Theory Seminar presented by Yingni Guo (North Western University)

Paper (see below for abstract): http://yingniguo.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/robust-monopoly-regulation.pdf

Abstract: We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach.  We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff.When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap.  When his payoff  is the total  surplus of both consumers  and the firm,  he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy.  For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate  subsidy.   The  optimal  policy  balances  three  goals:  giving  more  surplus  to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.

Zoom Meeting ID: 991 0547 9347
Password: 251249

Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99105479347?pwd=M2UrT0ZrUlpFWDIxbWNQWkpDODJsQT09

Please mute your microphone to avoid noise during the presentation.

Yingni is available for individual meetings before and after the seminar (1:30-4pm and 6:30-8:30pm London time).

You can sign up for an appointment on the wiki page:

https://wiki.ucl.ac.uk/display/~uctpnr1/Theory+seminar