


The Rohingya Exodus 2017

Issues and Implications for Stability,
Security and Peace in South Asia



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The Rohingya Exodus: Issues and Implications for Stability, Security and Peace in South Asia

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Abstract

Given the recent (August 2017) Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh, this research aims to study the overall implications of this exodus for regional stability, security and peace. In so doing, this research intends to understand causes and drivers of identity-based politics associated to Rohingya population in Myanmar. This study also wants to understand complex issues of management of large exodus of refugees in Bangladesh and how best to address them in the longer-term. This project intends to contribute to policy making related to management of the Rohingya refugee crisis at local, regional and international levels with a view to help in their repatriation process.

The project team members applied a mixed-methods research approach including semi-structured questionnaire and key informant interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with the Rohingyas and members of the host communities in Cox's Bazar. The team interviewed 600 Rohingya people, 600 host community members and 33 key informants, and conducted 7 FGDs **between August–December 2018**. Both quantitative and qualitative tools and techniques have been applied to analyse the datasets. The results suggest that the exodus has caused severe environmental consequences due to the destruction of forest, hills and the ecosystem. Education is one of the sectors most adversely affected by the 2017 influx due to the use of educational institutions as temporary shelters, insecurity of local students, deterioration of educational environment and involvement of teachers and students in part-time jobs in the camps. The livelihoods of the host communities have severely been affected due to the scarcity of jobs and loss of agricultural land. The locals now perceive the presence of Rohingyas in their locality as a threat to their safety and security which consequently lead to different sorts of conflict and violence between them.

In general, the Rohingyas are keen to repatriate subject to the Myanmar authority ensure their free movement, religious freedom, and stop sexual violence towards women (high priority). They also demand rights to land and property ownership, healthcare facilities, and recognising their Rohingya identity (medium priority). Lastly, they require access to employment, education, marriage and citizenship rights, no military attack in their villages, and bringing justice for them (low priority). Overall, the Rohingyas want protection from violence and torture followed by ensuring their civic rights, and providing community facilities and services. It is strongly recommend to listen to the Rohingya voices for an effective repatriation in Myanmar with safety and dignity.

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Disclaimer: The findings of this report are solely based some preliminary fieldwork conducted in the Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar between August–December 2018. This is a pilot study and does not necessarily mean it represents the overall scenario of the entire Rohingya community or their host communities. This work is produced for research purpose only. The views expressed in this report do not reflect those of UCL or the University of Dhaka (DU) or the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The authors, team members, surveyors, research assistants, project partners, funders, editors, any authorities, conference administration, UCL, IRDR, CCV, IAS, CGS, DPCS, DU or anyone else are not liable to anyone for any loss or damage caused by any error or omission in the report or for publishing or disseminating any articles, online blogs, any materials, abstracts, technical papers related to the Rohingya crisis or anything else, or whether any such error or omission is the result of negligence or any other cause. All and such liability is disclaimed. The reader should verify the applicability of the information to particular situations and check the references prior to any reliance thereupon. Since the information contained in the report is multidisciplinary, international and professional in nature, the reader is urged to consult with an appropriate licensed professional prior to taking any action or making any interpretation.

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
CBD	Cox's Bazar District
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CiC	Camp in Charge
DPCS	Department of Peace and Conflict Studies
DRR	Disaster Risk Deduction
DU	University of Dhaka
FDMN	Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GCRF	Global Challenges Research Fund
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRDR	Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction
ISCG	Inter Sector Coordination Group
KII	Key Informant Interview
MoDMR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Bangladesh
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Government Organization
RRRC	Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UCL	University College London
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	UN Security Council
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

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please email Dr Bayes Ahmed at bayes.ahmed@ucl.ac.uk].

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Background

Rohingya population, an ethnic Muslim minority community from Myanmar who were rendered stateless by the Myanmar government in 1982 when they were stripped of citizenship after a long period of systematic exclusion (Farzana, 2017). The Rohingya community have experienced waves of violent forced displacement over recent decades, culminating in large-scale ethnic cleansing operations conducted by the Myanmar Army from August 2017, which forced about 1 million Rohingyas over the border to Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019).

Around 2 million Rohingya refugees are currently hosted in countries across Asia and the Middle East, with a further 1.2 million remaining internally displaced in Myanmar (OCHA, 2019). Their number and conditions vary from country to country (see Figure 1 for stats on Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia). This is an acute protracted crisis, as the million displaced from the 2017 violence joined nearly 1 million displaced in earlier waves of forced displacement in 2015, 2012, 1992, and 1978. Many of these host states in Asia including Bangladesh do not have domestic frameworks that legislate for refugee protection, nor are they signed up to international frameworks (e.g. the 1951 Refugee Convention) that guarantee protection and assistance (Ibrahim, 2016). In most scenarios, it is local host communities that offer front-line assistance and opportunities, and/or bear the socio-economic pressures of offering refuge (Chaudhury and Samaddar, 2018).




Figure 1.1. Rohingya diaspora in wider Asia. Source: Bayes Ahmed.

1.2. Historical Background

This crisis has not evolved in a day. Following the formal British annexation of Burma in January 1886, the Arakanese Muslims, who left their ancestral land during the Burmans conquest of Arakan, returned to settle in today's Northern Rakhine State. It also encouraged a steady movement of population from Bengal or India to Arakan, as it was then part of the same British India. After 124 years of the British rule, Burma got

independence in 1948. Since then, the Muslim population in Rakhine have been labelled as 'illegal Bengali migrants' and later on referred to as the Rohingyas. Subsequently, the post-independence Burmese governments systematically denied providing the Rohingyas any kind of recognition, including the right to acquire citizenship. The situation became worse following the military takeover of the country in 1962 led by General Ne Win. The entire population of Burma was then provided with four colour-coded cards to identify the citizenship of the bearer: pink (full citizens), blue (associate citizens), green (naturalised citizens), and white (foreigners). However, no such cards were issued to the Rohingyas (Ahmed, 2010). It created a space for systematically targeting the Rohingyas. The persecution towards the Rohingyas continued in different forms. The first major push occurred in February 1978 following the 'Operation Dragon King' carried out by the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) and immigration officials. Consequently, a huge number of Rohingyas totalling at least 200,000 was forcibly pushed into Bangladesh. However, In July 1978, around 180,000 Rohingyas returned to Rakhine following a repatriation agreement between the governments of Bangladesh and Burma (Ahmed, 2010).

