

Additivity, Accommodation, and Alternatives*

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Abstract

Kripke (2009) observed that additive presuppositions triggered by additive particles like *too* resist accommodation in out-of-the-blue context, and proposed that this is because additive presuppositions are anaphoric and hence cannot be accommodated. This proposal has been very influential, but Ruys (2015) claims that Kripke’s observation can be explained in terms of conditions on deaccenting, and an existential analysis of additive presuppositions is not only sufficient but also empirically more adequate, in light of exceptional cases where additive particles can be used felicitously out of the blue. However, such exceptional cases have not been given a systematic explanation so far. In this paper, we closely examine existing and novel examples where accommodation of additive presuppositions is felicitous, and argue that Ruys’ existential analysis as well as the Kripkean anaphoric approach face issues. We propose a new analysis, according to which the *sui generis* resistance of accommodation of additive presuppositions in out-of-the-blue contexts is due largely to their focus sensitivity. Specifically, we claim that interpreting an additive particle involves two distinct processes, (i) accommodation of a contextually relevant set of focus alternatives, and (ii) computation of an additive presupposition with the focus alternatives so accommodated, which might or might not have to be accommodated as well. A notable feature of our analysis is that neither process is assumed to be special with respect to how it is pragmatically constrained, but their interplay accounts for Kripke’s original observation as well as various exceptions to it.

Keywords: additive particles, presupposition accommodation, focus, alternatives

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1 Introduction

In a paper based on a talk delivered in 1990, Kripke (2009) claims that the additive presupposition of *too* is not merely existential but anaphoric.¹ His main arguments come from examples like (1) and (2).²

- (1) If Katie and Berit come to the party, then [the linguist]_F will come, too.
(2) Katie_F is having dinner in New York right now, too.

¹As an anonymous reviewer reminded us, Kripke 2009 only discussed *too* and never other additive particles like *also* and *as well*. We will likewise mostly discuss *too*, but as far as we can see, these other additive particles, as well as similar particles in other languages, behave identically in relevant respects (although there are obvious syntactic differences, and some of them seem to have additional uses, e.g., *also* at the beginning of the previous sentence), and we believe his theory is meant to be applicable to them as well, at least as far as the uses we are interested in are concerned. This is true for our theory as well, and in fact, we predict them to behave similarly with respect to accommodation, to the extent they are focus sensitive like *too*.

²The original example of the second type in Kripke 2009 is *Sam_F is having dinner tonight, too* (p. 373), which is ambiguous between a progressive reading and a futurate reading. This ambiguity is immaterial for his proposal and our evaluation of it in this paper, and to simplify the discussion we will use an unambiguous example that only has a progressive reading instead.

Kripke’s arguments against the purely existential analysis of the additive presupposition go as follows. Intuitively, (1) presupposes that neither Katie nor Berit is the linguist mentioned in the consequent. However, if the consequent of (1) only had an existential presupposition that someone other than the linguist will come to the party, the linguist mentioned in the consequent should be able to be identical to either Katie or Berit, contrary to intuition. The argument from (2) is that if the additive presupposition were merely existential, i.e. that there is at least one more person that is having dinner in New York at the utterance time, the presupposition should be satisfied as long as the utterance time is a reasonable time for having dinner, given the common knowledge that there are many people having dinner in New York on any given day. Then, the sentence is predicted to be assertable out of the blue, contrary to fact.

Kripke’s idea of anaphoric presuppositions has been very influential and countenanced by many, and consequently, the current literature contains several technically distinct versions of the idea (Soames 1989, Heim 1990, 1992, Geurts & van der Sandt 2004, Beaver & Zeevat 2007, Chemla & Schlenker 2012, for example).³ Abstracting away from subtle differences among different implementations, the above data are explained roughly along the following lines. The disjointness effect of (1) arises because the additive presupposition is anaphoric to the antecedent of the conditional and requires the content of the consequent to be distinct from it. As for (2), the anaphoric additive presupposition cannot be satisfied out of the blue, because by assumption, the relevant anaphora resists accommodation in an out-of-the-blue context, similarly to pronominal anaphora.

Ruys (2015) claims that Kripke’s first argument based on (1) is flawed. We find this part of Ruys 2015 very convincing, so we will only review it briefly here, omitting certain details and additional evidence he offers. His key observation is that if the linguist mentioned in the consequent of (1) were identical to Katie or Berit, then the consequent would be trivial. The disjointness effect, therefore, can be explained solely by the reasonable assumption that such trivial interpretations are eschewed, independently from how the additive presupposition is analysed, and as such, it does not motivate the anaphoric analysis.

This leaves us with Kripke’s argument from (2). It is undeniable that this argument poses a damning issue for the *purely* existential analysis of the additive presupposition, but Ruys (2015) argues that the existential analysis could be augmented with independently motivated licensing conditions on deaccenting in order to explain the infelicity. Very roughly, the idea is that (2) is infelicitous because the post-focal material is most naturally read with deaccenting, but this deaccenting is unlicensed in an out-of-the-blue context. If this were the correct analysis, indeed, the Kripkean anaphoric approach would lose its support from examples like (2). Ruys furthermore points out that there are ex-

³Soames 1989 predates Kripke’s talk in 1990, but mentions in n. 54, Kripke’s first argument above, as well as some of the other cases of alleged anaphoric presuppositions discussed in Kripke 2009, attributing them to Kripke. But Soames’ view is not completely identical to Kripke’s, as we understand it. According to our reading of the relevant passage (p. 604), the additive presupposition for Soames is *existential* but is crucially *de re* with respect to the presuppositional attitude. For instance, for him, (2) presupposes *of a particular person* that he or she is having dinner in New York. This is very close to our proposal, except that it does not mention any role of focus. Soames also claims that such a *de re* presupposition is not compatible with certain theories to presuppositions, most notably the one put forward by Heim (1982, 1983), but see Heim’s remark to the contrary in Heim 1990: fn. 11. Our theory is a concrete demonstration that *de re* presuppositions are indeed compatible with the Heimian theory of presuppositions, although it formulates the presuppositional condition in a way different from how Heim (1990) sees it. We discuss some related points at the end of the paper. We thank Bernhard Schwarz (p.c.) for directing our attention to Soames 1989.

ceptional cases that are felicitous in (more or less) out-of-the-blue contexts, which are problematic for the anaphoric approach, and takes them as evidence for his existential analysis augmented with conditions on deaccenting.

The above paragraphs summarise our understanding of the current theoretical debate on the semantics and pragmatics of additive particles. The upshot is as follows. Kripke's argument based on examples like (2) has put the purely existential analysis out of the picture. While his anaphoric approach has been influential and still entertains popularity, Ruys (2015) has put forward an interesting alternative analysis that augments the existential analysis with independent constraints on deaccenting, and aims to explain away Kripke's observation. Since the purely existential analysis is no longer on the table, we will henceforth call Ruys' (2015) analysis of additive particles simply his existential analysis.

In this paper we will first review Ruys' (2015) existential analysis in detail, together with one class of problems for it that have already been identified by Ruys himself, namely, empirical facts suggest that whether an additive particle can be felicitously used out of the blue does not seem to correlate perfectly with whether deaccenting is licensed. While one might take this to be significant enough an issue for this analysis, we will also point out an additional problem coming from examples where an additive particle can be felicitously used out of the blue. As Ruys 2015 argues in great detail, such examples are problematic for the Kripkean anaphoric approach because they show that the (in)felicity of additive particles does not correlate with the (im)possibility of anaphora, contrary to its prediction. Ruys claims that his existential analysis handles these cases better, but we will point out that it is actually not without problems. Therefore, we think both theories face some issues.

In order to explain Kripke's observation and apparent exceptions to it, we will propose an entirely new analysis that builds on the following idea. Interpretation of an additive particle requires two distinct processes, namely, (i) accommodation of a contextually relevant set of focus alternatives, and (ii) computation of an additive presupposition with the focus alternatives so accommodated, which might or might not have to be accommodated as well, depending on the context. It turns out that the resulting theory bears resemblance in certain respects to the anaphoric approach, especially versions suggested by Soames 1989 and Heim 1990, but one particularly important feature of our analysis is its reference to focus. Furthermore, we maintain that neither (i) nor (ii) is specific to additive particles in terms of how it is pragmatically constrained. Specifically, (i) is the same process as what is involved with other examples of focus that require accommodation of contextually salient alternatives, and likewise, the result of the computation in (ii) is a normal presupposition that has no special properties with respect to accommodation. This should be contrasted with the crucial assumption of the Kripkean anaphoric approach that antecedents of anaphoric presuppositions cannot be accommodated, unlike other garden-variety presuppositions, and we will see, this makes it difficult to account for certain cases of exceptionally acceptable out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles. Under our account, on the other hand, it is the interplay between the above two processes, (i) and (ii), that makes additive particles seem as if they behave differently from other presupposition triggers with respect to accommodation. We will also offer additional empirical motivation for our view coming from (a) additive particles associating with quantifiers, and (b) the behaviour of other focus particles with respect to accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We will start with reviewing Ruys'

existential analysis in Section 2, together with the issue that Ruys himself has pointed out. We will then examine in Section 3 examples where an additive particle can be used felicitously (more or less) out of the blue, and discuss challenges they pose for Ruys’ existential analysis and different versions of the anaphoric approach. In Section 4, we will present our own analysis, and show how it explains both the felicitous and infelicitous examples from the preceding section. After that we will turn to examples involving an additive particle associating with a focussed quantifier in Section 5, and to other focus particles in Section 6, which we claim provide further support for our analysis. We will conclude in Section 7 with some remarks on implications of our analysis of additive particles on the theory of presuppositions.

2 Ruys’ existential analysis

As mentioned in the introduction, Ruys (2015) proposes to account for the infelicity of (2) in out-of-the-blue contexts in terms of constraints on deaccenting, rather than in terms of an anaphoric presupposition. The essence of his idea is as follows. The example is most naturally read with a prosodic focus on the subject *Katie* and deaccenting of the rest of the sentence. It is independently demonstrated that deaccenting requires a discourse (or contextual) licenser or antecedent, and an antecedent for deaccenting generally resists accommodation. Consequently, (2) is rendered infelicitous out of the blue, due to the lack of a suitable antecedent for the deaccented VP.

In support of this analysis Ruys points out that even when *too* is removed, as in (3), the sentence remains infelicitous out of the blue with the same intonational pattern including deaccenting of the VP.

(3) Katie_F is having dinner in New York right now.

Thus, according to Ruys, the unacceptability of (2) out of the blue has little to do with the additive particle *per se*, but more to do with the post-focal part of the sentence.

It should be emphasised, however, that it is not the case that an additive particle has no presupposition for Ruys. He correctly points out that if it had no presupposition, the unacceptability of *too* in the following sentence would be unaccounted for.

(4) James didn’t smoke, but Katie_F smoked (#*too*).

Since the version of the sentence without *too* is acceptable, the deaccenting of *smoked* in the second sentence is licensed here. In fact, the verb could even be elided, which can be seen as an extreme case of deaccenting (Rooth 1992b, Tancredi 1992). Ruys points out, crucially, that an existential presupposition is good enough to explain the infelicity of the version of (4) with *too*. More specifically, he writes in fn. 23, “I tentatively assume that $\phi[\alpha_F]$ *too* presupposes $\exists x[x \neq \alpha \& \phi[x]]$ ”, and indeed, this existential presupposition will render *too* in (4) infelicitous.

However Ruys himself mentions what seems to us to be a significant problem of his analysis, which remains unsolved in his paper. It has to do with examples where deaccenting is independently controlled for. There are two sub-cases to consider.

Firstly, Ruys’s analysis predicts that when there is no deaccenting, a sentence like (2) should become acceptable out of the blue. This is testable because the deaccenting in this example is natural but is not absolutely required. To argue that this prediction is on the right track, Ruys raises the following example, which indeed can be used without

an explicit discourse antecedent.

- (5) This_F, too, shall PASS_F. (adapted from Ruys 2015: p. 356)

The logic here is that nothing is deaccented in this sentence, so one would simply have to accommodate the existential additive presupposition triggered by *too*, which should be possible. However, we do not find this example very convincing. The sentence in question is arguably a fixed adage, so its semantic properties might differ from what is predicted from the compositional semantics of this sentence. We think examples like (6) are more telling, which is attributed by Ruys (2015: fn. 18, p. 356) to an anonymous reviewer of his paper.

- (6) Sam_F, too, is having dinner_F in New York_F.

This is essentially the non-deaccented version of (2). Since there is no deaccenting here, Ruys's account predicts that the existential additive presupposition should be simply satisfied—and not even accommodated—given that it is commonly known that many people are having dinner in New York in the evening on any given day. However, evidently, this prediction is not borne out: (6) is as infelicitous as (2) out of the blue. Ruys gives some comments on this issue in the same footnote that (6) is from, but before discussing them let us look at the other sub-case of the problem.

Another prediction of Ruys's analysis is that if the deaccenting of the VP in (2) is independently licensed, then what is left will be just a purely existential additive presupposition, which should be able to be satisfied given the common knowledge. This is also testable. Consider (7), which is mentioned in the same footnote as (6) in Ruys 2015 and also attributed to the same anonymous reviewer.

- (7) Who had dinner in New York last night?
— #Peter_F had dinner in New York last night, too.
(adapted from Ruys 2015: fn. 18, p. 356)

Contrary to the prediction of Ruys's analysis, the additive presupposition here causes infelicity that is arguably comparable to (2). Note also that without *too*, the sentence would be acceptable, with the intonation indicated, suggesting that the deaccenting of the VP is indeed licensed. The same issue is illustrated by the following example raised by Ruys himself towards the end of his paper.

- (8) ??Peter did not have dinner in New York last night, but John_F did, too.
(adapted from Ruys 2015: p. 359)

To summarise the issue, Ruys's analysis of the infelicity of (2) out of the blue relies on the assumption that the licenser of deaccenting cannot be accommodated, while the additive presupposition is merely existential and has no special properties with respect to accommodation. In fact, for (2), the existential additive presupposition is simply satisfied, so the (in)felicity of the example should simply correlate with whether deaccenting is licensed. Empirical facts suggest that this prediction is on the wrong track.

Ruys is aware of this issue, and in response, he suggests that there might be an additional factor that renders the above examples infelicitous. To quote his own words:

Since *too* does not affect the assertion, but only adds an existential presupposition, I presume that the function of *too* must be to highlight the fact that the

context admits this presupposition. If so, *too* would tend to be unacceptable unless the hearer can figure out why the presupposition is being highlighted. (Ruys 2015: fn. 18, p. 356)

Since presuppositions generally do not have such a ‘highlighting’ function—in fact, they are usually backgrounded—this essentially amounts to a claim that there is more than just the existential additive presupposition in the presupposition of additive particles after all. Our understanding of the above quote is that the relevant additional interpretive effect is pragmatic in nature and arises from the fact that additive particles do not change the assertive content. However, such an additional pragmatic component of meaning does not seem to be a general property of such ‘pure presupposition triggers’ that lack assertive contributions. Consider, for example, positive implicative verbs like *remember to VP* and *succeed in VPing*. They are also pure presupposition triggers in the sense that they do not change the assertive contents, but their presuppositions are entirely banal with respect to accommodation. Concretely, the following examples do not trigger infelicity comparable to (2) when used out of the blue.

- (9) a. Katie remembered to have dinner in New York.
b. Katie succeeded in having dinner in New York.

