

# Structural Econometrics: Dynamic Discrete Choice

Jean-Marc Robin

## **Plan**

1. Dynamic discrete choice models
2. Application: college and career choice

## Dynamic discrete choice models

See for example the presentation by [Wolpin \(AER, 1996\)](#).

At each date  $t$  discrete, an individual has to choose one action among  $K$  possible actions.

Let

$$d_k(t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } k \text{ is the chosen action,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let  $d(t) = (d_1(t), \dots, d_K(t))$  or  $d(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K k d_k(t)$  be the choice variable.

Let  $S(t) \in \mathcal{S}$  be the state variable (i.e; the information at the beginning of period  $t$  when the action is chosen). Assume  $\mathcal{S}$  discrete:  $\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, \dots, s_N\}$  (in any case the computer will require a discrete state space).

Action  $k$  yields payoff  $R_k(S(t), t)$ .

The state transition probability matrix is

$$p_{ij}(k, t) = \Pr \{S(t+1) = s_j | S(t) = s_i, d_k(t) = 1\}.$$

## Strategies

A strategy is a sequence of functions

$$\begin{aligned} D(\cdot, t) : \mathcal{S} &\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^K \\ s &\mapsto D(s, t) = (D_1(s, t), \dots, D_K(s, t)) \end{aligned}$$

Individuals seek for the strategy  $D$  to maximise the expected discounted sum of future payoffs:

$$V(S(t), t) = \max_{D(\cdot, \cdot)} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{\tau=t}^T \beta^{\tau-t} \sum_{k=1}^K D_k(S(\tau), \tau) R_k(S(\tau), \tau) \middle| S(t) \right].$$

## Bellman principle

Write, for  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ ,

$$V(s, t) = \max \{V_1(s, t), \dots, V_K(s, t)\}$$

where  $V_k(s, t)$  is the present value if action  $k$  is chosen at  $t$  when  $S(t) = s$ :

$$V_k(s, t) = R_k(S(t), t) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S(t+1), t+1) | S(t) = s, d_k(t) = 1]$$

and

$$V_k(s, T) = R_k(s, T).$$

The optimal strategy is

$$D_k(s, t) = 1 \text{ iff } V_k(s, t) = \max \{V_1(s, t), \dots, V_K(s, t)\}$$

and then

$$V(s, t) = \sum_{k=1}^K D_k(s, t) V_k(s, t).$$

## Solution

Start from terminal period  $T$  and, for all  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ , determine the action which maximises payoff  $R_k(s, T)$ :

$$D_k(s, T) = 1 \text{ iff } R_k(s, T) = \max \{R_1(s, T), \dots, R_K(s, T)\}$$

and

$$V(s, T) = \sum_{k=1}^K D_k(s, T) R_k(s, T).$$

Then determine  $D(s, t)$  recursively: for all  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ ,

$$D_k(s, t) = 1 \text{ iff } V_k(s, t) = \max \{V_1(s, t), \dots, V_K(s, t)\}$$

where, for all  $s_1, \dots, s_N$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} V_k(s_i, t) &= R_k(s_i, t) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S(t+1), t+1) | S(t) = s_i, d_k(t) = 1] \\ &= R_k(s, t) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N p_{ij}(k, t) \underbrace{V(s_j, t+1)}_{= \sum_{k=1}^K D_k(s_j, t+1) V_k(s_j, t+1)} \end{aligned}$$

Curse of dimensionality: huge number of computations and large memory size required to compute

$V_k(s, t) \forall k, s, t$ .

## Estimation

**Parameters:** in the payoff functions  $R_k(s, t)$  and transition probabilities  $p_{ij}(k, t)$ .

**Inference:** maximum likelihood or (simulated) method of moments.

**Data:** individual sequences  $y^h = \{x^h(t_0^h), d^h(t_0^h), x^h(t_0^h + 1), d^h(t_0^h + 1), \dots, x^h(t_1^h), d^h(t_1^h)\}$  for individuals  $h = 1, \dots, H$  and  $t \in \{t_0^h, t_0^h + 1, \dots, t_1^h\}$ , where  $x^h(t) \in \{x_1, \dots, x_I\}$  is the observed part of the state variables, i.e.  $S^h(t) = (x^h(t), \varepsilon^h(t))$ , with the following...

