INFERENCE OF SIGNS OF INTERACTION EFFECTS IN SIMULTANEOUS GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

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This paper studies the inference of interaction effects in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose a test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects that does not require parametric specifications of players’ payoffs, the distributions of their private signals, or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption that players’ private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure is valid in (but does not rely on) the presence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process (DGP). As a by-product, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the DGP. We also implement the test using data on radio programming of commercial breaks in the United States, and infer stations’ incentives to synchronize their commercial breaks. Our results support the earlier finding by Sweeting (2009) that stations have stronger incentives to coordinate and air commercials at the same time during rush hours and in smaller markets.

KEYWORDS: Multiple equilibria, identification, Bayesian games, multiple testing.

1. INTRODUCTION

STRATEGIC INTERACTION EFFECTS occur when a player’s action choice affects not only his or her own payoff but also those of other players. In simultaneous discrete games of incomplete information, each person has a private signal about his or her payoff, while the joint distribution of such private signals is common knowledge among all players. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), individuals act to maximize their expected payoffs given their knowledge of these distributions and the payoff structure. Such models have found applications in a variety of empirical contexts where players are uncertain about their competitors’ payoffs given their own information. These in-

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2Recent work by Grieco (2010) studied a class of games with flexible information structures that also subsume games with complete information where players know each other’s payoffs for sure. In a similar spirit, Navarro and Takahashi (2009) suggested a test for the information structure that, among other things, relies on a degenerate equilibrium selection rule and independence between residuals and observed covariates. Other papers have also dealt with unobserved heterogeneity across games which is observed by players but not econometricians (e.g., Sweeting (2009), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), and Arcidiacono and Miller (2010), these last two in a dynamic setting).
clude, for example, airing commercials at radio stations (Sweeting (2009)) and peer effects in recommendations by financial analysts (Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010)).

Earlier works have studied the identification and estimation of these games using a wide spectrum of restrictions. These include (but are not limited to) the independence of private signals from observable covariates, parametric specification of relevant distributions or utility functions, or constraints on the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria. In comparison, we focus on inference of the signs of interaction effects, which are allowed to be individual-specific and state-dependent, under a minimal set of nonparametric restrictions on private signals and payoff structures. Our choice of focus is motivated by two considerations. First, signs of interaction effects alone may have important policy implications. For example, if agents have an incentive to coordinate on a particular action, then interventions that induce a subset of participants to choose a certain action should at the same time also incentivize other players to act accordingly. Second, while point identification and estimation of the full structure of such games inevitably hinge on parametric restrictions, inference on signs of interaction effects can be done under minimal nonparametric restrictions on the structure. Such inference is valid even in the presence of multiple equilibria and does not invoke any assumptions on the equilibrium selection mechanism in the data-generating process. This is particularly notable, since almost all previous work has relied on stringent assumptions about equilibrium selection or multiplicity to attain identification (e.g., the single-equilibrium assumption in Bajari et al. (2010) and Tang (2010), equilibrium uniqueness in Seim (2006) or Aradillas-Lopez (2010), the restriction to monotone, threshold-crossing Bayesian Nash equilibria of Wan and Xu (2010), or the symmetry of equilibria and payoff functions, and parametrization of equilibrium selection mechanisms as in Sweeting (2009)).

The intuition that multiple equilibria can be helpful in identifying model primitives appears, for example, in Manski (1993) and in Sweeting (2009). We show formally how the multiplicity in the data can be exploited to infer the signs of strategic interactions. If players’ private signals are independent of each other given observed covariates, then their chosen actions must be uncorrelated in any single equilibrium. On the other hand, if multiple equilibria exist in the data, then the joint distribution of actions observed is a mixture of those implied in each single equilibrium. This leads to correlations between

As indicated in Berry and Tamer (2007), another possibility is to resort to partial identification. Examples of such a strategy in games of complete and incomplete information are Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2009), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Galichon and Henry (2009), Grieco (2010), and earlier references cited in Berry and Tamer (2007). Also in games of complete information, Bjorn and Vuong (1984) parameterized the equilibrium selection mechanism.

“The prospects for identification may improve if \( f(\cdot, \cdot) \) is nonlinear in a manner that generates multiple social equilibria” (Manski (1993, p. 539)).
the players’ actions observed from data. We show further in Section 3 that signs of correlations between players’ actions are determined by the signs of the strategic interaction effects. As a by-product, the correlations also allow us to identify the existence of multiple equilibria in the data (see below). The assumption of conditional independence of private information is commonly maintained in the literature on estimation and inference in static games with incomplete information and social interaction models (see, e.g., Seim (2006), Aradillas-Lopez (2010), Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari et al. (2010), Bajari, Hahn, Hong, and Ridder (2011), Brock and Durlauf (2007), Sweeting (2009), and Tang (2010)).\footnote{In a subsection, Aradillas-Lopez (2010) suggested an estimation procedure to handle cases in which the assumption is violated, but relies on the assumption that a single equilibrium is played in the data. Another exception is Wan and Xu (2010), who nevertheless also require that a unique (monotone) Bayesian Nash equilibrium be played in the data.} The assumption can also be found in the literature on the estimation of dynamic games with incomplete information.

We also generalize these arguments for identifying the signs of interaction effects to allow for the possibility that in the data there is only a unique equilibrium for a given state. The idea relies on the following simple intuition. Suppose that for some player $i$ there exists a subvector of state variables that affect other players’ payoffs or private signals but not his or her own. Then the sign of the correlation between actions chosen by $i$ and others across different realizations of such “excluded” states must be solely determined by how others’ actions affect $i$’s payoffs, provided the private signals are independent given observed states. Such exclusion restrictions on state variables arise naturally in many applications and have been used before in similar contexts.

Another contribution of this paper is to introduce a formal test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. Testing for multiple equilibria is of practical importance in empirical research, because existing estimation methods often rely on the occurrence of a single equilibrium in the data. The test we propose is a natural outcome of the logic used in our inference of the signs of interaction effects. An innovation of our test for multiple equilibria is to use a stepwise multiple testing procedure proposed by Romano and Wolf (2005) to infer whether each individual player has different strategies across the multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. This is particularly interesting for structural estimation of games involving three or more players, in which a subset of players may stick to the same strategy across multiple equilibria. Semiparametric methods based on the assumption of a unique equilibrium can still be applied to consistently estimate payoff parameters for those players who do not use different strategies across multiple equilibria. Hence, it is useful to infer the identity of such players from observed distributions of actions. Our test is known to effectively control the probability of rejecting at least one of the true single null hypotheses.

For a parametric model with state-independent interaction effects, Sweeting (2009) proposed two procedures to check for multiple symmetric equilibria.
in the data. The first is based on calculating the percentage of pairs of players whose actions are correlated. The other is a test of the null of a unique BNE against the alternative of exactly two BNE in the data using maximum likelihood estimates. In comparison, we develop stronger and new results by extending this intuition in a more general context. The most important distinction is that our test can be applied in cases where asymmetric equilibria may arise due to heterogeneities in players’ payoffs, and individual-specific interaction effects may depend on the states in unrestricted ways. Our test addresses several additional subtle issues. First, our test for multiple BNE in the data is based on testing whether each individual’s action is correlated with an aggregate measure of competitors’ actions. Therefore, our test has power under alternatives in which multiple BNE exist in the data with only a small number of players using different strategies across the multiple equilibria. Second, our approach does not require knowledge of the number of equilibria under the alternative. Third, as mentioned before, our procedure can be used to infer the exact identities of players who adopt multiple equilibrium strategies in the data.

We apply our methodology to investigate radio stations’ incentives to coordinate on commercial breaks using the data from Sweeting (2009). Relaxing the parametric and symmetry assumptions in Sweeting’s paper, we confirm his findings that incentives to coordinate are stronger during rush hour and in smaller markets.

The paper proceeds as follows. We present our basic model and empirical characterization in the next section. In Section 3, we present the main results on the identification of the sign of interaction effects. Section 4 outlines general testing procedures for inference. Monte Carlo experiments and an application to the timing of radio commercials are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.

2. THE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT

We consider a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information involving \( N \) players. Each player \( i \) chooses an action \( D_i \) from two alternatives \( \{1, 0\} \). A vector of states \( X \in \mathbb{R}^K \) is common knowledge among all players. A vector of private information (or “types/signals”) \( \varepsilon \equiv (\varepsilon_i)_{i \leq N} \in \mathbb{R}^N \) is such that \( \varepsilon_i \) is only observed by player \( i \). Throughout the paper, we use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realized values. We use \( \Omega_R \) to denote the support of any generic random vector \( R = (R_1, R_2) \), and let \( F_R \) and \( F_{R_1|R_2} \) denote, respectively, the marginal and conditional distributions in the data-generating process (DGP). Conditional on a given state \( X = x \),

\(^6\)In the working paper version (De Paula and Tang (2011)), we also showed that our test can be extended to allow for correlated private signals if researchers know a priori groups of observed games within which the same equilibrium is played.
private information $\varepsilon$ is jointly distributed according to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) $F_{\varepsilon|x}(\cdot|x)$. The payoff for player $i$ from choosing action 1 is $U_1(X, \varepsilon_i) \equiv u_i(X) + (\sum_{j \neq i} D_j) \delta_i(X) - \varepsilon_i$, while the return from the other action $U_0(X, \varepsilon_i)$ is normalized to 0. Intuitively, $u_i(X)$ specifies a base return from action 1 for player $i$. Meanwhile $\delta_i(X)$ captures interaction effects on $i$’s payoff due to another player $j$ who chooses 1. The return functions $(u_i, \delta_i)_{i=1}^N$ and the distribution of private information $F_{\varepsilon|x}$ are common knowledge among all players. We maintain the following identifying restrictions on $F_{\varepsilon|x}$ throughout.