Certainly, the presuppositions of these examples are not identical to the case of (2), so we cannot simply directly compare the former to the latter, but the negative counterparts of these implicative verbs, *forget to VP* and *fail to VP*, provide a useful reference point. Unlike the positive implicative verbs, they do tamper with the assertion, namely, they negate the assertive meaning of the complement while triggering the same presuppositions as their positive counterparts. Therefore, if Ruys’ idea suggested in the above quote is on the right track, accommodation of the presuppositions of (9), unlike that of the presuppositions of (10), should invite the hearer to seek the reason why the speaker is highlighting the presupposition. As far as we can see, no such difference is intuitively perceived, which casts doubt on the idea under question.

- (10) a. Katie forgot to have dinner in NY.
b. Katie failed to have dinner in NY.

Furthermore, it seems to us that the proposed idea is insufficient in explaining the examples problematic for Ruys’ existential analysis to begin with. As written in the above quote, examples like (6)–(8) should be judged as unacceptable unless the hearer can figure out the reason for highlighting the presupposition. It is not entirely clear from the quoted passage, which is the only place in Ruys 2015 this idea is mentioned, what ‘highlighting’ actually amounts to in empirical terms, but one could imagine a context where the speaker wants to highlight the fact that John is not at all special among relevant individuals for having had dinner in New York on the previous day, for example. Then, (8) is expected to become felicitous, to the extent that one could come up with such a reason, but as far as we can see, there is no positive evidence supporting this prediction. In fact, Ruys concedes at the end of his paper that the issue we are discussing here is an open issue for his existential analysis.

To stress, the issue at hand has already been mentioned in Ruys 2015, and we are merely reiterating it here. However, it is fair to conclude that what Ruys 2015 puts forward is at best an incomplete account of Kripke’s observation about the infelicity of additive particles in out-of-the-blue contexts. In particular, it remains incomplete until

the idea of ‘highlighting’ is substantiated, or an alternative explanation for the infelicity of examples like (6)–(8) is offered. We do not see how that could be done at this point and will leave it open as well.

Of course, we should not forget the positive aspect of Ruys existential analysis. Its main empirical advantage over the Kripkean anaphoric approach actually consists in how it handles examples where an additive particle can be used felicitously out of the blue, rather than how it accounts for infelicitous uses of additive particles. We have so far only seen the latter kind of examples. We will turn to the former kind in the next section.

3 When an additive particle is felicitous out of the blue

In this section, we will closely examine examples where an additive particle can be felicitously used (more or less) out of the blue. As mentioned already, Ruys 2015 regards such cases as providing empirical support for his existential analysis over the Kripkean anaphoric approach, and indeed, we will echo his criticisms against the latter, but we will also point out that certain cases pose additional problems for Ruys’ existential analysis. We will eventually conclude that no previous theory provides a satisfactory account of felicitous uses of additive particles in out-of-the-blue contexts.

We will start with a generalisation that additive particles that trigger what we call *indexical additive presuppositions* can generally be used felicitously out of the blue. Roughly, an indexical additive presupposition is an additive prediction ‘about an aspect of the utterance context’, such as the speaker, hearer, location, etc. Note that under Ruys’ view, it does not make sense to say that an additive presupposition is ‘about a particular aspect of the utterance context’, as the presupposition is existential for him, but the notion could instead informally be understood in terms of the *witness* of the existential additive presupposition.

After discussing how the previous analyses would explain the examples of indexical additive presuppositions, we will turn to examples where the additive presupposition is not indexical but the additive particle can still be used felicitously out of the blue. We argue that these cases are particularly problematic for the anaphoric approach.

3.1 Indexical additive presuppositions

The first class of examples we will focus on involves what we call indexical additive presuppositions. In particular, we submit the following empirical generalisation (see Heim 1990 for a similar remark):

- (11) Additive particles that trigger indexical additive presuppositions are generally felicitous out of the blue.

To illustrate, let us come back to (2). Kripke’s (2009) original observation regarding sentences like (2) is often understood to be based on intuitions in a truly out-of-the-blue-context, where nothing particular is presupposed about anything, including the interlocutors, and the intuitions are indeed very robust. However, suppose now that the interlocutors are having dinner in New York themselves. We observe that in such a case, (2) becomes perfectly acceptable, despite the fact that the sentence is still uttered out of the blue. In fact, it is sufficient that at least one of them is commonly known to be having dinner in New York, for the utterance to be felicitous out of the blue.

One might think that the relevant contextual assumption about the speaker and hearer makes the context not truly out of the blue, but if such contextual assumptions render contexts not truly out of the blue, any out-of-the-blue context will be extremely unrealistic, as practically we make some assumptions in all natural conversational contexts. For instance, the intended context for Kripke’s original example is one where the speaker and hearer are *not* having dinner in New York themselves (and hence it is not commonly known and cannot be easily accommodated that either of them is having dinner in New York), and that is as non-trivial a contextual assumption as the assumption that (it is commonly known that) they are having dinner in New York at the speech time.

We will present some more examples illustrating the generalisation in (11) below. However, we will not try to formalise the notion of indexical additive presupposition or the generalisation itself because we will eventually argue that the generalisation is part of a broader phenomenon that subsumes the second class of cases where additive particles are used felicitously out of the blue but the additive presuppositions are non-indexical. In other words, indexicality is only a sufficient condition and is not necessary for an additive particle to be used felicitously out of the blue. This fact suggests that a theory of the semantics and pragmatics of additive particles should actually *not* make reference to indexicality, but rather should derive the generalisation in (11) as an epiphenomenon. To this end, we will claim in the next section that the true generalisation has to do with what kind of focus alternatives are easier to accommodate as contextually relevant, and what additive presuppositions they give rise to. However, for our local purposes and for the ease of exposition, the rough and informal generalisation in (11) proves to be useful.

To convince ourselves that our generalisation in (11) is empirically sound, let us go through some more examples. Some cases of indexical additive presuppositions can actually be found in previous studies. For example, consider the following example, taken from Ruys 2015, which he observes does not require a discourse antecedent of the kind predicted by the Kripkean anaphoric approach.

(12) Hey, that kitten has feelings too, you know! (Ruys 2015: p. 359)

The most natural interpretation of (12) is one where the additive presupposition is about the speaker and/or the hearer. Either way, the additive presupposition can be said to be indexical.

Another example can be found in Grubic 2019. Here, the intended additive presupposition is clearly about the hearer.

(13) *Two women are standing at a bus stop on a rainy day. A car drives by, through a puddle, splashing one of the women with muddy water. To the splashed woman:*
One splashed me_F this morning, too. (Grubic 2019: p. 173)

As mentioned above, indexicality is only meant to be a sufficient condition, but crucially, infelicitous cases all seem to involve non-indexical additive presuppositions, which is in harmony with our generalisation. Let us look at a near minimal pair involving the same sentence but different contexts to further reinforce the observation. It so happens that such a minimal pair has never been explicitly discussed in previous work, so we will construct our own examples here. First, (14) is an example with an indexical presupposition.

(14) *Everyone in the department knows that it’s the day of notification of acceptance for*

the conference SALT. It is common knowledge between you and your colleagues, including Katie, that the majority of the 10 semanticists in the department, including you and Katie, have submitted a single-authored abstract to SALT. She comes to your office and asks you:

Did you get into SALT, too?

We observe that Katie's utterance is felicitous (though perhaps not very cooperative) in this context, and most naturally read as implying that Katie did get into SALT. This can be taken as evidence that the additive presupposition is about the speaker, Katie, and hence is indexical. Now, consider the same sentence uttered by a different speaker, who the additive presupposition cannot be about.

(15) *In the same context as above, your phonologist friend, James, comes to your office and asks you:*

??Did you get into SALT, too?

The utterance here does not seem to be as felicitous as before. Note that our one-way generalisation does not make direct predictions for cases like this where the intended additive presupposition is non-indexical, but it is worth noting that (15) is not entirely unacceptable, and does seem to ameliorate with certain additional contextual assumptions, e.g. if they have been discussing Katie, a semanticist, due to a close friendship with her. Since speakers are naturally inclined to find contextual fixes in assessing acceptability, it is not surprising that the judgments here are not so stable. As we will discuss in detail later, our forthcoming theory has just the right amount of flexibility to explain this observation.

Before discussing theoretical implications of the generalisation in (11), we would like to point out that it is also valid in cases where the intended additive presupposition is about the location or the time of the current context of utterance as well. Let us start with temporal cases. If the speaker and hearer are entering a cafe together sometime in the afternoon, the following sentences could be uttered out of the blue.

- (16) a. I came here yesterday_F, too.
b. I was here [in the morning]_F, too.

In these cases, the additive presuppositions are understood as about today and now, respectively, and hence are indexical.

We also observe that the generalisation holds when the additive presupposition is about the current location of the speaker and hearer. Suppose that the speaker and hearer are in a very busy Italian restaurant, waiting for their food. The speaker says to the hearer, pointing at a Mexican restaurant on the other side of the street:

- (17) Look, there are a lot of people [in that Mexican restaurant]_F, too.

Here, the intended additive presupposition is indexical in that it is about the restaurant that the speaker and the hearer are currently at. The sentence is much more marked when the Mexican restaurant is the intended antecedent.

- (18) ??There are many people [in this restaurant]_F, too.

3.2 Challenges for previous analyses

In our exploration, we now turn our attention to the implications of the generalisation in (11) for Ruys’s analysis and also for the Kripkean anaphoric approach.

3.2.1 Challenges for Ruys’ account

Let us start with Ruys’ existential analysis. Recall that for him, the additive presupposition is existential, and he argues that this is an advantage over the anaphoric approach with respect to examples where the additive particle is used felicitously out of the blue, because the existential additive presupposition is often simply satisfied, or at least very easy to accommodate, unlike the anaphoric additive presupposition that the anaphoric approach postulates. For instance, consider (2) again. The existential presupposition would simply be satisfied here by virtue of the mutually shared world knowledge that many people are having dinner in New York in the evening. Therefore, those examples where an additive particle is felicitously used out of the blue themselves are not particularly problematic.

However, when exactly an additive particle can and cannot be used felicitously needs to be explained. As we reviewed in the previous section, Ruys (2015) proposes deaccenting as the explanatory mechanism, but, as we pointed out, there are empirical reasons to doubt that constraints on deaccenting alone provide a complete account. This is already an issue, as Ruys admits himself, but here, we will point out further issues for his analysis.

We observed above that (2) is judged acceptable if the speaker and hearer are having dinner in New York themselves, but unacceptable, if not. In order to explain this contrast, Ruys 2015 could assume that such contextual factors as what the speaker and hearer are doing could license deaccenting. This in itself is not at all implausible (e.g., see Rochemont 1986, Geiger & Xiang 2021), but this line of explanation cannot apply to cases where the deaccenting is independently licensed. We have already seen that such cases are anyway problematic for the analysis under consideration, but we moreover observe that whether the additive presupposition is indexical matters for the felicity of an additive particle in an out-of-the-blue context, even when deaccenting is controlled for. Concretely, consider (19), involving VP-ellipsis. The answer in (19) is felicitous out of the blue if the speaker and/or hearer are having dinner in New York themselves at the speech time (and so can afford dinner in New York), but infelicitous and comparable to Kripke’s original observation, if neither of them can afford dinner in New York.⁴

- (19) A: Tell me, who can afford dinner in New York?
B: Katie can, too.

While the present observation suggests that indexicality’s role in this phenomenon goes beyond deaccenting conditions, it should be pointed out that it is not a major issue for Ruys’s analysis on its own, because there could potentially be another explanation for the generalisation in (11), although we currently do not see what that might be. However, other examples in this section actually pose a more serious challenge to Ruys’s analysis, as we will argue now.

Recall the pair of examples in (14)–(15) about SALT abstracts. We observed that the former is felicitous, despite the additive particle being used out of the blue, and one nat-

⁴In the former context, it would presumably be more felicitous to use *who else*, rather than *who*, but this would not affect the argument here.

urally draws the inference that the speaker, Katie, got into SALT. One crucial difference between this example and (2) uttered in a context where the speaker and hearer are having dinner in New York is that in this example, the information that Katie got into SALT is new to the hearer. A parallel remark applies to (15). Recall that the acceptability of (15) improves with certain additional contextual assumptions, but importantly, whenever it is acceptable, one draws an inference that James, who is the speaker, knows *of a particular person*, let's say from the department, that his or her abstract has been accepted. This inference does not require exact knowledge of the person's identity, but crucially surpasses the weaker inference that he knows that there is someone or other whose abstract has been accepted (which would be simply common knowledge if the existential quantification is unrestricted, as a conference always accepts some abstracts). Thus, in examples like (14)–(15), the additive particle is used to introduce new information, and we think it is reasonable to regard this new information to stem from accommodating the additive presupposition. However, importantly, this does not follow directly from Ruys's existential analysis, because the existential additive presupposition he assumes is weaker than the inference we observe. This is doubly problematic for his analysis because something additional needs to be said about why the stronger inference is made than the existential presupposition itself, and also it needs to be explained why the plain existential presupposition cannot be accommodated.

Furthermore, this observation holds independently from how deaccenting is licensed. Specifically, a similar, non-existential inference is obligatorily made, even if the relevant deaccenting is independently licensed by an overt antecedent, as in (20). Suppose that A is another semanticist.

- (20) A: I wonder who got into SALT.
 B: Oh, did you, too?

If Katie is B, then as before, one can conclude that Katie got into SALT. Now suppose that B is James, who is a phonologist and presupposed to not have submitted an abstract to SALT. Then the judgments are comparable to (15) in that its acceptability is low, but may improve with certain additional assumptions like the ones mentioned above. Crucially, in that case, the inference is stronger than merely that James knows that there is someone or other who got into SALT. Rather, one infers that James knows of someone in particular (again, without necessarily knowing the exact identity of that person) that he or she got into SALT.

Note also that it is unlikely that an existential presupposition somehow gets strengthened here. In fact, an out-of-the-blue utterance of a sentence triggering a *bona fide* existential presupposition like (21) only results in accommodation of the existential proposition.

- (21) Does everyone here know that someone got into SALT?

We take this observation as suggesting that the additive presupposition is in fact not existential, contrary to Ruys' assumption. Rather, it is better characterised as a singular proposition, or at least existential but *de re* with respect to the presuppositional attitude, as previously suggested by proponents of the anaphoric approach like Soames 1989 and Heim 1990, among others. Together with the problem discussed in the previous section, we think there are enough empirical facts to challenge Ruys' existential analysis.

3.2.2 Challenges for anaphoric approaches

The anaphoric approach, on the other hand, fares better with respect to the above issue of accommodating the additive presupposition, because for it, the additive presupposition, being anaphoric, is stronger than an existential proposition. To be more precise, there are broadly two different versions of this theory that we need to consider (see [Ruys 2015](#) and [Grubic 2019](#) for more detailed overviews of different implementations): Those that take the additive presupposition to contain a pronominal component that requires a contextually salient antecedent to be resolved ([Heim 1990, 1992](#), [Geurts & van der Sandt 2004](#)), which we call the *pronominal anaphora analysis*, and those that take the anaphora to be propositional in nature ([Kripke 2009](#), [Beaver & Zeevat 2007](#), [Tonhauser et al. 2011](#)), which we call the *propositional anaphora analysis*. To illustrate, these two types of theories would analyse (2) roughly as follows. Under the pronominal anaphora analysis, the additive presupposition will be “ x is having dinner in New York now”, where x is a (gender-, person-, and number-neutral) anaphoric pronoun whose referent is distinct from Katie. The propositional anaphora analysis, on the other hand, will require an antecedent proposition that is salient in the context of utterance and is ‘parallel’ to the proposition that the additive particle modifies, e.g., the proposition that James is having dinner in New York right now. Among propositional anaphora analyses, different characterisations of the relevant ‘parallel’ relation between propositions can be found, but these technical details do not concern us much here.