**...Assumptions on the process of shocks  $\varepsilon^h(t)$ :**

- $\varepsilon^h(t) = (\varepsilon_1^h(t), \dots, \varepsilon_K^h(t))$  iid;
- $R_k(S^h(t), t) = \bar{R}_k(x^h(t), t) + \varepsilon_k^h(t)$ ;
- **conditional independence:**

$$\Pr \{x^h(t+1), \varepsilon^h(t+1) | x^h(t), \varepsilon^h(t), d_k^h(t) = 1\} = \Pr(\varepsilon^h(t+1)) \\ \times \underbrace{\Pr \{x^h(t+1) = x_j | x^h(t) = x_i, d_k^h(t) = 1\}}_{\equiv \bar{p}_{ij}(k, t)}.$$

## Likelihood

The conditional likelihood of  $y^h$  given  $x^h(t_0^h)$  is

$$\begin{aligned} \ell(y^h|x^h(t_0^h)) &= \Pr \{d^h(t_0^h)|x^h(t_0^h)\} \times \Pr \{x^h(t_0^h + 1)|x^h(t_0^h), d^h(t_0^h)\} \\ &\quad \times \Pr \{d^h(t_0^h + 1)|x^h(t_0^h + 1)\} \times P \{x^h(t_0^h + 2)|x^h(t_0^h + 1), d^h(t_0^h + 1)\} \\ &\quad \times \dots \times \Pr \{d^h(t_1^h)|x^h(t_1^h)\} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\Pr \{d_k^h(t) = 1|x^h(t)\} = \Pr \{\varepsilon^h(t) \text{ s.t. } D_k(x^h(t), \varepsilon^h(t), t) = 1|x^h(t)\}.$$

The conditional likelihood of the sample is

$$\prod_{h=1}^H \ell(y^h|x^h(t_0^h)).$$

## Choice probabilities

$$\Pr \{d_k^h(t) = 1 | x^h(t) = x_i\} = \Pr \{\varepsilon_k^h(t) \geq \varepsilon_m^h(t) + \bar{V}_m(x_i, t) - \bar{V}_k(x_i, t), \forall m \neq k | x^h(t) = x_i\}.$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{V}_k(x_i, t) &= \bar{R}_k(x_i, t) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N \bar{p}_{ij}(k, t) \bar{V}(s_j, t+1), \\ \bar{p}_{ij}(k, t) &= \Pr \{x^h(t+1) = x_j | x^h(t) = x_i, d_k^h(t) = 1\}, \\ \bar{V}(x_j, t+1) &= \mathbb{E} \max_{k=1}^K \{\bar{V}_k(x_j, t+1) + \varepsilon_k^h(t+1)\}. \end{aligned}$$

For instance, for  $(X_1, X_2)$  Gaussian,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \max \{X_1, X_2\} &= X_2 + \mathbb{E} \max \{X_1 - X_2, 0\} \\ &= m_2 + (m_1 - m_2) \Phi \left( \frac{m_1 - m_2}{\sigma} \right) + \sigma \varphi \left( \frac{m_1 - m_2}{\sigma} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\sigma = \text{Std}(X_1 - X_2) = \sqrt{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 - 2\rho\sigma_1\sigma_2}$ .



## Two stage estimation

One can proceed in two stages to save computer time, although at the cost of some efficiency loss.

1. Maximise partial likelihood of state changes:

$$\prod_{h=1}^H \Pr \{x^h(t_0^h + 1) | x^h(t_0^h), d^h(t_0^h)\} \Pr \{x^h(t_0^h + 2) | x^h(t_0^h + 1), d^h(t_0^h + 1)\} \\ \cdots \Pr \{x^h(t_1^h) | x^h(t_1^h - 1), d^h(t_1^h - 1)\},$$

with respect to parameters of  $\Pr \{x(t + 1) | x(t), d(t), t\}$ .

2. Maximise the likelihood of the sequence of decisions:

$$\prod_{h=1}^H \Pr \{d^h(t_0^h) | x^h(t_0^h)\} \times \cdots \times \Pr \{d^h(t_1^h) | x^h(t_1^h)\}$$

using the estimated  $\Pr \{x(t + 1) | x(t), d(t), t\}$  to compute the present value functions necessary to calculate choice probabilities.

## Unobserved heterogeneity

The two-stage estimation procedure does not work if there exists unobserved heterogeneity.

