1 Indexical Presuppositions of *Come* and *Go*

• *Come* and *go* describe movement of an Entity/Theme from a Source to a Goal.

• Rough semantics (to be refined):

\[
[\text{Sergei came/went to London}]_{\text{go}}^{\text{e}}(t)(w) = \exists e \left[ \text{MOVE}(e, w) \land \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w) \land \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w) \land \tau(e, w) < t \right]
\]

(\(\tau(e, w)\) = the run time of \(e\) in \(w\))

• *Come* and *go* have different indexical restrictions on the Goal (Fillmore 1997, Oshima 2006, 2007, Percus 2011):

(2) **Indexical Restriction** (to be refined)

If the Goal is the Speaker or Hearer’s Home-Base (HB), *come* is used. Otherwise *go* is used.

(3) A location \(\ell\) is an entity \(x\)’s Home-Base (HB) at \(t\) in \(w\) if

a. \(x\)’s location at \(t\) in \(w\) is \(\ell\); or

b. \(x\) is somehow associated with \(\ell\) at \(t\) in \(w\) (e.g. \(x\) was born and grew up in \(\ell\) in \(w\), \(x\)’s close relative lives in \(\ell\) at \(t\) in \(w\), etc.).

1 I won’t try to be clear about what counts as a HB in this talk. In particular the second clause (3b) seems to be highly context-dependent.²

• **Example situation 1:** John is in London, Masa is in Tokyo, Sergei is in Moscow.

  - **Speaker:** John in London
  - **Hearer:** Masa in Tokyo
  - **Entity:** Sergei moving from Moscow

  1. If Goal = Speaker’s HB, then *come*:

     (4) a. Sergei is **coming** to London next week.

     b. #Sergei is **going** to London next week.

  2. If Goal = Hearer’s HB, then *come* or *go:*

     (5) a. Sergei is **coming** to Tokyo next week.

     b. ?Sergei is **going** to Tokyo next week.

  3. If neither, then go (unless a salient individual is in the Goal; more on this later):

     (6) a. #Sergei is **coming** to Milan next week.

     b. Sergei is **going** to Milan next week.

• Oshima (2006, 2007) and Percus (2011) analyse the indexical restrictions as pre-suppositions. I think this makes sense.

  o **Presupposition failure:** I’m talking to Klaus on Skype.

     (7) me: You should come to Göttingen.

     Klaus: Wait, I didn’t know that you are in Göttingen!!

     (8) Klaus: It looks like Andrew is going to Tromsø.

     me: Wait, I thought you were in Tromsø!!

  o **Projection tests:** All of the following presuppose that the speaker or hearer is in Göttingen. (We’ll talk about attitude contexts below)

     (9) a. Klaus isn’t coming to Göttingen.

     b. Is Klaus coming to Göttingen?

     c. If Klaus comes to Göttingen, we’ll get trashed.

• First try:

(10) [Sergei came to London]_{\text{go}}^{\text{e}}(t)(w)

  a. Presupp: HB(s, London, t, w) \lor HB(h, London, t, w, )

  b. Asser: (1)

(11) [Sergei went to London]_{\text{go}}^{\text{e}}(t)(w)

  a. Presupp: \neg HB(s, London, t, w) \land \neg HB(h, London, t, w)

  b. Asser: (1)

• I’ll omit the presupposition that Source(e, w) \neq Goal(e, w).

1.1 Reference Time

• There’s one difference between *come* and *go:* *come* can refer to the reference time, *go* cannot (Fillmore 1997, Oshima 2006, 2007).

• **Example situation 2:** John in London, talking to Mary in London. Sergei lives in Moscow.

(12) I was in Paris from Friday to Sunday last week.
a. Sergei came there on Saturday,
b. Sergei went there on Saturday,

(12a) is relative to the Speaker and Hearer's location on last Saturday. (12b) is relative to the Speaker and Hearer's location now.

(13) [John and Mary are in a restaurant]
a. Sergei came here with his friends yesterday.
b. #Sergei went here with his friends yesterday.

(13a) references the current location. (13b) shows that went cannot be relative to the Speaker or Hearer's location yesterday.

Another example:

(14) a. When are you going to come home?
b. When are you going to go home? (Fillmore 1997)

(14a) is appropriate if the Speaker is at home now, or will be home when the Hearer comes back.