Notice that under both versions of the anaphoric approaches, the additive presupposition is stronger than [Ruys](#)’ existential presupposition, and consequently, they straightforwardly account for why a proposition stronger than an existential statement is accommodated when the additive presupposition is new information. Certainly, it needs to be explained why such a use is possible at all, and indeed, this is where the anaphoric approach fails, as we will discuss now.

The anaphoric approach assumes that there are rather severe constraints on the accommodation of anaphoric antecedents, which can be given independent empirical motivation, and these constraints will dictate that additive particles cannot be felicitously used out of the blue, unless the anaphoric component of their additive presuppositions can be somehow resolved. In other words, the prediction of this approach is that constraints on accommodation of additive presuppositions should be parallel to constraints on accommodation of anaphoric antecedents. As [Ruys 2015](#) argues previously, this prediction is in fact not borne out. We will now discuss specific cases of this problem with respect to our generalisation about indexical additive presuppositions in (11).

3.2.3 Pronominal anaphora analysis

Let us consider the pronominal anaphora analysis first. To account for our generalisation (11), it could stipulate that the pronominal anaphora in the additive presupposition can exceptionally be resolved to the speaker or hearer even in out of the blue contexts. This idea is in fact not so far-fetched as it might seem at first. Notice that indexical pronouns like *I*, *you* and *we* can be used out of the blue, unlike third person pronouns. This is actually true for so-called null pronouns, or *pro*, in languages like Japanese. In this language, there is no verbal agreement to indicate the intended referent of a null pronoun, but a null pronoun could easily be used out of the blue, when it refers to an indexical element. For instance, (22) can easily be understood as about the speaker or a group containing a speaker, while (22) can equally easily be understood as about the hearer, or

a group containing the speaker and hearer.

- (22) a. tuita yo.
arrived PRT
'I/We have arrived.'
b. tuita?
arrived
'Have you/we arrived?'

On the other hand, interpreting the null pronoun in these examples as referring to a third person is possible but heavily constrained, and at best very difficult out of the blue. Thus, if we took the pronominal anaphora analysis literally and supposed that the additive presupposition contains a null pronoun that is underspecified for person, then it could potentially explain the generalisation (11) as falling from a general constraint on resolution of null anaphora.

It should be noted, however, that to achieve a complete account, more needs to be said about the nature of the null anaphora involved because not every case of null anaphora with an indexical referent is felicitous out of the blue. For instance, the standard phrase of a comparative sentence can be implicit and in that case, it behaves like pronominal anaphora, as illustrated by (23).

- (23) a. This scientist has a high IQ, but Katie is smarter.
b. We have a high IQ, but Katie is smarter.

If an implicit comparative standard and the additive presupposition are resolved by the same mechanism of anaphora, then we expect “Katie is smarter” to be usable on its own out of the blue with the standard being understood as the speaker, the hearer, or both. Contrary to this expectation, this does not seem to be possible, and such an utterance is simply infelicitous out of the blue. Despite this potential open issue, our tentative conclusion here is that the pronominal anaphora analysis may be able to explain our generalisation about indexical additive presuppositions. However, as we will see later in this section, it runs into significant issues with examples where an additive particle is felicitously used (more or less) out of the blue, but the additive presupposition is non-indexical.

3.2.4 Propositional anaphora analysis

Let us now turn to the propositional anaphora analysis. Take (14), for example. In this case, the anaphoric additive presupposition must be resolved to the proposition that Katie’s abstract has been accepted, and it needs to be assumed that this propositional antecedent can exceptionally be accommodated, as it is not salient prior to the utterance. On the other hand, for (15), such accommodation needs to be impossible or somehow more difficult. Note that the accommodated antecedent could be the same proposition, that Katie’s abstract has been accepted. A possible explanation of this contrast available under the propositional anaphora analysis is that accommodation of a propositional antecedent is constrained by how reliable the speaker is with respect to the truth of the proposition to be accommodated. That is, in the case of (14), the speaker is obviously a reliable source as to whether she got into SALT. On the other hand, for (15), the speaker might or might not be. Furthermore, this account could provide a natural explanation for the observation that certain additional contextual assumptions can ameliorate the acceptability of (15).

That is, if James is somehow known to be a reliable source for information about a particular semanticist, it becomes easier to construe the additive presupposition to be about that semanticist.

However, we think such an account overgenerates. Suppose that you are taking a stroll with your friend who has one teenage son. We observe that it would be infelicitous for your friend to utter (2) out of the blue, on a par with Kripke's (2009) original observation. In other words, whether the speaker has a teenage son or not does not matter for the acceptability of this utterance in an out-of-the-blue context. However, in this case, there is an obvious candidate for the accommodation, namely, that the speaker's teenage son is having dinner in New York because the speaker can safely be assumed to be a reliable source for whether and where their son is having dinner. Admittedly, however, this is not a particularly grave issue for the propositional anaphora analysis, because the relevant constraint on accommodation could potentially be more precisely characterised to differentiate indexical additive presuppositions from non-indexical additive presuppositions, so as to account for the contrast in question, although how exactly to state such a constraint is an open question at this point.

Thus, we tentatively conclude that both versions of the anaphoric approach can potentially account for our generalisation about indexical additive presuppositions, while Ruys' existential analysis fails to give a straightforward explanation of why an additive particle gives rise to accommodation of a singular proposition when its additive presupposition is new information. In what follows, we will discuss examples of felicitous out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles whose additive presupposition is non-indexical, and partly following Ruys 2015, argue that such examples pose serious issues for the anaphoric approach.

3.3 Non-indexical additive presuppositions that can be accommodated

As mentioned above, indexicality is only a sufficient condition for an additive particle to be used felicitously in a more or less out-of-the-blue context. For instance, Ruys 2015 raises the following example.

- (24) Sam used to be really poor, which made him feel ostracized and lonely. But now that Sam has struck it rich, he no longer feels alone. Now he too can drive a Mercedes, and have dinner in fancy restaurants in New York.

(Ruys 2015: fn. 18, p. 356)

Due to the two sentences before the third one containing *too*, this is not a case of a truly out-of-the-blue use of the additive particle, but its felicity is nonetheless theoretically relevant. In fact, it poses a challenge for the anaphoric approach to additive presuppositions. Specifically, according to the pronominal anaphora analysis, the additive presupposition of (24) refers to an alternative individual or individuals to the referent of *he*, and intuitively, it refers to people in Sam's circle, or perhaps other rich people in New York more generally. Either way, the pronominal anaphora analysis predicts that pronominal anaphora should succeed in the same context. However, this prediction is not borne out, as illustrated by the infelicity of (25).

- (25) Sam used to be really poor, which made him feel ostracized and lonely. But now that Sam has struck it rich, he no longer feels alone. #Now he hangs out with *them* in Manhattan all the time.

Similarly, a null standard of a comparative cannot be interpreted as referring to the relevant individuals. (26).

- (26) Sam used to be really poor, which made him feel ostracized and lonely. But now that Sam has struck it rich, he no longer feels alone. #Actually, he is even richer.

One can try other assertive content, but it seems to be generally impossible to refer to the individuals that the additive presupposition of (24) is about with a pronoun, overt or null, in this context, contrary to the prediction of the pronominal anaphoric analysis.

A parallel issue arises for the propositional anaphora analysis. It predicts that propositional anaphora should be licensed in this context, but the following example suggests that this prediction is not borne out either. That is, the pronoun *it* in (27) cannot be understood as people in his circle driving Mercedes and having dinner in fancy restaurants in New York; rather the only conceivable referent of *it* here is Sam being rich (and not feeling alone).

- (27) Sam used to be really poor, which made him feel ostracized and lonely. But now that Sam has struck it rich, he no longer feels alone. Yet, he still feels uncomfortable with *it*.

In this particular case, one might argue that the assertive content of the final sentence of (24) is necessary to resolve the propositional anaphora to the relevant proposition, and that is why the propositional anaphora fails in (27). This seems to be a reasonable explanation, but there are other examples that are more directly problematic.

For example, consider the following example taken from [Ruys 2015](#): p. 359.

- (28) Dean of students: Do PhD students even have families to take care of?
Student rep.: Yes, PhD students have families, too.

Intuitively the additive presupposition is about professors, and potentially both academic and professional staff of the university. The dean could be assumed to have a family, in which case the presupposition could be said to be indexical, but crucially, the example remains felicitous even if it is commonly known that the dean does not have a family. Since the latter case would be more problematic, let us assume that the dean does not have a family and that is common knowledge. According to the propositional anaphoric analysis, then, the proposition that the relevant people have families is salient in this context and can be referenced. Contrary to this prediction, such propositional anaphora is not possible with *that* in (29); Rather, it can only be resolved to the proposition that PhD students have families to take care of.

- (29) Dean of students: Do PhD students even have families to take care of?
Student rep.: Clearly, that's all you care.

The same example also poses an issue for the pronominal anaphora analysis, according to which the additive presupposition contains a pronominal anaphora referring to professors (and/or professional staff) of the university. The following example shows that such a reading is impossible to obtain with an overt *they*. Rather, it can only be resolved to PhD students.

- (30) Dean of students: Do PhD students even have families to take care of?
Student rep.: Do you think only *they* have families?

(31) is another example from [Ruys 2015](#): p. 359.

- (31) Guard: I am sorry, small children are not allowed to enter the garden.
Child: That's not fair! I deserve the right to enter the garden, too.

The most natural understanding of the additive presupposition of (31) is not about the guard, but older children and/or adults, and the additive presupposition is still felicitous. Again, both pronominal and propositional anaphora are not licensed here, as illustrated by (32) and (33), respectively.

- (32) Guard: I am sorry, small children are not allowed to enter the garden.
Child: #So only *they* are allowed?
- (33) Guard: I am sorry, small children are not allowed to enter the garden.
Child: #The sign only says *so*!

Perhaps a more striking example of this kind is (34), which is the heading of an online article.⁵

- (34) Your 'Fresh' Fish Was Probably Frozen, Too.

This is a truly out-of-the-blue utterance, but the intended additive presupposition is fairly easy to recover, namely, it is about frozen fish. As in the other examples above, neither pronominal nor propositional anaphora about frozen fish is possible out of the blue, which illustrates the same problem for the anaphoric approach: The constraints on additive particles in out-of-the-blue contexts cannot be reduced to the constraints on accommodation of anaphoric antecedents, as the latter seems to be generally more constrained than the former.

3.4 Section summary

Let us sum up the discussion so far. In this section, we examined [Ruys'](#) existential analysis and two versions of the anaphoric approach in light of various examples where additive particles are felicitously used more or less out of the blue, and argued that none of them offers a satisfactory account of when additive particles can and cannot be used felicitously out of the blue.

For [Ruys'](#) existential analysis, we concluded in the previous section that it does not provide a full account of the infelicitous examples, as empirical facts show that the constraints on out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles cannot be entirely reduced to the constraints on deaccenting. This point has already been acknowledged in [Ruys 2015](#), but additionally, in this section, we argued that this analysis runs into issues with certain cases of felicitous out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles as well. The biggest issue that we identified is that whenever it is felicitous, an out-of-the-blue use of an additive particle requires accommodation of a singular proposition, which is stronger than the existential presupposition that [Ruys](#) ascribes to the additive particle. We take this fact to be evidence that the additive presupposition is in fact not existential.

For the pronominal and propositional anaphora analyses, our arguments are essentially the same as [Ruys'](#) (2015) against them. The underlying idea of the anaphoric approach is to reduce the constraints on uses of additive particles to the constraints on anaphora. However, the examples we discussed in this section point to the conclusion that

⁵<https://lifehacker.com/your-fresh-fish-was-probably-frozen-too-1848983328>

these two phenomena are not constrained in the same way. In particular, the constraints on uses of additive particles seem to be generally less stringent than the constraints on anaphora in out-of-the-blue contexts.

In Section 5, we will come back to these previous analyses again and point out additional problems that come from additive particles that associate with quantifiers, and also argue that our own account to be presented in the next section is in a better position to account for them.

4 Focus-based theory of additivity

The starting point of our theory of additive particles is the assumption that additive particles like *too* exhibit sensitivity to focus, and focus evokes focus alternatives. It bears emphasising that within a sentence containing an additive particle, the intended focus alternatives are not linguistically specified, but nonetheless a particular set of focus alternatives is intended by the speaker, whenever an additive particle is used. This means that a use of an additive particle consistently necessitates identification of the contextually relevant focus alternatives on the hearer's part, and this process is a process of *accommodation* in the sense that the hearer needs to make a guess at what the speaker intended to be the contextually relevant set of focus alternatives (while the speaker expects them to be able to do so, and embark on it upon hearing the additive particle) and adjust the aspect of the common ground, by updating their assumption about contextual relevance.⁶ Note that this accommodation process has to take place, even when the intended focus alternatives happen to mirror previously uttered sentences, because there is nothing in the linguistic expressions that says what exactly are the intended focus alternatives and they might or might not be identical to previous uttered sentences (see below for examples). In this sense, this process is similar in nature to resolution of anaphora, which can also be said to be a type of accommodation, but as we will argue below, there are several crucial differences in terms of what other factors could be made use of in identifying the intended set of contextually relevant focus alternatives.

What we have just pointed out is not at all novel, and in fact we believe they are uncontroversially assumed, explicitly or implicitly, by all contemporary analyses of additive particles. However, we would like to emphasise that a natural consequence of this is that whenever an additive particle is used, out of the blue or not, two distinct processes will take place: (i) accommodation of a contextually relevant set of focus alternatives, and (ii) computation of the presupposition based on these focus alternatives, which might or might not have to be accommodated. We will claim that with some ancillary assumptions about how (i) is constrained, we can explain the felicity and infelicity of the examples we have discussed so far, without recourse to ideas like deaccenting or anaphoric presuppositions.⁷

⁶We should note that we are using the term *accommodation* broadly as adjusting the common ground by updating one's assumptions so as to interpret an utterance in a way that the speaker intended. This encompasses adjusting one's beliefs for presupposition accommodation, as well as one's assumptions about how to interpret variables/discourse referents, which are commonly viewed as an aspect of the common ground, especially in the dynamic tradition (see, e.g., Karttunen 1976, Kamp 1981, Heim 1982). Also, see Singh et al. 2016 for empirical evidence that presupposition accommodation differs from normal context update via assertion.

⁷To be clear we do not deny the role of deaccenting in examples where it takes place. In fact, we believe no one would deny it. Rather, as we have demonstrated, we can always factor out deaccenting either by having no deaccenting at all or by licensing the deaccenting independently, and empirical facts

To underscore the difference between our theory and [Ruys](#)'s, for us, the crucial culprit behind the seemingly unique behaviour of additive particles in out-of-the-blue contexts is focus, or more specifically, constraints on accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives, rather than constraints on deaccenting.

It is also worth remarking at this point that our approach has some degree of resemblance to the anaphoric approach in that there is one additional pragmatic process, in addition to a mere presupposition: Under the anaphoric approach, it is resolution of the anaphoric component of the presupposition, and under our approach it is identification of the contextually relevant focus alternatives. Yet, what crucially separates the two approaches is that in our view, no aspect of the additive presupposition is special with respect to accommodation. Furthermore, we claim that there is nothing notable about accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives for additive particles, and it is constrained in exactly the same way as for any other focus sensitive phenomenon when accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives is called for. In fact, we go one step further and suggest that accommodation of focus alternatives can be regarded as involving the same mechanism as accommodation of any other information relevant for conversation. As we will discuss shortly, empirically, it appears to be less constrained than, say, accommodation of antecedents for pronominal anaphora, because the search space for focus alternatives is circumscribed by linguistic factors, and in the case of additive particles, because the additive presupposition could be used as an additional factor in the reasoning.

