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What Equality Comes To -- The
Principle of
Humanity by Ted Honderich There is a
survey elsewhere with which you
should begin, a survey of
almost all the main ideas of equality -- What Equality Is Not. It is in
fact
much of a chapter of my 2005 book Conservatism:
Burke to Nozick to
Blair?,
which is an enlargement and revision of Conservatism. The book seeks to
find
the distinctions of the tradition of conservatism and also its
underlying
rationale.What you get below is the culmination of that particular
survey, an
answer to the question of the very nature of egalitarianism. It is a
part of
another chapter of the book. It replaces what appeared here previously
under the
the title 'What Equality Is'. There is a better expression of
the various
political traditions of the
left, notably democratic socialism. This takes them to be based not on the
principle of equality of results but on something related to it but
significantly
different. In the past this was dignified with the name of being the
Principle of Equality. for good reason. But it then transpired
there was
better reason, of which you will hear, to give it the name the
Principle of
Humanity. Fundamentally this
principle has to do not with treatment, with what is done to and for people, but with satisfaction. Fundamentally although not exclusively it has to do, that is, with a result
of treatment -- the nature or quality of people's lives, satisfaction,
well-being, happiness, or freedom. At bottom it has to do with the
satisfaction
of desires. The Principle of Humanity is
directed, more particularly, to the satisfaction of fundamental categories of
human desires. It has to do with the satisfaction of those categories of
desire that were set out, when
we were considering human nature, as giving us most of a general conception of that nature (p. 00). They are,
you
might say, what defines human nature. We all want, first, the material
means to
subsistence, a satisfactory length
of life for ourselves and for others close to us. We desire, that is, lifetimes of something like 70 years
rather than 35 or 40, full lives rather than half-lives or
quarter-lives. We
want, second, material goods in addition to those that will merely keep us alive for such a time.
These will include things of importance: tolerable homes and environments
for
a start, pain-relievers, and such lesser items as means of travel. They
are not
properly described as
luxuries.
All the categories of desire can rightly be described as desires for freedoms, but the third
category is the one most
naturally described as having in it
desires for certain freedoms and powers. Some fundamental ones are political, others have
to do with independence in one's work and other such smaller contexts
of
life. We want, fourth,
respect
and self-respect, which we cannot have if we are, say, the victims of class-condescension or racism. We want,
fifth, the satisfactions of personal and wider human relationships.
Some of
these have to do with
the
family, others with membership of larger groups and a society. Last, we desire the goods of culture. Here we want,
among other things, not ignorance or incompetence
but the satisfactions of education. No doubt there are other
possible ways of
sorting out our fundamental desires, but this will do. The Principle of
Humanity is concerned
with
extents to which these fundamental desires are satisfied. It has to do with different extents of well-being,
this
being nothing other than the mentioned
satisfaction. It is a recommendation with respect to the distribution of this satisfaction or
well-being. Its formulation depends on first
deciding on a
definition of the badly-off, a class of persons who are badly-off.
There is
room for different decisions here, and
somewhat different decisions are in fact made by different traditions within the
leftward part of the political spectrum. Certainly there is no fact of the
matter that by itself
determines
who is to count as badly-off, and no surprise or embarrassment in that.
The
answer to the question 'Who is to decide who is badly-off?' is, of course, 'Anyone
proposing to make and use distinctions between different conditions of
life.' Here is one central definition
of the
badly-off:
(1) those who fail to
satisfy
even the first or subsistence desire, and hence are frustrated in desires of the other categories as well,
(2)
those who seriously lack further
material goods, (3) those who are unsatisfied in terms of freedom and power, (4) those who are
unsatisfied
in terms of respect and self-respect, and (5)
those who are minimally satisfied in all categories but the first. The Principle of Humanity is
roughly to the
effect that we should
take
rational steps that will make well-off those who are badly-off. That is, we should take up and
follow policies that are
actually effective in removing individuals from the class of the badly-off, and of course are humanly
economical -- they do not produce more loss than gain. Further, we
should seek
to act on these policies by having
certain practices of equality. The first policy is in part that
of helping
the
badly-off without thereby affecting at all the
well-off, the remainder of the population. In this case no goods, which is to say no
means to satisfaction, are
transferred from the well-off to the
badly-off. Rather, new means are brought into existence. If this endeavour by
itself could be successful,
that would be the end of the
matter. No question of transfers of goods between the two classes would arise. And, if
there remained inequalities
within the now universal class of the well-off, the Principle of
Humanity would
have nothing to say of this state of affairs. In its other part the first
policy is that of
transferring goods from the
well-off, but goods whose loss would not significantly affect their well-being. It is arguable, to say the least,
that there do exist such goods,
means to well-being which their possessors do not trouble to use. Again, if these transfers could be
successful in achieving the goal of
the principle, that would be the end of the matter. The second policy is that of
reducing the
number
of the badly-off by transferring goods to them
from the well-off, with the known effect that this will reduce the well-being
of the well-off. Given our
earlier scepticism of conservative
claims as to an incentive system, we can take this as a real and large possibility, in
no way an ill-fated enterprise. That is, we can
reduce the
number of the badly-off in this way. This policy may be regarded, in fact, by
proponents of the Principle of Humanity, as their
most important. The third policy is a partner to
the second,
and
not much less important. It has to do with
what can be granted, that the goal of the principle may be served by having a kind
of incentive system,
perhaps as
well described as a compensation
system. It will involve certain
favourable inequalities, of limited extent. The policy presupposes that
what
individuals require, by way of any such inequalities, is certainly no
matter of
human nature, no matter of iron law. It is properly described, rather, as a matter
of their attitudes. If
present
attitudes have been passed on from
generation to generation, they
are none the less open to change. To revert to terms used earlier, they have to do with social altruism or
rather
the lack of it, and of
what
mainly gives rise to this state of affairs, an absence of social persuasion. The third policy, then, will
reduce
very greatly the inequalities of incentive or
compensation that are expected or demanded
by individuals if they are to forward the end of a society. These inequalities are to be reduced, of
course,
just in order to leave
greater
resources for the relief of the badly-off. The fourth policy is implicit in
the
conception
of bad and good lives, particularly in what was said of our first
desire. It is
also implicit in the first three policies for the avoidance of misery.