Thus, failing to permanently expel the Rohingyas from Rakhine, later in October 1982, the Military government, introduced a new citizenship law stating – "full citizens are descendants of residents who lived in Burma prior to 1823 or were born to parents who were citizens at the time of birth". This specific clause was targeted towards the Rohingyas and other ethnic minorities. The new law has a clear link with the Muslim migration during the British rule in Burma (1824-1948). Eventually the new citizenship law excluded the Rohingyas from the legally recognised ethnic groups in Burma. As a result, the Rohingyas immediately lost their citizenship and became stateless in 1982. The second big push took place in 1991-92 when around 250,000 Rohingyas again crossed the border into Bangladesh. Most of them returned to Myanmar (the military junta changed its name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989) between 1993-1997 under a repatriation agreement signed in April 1993. The persecution followed other major military crackdowns and displacement notably in 2012, 2016, 2017, and in 2019 (Ahmed, 2010). Once pushed back as stateless people, they repatriated also as *stateless* people. No fundamental change has occurred to their life-long condition. They continue to experience extreme violence, discrimination, landlessness, arbitrary arrests, abductions, burning of houses, imposition of forced labour practices, killing of civilians, denial of rights and mobility, serious human rights violation, and above all, identity crisis and statelessness in Myanmar.

1.3. Myanmar Context

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that around 715,000 stateless Rohingya are still remaining in Rakhine State (OCHA, 2019). Unofficially, this number is around 1-1.2 million. Still it is very much inconclusive as the Rohingyas are dispersed throughout various locations and are discouraged from open identification). The Myanmar government objects the use of the term Rohingya. The term 'Rohingya' is used in recognition of the right of people to self-identify. Among the listed Rohingyas, approximately 128,000 stateless Rohingya (78% of them are women and children) are living in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps and camp-like settings. The remaining non-displaced stateless Rohingya are spread across ten townships. Since November 2018, more than 32,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine State as a result of the continued armed conflict between the

Myanmar Military and the Arakan Army (OCHA, 2019). On 5 April 2019, the Myanmar Army deliberately killed in air strike 30 innocent Rohingyas in Rakhine State. The non-stop violence is having a significant impact on civilians and Rohingyas continue to flee into Bangladesh.

As informed by our partner local non-government organization (NGO) – “Organization for Building Better Society (BBS)”, based in Sittwe, Rakhine State – the Rohingyas mostly live in small clusters/IDP camps or villages near the coast of the Bay of Bengal. Those areas are highly vulnerable to tropical cyclones and storm surges (Figure 2). The villages are regularly flooded and sometimes destroyed by cyclones. The villages have their own boundaries and are guarded by the Myanmar Army and police. The Rohingyas are not allowed to visit the nearby villages. They need to take special permissions to go outside the villages for urgent needs. The children are not allowed to study more than class 7 and they are mostly provided with informal education in a limited scope. The Rohingyas have limited access to primary treatment, however, they are completely denied access to secondary and tertiary level health facilities or hospitals. Government approval is required to implement any humanitarian projects and access locations. Permit requirements is a major challenge. Approvals are needed for every visit into village and IDP camp locations, which are needed to transit three policed checkpoints.

The Rohingyas have limited access to farmlands and legal markets. For example, only the government can own land, so agricultural activities can be disregarded at any time. Movement to markets can only occur in the vicinity of the IDP camps and nearby villages, with no movement allowed outside of the checkpoints at all. This greatly limits livelihood opportunities. The Myanmar government tend to reject projects with a focus on nutrition, as there is fear the collection of nutrition data will illuminate the rate of malnutrition in the country, particularly in Rakhine state. The only accessible clinics are overcrowded. This has had an effect on the quality of care. They seriously lack Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities. The government has banned any kind of cash programming with worries the cash would be used by IDPs to escape the camp/villages and/or get in the hands of the Arakan Army. The Rohingyas mainly rely on cow rearing, day-labourer, managing livestock, growing of local flowers and maize, and crop management. They are not allowed to fishing even living very close to the Bay of Bengal.



Figure 1.2. A Rohingya IDP camp (locally known as *Onway*) in the middle of the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Source: Our partner NGO – Organization for Building Better Society, 2019.

1.4. Bangladesh Context

Historically, the Rohingyas consider Bangladesh as a guaranteed sanctuary for their safety and security due to its close proximity to the Northern Rakhine State and community feelings. The UN Human Rights Council has quoted the 2017 Rohingya violence as the gravest crimes against humanity and have called for an investigation for genocide and war crimes against the authorities in Myanmar (Human Rights Council, 2018). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) estimated that at least 9,400 people lost their lives (6,700 due to violence) in Myanmar between 25 August and 24 September 2017, and at least 730 of them were children under the age of five. Experiences of violence have ranged from gunshots and burns to sexual violence and rape, especially against women and girls. Testimonies suggest that violence towards women and girls were prominent even prior to the recent crisis. Children have been shot and burned or beaten to death in their homes. The mortality of elderly people has also increased in this crisis (MSF, 2018). The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) does not consider the Rohingyas as refugees, rather they are officially being labelled as 'Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)'.

The recent crisis evolved when the so called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an insurgent group, carried out attacks on a dozen police stations in late August 2017. The ARSA, which the Myanmar authority considered as a terrorist organization, fights to "defend, salvage and protect the Rohingya community" in line "with the principles of self-defence" (Myanmar Tatmadaw, 2018). Nonetheless, the government forces of Myanmar carried out all out actions against the Rohingya, who left their homes for safe refuge in Bangladesh. There are claims of killing and murder of innocent Rohingya and burning down their homesteads in Rakhine state of Myanmar directed to 'ethnic cleansing' as some rights activists claimed. According to the United Nations (UN) medics, the majority of Rohingya women were raped and sexually assaulted by Myanmar security forces (Reuters, 2017).

