and wealth, power and standing. The
third
consideration is the first part of the Difference Principle, that
socio-economic goods are to be
distributed in the particular way that leaves the worst-off in such goods better off than they would be given any
other way of the distribution.
This
view is much elaborated and yet for several reasons may be thought to remain indeterminate. There is remarkably little discussion of the given
liberties, but, 'roughly speaking',
they are 'political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with
freedom of speech and
assembly,
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold
(personal) property; and freedom
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law'.7 Presumably
also
included are other rights before
the law. It is not easy to judge the effect of this first-priority principle on the distribution of well-being
and
distress. This has much to do with the fact that
what are in question are indeed rights rather than powers. There has been a long
history of argument to
the effect
that mere rights, unsupported by
economic and other resources, are of a limited
and uncertain value. Nor
is it, of course, that the second part of the
Difference Principle guarantees anything like an economic quality. Conjoined with
certain propositions about the need for the incentives of socio-economic
inequality, it may issue in striking inequality.
Consider then the following description: 'distribution of well-being and distress
considerably determined by an equal distribution of rights supported by one
or another distribution of
socio-economic resources'. The description may be thought to pick out nothing definite. It is worth adding
that the absence of a
specification
of 'the right to hold (personal) property' makes by itself for an indeterminateness of
considerable consequence. Rawls's
theory of justice, nonetheless, is a kind of culmination of liberal
thinking,
and, as lately remarked, a good deal more will be said
of it, particularly his argument for his principles -- and an ensuing
obligation we have to obey the law.8 But let us now consider something else.
The
proper response to the question of well-being is at bottom a simple one which has been undeveloped despite
being presupposed by many doctrines about
tactics and institutions, and which in fact fails to get expression in Rawls's theory of
justice. For the reason given in connection with liberties, and
others,
it is not clear that it is
consistent with that theory, even if the theory can be taken out of its given context, which is single
society. The
principle is that we
should have
actually
effective policies whose end is to make well-off those who are badly-off -- get them out of distress and
into
well-being. The principle, which will be more fully stated in due course and which for a reason to which I
shall
come will be given the new name of being the
Principle of Humanity rather than the Principle of Equality, has to do
directly
with well-being rather than socio-economic goods. Like other responses
to the
question of well being, including the
utilitarian, it would have little force if construed in a merely ordinal way. It is not to be
confused with the 'negative utilitarian principle' that we should as far
as
possible reduce the numbers of badly-off, which
was so taken as absurdly to justify ending their lives.
The
population to which the principle applies is that of persons generally, as distinct from persons within a
given society or nation. Several
future generations must be included, those about which we can make more or less rational predictions.
The
limitation to such foreseeable generations is
essential if the principle is to be at all practical. Needless to say, taking account of
the future raises
difficulty. It would be wrong to give great weight to any vision of
future Utopia, or, for that matter,
future ruin. What
is obviously necessary
is
that we follow certain rules, of which a principal one is that a lesser probability of greater distress is to
count for only as much as a
greater probability of lesser distress. Another is that in general we must assign lesser probabilities to events
in
the distant as against
the
nearer future. The upshot is that future generations will count for less.
There
is the necessity of reflecting on the restriction of the principle to
one
species. We should be taken aback by the thought that within a century or two much of our present
use of animals may quite generally be regarded with
moral disgust.
Whether or not this comes about, it seems evident
that the lives of animals call for greater regard than we give them. Still, as
you will guess, I do not
propose that we take the Principle of
Humanity to cover more than the human species. One better reason is that other animals have
very greatly different
capabilities
of well-being and distress. What is
clearly true, however,
is
that animals and their distress and well-being must put some
constraint
on the operation of the Principle of Humanity. I shall not attempt to discuss it here.
Taking
people generally, of several generations, who are to be taken as the badly-off? Certainly
to be included are (a) those persons who fail to satisfy even their subsistence
desires, and therefore not only desires for further material goods but
also
to some extent desires
in
all categories. The latter is necessarily true if, as seems necessary, we take the desires for respect, personal
relations, freedom, and culture
to be desires for a lifetime's satisfactions of them. The people in question will include individuals of
various
life-spans, certainly.