In what follows we will first give some details of our semantic assumptions about additive particles, and then discuss how our analysis accounts for the data we saw above.

4.1 Focus alternatives

Previous studies have provided convincing evidence that additive particles like *too* and *also* are focus sensitive and operate on a set of focus alternatives. Since this seems to be a consensus in the current literature, we assume it too without argument. One potentially controversial but useful theoretical assumption that we make here is [Fox & Katzir](#)'s (2011) idea that focus alternatives are linguistic expressions, rather than model-theoretic objects as assumed by older theories of focus alternatives ([Krifka 1991](#), [Rooth 1985, 1992a](#), among others). We will remark on the importance of this assumption in our analysis as we go along.

It is commonly assumed in the literature that the set of relevant focus alternatives for a given occurrence of an additive particle is constrained by the focus structure of the sentence it occurs in, as well as by contextual factors. We believe this is also uncontroversial, so we will briefly illustrate it with one example here. Suppose that the speaker and hearer are in New Jersey at 7 pm.

- (35) James must be having dinner in an Italian restaurant in Manhattan right now.
Katie_F is having dinner in New York now, too.

Note that the second sentence here is identical to (2). Principles of focus semantics require that the relevant set of focus alternatives be a subset of the following set of sentences. Each value of the metalinguistic variable ξ here is a focus alternative to the focussed

indicate that the constraints on deaccenting seem to be orthogonal to the constraints on out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles, *pace* [Ruys 2015](#).

element of the sentence, i.e. the proper name $Katie_F$. We will discuss immediately below what counts as a focus alternative to $Katie_F$ in this case.

$$(36) \quad \{ \text{'}\xi \text{ is having dinner in New York now'} \mid \xi \in \text{FocAlt}(Katie_F) \}$$

More often than not, the contextually relevant set of focus alternatives is a much smaller proper subset of this set. For (35), for example, we can assume that the contextually relevant set of alternatives is simply the following singleton.⁸

$$(37) \quad \{ \text{'James is having dinner in New York'} \}$$

With this notion of focus alternatives at hand, we analyse the presupposition that the additive particle triggers as in (38). We assume here that the additive particle takes a propositional scope, but one could type-generalise (38), if necessary. Also, we assume that a given occurrence of the additive particle is associated with a variable denoting the set C of contextually relevant focus alternatives. For the sake of concreteness, we represent C as a silent variable in the object language (cf. Rooth 1992a, von Stechow 1994), but this is only for presentational purposes, and an alternative way of representing it could be used, as long as C is identified in reference to the utterance context. Finally, we use bi-dimensional semantics where $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^g$ consists of an at-issue proposition and a semantic presupposition but any theory of presupposition could be used instead.⁹

- (38) The semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \text{too}_C \phi \rrbracket^g$ is the grand conjunction of the following propositions, for some $\psi \in g(C)$.
- a. The conjunction of the at-issue meaning and semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket^g$
 - b. That ψ does not contextually entail and is not contextually entailed by ϕ
 - c. $g(C) \subseteq \text{FocAlt}(\phi)$ and $\phi \notin g(C)$
 - d. The semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^g$

Let us explain these clauses one by one. (38a) is the crucial additive presupposition. Note that the existential quantification over contextually relevant focus alternatives takes scope over the presupposition, and consequently, when the semantic presupposition in (38a) is mapped onto a pragmatic presupposition, the additive presupposition will be *de re* about some particular alternative ψ (which we assume is a linguistic expression) with respect to the presuppositional attitude (see Soames 1989, Donáti & Sudo 2021 for related discussion). Roughly, the pragmatic presupposition will require for some ψ , it

⁸It is often assumed that the prejacent—the sentence that *too* modifies—is in the set of alternatives itself. We do not assume so here, as it simplifies the exposition, but our analysis could be restated with this assumption without significant changes.

⁹There are further theoretical choice points here. Firstly, for the additive particle, we could assume that $g(C)$ is always a singleton set. In that case, the analysis would be similar (though not exactly the same) to the anaphoric approach in a sense. In our opinion, it is difficult to solve this question on an empirical basis, so anticipating the discussion in Section 6 of other focus particles that clearly allow for non-singleton sets of focus alternatives, we assume no restriction on the cardinality of $g(C)$ here either. Related to this is a question about the quantificational force. The analysis in (38) involves existential quantification over alternatives. If $g(C)$ is singleton, it can obviously be replaced with universal quantification without any consequences, but even when it is not singleton, one could maintain that the quantificational force is always universal because given that $g(C)$ can be sufficiently small, the two versions of the analysis are actually quite difficult to distinguish empirically. As far as we can see, the particular analytical choice here we made in (38) is inconsequential for the purposes of this paper, and the existential semantics here has a presentational advantage in that it is closer in spirit to the previous proposals we discussed above.

is common ground that ψ is true—which is to say that the common ground entails the truth of ψ —rather than requiring it to be common ground that there is ψ that is true. It should also be emphasised that this is different from *de re* about a particular individual and as we will discuss with specific examples below, does not necessarily require the speaker or any other interlocutor to know the entity of an individual, depending on what referring expressions are involved in ψ . The scope of the existential quantifier should not be lower, because if it were, the additive presupposition of (2) would be simply that there is some DP ξ such that ‘ ξ is having dinner in New York now’ is true, which amounts to the existential presupposition that someone relevant is having dinner in New York, which would be too weak, as we discussed in the previous section. Note also that the additive presupposition does not require the focus alternative ψ itself to have been used in prior discourse, but only that its truth be part of the common ground.

In addition, it is presupposed that the meaning of ψ is independent from the meaning of ϕ , as stated in (38b). This condition prevents a trivial use of *too*, and plays a particularly crucial role in Section 5, so we will come back to it then.

The clause in (38c) requires that C be a subset of structurally defined alternative expressions of ϕ . We largely follow Fox & Katzir (2011) here (see also Katzir 2007), and define $\text{FocAlt}(\phi)$ as follows.

- (39) a. $\text{FocAlt}(\phi)$ is the smallest set containing all expressions ψ that can be derived from ϕ by successive replacements of F -marked subconstituents of ϕ with elements of the substitution source for ϕ .
- b. The substitution source for ϕ is the smallest set containing everything in the lexicon, all the sub-constituents of ϕ , and contextually salient constituents.

Essentially, focus alternatives need to be derived by substitution or deletion of subconstituents. This often means that focus alternatives cannot be structurally more complex, but the inclusion of contextually salient expressions in the substitution source could lead to structurally more complex focus alternatives. We are mostly interested in accounting for felicity judgments in out-of-the-blue contexts where such expressions do not exist by assumption, but as we will see in some cases, it will be crucial to allow for such a possibility.

Lastly, the last clause (38d) specifies the presupposition projection property of *too*. It basically passes up all the semantic presuppositions of ϕ . This, too, should perhaps be ultimately derived from some general principle of presupposition projection and removed from the lexical semantics of additive particles, but this question is orthogonal to our main interest in this paper (see Schlenker 2008, 2009, Rothschild 2011, among others, for relevant discussion).

4.2 Accommodation with additive particles

Having presented the semantics of additive particles, let us now turn to their pragmatics. To repeat, whenever an additive particle is used, a set of contextually relevant focus alternatives needs to be accommodated, based on which the additive presupposition is computed using the lexical semantics of the additive particle given in (38). Sometimes the additive presupposition is already satisfied, but sometimes it needs to be accommodated.¹⁰

¹⁰Note that the only kind of presupposition accommodation that we are interested in in this paper is so-called *global accommodation*, as discussed by Stalnaker (1999, 2002) and von Stechow (2008), etc. We

Thus, under our theory, there can be two types of accommodation involved in interpreting an additive particle, accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives and presupposition accommodation. The former always happens, while the latter might or might not depending on the context. Importantly, for both types of accommodation, we propose that nothing specific to additive particles needs to be assumed beyond the general pragmatic principles regulating accommodation. In particular, we assume that accommodation of any type only succeeds through a pragmatic coordination between the speaker and hearer such that the hearer needs to be able to infer what the speaker intends, including the fact that the accommodation is called for; the speaker needs to be aware of what is and is not possible, as well as what is and is not likely, for the hearer to infer; and also that all this should be either common knowledge or inferrable at the point when accommodation takes place, so that the hearer knows that the speaker has intended accommodation, and the speaker can decide that accommodation is a reasonable discourse strategy (cf. Lewis 1979, Stalnaker 1978, 1999, 2002, 2004, von Stechow 2008).

Note that in characterising the processes of interpreting an additive particle above, we spoke as if the accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives happens before the computation of an additive presupposition, and this certainly must be the order as far as the semantic computation of the additive presupposition is concerned. However, from the perspective of the hearer, the first step of accommodating contextually relevant focus alternatives could be facilitated by considering what additive presupposition a given choice would give rise to, and they might consider multiple possibilities before settling on the set of focus alternatives the speaker intended. For example, if a certain focus alternative stands out among the focus alternatives and the additive presupposition computed with them is satisfied in the current utterance context, that could well be the one that the speaker intends. Thus, for performing pragmatic reasoning like identifying the contextually relevant focus alternatives that the speaker intended, the hearer will naturally consider both possible focus alternatives and additive presuppositions they would give rise to at the same time. Furthermore, the speaker should be aware that the hearer would go through such reasoning, and compute what is and is not possible for the hearer to infer.

The above understanding of accommodation is a general one, and may apply to accommodation of antecedents of pronominal anaphora as well. However, given the relative scarcity of information that is available in identifying the intended referent, accommodation of antecedents of pronominal anaphora is naturally expected to be difficult, if not absolutely impossible. For example, if the hearer encounters a free pronoun *it* out of the blue and if there is no other useful information regarding the pronominal referent, they will be left with a lot of candidate referents. If the hearer cannot infer exactly which referent the speaker intends, then accommodation will not succeed and infelicity will ensue. Also, from the perspective of the speaker, being a competent language user, they should be aware that the hearer would not be able to identify the referent, and that making such a discourse move would be uncooperative and therefore infelicitous. Resolution of pronominal anaphora might involve more than this (e.g. Elbourne 2005 argues that a pronoun requires a linguistic antecedent for its missing NP), but already at the level of identification of the intended referent, it makes sense that accommodation of an antecedent for pronominal anaphora in out-of-the-blue contexts should be very difficult or impossible.

will not be concerned with *local accommodation* (Heim 1982, Beaver & Zeevat 2007), which might or might not be the same phenomenon.

Essentially the same pragmatic reasoning is at play when contextually relevant focus alternatives are accommodated by the hearer, but we assume, with [Fox & Katzir \(2011\)](#), that it is part of the interlocutors' linguistic knowledge that focus alternatives are linguistically constrained and that the hearer may sometimes, though not always, leverage it and identify the focus alternatives intended by the speaker. This, we claim, explains why additive particles can be used out of the blue in a larger set of contexts than pronouns, contrary to the prediction of the pronominal anaphora analysis, as we saw in the previous section. We will come back to this point shortly with some concrete examples.

Let us take a specific example, say (2). Upon receiving the message, the hearer needs to first identify the contextually relevant focus alternatives, as they are not explicitly expressed. Given that both the speaker and hearer are competent speakers, the structural constraints on focus alternatives are common knowledge. However, these constraints themselves are not sufficient to uniquely determine the intended value of C . More specifically, since what is in focus is the subject *Katie*, all members of C will have a different expression as the subject, which amounts to:

$$C \subseteq \{ \text{'}\xi \text{ is having dinner in New York now'} \mid \xi \in \text{FocAlt}(Katie_F) \}$$

The legitimate focus alternatives to $Katie_F$ should be common knowledge, although from the perspective of us linguists, this question deserves further contemplation. It is reasonable to assume that other proper names are focus alternatives here, but it is less clear if definite descriptions like *the boy* or *the president* should be. If one adopts the description theory of proper names ([Matushansky 2008](#), among others), according to which proper names are definite descriptions with a hidden definite article (in English, at least), then at least such simple definite descriptions should be focus alternatives here, because they can be derived by (reducing and) replacing the description part of the definite description with a common noun and the implicit definite article with an overt one. On the other hand, under the view that proper names have relatively simple structure, then one might not expect full-fledged definite descriptions to be focus alternatives to proper names (unless they are contextually salient; see the remark on the definition of focus alternatives à la [Fox & Katzir 2011](#) above). Luckily, for the kind of examples, we will be looking at, we do not need to answer this question completely, so we will leave it open here. However, it will be crucial for us that pronouns are alternatives to proper names. If one adopts the description theory of proper names as well as the description theory of pronouns (e.g. [Postal 1966](#), [Elbourne 2005](#)), according to which pronouns are realisations of definite articles when they don't have an (overt) NP complement, then pronouns should count as focus alternatives to proper names, as they are structurally at least as simple. Even if one doesn't take these theoretical views, pronouns are arguably structurally very simple and it does not seem to us to be too farfetched to assume that they are always legitimate focus alternatives to proper names and definite descriptions.

Now, the hearer is still facing the issue of uniquely identifying the value of C intended by the speaker. Let us first consider a case where this succeeds. Recall that when the speaker and hearer are having dinner in New York themselves, (2) can be felicitously uttered out of the blue, which under our analysis means that the hearer succeeds in accommodating the value of C . There are several theoretical possibilities but any of the following will do.

- (40) a. { 'We are having dinner in New York right now' }
 b. { 'I am having dinner in New York right now' }

- c. { 'You are having dinner in New York right now' }
- d. The union of any two or all of the above sets.

Perhaps in different contexts different one of these options is accommodated, but it sounds to us that (40a) is a very plausible candidate, so let us tentatively assume that (40a) is meant to be accommodated. There are several reasons why (40a) can actually be successfully accommodated as the intended value of C in the context under discussion. Firstly, a pronominal expression like *we* is a highly frequent expression and it should be common knowledge that such frequent expressions are more likely to be contextually relevant. Secondly, it is easy for the hearer to see that the additive presupposition computed with this value of C would be simply satisfied with respect to the current common ground. Since both of these are also commonly known to the speaker and hearer, the speaker is entitled to utter (2) with an expectation that the hearer could accommodate (40a) as the intended value of C .

Nothing crucial in the analysis would change, even if any of the other possibilities mentioned in (40) were the intended set of contextually relevant focus alternatives. It is furthermore possible that the speaker and hearer would not be concerned with actually singling out one contextually relevant set of alternatives among the possibilities in (40), because the choice here would not matter at all for their communication. In other words, what is required might well be the unique identification of a set of contextually relevant focus alternatives up to the current conversational goal. Admittedly this idea needs to be worked out in more formal terms but is not crucial in accounting for the core set of data in this paper, so we will leave it for future work.

The sentence is also felicitous when it is common knowledge that only one of the speaker and hearer is having dinner in New York at the utterance time. In such a case C will be (40b) or (40c), whichever is appropriate, and our analysis will be essentially the same.

In these examples, what needs to be accommodated is just the correct value of C , as the additive presupposition computed based on it is simply satisfied in the context and does not need to be accommodated itself. We have seen some examples where the additive presupposition also needs to be accommodated. Let us discuss one of them, (14), where Katie, who is known to have submitted an abstract to SALT, comes to your office and asks, “Did you get into SALT, too?”. Here, the hearer first needs to identify the contextually relevant focus alternatives. By assumption, there are only two relevant individuals, Katie (the speaker), and you (the hearer), present in the context of utterance. Since the question is about you, the only reasonable candidate for the intended value of C is (41),

$$(41) \quad \{ \text{'I got into SALT'} \}$$

Having identified the intended value of C , the hearer also needs to deal with the additive presupposition that Katie’s abstract has been accepted, as this is new information for them. An important assumption here is that accommodation of this additive presupposition should be possible to the same extent that other types of presuppositions can be accommodated. As a matter of fact, we are still far from attaining a complete understanding of how presupposition accommodation is constrained, and consequently, we need to be hand-wavy here, but we do not see why the accommodation of the additive presupposition in this context should be impossible.