Currently, the refugees are not allowed to go outside the camps and get formal employment or education within the Bangladeshi administrative system. Many of them are also afraid to go back to Myanmar as they suspect fresh attacks on them by the Myanmar Army. Although they are safe in Bangladesh and getting enough humanitarian assistance, however their future is quite uncertain in terms of proper settlement in Myanmar or in any neighbouring countries. Rehabilitating or repatriating them is now a major challenge. Another issue is that the refugees are also moving to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, a region that has existing tensions with the GoB despite signing a peace accord in 1997 (Mohsin, 2003). The CHT has a majority of Buddhist population, whereas Rohingya population was uprooted due to majoritarian Buddhist rule in Myanmar. A new pattern of conflict could emerge out of this uncomfortable religious tension. Relationships, in some cases over time, between refugees and host communities have also deteriorated. Moreover, potential indoctrination of Muslim Rohingya by some quarters could undermine overall stability of the region in a globalized world. Hence, the implications of contemporary large migration of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh should not be overlooked since this could impact regional stability, peace and security.

1.5. Project Aim and Objectives

It is within this background, that this project aims to examine the overall implication of Rohingya refugee exodus to Bangladesh and its impact on regional peace, stability and security. In doing so, it will examine the root-causes and factors that derived the Muslim Rohingya population out of Myanmar. The research hypothesis and objectives are as follows:

Hypothesis

In the long run, it is possible to effectively repatriate and rehabilitate the Rohingya refugees in Myanmar considering the present geopolitical context in South Asia.

Objectives

1. To understand and examine the changing nature and status of citizenship of Rohingya people in Myanmar over time.
2. To examine the humanitarian implications of the Rohingya exodus in Bangladesh.
3. To project the future trajectory of current Rohingya crisis in relation to their human rights and repatriation to Myanmar, and significant impacts on the geopolitics of the region.

1.6. Benefit and Impact

1.6.1. International Context

In present world, the persecution of Rohingya population in Myanmar and their mass influx towards Bangladesh has become an important agenda of international politics for diverse reasons including global peace, human rights of the Rohingya, global and regional security as well as stability. The UN Security Council (UNSC) understood its significance and recently discussed it seriously, albeit without any effective response mechanism other than offering continuous humanitarian aid and assistance. This happened due to different interests of member states of the UNSC. The Myanmar authority had declined to comply with the recommendations proposed by the Annan Commission. Given this situation, therefore, there is a need to understand the context of complicated Rohingya crisis and its related issues rigorously.

This proposed study will benefit the international community in many respects. Primarily, it will give an overall understanding of complex reasons of Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, and that will help the international community to design response mechanisms to address contending issues in Myanmar and in South Asian region. Secondly, it will help many international organizations including the UN bodies that have been working for humanitarian and other grounds in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh as this study aims to find out problems of addressing large refugees in Bangladesh. Thirdly, it will help to devise a working method for the international community to engage with the government of Bangladesh, and possibly with government of Myanmar, more rigorously in terms of ensuring human rights of Rohingya population, and their voluntary repatriation to Myanmar. Nevertheless, the most important aspect of this study will be to give an understanding of the potential

tensions and conflict (intra-state and inter-state) that could flare up from current refugee crisis, and could destabilize regional peace and security. This will help the international community to take appropriate measures in association with the Bangladesh government, and other concerned governments, to tackle such challenges.

1.6.2. UK Context

The UK has a long-standing relationship in South Asia including Bangladesh, Myanmar and India. Consequently, the UK government has paid maximum attention not only to offer humanitarian aid and assistance to refugees immediately after the emergence of Rohingya crisis but also to ensure democratic rules and governance in Myanmar. The UK is one of the influential members of the international community. In the recent UNSC meeting, the UK played a significant role in terms of identifying an appropriate response mechanism to end the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and bring human rights, rule of law and democracy back there. The meeting failed to design any quick response mechanism applicable for Myanmar.

This study will be benefiting the UK in different respects. The insights of this study will assist the UK government and its different associated institutions in terms of understanding complex issues of Rohingya refugee problems in Bangladesh and help to plan accordingly to response to this crisis, if prolonged, from humanitarian ground as well as strategic perspective. The UK will be able to use this research findings in terms of improving the state of human rights in Myanmar by devising appropriate response mechanism so that Rohingya refugees could return to their homes in due course. What is more, this will create a condition to engage with the government of Bangladesh in addressing long-stranding Rohingya refugee issues to avoid any further inconvenient relationship between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Recently, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh indicated that there were provocations for inter-state war from Myanmar side, which Bangladesh avoided effectively. Nevertheless, there could be many other indicators, both internal and international to destabilize situation of Bangladesh, which would impact regional and international contexts, negatively. There is a need for the UK as a friend state of Bangladesh to play significant role in this respect, and the findings of this study will assist in this process.

Chapter 2: Study Area and Methods

2.1. Study Area Profile

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recorded 741,841 new arrivals into Bangladesh (as of 15 June 2019) since 25 August 2017 following an escalation in violence in Rakhine. Bangladesh, even being a least developed country, is currently hosting the 7th largest refugee population (at least 910,991 Rohingyas) globally (UNHCR, 2018). The Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) estimates that nearly 1.2 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance in Cox's Bazar. It includes over 336,000 vulnerable Bangladeshis in the surrounding host communities and 34,172 previously registered Rohingyas from Myanmar (ISCG, 2019). In addition, there are still more than 250,000 Rohingyas who are illegally staying outside the official camps as undocumented individuals (Ahmed, 2010). The Kutupalong Rohingya Camp in Cox's Bazar, hosting approximately 625,500 Rohingyas, is now considered as the world's largest and most densely populated refugee camp (Figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1. Location of the Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. Source: UNHCR, 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/69955> (25 June 2019).