(14b) is appropriate if the Speaker is not at home now. Strange if the Speaker is at home now, but will be somewhere else, when the Hearer comes back.

Let's revise our semantics as follows.

(15) [Sergei came to London]^{EC,t}(e)
   a. Presupp: $\exists e [\text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w) \land t(e, w) < t]$ 
   b. Asser: $\exists e [\text{MOVE}(e, w) \land \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w) \land \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w) \land t(e, w) < t]$ 

(16) [Sergei went to London]^{EC,t}(e)
   a. Presupp: $\neg \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, t(e, w)) \land \neg \text{HB}(e, \text{London}, t(e, w))$
   b. Asser: $\exists e [\text{MOVE}(e, w) \land \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w) \land \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w) \land t(e, w) < t]$ 

(When Speaker = Theme, because of the presupposition that Source(e, w) $\neq$ Goal(e, w), it cannot be that the Speaker is in the Goal throughout the reference time. This is a good prediction.)

Example situation 3: Yasu in East London, talking to Sergei in Moscow:

(17) a. #I am coming to Barcelona in August.
b. I came to London two years ago.
c. I am coming to Moscow next week.
d. Tomorrow, I'll come to the station to pick you up.

(18) a. I am going to Barcelona in August.
b. #I went to London two years ago.

c. #I am going to Moscow next week.
d. Tomorrow, I'll go to the station to pick you up.

1.2 Outlook

• Summary so far:
  - Come presupposes the Goal is the Speaker’s or Hearer’s Home-Base at the current time or reference time.
  - Go presupposes the Goal is neither the Speaker’s nor Hearer’s Home-Base at the current time.

This is close to what Oshima (2006, 2007) proposes (see also Fillmore 1997).

• Claim: This semantics needs to be refined a bit further. Especially, we need to factor in perspective-shifting.

• Plan:
  - §2 The unmarkedness of go and anti-presuppositions
  - §3 Perspective-shifting in attitude contexts and monsters
  - §4 More shifting and a solution to the puzzle
  - §5 Some more fun stuff to think about

2 Unmarkedness and anti-presuppositions

• Claim: Go actually has no indexical presupposition.

• Example situation 4: John talking to Mary in London about Sergei in Moscow.

1. Negative sentences:

(19) a. Sergei didn’t go anywhere last summer.
b. ??Sergei didn’t come anywhere last summer.

- Notice that (19a) entails Sergei didn’t go to London! If go presupposed that the goal couldn’t be London, this wouldn’t be an entailment, because it’d be about distinct from the Speaker’s and Hearer’s HB.

- In fact, we observe this projection pattern in (19b): It can only be used to talk about John’s location now or locations at the reference time (e.g. John and Sergei were supposed to travel together, but Sergei didn’t come along).

2. Questions:

(20) John: Do you know where Sergei is going this summer? Mary: He’s actually coming to London!

(21) #Do you know where Sergei is coming this summer?

3. Ignorance/Presupposition Failure:
(22) [A is texting to B]

A: I don't know where you are now, but I'm going/#coming to 1369 to have coffee soon.

B: That's great. I'm actually at 1369 now!

- The behaviour of go patterns like so-called anti-presuppositions.

2.1 Anti-presuppositions

- Anti-presuppositions are competition-based inferences (just like scalar implicatures) involving a pair of words such that one has a stronger presupposition than the other (Percus 2006, 2010, Sauerland 2008, Singh 2011, Schlenker 2012).

- Example: Think has no factive presupposition, but competes with know generating the inference that the complement is not presupposed to be true:

  (23) John thinks that Mary is pregnant.
  \[\rightarrow\] We don't know whether Mary is pregnant.

- One way to understand this is that the use of a ‘presuppositionally stronger’ alternative is forced, if everything else is equal.

(24) Maximize Presupposition (MP):
An utterance of sentence S is infelicitous in a (local) context c iff there is an alternative S’ to S such that:
- a. The assertoric contents of S and S’ are contextually equivalent in c;
- b. The presuppositions of S and S’ are both satisfied in c;
- c. The presupposition of S’ is stronger than the presupposition of S.