Assume that  $S^h(t) = (x^h(t), \varepsilon^h(t), \mu^h)$  where  $\mu^h \in \{1, \dots, M\}$  indicates a particular way of grouping individuals. All individuals with the same  $\mu^h$  have a specific value of the parameters governing payoff functions and state probabilities.

Let  $\Pr \{\mu^h = m\} = \pi_m$ ,  $m \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ .

The likelihood becomes

$$\prod_{h=1}^H \ell(y^h | x^h(t_0^h)) = \prod_{h=1}^H \left( \sum_{m=1}^M \pi_m \ell(y^h | x^h(t_0^h), m) \right)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \ell(y^h | x^h(t_0^h), \mu^h) &= \Pr \{d^h(t_0^h) | x^h(t_0^h), \mu^h\} \times \Pr \{x^h(t_0^h + 1) | x^h(t_0^h), \mu^h, d^h(t_0^h)\} \\ &\times \Pr \{d^h(t_0^h + 1) | x^h(t_0^h + 1), \mu^h\} \times \Pr \{x^h(t_0^h + 2) | x^h(t_0^h + 1), \mu^h, d^h(t_0^h + 1)\} \\ &\times \dots \times \Pr \{d^h(t_1^h) | x^h(t_1^h), \mu^h\}. \end{aligned}$$

## EM algorithm

Let  $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_H)$  be a vector of observations. Let  $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_H)$  be unobserved covariates. The likelihood of  $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$  is  $f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta)$ .

Since  $\mathbf{z}$  is not observed one estimates  $\theta$  by maximizing the integrated likelihood:

$$f(\mathbf{y}; \theta) = \int f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta) \mu(d\mathbf{z}).$$

This integral may be difficult to compute and the numerical approximation may yield unstable Newton-type optimisation algorithms (numerical errors accumulate instead of averaging). The EM algorithm is often preferable.

The EM algorithm iterates the following steps until numerical convergence (generally slowly)

$$\theta^{(p)} = \arg \max_{\theta} Q(\theta | \theta^{(p-1)}),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} Q(\theta | \theta^{(p-1)}) &= \mathbb{E} \left[ \ln f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta) | \mathbf{y}; \theta^{(p-1)} \right] \\ &= \int p \left\{ \mathbf{z} | \mathbf{y}; \theta^{(p-1)} \right\} \ln f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta) \mu(d\mathbf{z}). \end{aligned}$$

Each iteration increases the likelihood and converges toward a local maximum of the likelihood.

## EM algorithm: discrete mixtures

Assume  $z_i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$  and  $\pi_m = \Pr\{z_i = m\}$ .

Then  $\theta = (\beta, \pi)$  where  $\beta$  indexes  $f(y_i|z_i; \beta)$  and  $\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_M)$ .

We have

$$f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^H f(y_i, z_i; \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^H \left[ \sum_{m=1}^M \pi_m f(y_i|z_i = m; \beta) \right].$$

**Step E (expectation):** Use Bayes rule to compute posterior probabilities:

$$p\{z_i = m|y_i; \theta^{(p-1)}\} = \frac{\pi_m^{(p-1)} f(y_i|z_i = m; \beta^{(p-1)})}{\sum_{m=1}^M \pi_m^{(p-1)} f(y_i|z_i = m; \beta^{(p-1)})}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} Q(\theta|\theta^{(p-1)}) &= \int p\{\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{y}; \theta^{(p-1)}\} \ln f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}; \theta) \mu(d\mathbf{z}) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^H \sum_{m=1}^M p\{z_i = m|y_i; \theta^{(p-1)}\} \ln [\pi_m f(y_i|z_i = m; \beta)]. \end{aligned}$$

**Step M (maximisation):** Update  $\beta$  by constrained ML:

$$\beta^{(p)} = \arg \max_{\beta} \sum_{i=1}^H \sum_{m=1}^M p \left\{ z_i = m | y_i; \theta^{(p-1)} \right\} \ln f(y_i | z_i = m; \beta),$$

(i.e. duplicate individual observations  $K$  times and affect a weight equal to posterior probability  $p \left\{ z_i = m | y_i; \theta^{(p-1)} \right\}$ ) and update  $\pi$  as

$$\pi_m^{(p)} = \frac{1}{H} \sum_{i=1}^H p \left\{ z_i = m | y_i; \theta^{(p-1)} \right\}.$$

## Application: education and career choice

See for example the presentation by Keane et Wolpin (*JPE*, 1997).