It is a unique feature of our analysis that there are two types of accommodation

happening in an example like this one, unlike in, say, the previous example of (2) uttered during a dinner in New York. Ideally, we would like to see some empirical difference between cases involving only accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives, which is always required whenever an additive particle is used, and cases that involve both accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives and accommodation of an additive presupposition. We suspect that the difference would be subtle and as such would probably require experimental investigation. We, therefore, leave this question for future research.

Let us now come back to Kripke’s original observation that (2) is infelicitous in an out-of-the-blue context where it is neither commonly known nor can be accommodated that the speaker and/or the hearer are having dinner in New York at the speech time. In such a context, it is evident that none of the options in (40) will yield an additive presupposition that is consistent with the context, and the hearer should be aware of it. Thus, they need to check other possible values of C . One group of candidate values involve other proper names like (42a), or perhaps a bigger set like (42b), or any subset of it.

- (42) a. { ‘James is having dinner in New York’ }
 b. { ‘ ξ is having dinner in New York’ | ξ is a proper name distinct from *Katie* }

There are several reasons why these values of C cannot be accommodated. Firstly, in the out-of-the-blue context, we are assuming, no proper name is particularly salient, and the likelihood of the speaker intending a particular proper name as in (42a) is extremely low, as it is common ground that it is highly unlikely that the hearer could make a correct guess at it. Therefore, a specific singleton set like (42a) cannot be accommodated. How about (42b)? In this case, the additive presupposition will cause an issue. That is, recall that the additive presupposition is *de re* with respect to the presuppositional attitude in the sense that in order to accommodate it, the hearer first needs to make a choice as to which member of (42b) to use in computing the additive presupposition. Since it is known that not everyone in the world is having dinner in New York, the hearer cannot simply pick an arbitrary member of (42b). However, by assumption, the out-of-the-blue context has no information that singles out any of these members, so there is no way for the hearer to make a choice as to which one to use to compute the additive presupposition. All this being part of the common ground, the speaker should be aware that the hearer would be in this conundrum, so it is unreasonable for them to assume that the hearer would resolve C to (42b). Similar reasoning precludes any subset of (42b) from being successfully accommodated. Hence the infelicity.

The flip side of this account is the prediction that if an alternative proper name is highly salient, it should be possible to identify a set like (42a) and accommodate the additive presupposition computed based on it. This prediction is borne out. A case in point is the example in (15), where your phonologist friend, James, who didn’t submit an abstract to SALT, comes to your office and asks you “Did you_F get into SALT, too?”. Suppose that it is common knowledge between you and James that Katie is the only other person in the department who submitted an abstract to SALT. Suppose also that you three had been talking about this conference lately. Then, James’ utterance is acceptable in such a context, at least mildly, and it is not impossible to accommodate the additive presupposition that Katie got into SALT. Similarly, in a context where Katie is a very frequent conversational topic between you and James, it is not impossible to accommodate the same additive presupposition. Our account allows us to make sense

of this. Specifically, in such a context, the hearer could make a reasonable guess that the proper name *Katie* is the intended focus alternative to *you*, and it is legitimate for the speaker to expect the hearer to be able to do so.¹¹ On top of this, the additive presupposition needs to be accommodated, since it is new information, but we assume this is possible in a context like this, as in the case of (14).

We have ruled out the possible values of C for (2) in (42), but there is another class of focus alternatives to (2) we should consider. In the first example above, we assumed that first and second person pronouns are good candidates, thanks to their high frequencies and the prominence of their referents in the utterance context. Then, by the same token, we would expect third person pronouns to be good candidates as well, as they are highly frequent expressions and their referents could be one of the salient individuals in the context. More specifically, we have the following candidate values for C for (2).

- (43)
- a. { 'He is having dinner in New York right now' }
 - b. { 'She is having dinner in New York right now' }
 - c. { 'They are having dinner in New York right now' }
 - d. The union of any two or three of the above sets.

Accommodating such a value of C itself might not be impossible, but there is an additional issue here that renders these values practically unusable in the out-of-the-blue context. That is, these pronominal expressions need to find an appropriate antecedent. In the out-of-the-blue context, there is no information about their referents, and the required pronominal anaphora would simply fail, as discussed at the beginning of this subsection. Consequently, the hearer will not be able to identify what additive presupposition to accommodate. Since this is common knowledge, it would be felicitous for the speaker to utter (2) expecting the hearer to accommodate these values of C .

Conversely, if the pronominal anaphora can be resolved, sets of focus alternatives like (43) should be able to be accommodated. We claim that this prediction is in fact correct. Consider the following examples from Grubic (2019). In her acceptability judgment experiment these examples received high acceptability scores (which was theoretically unexpected). The original stimuli of the experiment were in German, but we will only present the English translations here (see Grubic 2019: p. 188 for the original sentences). We place *too* right after the focussed expression in (44), following Grubic's placement of *auch* in the original German sentences.

- (44)
- a. Philip goes out for breakfast alone. Nobody is talking to him. But he doesn't care, since he_F, too, has a newspaper.
 - b. Nobody has time to travel to the Baltic Sea with Dennis. But Dennis can travel alone, since he_F, too, has a car.

¹¹Note that depending on the syntax of proper names and pronouns, *Katie* can or cannot be derived from a pronoun like *you* by deletion and lexical substitution. However, as Fox & Katzir (2011) discuss in detail, contextually salient expressions are also in the substitution source (see also Katzir 2007). Typically, contextually salient expressions are ones that have been used in immediately preceding utterances, but we think it is not unreasonable to assume that this is only a sufficient condition. Then, we could assume here that the context contains *Katie* as a 'contextually salient expression' (potentially as a result of another process of accommodation as to what counts as contextually salient). This might also explain the fact that the example under question sounds a bit more marked than the indexical version of the example discussed above, where *Katie* herself is the speaker. We will discuss below other examples that involve such contextually salient expressions that have not been uttered.

Grubic points out that the quantifier *nobody* in the first sentence enables pronominal anaphora to its domain of quantification, as demonstrated by (45) for (44a).

- (45) Philip goes out for breakfast alone. Nobody is talking to him. They are all looking at their newspapers. (Grubic 2019: p. 188)

Under our analysis, the felicity of (44a) is explained by the possibility of accommodating the singleton set containing “They have a newspaper” as the value of *C*. An analogous explanation can be easily constructed for (44b), which we omit here.

To complete our explanation of Kripke’s observation that a sentence like (2) cannot be felicitously used out of the blue, we account for it in terms of failure of accommodation of the intended set of focus alternatives. As discussed above, focus alternatives involving other proper names or pronouns, which are reasonable alternatives to the focused proper name *Katie*, will not succeed in such an out-of-the-blue context. Since there is no other contextually salient expression, the hearer fails to identify the intended set of contextually relevant focus alternatives, and knowing this, it is illegitimate for the speaker to utter (2) out of the blue.

Let us take stock at this point. We have so far discussed the following cases where an additive particle can be felicitously used out of the blue.

- (46) a. The accommodated focus alternative involves an indexical pronoun, and the additive presupposition derived with it is already satisfied in the context, e.g., (2) uttered by someone having dinner in New York.
b. The accommodated focus alternative involves an indexical pronoun, and the additive presupposition also needs to be accommodated, e.g., (14) uttered by someone who got into SALT themselves.
c. The accommodated focus alternative involves a contextually salient proper name, and the additive presupposition also needs to be accommodated, e.g., (15), uttered by someone who didn’t submit an abstract to SALT in a context where a proper name is contextually salient.
d. The accommodated focus alternative involves a third person pronoun whose referent can be resolved, and the additive presupposition also needs to be accommodated, e.g., (44).

Variants of (46c) and (46d) where the additive presupposition is contextually satisfied, instead of accommodated, can be constructed fairly easily, but we will not discuss them here, as their felicity is not particularly surprising. In addition to the felicitous cases in (46), we also explained Kripke’s observation about the infelicity of examples like (2) as cases with no reasonable focus alternative that can be accommodated. We also explained the infelicity of (15) in the same way, as well as contextual factors that could make the sentence acceptable.

We can account for the data involving temporal and locative expressions from Section 3.1 essentially in the same way. The examples in (16), where *yesterday* and *in the morning* are focussed, are analogous to (46a). Here, the relevant alternative expressions are *today* and *now*, which are highly frequent, have contextually highly salient referents, and would lead to an additive presupposition that is already satisfied in the utterance context. Similarly, the example in (17) where a locative expression is in focus can be accounted for by assuming that *here* or perhaps *in this restaurant* is a reasonable alternative to the focussed expression *in that Mexican restaurant*. We also observed that when *in this*

restaurant is in focus, the additive particle is at least mildly infelicitous, as in (18). Our explanation for this is analogous to that for (15). That is, more contextual information is needed for the hearer to be able to single out the intended focus alternative, and so it is an illegitimate pragmatic move for the speaker to expect the hearer to be able to identify the focus alternative they have in mind.

Furthermore, a truly out-of-the-blue but felicitous example, (34), repeated below, can be explained as well.

(34) Your ‘Fresh’ Fish Was Probably Frozen, Too.

Since this is a genuine out-of-the-blue use of *too*, the reader has essentially no other information than this sentence itself in identifying contextually relevant alternatives. Nonetheless, they can fairly easily recover the intended focus alternative, namely, ‘Your frozen fish was frozen’, thanks in part to the scare quotes around *fresh* and in part to the fact that this alternative is tautological and hence the additive presupposition it would give rise to is trivially satisfied.¹² In fact, that is the only alternative that would give rise to an innocuous additive presupposition and could be relevant in this context at the same time, so the reader can infer that that is what the writer meant. The writer is aware that the reader would do this reasoning, so they can go ahead and use (34) out of the blue.

Recall at this point the issue of the anaphoric approach from the previous section. There, we saw a number of examples showing that anaphora resolution is more constrained than out-of-the-blue uses of additive particles. Our theory has an empirical advantage over the anaphoric approach here because accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives is actually less constrained than accommodation of pronominal antecedents. Certainly, a more restricted theory is conceptually more attractive, but only to the extent that it is empirically as adequate. In this case, empirical facts favour the more flexible theory. That is, this flexibility allows us to explain examples that are problematic for the pronominal anaphora analysis. Concretely, (24), repeated below, is one example that poses an issue for the anaphoric approach.

(24) Sam used to be really poor, which made him feel ostracized and lonely. But now that Sam has struck it rich, he no longer feels alone. Now he too can drive a Mercedes, and have dinner in fancy restaurants in New York.

(Ruys 2015: fn. 18, p. 356)

Our account offers more theoretical wiggle room than is available to the anaphoric approach. In particular, the first two sentences of this example include words like *ostracized*, *lonely*, and *alone*, from which it is naturally inferred that this narrative is about Sam’s social group, perhaps his friends and/or colleagues, who are rich. Then, it is not too outlandish to assume that the expression *his rich friends* can be accommodated to be a ‘contextually salient expression’ here, although the expression itself has not been used (see also fn. 11). Then using this expression, the following alternative can be constructed: “His rich friends can drive a Mercedes, and have dinner in fancy restaurants in New York”. The additive presupposition amounts to the truth of this alternative, which can easily be accommodated in this context.

One might object that this explanation is a bit too *ad hoc*, especially, given that

¹²To be a bit more precise, we analyse the scope of *probably* to be higher than that of *too* in this sentence, and the additive presupposition projects out through *probably*, which can be independently shown to be a presupposition hole.

an expression like *his rich friends* needs to be accommodated as a contextually salient expression, despite the fact that this sequence of words itself does not appear anywhere in the discourse. Acknowledging this potential criticism as well as the need for further research in order to construct a more precise theory of contextual relevance, we would like to underscore that our analysis is the only one on the market that can deal with this example as well as the others. Also, it is at this point an open empirical question whether accommodation of an expression like *his rich friends* as a focus alternative is actually possible or not in a context like this. We hope that this could be tested one way or another, e.g. by looking at priming effects of the context and also closely comparing additive particles and other phenomena that refer to focus alternatives, but we cannot answer it at this point and leave it for future research.

Before moving on, let us comment on two other examples of similar nature, namely, (28) and (31), which Ruys (2015) raised as problems for the anaphoric analysis.

- (28) Dean of students: Do PhD students even have families to take care of?
 Student rep.: Yes, PhD students have families, too. (Ruys 2015: p. 359)
- (31) Guard: I am sorry, small children are not allowed to enter the garden.
 Child: That's not fair! I deserve the right to enter the garden, too.
 (Ruys 2015: p. 359)

Our account of these examples relies again on accommodation of non-pronominal expressions. In particular, these examples seem to be set up to prompt a contrast between two groups of people. For (28), the crucial focus alternative to *PhD students* is *professors* (or perhaps *staff*). These phrases naturally stand in a contrastive relation in the context of academia, and it is reasonable to assume that the hearer can accommodate the relevance of the latter unmentioned expression. In the case of (31), since the expression *small children* is used in the guard's utterance, expressions like *older children* or *other children* are plausible candidates for contextually relevant alternatives.

4.3 Focus alternatives as expressions

Having presented our analysis, we would like to give an additional remark on our assumption that focus alternatives are linguistic expressions, rather than semantic objects, as it is a natural question whether our analysis could be restated in terms of the latter. The crucial difference between the two versions of the theory is in the focus alternatives, so we will zoom in on this aspect, without explicitly reformulating all the details, such as the meaning of *too*, although that could easily be done. Notice that this alternative version of the theory is more economical in that focus alternatives would carry less information, given that a linguistic expression carries its meaning under its sleeve, so the focus alternatives we assumed could be understood as carrying two pieces of information, propositions and how they are linguistically encoded. We will argue below that this extra structure in focus alternatives is crucial in understanding the restrictions on accommodation of focus alternatives, so as to motivate our official version of the analysis. In other words, appropriate constraints would be harder to formulate in the alternative formulation where focus alternatives are semantic objects and potentially run into overgeneration issues.

Suppose that focus alternatives for additive particles are simply propositions, and are computed in a manner similar to Rooth (1992a). For instance, for (2), the value of C will be a subset of the following set. As before, we will exclude the 'prejacent', from C . We denote the utterance time by t .

(47) { that x is having dinner in New York at t | x is an entity distinct from Katie }

Since it is common knowledge among competent language users that C must be a subset of (47), the hearer can leverage this piece of linguistic knowledge in guessing what the speaker intended. When a member p of (47) is clearly satisfied in the utterance context, e.g., when the speaker and hearer are having dinner in New York together at the speech time and p is the proposition that they are having dinner in New York at t , then the hearer can easily infer that the speaker intended C to be $\{p\}$ (or potentially a superset of it, but this won't matter much). This means that those indexical cases where the additive presupposition is satisfied can be accounted for in this version of the theory, too.

Furthermore, it can also deal with cases where the additive presupposition needs to be accommodated, in addition to the value of C , with further assumptions. For (14), C needs to be a subset of (48). We call the hearer h here.

(48) { that x 's abstract has been accepted to SALT | x is distinct from h }

In the intended interpretation, C is the singleton set containing the proposition that Katie's abstract has been accepted. The truth of this proposition is not commonly known at the time of Katie's utterance, so the additive presupposition that it is true will also have to be accommodated. Now, how could the hearer guess that this singleton set is indeed the intended value of C , as opposed to any other propositions in (48)? One could assume that this is because it is common knowledge that Katie is more likely to know what is true about herself, than what is true about other people, so the proposition about herself stands out in (48). The speaker and hearer make use of this common knowledge to enable accommodation.