What
they have in common, in terms of length of life, is that they die at one or another premature age. Also
to be included are (b) those who subsist but lack further material goods, and hence are certain to be
frustrated in other ways as well, notably with
respect to freedom. It also seems to me necessary that we include others in the
badly-off. This comes about partly as a consequence of having to pay
attention, in a way, to the subject
of tactics and institutions. It is not to be supposed, given certain political, psychological, and other
realities, that there will or
can be a total or even an effective concentration on groups (a) and (b). It seems in accord with the impulse
of
the Principle of Humanity, taking it to
be a principle which has to do with the possible, in a realistic sense, to bring in other groups. It
would be unrealistic and mistaken, given the principle, to object to
the
endeavours of individuals who
choose to concentrate on (c) people badly-off in that they lack the great satisfactions of freedom, say
freedom
in a homeland. So with concentration on (d) those who lack respect. The
same may
apply to endeavours in connection
with (e) people who subsist but have a minimal degree of satisfaction in all the
other categories. So I
take it in what follows that the
badly-off or those in degrees of distress, in terms of the population of all persons, are to be understood to be
members
of the groups (a) to (e). The better-off, those
enjoying degrees of well-being, are the remainder of all persons.
It
is not inconsistent with the Principle of Humanity, however, to concern
oneself
with a single nation, indeed one of the nations of the rich world. Again there are relevant political, psychological, and other
realities. There are
members of group (a) here. Their existence cannot be overlooked. There
are also
members of (b), including many
of the unemployed, and of (c), (d) and (e).
Other
groups in the rich societies will come to mind. Here a large majority of people are considerably
satisfied in all the six categories, more than minimally satisfied. We
make distinctions within this large group. By
way of one very general one, there are the poorly-paid and the better-paid. The
poorly-paid are not
well-satisfied in terms of further material goods, and hence in certain ways and degrees not well-satisfied in
freedom
and respect. Ought they not to have been included,
from the point of view of the Principle
of Humanity, as a group who are badly-off? The question is not one to be answered just by discovery,
so to speak. We are specifying a principle, and the
answer given
specifies it further. The principle
is to be so understood that this group does not count as badly-off. This is not to say that it cannot
defensibly make demands of
the better-paid, under certain assumptions and by way of different and lesser considerations.
Before
considering a bit further the poorly-paid and the better-paid, in
connection
with the specific policies mentioned in the initial statement of the Principle of Humanity, we
need to give further
attention to
the badly-off as defined by the six
categories. The principle is about them and
not necessarily about the worst-off in those categories. To proceed quickly, if too
abstractly, consider a
situation
where, say, 999 similar-sized groups
of people are very badly-off indeed, and one
similarly-sized group is trivially worse-off. Consider a choice between
a
programme which trivially improves the lot of the single group, and a
programme
which does not help the single group but
very greatly improves the lot of the 999. It is hard to resist the unhappy inclination
to prefer the second
policy.
It
may be that conflicts between the claims of the badly-off and the worst-off do not often occur. In any
case, I
shall not now say much of how to reach a
precise formulation of what seems forced upon us: in part that a large gain for many,
say an escape from mere subsistence, may outweigh
the abandoning of
a few in yet greater distress. We do not actually have a guide until we
supply definitions for 'a large gain',
'many', and so
on. Are we in this neighbourhood forced to
proceed in a piecemeal way, sometimes called intuitionist, deciding situations as
they come up, sometimes being more moved by the situation of many
rather
than fewer, sometimes not? This sort of
procedure is common, and primitive judgements of the kind must occur somewhere
in any evaluate system, but it is not
satisfactory here. We
can instead construct a certain
rule, or at any rate a set of rules for manageably limited problems: a fundamental one would be that of
income. Such a rule can serve purposes of an
ordinary decision-specifying principle expressed in general terms. It can reflect
our convictions, ensure consistency, and allow for its own revision
in
the event of conflicting and
recalcitrant consequences. In short, it will guide action. To construct it we produce a range of
paradigmatic
possible choice-situations, and give the choice to be made in each, in
some in
favour of the worst-off and in
others in favour of the badly-off. In any actual choice-situation we decide which paradigm is
most applicable, and
choose
accordingly. Such a rule, which has many
analogues, can give us what is as
satisfactory as a guide of the ordinary kind, expressed in general terms.
It
may be rightly anticipated that the proposed response to the question of well-being is not a complete
answer to it. It has nothing to say of groups of the better-off taken by themselves, say
the poorly-paid and the better-paid in rich societies, and their
cardinal or
ordinal positions. If it were to come about that there were no more of the
badly-off, as defined, the principle would have no further use, or
rather
it would instruct us
only to see
that no badly-off
came into existence. That
the principle has nothing to say of any
distributions of well-being, if there are any, that do not affect the badly-off, is a matter
of moral concentration. It is a matter of concentration on one human
reality, a reality not
about
to disappear. There is no serious embarrassment in the breadth of the
principle, in its being an incomplete answer to the question of well-being. An incomplete answer
is not an irrelevant
answer. It may
be, as in this case, that answer
which is taken to be most significant. The
conviction here, put quickly, is that what has priority over any other principle for the
distribution of things
among the
better-off is a principle about famine
and miserableness and the other kinds of distress.
