1. The Circle of Belief. BonJour’s Presentation and Alston’s Response

* BonJour, L., “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (1978), pp. 1–13.

* Alston, W., “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?”, Synthese, vol. 55 (1983), pp. 73–95.

Also:

Alston, W., “Two Types of Foundationalism”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 85 (1976), pp. 165–85.

2. The Legitimacy of Self-Support

* Van Cleve, J., “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle”, Philosophical Review, vol. 88 (1979), pp. 55–91.

* Alston, W., “Epistemic Circularity”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 47 (1986), pp. 1–28.

* Fumerton, R., Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1995, Chapter 6.

Also:

Van Cleve, J., “Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction”, in P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 9: Causation annd Causal Theories, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984, pp. 555–567.

Van Cleve, J., “Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief”, The Monist, vol. 68 (1985), pp. 90–104.

Papineau, D., “Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism”, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 42 (1992), pp. 1–20.

Vogel, J., “Reliabilism Leveled”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 97 (2000), pp. 602–623.

3. Goldman’s Contribution

* Goldman, A., “The Internalist Conception of Justification”, in P. French, T. Uehling, Jr. And H. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. V: Studies in Epistemology, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1980, pp. 27–51.

* Goldman, A., Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986, Chapters 2–5.

* Goldman, A., “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism”, in P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 19: Philosophical Naturalism, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1994, pp. 301–320.

Also:

Goldman, A., “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73 (1976), pp. 771–91.

Goldman, A., “What is Justified Belief?”, in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, pp. 1–23.

Goldman, A., “Strong and Weak Justification”, in J. Tomberlin, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2: Epistemology, Ridgeview, Atascadero, 1988, pp. 51–69.

4. Quine’s Naturalism

* Quine, W. V., “Epistemology Naturalized”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, pp. 68–90.

* Quine, W. V., The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, Ill, 1973, ch. 1, §1.

* Stroud, Barry, “The significance of Naturalized Epistemology”, in P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 6: Analytic Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1981, pp. 455–471.

Also:

Hylton, Peter, “Quine’s Naturalism”, in P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 19: Philosophical Naturalism, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1994, pp. 261–282.

BonJour, Laurence, “Against Naturalized Epistemology”, in P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 19: Philosophical Naturalism, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1994, pp. 283–300.

5. The Stroud-Sosa Debate

* Stroud, B., “Understanding Human Knowledge in General”, in M. Clay and K. Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism, Westview, Boulder, 1989, pp. 31–50.

* Sosa, E., “Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 263–290.

* Stroud, B., “Scepticism, ‘Externalism’, and the Goal of Epistemology”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 291–307.

6. Justification without Truth

* Alston, W., “Concepts of Epistemic Justification”, The Monist, vol. 68 (1985), pp. 57–89.

* Lehrer, K., Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974.

* Foley, R., Working without a Net, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993.

* Alston, W. “A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology”, in M. Clay and K. Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pp. 1–29.

7. Other

* Bergmann, M., “Externalism and Skepticism”, Philosophical Review, vol. 109 (2000), pp. 159–194.