So far so good, but as remarked above, the alternative formulation under question is generally less constrained with respect to accommodation of focus alternatives than the version of the theory we presented above, so it is not particularly surprising that it predicts examples like the above to be felicitous when the original formulation also predicts them to be felicitous. In order to adjudicate between the two formulations, we ought to look at examples that the original formulation predicts to be infelicitous.

A case in point is Kripke's original observation. Let us assume that the speaker and hearer are not having dinner in New York. Then (2) is infelicitous. Recall that our original explanation is that since none of the alternative proper names to *Katie* particularly stand out and third-person pronominal alternatives are unusable without discourse antecedents, the hearer cannot find a suitable value of C . In the current alternative formulation, the hearer knows that C is a subset of (47). In the absence of any further information, one could say that the hearer fails to identify the intended value of C . Then, the observation that (2) is infelicitous is accounted for. However, what if there is some additional information?

Let us add a piece of information to the out-of-the-blue context and see what happens. For example, suppose that it is common knowledge between the speaker and hearer that the speaker lives with their partner (and no one else). Call her *Dora*, but to keep the context as neutral as possible, let's also assume that the hearer doesn't know her name. Observe that even with this change to the context, (2) stays infelicitous. However, this infelicity is not straightforwardly explained by the alternative formulation under discussion. Recall that for (14), we assumed that the hearer can make use of the fact that the speaker is very likely to be knowledgeable about whether or not their abstract has been accepted, which singles out one member of (48). Then, similar reasoning should

be available in the current example too. It is already known in the context that the speaker is not having dinner in New York, so the proposition that the speaker is having dinner in New York is definitely not a relevant focus alternative. However, there is one proposition that the speaker is very likely to be knowledgeable about, namely, the proposition that Dora is having dinner in New York. Then why is the accommodation of this presupposition is so marked in this context, in comparison to (14)?

In our original formulation, too, this overgeneration problem could potentially arise, because, again, the propositional contents of the focus alternatives are in principle available in both versions of the theory, and the focus alternative “Dora is having dinner in New York now” could be made more salient than other possible focus alternatives for the same reason. However, crucially, we have a way to prevent it. That is, accommodation of the intended value of C involves reasoning about which linguistic expressions are likely to be relevant in the current context, and the speaker’s knowledge about their propositional content does not necessarily affect their salience. In the context under discussion, Dora has not been mentioned at all, and thus the proper name *Dora* being relevant is no more likely than other random proper names being relevant. Also, in this very bleached context, we are assuming that this expression is not particularly frequent. So the hearer is expected not to be able to identify the intended value of C . On the other hand, if this expression is known to be very frequently used in conversation between the speaker and hearer, accommodation is predicted to be possible, and it is, as we discussed for (15).

In sum, it is an advantage of our original formulation of the analysis that we can formulate constraints on accommodation by referencing linguistic properties of focus alternatives. Admittedly, a lot is still unknown about how exactly accommodation is done in real life, and the arguments above might eventually not stand, so this conclusion should be understood as a tentative one for now. More suggestive data could perhaps be gathered by employing techniques such as phonological priming, which should affect linguistic expressions but not meanings, so is only predicted to help under one of the two versions of the analysis, but this needs to be left open for now.

5 Additive particles associating with quantifiers

Having introduced our own theory of additive particles, we would like to discuss an interesting class of examples where the focus associate of the additive particle is a quantifier. An anonymous reviewer raised related examples as a challenge specifically for our theory, but as we will argue immediately below, they are in fact problematic for all the theories of additive particles we have been discussing. We cannot provide a full solution to the problem in this paper, but as far as we know, the puzzle of additive particles associating with quantifiers has, to the best of our knowledge, not been previously discussed and we think it is worth discussing it here. Also, we will propose a novel empirical generalisation and suggest the possibility that the generalisation stems from a general constraint on focus alternatives that applies equally to all focus sensitive phenomena, and is not specific to additive particles. If this idea is on the right track, our account would offer a particularly natural explanation of the puzzle, given the central role of focus in our theory. That being said, it should be emphasised that the discussion in this section is not meant to be an argument for our theory over its alternatives, as we have already discussed our main criticisms in previous sections, and one may skip this section entirely without impacting their understanding of being able to understand the rest of the paper.

5.1 Cross-categorical additivity

Let us start with the undeniable fact that an additive particle can associate with all sorts of words and expressions. For instance, (49) is a case where the focus associate is a verb (phrase).

(49) James danced, and he sang_F, too.

As before, we can analyse (49) with *too* taking a propositional scope (although this assumption is by no means necessary for our theory), with the sole difference from the examples so far being that the relevant focus alternatives will be constructed with different verbs, rather than different DPs.

Examples like (49) need to be accounted for under any theory of additive particles, and as far as we can see the analyses we have discussed so far can all deal with them. For instance, if we are to extend Ruys' existential analysis to it, the existential presupposition will be over verb denotations, and if we are to extend the pronominal anaphora analysis to it, the pronominal component will refer to a predicate (or property). Similarly, the propositional anaphora analysis will postulate a propositional anaphora to a proposition that is 'parallel' to the proposition that James sang, e.g., the proposition that James danced in the case of (49).

Similarly, there are examples where the additive particle associates with a quantifier and the relevant focus alternatives are other quantifiers. For instance, consider (50).

(50) You can make this dessert with one egg. You can make it with [no animal product]_F, too.

Since *no animal product* is irreducibly a quantifier, its focus alternatives are expected to be quantifiers too. In fact, if its focus alternatives were individuals in this example, the additive presupposition would require there to be a particular individual that you can make the dessert with, but the example stays felicitous even if we expect there to be no such individual. We therefore take this example as showing that the additive presupposition of the second sentence can be computed based on other quantifiers as alternatives.

Note that we are not excluding the possibility that the additive presupposition can also be about an individual, although this reading would perhaps not be very natural for this particular case. It will be convenient to give labels to these (purported) readings of the additive presuppositions, so let us call them a *quantificational additive presupposition* and an *individual additive presupposition*.

Under our theory, these two types of additive presuppositions for this example can be characterised as follows. The quantificational additive presupposition would involve a focus alternative derived from the second sentence of (50) by replacing *no animal product* with another quantifier. In this particular case, the quantificational additive presupposition computed with the focus alternative "You can make it with one egg" will simply be satisfied in the utterance context of the second sentence, thanks to the assertion of the first sentence. This accounts for the most natural interpretation of the example, at least in contexts where nothing else is assumed. The individual additive presupposition, on the other hand, would involve a focus alternative derived by replacing *no animal product* with some referring DP. Since we did not provide contextually salient DPs in this example, one possibility is to use a pronoun *it* and derive the additive presupposition "You can make it with it". In order to resolve the pronominal anaphora, it would be

necessary to read the first sentence while *one egg* taking scope over *can*. It seems to us that this reading does exist, but it is arguably not a very natural interpretation for this example. However, as we will discuss below, for other examples, such an individual additive presupposition is the only available reading, and they will therefore provide more convincing evidence for this reading.

It should also be pointed out that the other theories we discussed in this paper will similarly be able to account for (50). Specifically, under Ruys’s existential analysis, one could assume that the existential quantification in the presupposition can be over quantifiers. For the example at hand, the existential presupposition will be that for some quantifier Q distinct from the denotation of *no animal product*, the dessert in question can be made with Q , which is simply satisfied when the second sentence is uttered, thanks to the first sentence. The individual additive presupposition could potentially be derived if we assumed that the existential quantification can also be over individuals. Turning now to the pronominal anaphora analysis, all one would have to assume in order to explain a quantificational additive presupposition is that the anaphoric presupposition would contain an anaphora to a quantifier. In the case of (50), the pronominal anaphora can be resolved to the salient quantifier denoted by *one egg*, and the additive presupposition will be satisfied. The propositional anaphoric analysis will be able to account for (50) without any additional assumption (as our theory): The additive presupposition will require another proposition parallel to the one that the additive particle modifies, and there is indeed a suitable antecedent for it in (50), namely the proposition the first sentence expresses.

We have just discussed how different theories would deal with the example in (50), as this is necessary in order to show that the puzzle we will discuss below is a general one that applies to all theories. In this regard, it should also be remarked that examples like (51) do not provide a convincing case for a quantificational additive presupposition, because an analysis with an individual additive presupposition will be sufficient to account for it.¹³

(51) Some girls are hungry. And [some boys]_F are (hungry), too.

Specifically, under our account, the relevant focus alternative could involve a pronoun as in “They are hungry” where *they* can find its discourse antecedent, namely, the hungry girls mentioned in the first sentence (Note that there’s no need for knowing their identity, as pronominal anaphora does not require that). Similarly the other theories under discussion could explain (51) with an individual additive presupposition, but we will omit the details to save space. An important observation here is that some but not all examples of quantifiers in focus provide clear evidence for quantificational additive presuppositions. In fact, we will argue below that the example in (51) only has a reading with an individual additive presupposition, despite what is in focus is a quantifier, which is part of the theoretical puzzle of additive particles associating with quantifiers.

5.2 A remark on distinctness

Before discussing the puzzle, we would like to make a technical remark. Recall that according to our analysis, the additive presupposition of ϕ *too* is computed with respect to a particular focus alternative ψ to ϕ such that ψ does not contextually entail and is not

¹³Here and below we indicate the possibility of ellipsis in parentheses, which should make it easier to control for the focus structure, but it is not crucial for the argument here.

contextually entailed by ϕ , rather than ψ that is merely distinct from ϕ . This stronger distinctness condition is necessary, in order to account for the infelicity of additive particles in examples like (52).

- (52) Viola ordered the only vegetarian dish on the menu. She ordered [a cauliflower steak]_F (#too).

Since *a cauliflower stake* is distinct, both syntactically and semantically, from *the only vegetarian dish on the menu*, if what is required were simply that the focus alternative be distinct in some way, “She ordered the only vegetarian dish on the menu” should be able to be a legitimate, contextually relevant focus alternative here, and the additive presupposition it gives rise to should be simply satisfied. Our formulation, on the other hand, correctly predicts the additive presupposition to fail here. Specifically, if the only vegetarian dish on the menu were in the domain of quantification of *a cauliflower steak* in the second sentence (and this dish were a cauliflower steak), then the focus alternative “She ordered the only vegetarian dish on the menu” would contextually entail the sentence “She ordered a cauliflower steak”, violating our distinctness presupposition. By contraposition, if the additive presupposition is to be satisfied, it must be the case that the only vegetarian dish on the menu is excluded from the domain of quantification of the indefinite *a cauliflower steak*. However, this would entail that Viola ordered two vegetarian dishes, which contracts what the first sentence says. Hence the infelicity of the example.¹⁴

¹⁴It should also be remarked in passing that the argument here for the distinctness condition based on contextual entailment is independent from the specific theory of additive particles proposed in this paper in the sense that a comparable condition would be required under any theory to correctly rule out the use of *too* in (52). Take Ruys’ existential analysis, for example. If the existential additive presupposition of this sentence were simply ‘There is a quantifier Q distinct from the denotation of *a cauliflower steak* that maps the predicate of having been ordered by Viola to truth’, then it should be satisfied by the first sentence, because the quantifier denotation of *the only vegetarian dish on the menu* should be able to serve as a witness for this existential statement, and the additive presupposition is wrongly predicted to be satisfied (note that the deaccenting should also be licensed here). Thus, under this analysis, too, the additive presupposition needs to mention a stronger distinctness condition, as in ‘There is a quantifier Q that does not contextually entail and is not contextually entailed by the denotation of *a cauliflower steak* and that maps the predicate of having been ordered by Viola to truth’. Essentially the same remarks apply to the anaphoric approach: The anaphora needs to be resolved to a quantifier or a proposition that does not contextually entail and is not contextually entailed by what is uttered. We would like to thank the same anonymous reviewer we alluded to above for pressing us to explain this point. They also pointed out a potentially problematic example from Ruys 2015: p. 346:

- (i) Surely, if all members of A are divisible by x , then the smallest member of A is divisible by x , too.

In a discourse context where it is commonly known that $A \neq \emptyset$, the relevant focus alternative ‘they are divisible x ’ where *they* refers to the members of A , would contextually entail ‘the smallest member of A is divisible’, but arguably that is the intended focus alternative here. Why this is allowed in this case, but arguably not in other cases, remains as an open question here, but we should note that this is an issue for all theories of additive particles, given the discussion above. Also, we think that solving this issue will only come about by understanding why this whole conditional does not (always) sound trivial. Perhaps in some discourse contexts, but not in others, triviality is computed with respect to some notion of ‘implication’ such that the antecedent of (i) does not ‘imply’ the consequent, despite the contextual entailment that holds when $A \neq \emptyset$. Once we have such a notion of implication, we could use it state the distinctness condition for additive particles, but this is an issue for another occasion.

5.3 The puzzle of quantificational focus alternatives

As we saw above, (50) clearly has a reading with a quantificational additive presupposition, and all the theories we have been discussing can accommodate such cases (with or without minor modifications). However, an interesting puzzle arises examples like (53).¹⁵

(53) No girls are hungry. #[Some boys]_F are (hungry), too.

The use of the additive particle here is comparable to (2) in that out of the blue, the sequence of sentences in (53) is infelicitous, which indicates that the first sentence cannot give rise to an intermediate context that licenses the use of the additive particle. The observed infelicity of (53) poses an issue for all the theories under consideration: Roughly, given the way they derive quantificational additive presuppositions for cases like (50), they have nothing that prevents them from assigning to (53) a reading with a quantificational additive presupposition, but then they will wrongly predict it to be felicitous, given the first sentence. Let us discuss this issue in more detail for each theory in turn.

First, under our theory, *no girl* should be a legitimate focus alternative to *some boys* in this context, not only because the former is derivable from the latter by lexical substitution alone, but also because it is fairly easy to identify it as a salient and contextually relevant alternative in this context. With the focus alternative “No girls are hungry”, the quantificational additive presupposition will simply be satisfied, due to the first sentence, so the example is wrongly predicted to be felicitous.

Second, for Ruys’ existential analysis, the quantificational additive presupposition will be simply that there is a quantifier Q distinct from the denotation of *some boys* that maps the predicate of being hungry to truth. Since this presupposition is satisfied, with the denotation of *no girl* being the witness for it. Also, there should be no issue with deaccenting, thanks to the first sentence, so this theory also wrongly predicts the example to be felicitous.

Third, for the pronominal anaphoric analysis, the quantificational additive presupposition has an anaphoric component to be resolved to a salient quantifier, and there is indeed a contextually salient quantifier that should satisfy the additive presupposition, namely, the denotation of *no girls*.

Fourth, for the propositional anaphoric analysis, the propositional anaphora is to be resolved to a proposition that is parallel to the proposition that there are hungry boys. Whether the denotation of the first sentence should qualify as a parallel proposition depends on one’s definition of ‘parallel’, but it would not be easy to rule it out on this basis, it seems to us. That is, unlike in the case of, say, “#James is not hungry, but Katie_F is, too”, which is infelicitous out of the blue, the two sentences are identical except for the focussed phrase in the second sentence, so (53) is closer in structure to “James is hungry, but Katie_F is, too”, which is felicitous out of the blue. Some versions of this theory (e.g., Beaver & Zeevat 2007, Tonhauser et al. 2011) are more explicit about the parallel relation, and require the antecedent proposition to be a partial answer to the same question under discussion (QUD) in the discourse that the sentence that the additive particle modifies is a partial answer to. According to this idea, too, one can think of a QUD that both sentences in (53) are partial answers to, e.g., the question about which quantifiers map the predicate of being hungry to truth. Certainly, this is not the only QUD that the second sentence of (53) can be a partial answer to, but the

¹⁵We thank the aforementioned anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this puzzle. To the best of our knowledge, the puzzle has never been previously discussed in published work.

point is that this problematic QUD needs to be somehow ruled out, in order to account for the infelicity of (53) under this theory, and that is not trivial.