The
initial statement of the Principle of Humanity was that we are to have actually effective policies whose end
is
to make better-off those who are
badly-off. What are those policies? There
is the policy to be considered, first, of helping the badly-off without
at all
affecting the well-being of the better-off. If the pie of well-being can be enlarged by a method
which does not at all lessen the shares of the
better-off, that is
to be done. We must act, if we can, on the
familiar instruction to raise up those below rather than drag down those above, to
level-up rather than level-down. But could we act effectively by only
this
policy? Could we, for example, simply
increase the various material and other goods, the means to well-being? Alternatively, could we
transfer
sufficient material goods from the better-off without reducing their well-being?
The
first idea supposes that we are in something like a circumstance of realizable abundance or
plenitude. The supposition is sufficiently uncertain as to make a
reliance on it impossible. The
second idea is a reasonable one. The better-off waste a great
deal.
Indeed we waste mountains of means to well-being. Still, it is unclear
that we
can rely on this alone. We need more than the first policy.
The
second possibility to be considered, then, is precisely a policy of transfer of the means of well-being from
the
better-off to the badly-off, in the knowledge that
this will reduce the well-being of the better-off. It is maintained by many, of
course, that there is a serious question of to what extent we can do
this. It is maintained, as it
has been for long, that policies which greatly or considerably reduce the means of the better-off will in
fact
fail to be effective
transfer-policies.
It is also
maintained, differently and extremely, that to subtract anything from the
means of the better-off will
be ineffective. Both claims rest
on what is taken to be a fundamental fact of human existence, which is an
incentive system's connection with the total pies of means and of
well-being,
and hence the well-being of the badly-off. The need of the poor is that
the
rich be rich. The
extreme view, that to subtract any significant amount of the means of the better-off in the world today
would
necessarily worsen the situation of the
badly-off, is of course false. There is only the question of what extent of taking means from
the better-off will in
fact be
successful transfer-policies. What
extent of taking from the rich
will help the poor? Of the inequalities in means, what fraction of them are in fact not necessary
inequalities: those of which is is true that they are needed, given attitudes as
they are or can become, in
order to serve an end of the
badly-off?
Something
related to this is certainly important enough to stand on its own as a
policy,
the third one. Necessary and unnecessary inequalities in means are in a way relative.
That is, a favourable
inequality's
being necessary is a matter of the
attitudes of the person favoured
by it. An inequality's being necessary is a matter of its being a necessary incentive, and the latter
is a
matter of the person's
attitudes.
He might change, and become less demanding about payment for using his abilities. There is the
possibility of practices, not necessarily coercive ones, directed to
changing attitudes, so that what
are now necessary inequalities cease to be such and can become the subject of effective transfers.
A
fourth policy is implicit in what has been said of our fundamental
desires, the
first and third above all, those for a decent length of life and for
freedoms
of various kinds. It is also implicit in the policies we already have
--
policies, in a word, for reducing misery and the like. What the fourth
policy
comes to, then, is that we of course must strive not to act in a
positive way
to give rise to misery and like -- we must strive not attack lives
ourselves.
So the policy is a prohibition on wounding, killing, torture, sexual
violation,
threat, intimidation and other violence and near-violence against
individuals.
Since
this policy cannot possible be an absolute one, cannot possibly rule
out all
uses of force by societies against individuals, or rule out an
individual's
right to try to save his own life by force, the definition of the
policy cannot
conceivably be easy. It will be clear that it cannot be a prohibition
on all
terrorism and state-terrorism. It is a policy about which to think more
fully
not at this moment but only at the end of a larger inquiry.
A
fifth possible policy of the Principle of Humanity, important to some,
has to
do with envy. It is claimed that some of the
distress of the badly-off is owing to their envy of the better-off, and that this can and
should change. We can
take it that
envy is a feeling owed to relative
positions of the envious and
the better-off, not to the absolute position of either. That is, the envious would persist in that particular
part of their unhappiness owed to envy if both they and the better-off
went the
same distance up (or down) a scale
of well-being. Perhaps, since envy also has to do with the means to well-being,
the envious would feel
in a way
better if certain goods or means to the
well-being of the better-off were destroyed, as
distinct from transferred to the envious. We can, it is supposed, increase the
well-being of the badly-off by putting an end to their envy. This fourth
policy
is related to the first. Both would help the
badly-off without affecting at all the well-being of the better-off.