The majority of the displaced Rohingya people are residing in overcrowded temporary makeshift shelters made of bamboo frames and plastic sheeting. Among them 52% are female, 55% are children and 42% are adults (aged between 18-59 years). Out of the 209,869 families, about 31% of them require specific needs, for example, 16% are single mother, 5% have serious medical conditions, 4% has disability, and 2% are separated child (UNHCR, 2019).

An enormous area of hill forests has already been swiped-out to build the huts by cutting hills and to arrange fuel for cooking. They are forced to live in camps that are particularly vulnerable to landslides (Ahmed et al., 2018a), flash flooding, cyclones, and fire hazards (Figure 2.2). At least 200,000 refugees are living at high risk of landslides (UNHCR, 2018). Any disaster in the camps can seriously disrupt basic healthcare, education and other livelihood facilities (Ahmed et al., 2018b). The GoB is now planning to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas into a remote small-island in the Bay of Bengal locally known as '*Bhasan Char*'. The island itself is vulnerable to cyclones, flooding and storm-surges that will bring additional challenges and hardship for the Rohingyas.



Figure 2.2. Multi-hazard prone Rohingya makeshift camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. Source: Peter Sammonds and Bayes Ahmed, fieldwork, April 2019 (top photo); and ISCG, 2018-19.

Each Rohingya has been issued an identity card by the Department of Immigration and Passport, Bangladesh. To tackle the humanitarian crisis, at least 125+ NGOs are currently working in the camps in Bangladesh. In theory, the Rohingyas are not allowed to go outside the camps and get involved in livelihood generating activities. However, some of them are running small retail businesses and working as day-labours. A Rohingya family with 1-3 members are getting 30 kg rice, 9 kg yellow split peas and 3 litres of palm oil in every 2 weeks by the World Food Programme (WFP). The Rohingyas are getting free treatments in the camps, and the children are being able to attend informal schools or child care centres.

To meet the massive needs, the UN seeks US\$920.5 million in 2019 (ISCG, 2019). But, as of 17 April 2019, the appeal is only 17% funded (UNHCR, 2019). The future challenges include – continuation of international donor funding, disaster risk management, tackling tensions with the host community, and ensuring a secured and dignified repatriation in Myanmar.

2.2. Environmental Degradation

Cox’s Bazar District (CBD), with area of 2,491.85 km², lies between 20°43’ and 21°56’ north latitudes and between 91°50’ and 92°23’ east longitudes. CBD is bounded on the north by Chittagong district, east by Bandarban district, the Naf River and Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and on the south and west by the Bay of Bengal (Figure 2.2). As per the National Population Census-2011, the total population of CBD was 2.29 million (before the 2017 Rohingya exodus) that was 1.77 million in 2001. The annual average temperature of CBD varies maximum 34.8 °C to minimum 16.1 °C, and the average annual rainfall is 4,285 mm (BBS, 2014).

The land cover change analysis indicates that deforestation and urbanization is prominent in CBD over the years (Figure 2.3). Due to the 2017 Rohingya exodus, at least 58 km² forest disappeared. Grassland type that contains deciduous forests was significantly reduced (approx. 235 km²) because of the influx. These two types primarily disappeared for the purpose of constructing new Rohingya makeshift camps and collecting fuel for cooking for the refugee population (Figure 2.4).




Figure 2.3. Land cover maps of Cox’s Bazar District. Source: Bayes Ahmed.




Figure 2.4. Changes in grassland, forest, and builtup land cover types (a-c) between 1998-2017, and (d-f) and between 2017-2018. Source: Bayes Ahmed.

2.3. Methodology

A series of activities were undertaken to achieve the project aim and objectives:

2.3.1. Scenario Workshop in London

To begin with, a workshop titled – “Rohingya Health and Disaster Simulation” was jointly organised by the UCL Humanitarian Institute (HI), the UCL Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction (IRDR), and the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (DPCS) at the University of Dhaka (DU) in association with the UCL Lancet Commission on Migration and Health, and the UCL Institute of Global Health (IGH) in

the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London on 30 November 2017. The daylong scenario workshop (Figure 2.5) explored the political and logistical complexities of the humanitarian and longer term response to the public health needs of the Rohingya when faced with both mass displacement and natural hazard-induced disasters. The workshop, funded by UCL IRDR, focused on five thematic areas – conflict, migration, disasters, health, and repatriation/rehabilitation. Around 15 relevant experts and stakeholders participated in the workshop. The workshop findings (see supplementary document, S1) helped us to formulate guidelines on the Rohingya crisis, repatriation process and to shape future security and stability in this region. Later we published a commentary in the *Lancet Global Health* journal led by UCL IRDR.



Figure 2.5. The Rohingya health and disaster simulation workshop held at the University of London in November 2017. Source: Bayes Ahmed.

2.3.2. Ethics Approval

UCL Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction (IRDR) accepted the project award from the British Academy on 5th December 2017 (Award Reference: IC2\100178) and signed a formal contract with the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (DPCS) at the University of Dhaka (DU) on 23rd March 2018. We got the UCL ethics approval (Project ID: 12991/001) on 22nd June 2018. During the project lifetime, we strictly maintained all the necessary fieldwork and Official Development Assistance (ODA) country collaborative project guidelines as formulated by UCL and Bangladesh – data protection, risk assessment, research ethics, due diligence, safeguarding, and code of conduct for research. Later in August 2018, we got permissions to conduct research work in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Bangladesh, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief – Bangladesh, and the

Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), Cox's Bazar. Nothing regarding ethics, and safety and security occurred in this project.

2.3.3. Questionnaire Development Workshop in Dhaka

Initially our project team developed three draft questionnaires for the Rohingyas, host communities, and stakeholders/key informants. The final questionnaire development workshop was held on 6th August 2018 at the Nabab Nawab Ali Chowdhury Senate Bhaban, University of Dhaka (Figure 2.6). Participants were selected from various fields that are relevant to the objectives of the study. Among them were journalists, academicians, development sector workers, and security sector actors with ground-level experience in their respective fields. The objective of the workshop was to share the three draft questionnaires with a diverse group of experts so that the instrument could be evaluated before it is used in data collection.