It is a
policy against violence and near-violence -- against wounding, sexual
violation, torture, and killing. It is a policy against at least much
war. Like
other principles against violence, it cannot be without exceptions. As remarked, the Principle of
Humanity is
also
to the effect that the
four
policies are to be forwarded by certain practices of equality. The most important political one
begins from
one
person one vote -- it goes further than that in securing effective
democracy. It involves fair restraints on
the financing of
particular political parties and on
their influence by way of the media. Also, there is the non-political
practice
of equal provision of many material goods and of many opportunities. If we are
not in fact perfectly equal, in any of the ways suggested by what was
called
the principle of natural equality (p. 000), we
are sufficiently alike so as to make equal provision, for the most part, a rational
practice. That we are alike is the fact of
our shared
fundamental desires.
Still, if
these two practices
of equality are of the greatest importance, they are not the only practices allowed by
the principle. If we are alike, we are also different. It is not
always
true, evidently, that an equal
provision of a good will serve the end of the principle. The sick need what the well do not. The Principle of Humanity can
now be more
explicitly stated. Our end must be
to
make well-off those who are badly off, by way of certain rational policies: (1)
increasing means to well-being
and, more surely, transferring means
from the better-off that will not affect their well-being, (2)
transferring means from the better-off that will
affect their well-being, those at the higher levels to be affected first, and observing a
certain limit, (3) reducing
the necessity of inequalities, and (4)
allowing only what can be called, without definition for now, necessary
violence. Further, these policies are to be pursued in part by way of practices of equality. This is not vulnerable at all to
the
objection
having to do with mere relativities or
irrationality. What it recommends is not the goal of people being related in a certain way to one another,
being
equal. The goal or aim is to get
people out of the condition of being badly-off. It is the goal of ending frustration, distress and misery.
Certainly, if it is achieved, there will be a large side-effect -- all people being
equal in the sense of being other than badly-off. But nothing but woeful
or
wilful confusion can
give anyone
the idea that the
goal is itself a relational one. In particular, the goal is not an
equality.
The same is to be said in connection
with the mentioned practices of equality. They are greatly important means, but not the
end.17 If I am
convinced that more democracy is the way to a society in which people do not have to sleep in the streets, and want
such a society above all, it is
absurd to suppose that in this respect I have democracy as an end-in-itself. It is as clear that the
principle does not
entail that we should
have
everyone only equally well-off if the alternative were everyone unequally better-off. Nor does it entail the
worse upshot that we
should have
everyone equally
badly-off if the alternative were everyone being unequally well-off.
This is
the case if we understand these several
terms, 'badly-off' and so on, in the way we have defined them, and also if they are used in related
ways.
Using the terms in the defined way, the fact of
the matter is that the principle does not speak of the situation, not yet nearly in
sight, where there might be a choice between everybody's being equally
well-off and everyone
still
better-off but unequally so. The spirit of the principle is very definitely for the second option. Nor does
the
principle have the consequence that we should
drag down the well-off if that had no good effect, but rather made all of us
equally badly-off. On the contrary, the principle prohibits this. The
second policy requires that transfers
from the well-off decrease the numbers of the badly-off. The formulation we have of the
Principle of
Humanity is not the only one, and not identical
with a formulation that has seen the light of day in the past. We need not suppose we
have its eternal and
canonical form
-- or a form as agreeable to all
other supporters of it
as it
is to those of philosophical habits. Enlightened economists, no doubt,
would couch it differently, and
political theorists
differently again.18 If the subject of the inquiry we are now ending were
the left rather than
the Right, the
principle would get a lot more
attention.19 We would look into various questions raised by
it and
various recommendations of
it, and relate it to the various generalities about equality looked at earlier. We would also consider its great capability
of withstanding objections
-- such as the objection about liberty -- which are also withstood by the principle of equality of results. Given that our concern is what
it is, there
are
only two essential propositions to be noted.