**Assumption 1:** Conditional on any $x \in \Omega_X$, $F_{\varepsilon|x}(\cdot|x) = \prod_{i \in [N]} F_{\varepsilon_i|x}(\cdot|x)$ and has positive density over $\mathbb{R}^N$.

Assumption 1 requires that the $\varepsilon_i$’s be mutually independent conditional on $X = x$. It allows $X$ to be correlated with private information of the players, as is plausible in empirical applications. This conditional independence restriction is commonly used in the estimation literature for both static and dynamic games with incomplete information. A pure strategy for player $i$ in this Bayesian game is a mapping $s_i: \Omega_X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Letting $S_i(x, \varepsilon_i)$ denote an equilibrium strategy for player $i$, the equilibrium behavior prescribes

$$S_i(X, \varepsilon_i) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } u_i(X) + \delta_i(X) \sum_{j \neq i} \mathbb{E}[S_j(X, \varepsilon_j)|X, \varepsilon_i] - \varepsilon_i \geq 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Under Assumption 1, $\mathbb{E}[S_j(X, \varepsilon_j)|X = x, \varepsilon_i] = \mathbb{E}[S_j(X, \varepsilon_j)|X = x] \equiv p_j(x)$, and a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in pure strategies (given state $x$) can be characterized by a profile of choice probabilities $p(x) \equiv [p_1(x), \ldots, p_N(x)]$ such that for all $x \in \Omega_X$,

$$p_i(x) = F_{\varepsilon_i|x=x}(u_i(x) + \delta_i(x) \sum_{j \neq i} p_j(x)) \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \ldots, N, \tag{1}$$

where $p_i(x)$ is player $i$’s probability of choosing action 1 conditional on the state $x$ and $F_{\varepsilon_i|x}$ is the marginal distribution of $\varepsilon_i$ conditional on $X$. Let $L_{x, \theta}$ denote the set of BNE (as summarized by solutions in $p$ in (1)) for a given $x$ and structure $\theta \equiv \{(u_i, \delta_i)_{i=1,\ldots,N}, F_{\varepsilon|x}\}$. The existence of pure-strategy BNE for any given $x$ follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and the continuity of $F_{\varepsilon|x}$ under Assumption 1. In general there may be multiple BNE, depending on the specifications of $F_{\varepsilon|x}$, $u_i$, and $\delta_i$.

The model specification rules out general heterogeneous interaction effects that may vary with the identities of each pair of competing players (e.g., $\delta_{ij}$). Nonetheless, we can extend our inference approach to allow players’ payoffs to be affected by competitors’ decisions in general forms that are known to
researchers (see discussions in Section 3 and the Supplemental Material (de Paula and Tang (2012))). This would be the case, for example, if payoffs depend on the proportion (instead of the sum) of agents taking an action, or on the action of at least one other person but not on the action of additional agents beyond that (i.e., \( f_i(x, D_{-i}) = \max_{j \neq i}(D_j) \)), or even if it changes only when all competitors take a particular action (i.e., \( f_i(x, D_{-i}) = \min_{j \neq i}(D_j) \)).

This model differs qualitatively from the social interaction model studied in Brock and Durlauf (2007) and that in Sweeting (2009) in that it allows for asymmetry in players’ payoff functions and equilibria. Thus, even when payoffs are symmetric, we allow for asymmetric BNE where the implied choice probabilities could vary across players, and multiple asymmetric BNE can arise regardless of the signs of interaction effects. This makes detecting multiple BNE and signs of interaction effects both more interesting and more challenging.

We assume econometricians have access to a large cross section of independent games between \( N \) players. In each game, they observe choices of actions by all players and realized states \( x \), but do not observe \((\varepsilon_i)_{i \leq N}\) or know the form of \((u_i, \delta_i)_{i \leq N}\) and \( F_{\varepsilon|X} \). Our analysis posits (i) that the structure \((u_i, \delta_i)_{i \leq N}\) and \( F_{\varepsilon|X} \) is fixed across all games observed and (ii) that the choice data observed are generated by players following the pure strategies prescribed by BNE. Econometricians are interested in learning (at least some features of) the structure \((u_i, \delta_i)_{i \leq N}\) and \( F_{\varepsilon|X} \) from the observable joint distribution of \( X \) and \((D_i)_{i \leq N}\).

Suppose the choices observed in the data are known to be generated from a single BNE in the DGP for all \( x \in \Omega_X \). This may arise because either (a) the solution to (1) is unique or (b) the system of equations in (1) admits multiple solutions but the equilibrium selection in the DGP is degenerate in one of the multiple solutions. Then (1) offers a link between observable conditional choice patterns and structural elements \((u_i, \delta_i)_{i \leq N}, F_{\varepsilon|X}\). Estimation can then be done under various restrictions on \( u, \delta, \) and \( F_{\varepsilon|X} \) (see Aradillas-Lopez (2010), Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari et al. (2010), and Tang (2010) for more details). We say there are multiple BNE in DGP if there are several solutions to (1) and the equilibrium selection mechanism in the data is not degenerate at any one of them.

This link between observed choice patterns and structural elements may nonetheless break down when there are multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. To see this, let \( \Lambda_{x, \theta} \) be an equilibrium selection mechanism (i.e., a distribution over \( L_{x, \theta} \)) in the data-generating process that may depend on \( x \) and \( \theta \), but is independent of the vector of private information \((\varepsilon_i)_{i \leq N}\). That \( \Lambda \) depends on \( x \) but not realizations of \( \varepsilon_i \) captures the idea that only information commonly known to all players may plausibly affect which equilibrium is played in the data-generating process (see Myerson (1991, pp. 371–372)).

To simplify the notation, we drop subscripts \( \theta \) from \( \Lambda_{x, \theta} \) and \( L_{x, \theta} \) in the subsequent sections when there is no ambiguity. For any \( x \) such that \( L_x \) is not a singleton, the conditional choice probability observed in the data is a mixture
of the conditional choice probabilities implied by each pure-strategy BNE in $L_x$. That is, $p^*_i(x) = \int_{L_x} p'_i d\Lambda_x(p')$, where $p^*_i(x)$ is the actual marginal probability that $i$ chooses 1 conditional on $x$ observed from data and $p' = (p'_l)_{l \leq N}$ is a generic element in the set of possible BNE $L_x$, with $l$ indexing the equilibria in $L_x$ and $p'_i$ denoting the marginal probability for $i$ to choose 1 given $x$ (and the structure $\theta$) implied in equilibrium $l$. While, by definition, the fixed point characterization in (1) holds for every single BNE $p' \in L_x$, it does not necessarily hold for the vector of mixture marginals $p^* = (p^*_i)_{i \leq N}$ observed.

### 3. IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF INTERACTION EFFECTS

#### 3.1. The Basic Idea

We now show how to detect the presence of multiple BNE in the data-generating process and identify signs of interaction effects $\delta_i(x)$ for any $i$ given any $x$. The sign reveals the nature of strategic incentives among players. Compared with earlier works, our sign identification has several innovations and contributions. First, our test does not invoke any parametric restrictions on players’ preferences or distributions of private information. Second, it allows the strategic incentives (as captured by the sign of $\delta_i$) to be a function of states $x$. Third, our approach is robust to the presence of multiple BNE. In fact, while the existence of multiple BNE at first precludes complete identification of the structure, it does help identify the sign of interaction effects.

We first show how to detect multiple BNE in the data using observed distributions. Define

$$\gamma'_i(x) \equiv \mathbb{E}_l \left( \sum_{j \neq i} D_j \mid X = x \right) = \sum_{j \neq i} p'_j(x),$$

where $\mathbb{E}_l$ denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of $(D_i)_{i \leq N}$ induced in the equilibrium $p' \in L_x$. Define $\text{sign}(a)$ to be 1 if $a > 0$, $-1$ if $a < 0$, and 0 if $a = 0$. For any player $i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$, let $\tilde{\gamma}'_i(x)$ denote the conditional expectation of the product $D_i(\sum_{j \neq i} D_j)$ given $x$ observed in the data. That is, $\tilde{\gamma}'_i(x) \equiv \int_{p' \in L_x} p'_i(x) \gamma'_i(x) d\Lambda_x(p')$, where $\Lambda_x$ denotes the equilibrium-selection mechanism in the DGP. Let $p^*_i(x)$ be the actual probability that $i$ chooses 1 given $x$ observed in the data (i.e., $p^*_i(x) = \int_{p' \in L_x} p'_i(x) d\Lambda_x(p')$) and let $\gamma^*_i(x) \equiv \sum_{j \neq i} p^*_j(x)$. Let $L_x^+$ denote the subset of $L_x$ that occurs in the DGP with positive probability ($L_x^+ \equiv \{p' : \Lambda_x(p') > 0\}$). Multiple BNE exist in the DGP if $L_x^+$ is not a singleton.

**PROPOSITION 1:** Suppose Assumption 1 holds. (i) For any given $x$, multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process if and only if $\tilde{\gamma}'_i(x) \neq p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x)$ at least for some $i$. (ii) For all $i$ and $x$ such that $\tilde{\gamma}'_i(x) \neq p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x)$,

$$\text{sign}(\tilde{\gamma}'_i(x) - p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x)) = \text{sign}(\delta_i(x)).$$
PROOF: Under Assumption 1, $D_i$ must be independent of $\sum_{j \neq i} D_j$ conditional on $x$ in every single BNE $p'$ in $L_x$.

