Design & Trust

Urban Pamphleteer #3

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Urban Pamphleteer
Ben Campkin and Rebecca Ross

We are delighted to present Urban Pamphleteer #3

In the tradition of radical pamphleteering, the intention of this series is to confront key themes in contemporary urban debate from diverse perspectives, in a direct and accessible—but not reductive—way. The broader aim is to empower citizens, and inform professionals, researchers, institutions and policy-makers, with a view to positively shaping change.

#3 Design & Trust

What are the consequences of prioritising defence and security as a first principle in design? What forces—social, professional, commercial, technological—have shaped such strategies? This issue aims to stimulate a critical discussion about the role of design in ensuring safety—often indistinguishable from perceptions of safety—and facilitating trust in urban environments. Contributors consider the history and contexts in which crime prevention through environmental design and other theories of risk and security emerged in different places; and they examine the ways that such thinking has been embedded in a range of legal, policy, regulatory, community and practice frameworks. The aim of the issue is to situate and question the assumptions and evidence that have shaped understandings of the relationships between design and trust. It is also to attend to the physical imprint and social consequences of our theories of security, including both intended and unintended effects. New perspectives arise via projects that contextualise and comment on existing design features and urban practices associated with security and crime prevention, as well as those that seek to enhance public life by fostering trust and an inclusive sense of community in the public realm.

The authors here ask: where have design interventions actually prevented or reduced crime or promoted feelings of safety and responsibility, and where have security-led features jeopardised trust or sociability, eroding potentials for public life? In addressing this question they also provide valuable perspectives on possible future scenarios and alternatives to existing approaches.

Urban Pamphleteer is supported by the UCL Grand Challenge of Sustainable Cities and the UCL Urban Laboratory.

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Railings form a significant part of the security apparatus of cities such as London. They also possess a fascinating cultural history. This particular kind of barricade bears a character that was forged in its heyday, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that belongs to the age of cast iron rather than steel. Creatures of the Industrial Revolution, railings articulate the borders between different kinds of places, marking off the limits of one site and the beginnings of another, sanctioning and foreclosing forms of human action that can happen here or there, marking out public from private. Unlike many other examples of physical boundary, such as the wall, however, they allow the excluded to look inside and meet the gaze of the included. Because of this apparently trusting openness, this transparency, these items of street furniture have often gone unnoticed themselves. But in the work of some writers, film-makers and artists, railings are brought out from the shadows, and the socio-cultural function they perform in the background of everyday life is brought into sharper focus.

In Thackeray's *Vanity Fair* (1848), for instance, railings quietly gesture to the central residential 'peripeteia' that pivots this long multi-plot novel – that is, the sudden decline of the Sedley family's fortunes and their forced removal from a town house in Russell Square to a 'baby-house' cottage in Brompton. After Amelia Sedley has given up her son Georgy to the materially finer life he will enjoy with the Osbornes, she haunts Bloomsbury, resting 'on the stone by the railing of the garden opposite' her father-in-law's residence. Thackeray's own illustrations emphasise Amelia's embodied presence in the streets, by setting her figure distinctly against the railings of Russell Square. Subtly delineating the contours of her changed relationship to this locality, the backdrop of these railings remind us that the private Humphry Repton-designed garden they enclose is not permitted to Brompton residents like her. Whereas before the barriers had protected Amelia from aggressive outsiders, now they keep her out of the square and out of easy intimacy with her deceased husband's family.

An earlier passage is recalled in that detail of the railings, which articulates with particular clarity this historical novel's curious interest in the local materiality of urban space:
‘Napoleon has landed at Cannes.’ Such news might create a panic at Vienna and cause Russia to drop his cards ... but how was this intelligence to affect a young lady in Russell Square ... : who, if she strolled in the square, was guarded there by the railings and the beadle: who, if she walked ever so short a distance to buy a ribbon in Southampton Row, was followed by black Sambo, with an enormous cane ... You, too, kindly, homely flower! – is the great roaring war tempest coming to sweep you down, here, although cowering under the shelter of Holborn? Yes; Napoleon is flinging his last stake, and poor little [Amelia] Sedley's happiness forms, somehow, part of it.²

Napoleon’s spectral absence in Russell Square riffs lightly on the blissful ignorance of Amelia’s childlike mind, but it also represents a meditation on the interpenetrability of space in modernity. If war ostensibly happens elsewhere, the market extends here and everywhere, even ‘under the shelter of Holborn’, and the tremors of Napoleon's landing at Cannes will be felt very materially in Bloomsbury. Amelia’s happiness will suffer two major punctures as a result of the shrapnel from Napoleon’s last fling, no matter how much Sambo attempts to shield her. Of these, the mortal bullet through her husband’s heart will wound her most dramatically, but the financial losses her father sustains as a result of the war-related stock market fluctuations will make at least as severe an impact. In the context of her family’s imminent financial ruin and consequent ejection from Russell Square middle-class life, Amelia’s chaperoned act of casual consumption in walking ‘the ever so short distance’ to Southampton Row to buy a ribbon is destined soon to become an object of nostalgia.

Thackeray shows how local history is always a part of larger national military or economic history, but, more than that, he shows how it is only through history’s manifestation on this local level that its grand events have substance at all. That Thackeray conjures Napoleon in Russell Square is surreal only superficially. His deeper intention is to suggest how supposedly solid things are permeable and subject to change. The railings around the reserved gardens in *Vanity Fair* look like they can keep Napoleon and history out, but they cannot. Rather they are made from and constitute history.

The railings around the reserved gardens in *Vanity Fair* look like they can keep Napoleon and history out, but they cannot. Rather they are made from and constitute history.
The redevelopment will transform the area and provide a state-of-the-art transport interchange and a magnificent new public square, together with prestigious ‘grade A’ offices, premium residential, retail and hotel space and purpose-built student residence accommodation. The vision is for a new city quarter in Cambridge that will provide a gateway into the city.

Nearly twenty years after the government-backed roll-out of CCTV (the 1995 ‘City Challenge Competition’), millions of cameras and billions of pounds of public money later, a mandatory code for the regulation of overt surveillance has finally been introduced in the UK. Without any trace of irony, the code employs the principle of ‘surveillance by consent’ to justify the spread of CCTV, thereby constructing a presumption of implied consent by the public to being surveilled – for reasons of public order and crime prevention – in public spaces.

Arguably, the code comes at a time when we are now, already, post-CCTV: the scant academic work undertaken indicates that CCTV has little deterrence effect on crime, whilst many local authorities are turning cameras off in order to cope with budget cuts. Yet, as the very idea of ‘surveillance by consent’ indicates, CCTV has done its job. We, the public, have become acclimatised to being surveilled; after almost twenty years, the fact that we are exposed to the gaze of the camera is now accepted as a fact of life, something to be unconcerned about, so long as ‘one has nothing to hide’.

However, this exposure to camera is merely the most obvious articulation of a much broader and deeper exposure, one that has effectively, we would argue, undermined the very fabric of ‘the public’. By exposing us, as the public, to surveillance power, the tables have been turned: it is now the public who must justify themselves, who must be transparent, who must order themselves/ourselves; we must have nothing to hide.

This logic of exposure is now presumed in urban developments. Acclimatised to consensually exposing ourselves as soon as we leave our homes, we are now familiarised with tacitly justifying our very presence ‘outside’: not only must we have nothing to hide, we must also have no contrary purpose or agenda when it comes to being in public space. If we consider the ideal of public space to be space where one does not need to justify one's presence, then the current mania for ‘new public spaces’ in every large-scale urban redevelopment and regeneration project becomes something of a bad joke.
The arrangement of buildings has been carefully developed to create a number of significant open spaces on a variety of scales, from dramatic civic spaces and parks to smaller squares—a sequence of public spaces running through the master plan area.

Even more profoundly than the consent presumed for surveillance, we must now also consent to the objectives of the property developer, their tenants and other ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’, in order to be a valid ‘member of the public’ in ‘public space’. It is as if transparency has entered into the very fabric of the built environment.

There is no clear concept of the square for use as a public space other than as a commuter thoroughfare and odd café areas. It is unclear……if any public usage of the whole or parts of the square can be achieved…to ensure the square is…a new and true versatile public space/square for Cambridge.

It is a neat coincidence to our argument that the major tenant anchoring the CBI development is the European Research Headquarters of Microsoft.