- By assumption (23) competes with the version of the sentences with know:

  (25) John knows that Mary is pregnant.

  o (25) has a factive presupposition and is presuppositionally stronger than (23).
  o (23) and (25) mean (roughly) the same thing. So if they are both felicitous, they will be contextually equivalent.
  o Consequently, MP demands the use of (25), whenever possible. Or to put it differently, (23) can only be used when the presupposition of (25) is not satisfied, i.e. it is not commonly believed that Mary is pregnant. (including when it is commonly believed that Mary is not pregnant)

- Side remark (‘Epistemic Step’): In some cases we derive a stronger reading:

  (26) John thinks that I speak German.
  \[\rightarrow\] I don't speak German

This competes with (27):

(27) John knows that I speak German.

MP says (26) is felicitous only if it is not commonly believed that I speak German. Given that the speaker (usually) knows which languages they speak, this inference is often strengthened to ‘it is commonly believed that I don't speak German’ (see Chemla 2008 for details).

- Anti-presuppositions interact with operators:

  1. Negative sentences:

     (28) [We all know that John won the race]
     a. None of the runners thinks that he won.
     b. #None of the runners knows that he won.

     Notice that (28b) has a universal presupposition that every runner won (which cannot be true), so consequently, (28a) is felicitous in contexts where it is not commonly believed that every runner won, which is trivially satisfied.

  2. Questions:

     (29) Q: Who thought he'd won the race?
     Q': #Who knew that he'd won the race?
     —A: John actually knew that he'd won the race.

     Presuppositions universally project through wh-phrases, so (29Q') presupposes that everybody won the race. Then, (29Q:) is felicitous in contexts where it is not commonly believed that every runner won.

  2.2 Puzzle about the Anti-Presupposition of Go

- Idea: Go to come is think to know. I.e. Go actually has no presuppositions, but because MP demands come to be used whenever possible, go is only felicitous when come cannot be used.

- For simple sentences like (30a), MP generates the anti-presuppositional inference based on (30b).

(30) a. Sergei went to London.
    b. Sergei came to London.

(30b) presupposes that London is the Speaker's and/or Hearer's HB. So (30a) is only felicitous if this is not commonly believed (e.g. when London is not their HB).

- In ignorance contexts like (22), it is not commonly believed that the Goal is the Speaker's or Hearer's HB, so go is felicitous and come is not felicitous.

- In negative contexts like (19), the presupposition of come becomes universal:

(19) a. Sergei didn't go anywhere last summer.
    b. ??Sergei didn't come anywhere last summer.

  o (30b) presupposes that all the relevant places are the Speaker's or Hearer's HB (which is the source of the mild infelicity).
perspective-shifting in attitude contexts and monsters

• So (30a) is used whenever it is not commonly believed that all the relevant places are the Speaker’s or Hearer’s HB, which includes cases where some of the places are neither the Speaker’s nor Hearer’s HB.

• The explanation is the same for questions like (20) (details omitted here).

• Puzzle: But then how come in some cases, either come or go can be used?

1. Goal = the current hearer’s HB
   a. Sergei came there on Saturday.
   b. Sergei went there on Saturday.

2. Goal = the current speaker’s HB
   a. She’ll come there to meet you.
   b. She’ll go there to meet you. (Fillmore 1997)

• If the presupposition of come is as in (15), go can only be used if it is not commonly believed that the Goal is different from the speaker’s HB or hearer’s HB at the current time or at the reference time.

• This is violated in these contexts (as evidenced by the felicitous use of come in the (a)-examples).

• Looking ahead: I’ll claim that the computation of anti-presuppositions is only under a particular ‘perspective’, and that the current time vs. reference time distinction is a kind of perspective-shifting. In cases like above, different perspectives are taken between the (a)- and (b)-examples.