Sufficiency of (i). Suppose there is a unique BNE in the data-generating process; that is, $L^+_x$ is a singleton \{p'\}. Then $p^*_i(x) = p'_i(x)$, $\gamma^*_i(x) = \sum_{j \neq i} p'_j(x)$, and $\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) = p'_i(x) \sum_{j \neq i} p'_j(x)$ for all $i$ in state $x$. Hence $\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) = p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x)$ for all $i$.

Necessity of (i). Suppose $L^+_x$ is not a singleton in state $x$. Then there exist at least some $i$ and $p'_{i}, p'_{k} \in L^+_x$ such that $p'_{i} \neq p'_{k}$. Also note that for such a player $i$, $\delta_i(x)$ must necessarily be nonzero. By definition,

$$\Delta_i(x) \equiv \tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) - p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x) = \int_{p' \in L^+_x} p'_i(x) \gamma'_i(x) d\Lambda_x - \int_{p' \in L^+_x} p'_i(x) d\Lambda_x \int_{p' \in L^+_x} \gamma'_i(x) d\Lambda_x.$$  

Suppose $\delta_i(x) > 0$. The equilibrium characterization in (1) implies that there exists a strictly increasing function $h_i$ such that $\gamma'_i(x) = h_i(p'_i(x)) \equiv (F^{-1}_{u_i}(p'_i(x)) - u_i(x))/\delta_i(x)$ for each single $p'$ in $L^+_{x,\theta}$. Thus for $x$ given, (3) can be written as

$$\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) - p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x) = \int_{0}^{1} h_i(z) z d\tilde{\Lambda}_{i,x}(z) - \int_{0}^{1} z d\tilde{\Lambda}_{i,x}(z) \int_{0}^{1} h_i(z) d\tilde{\Lambda}_{i,x}(z),$$

where $z \equiv p'_i(x)$ and $\tilde{\Lambda}_{i,x}$ is a distribution of $p'_i(x)$ induced by the equilibrium selection mechanism $\Lambda_x$ defined on $L_x$. Thus (3) takes the simple form of the covariance of a random variable $z$ and a strictly increasing function of itself:

$$\text{cov}(Z, h_i(Z)) = \mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}(Z))(h_i(Z) - \mathbb{E}(h_i(Z)))]
= \mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}(Z))(h_i(Z) - h_i(\mathbb{E}(Z)))]
+ \mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}(Z))(h_i(\mathbb{E}(Z)) - \mathbb{E}(h_i(Z)))]
= \mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}(Z))(h_i(Z) - h_i(\mathbb{E}(Z)))] .$$

Because $h_i$ is strictly increasing in $[0, 1]$ for given $x$, we have $z_1 > z_2 \Rightarrow h_i(z_1) > h_i(z_2)$. Consequently, $(z - \mathbb{E}(Z))(h_i(z) - h_i(\mathbb{E}(Z))) > 0$ for any $z \neq \mathbb{E}(Z)$, and the covariance is strictly positive, provided the distribution $\tilde{\Lambda}_{i,x}$ is not degenerate on $L^+_x$. Hence $\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) - p^*_i(x) \gamma^*_i(x) > 0$ if multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process in state $x$. The case with $\delta_i(x) < 0$ is proved by

The form of $h_i$ may depend on $\theta$ and $x$ in general. We suppress this dependence for notational ease.
symmetric arguments. The proof of (ii) is already included in the proof of (i) above. \[ Q.E.D. \]

Part (i) of Proposition 1 can be exploited to devise a Wald test for multiple BNE under any given \( x \) in the DGP. We describe the test and discuss its asymptotic properties in the Supplemental Material. Part (ii) of the proposition suggests the sign of \( \delta_i(x) \) can be recovered from observed distributions provided \( i \) actively switches between multiple equilibrium strategies under \( x \) in DGP.

In some empirical contexts, players’ actions may have heterogeneous impacts on each others’ payoffs. Our arguments in Proposition 1 can be extended as long as econometricians know the role of these heterogeneities in strategic interactions. More specifically, we allow \( U_1(X, \varepsilon, \theta) = u_1(X) + \delta_i(X) f_i(X, D_{-i}) - \varepsilon_i \), where \( f_i(X, D_{-i}) \) is a known function that summarizes how individual actions affect interaction effects and \( \delta_i(x) \) is a baseline effect whose sign is to be inferred. We provide further details in the Supplemental Material.

### 3.2. Allowing for Unique BNE

The result in part (ii) of Proposition 1 shows that the sign of interaction effects for \( i \) under \( x \) can be recovered provided that there exist multiple BNE at \( x \) in the DGP and that \( i \) follows different strategies across these equilibria. This result does not warrant the identification of sign \( (\delta_i(x)) \) for all \( (i, x) \), because there can exist players who employ the same strategies across all equilibria under \( x \). This could happen when there is a unique BNE under state \( x \). It could also occur if the game involves three or more players and, for some player \( i \), all of the multiple BNE under \( x \) prescribe the same strategy. (That is, there is \( i \) with \( p_i^j = p_i^* \) for all \( p_i^j \) in \( \mathcal{L}_{i,0} \), so that \( \tilde{\gamma}_i(x) = p_i^*(x) \gamma_i^*(x) \).) The following example illustrates this possibility.

**Example 1—A Player Who Follows the Same Strategy in Multiple BNE:** Consider a simple 3-by-2 game with \( N = 3 \), where the identities of all three players are observable in data. Suppress the dependence on \( x \) for notational ease. Let \( u_1 = 0.5, u_2 = u_3 = 0.3611, \delta_i = -1, \) and \( \varepsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0.10, 0.25^2) \) for all \( i \). Then there exist at least two distinct BNE:

\[
\begin{align*}
p^a & \quad \text{with} \quad p_i^a = 0.0611, \quad p_2^a = 0.7756, \quad p_3^a = 0.0107; \\
p^b & \quad \text{with} \quad p_i^b = 0.0611, \quad p_2^b = 0.0107, \quad p_3^b = 0.7756.
\end{align*}
\]

In these two BNE (\( p^a \) and \( p^b \)), Player 1 chooses alternative 1 with the same probability in both BNE, while both players 2 and 3 play strategies that imply different choice probabilities in equilibrium (i.e., \( p_i^a = p_i^b \) for \( i = 2, 3 \)).
This issue can be solved if, for the \((i, x)\) considered, the signs or the magnitudes of the interaction effects are known to remain the same over a set of covariate realizations (for example, because of parameter constancy or, more generally, exclusion restrictions). In such cases, the researcher can pool information from games with heterogeneous covariates to help identify the signs of interaction effects for such a \((i, x)\). We consider these two scenarios for the rest of this subsection.

**Aggregating Data From Games With the Same Sign of \(\delta_i(x)\)**

Consider a simplified case where strategic interaction effects have the same sign for all \(x \in \Omega_X\) for some \(i\). Then \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(\cdot))\) is identified if and only if the set of states where \(i\) uses multiple BNE strategies in the DGP has a positive measure under \(F_X\). To see this, note that \(\delta_i(x) > (\leq) 0\) if \(\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) - p^*_i(x)\gamma^*_i(x) > (\leq) 0\). Furthermore, if \(\delta_i(x) > (\leq) 0\) and multiple equilibria are played in the DGP under \(x\), then \(\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) - p^*_i(x)\gamma^*_i(x) > (\leq) 0\). It then follows that if the set of \(x\) under which \(i\) adopts multiple BNE strategies occurs with positive probability, then the sign of \(E[\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(X) - p^*_i(X)\gamma^*_i(X)|X \in \omega_i]\) is the same as the sign of \(\delta_i(\cdot)\). On the other hand, if \(i\) sticks to a single BNE strategy for (\(F_X\)-almost) every \(x\), then \(\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(x) = p^*_i(x)\gamma^*_i(x)\) \(F_X\) almost everywhere and \(E[\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(X) - p^*_i(X)\gamma^*_i(X)] = 0\). The following corollary formalizes and generalizes this idea.

**Corollary 1:** Suppose Assumption 1 holds and there is a known set \(\omega_i\) such that \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(\cdot))\) remains the same for all \(x \in \omega_i\). Then (i) \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(\cdot))\) is recovered on \(\omega_i\) as the sign of \(E[\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(X) - p^*_i(X)\gamma^*_i(X)|X \in \omega_i]\) if

\[
\Pr\{x \in \omega_i: \text{i follows multiple BNE strategies at } x\} > 0
\]

and (ii) the condition in (4) holds if and only if

\[
E[\tilde{\gamma}^*_i(X)|X \in \omega_i] \neq E[p^*_i(X)\gamma^*_i(X)|X \in \omega_i].
\]

Corollary 1 shows that \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(x))\) can be identified even when there is a unique BNE at \(x\), as long as \(i\) employs multiple BNE strategies with positive probability over a set of \(x\) with \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(x)) = \text{sign}(\delta_i(x'))\). The corollary is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1.