The new Cambridge HQ for Microsoft Research…at Twenty One Station Road. The state-of-the-art offices have achieved a BREEAM excellent environmental assessment. A new pocket garden, with artist designed seating, marks the centenary of local company ‘Ridgeons’.

One research priority at Microsoft is the development of facial detection and recognition software—moving the logic of surveillance towards the automated assignment of individuals to specific data sets and categories. Facilitating this process is the use of reference ‘exemplars’, extrapolated and constructed ‘by considering the discriminative potential of each data, given what the system expects to see in the future’. The requirements of exposure and transparency are thus not merely that all should be seen, *but that all should be seen in advance*. To achieve this, it is necessary to impose, as a matter of pre-emption, a design that discriminates, selects and, in architectural terms, herds people into, and through, the most appropriate spatial patterns. Such herding is achieved through subtle means: squares, pathways, trees, green spaces, curved benches, etc. It signals where individuals should go and what they should do when they get there. For a certain section of the ‘public’, the CBI development offers an agreeable lifestyle experience in which one will find exactly what one expects to find. However, one's presence in the development will only be experienced as pleasant and agreeable to the extent that one's purpose for being there coincides, pre-emptively, with the purposes of the developer. Presence is justified through a complicit self-selection, premised upon the overdetermined purposes for which the space has been designed. It is a question of *what the space expects to see*.

Such expectation is expressed through spatial design, read and assimilated by those capable of so
doing. Without doubt, the overall spatial 'message' of CBI moves beyond mere transparency to outright disappearance. The Microsoft Research Headquarters is the Panopticon turned inside out, with every office constantly lit and clearly visible through floor-to-ceiling windows.  

We design and develop intelligent buildings; where the environment and operation is controlled in the most efficient manner to benefit our client — the developer, owner or occupant. The technical infrastructure acts as the building's central nervous system, controlling systems and collecting data from multiple sensors, before analysing it through a central processing unit, and making fine adjustments to optimise operation and efficiency.

Our team of intelligent buildings consultants ... (IT and communications, controls, audio-visual and security and access controls) work together to devise and develop bespoke systems. They operate within a communications infrastructure based around proven IT technology, sharing information and providing a platform for smooth operation 24/7.

Clearly, Microsoft has nothing to hide, and wishes to express this fact. Its radical self-exposure imposes a standard upon all who pass through CBI: be seen, and thereby make it clear that you are justified in being here and that your purpose coincides with the exemplars expected by this space. This is expressive public-ness, preventing the public from actually being present, as the auto-erasing ‘dramatic civic spaces’, ‘linear parks’ and ‘pocket gardens’ of CB1 attest.

1 The advertising strategy developed for the ‘regeneration’ of the CB1 area of Cambridge is hinged around plays on ‘see, be’.
2 Taken from the web page introducing the 25-acre CB1 site by the developers: www.cb1cambridge.eu (accessed 14 May 2014).
6 Exposure continues, of course, in ‘the privacy’ of the home, carried in and through the many devices employed to keep us in continual contact with the ‘outside’.
7 See www.cb1cambridge.eu.
8 Gohler, letter.
9 See www.cb1cambridge.eu.
Ridgeons, a supplier of building materials, was once located on this site, close to the railway sidings. It has now relocated to less commercially valuable sites on the fringes of the city.
12 See www.hilsonmoran.com/Case-studies/CB1-Masterplan,-Cambridge (accessed 14 May 2014). Their brief included making the Microsoft building ‘intelligent’.

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This short article offers a brief history of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). It suggests that those who denounce the way crime prevention and architecture can work together are out of date and perhaps unaware of ‘second generation’ CPTED accounts.¹

CPTED is a multidisciplinary approach to deterring criminal behaviour linked to reducing opportunities for crime through environmental design, from structures to neighbourhoods. Today, most implementations of CPTED occur within the built environment delivered around a set of design principles that have the potential to be sensitively adapted to local contexts. How CPTED is delivered, and by whom, is crucial. Whilst a new CPTED field is gradually emerging, in terms of historical precedents it must be said there has been some pretty poor practice.

The origins of CPTED emerged within the writings of American authors including Oscar Newman (1972) and C. Ray Jeffrey (1971) and, more specifically, Jane Jacobs (1961), but these authors cannot be blamed for early CPTED interpretations.² Some police-led US and UK CPTED practitioners focused on what they thought people wanted less of, and developed rules about how to achieve this. This caused real problems because they forgot to design in beauty and hope, which people want more of. For example, many UK police-led practitioners omitted public conveniences, seating and litterbins from designs in an attempt to reduce antisocial behaviours, ignoring the negative impact on those who wanted to sit, avoid littering and use the toilet in the public realm. While these first-generation CPTED approaches may have worked to reduce crime in specific locations, they were punitive to the law-abiding majority of us who needed to use such amenities. This perhaps also contributed to wider problems with public urination and defecation, littering and reduced mobility for those who wished to rest when out walking as well as those who simply wanted to socialise and watch the world go by.

Ultimately, first-generation CPTED approaches, while effective at reducing crime in specific locations should be considered as myopic with regard to community well-being.³ In their attempt to design in elements that lead to thriving communities they overdetermine the design of the physical environment. They respond to concerns over the antisocial at the cost of the social.

‘Second-generation CPTED’

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approaches consider social ecology and psychology alongside the design of the built environment and prioritise new methods of community consultation. The way the consultation process is managed is crucial here. What distinguishes a second-generation approach is not just the idea of consultation but the way in which participatory design methods as well as crime principles are drawn upon.

Many crime-prevention practitioners agree on the need for consultation and the idea that desirable neighbourhoods are often those where people feel safe. However, how to deliver crime-prevention design at the same time as convivial place-making through community consultation and collaboration is the subject of frequent agonistic debate. A recurring theme is ‘the defensibility versus permeability’ dilemma. Crime prevention often favours defensibility arguing with Taylor that ‘neighbourhood permeability is … one of the community level design features most reliably linked to crime rates, and the connections operate consistently in the same direction across studies: more permeability, more crime’.4 Those concerned with making public space more convivial tend to seek permeability and openness, which enables the public realm to be understood as ‘a place where strangers meet’, where ‘eyes on street’ and ‘social capital’ can help to foster ‘enduring neighbourhoods’ and prevent crime.5 But who is right? Certainly, the evidence for permeability over defensibility is mixed, leading some critics to make the case for ‘secure permeability’ linked to public access to social engagement.6

What is clear is that pro-social activities, which constitute what in CPTED parlance is understood as ‘activity support’, have a role to play. ‘Activity support’ describes designed provisions within a space that promote desirable use of the space and, in doing so, deter undesirable use of the space. Often these approaches build social capital and contribute to ‘eyes on the street’. Activity support has a stronger role to play in preventing crime than first-generation CPTED practitioners understood. Second-generation CPTED practitioners, therefore, focus more on pro-social activities in public space, building existing social ties, networks and mutual assistance. Here, then, best practice is not just about redesigning physical environments but also understanding that crime preventers need to work to build social capital, drawing upon existing social networks and infrastructures as well as creating pro-social designs that catalyse positive interaction. Those who are involved in making life better during ordinary times (as well as during disasters) are the people who can ultimately make a difference to crime prevention. Here, then, second-generation CPTED approaches reinforce what the sociologist Robert Sampson calls the ‘enduring neighbourhood effect’ for which he has made a strong case.7 His evidence points to the fact that a community’s resilience to crime is enhanced by...
neighbourhoods where strong social ties and networks are featured and promoted and where socially focused activities can operate to produce what he calls ‘collective efficacy’.

Reducing fortress aesthetics and avoiding ‘vulnerability-led responses’ that promote ‘defensibility’ in the public realm over ‘permeability’ should be the aim of those who seek to promote social interaction and foster pro-social activities that contribute to social capital. Whilst CPTED theory and practice is continually being updated, not all of the new accounts foreground the potential for pro-social behavior in the way Sampson does. Nor in the way that second-generation CPTED practitioners such as Saville, ourselves and the evolved UK Designing Out Crime Association or astute ‘do’ teams such as the Sorrell Design Programme have done. These approaches include designing in ‘social stabilisers’ and understanding the relationship between design and ‘tipping points’ in behaviours, from pro-social to antisocial and vice versa. For example, it is already known that too many abandoned homes in a neighborhood act as a magnet for certain types of crime and vandalism, so activities like building collective community gardens and new strategies for community housing management should be at the forefront of design by crime preventers. So, too, should approaches to ‘[h]elp[ing] those who reside in neighbourhoods learn how to create and self-regulate their own safety in collaboration with service providers such as planners and police’.