Note that essentially the same issue arises with examples like (54).¹⁶

(54) No girls are hungry. #James_F is (hungry), too.

Under our theory, there is a contextually salient expression, namely *no girls*, that we can use to form an alternative sentence to the second sentence here and the additive presupposition it gives rise to will simply be satisfied. For Ruys' 2015 existential analysis, on the other hand, one might wonder if it predicts a quantificational additive presupposition for this example at all, given that what is in focus is a referring term. If not, there will certainly not be an issue, as the individual additive presupposition will not be satisfied by the first sentence. Unfortunately for Ruys, however, there are independent reasons to believe that proper names can have quantificational denotations. For instance, proper names and quantifiers can be conjoined as in *no girl and James, no boy or Katie* (see, e.g., Winter 2001), which suggests that the denotations of quantifiers and proper names are of the same type. Furthermore, a case that is more directly relevant for us is given in (55).

(55) You can play this game with a friend from school, but remember, you can play it with [James]_F, too.

As in the case of (50), let us focus on the interpretation of the first sentence where *a friend from school* takes scope below *can* and is understood non-specifically, in order to rule out the reading with an individual additive presupposition. We observe that even with this understanding of the first sentence, the sentence does not incur infelicity comparable to (54). This must be because the second sentence here can receive a reading with a quantificational additive presupposition.¹⁷ Then, there is no reason why the second sentence of (54) cannot receive a quantificational additive reading, and in that case the theory will fail to capture its infelicity. The problem for the anaphoric approach will be analogous to this, but to save space, we will omit the details.

Even if one is not completely convinced by the discussion on proper names here, (53) will remain as an issue to be accounted for and more straightforwardly illustrate the puzzle we are after, so we will only consider below examples where quantifiers are in focus. Also, we will only discuss our theory from now on, as we have now achieved the goal of presenting the puzzle as a general problem for all theories of additive particles, and we already raised independent criticisms against the previous theories in previous sections.

¹⁶The same anonymous reviewer that we mentioned above raised a case like this as a problem for our theory, but as we argue here, it is equally problematic for the other theories we are considering as well.

¹⁷The standard account of these facts makes use of the fact that the domain D_e of individuals ($a \in D_e$) is isomorphic to the domain of ultrafilters on D_e ($\{S \subseteq D_e \mid a \in S\}$), and ultrafilters can be seen as generalised quantifiers $(\lambda P_{\langle e,t \rangle}. P(a))$. This means that model-theoretically, individuals ($a \in D_e$) and their 'Montague-lifts' $(\lambda P_{\langle e,t \rangle}. P(a) \in D_{\langle\langle e,t \rangle, t \rangle})$ can be seen as the 'same thing', and one could even assume that proper names and other 'referring expressions' always have quantificational denotations, as in Montague 1973 (although his quantifiers are intensionalised).

5.4 A generalisation

To restate the main puzzle, (50) shows that readings with quantificational additive presuppositions exist, but (53) only receives a reading with an individual additive presupposition, despite the fact that both cases involve quantifiers in focus. This means that there are two types of cases with additive particles associating with quantifiers with respect to the availability of quantificational additive presuppositions. We cannot provide a full explanation in this paper, but we propose the following descriptive generalisation.

- (56) Let ϕ contain a focussed quantificational DP Q that associates with the additive particle *too* in ' ϕ , *too*'. ' ϕ , *too*' has a reading with a quantificational additive presupposition if there is a scopal phrase taking scope between Q and *too*.

We say that a phrase is scopal if there is at least one quantifier whose meaning does not commute with it, i.e., the overall truth-conditions change depending on whether the quantifier takes narrow or wide scope with respect to it.

Let us first see how the generalisation in (55) applies to (50) and (53). In (50), there is a scopal element, namely, the modal *can* between the focussed quantifier *no eggs* and *too*. As our generalisation says, in such a case, the sentence can receive a reading with a quantificational additive presupposition. By contrast, in (53) there is no scopal element occurring between the quantifier and *too*.

One prediction of our generalisation is that by inserting an operator between the quantifier and the additive particle should improve the acceptability of (53). This prediction is borne out, as demonstrated by the examples in (57).¹⁸

- (57) a. Katie thinks that some girls are hungry. She thinks that [no boys]_F are (hungry), too.
b. Katie doubts that no girls are hungry. She also doubts that [some boys]_F are (hungry).

That these sentences have readings with quantificational additive presuppositions can be argued for in the same way as for (50), but we will omit discussion here to save space.

- (58) a. You are allowed to drop one elective course. You are also allowed to drop [no courses]_F.
b. There is a cage with no cats. There is a cage with [two dogs]_F, too.

5.5 Other focus sensitive particles

To repeat, we cannot provide a theoretical explanation as to why the restriction on the availability of quantificational additive presuppositions as stated in the above generalisation exists. We also do not mean to use this generalisation to construct an argument in support of our theory of additive particles. However, we would like to point out that

¹⁸Here and the following, we avoid *either* as an additive particle, because Rullmann 2003 shows—convincingly, in our opinion—that *either* takes scope under the negative operator that licenses it, rather than above it, and proposes to analyse it with a different lexical entry from *too*. In some cases there seems to be a strong preference for *either* over *too*, and such examples are excluded from the discussion here. Also, we use *also* in (57b) and (57c), in order to better control for its scope, as postposed *too* could take scope within the embedded clause, unlike in (57a), where an analogous low scope reading would be blocked by the strong preference for *either*.

the generalisation about the availability of quantificational additive presuppositions can be seen as part of a more general phenomenon that constrains focus alternatives.

First, let us consider (59), which contains an exclusivity particle, *only*, whose semantic function is to negate the contextually relevant focus alternatives (see Section 6 for more detailed discussion).

- (59) Katie doubts that no girls but some boys failed. Berit only doubts that [some boys]_F failed.

The second sentence of this example can be read as entailing that Berit does not doubt that no girls failed, i.e., she thinks all girls passed. This is naturally explained with the focus alternative that *only* negates being “Berit doubts that no girls failed”, which can be derived from the prejacent by lexical replacement of the phrases in focus.

A comparable reading is, however, absent in (60).

- (60) Last year, no girls but some boys failed. #This year, only [some boys]_F failed.

The second sentence of this example cannot be read as entailing that some girls failed this year. However, that should be a possible reading if the focus alternative that *only* negates could be “(This year) no girls failed”, which should be derivable in a manner parallel to the previous example in (59). Rather, the actually observed reading for the second sentence entails that the other people did not fail, and hence all the girls did pass. This, however, would render the second sentence unacceptable, arguably due to the lack of an additive particle like *again*, given that the two sentences would mean essentially the same thing, except for the time adverbial, and indeed, the acceptability of the sentence improves with an additive particle. This reading could be derived by negating two quantificational alternatives “(This year) all boys failed” and “(This year) some girls failed” but that would leave it unexplained why “(This year) no girls failed” cannot be a relevant focus alternative in this example. On the other hand, the lack of this reading would follow if we assumed that the alternatives to *some boys* in this example have to be referring expressions, similarly to the case of examples that only have individual additive readings.¹⁹ We thus take the infelicity of the second sentence of (60), as well as the improved acceptability of the version of the example with *again*, as evidence that this quantificational focus alternative is blocked in this example, unlike in (59).

The above observation suggests that there is a constraint on the availability of quantificational focus alternatives for *only*, similarly to what we observed with *too*. We in

¹⁹Note that we cannot negate alternatives with proper names, as the sentence does not identify the students. Rather the relevant alternative expressions would have to be expressions like *the other boys*, *the girls*, *the other students*, etc. However, one might find the use of *other* a bit dubious, as it is not particularly salient in this context and it increases the structural complexity. In a syntactic framework that assumes covert movement of quantifiers, there is another way of deriving the non-quantificational reading, which is to associate *only* with the trace of the covertly moved *some boy* (cf. Erlewine 2014, 2018). The trace for quantifiers are (or can be) referring expressions, and their focus alternatives will be simply variables that refer to other contextually relevant people (including the girls in the case of the example under discussion). In this connection, it should be noted that the second sentence of (59) presumably may receive a reading that involves referring expressions in the negated focus alternatives as well. This reading, however, would obligatorily involve a specific reading of *some boys* (cf. the same example with *most* in place of *some*, which lacks such a specific reading). Theoretically, this is either because the anaphoric component of the meaning of *other* in the focus alternative ‘Berit doubts that the other students failed’ would require that, or because in order for *only* to operator on the focus alternatives of the trace of *some boy*, the former needs to be in the scope of the latter.

fact suggest that it is the same constraint that is responsible for this observation about exclusivity particles like *only* and the earlier observation about additive particles like *too*. The primary motivation for this proposal comes from the fact that in examples containing additive particles that have readings with quantificational additive presuppositions, replacing the additive particle with *only* will yield a reading that negates a focus alternative with a quantifier, but not in examples that do not have quantificational additive presuppositions. This is illustrated by the examples in (61), which are of the former kind, and those in (62), which are of the latter kind.²⁰

- (61) a. You can only make this dessert with [no egg]_F.
 b. There is only a cage with [two dogs]_F.
- (62) a. Only [some boys]_F are hungry.
 b. This cage only has [two dogs]_F.

We will therefore re-state our descriptive generalisation in such a way that it applies to all cases of focus sensitive particles:

- (63) Let ϕ contain a focus sensitive particle α and a focussed quantificational DP Q that associates with α in ϕ . ϕ has a reading where α operates on focus alternatives containing quantificational alternatives in place of Q if there is a scopal phrase taking scope between Q and α .

This generalisation predicts that the interpretations of other focus particles like *at least* and *even* will also be constrained in the same way, and we believe so, but there are some additional complications with these particles that makes it difficult to obtain straightforward evidence. In the case of *at least*, for example, the ignorance inference that it would give rise to with focus alternatives involving quantifiers and referring terms would be empirically difficult to tease apart. More concretely, it cannot be easily demonstrated that the following example lacks a reading that is based on focus alternatives involving quantifiers.

- (64) Last year, no girls but some boys failed. This year, at least [some boys]_F failed.

In the case of *even*, it is known that its interpretation is systematically affected by monotonicity (see, e.g., Rooth 1985, Rullmann 1997, Crnič 2011). This in itself does not mean that relevant examples cannot be constructed, but the scope of relevant operators need to be carefully controlled for. In addition, there is a theoretical controversy over how exactly *even* interacts with operators that change monotonicity. We will therefore leave a systematic investigation of such cases for future research. We should however stress that while these cases do not provide straightforward support for the generalisation in (63), they also do not directly pose issues for it, as far as we can see.

²⁰Note that readings involving quantificational focus alternatives should abide by the same pragmatic conditions as for readings involving referring focus alternatives, which we amply discussed in the preceding sections. In particular, we do not expect the former to be felicitous out of the blue, so (61) should be judged at least against contexts that allows for accommodation of contextually relevant quantificational focus alternatives, or contexts that make clear which quantifiers are contextually relevant. Specific examples are omitted here, however, to save space. In addition, the focus alternatives obviously must be compatible with the inference that *only* generates, which often has a scalar flavour (see Coppock & Beaver 2014, Alxatib 2020).

5.6 Section summary

To summarise this section, we discussed the puzzle of focus alternatives involving quantifiers. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out to us, our theory, if unconstrained, does wrongly predict the example in (53) to be felicitous with a quantificational additive presupposition, but we claimed that we do make the correct prediction for examples like (50) that clearly have readings with quantificational additive presuppositions. Furthermore, given that the latter class of examples need to be explained under all theories of additive particles, the former class of examples will pose an analogous issue under any theory. In a sense, this means that the present puzzle is orthogonal to the evaluation of the theories of additive particles; yet, we argued that the issue of when quantificational additive presuppositions are available and when they are unavailable can be seen as part of a more general restriction that constrains the range of legitimate focus alternatives. We did not provide a theoretical explanation as to why such a restriction exists, and the puzzle certainly remains as a theoretical puzzle, but we put forward a descriptive generalisation in (63). Importantly for the present paper, with the restriction on focus alternatives that is responsible for the generalisation, the puzzle ceases to be an issue for our theory of additive particles; or for its competitors, for that matter, as long as they make reference to focus alternatives (as they should).

6 Accommodation of focus alternatives with other focus sensitive particles

In this section, we will provide further empirical support for our idea that the infelicity of (2) out of the blue has to do with focus. Our analysis of Kripke’s observation makes crucial reference to accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives, and as such predicts that comparable difficulty of accommodation should be observed with other focus particles as well, as they also crucially reference focus alternatives. We claim in this section that this prediction is borne out.

6.1 *Only*

The semantics of *only* is particularly well studied in the literature, which is standardly characterised as follows. To keep the exposition simple, we treat *only* as a sentential operator (cf. Horn 1969), but it is easy routine to type-generalise it (see, e.g., Rooth 1985). One could also find more sophisticated versions of (65b) in recent studies (e.g. Fox & Katzir 2011, Coppock & Beaver 2014, Alxatib 2020), but this does not concern us here.

- (65) a. The semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \text{only}_C \phi \rrbracket$ is the grand conjunction of the following propositions.
- (i) $g(C) \subseteq \text{FocAlt}(\phi)$ and $\phi \notin g(C)$.
 - (ii) $|g(C)| > 0$.
 - (iii) the conjunction of the at-issue meaning and semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^g$.
 - (iv) the semantic presupposition of $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket^g$, for each $\psi \in g(C)$ that is (Strawson) non-weaker than ψ .
- b. The at-issue meaning of $\llbracket \text{only}_C \phi \rrbracket$ is that the at-issue meaning of $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket^g$ is false for each $\psi \in g(C)$ that is (Strawson) non-weaker than ψ .

Since the technical details are not so important for us, we will not explain or motivate all these aspects of the meaning of *only* here. Rather, what is important is that it is crucial to identify the correct value of C in order to understand a statement like (66).

(66) Only $Katie_F$ is having dinner in NY now.

Note that this example is much more felicitous than (2) in out-of-the-blue context. One might think that that is not as we predict, because in this example, too, the correct value of C needs to be accommodated. However, one crucial difference between (66) and (2) is that the reading computed by following set of focus alternatives will be felicitous out of the blue, given that it is implicitly assumed that the speaker and the hearer are *not* having dinner in New York,

(67) { 'We are having dinner in New York now' }

Note that it would be extremely unnatural for the speaker and hearer to be ignorant about whether or not they are having dinner in New York at the time of utterance, so practically, one needs to assume either that they are having dinner in New York now or that they are not. When we say an out-of-the-blue context with no particular assumptions, we tend to assume that they are not, as that is presumably more likely to be the case than otherwise. Crucially, if we indeed assume that the speaker and hearer are not having dinner in New York, then the at-issue meaning computed based on $C = (67)$ will be true. The presupposition that Katie is having dinner in New York needs to be accommodated, but that shouldn't cause any issue, as in the case of additive presupposition. Consequently, the example is predicted to be acceptable with accommodation of $C = (67)$, unlike (2).²¹

What is crucial for our analysis is the converse of this: When the speaker and hearer are having dinner in New York now, then we observe that (66) is infelicitous. We can explain this as follows. In this context, the value of C in (67) cannot be what the speaker intends, because the reading derived with it is false. The hearer needs to find another value, but in the absence of further information, this is not possible. Note that this explanation is completely parallel to our explanation for Kripke's original observation, and in fact, it seems to us that the nature of infelicity is very similar. We, therefore, take this observation to support our analysis.