**Aggregating Data From Games With the Same Size of \(\delta_i(x)\)**

So far, identification of \(\delta_i(x)\) has relied on the existence of multiple BNE. For the rest of this section, we consider a DGP where the BNE adopted at each \(x\) may be unique. We show that \(\text{sign}(\delta_i(x))\) can still be recovered in this case if an exclusion restriction holds. This strategy is also invoked in similar contexts in the literature. To understand this exclusion restriction, consider a game that involves \(N\) firms which make simultaneous entry or exit decisions. The vector
of states $X$ includes a subvector $\tilde{X}_0$ that consists of market- or sectorwide factors that affect the demand for firm products. $X$ also includes mutually exclusive subvectors $(\tilde{X}_i)_{i \leq N}$ with $\tilde{X}_i$ capturing firm-specific factors that only affect the profits for firm $i$ but none of its rivals. For example, $\tilde{X}_i$ may include labor costs or local regulations that pertain to the geographic location of $i$. The vector of private information $(\epsilon_i)_{i \leq N}$ may well capture all other firm-specific profit factors (such as idiosyncratic costs) that are unobservable to opponents and econometricians. If rivals’ idiosyncratic factors (such as labor costs) have no bearing on firm $i$’s profits in addition to $\tilde{X}_0$ and $\tilde{X}_i$, then $F_{\epsilon_i|X} = F_{\epsilon_i|\tilde{X}_i}$, where $X = (\tilde{X}_0, \tilde{X}_i)$. For each $(i, x)$, we refer to the set $Y_i(x_i) \equiv \{x': x'_i = x_i\}$ as the equivalence class for $i$ at $x$. We state the exclusion restriction assumption as follows.

**Assumption 2:** For all $i$, there exists a strict subvector of $X$ (denoted $X_i$) such that $u_i(x) = u_i(x_i)$, $\delta_i(x) = \delta_i(x_i)$, and $F_{\epsilon_i|X=x} = F_{\epsilon_i|X=x_i}$ for all $x$.

The main idea for identifying sign$(\delta_i(x))$ (even when $i$ only has a unique BNE strategy at each realization $x$) is based on three observations: (a) Player $i$ can adopt different BNE strategies as $u_j(x')$, $\delta_j(x')$, $F_{\epsilon_j|X=x'}$ vary over the equivalence class $Y_i(x_i)$. (b) By assumption, the $i$th equation characterizing equilibrium in (1) is the same for all $x'$ in $Y_i(x_i)$. (c) Opponents’ choice probabilities affect $i$’s choice probability across different $x'$ in $Y_i(x_i)$ only via the sign of the strategic interaction effect for $i$, which is the same for all $x'$ in $Y_i(x_i)$ under the exclusion restriction in Assumption 2. Consequently, if in response to her opponents’ equilibrium strategies, $i$ is induced to adopt different BNE strategies across games with different states in the equivalence class for $x$, then the sign of the correlation between actions by $i$ and competitors across these games identifies sign$(\delta_i(x))$ just as in our previous analysis.

Let $\Lambda^*_x$ be the probability distribution over equilibrium choice probability profiles in the equivalence class for $x_i$. It is obtained by integrating the equilibrium selection mechanism $\Lambda_x$ across the states in $Y_i(x_i)$ with respect to conditional distribution $F_{X|X \in Y_i(x_i)}$. That is, for any $A \subseteq [0, 1]^N$,

$$\Lambda^*_x(A) = \int_{\{x: L^+_x \cap A \neq \emptyset\}} \Lambda_x(L^+_x \cap A) dF_{X|X \in Y_i(x_i)}(x),$$

where $\Lambda_x$ denotes the equilibrium selection probabilities defined in Section 2. It is easy to verify that $\Lambda^*_x$ is a well defined distribution. Let its support be denoted by $L^+_x$.

The key condition for identifying $\delta_i(x)$ is that player $i$ adopts varying strategies across BNE in different games whose states belong to the equivalence class for $i$ at $x$. Formally, the distribution $\Lambda^*_x$ is nondegenerate in $i$’s dimension if $\exists t \in [0, 1]$ such that the support $L^+_x \subseteq \{p \in [0, 1]^N: p_i = t\}$. We give a simple illustration of Assumption 2 and the nondegeneracy condition in Design 2 of the
Monte Carlo section (Section 5). We also discuss this assumption in greater detail following Proposition 2. Let $g$ index independent games observed in data, and let $D_{i,g}$ denote the decision made by $i$ in game $g$. Define

$$
\Psi_i(x_i) \equiv \mathbb{E} \left[ D_{i,g} \left( \sum_{j \neq i} D_{j,g} \right) \bigg| X_g \in Y_i(x_i) \right] 
- \mathbb{E} [D_{i,g} | X_g \in Y_i(x)] \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j \neq i} D_{j,g} \bigg| X_g \in Y_i(x_i) \right].
$$

**Proposition 2:** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (i) at any $x$, \( \text{sign}(\delta_i(x)) = \text{sign}(\Psi_i(x_i)) \) for all $i$ if $\Lambda^*_x_i$ is nondegenerate in $i$’s dimension and (ii) $\Lambda^*_x_i$ is nondegenerate in $i$’s dimension if and only if $\Psi_i(x_i) \neq 0$.

**Proof:** Consider any pair of $(i, x)$ such that $\Lambda^*_x_i$ is not degenerate. The equations in (1) and Assumption 2 imply that there exists a function $h_i$ such that $\gamma_i(z) = h_i(p_i(z))$ for all $z \in Y_i(x_i)$ and $p_i \in \mathcal{L}^+_x$, where $h_i(\cdot) = (F_{x_i}(\cdot) - u_i(x))/\delta_i(x)$. The function $h_i$ summarizes the interdependence between $i$’s BNE strategies and those for $j \neq i$. If $\Lambda^*_x_i$ is nondegenerate in $i$’s dimension, then

$$
\Psi_i(x_i) = \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x_i} \mathbb{E} \left[ D_i \left( \sum_{j \neq i} D_j \right) \bigg| p, X \in Y_i(x_i) \right] d\Lambda^*_x_i 
- \left( \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x_i} \mathbb{E} [D_i | p, X \in Y_i(x_i)] d\Lambda^*_x_i \right) \cdot \left( \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x_i} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j \neq i} D_j \bigg| p, X \in Y_i(x_i) \right] d\Lambda^*_x_i \right)
= \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x} p_i \left( \sum_{j \neq i} p_j \right) d\Lambda^*_x_i - \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x} p_i d\Lambda^*_x_i \int_{p \in \mathcal{L}^*_x} \left( \sum_{j \neq i} p_j \right) d\Lambda^*_x_i,
$$

where $p \in [0, 1]^N$ denotes a generic characterization of BNE on the support $\mathcal{L}^*_x$. The first equality follows from the definition of $\Lambda^*_x_i$, and the second equality follows from independence between $D_i$ and $(D_j)_{j \neq i}$ conditional on the equilibrium played and on states being in the equivalence class. Because $h_i(\cdot)$ is the same for all $x \in Y_i(x_i)$ due to Assumption 2, (5) can be written as

$$
\Psi_i(x_i) = \int_0^1 p_i h_i(p_i) d\Lambda^*_x_i - \int_0^1 p_i d\Lambda^*_x_i \int_0^1 h_i(p_i) d\Lambda^*_x_i
$$

where $\Lambda^*_x_i$ is the marginal distribution of $p_i$ according to the joint distribution $\Lambda^*_x_i$. Finally, note that $h_i(\cdot)$ is increasing (or decreasing) over $[0, N - 1]$ if
\( \delta_i(x) > 0 \) (or < 0) for \( x \in Y_i(x_i) \). Hence the same argument as in Proposition 1 shows that for all \((i, x)\), \( \Psi_i(x_i) > 0 \) (or < 0) if \( \delta_i(x) > 0 \) (or < 0) and \( \Lambda^*_i \) is non-degenerate in \( i \)'s dimension. It also follows immediately from (6) that if \( \Lambda^*_i \) is degenerate in \( i \)'s dimension, then \( \Psi_i(x_i) = 0 \). \( \square \)

That the distribution \( \Lambda^*_i \) is non-degenerate in \( i \)'s dimension is a weak restriction given Assumption 2. For this to hold, it is necessary that \( \delta_i(x) \neq 0 \) and \( (u_j, \delta_j, F_{e_j|x}) \) for \( j \neq i \) vary over states in the equivalence class for \( i \). The non-degeneracy can fail in cases such as when player \( i \) does not interact with rivals at all at \( x \) (\( \delta_i(x) = 0 \)). Part (ii) of Proposition 2 suggests an immediate test for the nondegeneracy condition using observed distributions of states and actions. The example below shows how the nondegeneracy condition can hold for all \((i, x)\) under fairly intuitive restrictions.

**Example 2—Nondegeneracy for All \( i, x \):** Consider a 2-by-2 entry or exit game with incomplete information between firms 1 and 2 with state vector \( X \) which can be partitioned as \((X_0, X_1, X_2)\), where \( X_0 \) are market-level factors that affect profitability of the firms, and \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \) are firm-level characteristics for firms 1 and 2, respectively. Suppose \( \delta_i(x) \neq 0 \) for all \( i, x \), and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold with \( X_1 \equiv (X_0, X_1) \) and \( X_2 \equiv (X_0, X_2) \). Assume further that the interaction effects and the distribution of private information only depend on market-level factors \( X_0 \) (\( \delta_i(x_i) = \delta_i(x_0) \) and \( F_{e_i|x_i=x_i} = F_{e_i|x_0=x_0} \) for both \( i \) and all \( x_i \)). Then for \( i = 1, 2 \), the probability of entering (choosing action 1) in a BNE is given by

\[
p_i(x) = F_{e_i|x_0} (u_i(x_i) + \delta_i(x_0) p_{3-i}(x)).
\]

Assume for any \( x_1 = (x_0, \tilde{x}_1) \) that there exists a set of \( \tilde{x}_2 \) (denoted \( \tilde{\omega}_2 \)) that occurs with positive probability and leads to different baseline profits. That is, \( \Pr[\tilde{x}_2 \in \tilde{\omega}_2 | x_1] > 0 \) and \( u_2(\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}_2) \neq u_2(\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}'_2) \) for all \( \tilde{x}_2 \neq \tilde{x}'_2 \) in \( \tilde{\omega}_2 \). It then follows that for any pair of states \( x \equiv (x_0, \tilde{x}_1, \tilde{x}_2) \) and \( x' \equiv (\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}_1, \tilde{x}'_2) \), \( \Lambda^*_i \) is nondegenerate in player 1’s dimension for any \( x_i \). Swapping 1 with 2 and repeating the arguments above shows that \( \Lambda^*_2 \) can be nondegenerate in player 2’s dimension for any \( x_2 \).