This participatory approach and address to crime prevention through design has much in common with the ‘open innovation’ approaches to social innovation applied, and found to be effective, within our own research and practice at the Design Against Crime Research Centre (DACRC) located within Central Saint Martins College of Arts and Design, particularly linked to the centre’s Bikeoff cycle-theft prevention and ATM fraud-prevention initiatives. We believe conclusively that second-generation CPTED has much to offer those sensitive and collaborative practitioners open to updating their knowledge of crime prevention through environmental design. If we are to foster more social safer cities, there is a necessity for design and built-environment professionals to become familiar with newer accounts and to use design skills to further integrate crime-reductive approaches within their practice.

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In 2001, Russell Square in Central London closed for refurbishment. When it reopened the following year, this popular park and cruising ground had been re-landscaped and its reconditioned railings and gates were thereafter locked between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. Restricted opening hours to parks and squares is not uncommon in London, but how was the decision to close this particular square at night taken, and by whom?

Historically, it has been controversial to restrict public access to London’s parks, and the first enclosure, which took place in Lincoln’s Inn Fields in 1735, required parliamentary approval after residents complained in a petition about the ‘robberies, assaults, outrages, and enormities’ that were committed on the square. Sexual encounters between men were almost certainly among these ‘outrages and enormities’, and, as queer historian Rictor Norton has shown, Lincoln’s Inn Fields was mentioned in a newspaper exposure of London’s homosexual meeting places as early as 1726.

Although the Metropolitan Commons Act 1866 prevents commons in London from being enclosed, Russell Square, which is owned by the Bedford Estate, does not qualify as common land. Since the Georgian planning of the square included fences and gates, the reinstatement of railings to the original design — removed during World War II — and locking of the park at night could be promoted as a conservationist effort. In fact, the local authority, Camden Council, never commented on the enclosure in terms of public accessibility but implied that the gates and railings were merely design features, part of a wider ‘historical restoration’ scheme. ‘Using archive photographs, the ornate boundary railings and entrance gates, removed during World War II as part of the war effort, have now been faithfully restored’, read an information board in the park.

It is not insignificant that the refurbishment of Russell Square was funded by a grant from the National Heritage Lottery Fund, a Conservative flagship initiative set up by the Major government in 1994 to support conservationist projects with revenues from the National Lottery. Camden Council was awarded funding for a complete revamp of Russell Square but only on the condition that the lease with the landowners, the Bedford Estate, was extended to twenty-five years. As part of the negotiation of this extension, it was decided that the site should be closed at night. Apart from limiting access, the historicising themes in the new Russell Square can be seen as a form of nostalgia for an imperial, more ordered past. In work on landscape and national identity, Stephen Daniels has observed how the devotion to national heritage during the
Conservative era of the 1980s and early 1990s reflected anxieties about immigration and the globalisation of institutions at a time when ‘the decline of Britain as a world power finally registered on the English public’. In that respect, the ornate boundary railings and entrance gates in the refurbished Russell Square do not merely underline the private nature of the land but also look back on pre-war London, a city at the heart of Empire, where the poor masses of the colonies still remained in distant lands.

Yet, overall, the ‘historical restorations’ were selective: the original footpaths were restored, but the new park centred on an open space and a modern fountain. While Sir Humphry Repton, who designed Russell Square for the Bedford family in 1800, had himself favoured a degree of surveillance on the circular lawn, where ‘children may be kept always in sight from the windows of the houses immediately opposite’, the removal of robust planting and, in particular, the hedge that used to surround the park, has accentuated this theme much further than in the original design. By labelling the landscaping a ‘historical restoration’ the Council has avoided any serious evaluation of how its actions have impacted on different communities of park users including night-time cruisers. While romanticised notions of cruising as egalitarian have often ignored the ways in which public sex was always hierarchically stratified, the eradication of sex from parks such as Russell Square nevertheless has implications for London’s queer community. It is not that the contemporary city is being desexualised but, rather, that liaisons arranged online or with GPS technology on smartphone apps are now more likely to take place in the private sphere of the home. Such reprivatisation of queer sexuality is bound to undermine what was once its most attractive feature: the ability to transcend classed binaries of ‘host/travel’ (and ‘your place or mine?’) in favour of a sexual realm beyond anxious domesticity.

The heritage discourse deployed to justify the night-time enclosure of Russell Square – and later also the neighbouring Bloomsbury Square – illustrates the ease with which selective variations of historical themes can be adopted to displace specific activities from the city’s prestige locations. Without consultation, a government scheme was utilised to fund the refurbishment of Russell Square, but, in the process, through complex lease requirements, the Council granted the aristocratic landowner additional influence to restrict public access. The historicising designs, with their iconography of enclosure and landed interest should not merely be read as innocent references to Bloomsbury’s past. Inadvertently, these heritage features reveal the aristocratic influence on London in the twenty-first century.
‘Hide and Seek’ is an ongoing documentary photography project created by the photojournalist Adam Walker-Smith.

**DUBIOUS NATURE**

Instigated by his discovery of the landscape design programme ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’, Walker-Smith realised that high-security public spaces in London, which present themselves as being free and open, actually covertly guide behaviour through landscape design and monitor human activities through extensive surveillance infrastructure. The reason these things are not often observed is because they are carefully hidden and softened by the strategic deployment of vegetation. This illuminating finding led to what could only be described as Walker-Smith’s intense paranoia as to the ‘innocence’ of all plant life in these spaces. His resulting photographs dramatically expose the plants of securitised urban spaces which he sees as ‘suspect’ (for posing as ‘innocent’ decoration whilst actually being hidden parts of the security apparatus).

The photographs expose the ‘suspect’ plants of securitised urban spaces (so-called for posing as ‘innocent’ decoration whilst actually being hidden parts of the security apparatus).
On 9 January 2014, London Fire Brigade underwent a number of reductions as part of the Fifth London Safety Plan (LSP5). One of the objectives of this plan is to save £29 million, and it involves: the closure of ten fire stations; reducing the number of fire engines (pumping appliances) by fourteen; reducing the number of firefighter posts by 552.1

Although LSP5 aims to improve Londoners’ safety, a recent accident that took place in February 2014 in Woolwich confirms an increasing concern about this plan. An old man died less than seven weeks after his local fire station closed. Comparing to historical data, there was a 33 percent delay of the Fire Brigade’s arrival at the scene of the incident, and this, according to the Fire Brigades Union, might have been the reason for his death.2

Even prior to these cuts, the risk of fire in London, as in any other urban environment, was particularly high. This is because every building is a potential source of fire. Residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and office buildings are made of combustible materials; they house inflammable objects; and they all use and produce some type of energy that can cause an unpredicted fire. Yet the risk of fire is not merely contained within buildings. Every vehicle parked or moving through the city carries fuel, which increases the risk of an accident. This risk, enhanced by the traumatic memory of previous catastrophes, has shaped the face of the city, and this is evident in the design and technology of buildings and in the urban planning and infrastructure.

Contemporary buildings are prepared to combat fire at any time. They are equipped with fire protection systems, which respond actively to flames. Automatic air vents allow buildings to breathe and let the smoke out. Sprinklers complement firefighters’ duties, whereas automatic fire doors compartmentalise the building and secure safe egress, thus enhancing the Fire Brigade’s efforts in advance. In a sense, the risk of fire equips architecture with qualities that animate the building in case of an emergency.

Buildings also protect themselves against fire passively, through their design and material suitability, which must abide by certain regulations. Building regulations, which have their roots in catastrophes caused by fire, are complex and sophisticated and function as an archive of accidents and destructions.3 This archive remains static until a new accident occurs; in this case, it is activated as new information is added to it. The legislative archive informs architecture, for all constructions have to abide by it. The traumatic memory of accidents is compulsorily externalised and embodied in the architectural end product, in its form, spatial arrangement, construction methods, choice of materials and so on. Architecture operates also as an archive as it shelters a frozen memory of previous catastrophes. Nevertheless, in case of a new accident, the architectural archive is put into motion and informs legislation through what is left behind, its ruins...
Burn Cuts: On Urban Memory

or ashes. Effectively, the memory of architecture’s own catastrophe informs architecture itself in a vicious circle.