Figure 2.6. A questionnaire development workshop was held at the University of Dhaka in August 2018. Source: Md Touhidul Islam, 2018.

The workshop began with a round of introduction followed by a presentation by researchers on the objective and methodology of their study. Then the questionnaires were projected on a large screen so that everyone could read the questions and engage in intensive discussion about them. Participants discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the questionnaires. They offered suggestions on how to improve the

capacity of the instruments. A lively discussion was held where participants shared their knowledge about Rohingya life in the camps which allowed researchers to fine tune the options presented for respondents. Participants also shared valuable insight on appropriate ways of enquiring about the experience of the Rohingyas, including the state of life in Myanmar, reason for leaving, access to relief and economic activities, and awareness about the Annan Commission's report etc.

One security-sector actor advised to frame the questions in a way so that the study does not produce unwanted impact, namely, encourage the Rohingyas to stay long in Bangladesh. One journalist informed the researchers about the details of camp-centred economic activities by local influential people and also helped by corroborating the effectiveness of questions on impact on host community. A development sector actor informed researchers about practical matters regarding data collection within the constraints of the camp. The academics engaged in a debate on efficient ways to structure the questionnaires, for example, the merits and demerits of using a Likert scale and including questions on the 'pull factors' in migration decision. They also offered suggestions about the questionnaire for key informant interviews and designing sampling.

2.3.4. Field Testing and Pilot Surveying in Cox's Bazar

After the workshop, the project team went to meet the Secretary of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) – Bangladesh, who is responsible for the overall management of the Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar. The questionnaires were revised by incorporating some of the feedback provided by workshop participants and the Secretary of MoDMR. Next, the project team members (Appendix A1) translated the questionnaires into Bengali language.

This revised questionnaires were tested by the project team in the Rohingya camps and surrounding host communities in Cox's Bazar from 9th to 18th August 2018. The project team recruited local volunteers for translation purposes. The team also conducted three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) as a pilot case to understand the root cause of the crisis (Figure 2.7). The pilot surveying and testing helped the researchers to contextualise and finalise the questionnaires (see Appendices A2-A4) to reflect the actual scenario in the camps. Next, the project team trained the research assistants and local volunteers/translators. Some fieldwork photographs are attached in Appendix A5.

2.3.5. Qualitative Survey

As a part of mixed method, the research team have conducted Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with relevant stakeholders of both the Rohingya and host communities. A total of 33 in-depth interviews were conducted in the Rohingya camps and host community (see supplementary document, S2). A semi structured questionnaire guide has helped us to conduct these face to face interviews. Majority of the interviews in the Rohingya camps and host community, and with stakeholders were conducted during the questionnaire survey period from 07-11 September 2018. Other interviews, such as with academics and security experts were conducted in Dhaka in November and December 2018.



Figure 2.7. Focus group discussions with Rohingya (**top photo**) men in no man's land between Myanmar and Bangladesh in Tumbru, Naikhongchari, Bandarban; and with Rohingya (**bottom left**) elderly persons and (**bottom right**) women in the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. Source: Bayes Ahmed, 2018.

Amongst these 33 interviews, eight were conducted with Rohingya people living in the camps. Out of them, six were female and 2 were male including one camp *Majhi* (Rohingya representatives from each block is known as “Majhi”). These interviews have helped to know about experience and understand, and insights what Rohingya people who crossed border have went through during the crisis. They also shared their ideas and thoughts about possible future issues related to repatriation to their home country. However, we interviewed five local journalist, mostly based in Cox's Bazar but have access to Rohingya camps. They have enlightened us with their knowledge and perceptions about their issues and concerns what have been happening in the camps and localities. Moreover, we interviewed four NGO workers who have been working in the camp areas in different capacities and have connections with grassroots people of the host community.

We also covered two local government representatives (One Chairman and one councillor) in our interviews, who have provided significant input and shared insights about Rohingya influx and its impact to host community. Besides that, we interviewed three academics and one security expert, who have shared their critical thoughts about Rohingya influx to Bangladesh and its wider implications towards the state of peace, security and harmony, as well as potential issues related to Rohingya repatriation process.

Apart from KIIs, the research team conducted 4 FGDs during the period of questionnaire survey, 6-11 September 2018 (see supplementary document S3). Each FGD session was constituted by 6-12 participants. Two FGDs were conducted in the Rohingya camps with Rohingya people. One of these two was with male participants (Rohingya *Majhi*), and the other was mixed in gender. These FGDs have helped us to know about the experience of Rohingya people and their livelihood process in the camps. We conducted two FGDs with the participants of host community. Both of them were mixed in gender. People of different sectors like teacher, local business person and shop owner, imam, carpenter, housewife, day labours etc. participated in these FGDs. These FGDs were highly interactive and participatory in nature that assisted us to know many critical issues of Rohingya influx and its associated impact and complexities facing by the host communities.

In all cases, detailed field notes were taken by the field investigators and interviewers. All the qualitative interview narratives were summarised and translated into English language (see supplementary document), and later systematically analysed by out project team members.

2.3.6. Quantitative Survey

(a) Survey sampling for the host community

We determined the sample size for the host community in two subsequent steps. First, we calculated the sample size for infinite population. Then, we adjusted this sample size to the required population. The sampling formula for finite populations is: $S = \frac{Z^2 * p(1-p)}{e^2}$, where S=sample size for infinite population, Z=1.96 (if we take 95% confidence level, then the Z-score will be 1.96), p=population proportion (assumed to be 50% = 0.5) and e=margin of error (if we take 4% margin of error, the value will be 0.04). Then, we substituted this sampling formula with required data that: $S = \frac{(1.96)^2 * (0.5) * (1-0.5)}{(0.04)^2} = 600.25$. After that, we adjusted this sample size to the total population of the host community of Cox's Bazar district which is 2,289,990 as per the Population Census of Bangladesh (BBS, 2014). The adjusted sampling formula is: $Adjusted\ S = \frac{S}{1} + \left[\frac{(S-1)}{Population} \right]$, and we substituted the adjusted sampling formula with required data that: $S = \frac{600.25}{1} + \left[\frac{600.25-1}{2289990} \right] = 600.25 + 0.0002 = 600.0002$. Thus, we got the sample size of 600 respondents for the host community (Cohen, 2013; Lavrakas, 2008; Sirkin, 2005).