We conclude our discussion by noting that the exclusion restriction in Assumption 2 is stronger than necessary for identifying \( \text{sign}(\delta_i(x)) \). In particular,

\[8\] When \( \delta_i(x) \neq 0 \), this condition can also fail if best responses for \( j \neq i \) change over the equivalence class for \( i \) at \( x \) in very peculiar ways so that the solution for \( p_i(\cdot) \) in (1) for \( x \in \Psi_i(x_i) \) remains the same.

\[9\] To see this, note that \( F_{e_i|x_0=x_0} (u_i(\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}_1) + \delta_i(\tilde{x}_0) t) \) as a function of \( t \) over \([0, 1]\) remains the same for \( x \) and \( x' \), while \( F_{e_2|x_0=x_0} (u_2(\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}_2) + \delta_2(\tilde{x}_0) t) \neq F_{e_2|x_0=x_0} (u_2(\tilde{x}_0, \tilde{x}'_2) + \delta_2(\tilde{x}_0) t) \) for all \( t \in [0, 1] \).
if no variables are excluded for individual \( i \) and the equivalence class for \( i \) at \( x \) is a singleton, then the nondegeneracy of \( \Lambda^*_i \) on \( i \)'s dimension will amount to the existence of multiple BNE strategies at state \( x \).

### 4. TESTING MULTIPLE BNE AND INFERRING INTERACTION SIGNS

When equilibrium choice probabilities are the same for all players in a game, the average choice in this particular game is an unbiased estimator for the choice probabilities within a particular symmetric equilibrium (e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2007, p. 58)). However, asymmetric BNE where players have different choice probabilities in one equilibrium may arise. This happens, for example, even when payoffs and distributions are homogeneous but the (common) \( \delta(\cdot) \) is negative. When the game has asymmetric equilibria or there is a small number of players, the choice probabilities are not reliably estimated by averaging choice within a game. Nevertheless, if the same equilibrium is played across games, the data can be pooled across those games to estimate the choice probabilities. Hence, testing for multiple equilibria is of interest in its own right.

Additionally, most of the known methods for semiparametric estimation of incomplete information games (without explicitly specifying an equilibrium selection rule) have relied on the existence of a single equilibrium in the data (e.g., Aradillas-Lopez (2010), Bajari et al. (2010), and Tang (2010)). Hence it is imperative to devise a formal test for the assumption of unique equilibrium in the data-generating process.

We focus on an empirical context where researchers observe states and decisions from a large cross section of independent games (indexed by \( g = 1, \ldots, G \)) drawn from the same DGP characterized by \( (u_i, \delta_i)_{i \leq N}, F_{e|x} \). Consider the null hypothesis that a unique BNE exists in the DGP under state \( x \). By Proposition 1, the null of a unique BNE in the DGP is equivalently formulated as

\[
H_0 : \Delta_i(x) = 0 \quad \forall i \leq N. \tag{7}
\]

We confront this null hypothesis with the alternative that

\[
H_1 : \exists i \text{ s.t. } \Delta_i(x) \neq 0, \tag{8}
\]

where

\[
\Delta_i(x) \equiv \tilde{\gamma}_i^*(x) - p_i^*(x) \gamma_i^*(x) = \sum_{j \neq i} \{ \mathbb{E}[D_i D_j|x] - \mathbb{E}(D_i|x) \mathbb{E}(D_j|x) \}.
\]

\[10\] For an illustration of how misspecification of the equilibrium selection rule can affect inference in a complete information game with a small number of players, see Honoré and de Paula (2010).
It follows from Section 3 that $\Delta_i(x) \neq 0$ if and only if $i$ adopts multiple strategies with positive probability at $x$. In the Supplemental Material, we propose a simple Wald test that can be used to test the joint null in (7) at $x$. We also note that the parameter $\Delta_i(x)$ can be easily adapted to accommodate general (known) $f_i(x, D_{-i})$ as indicated previously.

A failure to reject the null of a unique equilibrium in the DGP suggests the equilibrium conditions in (1) can be used for estimation under additional identifying assumptions on $u, \delta$, and $F_{\epsilon_i}$.11 If the null of a unique BNE is rejected, then finding out which of the $N$ single nulls in (7) are responsible for the rejection is helpful. We further motivate and address this question using a multiple-testing procedure in Section 4.1 below.

Finally, note that with $N = 2$, multiple BNE exist at $x$ only if signs of individual interaction effects are the same for both players. In this case, both players adopt strategies that imply distinct conditional choice probabilities across these BNE. Testing for multiple equilibria and inference of signs of interaction effects uses sample correlation of actions between the two players (given $X$). In this case, inference of multiple BNE and signs of interaction effects will be based on a scalar statistic $T_G \equiv T_{G,1} = T_{G,2}$ as defined later in this section.

4.1. Inference of Players With Multiple Equilibrium Strategies

With $N \geq 3$, while a subset of the players may employ different strategies across multiple BNE in the DGP, others might stick to the same strategy in all games observed in the data (see Example 1). Finding out the set of players who adopt multiple strategies has important implications for identifying and estimating players’ payoffs. Semiparametric estimation of Bayesian games typically refrains from parametric restrictions on primitives or the equilibrium selection mechanism at the cost of assuming that there is only a unique DGP for all $x$ in the data. The applicability of these robust estimation approaches hinges on this single-equilibrium assumption.12 While a simple test of the joint null (7) using Wald statistics helps detect the existence of multiple BNE, it does not specify any rules for deciding which players employ different strategies across multiple BNE.

Since we would like to detect which players employ different strategies across BNE and make inference on the signs of those players’ interaction effects, we resort to the statistical literature on multiple comparisons (for a recent survey, see Lehmann and Romano (2005, Chapter 9)). This literature considers decision strategies that aggregate the tests for the individual hypotheses

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11In implementation, sampling errors from such a pre-test for unique equilibrium should ideally be accounted for in deriving distributional properties.

12It should be noted that “social interaction” models do not rely on this assumption, but require the number of agents in each game to be large so that within (symmetric) equilibrium choice probabilities can be consistently estimated from average choices in each game.
corresponding to each $i$ given $x$:

\[ H_0^i : \Delta_i(x) = 0, \]
\[ H_1^i : \Delta_i(x) \neq 0. \]

Given individual test statistics for each of the $i \leq N$ hypotheses, our objective is to define a decision rule that controls the familywise error (FWE), rate, or the probability of rejecting at least one of the true null hypotheses. That is,

\[ \text{FWE}_P = \Pr_P\{\text{reject at least one } H_i^0 : \Delta_i(x) = 0 \text{ where } i \in I_0(P)\}, \]

where the subscript $P$ indicates the DGP and $I_0(P) \subset \{1, \ldots, N\}$ is the set of indices $i$ of true null hypotheses under $P$. A multiple-testing procedure asymptotically controls the FWE at $\alpha$ if

\[ \limsup_{G \to +\infty} \text{FWE}_P \leq \alpha \]

for any $P$.

We focus on a finite support $\Omega_X$ and we suppress $x$ for notational ease when there is no ambiguity. Sample analogs of expectations conditional on $x$ are simply calculated as the sample averages across games with $X = x$. Whereas this is easily done when $\Omega_X$ is discrete, a sample analog for a continuous $X$ would involve the aggregation of realizations at “nearby” observations via nonparametric techniques (e.g., kernel methods). Since covariates may induce a different number of equilibria, in small samples the inference for a particular realization in $\Omega_X$ may be contaminated by the uniqueness or multiplicity of solutions at neighboring realizations. Note nevertheless that the identification arguments do not require that $\Omega_X$ have finite support. A thorough analysis of this inference problem under continuous covariates is beyond the scope of this paper.

We focus on the case with $N \geq 3$. For any subset $I \subset \{1, \ldots, N\}$, let $D_{i,g} \equiv \prod_{i \in I} D_{i,g}$, $\mu_i \equiv E(D_{i,g}1(X_g = x))$, and $\mu_0 \equiv \Pr(X_g = x)$. In addition, $\mu(\{x\})$ denotes a $\tilde{N} \equiv (N + \binom{N}{2} + 1)$ vector that consists of $\mu_0(\{x\})$, $\mu_i(\{x\})$ and $\mu_{ij}(\{x\})$ for all individual $i$ and all pairs $i \neq j$. For example, with $N = 3$ (and omitting the argument $\{x\}$), $\mu \equiv (\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \mu_{12}, \mu_{13}, \mu_{23})'$. Define

\[ \hat{\mu}_i(\{x\}) \equiv (G)^{-1} \sum_g D_{i,g}1(X_g \in \{x\}), \]
\[ \hat{\mu}_g(\{x\}) \equiv (G)^{-1} \sum_g D_{g,g}1(X_g \in \{x\}), \]
\[ \hat{\mu}_0(\{x\}) \equiv (G)^{-1} \sum_g 1(X_g \in \{x\}), \]
\[ \hat{\mu}_G(\{x\}) \equiv (\hat{\mu}_0(\{x\}), \ldots, \hat{\mu}_i(\{x\}), \ldots, \hat{\mu}_q(\{x\}), \ldots)' \]