Contemporary cities provide organised fire services. Although the earliest evidence of firefighting bodies stretches back to the Roman *familia publica*, a firefighting force composed of slaves,⁴ the Roman knowledge of firefighting was forgotten until the advent of industrialisation, when humanity witnessed severe catastrophic fires.⁵ Since then, the fire service is constantly being reorganised according to the needs and demands of each city. Concurrent with these developments, the city itself is spatially reconfigured to accommodate the demands of the fire service. Cities are split into fire zones within which some buildings, strategically chosen, are assigned to accommodate fire stations from which any fire incident can be dealt with within minutes. Fire has, therefore, a noticeable impact on urban planning and infrastructure.

Reflecting on the recent cuts to London’s fire service, the implementation of changes according to budget does not only affect local residents, employees and trade unionists but also challenges the conditions of urban memory. These cuts override arbitrarily previous organisational establishments and decisions, which were based on years of knowledge and experience, and obliterate them in an instant, thus enforcing a sense of collective urban amnesia. The risk of fire is now higher, and this will also become gradually visible on the architecture of the city, as the latter naturally evolves.

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Since October 2006, Arsenal Football Club’s Community Department has been leading ‘Kicks’, a project funded by the Premier League and the Metropolitan Police, at Elthorne Park in Islington.¹ From a community-safety perspective, levels of antisocial behavior had been of concern locally, due in part to street drinkers and drug misusers frequenting the park. These were statutory and voluntary-sector concerns which were shared by local residents, parents and young people. The park was poorly lit, and local gangs operated there, so some community members avoided it for fear of their safety. There was a youth crime problem in Elthorne Park, and various local youth projects were trying to address the problem. Young people in the area were bored, disengaged and felt they were not getting enough help. The existing sports facilities were considered dangerous to use and in desperate need of repair.

In 2006, the Metropolitan Police and Islington Council selected the park for a Kicks project. Funding meant that through the project long-term consistent engagement could take place. It soon became apparent that the football pitch needed upgrading. A donation from Arsenal legend Dennis Bergkamp and funding from Islington Council transformed the space into a high-quality sports facility and contributed to the much needed regeneration of the park. The project now holds Kicks activities five nights a week with matches once a week.

Other Arsenal in the Community sports sessions at Elthorne Park include an adult mental-health programme and a project for adults with learning difficulties. Many people in Islington have a natural affiliation with Arsenal Football Club, and this is used as an initial route for engagement. The Kicks project engaged young people who had previously been getting in trouble with the police. The staff at Elthorne Park Kicks are all trained youth workers. They might be there nominally as football coaches, but their main concern is understanding the issues that local young people face and reacting to them. Young people now have somewhere to play sport and meet their friends and have positive relationships with the youth workers.

All of the clubs are doing this work in the community and are involved in working with the police and youth-offending teams on the ground level. Pretty much all our staff are local. People wouldn’t realise the football club is doing this in-depth work in the community. There’s a huge number of young people engaged in positive activities through football clubs. This work is going on throughout London in the various different patches around the clubs.¹

I was born in Islington and grew up in Hackney – at Arsenal in the Community we all come from round here. We know the area very well. There are certainly two Islings. The type of Islington we are working with is not your clichéd Tony Blair Islington, because that side of Islington do not need their children engaged in positive activities in the evening, or employability programmes or homework clubs on the estates … They don’t live on estates.

Arsenal youth workers are a constant presence – maybe three nights a week. The young people trust them more than the police: they’re go-to people. A lot of the young people employed by us were previously participants in our projects, so they grew up on the estates, they came to our schemes. We don’t care about the football, it’s beyond that. So we’re always doing workshops and other positive activities, and they listen to us through these sorts of pathways. A high percentage of young people who are known to the police, or at risk, or whatever you want to call it, are engaged with our projects.

Whatever your view is of money being spent on one-on-one mentoring, it does work. It is intensive. They’re all local lads, they’re pretty much all Arsenal fans, they’ve got attachment … They might not have had an attachment to any sort of institution before – school, work, sadly even family – but this is an institution, and it’s something they can feel a part of.

¹ Quotes by Samir Singh, Interview with Ben Campkin, Arsenal in the Community, Arsenal Football Club, London, 6 May 2014.

Samir Singh works for Arsenal in the Community.
On Elthorne Park we are working very closely with Islington Council – they’re our partners – and the police, leveraging in funds from multiple sources. To get the pitch done up takes a bit of time and effort and building … but once it’s up and running we are there delivering sessions.

With the football sessions going on it’s a buzzy place; it’s lively, so let’s say there wasn’t a football session going on, people might not want to pass through that park. They’d go around it. Whereas if they can see there are loads of kids playing, it’s quite buzzy, and there’s obviously something happening, that something formal is taking place … there’s someone leading it, then they will walk past.

One of our main points is that everyone’s like ‘Gangs, bad, gangs are no good’: the most success we ever had is creating our own gangs and keeping them together. We’re ripping up the rule book that says gangs are bad, which they are if a gang, by definition, is doing something criminal. But keeping young people together in a group, so you’ve still got the same excitement, or building a new gang – be part of our Arsenal gang if you like… A gang is only a gang if it’s focused on criminal activity. If it’s focused on playing football and they’re effectively a football team and they travel to go and play football, they’re not a gang they’re just a group.

Islington as a borough has got the most private green space per head, and the least public green space per head. So, if you’re living in a nice Georgian terrace in Barnsbury, lucky you, but if you’re living on the estates you don’t have much green space. So the work we do on the estates through football and upgrading facilities – alright it’s Astroturf, not grass – but at least you know that Astroturf you can use year-round.
Henrietta Williams

*Zaun* means fence in German. Zaun Ltd are a company that make high-security fencing from an industrial unit in Wolverhampton. They were responsible for the rather frightening perimeter fence around the Olympic Park in Stratford. More advanced than most high-security prisons, the Olympic fence was made up of a Zaun product called the ‘hi sec super 6 welded mesh fencing system’. They added the electric fencing at the top, as well as the CCTV cameras that studded the fence posts at intervals of 5 metres. The company is a member of Secured by Design (SBD), a group operated by the police in the UK, which aims to ‘design out crime’. All new public developments in the UK now have to adhere to their guidelines, but SBD policies have been criticised for creating characterless environments that are needlessly threatening.

One of Zaun’s representatives came and met me in Hackney Wick in the spring before the 2012 Olympics began. As we walked along the perimeter of the park, with its soaring fence, he explained how Zaun products were developed for use around high-risk security sites, including prisons, ports, airports, railways and water pumping stations. But he then explained that since being awarded SBD status, the company was regularly commissioned to make fences for schools: ‘We started off making fencing for prisons but as a result of Secured by Design we are increasingly doing work with schools and multi-use games areas [playgrounds].’

Working with writer Anna Minton on a report for the New Economics Foundation, published in 2013, I travelled around the UK photographing examples of areas where SBD policy was changing the way in which urban areas were being configured.1 This report, titled ‘Fortress Britain’, questioned the blanket adoption of SBD policy and the suitability of putting security at the forefront of design. Minton’s report also noted how a crime risk assessment is central to the SBD process. As a result, areas with higher crime rates, often with pockets of poverty, become characterised by enhanced security. Tree planting is limited for enhanced visibility, high-security fences encircle new housing developments, schools become fortresses.

The use of SBD techniques is also noticeable in new private developments in areas undergoing rapid gentrification. This is particularly evident in and around the BBC’s new ‘Media City’ in Salford, Greater Manchester. Some locals feel that the Council is purposefully allowing existing council housing to degenerate in order to clear space for private developers. Less than a mile away from such sites, glittering gated communities line the waterfront, with high-security fencing protecting the inhabitants from the perceived threat outside the enclave.

This series of photographs present a series of urban areas clearly impacted by SBD policies.
These are streets devoid of urban accident and interest, characterless dystopias where security concerns lie at the forefront of design. Perhaps most importantly, these images denote how SBD is creating a different visual landscape for poverty-stricken areas. A new school in Bath will have very little fencing, whereas a school in Brixton will be heavily fortified. Pockets of wealth, in the form of gated communities, are insular islands sealed off from ‘the other’, the symbol of the fence, as always, entrenching and encouraging divisions within society.
An important, though often overlooked, part of the London 2012 Olympic Games’ Stratford site are the numerous fences that have surrounded it. As an archaeologist excavating inside these fences in 2007–8, I began to think about how enclosure affected perceptions of the project, how it could be interpreted archaeologically, and how this might question the Games’ legitimacy.