3. Perspective-Shifting in Attitude Contexts and Monsters

• Observations: The indexical presuppositions shift in certain contexts. E.g. in speech reports, the indexical presuppositions are optionally evaluated relative to the original utterance context (Oshima 2006, 2007, Percus 2011)

• Example situation 5: John is in London, Masa is in Tokyo, Sergei is in Moscow. Gianni in Milan, Guillaume in Paris:

  o Current speaker = John in London
  o Current hearer = Masa in Tokyo
  o Original speaker = Gianni in Milan
  o Original hearer = Guillaume in Paris
  o Theme = Sergei moving from Moscow

  1. Goal = the current speaker’s HB
     a. Gianni told Guillaume that Sergei is coming to London next week.

3. Oshima seems to think that attitude contexts and other shifting contexts should be given separate accounts (Oshima 2006:123, Oshima 2007:fn.4), and does not give an explicit account of the latter.
3.1 A Quick Review of Indexical-Shifting


- E.g. In the following Uyghur sentence, [1sg] is interpreted as Ahmet (indexical-shifting is obligatory in Uyghur).

  (40) Ahmet [ proAhmet kim-ni jakshi kör-imen ] didi?
  Ahmet [ pro who-acc well see-imperf.1sg ] said
  ‘Who did Ahmet say that he likes?’

In languages like English, first person is always the current speaker, so (41) doesn’t mean the same thing as (40).

(41) Who did Ahmet say that I like?

- Anand & Nevin’s (2004) and Anand’s (2006) on indexical-shifting:
  - The interpretation function \([\_\_]\) is relativized to an assignment \(g\), and a possible context \(c\).
  - A possible context \(c\) (of type \(k\)) is a tuple \((s_c, h_c, t_c, w_c)\) (Speaker, Hearer, Time, World).
  - The semantics-pragmatics interface demands that \(c\) represents the current context of utterance (in normal conversational contexts):

    (42) When a speaker \(s\) utters \(\phi\) to \(h\) at \(t\) in \(w\) (with assignment \(g\)),
    a. \(\phi\)'s presupposition is satisfied iff the presupposition of \(\lbrack \phi \rbrack^{g,c} = (s, h, t, w) = 1\).
    b. \(\phi\) is true iff the assertoric content of \(\lbrack \phi \rbrack^{g,c} = (s, h, t, w) = 1\).

- Indexical pronouns refer to a coordinate of \(c\):

  (43) a. \([me]^{g,c} = s_c\) b. \([you]^{g,c} = h_c\)

- By assumption English has no operator that shifts the context index, so indexical pronouns are always evaluated relative to the current context of utterance, no matter where they appear.

- Languages like Uyghur have an operator that shifts the context index (a Kaplanian monster \(\lambda\)).

  (44) \([M \alpha]^{g,c} = \lambda k. [\alpha]^{g,k}(k)\)

  It is assumed that \(\lambda\) appears only in (a subset of) attitude contexts (to simplify, I ignore tense here).

- Embedded clauses denote functions of type \((k, t)\) (generalised centered worlds):

  (45) \([\text{that I like you}]^{g,c}(k)\)
    a. Presupp: \(\top\)
    b. Asser: \(\text{like}(s_c, h_c, w_k)\)

  (46) \([\text{M that I like you}]^{g,c}(k)\)
    a. Presupp: \(\top\)
    b. Asser: \(\text{like}(s_k, h_k, w_k)\)

- Attitude predicates take functions of type \((k, t)\).

  (47) \([\text{John said that I like you}]^{g,c}(c')\)
    a. Presupp: \(\top\)
    b. Asser: \(\text{SAY}(j, w_c)(\lambda k. \text{like}(s_c, h_c, t_k, w_k))\)

  (48) \([\text{John said M that I like you}]^{g,c}(c')\)
    a. Presupp: \(\top\)
    b. Asser: \(\text{SAY}(j, w_c)(\lambda k. \text{like}(s_k, h_k, t_k, w_k))\)

The definition of \(\text{SAY}\) is a little convoluted (to take care of attitude de se). See Percus (2011) and Hazel’s work for details.

(49) \(\text{SAY}(j, w_c)(p_{(k,t)})\) iff in \(w_c\), by virtue of what \(j\) said in \(w_c\), \(j\) characterises his own context of utterance as a context \(k\) such that \(p(k) = 1\).

- Punchline: Indexicals refer to the context index \(c\). The monster \(\lambda\) shifts it to a different context (which the attitude verb quantifies over).

3.2 Percus on Perspective-Shifting under Attitude

- Idea: Perspective-sensitive items like come refer to another context index.

  I’ll reconstruct Percus’s system with some modifications (so that it’s more like Nevins’s Anand’s system).