There
is a sixth and related possibility, which has to do with condescending pride, to give it a mild name,
on
the part of the better-off. There is
satisfaction owed to relative position, to the fact that others have less of well-being or the
means to it. This, like envy, is not a matter of absolute level.
Condescending pride perhaps may
be said to make some contribution to the situation of the badly-off,
partly but
not wholly by way of giving rise to envy or reinforcing it. An alteration of this pride, then, would
somewhat improve the
lot of the
badly-off.
Of
these six possibilities of improving the lot of the badly-off, the fifth and sixth are not of great
significance. It is to be kept in mind
that they have to do with one element in one category of well-being,
that of
respect. The first, at least in part, and the second, third and fourth,
are in
my view policies that can reasonably be included in the Principle of
Humanity. To
say more of the second, about means-transfers that do reduce the
well-being of
the better-off, should we take it that the Principle of Humanity says
nothing,
in connection with transferring means and well-being from the better-off, of particular
groups of the better-off? Thinking so would not be in accord with the
spirit of egalitarianism. It
must be that means are to be transferred first from those of the better-off who are better placed than others
of
the better-off. In terms of the rich societies
and the general distinction, effective transfer begins with the better-paid rather
than the poorly-paid.
What limit is
there to the transfer of the means
of well-being from the better-off? There is room
for choice, but evidently distress must not be increased by the transfer of means.
Transfer is not punishment.
It
is essential to remain clear about the goal of the Principle of
Humanity.
Despite certain possibilities of self-deception and propaganda, the
goal is not
to lower the absolute well-being of the better-off. The goal is not to level down.
That may happen, although the connection between well-being and what we
have called the means to it -- about which
connection not enough has been said -- is far from simple. It would be
consistent with the spirit of egalitarianism to act only on the first
of the
five policies if it were anything like
sufficient itself, rather than the second. To act on the second possibility is then not at all necessarily to
be
moved by a questionable or base impulse. It is to be moved by the
greatest of
concerns, that of improving the lot of
the badly-off by an effective method. The project remains sufficiently human and
proper when the active
parties are
the would-be beneficiaries. That
this method may have
the
side-effect of reducing
the absolute well-being of the better-off is another fact, consistent with the high
moral standing of egalitarianism.
A
second and related point is that if we act on the second policy our goal is not that of changing the relative
positions of the well-off and
the badly-off. In particular it is mistaken somehow to identify or associate the end with envy. The goal of the
enterprise is not to
approximate to
or secure an
equality, a certain relationship. Certainly to transfer goods is to do
something which has the side-effect of tending to equalize both goods and
well-being. The hitherto badly-off in well-being will have more of
both,
and the hitherto better-off will have less of
goods and perhaps of well-being. If the goal of the Principle of Humanity were
achieved, there would exist as a second side-effect the equality, so to
speak, of all people being other
than badly-off. Still, none of this is the end of the enterprise. It
remains true, more important, that changing the relative positions of the better-off and the badly-off is not
the
goal when particular
campaigns or
practices have
the specific aim of producing an equality of goods, or of
approximations to
one, as a means to the end of the
Principle of Humanity. Such campaigns or practices in certain contexts are the most effective ones. One
person
one vote is an example. Others, involving
material goods, make the correct assumption
that a given group of people are in the same need, or roughly equal in their capability to secure
well-being from identical shares of resources. Variants of this
consideration,
that the goal of the Principle of Humanity
is not relative, and of the previous consideration, that the goal is not the
dragging down of the better-off,
apply to the stipulation that in transferring goods from the better-off, the first to be affected should
be
those best placed, including the better-paid rather than the
poorly-paid in the
rich societies.
The
Principle of Humanity can now be more fully stated, as follows. Our end must be
to
make well-off those who are badly off, by way of certain policies: (1) increasing
means to well-being and, more
surely, transferring
means from the
better-off
that will not affect their well-being, (2) transferring means from the better-off that will
affect their well-being,
those at the higher levels to be affected first,
and observing a certain limit, (3) reducing the necessity of inequalities, and (4) allowing only what
can
be called, without definition for now, necessary violence. Further,
these
policies are to be pursued in part by way of practices
of equality. 5. HUMANITY
AND EQUALITY
The
Principle of Humanity, in earlier versions of this essay, was spoken
of,
rather, as the Principle of Equality. What is more, arguments were
advanced for
that name. The matter is larger than a merely teminological one. A
proper sense
of any principle is or should be conveyed by what it is called. It was
my idea,
in the past, that a proper sense of the the thing was given by speaking
of it
as [to Ed: no inverted commas in these cases, please] the Principle of
Equality. My reasons were as follows. The
first consisted in several facts mentioned above. These are the two side-effects of concern for the badly-off,
these
being equalizations or a tendency to them. A second reason, more important, was the
noted fact that in many situations and
contexts, involving
similar need and capability, the most
reasonable way of helping the badly-off in well-being is by aiming at
an
equality of material goods and so on. This is not always true, and that it is not always
true is important. Still,
it is true enough to go a good way by
itself toward making the principle's name natural.