Contemporary archaeology uses archaeological methods to study the present, based on our interaction with material things, with artefacts acting as a counterpoint to purely literature- or economics-based approaches to understanding power relationships. By comparing such traditional sources with physical structures and objects, discontinuities are often revealed between a thing’s material qualities and its proclaimed function.

In the case of the 2012 Games, the organisers’ justification for building the fences was often challenged by the structures they actually created. The blue fence, an 18-kilometre long wooden hoarding, was built, according to the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), for ‘health and safety reasons’, due to the demolition and decontamination processes that were taking place on the site in 2007–8. This official justification was frequently contradicted by the clouds of contaminated dust that rolled out over the fence, causing concern amongst local residents. The photographs of this dust (standing in for the original substance) and the likelihood that its constituent contaminants were ingested by nearby residents, act to contradict the health and safety discourse that supposedly justified the need for the enclosure.

The blue fence also seemed to act as a monolithic proxy for the controversial Olympic brand. It was emblazoned with panels depicting a computer-generated pristine future landscape, jarring with the mountains of rubble behind – an erasure and disturbance that were meant to be hidden by an enclosure. Though the fence was purportedly for the protection of the public, its opacity led to fears about what was being disturbed. Its presence was also the first securitisation of the park; we archaeologists, who were complicit in reshaping the terrain within, were temporary inmates here, going daily through a barrage of security and decontamination procedures, grounded in technologies not only of health and safety but also of ‘safety and security’. These were brought even more to the fore by the succeeding barrier, the Olympic Perimeter Fence (OPF).

The OPF was built as a ‘safety and security’ measure by the ODA in 2009, according to principles approved by Secure by Design and the Home Office. The ODA’s concern was that there was a ‘significant risk of unauthorised entry’ to the site,
with peaceful protest listed in documents at the same category of threat as ‘domestic extremism’: protester equated to terrorist.\(^8\)

However, not only did the OPF’s presence make manifest the ‘total policing’ paranoia of the event’s organisers (particularly when seen as part of their wider military arsenal), but it also undermined the myth of a utopian Olympism.\(^9\) As host city, London signed up to the Olympic Charter, including its aims of promoting peace and reconciliation.\(^10\) Not only did the militarised Games’ security challenge this, but its fences also evoked memories of other, more distant, walls.

Laura McAtackney, an archaeologist who focuses on the material culture of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, has demonstrated how ‘peace walls’ in Belfast often act not as a show of state force but instead as a manifestation of an official anxiety, resulting in the segregation of groups and attitudes and, therefore, less security.\(^11\) Similarly, at the Olympics, a commitment to provide safe and secure environments was challenged by the OPF, given its gross proportions and relationship to its surroundings. We inevitably think of other barriers, past and present, in Israel/Palestine, Berlin and Belfast, undermining the idea that this is a safe, peaceful place to be.\(^12\)

The OPF’s presence also highlights an absence created during the period of its blue, opaque predecessor, the missing streets, homes and businesses permanently sealed off. Visible through the gaps in its steel welded-mesh panels, the old neighbourhoods have been graded into picturesque hills. The Pudding Mill river, long since filled, remains only in old maps and photographs. Yet, in its framing of absence, the OPF stirs memory and creates a juxtaposition between the new terrain and the old, at least for those who knew the place before the Games came.

Thus, the fences, and the demarcation their material presence enacted, can also be redemptive. The strange contrast they present us with, the old and the new, encourages a remembrance of what was once here and reflection upon how the future built within the fences cannot be walled off from this past. Studying the material remnants of these structures of defence opens a space for a wider questioning of the existence and legitimacy of such mega events.

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Traces of enclosure outside the London 2012 Olympic Park: a sycamore tree has grown around a chain-link fence at what was once the back of the old Clarnico sweet factory. Blue paint spatters on the bark are one of the few remnants of the London 2012 construction hoarding (blue fence). In the background lurks the Games’ high-security fence, which still persists in 2014. Photo by Jonathan Gardner.


9 See Peter Fussey, Jon Coaffee, Gary Armstrong and Dick Hobbs, Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).


Responding to the immediate needs and desires of residents in informal settlements, South African shebeens are a microcosm of changing socio-economic circumstances, located at the fringes of urban environments. Apart from its function as a place for the sale and consumption of alcohol, the shebeen is a social space, in a dynamic relationship with the community, culture and economy of its urban setting. In an increasingly divided and hostile society it also becomes an unlikely site for alternative spatialities based on new forms of trust.

Shebeens have their roots in the townships of Apartheid South Africa where black residents were forced to live away from urban and economic centres. Concentrated in residential ghettos, many were forced into generating a livelihood at these locations, with shebeens an accessible entry into the entrepreneurial economy. Because black South Africans were forbidden to socialise in designated white areas, shebeens served as important social and political sites for black residents. Located in denser and more distressed settlements, the shebeens of today are commonly portrayed as places of drunkenness, violence and deviance.

Shebeens are by definition illegal drinking establishments, and South African law prohibits the sale of alcohol within them. The sale of liquor in South Africa is regulated, and new policy encourages the consumption of liquor to be carried out in licensed premises on high streets — that is, the domain of the cities and suburbs, traditionally white enclaves of the past. The already marginalised entrepreneurs are further victimised through this repressive criminalisation of shebeens. This act simultaneously dismisses the complex Apartheid geographies of contemporary South African cities and disregards the positive social roles of shebeens in these settings.

Recent Growth

The informal settlement Sweet Home Farm (2.2 hectares) comprises 17,000 inhabitants living in 3,115 shacks. With 109 shebeens, this translates to one shebeen for every twenty-eight shacks. Although with us for many years, the recent mushrooming and concentration of shebeens is new. This is in response to migrants dominating the retail market with competitive buying cooperatives (through outlets known as 'spaza shops'). As it is forbidden to the mostly Muslim migrants, the liquor trade is a relatively secure and lucrative market for the local South Africans. This results in a plethora of randomly distributed shebeens throughout the settlement. The dire shortage of recreational space in the settlement further reinforces their social role.

What lessons can practitioners seeking to make more authentic and relevant urban spaces learn from these shebeens?
Intensity and Differentiation
The density of the urban fabric and the close proximity to other shebeens necessitates differentiation, which is essential for economic survival. There is no clear pattern of distribution throughout the settlement: shebeens are randomly and evenly spread. Each one supports an ecosystem of interdependent micro-enterprises such as recycling and fast food.

Shebeens cater to a unique market. An inventory audit of each shebeen revealed that satellite TVs, pool tables, jukeboxes, type of alcohol, type and quantity of seating, size of establishment and proprietor all influence the type and role of the individual shebeen. From the sample group, the following types and characteristics were identified:

**Drinkataiament:** young patrons, entertainment, loud music, satellite TV, jukebox, beer, heavy drinking.

**Conversational:** elderly and religious patrons, no entertainment.

**Neighbourhood:** mixed patrons, accessible to different users throughout the day, operator an active community facilitator, a public space, entertainment, pool table.

**iSloti:** male patrons, little alcohol consumption, pool table as central activity, no women allowed (this has proven to prevent tension and fights amongst male patrons).

**Traditional:** traditional beer with elders centered around a fire in a separate room, an arrangement closely resembling rural practices.

This articulation of shebeen typologies demonstrates the complex and diverse uses of shebeens as more than simple sites of liquor consumption or places of violence and deviance.

**Programmatic Hybrids**
In the impoverished setting of the informal settlement, the shebeen is compelled to be more than a site of liquor consumption. It is also a place of gathering, entertainment and business. Significantly, it is simultaneously a private home. The two seemingly polarised functions are able to coexist through dynamic thresholds that mediate between the private and public realms. Sophisticated control mechanisms of doorways and hatches and unwritten rules governing users and proprietors guide the interplay between public and private. Thresholds comprise physical, ephemeral and symbolic devices, which in combination influence the use of the compact shebeen.