After that, we selected these 600 respondents of the survey through the multi-stage sampling technique. We firstly selected Cox's Bazar district as a whole. Second, we purposively selected the Ukhiya Upazila (i.e. sub-district) among 8 Upazilas of the concerned district since it the mostly affected area of the current Rohingya influx. Third, we picked up two unions (union is the lowest electoral unit in Bangladesh) – Palong Khali and Raja Palong - from this Upazila. Fourth, we worked in several villages of these two unions which are within the range of 0-2 km distance from Rohingya camps. Finally, we stepped down to households one after one for interviewed in line with the systematic random sampling technique.

The survey team composed of in total 8 male and 8 female enumerators fielded in the Palong Khali and Raja Palong unions of Ukhiya Upazila from 7 September 2018 to 16 September 2018. It is worth mentioning that we trained up all the enumerators with the research instrument and overall survey design through an interactive training workshop which was held on 6 September 2018 from 10.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. at the Hotel Beachway located at Kolatoli, Cox's Bazar. The main objectives of this training workshop were to introduce enumerators with the research instruments (code of conduct, ethics, safeguarding, and risks), instruct them how to explain variables if asked, and ensure voluntary consent of respondents before conducting in-person interviews.

It has been found that the majority of respondents (68%) of the survey are from Palong Khali union whereas approximately 32% of the respondents are the residents of Raja Palong union. The study has covered a number of villages of the afore-mentioned unions which are very close to Rohingya camps, namely Malvira, Amtoli, Balukhali, Baruapara, Bojuguna, Chakboita, Forest Road, Bazar, Ghilatoli, Hakimpara, Hagarhona, Hazipara, Hindupara, Jamtoli, Jumchora, Kaliyapara, Kutupalong, Lambashia, Land Office, Malvira, Modhurchara, Ponditpara, Purbopara, Shafiullah Kata, Sikdarpara, Station, Thaingkhali, and Walapalong. But the overwhelming number of respondents are mostly from Balukhali (158 persons), Thaingkhali (137 persons), Kutupalong (52 persons), and Lambashia (36).

(b) Survey sampling for the Rohingya community

This study calculated the sample size for the Rohingya community in two subsequent steps. First, we determined the sample size for infinite population, and secondly, we adjusted this sample size to the total population of the Rohingya community. As we know, the sampling formula for finite populations is: $S = \frac{Z^2 * p(1-p)}{e^2}$, where S=sample size for infinite population, Z=1.96 (if we take 95% confidence level, then the Z-score will be 1.96), p=population proportion (assumed to be 50% = 0.5) and e=margin of error (if we take 4% margin of error, the value will be 0.04). Then we substituted this sampling formula with required data that: $S = \frac{(1.96)^2 * (0.5) * (1-0.5)}{(0.04)^2} = 600.25$. After that, we adjusted this sample size to the total population of the Rohingya community which is approximately 1,000,000 (UNHCR, 2019). The adjusted sampling formula is: $Adjusted\ S = \frac{S}{1} + \left[\frac{(S-1)}{Population} \right]$, and then we substituted the formula with required data: $S = \frac{600.25}{1} + \left[\frac{600.25-1}{1,000,000} \right] = 600.25 + 0.0006 = 600.2506$. Finally, we rounded the value of adjusted sampling formula, and thus got a total sample size of 600 respondents for the Rohingya respondents (Cohen, 2013; Lavrakas, 2008; Sirkin, 2005).

We randomly selected these 600 respondents from our study area through two-stage probability sampling method. First, we made a list of all the Rohingya camps located in the Ukhiya Upazila, Cox's Bazar. Considering 1 camp for 1 cluster, we randomly selected 6 camps (camp number: 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 19) from the list of camps. Then we used systematic sampling method taking required number of households one after one when worked in the camps. The data collection phase started on 7 September 2018 and continued till 11 September 2018. Prior to fieldwork, we the research team organized an interactive training workshop from 4.30 pm to 7.30 pm on 6 September 2018 at the Hotel Beeachway which is located at Kolatoli, Cox's Bazar. This workshop

introduced 24 enumerators (gender balance was ensured) with the research instruments (code of conduct, ethics, safeguarding, and risks), instructed them about our survey design and also asked them to take voluntary consent prior to person-to-person interview. Moreover, we also informed them to take interviews of only those persons who are not less than 18 years. This study covered Kutupalong (202 respondents), Lambashia (121 respondents), Modhurchora (159 respondents), and Tanzimar Khola (118 respondents) areas.

In summary, we interviewed 600 Rohingya refugees and 600 host community members in Cox's Bazar, organised 4 focus group discussions, and interviewed 33 stakeholders in Bangladesh (from Dhaka and Cox's Bazar).

(c) Statistical Analysis

We have applied a range of statistical tools and techniques using the IBM SPSS Software. Among them, the Binomial logistic regression method is frequently applied. This method allows for a relationship to be modelled between multiple independent variables and a single dependent variable where the independent variables are being used to predict the dependent variable. However, in the case of a binomial logistic regression, the dependent variable is dichotomous. In addition, a transformation is applied so that instead of predicting the category of the binomial logistic regression directly, the logit of the dependent variable is predicted instead (Hosmer et al., 2013; Laerd Statistics, 2015).

For example, if we consider four independent variables to be "X₁" through "X₄" and the dependent variable to be "Y", a binomial logistic regression models the following:

$$\text{logit}(Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \beta_4X_4 + \epsilon.$$

Where β_0 is the intercept (also known as the constant), β_1 is the slope parameter (also known as the slope coefficient) for X₁, and so forth, and ϵ represents the errors (Hosmer et al., 2013; Laerd Statistics, 2015).