  - The interpretation function \([\_\_]\) is relativized to an assignment \(g\), and two possible contexts \(c_1, c_2\).

  - Indexical pronouns refer to the first context.

    (50) a. \([me]^{g,c_1, c_2} = s_c\)
    b. \([you]^{g,c_1, c_2} = h_c\) \(s_c\) \(h_c\)

  - Come refers to the second context \(c_2\):

    (51) \([\text{Sergei came to London}]^{g,c_1, c_2}(c')\)
    a. Presupp: \(\text{HB}(s_c, \text{London}, t_{c_2}, w_{c_2}) \lor \text{HB}(h_c, \text{London}, t_{c_2}, w_{c_2})\)
    b. Asser: \(\exists e [\text{MOVE}(e, w_{c'}) \land \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w_{c'}) \land \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w_{c'}) \land \tau(e, w_{c'}) < t_{c'}]\)

  - It’s crucial that the presupposition only refers to the coordinates of \(c_2\). In particular, the intensional parameters come from \(c_2\). As we will see, this derives the projection facts right.

  - The reference time is not mentioned in the presupposition. I’ll account for this by the perspective-shifting operator later.
The semantics-pragmatics interface ensures that at the utterance level, both context indices are the utterance context:

\[(\phi) \equiv (s, h, t, w) \in X \wedge (s, h, t, w) \in Y\]

The reason why we need two context indices is because indexical pronouns don’t shift in English, but the indexical presupposition of that Hans believes that London is the Speaker’s HB.

\[\phi \equiv \text{true iff the assertoric content of } [\phi](s, h, t, w) = 1.\]

Perspective-shifting is enabled by shifting the second index. Let’s postulate two monsters, \(M_1\) and \(M_2\):

\[\[M_1] \alpha \equiv \lambda k. [\alpha]^{k,c_2}(k)\]
\[\[M_2] \alpha \equiv \lambda k. [\alpha]^{c_1,k}(k)\]

\(M_1\) is used for indexical-shifting, only available in indexical-shifting languages like Ugghur.
\(M_2\) is used for perspective-shifting, available in (probably) all languages including English.

Following Heim (1992) (see also Sudo 2014), we assume that attitude predicates are presupposition filters. (We won’t go into the details here)

\[\[X \text{ believes/said/hopes } \phi \equiv [\phi]^{c_1,c_2}(c')\]

\[\[\text{Hans is saying that Sergei came to London}\equiv [\phi]^{c_1,c_2}(c')\]

\[\text{Presupp: } \text{DOX}(j, t_c, w_c)(\lambda k. \text{HB}(s_k, \text{London}, t_k, w_k) \vee \text{HB}(h_k, \text{London}, t_k, w_k))\]
\[\text{Asser: } \text{SAY}(j, t_c, w_c)(\lambda k. \exists e \left[ \text{DOX}(e, w_k) \wedge \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w_k) \wedge \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w_k) \wedge \tau(e, w_k) < t_k \right] )\]

In words, this presupposes that John believes that either he himself and/or his addressee is in London at the time and world of his utterance.

**Punchline:** We have two context indices, one for indexical items and one for perspectival items, both of which are shifted by monsters.

### 4 Solution to the Unmarkedness Puzzle

#### 4.1 Shifting to the Reference Time

- I’ll extend the above system to other shifting contexts. In particular, I assume that tense optionally shifts the temporal parameter of \(c_2\) to the reference time.

\[\text{[PRES] } [\phi]^{c_1,c_2}(c)\]
\[\text{[PAST] } [\phi]^{c_1,c_2}(k)\]

\[\text{Presupp: } \exists e \left[ \text{DOX}(e, w_k) \wedge \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w_k) \wedge \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w_k) \wedge \tau(e, w_k) < t_k \right] \]

\[\text{Asser: } \exists e \left[ \text{DOX}(e, w_k) \wedge \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w_k) \wedge \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w_k) \wedge \tau(e, w_k) < t_k \right] \]

\(t_k\) is of course very simplistic. In particular, we won’t be concerned with Sequence-of-Tense.

Future is a bit complicated, so I won’t try to formalise it today.