There
was also the third reason that the principle has an excellent claim to be regarded as the
principle which has most directed egalitarian struggles throughout
history,
although these are not too easily defined. It is
mistaken to suppose instead that these struggles have been informed by, say, the
Principle of Any Equality, or the Principle of Greatest Equal
Well-being.
These latter principles, as explained, are concerned with
relative
position, and may have the consequence that the
position of the better-off in well-being must be reduced even if this
does not
improve the absolute
position of
the poorer-off.
These principles may also have the consequence, perhaps intimately
connected
with the previous one, that certain
means to well-being are to be destroyed. These would be means of value to the better-off but for some
reason of no use to the poorer-off.
By
way of brief support for the proposition that egalitarianism has in fact been informed by the Principle of
Humanity rather than
these others,
let us take
egalitarianism to have consisted in struggles identified by demands for (a) giving 'to each according to their needs' or
'equality of welfare', (b)
'equality of opportunity', and (c) 'equal respect for all'. Were the struggles
so identified aimed at
equality of
well-being, any equality of it,
with the possible consequences just mentioned? Were they instead aimed
at
helping the badly-off? The answer is
plain enough. It is plain despite the fact that egalitarianism, like all other human
endeavours and traditions, has often enough fallen into confusion,
excess,
and absurdity. Those who have been concerned to satisfy the needs
and
wants of the impoverished and the degraded have not been aiming at a
relationship -- an
equality,
any equality. One may be led into supposing so by the truth that they have often had the subordinate aims of which
we
know, equalities of means to well-being. But there is no reason, to repeat, to confuse
their means and their
end. They have
not had an end which might have
been served by destroying food, say, or trying to make
sickness or poverty or disdain universal. They have not sought to have everyone
equally
in need. Nor is it really arguable that they have had the end of the Principle
of Greatest Equal
Well-Being. Those
who have struggled for equality of opportunity have been motivated by the vision of full
lives for those who have not had them because of want of education or
the
like. Whatever they have demanded about the
distribution of educational resources they have in the relevant sense not been
levellers. They have not sought an equality of ignorance, or poor
education for
everyone. Much the same can be said of
those who have been moved by the demand for respect.
My
fourth reason for the name the 'Principle of Equality' seemed the
strongest. It
has to do with the second reason
but certainly is distinct. To use any other name, including `The
Principle of
Humanity', would make it more likely, to say the least, that the
principal
means to the principle's end would not get
a proper attention. The principal means to the end of helping the badly-off was the means of
securing certain
equalities of material goods and so on.
This, part of the second policy mentioned above, seemed to me fundamental. It was
something passed by or resisted.
It seemed to me of fundamental importance that
the fundamental moral principle, by its name, should convey the essential means to its end, a means which commonly is ignored
or obstructed.
Well,
I think differently now. The overwhelming reason, as perhaps you will
anticipate, is that the great end of the principle, its raison
d'etre so
to speak, should not be lost sight of. It sums up a morality of
humanity, fellow-feeling
or generosity. That is its nature, a concern and determination having
to do
with people in distress, people with bad lives. Not to have this
salient is no
service to thinking about the matter. Also, it leaves some of us
unclear about
the moral imperative of the thing, and enables others of us to avoid
it. To
repeat something said in another connection, a good flag is not of
uncertain
colour. That
does not substract any of the principle's concerns with equality or put
into
question that it has been fundamental and central to egalitarianism. It
must
not distract us, either, from the campaigns for equalities of various
kinds
that are essential. In that connection, it is worth looking at the
relation of
the Principle of Humanity to familiar principles, rules,
maxims, and propositions mentioning
equality. If we accept the principle, it follows that some of these are to be accepted, others amended
or
rejected, rejected. To specify these consequences is to give further
content to the principle. It is in part through its own corollaries
that so
general a principle becomes clearer.