Incidentally, when associating with scalar items, as in (68), *only* generally is felicitous out of the blue.

- (68) a. Only $some_F$ of the linguists are rich.
 b. Only $three_F$ abstracts were rejected.

We can explain this state of affairs as well. These scalar items are (or are very likely to be) associated with particular scales, namely, *some* naturally contrasts with *all* (and perhaps also *most*) and *three* with other numerals, and since this is common knowledge among competent speakers, it is reasonable for the speaker to assume that the hearer can identify relevant alternatives even in out-of-the-blue contexts.

²¹The assertive meaning is predicted to be not informative here, but we should point out that such non-informative utterances are not always infelicitous (Sudo 2017). Also whether the truth of the prejacent is really a presupposition, as in (65a-i), or not, has been very controversial (Beaver & Clark 2008, von Stechow & Iatridou 2007, Ippolito 2008, Coppock & Beaver 2014, Panizza & Chierchia 2019, Alxatib 2020, Alonso-Ovalle & Hirsch 2022). The example under discussion might be a case where the truth of the prejacent is actually asserted, which would make the at-issue meaning informative.

6.2 *Even*

Even is another very well studied focus particle (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Rooth 1985, Kay 1990, Wilkinson 1996, Herburger 2000, Crnič 2011, Francis 2018, Greenberg 2018). Different authors characterise the scalar component of its meaning in different ways, but roughly “Even ϕ ” is said to have a scalar presupposition that “ ϕ ” is less likely or more noteworthy than its alternatives. In addition, *even* often also triggers an additive presupposition. There is a debate as to whether or not the additive presupposition can be absent all, and if yes, when (Rullmann 1997, Crnič 2011, Francis 2018). We will not be able to solve this question here, but the fact that (69) is not so infelicitous out of the blue suggests that its additive presupposition can be absent (but see Francis 2018), since if it had to have an additive presupposition, it should be as infelicitous as (2).

(69) Even Katie_F is having dinner in New York now.

There is still a scalar presupposition to be accommodated, but intuitively, the indexical one that is computed with respect to (67) seems to be naturally accommodated when (69) is used out of the blue. Notice importantly that the inference is not about the truth of an alternative, so whether the speaker and/or hearer are actually having dinner in New York is not very relevant. Consequently, there is nothing in the out-of-the-blue context that renders the accommodation of this scalar inference infelicitous. Note that this example perhaps sounds less straightforwardly acceptable out of the blue than (2) in a context where the speaker and hearer are having dinner, but that is entirely in line with our account. That is, there is a non-trivial scalar presupposition to accommodate in the cases of (69), whereas the additive presupposition of (2) is already satisfied and need not be accommodated, and this factor could also make the accommodation of the relevant focus alternative a bit harder as well.

To give further credence for this analysis, it is instructive to look at other languages. For instance, Hungarian has a scalar particle, *még...is* that is always associated with an additive presupposition. As expected, (70) is as infelicitous as the Hungarian translation of (2) in (71) in out-of-the blue contexts where the speaker and hearer are not having dinner in New York.

(70) Még Katie is New York-ban vacsorázik.
Even Katie too New York-in has.dinner
'Even Katie is having dinner in New York.'

(71) Katie is New York-ban vacsorázik.
Katie too New York-in has.dinner
'Katie, too, is having dinner in New York.'

Conversely, one of the scalar particles in Japanese, *-(de)sae*, does not seem to be associated with an additive presupposition, and the following sentence is not as infelicitous out of the blue as the Japanese translation of (2) in (73), and its most natural interpretation of the scalar presupposition is about the speaker and/or hearer (or a more general group that could be referred to by *we*), as predicted by our analysis.

(72) Katie-desae Nyuu Yooku-de yuuhan-o tabeteimasu.
Katie-even New York-in dinner-ACC is.eating
'Even Katie is having dinner in New York.'

- (73) Katie-mo Nyuu Yooku-de yuuhan-o tabeteimasu.
 Katie-too New York-in dinner-ACC is.eating
 ‘Katie, too, is having dinner in New York.’

6.3 *At least*

Finally, let us consider the focus particle *at least*. It also triggers a scalar inference but its scalar inference is about the opposite end of the scale, in comparison to *even* (Krifka 1999, Coppock & Brochhagen 2013, Schwarz 2016, Mendia 2018, Donáti & Sudo 2021). The same issue of how to characterise the nature of the scalar inference arises as in the case of *even*, but it would not concern us much here, so we will leave it unsolved.

What is of relevance is that the sentence in (74) is infelicitous out of the blue in a context when the speaker and hearer are having dinner themselves at the utterance time, similarly to the sentence with *only* in (66).

- (74) At least Katie_F is having dinner in New York now.

Our analysis can account for this observation as follows. A sentence like this has an epistemic reading and a concessive reading (Biezma 2013, Grosz 2011, 2012). Under the concessive reading, the scalar inference amounts roughly to that there is a relevant focus alternative that is actually false, but it would have been better than what is asserted, had it been true. Since *We are having dinner in New York now* is true, this is clearly not a relevant focus alternative. In the absence of any other information, the hearer won’t be able to identify relevant focus alternatives, and hence infelicity ensues. Likewise, under the epistemic reading, the scalar inference is about the speaker’s ignorance about the truth of relevant focus alternatives and says that the asserted proposition is the one that the speaker is most sure about. In the context under consideration, the speaker clearly knows that *We are having dinner in New York now* is true, so this is not a relevant focus alternative. Then, again, the hearer cannot identify relevant focus alternatives for the same reasons as in the case of Kripke’s original observation.

What about a context where the speaker and hearer are not having dinner in New York? Then the sentence becomes much more acceptable out of the blue. We can explain this as well. In this case, the same alternative containing *we* in place of *Katie* would give rise to a reasonable scalar inference under the concessive reading, although the epistemic reading should stay infelicitous, as the alternative is known to be not true. That is, the concessive inference would amount to that *We are having dinner in New York now* is false, but it would have been better, had it been true. This inference is not impossible to accommodate in the given context, and it seems to us that the acceptability is comparable to the case of *even* discussed in the previous subsection.

Lastly, we observe that when *at least* associates with scalar items, accommodation is generally possible, and our explanation is parallel to the case of *only* with scalar associates. That is, since the intended focus alternatives are obvious in such cases, no difficulty in accommodation in out-of-the-blue context is expected for (75).

- (75) a. At least some_F of the linguists are rich.
 b. At least three_F abstracts were accepted.

7 Concluding remarks

Kripke's (2009) idea of anaphoric presupposition has been influential, but as Ruys (2015) points out it is not without empirical problems. In particular, it tends to undergenerate, as the restrictions on accommodation it predicts are parallel to accommodation of antecedents for pronominal anaphora and are quite strong. On the other hand, Ruys' (2015) existential analysis tends to overgenerate: Its existential additive presupposition is supposed to be easy to accommodate and the prosodic condition it assumes can be taken care of independently. We put forward a novel theory that strikes a better balance. The innovative aspect of the theory is that an additive particle used out of the blue requires two kinds of processes, (i) accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives and (ii) computation of an additive presupposition based on the focus alternatives so accommodated. We claimed that this analysis leads to a deeper understanding of the nature of the meaning of additive particles and sheds further light on how accommodation works.

Before closing, we would like to mention the overall implication of our proposal for the theory of the typology of presuppositions. Ruys' (2015) critique notwithstanding, Kripke's (2009) idea of additive presuppositions still entertains a high degree of popularity in the current literature. In particular, his observation about additive particles is often regarded as primary evidence for the existence of anaphoric presuppositions that cannot be reduced to classical propositions. However, this conclusion should be reconsidered in light of our proposal.

Notice that our theory is *not* incompatible with the idea of anaphoric presuppositions *per se*, as our central claim is that Kripke's observation about additivity should be explained in terms of accommodation of contextually relevant focus alternatives, rather than in terms of pronominal anaphora, and leaves open the possibility that anaphoric presuppositions play a role in the semantics of additive particles, let alone in other presuppositional phenomena.

At this point, we should clarify what anaphoric presuppositions are, because there is a rather trivial sense in which they exist. For instance, consider the factive presupposition of (76).

(76) Katie is unaware that he is sitting behind her.

In order to understand the factive presupposition here, the pronominal anaphora needs to be resolved, and in fact, if one were to analyse it in a framework like Heim 1982, 1983, the presuppositional component would contain a free variable. In this sense, therefore, it is unequivocal that anaphoric presuppositions exist and there is in a way nothing surprising about it. What is novel about Kripke's claim, on the other hand, is that certain presupposition triggers, such as additive particles, are anaphoric themselves. In this sense, factive verbs like *unaware* are not anaphoric presupposition triggers, because in (76), the anaphora is triggered by something else in the sentence, namely *he*. This is the notion of anaphoric presupposition triggers we will discuss below.

Now, recall that according to our analysis, additive particles trigger an additive presupposition about a contextually relevant focus alternative that it is true. In this formulation of additive presuppositions, as well as the more formal way of saying the same thing in (38), the presupposition is existential, and there is no anaphoricity in the additive presupposition itself. Therefore, according to our analysis, additive particles are *not* anaphoric presupposition triggers. There can, however, be anaphora involved in the interpretation of an additive particle. For instance, the crucial focus alternative(s) might

contain a third person pronoun, as in “They are having dinner in New York”, and in that case, the pronominal anaphora needs to be resolved and all the constraints on anaphora will apply. Such a case can then be said to involve a presupposition with anaphora, but this situation is analogous to (76) in the sense that it is not the additive particle that is triggering anaphora.

Thus, according to our theory, additive particles are not anaphoric presupposition triggers. However, nothing in this claim is only about additive particles and is incompatible with the existence of anaphoric presupposition triggers elsewhere in natural language. Kripke 2009 in fact mentions a few more presupposition triggers, claiming that they are also anaphoric presupposition triggers (see also Heim 1990, whose discussion is based on Kripke 2009). Below, we discuss these presupposition triggers in turn and suggest the possibility that there is no such thing as anaphoric presupposition triggers.

7.1 *Again*

Kripke claims that *again* is an anaphoric presupposition trigger that refers to a contextually salient time interval t and introduces a temporal presupposition that the same type of event as what is asserted took place before t . One example he discusses is (77).

(77) Priscilla is eating supper, again. (Kripke 2009: p. 373)

His argument for the anaphoric analysis of the presupposition of *again* here is a little indirect and comes from the inadequacy of a purely existential analysis of it, according to which the presupposition of (77) is merely that Priscilla has eaten supper before the speech time and should be satisfied, whenever it is common knowledge that Priscilla is a grown woman. Contrary to this prediction, Kripke points out, one feels that there is a relevant, probably recent, time at which Priscilla had dinner.

Notice that (77) is not as infelicitous as (2) out of the blue, meaning the presupposition *again* triggers can be relatively easily accommodated. This does not square with Kripke’s crucial assumption that anaphoric presupposition triggers are (often) infelicitous out of the blue due to the anaphoricity of their presupposition. However, since we argued against the relevance of out-of-the-blue judgments for anaphoric presuppositions anyway, let us not dwell on this point too much, although it still should be kept in mind that the presupposition of *again* cannot involve the same type of anaphora as pronominal anaphora, which cannot be easily accommodated.

A stronger argument for the anaphoric analysis of *again* comes from an example like (78). Here we use an example from Heim 1990, but Kripke 2009 contains an analogous example, his (21), and argument.

(78) We will have pizza on John’s birthday, so we shouldn’t have pizza again on Mary’s birthday. (Heim 1990: (15))

The important observation here is that this sentence presupposes that John’s birthday precedes Mary’s, and this presupposition would go away, if *again* were removed. If *again* were anaphoric to John’s birthday in this example, this would be explained easily, as the presupposition would mean exactly that.

While we acknowledge *again* as a potential anaphoric presupposition trigger, we would also like to suggest an alternative theoretical possibility, namely, its presupposition is more akin to definite descriptions. The idea is that when attached to a VP, *again* presupposes that there is a uniquely identifiable (relevant) eventuality describable by the VP that

is temporally located before the reference time of the sentence. Formalising this would require us to be committed to a particular semantics of *again* as well as to a particular view of the semantics of definite descriptions, so we would leave it simply as an informal idea here, but to the extent that the semantics of definite descriptions is, or at least can be, formulated without recourse to anaphoricity (which is certainly a big if and potentially theoretically controversial), this might allow us to account for examples like (78) without assuming that *again* is an anaphoric presupposition trigger, as definite descriptions exhibit behaviour similar to anaphoric devices like pronouns in contexts like (78). Furthermore, in comparison to third person pronouns and other anaphoric devices, definite descriptions can more often be used felicitously out of the blue, so we could potentially also explain the felicity of (77) out of the blue, better than the anaphora approach.

7.2 *Stop*

Another candidate anaphoric presupposition trigger mentioned in Kripke 2009 is *stop*. For this, Kripke acknowledges that accommodation is quite easy, and sentences like (79) can be uttered out of the blue.

(79) Jill has stopped smoking. (Kripke 2009: p. 376)

However, he nonetheless suggests that *stop* is an anaphoric presupposition trigger, based on an example like (80). Here again, we will consider the version of the argument from Heim 1990.

(80) John is cooking. He will stop (cooking) when tomorrow's football game starts. (Heim 1990: (16))

The argument is similar in nature to (78): (80) presupposes that John will be cooking continuously until tomorrow's football game. If *stop* is anaphoric to the cooking event at the utterance time mentioned in the first sentence, the presupposition that the event continues at least until the utterance time, which is a future time in (80), and asserting that it is over at the reference time, then this inference will be captured. This is certainly a possible analysis of the observation under consideration, and we recognise it as such, but similarly to the case of *again* we also would like to mention an alternative possibility that the presupposition of *stop* is more akin to that of a definite description. That is, the second sentence of (80) presupposes that there is a uniquely identifiable cooking event, and asserts that the uniquely identifiable cooking event is over. Again, this idea itself does not necessarily mean that there is no anaphora involved, as that depends on one's theory of definite descriptions. However, one potential advantage of this analysis is that it might provide a better understanding of why accommodation is perceived to be much easier with *stop* than with *bona fide* anaphoric devices. We reserve a detailed discussion of this idea for another occasion as well.

7.3 Clefts and pseudo-clefts

The third, and final, example from Kripke 2009 that we would like to discuss is clefts and pseudo-clefts, such as (81). Unlike the previous two cases, they are indeed less easily accepted out of the blue.

- (81) a. It is Katie who is having dinner in New York right now.
 b. What James brought to the classroom was a guitar.

However, we do not take this observation as suggesting that these constructions are anaphoric presupposition triggers. The reason is because they are focus sensitive, similarly to additive particles, and as such, our analysis could be extended to them straightforwardly. Specifically, in both cases, the focus requires that the hearer identifies a set of contextually relevant focus alternatives, as it is not explicitly indicated which focus alternatives the speaker intends. This procedure is parallel to the case of (2) that we started out with, and in an out-of-the-blue context, the accommodation simply fails. Since such an explanation is viable, clefts and pseudo-clefts do not need to be analysed as anaphoric presupposition triggers. Having said that, what exactly their presuppositions are, and more generally what their interpretive contributions are, is a separate question. In particular, non-trivial issues could arise with respect to the exhaustivity and homogeneity associated with these constructions (Büring & Križ 2013). We, therefore, leave this idea at this informal level here.

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