THE FARCE OF FAIRNESS
Ted Honderich
These reflections on the British coalition government's
policies, presented as only a response to the economic situation
and in particular the rise in the national debt, also appear on the
website of Britain's New
Statesman and on the American website CounterPunch.
At the end of the New
Statesman version, there are 90 or so comments on it. Some,
those at
the top of the list, may be a revelation to you if you have not kept up
with the phenomenon of blogging. They illustrate the fact that the web
is not only the greatest encyclopedia in history.
John Stuart Mill, proud of his logic, gave
liberalism's 1859 answer, maybe the answer of Britain's Liberal
Democrats today. He gave it in his principle of state intervention in
his
essay On Liberty. The
principle was that the state is to intervene in
the lives of citizens not to help them, but only to prevent them from
causing harm to one another. Then Mill didn't say what harm is, say
whether bankers can do it. Nor did
he say in his essay Utilitarianism,
where vagueness about unhappiness and happiness went with an obscure
paean to individualism. The vagueness and obscurity helped
conceal the fact evident in clearer utilitarianisms, such as Jeremy
Bentham's, that they justify having
a slave class in a society if that does in fact produce the greatest
total of
happiness or satisfaction for the society.
John Rawls of Harvard gave us liberalism's 1972
answer to the question of what is fair in a society. What is fair is
what is in accordance with the social contract we would make if we
didn't
know where we would were going to turn out to be personally in a
society to come -- and if we believed what are deceptively called
general facts, say about the benefits of what is called liberty in a
society.
We, with those all-American beliefs, so innocent and so manufactured,
would choose a
society where a
kind of liberty trumps any equality. That liberty makes of little worth
the recommendation of a vaunted principle of
equality to
the effect that inequalities are all right so long as they can be
pretended to be in the interest of the badly off. All of which stuff is
oblivious of the truth that fundamental liberty is one thing with
equality, oblivious of the illustrative fact that if you and I are in
conflict, and unequal in that I have a gun, your liberty reduces to
zero.
Liberalism, you can therefore kindly think, as I
myself maybe still do, is indeterminate and irresolute. It is at best
decent moral
impulses, a little conscience, at
odds with self-concern, the latter being visibly to the fore in a
pinch, say the forming of a coalition government,
and less visibly before then. Maybe that is too tolerant a view of
liberalism, too kind. It
looks that way in England just now.
What is the tradition of conservatism's answer to
the question of
what is fair in a
society? Its answers abound. Resisting change, being for so-called
reforms, being against mere
theory, respecting human nature, being for self-serving freedoms, less
democratic government,
the organic society, being against equality -- and for the
pretence of indubitable economics, wholly spurious necessities.
None of those ideas and no bundle of them, examined
in itself or considered in terms of the history of conservatism, is in
sight of being an articulable and consistent candidate for a general
principle of fairness. No book on conservatism since Edmund Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in
France comes near to doing anything to
improve on the vacuity which Burke fills only with social condescension
to
barbers and with pomp in support of his 'natural aristocracy'.
No Conservative thinking, to take a step against the
cant of this moment, and to name the actual subject in hand, has
offered
a general principle of what is right in society that is worth
attention. There are only pieces of public relations. Mill's
verdict on conservatism as the stupid party or perhaps the stupidest
party was not merely abuse but comprehensible.
Conservatism, to come to my own view of it, is not
overwhelmingly more self-interested than any other political tradition.
Conservatism, as one or two Americans have admitted, is unique in
something else. It is the political tradition that has no general
principle at all to defend its self-interest. It therefore has nothing
to save it from self-interest and in particular from the self-deception
in which it lives and breathes.
But there is
an answer to the question of what is
fair in a society. An answer exists. You believe it, I think. It is a
kind of
common decency. You can suppose it has been the principle of the Left
in politics when the Left has not been confused or worse.
It is that we should take all rational means to a
certain end -- means that actually serve the end and will not be
self-defeating. The end is the clearly definable one of getting and
keeping people out of bad lives.
Those are lives of deprivation with
respect to the great human goods, the great desires of human nature.
They are, in my list, longer lives, bodily well-being, freedom and
power, respect and self-respect, relationships, and the goods of
culture. There is none of the tripe of metaphor here. Nothing of the
spuriousness and smell of David Cameron's 'big society'. Note too that
the
aim is not equality but good lives, whatever
goes with them.