My other intention in surveying these consequences is to argue that independently
of the Principle of Humanity
we or anyway many of us are in fact committed to moving toward or
inclined to many of them. It appears that we
favour or will
come to favour things in accord with the
principle and not those that conflict with it. Hence my second intention is to
provide one basic argument for the principle, that increasingly it
reflects
ordinary enlightened convictions and feelings.9 (1)
The day has passed when it could be said that the Principle of Formal Equality, fundamentally that like
cases should be treated alike,
is the only acceptable upshot of egalitarian reflection. Still, not long ago it was regularly supposed that
what
egalitarianism comes to is only this, to put
it a bit more fully, that no one shall be held to have a claim to better treatment
in advance of general
grounds being
produced. The principle can be
realized in a racist society, or indeed in any society which follows
rules of
any kind. It amounts to an
injunction to consistency. The Principle of Formal Equality is consistent with the
Principle of Humanity, but cannot be said to amplify it, or to be a
consequence or corollary of it.
(2)
There are a number of what can be called elitist maxims of equality. One, as the phrase is sometimes
understood, is 'to each according
to his ability'. A second one, again as sometimes understood, is 'to each according to his capacity to
develop'. Others, more likely to go
unstated, are 'to each according to his race', or 'his colour' or 'his nationality'. There is the
possibility
of taking the second
maxim
differently, in such a
way that it may be in accord with the Principle of Humanity. Truly elitist maxims
conflict with the principle,
and they also conflict with ordinary and growing attitudes and indeed with rising institutions. (3)
What of the principle of retributive justice: to each according to his desert? To speak of punishment, it is
essential to distinguish between
its rules and the principle of retribution. If some people defend the rules, such as the rule that only
the
guilty are to be punished, by referring to
desert, others do so as reasonably by referring to prevention, perhaps deterrence.
If we now ask the question
of what goals might be served by
deterrence, one is obviously the goal of the Principle of Humanity. Certain rules of
punishment, then, are in accord with, or indeed follow from, the
Principle of Humanity. There is conflict of a kind between the Principle
of
Humanity and the principle of retribution, but
there is room for a good deal of reflection on the latter. It is arguable that the
principle, on full inquiry, reduces very roughly to this: a man is to
have a
penalty which (a) exactly satisfied the
grievance-desire to which he has given rise, (b) will be in accordance with certain rules of
equal treatment, and (c) will cost him less distress than it would
someone else who had to undergo
it.10 Given this view, it is possible to argue that the
principle of desert is something whose
materials testify
to the correctness of
the
egalitarian's conviction that the fundamental thing is the reduction of distress.
It
can be argued in any case that ordinary enlightened attitudes about the rules of punishment and about
retribution go in the
direction
of the Principle of Humanity. Particular rules which cannot be seen as serving a tolerable deterrent end
are
at least suspect. It
is not too
much to say that
the principle of retribution, despite the materials in it, is in decline. (4)
'To and from each according to his voluntary consents and agreements.' This principle, if taken in some
ways, including one which makes it a partial
summary of a doctrine mentioned above, does fight with the Principle of Humanity.
The central point is that voluntary agreements under a certain loose
definition of voluntariness may be agreements which precisely defeat
the aim of
the Principle of Humanity. They
may indeed serve to reduce the well-being of the badly-off. Under other
restricted understandings of the quoted
principle it is in accord with the Principle of Humanity. It is a part of well-being to have certain
agreements
protected. If the principle is taken in the
first ways, so as to defend distributions of well-being that result from minimally
voluntary agreements, as when a man agrees to work for a certain wage
when the only alternative is deprivation
for his children, there is declining support for it.
(5)
There are a number of what can be called weak principles and rules of equality. One is to the effect
that
we are to pay an equal respect to everyone. No
one is to be ignored. Others specify certain absolutely minimal ways in which all
people are to be treated. Their 'basic' needs,
perhaps what we
have identified as subsistence-desires, are to
be satisfied. It will be evident that the Principle of Humanity conflicts with such
principles, if going far
beyond them is taken for conflict.
These and other weak principles are no longer ordinarily regarded as sufficient. It
is thought by very many that individuals have rights which go well
beyond them. There has
been
a change in attitudes which supports the Principle of Humanity.
(6)
There is the matter of equal liberties, with liberties taken in some such way as in connection with Rawls. We
have the proposition then that all are to be equal in roughly the
legal,
political, and intellectual rights
defended in Britain and America. As already suggested, equal rights conjoined with
unequal socio-economic
powers are of
limited value, to say the least.