If $\mu_0(\{x\}) = 1$, an unconditional version of our procedure can be easily derived.
where $\hat{\mu}_G$ is the vector of sample analogs for $\mu$. By the multivariate central limit theorem, $G^{1/2}(\hat{\mu}_G(\{x\}) - \mu(\{x\})) \xrightarrow{d} N(0_N, \Sigma(\{x\}))$ as $G \to \infty$, where $0_N$ is an $N$ vector of zeros and $\Sigma$ is the corresponding variance–covariance matrix. Define $T_G(\{x\})$ to be an $N$ vector with its $i$th coordinate being

$$
T_{G,i}(\{x\}) \equiv \sum_{j \neq i} \left( \frac{\hat{\mu}_j(\{x\}) - \hat{\mu}_i(\{x\})}{\hat{\mu}_0(\{x\})} \right)^2.
$$

By the delta method, we obtain that

$$
G^{1/2}(T_G(\{x\}) - \Delta(\{x\})) \xrightarrow{d} N(0_N, \mathbf{V}(\{x\})\Sigma(\{x\})\mathbf{V}(\{x\})')
$$

as $G \to \infty$,

where $\Delta(\{x\}) \equiv (\Delta_i(\{x\}))_{i=1}^N$ The Jacobian $\mathbf{V}(\{x\})$ is an $N$-by-$N$ matrix, with its $i$th row $V_i(\{x\})$ defined by the following table (where $\mu_{(m)}(\{x\}), V_{i,(m)}(\{x\})$ denote the $m$th coordinates of two $N$ vectors $\mu(\{x\})$ and $V_i(\{x\})$, respectively, and $j, k \neq i$):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mu_{(m)}({x})$</th>
<th>$\sum_{j \neq i} \left( \frac{\mu_{ij}({x})}{\mu_{0i}({x})} + \frac{2\mu_{ij}({x})\mu_{jk}({x})}{\mu_{0j}({x})^2} \right)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_0({x})$</td>
<td>$\sum_{j \neq i} \left( \frac{\mu_{ij}({x})}{\mu_{0i}({x})} \right)^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_i({x})$</td>
<td>$-\sum_{j \neq i} \left( \frac{\mu_{ij}({x})}{\mu_{0i}({x})} \right)^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_j({x})$</td>
<td>$-\left( \frac{\mu_{i}({x})}{\mu_{0i}({x})} \right)^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{ij}({x})$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{\mu_{0i}({x})}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{jk}({x})$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can estimate $\Sigma(\{x\}), \mathbf{V}(\{x\})$ consistently by replacing $\mu_0(\{x\}), \mu_i(\{x\})$ with the sample analogs described above. For the remainder of this subsection, we omit the argument $(\{x\})$ for notational ease.

Well known methods that asymptotically control for the familywise error rate include the Bonferroni and the Holm’s methods. Both methods can be described in terms of the $p$-values for each of the individual hypotheses (indexed by $i$) above. We denote these $p$-values by $\hat{p}_{G,i}$. The Bonferroni method at level $\alpha$ rejects $i$ if $\hat{p}_{G,i} \leq \alpha/N$. The Holm’s procedure, which is less conservative than the Bonferroni method, follows a stepwise strategy. (For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of the hypotheses and test statistics on $x$.) The Holm’s procedure starts by ordering the $p$-values in ascending order: $\hat{p}_{G,(1)} \leq \hat{p}_{G,(2)} \leq \cdots \leq \hat{p}_{G,(N)}$. Let $H_{i,k} : \Delta_k = 0$ denote the single hypothesis corresponding to the $k$th smallest $p$-value (i.e., $\hat{p}_{G,j_k} = \hat{p}_{G,(k)}$). Holm’s stepwise method proceeds as follows. In the first step, compare $\hat{p}_{G,(1)}$ with $\alpha/N$. If $\hat{p}_{G,(1)} \geq \alpha/N$, then accept all individual hypotheses and the procedure ends. Otherwise, reject the individual null hypothesis $H_{i,1} : \Delta_i = 0$ and move on to the second step. In the second step, the remaining $N - 1$ hypotheses are all
accepted if $\hat{p}_{G,(2)} \geq \alpha/(N-1)$. Otherwise reject $H^0_{j_2} : \Delta_{j_2} = 0$ and continue to the next step. More generally, compare $\hat{p}_{G,(k)}$ with $\alpha/(N-k+1)$ in the $k$th step. Accept all remaining $N-(k-1)$ hypotheses if $\hat{p}_{G,(k)} \geq \alpha/(N-k+1)$. Otherwise, reject $H^0_{j_k}$ and move on to the next step. Continue doing so until all remaining hypotheses are accepted or all hypotheses are rejected one by one in $N$ steps.

Though less conservative than the Bonferroni method, the Holm’s procedure can still be improved if one takes into account the dependence between individual test statistics. To achieve this, we follow recent contributions by van der Laan, Dudoit, and Pollard (2004) and Romano and Wolf (2005). Ordering the test statistics in descending order, we let $T_{G,(1)} \geq T_{G,(2)} \geq \cdots \geq T_{G,(N)}$. In the $k$th step, a critical level $c_k$ is obtained and those hypotheses with $T_{G,j} > c_k$ are rejected. Let $R_k$ be the number of hypotheses rejected after the first $k-1$ steps (i.e., the number of hypotheses rejected at the beginning of the $k$th step). As before, let $H^0_{j_k}$ denote the hypothesis whose test statistic is the $k$th largest (i.e., $T_{G,i_k} = T_{G,(k)}$). Ideally, we want to obtain $c_1$ such that

$$c_1 \equiv c_1(1 - \alpha, P) = \inf \left\{ y : \Pr\left\{ \max_{1 \leq j \leq N} T_{G,(j)} - \Delta_{ij} \leq y \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha \right\},$$

where all statements are implicitly conditional on $X = x$. Subsequently, $c_k$ is defined as

$$c_k \equiv c_k(1 - \alpha, P) = \inf \left\{ y : \Pr\left\{ \max_{R_k+1 \leq j \leq N} T_{G,(j)} - \Delta_{ij} \leq y \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha \right\}$$

(also conditional on $X = x$). As pointed out in the references cited, because $P$ is unknown in practice, we replace $P$ with the empirical distribution $\hat{P}_G$ and define

$$\hat{c}_k \equiv c_k(1 - \alpha, \hat{P}_G) \quad \text{(9)}$$

$$= \inf \left\{ y : \Pr_{\hat{P}_G}\left\{ \max_{R_k+1 \leq j \leq N} T^*_{G,(j)} - T_{G,(j)} \leq y \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha \right\},$$

where we follow Romano and Wolf (2005) and use $T^*_{G,(j)}$ to highlight that the sampling distribution of the test statistics is under $\hat{P}_G$ (not $P$). The stepwise multiple-testing procedure from Romano and Wolf (2005) is summarized in the Supplemental Material. In addition to estimating $\hat{c}_k$ via bootstrap, we also consider an alternative approach that uses the fact that the test statistics have a normal limiting distribution with a consistently estimable variance–covariance.

\textsuperscript{14}The following description closely follows the presentation in Romano and Wolf (2005). For similar strategies that control generalizations of the familywise error rate, see Romano and Shaikh (2006). A recent application of such generalizations is Moon and Perron (2009).
We summarize the two approaches for estimating $\hat{c}_k$ in the Supplemental Material.

We can also use a studentized version of the multiple-testing method as recommended in Romano and Wolf (2005). Let $\hat{\sigma}_{G,k}$ denote the estimates for the standard deviation of the test statistic $T_{G,k}$. To do so, we need an analog of (9),

$$\hat{d}_k \equiv d_k(1 - \alpha, \hat{P}_G) = \inf\left\{ y : \Pr_{\hat{P}_G}(\max_{k+1 \leq j \leq N}(T_{G,j}^{*} - T_{G,i}) / \hat{\sigma}_{G,i,j} \leq y \geq 1 - \alpha \right\},$$

where $\hat{\sigma}_{G,i,j}$ are the estimates for standard deviations of $T_{G,i}$ computed from bootstrap samples. The procedure is described in the Supplemental Material.

In Section 5, we report the performance of three tests based on stepwise multiple-testing procedures: (a) the nonstudentized test with $\hat{c}_k$ computed from parametric simulations; (b) the nonstudentized test with $\hat{c}_k$ computed via bootstrap; (c) the studentized test with $\hat{d}_k$ computed via bootstrap. Because our setting corresponds to the smooth function model with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data (Scenario 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005)), both strategies yield consistent tests that asymptotically control the familywise error rate at level $\alpha$. This would obtain from a slight modification in Theorem 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005) to accommodate two-sided hypotheses as indicated in Section 5 of that paper.

4.2. Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects

This section proposes a simple test for the sign of interaction effects for a player $i$ in a given state $x$. It relies on the characterization in Proposition 2, and holds when $x$ induces multiple equilibria and choice probabilities vary across equilibria or when there are excluded regressors as discussed in Section 3. We focus on the simple case with discrete $X$ where any $x$ in the support can happen with strictly positive probabilities. For any $i, x$, define

$$T_{G,i}(Y_i(x)) \equiv \sum_{j \neq i} \left( \frac{\hat{\mu}_{ij}(Y_i(x))}{\hat{\mu}_0(Y_i(x))} - \frac{\hat{\mu}_i(Y_i(x))\hat{\mu}_j(Y_i(x))}{(\hat{\mu}_0(Y_i(x)))^2} \right),$$

which is analogous to the statistic defined in the previous subsection, but with $1(X \in Y_i(x))$ in place of $1(X \in \{x\})$ when defining $\hat{\mu}_m$. This statistic is an estimator for $\Psi_i$ introduced in Proposition 2. When $Y_i(x) = \{x\}$, this statistic coincides with the statistic introduced in Section 4.1. For notational ease, we drop the subscript $i, x$ from the estimators when there is no ambiguity. Using

15See footnote 21 in Romano and Wolf (2005).
the delta method and Slutsky’s theorem, it is straightforward to verify that
\[
\left( \hat{V}_i(Y_i(x)) \hat{\Sigma}(Y_i(x)) \hat{V}_i(Y_i(x))' G \right)^{-1/2} \\
\times \left( T_{G,i}(Y_i(x)) - \Psi_i(x) \right) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, 1) \quad \text{as} \quad G \to \infty,
\]
where \( \hat{V}_i(Y_i(x)) \) and \( \hat{\Sigma}(Y_i(x)) \) are estimators for \( V_i(Y_i(x)) \) and \( \Sigma(Y_i(x)) \), which themselves are defined analogously to the discussion in Section 4.1.