The nature of these thresholds depends on the relationship between the various actors in the space. The more familiarity and trust exists, the more passive the thresholds, and vice versa. The carefully orchestrated arrangement of entrance, bedroom, kitchen, lounge, shebeen and courtyard establish powerful spatial rules and hierarchies. The kitchen serves both the shebeen and house and is the central point of the shebeen, typically occupied by the matriarch. Through a hatch related to this space, she is able to regulate the atmosphere of the environment by controlling the music.
TOILET
There is no formal toilet on the property. To use a flush toilet, customers must request a key for his toilet unit, located on the main street about 40 meters away.

LIGHTING
The entire shebeen, even this portion of the courtyard is well-lit at all operating hours.

COURTYARD
The courtyard space is primarily used by Zwai's extended family, who live in the homes adjacent to his shebeen.

HOME ENTRANCE
The door opens into Zwai and Sakhe's kitchen and bedroom, which they share with their young son.

OUTDOOR SEATING
When the shebeen is full, customers sit on crates in the courtyard.

STORAGE
Zwai stores his alcohol supply in this shack. When police come to raid his business, he locks the shack and says the resident is not home.

WATER
Sweet Home Farm is situated on land with a high water table, and there is no proper drainage system. After rains, the water rises and the ground is soon waterlogged. Old carpets have been placed on the ground to restrict mud and dirt.

URINALS
Zwai's urinals are in the back. Unlit and sequestered away, this space can be dangerous at times.

FAMILY, FISH & CHIPS
Zwai's sister and her four children live in this home to the back of the shebeen. She sells fish and chips to Zwai's customers. Other members of Zwai's family live behind this dwelling.

BURGLAR BARS
In a recent robbery, police broke into Zwai's bedroom and stole money. Zwai installed this security gate, which allows him to monitor activities within his courtyard.

BACK ENTRANCE
The shebeen opens to the courtyard through this entrance.

STORAGE
Zwai's storage unit is in the back. When police come to raid his business, he locks this unit and says he is not home.

LIGHTING
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HOME ENTRANCE
The door opens into Zwai and Sakhe's kitchen and bedroom, which they share with their young son.

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and lighting. She can also serve patrons and has clear sight lines to entrances and the main shebeen space.

Depending on time of day, use and accessibility, the space and its related courtyards can be accessed by the wider public. Some spaces easily transition into a meeting space, made possible by their position on paths used by the wider neighbourhood or by their having open entranceways and seating. The space is permeable and connected to adjacent yards, allowing children to run through, meet and play. Under surveillance by the proprietor, it is a relatively safe and protected space.

**Responsive Agility**

A self-organising intelligence is built into the shebeens, that allows them to adapt to threats or opportunities. The architecture of the shebeen plays an important role in enabling this. Through its connections and assembling of salvaged metal sheeting and timber planks, it offers a phenomenal degree of structural adaptability. Embedded within the space, the proprietor is able to immediately adjust the physical spaces to respond to any threat or opportunity faced by the enterprise. This real-time ability to author one’s environment builds powerful agency into the typology, which would be unthinkable using conventional construction techniques of bricks and mortar. The technology and materials lend dexterity to the spaces, which can be adapted immediately by one or two persons. Examples of these responses include:

- **removing** a room to make way for more entertainment space;
- **creating** a security cage to prevent armed robberies whilst still serving beer through a hatch;
- **installing** makeshift urinals to prevent fights caused by drunk (and vulnerable) patrons urinating in public;
- **creating** ledges for drinks to prevent them from being spilt and therefore causing brawls;
- **installing** serving hatches in the bedroom to allow the proprietor to run the business while ill;
- **closing/opening** entrances and passageways;
- **changing** the atmosphere of the space using different lighting and music.

**Stumbling Forward, Looking Deep**

Shebeens offer invaluable insights of great relevance for urban practitioners who are intent on moving towards a more ‘authentic’ and progressive South African city. In a context devoid of civic trust, the shebeen, in its apparently crude setting, seamlessly mediates domestic and public life through ordinary social and spatial devices. It presents a rare situation of explicit reciprocity between space and social patterns. Through there everyday and survivalist qualities, shebeens demonstrate an alternative imaginary for our cities that favours active authorship of users, complex uses and responsive architecture.
‘If we look for a moment at other cities around the world where enclaves are increasing, we see that some are going through similar processes of deep transformation and democratization: Johannesburg and Buenos Aires, for example. Their movement to build walls is thus understandable. The problem is that the consequences of fragmentation, privatization, and walling are severe. Once walls are built, they alter public life. The changes we are seeing in the urban environment are fundamentally undemocratic. What is being reproduced at the level of the built environment is segregation and intolerance. The space of these cities is the main arena in which these antidemocratic tendencies are articulated.

Among the conditions necessary for democracy is that people acknowledge those from different social groups to be co-citizens, having similar rights despite their differences. However, cities segregated by walls and enclaves foster the sense that different groups belong to separate universes and have irreconcilable claims. Cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion. Moreover, this effect does not depend directly on either the type of political regime or on the intentions of those in power, since the design of the enclaves and walls itself entails a certain social logic. The new urban morphologies of fear give new forms to inequality, keep groups apart, and inscribe a new sociability that runs against the ideals of the modern public and its democratic freedoms. When some people are denied access to certain areas and when different groups do not interact in public space, then references to ideals of openness, equality, and freedom as organizing principles for social life are no longer possible, even as fiction. The consequences of the new separateness and restriction of public life are serious: contrary to what Jencks (1993) thinks, defensible architecture and planning may promote conflict instead of preventing it, by making explicit the social inequalities and the lack of common ground. In fact, we may argue that the Los Angeles uprising was caused by social segregation rather than by lack of separation and defenses.1

If the experiences of separateness expressed in the urban environment become dominant in their societies, people will distance themselves from democracy. However, given the disjuncture between different types of experiences in cities such as Los Angeles and São Paulo, there is also hope that the reverse could happen: that the experiences of the blurring of boundaries and of democratization will one day extend into the built environment.’

CITY OF WALLS

References


1 Soja, for example, interprets the 1992 riots as the first movement of resistance to conservative postmodernism and post-Fordism.


References

Urban security is often thought of as strategies to protect and disarm city populations; however, security may also be understood as endurance, as the multiple ways in which urban residents use their everyday experiences to survive in the city.

Security as it is applied to urban life can be a strange brew of otherwise countervailing ingredients. It entails hesitation and risk, mobility and stasis, defense and dispersal. The underplayed yet critical aspect of urban security is endurance. Endurance is slightly different to survival. For example, much emphasis has been placed upon how residents survive the city, particularly the large numbers of urban poor. Sometimes their survival efforts are realistically acknowledged – a great deal of resilience and ‘street smarts’ are demonstrated under otherwise debilitating conditions. The celebration of urban survival can get out of hand, though, and the poor quickly becoming urban heroes, proof of the resilience of human ingenuity and spirit no matter what is thrown at them. Yet there is nothing necessarily heroic about a willingness to rush to the bottom.

On the other hand, there is a certain degree of insincerity in the bafflement as to how the poor manage to survive, as if only a middle-class efficiency can constitute the terms of survival. One can hear almost a palpable sense of relief as extensive statistical toolboxes are utilised to list off high mortality and crime rates for the poor, as well as a host of psychological, medical and social problems. In ‘dangerous’ cities, like Karachi or Caracas, stereotypical notions of survival seem predicated on a capacity to remain almost invisible. For, if one tries to be or have something of any significance, it is bound to attract all kinds of unwanted attention, and the chances are that person is not going to be around for very long.

But perhaps the more interesting invisibility as it pertains to endurance has been the persistence of large numbers of districts in almost all cities across the so-called Global South where people of different incomes, doing different things and using space in different ways manage to live in close proximity to each other. Here, artisans, factory workers, civil servants, shopkeepers, service workers, drivers, nurses and teachers have, over many decades, managed to incrementally build viable livelihoods and living spaces, while also operating in close proximity to those who are just starting out in the city and have little, those who have lost what they had and those who never had much of anything. For these residents, security entails doing a wide variety of things within local environments.

Many of these areas are slowly being wiped off the map and their populations displaced by large-scale redevelopment projects. In these
districts, a sense of planning was accomplished through producing an everyday plurality of interim solutions to problems over the use of space, the implications of particular economic activities and the interactions of different kinds of materials. Selections among such interim solutions often didn’t work. But then there were other options available to fall back on, different ways forward which were seen as equally plausible. Importantly, the plurality of possibilities kept a plurality of actors in some kind of relationship with each other. Differences in background, networks and ways of doing things became the elements that could be rearranged to constitute different possibilities for designing the overall living and working environment of a district.