This fairness, which can have the name of being the
Principle of Humanity, is more arguable than anything else going. It is
in operation whenever our lower or vicious selves are not in an
ascendancy. It is what we have most confident recourse to in defending
our
own self-interest in our own lives. It flows from our great desires and
the basic rationality of our natures that is our having reasons, these
necessarily being general.
The principle's commitment to means-end rationality
with respect to its end issues in, among other things, an abhorrence of
the revolution and terrorism whose irrationality is not reduced by
taking into account that that irrationality is owed mainly to the
anticipation of culpable resistance to the revolution or terror. If the
principle's
various possible consequences, what follows from it in terms of policy
and action, are
more difficult to judge than the moral greatness of the principle
itself,
they are entirely clearer than whatever passes for a summation of the
mere ideologies of liberalism and conservatism.
Think now of the conservative and liberal coalition
government which governs Britain now. It happens to be a three-part
coalition,
made up of conservatism, liberalism, and the petty careerism and the
level of moral intelligence that has since 1979 or 1997 has defined our
entire political class, certainly its membership in the New Labour
Party. Perhaps Mr Miliband will lead our politics back
towards a clarity and decency, by way of the Labour Party as distinct
from the New
Labour Party. Perhaps he can do something with our merely hierarchic
democracy.
The coalition government is true to its inherited
natures, the natures of liberalism and conservativism. To these it adds
the spirits of dim and pushy boys and of an economist, an economist
from Shell still holding up
his head, all led by
a public relations man. The coalition says and says again and
again that it is fair. Its policies are fair, fair, fair. Repetition is
truth.
It
is in fact already committed to, and will produce despite tactical
qualifications anticipated from the beginning, one thing. It will
produce a farce of fairness.
The inanity of thinking or hoping that what is in
prospect is
not a
farce of fairness, of contemplating
that possibility for half a minute, should not survive the reading any
day of what has a right to the name of being a newspaper of
intelligence, one of
the
two or three in England. What you have from The
Guardian
today is a confirmation of any clear thinking on the traditions of
conservatism and liberalism.
We hear, in this time of economic
emergency, of still increasing executive pay. Some boss of
something called Reckitt-Benckiser, 'a global force in household,
health and personal
care', notably air-fresheners and hair-removers, is now paid
£92,596,160 a year.
There is more information in the newspaper on the victimized end of
English
society too -- of the 'social
cleansing' of London by reducing the welfare benefits of the poor and
disabled, excused by way of vicious redescriptions of them and mindless
comparisons with others.
The Principle of Humanity calls right now for the
most effective forms of speech and argument against this farce of
fairness. That question
of effective expression, a question for me and for you, is not easy. It
arises,
of
course, well before there is any question of incitement. What is
rational with respect to the place and use of feeling in speech and
argument,
of condemnation,
against what is vile from the point of view of the Principle of
Humanity, vile from the point of view of a humanity? Other things
are clearer.
It is clearer that the Principle of Humanity now calls for strikes. It calls for strikes in defence of homes. It calls for strikes in defence of schools and universities. It calls for strikes in defence of local government. It calls, even, for strikes in defence of what institution of justice we have. It calls, no doubt, for a general strike.
It calls too for a political economics worth the name. That would tell
us
what is certainly possible, the extent to which the political power and
influence of the top decile of population in terms of wealth and income
is more than
a thousand times that of the bottom decile. This economics, too, so far
from the economics of Shell, would bring public and private income,
public and private expenditure, public and private waste, into sharp
definition and comparison. It would also measure who benefits from all
the
institutions of society, say the institution of justice for a start.
What deciles, for a start.
The Principle of Humanity calls too, as
importantly, for civil
disobedience,
and mass civil disobedience.
It calls in particular for gestures of
civil disobedience, of course non-violent and including what Rawls was
keen on, acceptance of the penalty for the disobedience. Maybe a
gesture in Parliament Square now by a British army colonel who
remembers the holy words of a predecessor, Colonel Rainborough, in the
English Civil War. 'Really I think that the poorest he that is in
England hath a life to live as the greatest he.' Our colonel could park
his tank
there in the Parliament Square for a while, until the television
cameras turn
up, before going back to barracks to accept
the penalty
for his civil and other disobedience.
Two of Ted Honderich's relevant books are On Political Means and Social
Ends (Edinburgh University Press) and Conservatism: Burke, Nozick,
Bush, Blair? (Pluto Press)
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