

Yasutada Sudo (University College London) & Jacopo Romoli (Ulster University)

## SUMMARY .....

Past stative predicates give rise to **Lifetime Effects** or **cessation implicatures**. Previous studies ([1–4]) explain Lifetime Effects in terms of suspending cessation implicatures contradicting contextual assumptions. We propose that the two scalar inferences are due to different mechanisms of scalar strengthening.

## Temporal Inferences

Past stative predicates give rise to additional inferences.

- (1) John was from London.  
 $\rightsquigarrow$  *John is dead* **Lifetime Effect**
- (2) John was hungry.  
 $\rightsquigarrow$  *John is no longer hungry* **cessation implicature**

Present stative predicates do not give rise to inferences.

- (3) a. John is from London.      b. John is hungry.

### Generalization

Past stative predicates that describe permanent properties ( $\approx$  individual-level predicates) give rise to Lifetime Effects.

Past stative predicates that describe non-permanent properties ( $\approx$  stage-level) give rise to cessation implicatures.

Lifetime Effects project like presuppositions.

- (4) a. John was not from London.  
 b. Was John from London?  
 c. If John was from London, he lived in Bloomsbury.

Cessation implicatures behave like scalar implicatures in projective contexts.

- (5) a. John was not hungry.  
 b. Was John hungry?  
 c. If John was hungry, he was grumpy.

With a salient past time interval, Lifetime Effects don't arise.

- (6) On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta.  
 Gregory was from America. ([1],p.19)

## Scalar Strengthening

We assume two mechanisms of scalar strengthening ([5]).

**Presuppositional Scalar Strengthening:** Strengthen the presupposition with the negations of the presuppositions of presuppositionally non-weaker alternatives (cf. Maximize Presupposition).

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbb{P}(\phi) \rrbracket_P &= \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_P \wedge \forall \psi \in \text{Alt}(\phi) [\llbracket \phi \rrbracket_P \not\subseteq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_P \rightarrow \neg \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_P] \\ \llbracket \mathbb{P}(\phi) \rrbracket_A &= \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_A \end{aligned}$$

**Assertive Scalar Strengthening:** Strengthen the assertion with the negations of Strawson non-weaker alternatives. The presuppositions of the negated alternatives are inherited (cf. Exh/O).

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbb{A}(\phi) \rrbracket_P &= \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_P \wedge \forall \psi \in \text{Alt}(\phi) [\phi \not\Rightarrow_S \psi \rightarrow \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_P] \\ \llbracket \mathbb{A}(\phi) \rrbracket_A &= \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_A \wedge \forall \psi \in \text{Alt}(\phi) [\phi \not\Rightarrow_S \psi \rightarrow \neg \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_A] \\ &(\phi \Rightarrow_S \psi \text{ iff whenever } \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_P \text{ and } \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_P \text{ are true, } \llbracket \phi \rrbracket_A \rightarrow \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_A) \end{aligned}$$

A scalar item must contribute to scalar strengthening via  $\mathbb{P}$  or  $\mathbb{A}$ , and non-trivial strengthening is preferred.

For (7),  $\mathbb{A}$  leads to no strengthening, so  $\mathbb{P}$  is preferred.

- (7)  $\mathbb{P}$ (Andrew is unaware that **some** of them are drunk)  
 a.  $\llbracket (7) \rrbracket_P$  = some but not all of them are drunk.  
 b.  $\llbracket (7) \rrbracket_A$  = Andrew does not know that some of them are drunk.

On the other hand, (8) is ambiguous:

- (8)  $\mathbb{P}$ (Andrew is aware that **some** of them are drunk)  
 a.  $\llbracket (8) \rrbracket_P$  = some but not all of them are drunk.  
 b.  $\llbracket (8) \rrbracket_A$  = Andrew knows that some of them are drunk.

- (9)  $\mathbb{A}$ (Andrew is aware that **some** of them are drunk)  
 a.  $\llbracket (9) \rrbracket_P$  = (some and) all of them are drunk.  
 b.  $\llbracket (9) \rrbracket_A$  = Andrew knows that some of them are drunk, but does not know that all of them are.

**References:** [1] Musan (1995) *On the Temporal Interpretation of Noun Phrases*. Ph.D. diss. [2] Musan (1997) Tense, predicates, and Lifetime Effects. *NALS*, 5. [3] Magri (2009) A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory implicatures. *NALS*, 17. [4] Thomas (2012) *Temporal Implicatures*. Ph.D. diss. [5] Spector & Sudo (to appear) Presupposed ignorance and exhaustification: How presuppositions and scalar implicatures interact. *L&P*. [6] Kusumoto (1999) *Tense in embedded context*. Ph.D. diss. [7] Altschuler & Schwarzschild (2012) Moment of change, cessation implicatures and simultaneous readings. *SuB17*.

### Assumptions

1. Existential theory of tense ([4,6])

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket (2) \rrbracket_A &= \exists t [t < \{ \text{time}(c) \} \wedge \text{hungry}(\text{john}, t)] \\ \llbracket (3b) \rrbracket_A &= \exists t [\text{time}(c) \in t \wedge \text{hungry}(\text{john}, t)] \end{aligned}$$

2. Stative predicates presuppose that the subject is alive or exists while they hold ([1,2,4]).

3. Presuppositions existentially project out.

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket (2) \rrbracket_P &= \exists t [t < \{ \text{time}(c) \} \wedge \text{alive}(\text{john}, t)] \\ \llbracket (3b) \rrbracket_P &= \exists t [\text{time}(c) \in t \wedge \text{alive}(\text{john}, t)] \end{aligned}$$

4. Stative predicates never hold for a single moment ([9]): If  $S(a, \{m\})$ , then  $S(a, \{m'\})$  for some  $m' < m$ . There are assumed to be uncountably many moments.

$\mathbb{P}(1)$  presupposes that John is dead now.

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket (1) \rrbracket_P &= \exists t [t < \{ \text{time}(c) \} \wedge \text{alive}(\text{john}, t)] \\ \llbracket (3a) \rrbracket_P &= \exists t [\text{time}(c) \in t \wedge \text{alive}(\text{john}, t)] \end{aligned}$$

$\mathbb{A}(1)$  would presuppose that John is alive now, and have a cessation implicature that John is no longer from London.

$\mathbb{A}(2)$  accounts for the cessation implicature.  $\mathbb{P}(2)$  is allowed, unless John is known to be alive.

(3) have no scalar inference, because of Assumption 4.  $\llbracket (3b) \rrbracket_P$  entails  $\llbracket (2) \rrbracket_P$ , and  $\llbracket (3b) \rrbracket_A$  Strawson-entails  $\llbracket (2) \rrbracket_A$ .

**Domain restriction** accounts for (6), e.g.  $C$  is a contextually relevant time interval such that  $\text{time}(c) \notin C$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbb{P}(\text{Gregory was from America}) \rrbracket_P &= \\ \exists t \subseteq C [t < \{ \text{time}(c) \} \wedge \text{alive}(\text{gregory}, t)] \\ \wedge \neg \exists t \subseteq C [\text{time}(c) \in t \wedge \text{alive}(\text{gregory}, t)] \end{aligned}$$

### Comparison with previous studies:

- [1,2] fail to account for projection of Lifetime Effects, (4).
  - [3,4] do not explain Lifetime Effects in ignorance contexts.
    - (10) I don't know whether John is still alive, but #he was from London.
- They also fail to predict Lifetime Effects of (11).
- (11) John was 35 years old and from London.