The unshifted interpretation looks like (61). The content of the indexical presupposition is essentially the same as before.

\[\text{[Sergei PAST, come] } [\phi]^{c_1,c_2}(k)\]
\[\text{Presupp: } \exists e \left[ \text{DOX}(e, w_k) \wedge \text{THEME}(e, \text{Sergei}, w_k) \wedge \text{GOAL}(e, \text{London}, w_k) \wedge \tau(e, w_k) < t_k \right] \]

- We assume that an optional operator \(M_2\) shifts the tense-coordinate of the second context index (cf. Schlenker’s 2014 super-monsters).

\[\text{Future is a bit complicated, so I won’t try to formalise it today.}\]

\[\text{We assume that an optional operator } M_2 \text{ shifts the tense-coordinate of the second context index (cf. Schlenker’s 2014 super-monsters).}\]

\[\text{4) don’t deny other theoretical possibilities, but it needs to be worked out how to implement the current idea in other theories of tense.}\]

\[\text{5) Here we depart from Kaplan’s ontology of possible contexts, which assumes each possible context } (s, h, t, w) \text{ to represent a possible conversational context. As far as I can see, this is a purely ontologically issue and does not cause much empirical trouble, though it’s not an unimportant issue.}\]
4.3 Competition under a Perspective

- The perspective based on the current context is used when the perspective-shifting doesn't happen. A shifted perspective is used when the perspective-shifting happens.

- The competition between come vs. go is only computed under one perspective at a time.

- Examples:

  (68) I'll go to the station to pick you up.

This doesn't involve $\mathcal{M}_t$, so the perspective is based on the current utterance context. In the current context, (it is commonly known that) neither the Speaker nor the Hearer is at the station, so go.

(69) I'll $\mathcal{M}_s$ come to the station to pick you up.

This does involve $\mathcal{M}_s$, and the perspective is shifted to the future time, and it is commonly known that at that time the Hearer will be at the station, so come.

- Recall also that go cannot be relative to the reference time.

  - Assumption: Utterances with go never involve $\mathcal{M}_t$.
  - Rationale: Since go has no indexical presupposition, $\mathcal{M}_t$ would have no direct semantic effects on go itself. Such vacuous occurrences are banned.

(70) #Sergei PAST go here yesterday.

Since it is commonly known that the Speaker (and Hearer) is in the Goal location, MP requires come to be used. If MP would be satisfied with (71), but this parse is impossible, due to the vacuous use of $\mathcal{M}_t$.

(71) *Sergei PAST $\mathcal{M}_s$ go here yesterday.

Consequently, go is always evaluated against the current context.

- In previous studies the difference between come and go about whether their indexical presuppositions can refer to the reference time was merely a lexical stipulation. Our unmarked semantics for go together with the ban on vacuous uses of monsters achieves a deeper explanation. In particular it makes a prediction that in all languages go (the unmarked one) cannot refer to the reference time.

5 Some More Fun Stuff

- There's some interesting cross-linguistic variation on the use of come and go.

- In some languages motion towards the Speaker's HB and motion towards the Hearer's HB are expressed by distinct verbs, e.g. in Palaun (Austronesian) (Nakazawa 2007):

  (72) a. me towards the Speaker
  b. eko towards the Hearer
  c. mo if neither (≈ go)
I do not know if \textit{mo} competes with \textit{me} and \textit{eko} at the same time.

  - In English (and German, Italian, etc.), when the speaker is moving towards the hearer, \textit{come}:
    \begin{equation}
    \text{I'll come/#go to your office later.}
    \end{equation}
  - In Japanese and Korean, \textit{go} in such contexts.
    \begin{equation}
    \text{atode ofisu-ni #ki/iki masu. later office-to #come/go polite 'I'll come to your office later.'}
    \end{equation}
  - In English, German, Japanese and Korean, when a third person is moving towards the hearer, \textit{come} is at least a possibility.
    \begin{equation}
    \text{Sergei is coming to your office now.}
    \end{equation}
  - Nakazawa (2007) also observes that in Shibe, \textit{come} can only refer to the Speaker's location at the utterance time, while in Mandarin Chinese, \textit{come} can refer to the Speaker's HB at the utterance or reference time. So in Shibe, \textit{come} is completely indexical. I don't know if it shifts at all.

- \textit{Bring} vs. \textit{take}, benefactives in Japanese, etc. also shift like \textit{come} vs. \textit{go}.

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