If these residents had to largely assume the responsibility of supplementing incomes, making their own livelihoods or finding ways to insert themselves into economic and social activities on a larger scale, they sometimes did so by reshaping their own aspirations, skills, self-reflections and social networks. This they did through the very ways in which they built, responded to and rearranged the material environments – the buildings, the infrastructure and the economic activities and materials produced and traded.

Such districts may have been particularly vulnerable due to the complexity of everyday practices which made it difficult to organise large-scale political mobilisations adequate to the task of dealing with the power dynamics of urban elites. The flexible working-out of provisional accommodations among a wide range of aspirations and initiatives could work against formalising standard conditions of tenure, housing finance or making sure that work was effectively distributed across different scales and types of economic activity.

Endurance is, thus, a way to ‘keep on keeping on’ not attributable to some inner force or underlying proposition. It is not the unfolding of a plan, or a well-put-together personality full of fortitude, able to roll with the punches and flexibly duck and dive all that would threaten falling apart. Rather, endurance is a matter of bridge-building. This is not a bridge that brings together distinct peoples or ways of life into a common purpose, resemblance or mutuality. For, bridges also point to breaks and frictions when different ways of doing things are put close to each other. But without such frictions there is little motivation to work out ways of associating people and things that have no overarching reason to be associated.

These are bridges that reiterate the separateness of things. Yet, this is a separateness ‘within view’, where different ways of doing things remain concrete possibilities for parallel lives that need not warrant continuous living. But they are still accessible to all parties as disruptions of their own routine assumptions. They can be experienced without residents always being compelled to either understand what is taking place on the ‘other side’ or completing ignoring it.

What is maintained is an intensive proximity, an offering of different perspectives to the other. As such, residents of the mixed-income, mixed-use districts I refer to here have been able to ‘recognise’ themselves, maintain a sense of coherence across many different activities and conditions and in the midst of others with whom it is not easy to identify or associate.
Seeing Security

Political and technical operations have long been engineered in ways that attempt to continuously and more precisely survey what is taking place in cities. From roads, cables, pipes, engines, computer chips, phone towers, machines, fiber optics, pumps, generators, wires, gas and the vehicles, bodies, instruments and structures that direct, enclose and expose them, and the calculations and powers that diagram their intersections, the capacities of persons and things are held, at least momentarily, to be viewed and shaped. These operations have been extended to elaborate ways of what Brian Massumi has called 'seeing in advance', of pre-empting dangerous activities through being able to recognise the incipient forms of danger, through prior scanning and algorithmic calculation of behaviors across a wide range of times and contexts.

While it is certainly possible to talk about how healthy, clean, functional or productive a district might be, these statements often fail to have any traction on the ground. It is not that residents don’t know the many problems and vulnerabilities they face. Rather than these problems summarising or representing what a district is, they become ways of deflecting attention or keeping open many different possibilities. Where state unintelligibility of the on-the-ground terrain may prompt political decisions to ‘make things clear’, the everyday realities of these improbable lives push back to make the politics of deciding things-as-certain more uncertain.

Intentionally or not, much of what takes place in cities today actively deskills the capacity of residents to use urban life and everyday relationships as a means of learning how to coexist in ways that do not depend upon the political enforcement of who residents are and what they ought to be. Despite the proliferation of social networking and instant updating, the endurance of cities such as Jakarta, São Paolo, Lagos, Karachi and others have long depended upon the capacities of residents to work collaboratively without seeming to do so, of affecting each other in the small but constant adjustments of their everyday lives.
We don’t want to upset anybody, we want to make sure that people have a good experience on the estate. We go for the softer look, we’re in a nice blue, not in-your-face security, and we’re trained in customer care.

The actual estate is a lovely estate, very clean because it’s cleaned 24/7. You know at the end of the day it’s very well looked after and the only way that you can keep it that way is by having certain rules in place, otherwise it becomes a mess.

If all is peaceful then everyone is happy. People coming with their picnics, staying all day, the kids running in and out of the fountains. We’re quite flexible with the rules. If people comply then we don’t have to do anything.

At the end of the day, the estate has been designed so that 51% is open to the public. [Occupy] would never happen here. We would make sure that it was stopped before it happened. It’s a private estate. People come here to have a nice experience. It’s a private estate, which is open to the public. That’s how the landlord wants it.

Security have all been trained in hostile reconnaissance, you see. If you are working in public space you have to be very careful because you don’t know who is who. When you make an enemy they know where to find you, so all that is danger for you. The trick is that you’ve got to know how to communicate, how to handle people. You have to look at the person, calculate, study, before you make a move.

You know, we say to them, ‘You could hurt yourselves and you’ve got a hundred people here who you could hurt as well. Do you realise that? Go somewhere where it’s safer to do it.’ We’re not doing it to ruin their lives. We’re just trying to help people in a safe environment.
Enjoy This Estate

The privatised estate, a feudal throwback, increasingly uses human beings rather than authoritarian design to defend its ‘public’ space. Security staff, often referred to as customer liaison, are asked to be the face of the rules. Trust in the human relation has been adopted enthusiastically by developers, for example by Argent, whose staff, in their King’s Cross estate branding, are known locally as the ‘redcaps’. The ‘customer’, who most likely does not see themselves as such, is constantly reminded by the presence of these staff that they are negotiating programmed access rather enacting their rights to the city.

*Enjoy this Estate* begins with a compilation of verbatim extracts from our conversations with security guards in four Central London private estates. We were curious to gather the voices of staff as individuals in an attempt to understand more about their role in these places. The men we talked to expressed pride in the places in which they worked, conceptualising their roles as carers for the spaces and those within them, protecting their public from ‘nuisance’, terrorists and themselves.

These conversations led us to question how it is that everybody who passes through a privately owned public space becomes a customer. The transaction that characterises people as such is not explicit, but it seems it may be the tidy experience of public life in a watched-over place that is enjoyed and consumed. In return, a compliant public augments the landlord’s assets by completing the convivial designed tableau: in Granary Square, the Central Saint Martins student provides collateral evidence of ‘creativity’, and local young people in nightly ping-pong contests supply a reassuring sense of ‘authenticity’; across the river, people exercising their democratic rights are accommodated by MoreLondon outside the GLA building on condition of contained protest. The ‘landlord’ is often a global investment fund (Paternoster Square is owned by Japan’s second-largest developer; MoreLondon by the State of Kuwait), with their public-realm strategy delivered by a management company (likely to be Broadgate Estates, who have established a regional market dominance). The uniformed individuals deployed on site are the personable moderators of the particular brand identity.

While writing this, we heard a politician on the radio refer to the electorate as customers. The pervasive slide into customership individualises and depoliticises the public, precluding a vital public life that incorporates discord, difference and dissent. The current attempt to introduce the IPNA (*Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance*) highlights the influence of the self-serving concerns of private bodies within new legal frameworks for public space. The challenges, raised in the troubled journey of its host Crime Bill through the House of Commons, are an encouraging reminder that we can resist the shift of publicness and consider how a customer might return to being a trusted and trusting member of the public.

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The automated teller machine (ATM), colloquially known in the UK as the ‘Hole-in-the-Wall’, dispenses cash. Its extinction could be imminent if we believe the now frequent predictions of the death of cash. Some police, crime scientists, urban designers and customers might welcome this, associating the ATM with illicit cash-based economies in drugs and prostitution, pavement-blocking queues and what Interaction Design professor Jonas Löwgren describes as ‘the most mundane of interaction experiences’.

Before the ATM is scrapped, it is worth looking more closely.

From needing cash to spending it, the ATM interaction is interwoven with choices influenced by need, desire, convenience, security and personal preference. ATMs are more replete with potential than users, banks or law enforcement might acknowledge. Strategically minded practitioners of ATM crime understand this. Seen from the perspective of a ‘criminal gaze’, the ATM is a ripe conjunction of opportunities, a specific time and place where valuable information and money normally kept separate will intersect.