It is clear, however, that the Principle of Humanity is at least in
accord with
equal distributions of rights supported
by like distributions of power. There is a change of attitudes in this direction.
(7)
It is said that those who make equal efforts are to be equally rewarded, and still more than those who make
lesser efforts. Or, differently, those who not
merely try but also succeed are to be rewarded in one way, and those who do not
succeed, whether or not they try, are to be less
well rewarded.
Another related rule has to do
with contribution, with or without effort or work. The first two rules, but hardly the third, are
sometimes
in accordance with the idea that we should have
any favourable inequalities of goods and well-being which in fact are
necessary to the end of the
Principle of Humanity. There
is the difficulty that it is far from easy to establish that those who carry forward certain jobs,
and hence make larger
contributions
to the total means of well-being,
would not do so without the rewards they are
getting. Many jobs and careers bring great satisfaction. It is not surprising that
many egalitarians are
sceptical
about arguments to the effect that
company directors, say, must
be paid more because of 'the burden of responsibility' which they carry. It may seem that in general this
responsibility is not
merely
bearable but desirable, the proof being that it is much sought after. Also,
to look back to the third of our policies in connection with the Principle of Humanity, it is to be
kept in mind that the
principle has
the consequence that we should
attempt to reduce what is necessary in the way
of certain incentives for the given end. It is not possible to say that there now
exists some ordinary support for only those rules of effort and
productivity
which in fact are consonant with the Principle
of Humanity. Perhaps there is movement in that direction. Something of
the same
sort can be said of the desirability of changing
incentive-demands.
(8)
The Principle of Humanity has informed egalitarian progress, and the latter has included the struggle for
equality of opportunity. Still,
there is more to be said about the latter, of relevance to a new and more perceptive egalitarian demand.
Opportunity
may be taken to consist in the use of
certain resources, including abilities of other people. If we are to improve the lot of the
badly-off, then we shall not always proceed most
efficiently by
securing equality of
opportunity.
We shall do so
by securing a certain inequality. If we
regard well-being as in part a function of opportunity on the one hand and the innate capabilities of
individuals on the other and
it is the case that some individuals are less capable than others, we shall sometimes do best by securing that
they
have more opportunity. The Principle of Humanity does not
derive from a
view of life as simply a curious race
where all attention is given to an equal start and no attention to some being lame.
There seems little doubt that ordinary moral attitudes are changing in
this direction. That
is, there is
movement toward
proper inequalities of opportunity. We are now familiar with the idea of using
more resources for the
less able in
education. There is also reverse
discrimination. (9) If
there are circumstances where capabilities and needs are unequal, there are also other circumstances,
already emphasized, where given people are
roughly equal in a certain capability or need. Here the Principle of Humanity requires
that there be a rule
of equal
distribution of material and other
goods. There are many
such
rules, guiding many practices. The rules have an insufficient acceptance.
(10)
Finally, there is the maxim 'To each according to his needs', with needs fully conceived. The maxim may be
supplemented by another, 'from each according
to his ability', understood in a certain way. Given narrow views of needs, noted
above, the first rule falls short of being a version of the Principle of
Humanity. Under another reading,
the maxim is in fact tantamount to the principle. It is unique among
maxims
about equality, and cannot be regarded
as merely one among many. So
much for a survey of the consequences of the Principle of Humanity for
maxims
and other thoughts having to do with equality. There is another possible survey, more
difficult but capable of shedding at least as much light on the
Principle
of Humanity. It takes us in the direction of
the question of tactics and institutions mentioned at the beginning, and is of the
general political consequences
of the Principle of Humanity --
political consequences traditionally conceived.
If
that principle is the principle of the Left, or the Right, or the Centre, then it is the principle of the Left.11
Indeed, the Left in politics is best defined by way
of it. It is some parties of the Left, further, that have actually done most for
progress toward realization of
the principle. Certainly the principle has sometimes been espoused by the Right and the Centre, but
typically in conjunction with
contradictory or conflicting impulses, among them the impulse to believe that great inequalities in
distribution of the means to well-being
are required to protect the grim state of the badly-off from being even more grim. The New Labour
Party in Britain is an outstanding
example, to me an awful one. Still, there can be disagreement about the political consequences of the
Principle of Humanity. More should
be said about self-deception in political philosophy, and also the pretence of self-deception, perhaps not
only
on the Right. The
Principle of Humanity, secondly, at this time as at most times, is the principle not of conservation but of
change. That of course
is
not the same as saying that it is the principle of the Left. The principle, thirdly, may or may not be the
principle of democracy, by
which is meant what we now call democracy -- once known to others as
bourgeois
democracy, with some reason. The question
is not easy, and certainly not one which allows for brevity. There evidently are many circumstances where
the
Principle of Humanity issues in democracy. The difficulty is that
certain
non-democracies can also be seen as in accord with the principle. Their far greater approximation to economic
equality
is of great importance. The principle, fourthly, has sometimes issued
in
revolution and it has indeed been behind
acts and campaigns of terrorism. It has had to do, fifthly, with provision for
free and equal expression of opinion. With the aid of certain
suppositions
it does provide an argument for some
violence. With the aid of other suppositions
it provides a more certain argument for free expression.