They will bring us to our conclusion about
conservatism. The first, assumed already, is
that the
Principle of Humanity is an adequate
summation of what we have been calling the politics of the left. Conceivably it is among the best of such
summations. It, unlike
the
principle of equality of results, can properly be spoken of as giving the rationale of the left. There can surely
be
no doubt about that conclusion of importance. Whether or not some egalitarians have been inclined
to describe themselves in the way of Tawney, in terms of the principle
of
equal results, it is
nonsense to
suppose that the
actual political traditions in question have pursued mere relativities. It is
nonsense, for various reasons, to suppose that they have pursued any sort of
equality over any sort of inequality. They have not, in connection
with education,
had
a goal that might in conceivable
circumstances have been achieved by destroying all possibilities of education, say by
burning down all the schools, thereby producing an equality. They have not
had
a goal that in conceivable circumstances
might have been achieved by reducing all education to some rudimentary level of
instruction, thereby again producing an equality. Consider something yet
more fundamental. In Britain, as you know, the
life-expectancy of the fifth social class has been strikingly smaller than that
of the first social class. The left has not
had a goal that
might have been exactly as well achieved by shortening
the lives of the first social class as by lengthening the lives
of the fifth, or of course by reducing both still further to any situation whatever of
equal lifetimes. It needs to be seen clearly that exactly such a
benightedness or awfulness, one that has these possibilities within it, is
exactly what is assigned to the
left by those who identify it with the principle of equality of results, or that principle as it can be
understood. The traditions of the
left have not conceivably had a goal that in conceivable circumstances might have been perfectly
achieved
by producing equal ignorance, equally
short lives, or an equal poverty, or an equal captivity and powerlessness, or a terrible
equality of frustration with respect to our other fundamental desires. It
cannot conceivably be
that
the concern or commitment of these traditions has been a relationship, a mere relativity. Anyone
tempted
to the silliness of saying otherwise can be cured
by considering those societies that have actually made some progress towards the
given ideal, and comparing them to what they were
before. NOTES 1. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 160. 2. Alan Ryan, Property and Political
Theory, p. 33; Lawrence Becker, Property
Rights: Philosophic Foundations. 3. Quoted by Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism
in America, p. 121. 4. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France, p. 138. 5. Ibid, p. 196. 6. This line is quoted from one of Mrs Gaskell's novels by Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption in Equality, p. 93.
It expresses, we are told, the
conventional wisdom of the 19th Century, but is put aside as untrue and repellent by our authors. 7. Quoted by Robert Eccleshall, Political Ideologies, p.
91. 8. Anthony Quinton, The Politics of
Imperfection, p. 90. 9. Anthony Flew, The Politics of
Procrustes, p. 81. 10. John Lucas, On Justice, pp. 197,
200. 11. George Sher, Desert (Princeton
University Press, 1987). 12. Joseph and Sumption, op. cit., p.
73. 13. My own view of them is given in Punishment:
The Supposed
Justifications, (Polity, 1989 and other editions),
forthcoming in a further
edition from Pluto Press. 14. George Sher, op. cit. 15. See my A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and
Life-Hopes
(Oxford University Press, 1988), the summary of it How Free Are You?
(Oxford University Press, revised edition 2003), and On Determinism
and
Freedom (Edinburgh University Press,
2004). . 16. I wish these were the conclusions drawn from some quite mistaken thinking on the subject by me at the end of A Theory of
Determinism. See
p. 612 for the
worst conclusion. It
also occurs in 'Determinism and Politics', in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy VII: Social and Political Philosophy.. 17. Roy Hattcrsley in his Choose Freedom:
The Future for Democratic
Socialism (Penguin, 1987) has
the distinction among politicians of making the point clearly. See pp. xvii, 21- 2. 18. Roy Hattersley offers a version of the
principle most succinctly when he writes: 'Liberty is our aim. Equality is the way in which it can truly be achieved' (Choose
Freedom, p. 23). His colleague, Bryan Gould, wrote similarly: '...the diffusion and equalization of power -- the true basis of socialism -- is...the only way to achieve a truly free society in which each individual enjoys the maximum degree of freedom commensurate with a similar degree of freedom for all others.' Socialism and Freedom
(Macmillan, 1985), p. 106. -------------------------- The Principle of Equality was first stated in
'The Problem of Well-Being
and the Principle of Equality', Mind,
1981, subsequently revised into Ch. 2 of my Terrorism for
Humanity: Inquiries
in Political Philosophy (Pluto, 2003) and Ch. 5 of
the collection of papers On Political Means and Social Ends
(Edinburgh
University Press, 2003). It is also discussed in After the Terror,
mainly Ch. 2. David Cooper is firm that it is an
illusion that the Principle of Humanity has
anything much to do with
egalitarianism, since
the
latter is necessarily just a matter of mere relativities. See his Illusions of Equality
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 4-5. Anthony Flew discusses
shortcomings
of the principle, as
well as some
of my own, in
the final pages of his Equality in
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