ATMs are ambiguously located, complicating behavioural cues and expectations. It is unclear whether an ATM set into its exterior wall is part of a bank or the street. It presents ATM users, and other street users, with dilemmas. Should I feel comfortable getting my purse out, inserting a card, inputting my PIN, withdrawing money? Is it OK to openly watch someone else doing this? Even the new generation of more ‘user-friendly’ bank branches bristle with rigid spatial cues, architecturally reinforced by glass partitions, counters, zonal carpeting schemes, queues and roving clerks. Should ATM users conform to the formal or semi-formal bank environment? Or should they participate in the more ‘open’ environment of the street, with freer movement, louder voices and people watching? ATMs situated in lobbies, at the rear of convenience stores, in full view of the shop-owner or in the walls of supermarket carparks, pose awkward problems around appropriate behaviour, personal security and etiquette. Visitors unfamiliar with UK norms are targeted by fraudsters as they struggle to navigate these situations.

An ATM’s role as a physical place where digital money becomes ‘real’ cash compounds the enigma. What we might think of as the transubstantiation of cash is logistically complex. Money in a UK machine belongs to the Bank of England. When a customer withdraws cash, it notionally moves into their bank’s account, of which their account is a sub-folder. Bank and Bank of England balance books later. Discrete interchange fees are paid by the card-issuing bank to the ATM owner. ‘I promise to pay the bearer
What Could Banks Learn About Community From ATM Criminals?

on demand the sum of … ’, printed across the top of a UK banknote, indicates that it is an analogue for something else, an IOU endorsed by the Bank of England. All of which begs the questions: What is it you have in your hand? What is it worth? Where did it come from? Who owns it? Is it real?

An ATM delivers cash. The withdrawal of money facilitates particular transactions in specific local economies. Traditional street markets, farmers’ markets, car-boot or ‘rummage’ sales are all dependent on cash, as are markets selling work by early-career designers such as Camden and Spitalfields in London. Some shops are dependent on cash transactions. Consider the last time you used an ATM. You probably needed cash for particular goods or services: tea, beer or snacks, market-stall flowers, screws, a newspaper. It is less likely your purchase was from a chain store, more likely the shop employed local staff. So, cash from an ATM supports potentially fragile local economies. It could be said to embody the slower-moving, human side of global capital.

Today, one second of US peak-time trading is equivalent to a whole day ten years ago. Most banks, including high-street banks, now rely somewhere in their business on the algorithmic codes that make this speed possible. Consider in contrast the more human speed and scale of cash transactions facilitated by an ATM.

The ambiguities surrounding ATMs belie their strategic position intersecting complex sets of temporal, spatial and economic relations. Organised-crime groups find opportunities and intervene across these times, places and networks, much as a community of interdependent businesses would. A card-skimming device made in Italy can be fitted to a machine off Oxford Street by a touring gang who send data by snail mail to Poland for processing into fake cards, which are used to withdraw cash in the USA, where largely European-controlled in-built card security is not mandated. Naturally, banks use their resources and ingenuity to detect and plug breaches in the system. But what if they used a more ‘criminal gaze’?

Hunted variegation of opportunity at the seams of these networks? For example, what if ATMs were deployed as community assets, as key pieces in the puzzle of planning cities? Might banks and local authorities co-operate in strategically positioning ATMs to support economically vulnerable local communities?

3 Robert Peston A Dark Magic, 8 July 2013, BBC Radio 4.

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A hype about the need for, and the challenges of, ‘growing connectivity’ pervades the whole landscape of urban governance and politics. Cities are said to be fostering, and at the same time confronted by, a mounting array of networks and networked processes. Connectivity is contingently recasting, splintering and repurposing the texture of the modern city. This attention for the connected geography of urbanisation cuts across the vast majority of urban challenges. Safety and security are no exception. Yet little attention is paid to the depth of this networking of urban security. Beyond the buzz of connected urban ‘big data’ and the increasing popularity of smart city discussions, connections at other scales or indeed across scales remain loosely discussed. Against this systematic disregard, the proliferation of networks dealing with urban safety around the globe is a telling evidence of the possibilities for truly cross-cutting action that is global in nature but also multi-scalar in reach.

Important are, for instance, the effects of networked urban governance across cities and national boundaries. Cities are increasingly demanding international audiences to take them and their worldview much more seriously. The sprawl in city-based networking and the growing entanglement of city politics with key transnational actors such as the World Bank certainly suggest that cities are playing an ever-increasing role in safeguarding urban security. The recently launched (2013) Global Network for Safer Cities (GNSC) is a case in point. Led by UN-Habitat, the GNSC aims to equip local authorities and urban stakeholders with the tools to deliver and maintain urban security.1 GNSC follows the footsteps of successful examples of city-to-city cooperation such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the C40 group or Eurocities, which are today quite active components in the international response to issues such as climate change, inequality and diversity.

Pooling their ‘network power’, cities seem to be increasingly capable of responding to pressing challenges arising locally and globally.2 For instance, GNSC has been progressively formalising the large pool of cities (seventy-seven in twenty-four countries) to which the UN is already providing technical support in terms of improving urban safety. Likewise, the global network can have a ‘webbing’ networked effect at a national and local level: GNSC has already received firm commitments for national sub-networks on Safer Cities in several key countries affected by urban insecurity such as Mexico, Colombia and South Africa. GNSC is not alone in this effort. For example, the European Forum on Urban Security has been connecting municipalities and non-governmental actors in the sphere of urban safety since 1987, and with 250 European members it has been a solid networking entrepreneur in prompting joint training and city-to-city learning.
However, when recognised, these networked connections tend to remain essentially ‘flat’. In the popular imaginary they tend to convey the image of global grids and international webs. Rather, when cities and urban processes connect both within and across boundaries, the resulting effect can be far deeper than notions tend to remain let on.

The potential for global connectivity should not obscure the multi-scalar ‘depth’ that new urban security initiatives can offer to enhance safety and citizen trust in urban design. This is, for instance, well represented in the Urban Design Protocol for Australian Cities. With an overall mission of ‘creating places for people’, the Protocol establishes broadly agreed principles for quality urban places in Australia, aiming at fostering a culture that critically assesses urban design, celebrates its best examples and, fundamentally for the development of citizen trust, ‘builds design literacy’. Against the commonplace ‘flatness’ of many city networks, the Protocol is an interesting cross-scalar effort grouping federal and state governments, with cities and major private actors.

Urban safety is here integrated with a variety of other urban design dimensions, with direct links to the dwellers’ broader experience of liveability, but it is also intertwined with practical dimensions of urban living such as diversity and walkability. Important for the multi-scalar and networked interpretation of these design principles is the ‘custodianship role appended to municipal government vis-à-vis urban design. Cities are invested with stewardship for the delivery of urban design and the development of a continuous trust between City Hall and the city dweller. Importantly, the protocol is an example of how there is today a need to revalue the role of urban management in an era where the networked hype of urbanisation has privileged outgoing entrepreneurial modes of urban governance, often at the expense of the pressing demands from local communities.

Examples like the Protocol are still to be tested in their long-term benefits and everyday application, but the multi-scalar view, respect for citizen engagement and wider government–private participation in the initiative offer at least some encouraging signs. Yet, to date, little attention is paid to the mundane connections of the urban dweller with local and global processes. Initiatives such as the Global Consortium on Security Transformation, the European Forum for Urban Security and the Protocol are critical in pushing towards the everyday reality of urban safety, but the growing momentum of city networks needs not shift the attention away from the individual dweller.

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1 More information on the GNCS, one of the key partners of UCL STEaPP’s City Leadership Initiative, can be found at http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives-2/global-network-on-safer-cities (accessed 14 May 2014).
3 Creating Places for People: The Urban Design Protocol for Australian Cities is a collaborative commitment to best-practice urban design in Australia, championed by peak community and professional organisations, businesses and all three levels of government. See http://www.urbandesign.gov.au (accessed 14 May 2014).
With Gratitude

Urban Pamphleteer #3 has been produced with financial support from the UCL Grand Challenge of Sustainable Cities programme.

Printing
Belmont Press
Sheaf Close, Lodge Farm Industrial Estate
Harlestone Road, Northampton NN5 7UZ

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Cover
CAMERAS, Madrid, Spain by SpY (2013). Photo by SpY
www.SpY-urbanart.com
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Urban Pamphleteer #3 was published in September 2014 in an edition of 1000 copies.

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Thanks!
Laura Hirst
Samir Singh
SpY
Central Saint Martins Graphic Communication Design
UCL Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment
UCL Engineering
UCL Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences

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ISSN 2052–8647 (Print)
ISSN 2052–8655 (Online)

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