It
will be as well to say a word more on terrorism, and in particular on
what can
be called terrorism for humanity.
What it is, by one rough understanding, is terrorism on behalf of
humanity, on
behalf of people in general who are in distress, all of them. What it
is, by
another rough understanding, is terrorism out of humanity, terrorism
that at
least may be owed to that disposition of some of us that is our
humanity,
generosity or fellow-feeling. Terrorism for humanity, by a third and
best
understanding, is terrorism directed to the end of the Principle of
Humanity or
a related end. It is terrorism more or less directed to the end of the
Principle of Humanity -- reducing wretchedness and other forms of
distress. It
gets its end from that morality of which I take the Principle of
Humanity to be
the best statement. You will not need assuring, I hope, that terrorism
for
humanity so understood is already right -- that it is morally
defensible by
definition. That is no part of the idea.12
The
Principle of Humanity is not the only conceivable formulation of the
morality
in question, and it requires enlargement in several ways. But surely it
is the
proper and true response to the question of well-being. It is, to my
mind, the
best formulation of the greatest of moralities. That is not so
controversial a
conclusion as some may too quickly
suppose. There remains the other large question, that of tactics and institutions, to which we have
latterly approached a bit more
closely. There is more room for dispute here. Certainly some 'egalitarian' means to the end of making
better-off those who are badly-off
are ill-judged. But support for the Principle of Humanity is not to be identified with support for them.
Nor
should opposition to them give rise to
opposition to it. ------------------ 1 Systematic accounts of human goods, basic
values and things which it
is rational to desire for their
own sake are not popular and have been attempted by few philosophers, for whatever reason. See W. K.
Frankena, Ethics
(Englewood Cliffs; 1973), p.
71f.; Morris Ginsberg, On the Diversity of Morals (London:
1956), chs. 7, 8; John Finnis, Natural
Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: 1980), chs. 3, 4. There is a further statement of my
six goods at the beginning
of Ch 8. See also my After the Terror (Edinburgh University
Press,
2002), Chs 1, 2. 2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Oxford: 1972), p. 440f, gives
a satisfactory account, and
defines self-respect as the most important primary good. 3 There is an excellent discussion of forms
of the assumption in Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare
(San Francisco: 1970), ch. 7. 4 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia
(Oxford, 1974), esp.
ch. 7, section 1. 5 D. A. Lloyd-Thomas in 'The Ones in
Darkness', Philosophy,
(1979), rightly notices a mistaken
line of mine in favour of this, the Principle of Any Equality, and a correct one against in
Three Essays on
Political Violence (Blackwells, 1976), p. 41, p.
10). His main contention, that in so far as there is a connection at all between
serious need and equality, it
holds doubtfully between need and the Principle of Formal Equality, noticed below, seems to me
mistaken.
Need, as explained in
this
essay, is bound up with the Principle of Humanity. 6. Op. cit. 7. Op. cit,
p. 61. More light is
shed in Rawls's later book Political Liberalism (Columbia
University Press, 1993), on which I have found it hard to get a hold. 8. See below, Ch. 4 9. There is another argument, more basic, to
the effect that it is the
human nature of each of us to put our personal demands for satisfaction
of our
great desires ahead of the demands of others for the satisfaction of
their
secondary rather than great desires, and that consistency then commits
us to
the Principle of Humanity. See After the Terror, Ch 2. There is
also the
argument for the principle that consists in the strength of its kind of
thing,
and the weakness or worse of other kinds of thing. See Ch 6. 10. See my Punishment, The Supposed
Justifications (Penguin,
1976) and also A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience and
Life-Hopes (Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch. 10 11. For a full discussion see my `Determinism
and Politics', Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, 1982.
[To be reprinted in EUP vol of papers on determinism & freedom]. 12. See Ch 8 below, and also Terrorism
for
Humanity: Inquiries in Political Philosophy (Pluto, 2003/4). HOME to T. H. website
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