2.4. Dissemination Activities

We successfully organised the "International Conference on the Rohingya Crisis in Comparative Perspective" at UCL from 4-5 July 2019. Our team members (Md. Touhidul Islam and Amira Osman) presented two papers in the conference from the outcome of this project (British Academy Award Reference: IC2\100178). We presented another paper at the American Geophysical Union (AGU) Fall Meeting held in Washington D.C. from 10-14 December 2018.

UCL Rohingya Conference 2019

UCL IRDR and UCL Humanitarian Institute in association with the University of Dhaka and UCL Centre for Collective Violence, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (CCV) has successfully organised an "International Conference on the Rohingya Crisis in Comparative Perspective" at Gustave-Tuck Lecture Theatre at UCL from 4th to 5th July 2019. The conference was partially supported by this grant.

The conference was opened by Her Excellency Ms Saida Muna Tasneem, Bangladesh High Commissioner to the UK, who commented on the current state of diplomacy. Special guest Chris Sidoti, member UN Human Rights Council’s Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar, discussed their call for genocide charges. Other contributors include: UCL Prof Mary Fulbrook (an internationally renowned Holocaust scholar) who placed the Rohingya Genocide in comparative perspective; and Dr Taifur Rahman, a medical doctor, who runs an independent NGO with centres and clinics in the Rohingya camps where (almost) no one else will go for the most vulnerable. Concurrently a professional photography exhibition by visual anthropologist, Mahmud, provided a narrative of the 2017 Rohingya crisis in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and, with his most recent images, of current life in the camps (Figures 2.8–2.10).

The conference intended to understand the root causes of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, drivers of Rohingya influx into Bangladesh, Rohingya diaspora and their adaptation strategies in host countries, environmental hazards and degradation, and implications for security and peace in the region. About 300 scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers signed up to attend. We had over 40 presenters and 100 participants, and published a booklet containing 126 abstracts. It can be considered as the most significant Rohingya conference to date.



Figure 2.8. HE Ms Saida Muna Tasneem, Bangladesh High Commissioner to the UK (left photo) and Mr Chris Sidoti, member UN Human Rights Council’s Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar (right photo) is presenting in a session chaired by Professor Peter Sammonds at the UCL Rohingya Conference on 4th July 2019.



Figure 2.9. Professor Imtiaz Ahmed (left photo) and Dr Bayes Ahmed (right photo) is chairing sessions at the UCL Rohingya Conference on 4th July 2019.



Figure 2.10. Visual anthropologist, Mr Mahmud, organised a photographic exhibition on the 2017 Rohingya crisis in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh at the UCL Rohingya Conference on 4th and 5th July 2019.

Conference web-link:

<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/risk-disaster-reduction/events/2019/jul/international-conference-rohingya-crisis-comparative-perspective>

Booklet web-link:

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/risk-disaster-reduction/sites/risk-disaster-reduction/files/rohingya_conference_booklet_2019.pdf

This project has also created the foundation for the project team to successfully develop and win two other competitive projects:

1. “Resilient Futures for the Rohingya Refugees”; £500,000 funded by the Royal Society (Grant Scheme: Challenge-led Grants); March 2019 – September 2021.
2. “Rohingya Journeys of Violence and Resilience in Bangladesh and its Neighbours: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”; £300,000 funded by the British Academy (Grant Scheme: Sustainable Development Programme 2018); September 2018 – December 2020.

Now we are planning to publish two journal articles from this project. We have established strong academic and professional networks in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Myanmar. Gradually we are extending our reach in other countries where the Rohingya people are taking shelter. We have a dedicated team who are keen to continue work for the Rohingya refugees in wider Asia.

Chapter 03: Literature Review

The Rohingya are considered to be one of the most neglected, abused and marginalised people in the world. Despite this, their plight has only recently captured international attention, notably when horrendous images of terrified ethnic cleansing survivors escaping Myanmar and walking days or crossing rivers and seas on unsafe boats seeking refuge elsewhere were broadcasted on social media and TV. The latter included international channels such as BBC, Sky, CNN and Al Jazeera. These prompted the involvement of several regional and international actors in the Rohingya crisis, including human rights organisations, UN agencies, and international figures.

This chapter starts by highlighting relevant theoretical debates that link violence to forced migration and then sheds light into the historical evolution of Rohingya in Myanmar, which reveals institutionalised violence and human rights abuses that led to trends of departure to neighbouring countries, notably Bangladesh, which host nearly one million refugees. Other causes of fleeing Myanmar are then discussed, and the chapter also looks at Rohingya politics in the region and how the refugee crisis affected Bangladesh as a major host country. Repatriation of refugees is also discussed, and the role of different actors including Rohingya diasporic organisations and the United Nations is explored.

3.1. Conflict and Migration: Conceptual Understanding

Many scholars have linked forced migration with conflict using different perspectives (Hayes et al. 2016; Schmeidl, 1997; Lischer, 2007, O'Malley, 2018). Lischer (2007, p. 142), for instance, perceives violence as a major push factor for migration and links it to international security. She argues that violent conflicts force millions of people to leave their homeland every year. This creates logistical and humanitarian burdens and threatens international security. Despite the aforementioned texts making a connection between violence, forced migration and international security, Lischer (2007, p. 143) argues that the literature on migration caused by violence “falls in the cracks” between various scholarly and practical disciplines. She argues that international relations scholars study conflict and violence scenarios but rarely make the connection with forced migration, whilst the literature on forced migration usually doesn't make the connection with conflict studies literature, instead focusing more on the outcome of conflict. Lischer (2007, p. 144) also touches on repatriation issues and states that understanding the cause of conflict may help to predict the possibility of peaceful repatriation, arguing that those who fled their homeland due to economic injustice are more likely to agree to repatriation than genocide survivors.