Testing the existence of multiple equilibria in the data and the sign of \( \delta_i(x) \) amounts to testing the three hypotheses
\[
H_+: \Psi_i(x) > 0, \quad H_0: \Psi_i(x) = 0, \quad H_-: \Psi_i(x) < 0.
\]
Rejection of \( H_0 \) in favor of \( H_+ \) is indicative of multiple equilibria and a positive sign for \( \delta_i(x) \). Analogously, rejection of \( H_0 \) in favor of \( H_- \) is indicative of multiple equilibria and a negative sign for \( \delta_i(x) \). Acceptance of \( H_0 \) suggests a unique equilibrium in the data and judgment on the sign of \( \delta_i(x) \) is withheld. Using the test statistic
\[
\sqrt{G(\hat{V}_i(Y_i(x)) \hat{\Sigma}(Y_i(x)) \hat{V}_i(Y_i(x))')}^{-1/2} T_{G,i}(Y_i(x)),
\]
we can choose critical regions at the two tails, each resulting in the rejection of \( H_0 \) in favor of either \( H_+ \) or \( H_- \). Proofs of consistency and asymptotic levels of the test follow from standard arguments. The player-specific sign tests can also be aggregated according to the procedure in the previous subsection (see, e.g., Shaffer (2006)).

5. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS

In this section, we explore Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the strategy presented in the previous section. The first design reproduces Example 1 and displays multiple equilibria. We use it to analyze the inference procedure on the existence of multiple equilibria and on the interaction signs when more than one equilibrium exists. Design 2 displays only one equilibrium and we use it to illustrate our procedure when multiple equilibria are absent but an excluded variable exists.

DESIGN 1: We study the finite sample performance of the tests for multiple equilibria in Section 4 using a simple design of a 3-by-2 game in Example 1. The design is conditional on some state \( x \) and this dependence is suppressed for notational convenience. For some fixed state, let the players’ baseline payoffs be \( u_1 = 0.5 \) and \( u_2 = u_3 = 0.3611 \), respectively, and let \( \delta_i = -1 \) and \( \epsilon_i \sim N(\mu = 0.1, \sigma^2 = 0.25^2) \) for all \( i \). Let \( \lambda \) denote the probability with which the first Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (4) shows up in the data-generating process. We experiment with \( \lambda = 0.1, 0.25, \) or \( 0.5 \) and sample sizes \( G = 1000 \) or 3000.

\[\text{This is a directional hypothesis test. For a recent survey, see Shaffer (2006).}\]
For any \((\lambda, G)\), we simulate a data set of players’ binary decisions by letting

\[
D_{i,g} = 1 \left\{ u_i - W^*_g \left( \sum_{j \neq i} p^1_j \right) - (1 - W^*_g) \left( \sum_{j \neq i} p^2_j \right) - \varepsilon_{i,g} \geq 0 \right\},
\]

where, in each game \(g \leq G\), \(W^*_g\) is simulated from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability \(\lambda\), \(\varepsilon_{i,g}\) from \(N(0, 0.25^2)\) and \(p^1, p^2\)’s are propensity scores in the two Bayesian Nash equilibria. For each \((\lambda, G)\), we simulate \(S = 1000\) data sets. For each data set, we employ the stepwise multiple-testing procedure as described in Section 4.2 and make a decision to reject or not to reject the null hypothesis that there is a unique equilibrium in the data-generating process. We experiment with three different approaches for choosing the critical level \(\hat{c}_k\) in Section 4.2: (i) simulation using estimated covariance matrix of \(T_G\), (ii) bootstrap, and (iii) studentized bootstrap (Algorithms 3.2 and 4.2 in Romano and Wolf (2005)). For meaningful comparison between these three approaches, we use the same number of simulated multivariate normal vectors in (i) as the number of bootstrap samples drawn in (ii) and (iii) (which is denoted by \(B\)). We experiment with \(B = 1000, 2000\). In Table I, we report the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis (i.e., rejecting \(H_0\) for \(i = 1\)) calculated from the \(S = 1000\) simulated data sets in columns RP1, RP2, and RP3, where RP denotes rejection probability.

Table II presents the tests of interaction signs for each of the three players. Since player 1 has the same conditional choice probabilities in the two equilibria, the test withholds judgment for most of the simulations. It detects a negative sign for the other two players.

**DESIGN 2:** In this design, we consider a 3-by-2-action game where Assumption 2 is satisfied. The baseline payoff for player \(i\) is \(u_i(x_i) = 1 + x_i\),

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(G)</th>
<th>(\lambda)</th>
<th>(B = 1000)</th>
<th>(B = 2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RP1</td>
<td>RP2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Design 1: Number of simulations \(S = 1000\); \(G\) is the sample size; \(\lambda\) specifies the probability that the first equilibrium in Example 1 is chosen. RP1, RP2, and RP3 are rejection frequencies of the true null following three tests, respectively: 1, the nonstudentized test with \(\hat{c}_k\) from parametric simulations; 2, the nonstudentized test with \(\hat{c}_k\) computed via bootstrap; 3, the studentized test with \(\hat{d}_k\) computed via bootstrap. The target probability for FWE is \(\alpha = 0.10\).
where \( x_1 \in \{-1, 2\}, x_2 \in \{-1/2, 3/2\}, \) and \( x_3 \in \{-1, 3\} \). Covariate realizations have the same probability. The state-dependent interaction effect for \( i \) is 
\[
\delta_i(x_i) = \delta x_i,
\]
where \( \delta \) is a parameter that controls the scale of the interaction effect. The private information \( e_i \) is uniformly distributed over \((-c_i, c_i)\), where \( c_i = 2(1 + x_i + |\delta x_i|)\).\(^{17}\) Table III lists the marginal choice probabilities, or propensity scores, \( p_i(x) \equiv \Pr(i \text{ chooses } i|x) \) in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibria for each state \( x \equiv (x_1, x_2, x_3) \). It is easy to verify that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique for all \( x \) from Table III, since all \( e_i \) are uniformly distributed and all propensity scores are strictly between 0 and 1.

To illustrate the nondegeneracy condition of \( \Lambda^* \) in Section 3.2, notice that when \( x_1 = -1 \), the equivalence class is \( Y_i(x_1) = \{(-1, -1/2, -1), (-1, -1/2, 3), (-1, 3/2, -1), (-1, 3/2, -1)\} \). In this case, because the equilibrium is unique at each of these four points in \( \Omega_x \), \( \Lambda_x(\cdot) \) is a degenerate distri-

\(^{17}\)The parameter \( c_i \) is chosen this way to ensure there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under each state.
bution that puts probability 1 on the unique equilibrium for each covariate realization \( x \). Accordingly, \( \Lambda^*_x(p) = 1/4 \) if \( p \in \{(0.3233, 0.5603, 0.3233), (0.2523, 0.5288, 0.7098), (0.2998, 0.7013, 0.2998), (0.2101, 0.7262, 0.7231)\} \), and is zero otherwise. The important implication is that for each one of these realizations, player 1 adopts a different equilibrium strategy, which implies a different conditional choice probability of choosing 1. As we vary the covariates for the other players while fixing \( x_1 \) at \(-1\), we are able to identify the sign of \( \delta x_1 \).

In Design 2, strategic interaction effects are state-dependent and individual-specific. For player 1, states in the first four rows in Table III form an equivalence class, while the other four rows form another equivalence class. We simulate \( S = 1000 \) samples, each with sample size \( G = 5000 \). For each of these samples, we calculate the test statistics \( \Psi \) as defined in Section 4 and apply the following decision rule. If \( T_{G,i} < -1.64 \), then reject \( H_0 \) (no interaction effect) in favor of \( H_- \) (negative interaction effect). If \( T_{G,i} > 1.64 \), then reject \( H_0 \) in favor of \( H_+ \) (positive interaction effect). Otherwise, do not reject \( H_0 \). Table IV summarizes the finite sample performance of our test. The two entries \([q_+, q_-]\) in the brackets report percentages of tests in \( S = 1000 \) simulations where \( H_2 \) is rejected in favor of \( H_+ \) (i.e., \( q_+ \)) and the percentage of rejections in favor of \( H_- \) (i.e., \( q_- \)), respectively. Recall that the sign of interaction effects for \( \delta_i(x_i) \) is the same as the sign of \( x_i \) in our design as \( \delta > 0 \).

6. EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION

In this section, we investigate how radio stations strategically allocate commercial breaks during their programming schedule. The interaction effects on the payoffs of broadcasting commercials (\( \delta(X) \)) can be either positive or negative. As explained by Sweeting (2009), if radio stations air commercials at the
same time, listeners may be dissuaded from switching stations to avoid breaks, and the audience for a particular station is not affected by the decision to broadcast a commercial. On the other hand, if listeners have an outside option (i.e., public radio, a CD, TV), synchronization by all stations risks ultimately driving listeners away, reducing the audience for all radio stations. Alternating commercial breaks would in this case be preferable (see Sweeting (2006) for a simple model). Whereas advertisers would like stations to coordinate to preclude consumers from avoiding the ads, radio stations may have an incentive to alternate, as ratings are computed on average listenership, not audiences of commercials. Lack of coordination by the radio stations would suggest that the market does not align incentives of advertisers and radio stations.

Sweeting (2009) examined this question by estimating a parametric model. His baseline specifications assumed (i) that stations care symmetrically about their interactions with all other stations in the market and (ii) that symmetric equilibria are played. Based on these assumptions, he found that stations prefer to choose the same time for commercials during drive-time hours, with stronger preferences in smaller markets. Our methodology allows us to test whether Sweeting’s conclusions are robust to relaxing these possibly restrictive assumptions in a nonparametric setting.

Because programmers have to allocate advertisements in real time (i.e., on the spot) around the usual schedule of songs and news updates without interrupting those pieces of programming, there is uncertainty as to when commercial breaks can be aired. The exact sequence of songs and news updates is not publicly distributed beforehand and, as Sweeting (2009, footnote 7) pointed out, disc jockeys are given ample discretion over schedules. Therefore, we follow Sweeting and assume that the unobserved component of the advertisement timing decision is private information to each radio station.

Warren (2001, p. 24) mentioned that airing commercials at a specific time “can be done some of the time. But it can’t be done consistently by very many stations. Few songs are 2:30 minutes long any more” (see also Gross (1988)). Hence there is also little reason to believe that this scheduling uncertainty is correlated given public information. This (private) payoff uncertainty to airing a commercial at a specific time is captured in our model by \( \varepsilon_i \).

Given that commercial break choices are made within the one hour programming horizon in real time, whether to advertise close to the end of that horizon will not be affected by continuation value considerations. Furthermore, the number of commercials already aired earlier may induce asymmetries in the payoff to broadcast a commercial at the last minutes of the hour, which are captured by our specification. Data show that most commercials are aired close to the end of the programming horizon (i.e., the hour), so our focus on the end of the hour can also be justified as the relevant empirical focus.
The data sources are BIAfn’s *MediaAccess Pro* data base, Media base 24/7, and the 2001 Census.\(^{18}\) Based on detailed information on airplay logs for around the first five days of each month in 2001 (59 days in total), the data report the decision of radio programmers to broadcast commercials at minute :55 of four different hours of the day: noon–1 pm, 4–5 pm, 5–6 pm, and 9–10 pm. We focus on the decision to broadcast commercials at minute :55 or not since this is close to the end of the programming horizon as explained above.\(^{19}\) Table V depicts the frequency of choices (airing a commercial at :55 or not).

Table V provides a breakdown of the frequency of choices made by players. The data is based on BIAfn’s *MediaAccess Pro* data base. The specific allocation is done using BIAfn’s *MediaAccess Pro* data base. There are 6534 games at the noon–1 pm hour, 6562 games at the 4–5 pm hour, 6536 games at the 5–6 pm hour, and 6520 games during the 9–10 pm hour. Also available are variables regarding market characteristics. We focus here on the market size obtained from 2001–2002 population estimates for individuals aged 12+ reported in BIAfn (based on Census data). For our analysis, we discretize this variable into terciles with the first tercile corresponding to the largest markets.

To best illustrate our methodology, we focus on the three dominant radio stations in each market according to measures of historical listenership. We label players accordingly so that player 1 is the radio station with largest market share, player 2 is the station with the second largest share, and player 3 is the station with the third largest portion. The combined market share is on average 41% across all markets, justifying our focus on the strategic interactions among the three largest players. We note that our approach can accommodate a larger numbers of players, but we opt for three for illustrative purposes. For example, payoffs can depend on the proportion of competitors choosing to play commercials, not simply on their number (see previous discussion).

\(^{18}\)We thank Andrew Sweeting for providing the data.

\(^{19}\)Alternatively, as in some of the specifications used by Sweeting (2009), if the private signal variables follow an extreme value distribution, we can restrict our analysis to the choice between :50 and :55 conditional on airing commercials at one of these times. Even though we do not impose a particular distributional assumption, one can legitimize our procedure as an approximation to a multiple action problem with extreme value distributed ε’s. We have also run our procedures using this specification and obtain qualitatively similar results.
Table VI displays tests of multiplicity conditional on the various hours of the day. We present test results using Wald statistics and the multiple comparison procedure by Romano and Wolf (2005) (with 1000 bootstrap repetitions) at a targeted 5\% FWE rate. For the Romano–Wolf procedure, we show the ordering of the individual test statistics, whether they are positive or negative, and which ones are rejected. Unconditionally and conditional on the 4–5 pm and 5–6 pm hours, we reject the hypothesis of a unique equilibrium: in all three cases this is indicative of a positive strategic interaction effect. We find evidence of multiple equilibrium strategies (across equilibria) for all three players without conditioning on any covariate and for the 4–5 pm and 5–6 pm hours of the day. Using either procedure (Wald or Romano and Wolf), we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unique equilibrium for the hours noon–1 pm and 9–10 pm. This is in agreement with Sweeting’s findings and the fact that larger interaction effects will more likely lead to multiple equilibria. Because listeners are less likely to switch off the radio to an outside option during drive-time hours, radio stations have stronger incentives to coordinate on commercial breaks and retain listenership. In this case, radio stations’ incentives are aligned with those of advertisers.

As Sweeting (2009) suggested, smaller markets may present stronger incentives for coordination. Because smaller markets have fewer stations, coordination is easier. Furthermore, if the nondominant fringe of the market provides more alternatives to listeners as would be the case in larger markets with more stations outside the top three, the incentives for coordination are not as prevalent. To examine this, in Table VII, we present results by conditioning also on terciles of market size. Evidence of multiplicity and positive interaction effects
for all players is salient in the smallest markets during the 4–5 pm and 5–6 pm hours of the day but not for the other conditional specifications.

7. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have shown how a condition typically employed in the analysis of simultaneous games of incomplete information leads to a simple and easily implementable test for the signs of interaction effects and the existence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. Inference of the signs of state-dependent and individual-specific interaction effects can be done under minimal assumptions that require only the conditional independence of private information and the existence of state variables that satisfy appropriate exclusion restrictions. In addition, given that many of the suggested methods for estimating and making inferences in such environments rely on the assumption that only one equilibrium is played in the data, this finding is relevant for the implementation of these techniques. Even when the conditional independence of private signals is not in place, it is possible to identify the signs and infer multiplicity if the researcher observes groups of games where players are known to follow the same equilibrium strategies (see the working paper version).

With discrete covariates, such inference is implementable using well known results in multiple testing. When a continuous covariate is included, the testing procedure should account for the boundaries between regions with a different number of equilibria. We leave this for future research. Another interesting direction for future research is the inference of interaction effects if strategic dependence exists between games observed in data.

---

TABLE VII
55 min vs. not 55 min (\(X = \text{Hour of Day, Market Size}\))\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Size (tercile)</th>
<th>Noon–1 pm</th>
<th>4–5 pm</th>
<th>5–6 pm</th>
<th>9–10 pm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Wald test</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>(T_3 &gt; T_2 &gt; 0 &gt; T_1)</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_3 &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(T_3 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_3 &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(T_1 &gt; T_3 &gt; T_2 &gt; 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Wald test</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_3 &gt; 0 &gt; T_4)</td>
<td>(T_3 &gt; 0 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_2)</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_1 &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_3 &gt; 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>2157</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>2159</td>
<td>2153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Wald test</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>19.06*</td>
<td>26.07*</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_3 &gt; T_1 &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(T_3 &gt; T_2 &gt; 0 &gt; T_1)</td>
<td>(T_3 &gt; T_1 &gt; T_2 &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(T_2 &gt; T_3 &gt; 0 &gt; T_2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>2176</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>2168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The asterix (\(\ast\)) denotes that Wald test statistic is significant at 5%. The dagger (\(\dagger\)) denotes the significant hypothesis at 5% FWE rate using Romano and Wolf (2005) (RW). \(T_k\) is the individual test statistic for player (hypothesis) \(k\). The number of bootstrap repetitions is 1000.
Finally, the conditional independence assumption is also found in dynamic games of incomplete information. In those settings, optimal decision rules involve not only equilibrium beliefs, but also continuation value functions that may change across equilibria. Although a detailed analysis is deferred to future research, we conjecture that our results generalize to such games under certain additional assumptions. In particular, the characterization of optimal policy rules in that context suggests that the existence of a unique equilibrium in the data can still be detected by the lack of correlation in actions across players of a given game as presented in the current paper.\(^{20}\)

REFERENCES


\(^{20}\)With two actions, the optimal policy for a specific equilibrium would prescribe a decision rule like
\[
S_i(X, e_i) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } u_i(X) + \delta(X) \sum_{j \neq i} p_j(X) + \beta \mathbb{E}(V_i(X', e'_i))|X, e_i, D_i = 1 - e_i \geq \beta \mathbb{E}(V_i(X', e'_i))|X, e_i, D_i = 0) \end{cases}
\]
where \(\beta\) is a discount factor, primed variables refer to the following period, and \(V_i(\cdot)\) is a continuation value defined by a Bellman equation where we make explicit the dependence on equilibrium choice probabilities \((p_1, \ldots, p_N)\) (see, for example, display (8) in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)). If the equilibrium is unique and Assumption 1 holds, conditional choice probabilities will factor as in the static case.


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