Model of education and career choices.

- **Data:** 11-year panel (National Longitudinal Survey of Youths): cohort of youths aged 16 in 1979 and followed until 1990.
- **Objective:** evaluate policy effects such as education subsidies.
- **Population studied** is a cohort of individuals starting at the age of 16 and retiring at 65.
- **Choices:** blue collar worker ( $k = 1$ ), white collar worker ( $k = 2$ ), military ( $k = 3$ ), education ( $k = 4$ ) or inactivity ( $k = 5$ ).

## Model

- Payoffs associated to choices  $k = 1, 2, 3$  are the corresponding wages, the log of which are

$$\ln R_k(t) = e_k(16) + e_{k1}EDUC(t) + e_{k2}EXP_k(t) - e_{k3}[EXP_k(t)]^2 + \varepsilon_k(t)$$

where  $e_k(16)$  is the intercept (initial condition),  $EDUC(t)$  is the number of years of education,  $EXP_k(t)$  is occupation- $k$  specific experience (= nb of years spent working as  $k$ ; with  $EXP_k(16) = 0$ ).

- Education's instantaneous payoff (or cost if negative):

$$R_4(t) = e_4(16) - c_1 \underbrace{\mathbf{1}[EDUC(t) \geq 12]}_{\text{HS graduate}} - c_2 \underbrace{\mathbf{1}[EDUC(t) \geq 16]}_{\text{college graduate}} + \varepsilon_4(t).$$

- Leisure utility:

$$R_5(t) = e_5(16) + \varepsilon_5(t).$$

- State variable:  $S(t) = (e(16), EDUC(t), EXP(t), \varepsilon(t))$  with

$$\begin{cases} e(16) = (e_1(16), \dots, e_5(16)), \\ EXP(t) = (EXP_1(t), EXP_2(t), EXP_3(t)), \\ \varepsilon(t) = (\varepsilon_1(t), \dots, \varepsilon_5(t)). \end{cases}$$

## Model (continued)

- Heterogeneity  $\mu$

- four groups  $m = 1, 2, 3, 4$ .

- $e(16) = (e_1(16), \dots, e_5(16))$  group-specific.

- as  $EDUC(16) = 9$  or  $10$ , assume different proportions of each type given  $EDUC(16)$ :

$$\Pr \{ \mu = m | EDUC(16) \} \equiv \pi_{m, EDUC(16)}.$$

- State probabilities:

- $\varepsilon(t) = (\varepsilon_1(t), \dots, \varepsilon_5(t))$  iid and  $\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Omega)$ , with  $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_k(t), \varepsilon_\ell(t)) = 0$  for  $\ell$  or  $k \geq 4$  (i.e. only  $\varepsilon_1(t), \varepsilon_2(t), \varepsilon_3(t)$  corresponding to employment spells are correlated).

- Education:  $EDUC(t+1) = EDUC(t) + d_4(t)$ .

- Expérience:  $EXP_k(t+1) = EXP_k(t) + d_k(t)$ .

- Value functions:

$$V_k(S(t), t) = R_k(t) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S(t+1), t+1) | d_k(t) = 1]$$

where  $\varepsilon(t+1)$  is the only risk factor (not predetermined) in  $V(S(t+1), t+1)$  given  $d(t)$ .



## Value functions

$$V_k(S(t), t) = R_k(t) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S(t+1), t+1) | d_k(t) = 1]$$

where  $\varepsilon(t+1)$  is the only risk factor (not predetermined) in  $V(S(t+1), t+1)$  given  $d(t)$ , a

- Pour  $k = 1, 2, 3$ ,

$$\begin{cases} EXP_\ell(t+1) = EXP_\ell(t) + \mathbf{1}(\ell = k), \ell = 1, 2, 3, \\ EDUC(t+1) = EDUC(t). \end{cases}$$

- Pour  $k = 4$ ,

$$\begin{cases} EXP_\ell(t+1) = EXP_\ell(t), \ell = 1, 2, 3, \\ EDUC(t+1) = EDUC(t) + 1. \end{cases}$$

- Pour  $k = 5$ ,

$$\begin{cases} EXP_\ell(t+1) = EXP_\ell(t), \ell = 1, 2, 3, \\ EDUC(t+1) = EDUC(t). \end{cases}$$

## Likelihood

- **Individual observations:**  $y^h(t) = (d^h(t), w^h(t))$ ,  $t = 16, \dots, 26$ , where  $d^h(t) = (d_1^h(t), \dots, d_5^h(t))$  is occupation choice and  $w^h(t) = \sum_{k=1}^3 d_k^h(t) R_k^h(t)$  is current wage (missing if not working).
- Sample likelihood:

$$L = \prod_{h=1}^H \left[ \sum_{m=1}^H \pi_{m, EDUC^h(16)} \ell^h(y^h(16), \dots, y^h(26) | e^h(16), EDUC^h(16)) \right].$$

- Likelihood for individual  $h$ :

$$\ell^h(y^h(16), y^h(17), \dots, y^h(26) | e^h(16), EDUC^h(16)) = \prod_{t=16}^{26} \ell^h(y^h(t) | e^h(16), EDUC^h(t), EXP^h(t)).$$

## Likelihood (continued)

Likelihood for individual  $h$  at time  $t$ :  $\ell^h(y^h(t)|e^h(16), EDUC^h(t), EXP^h(t))$  is computed as follows (we omit conditioning to simplify notations).

Different as general studied above as the wage information tells us about shocks  $\varepsilon_k^h(t)$ .

- Case  $d^h(t) = k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ : one thus knows that  $w^h(t) = R_k^h(t)$  and  $V_k(S(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S(t), t)$ ,  $\ell \neq k$ :

$$\ell^h(y^h(t)) = \Pr \left\{ V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t), \forall \ell \neq k \mid \underbrace{R_k^h(t) = w^h(t)}_{\text{determines } \varepsilon_k^h(t)} \right\} \times \underbrace{\text{pdf} \{R_k^h(t) = w^h(t)\}}_{\text{i.e. density of } R_k^h(t) \text{ at observation } w^h(t)} .$$

- Other cases: one only knows that  $V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t)$ ,  $\ell \neq k$ :

$$\ell^h(y^h(t)) = \Pr \{ V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t), \forall \ell \neq k \} .$$

Likelihood (continued)

Given  $e^h(16)$ ,  $EDUC^h(t)$ ,  $EXP^h(t)$ ,

$$\text{pdf} \{R_k^h(t) = w^h(t)\} = \frac{1}{w^h(t)} \frac{1}{\sigma_k} \varphi \left( \frac{\overbrace{\ln w^h(t) - e_k(16) - e_{k1}EDUC(t) - e_{k2}EXP_k(t) + e_{k3}[EXP_k(t)]^2}^{\varepsilon_k^h(t)}}{\sigma_k} \right)$$

where  $\sigma_k^2 = \text{Var}(\varepsilon_k(t))$ , and

$$\Pr \{V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t), \forall \ell \neq k \mid \varepsilon_k^h(t)\} = \Pr \{\varepsilon_\ell^h(t) \leq g_\ell(t), \forall \ell \neq k \mid \varepsilon_k(t)\}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g_\ell(t) &= \ln \left( V_k(S^h(t), t) - \beta \mathbb{E} [V(S^h(t+1), t+1) \mid d_\ell(t) = 1] \right) \\ &\quad - e_\ell(16) - e_{\ell 1}EDUC(t) - e_{\ell 2}EXP_k(t) + e_{\ell 3}[EXP_k(t)]^2, \quad \ell = 1, 2, 3, \\ g_4(t) &= V_k(S^h(t), t) - e_4(16) - c_1 \mathbf{1} [EDUC(t) \geq 12] - c_2 \mathbf{1} [EDUC(t) \geq 16], \\ g_5(t) &= V_k(S^h(t), t) - e_5(16). \end{aligned}$$

One has to compute the cdf of a vector of 4 normal r.v.'s. (Computation simplified by the fact that  $\varepsilon_4^h(t)$  and  $\varepsilon_5^h(t)$  are assumed independent and independent of  $\varepsilon_1^h(t)$ ,  $\varepsilon_2^h(t)$  and  $\varepsilon_3^h(t)$ ).

Lastly,  $\Pr \{V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t), \forall \ell \neq k\}$  can be computed by numerical integration of  $\Pr \{V_k(S^h(t), t) \geq V_\ell(S^h(t), t), \forall \ell \neq k\}$  w.r.t.  $\varepsilon_k^h(t)$ .

## Results

See article.

The fit is excellent.

They find a very limited effect of college tuition subsidies (exogenous change in  $c_2$ ).