The intersection of conflict and migration has been explored further by O'Malley (2018) who relies on a quantitative perspective that includes statistical data on migration to reveal the rising trend of forced violence induced migration during conflict in many countries in Africa and Asia. He supports his argument by referring to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Task Force, written in June 2018, which states that “almost 66 million people worldwide [had] been forced from home by conflict. If recent trends continue, this figure could increase to between 180 and 320 million people by 2030 (O'Malley, 2018, p. 5). This qualitative approach has been supported by statistics from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC, 2018) which states that as of 2018 the number of people who became displaced due to persecution and

violence has risen to 68.5 million (28.5 million are refugees, 40 million are internally displaced persons), an increase of 2.9 million from 2017. The countries that have received highest numbers of refugees are Turkey, Bangladesh, Uganda and Sudan. The highest sending countries are South Sudan, Syria, Myanmar and Democratic Republic of Congo (NRC, 2018).

Davenport et al (2003, p. 31-32) acknowledge violence as a factor that can lead to people leaving their homeland but go further and look at violence committed by different actors. They argue that people flee their homeland when their physical security is threatened by the state, as was the case with Argentina during the Dirty War, by non-state actors as demonstrated by conflict in Sierra Leone during the 1990s when rebel groups committed gross violations of human rights, or by involvement of both the state and non-state actors. An example is from South Africa during the 1980s, where both the state and dissidents were involved in violence against civilians (Davenport et al 2003, p. 31-32). Davenport et al (2003, p. 31-32) also refer to genocide as a tactic by some states to annihilate an entire ethnic group; in response genocide survivors tend to migrate in order to save their lives. Melander and Öberg (2003, p. 4) look at regional conflicts between different states and argue that inter-state conflict can also generate refugees and internally displaced persons, as the case during the Eritrean and Ethiopian war 1998-1999.

Another theme in the conflict and forced migration literature is the impact of refugees, as forced migrants on the host community. Krcmaric (2014, p. 182) argues that this impact includes tensions that refugee flows can cause to host communities, and tensions are more likely to happen when refugees contribute to changing the balance of power in host communities, however, once refugees are repatriated the balance of power will go back to its pre-refugee influx status. Moreover, refugee militants who migrate with their weapons and fighting skills may upset the military power at the host community (ibid, p. 190). In this sense, the effect of refugees on host community can stay longer even after refugees have left the host community (ibid, p. 190). This refugee militarisation literature can also be considered to promote our understanding of the migration – conflict field (ibid, p. 186).

Scholars from other disciplines, in particular peacebuilding, have supported the argument that conflict triggers migration (Hayes et al., 2016). The scale of the migration flow to Europe triggered by conflicts in the global south including the Syrian and Iraq conflicts as well as migration within the global south has emphasised that an “all hands on deck” approach is essential to engage scholars and practitioners from different disciplines, notably peacebuilding and development disciplines to explore conflict-induced migration (ibid). Bank et al (2017, p. 12) argues that migration conflict nexus can be complex and although violence can be a major driver for migration, it can also happen during journey to safety as well as in places people escaped to. In this sense, more dialogue between migration studies scholars and peace and conflict resolution scholars is needed to improve our knowledge and understanding on the migration-conflict nexus (ibid, 12-14). Considering these theoretical debates, the following chapters will review literature in order to understand the crisis of the Rohingya.

3.2. Historical Evolution of the Rohingya Population in Myanmar

This section sheds light on the history of the Rohingya, notably in Rakhine and its link to pre and post-independence eras and how policies and actions during these periods affected the Rohingya population.

Using a historical perspective Ibrahim (2018, p.29) stated that the Rohingya have been living in Burma before the nineteenth century. Burma was changed to Myanmar in 1989 (Yegar, 2018, p. 207). Estimations show that there were 1 to 1.5 million Rohingya in Rakhine State living in three towns - Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung (Equal Rights Trust, 2014; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 286). Their history there was linked to the geography of Arakan, which was an isolated land separated from the rest of Burma to a range of coastal mountains (Yegar, 2018, p. 197; Ibrahim 2016, p. 18). The natural links of the region were across the Bay of Bengal to India rather than with the rest of Burma (Ibrahim, 2016, p.18). Moreover, the area was a poor province dependent on fishing and farming (Mohajan, 2018, p. 20). In 1784, Arakan formally became part of the Kingdom of Burma (ibid, p. 21).

During the Second World War in 1942, the British were defeated, and the Japanese invaded the area and captured Burma (Rahman, 2015, p. 291; Yegar, 2018, p. 199, Human Rights Watch, 2000). This invasion was welcomed by some Burmese nationals who believed the defeat of the British Empire would lead to independence. However, the Rohingya remained loyal to the British, leading to significant ethnic conflict between the Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic communities (Yegar, 2018, p. 197; Ibrahim, 2016, p. 27). It has been estimated that nearly 307 villages were destroyed, 100,000 Rohingya lost their lives and some 80,000 fled the region (Ibrahim, 2016, p.27), showing an earlier trend of violence against the Rohingya and displacement. To make the situation worse, the Japanese committed multiple massacres of the Rohingya to punish them for their British support (Yegar, 2018, p. 197; Ibrahim, 2016, p.27). The 1942 ethnic violence also led to ethnic segregation between a largely Muslim north and a Buddhist south (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 27).

The British re-captured the area but their rule ended in 1948 and Myanmar became independent. Independence was characterised by economic problems and unsolved ethnic tensions. Lewa (2009, p. 11) stated that since independence, the Rohingya have been excluded from the process of nation-building, including economic and political participation.

The civilian government headed by Prime Minister U. Nu, just after independence recognised 144 ethnic groups in Burma but this was reduced to only 135 groups by General Ne Win (Kipgen, 2013, p. 33; Cheung, 2011, p. 52; Ullah 2016: 286), who came to power by a military coup in 1962 and started implementing a “Burmanization” policy, which aimed to exclude ethnic minorities such as the Muslims in Rakhine, the Indians and Chinese (Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 16). In 1965 he cancelled the Rohingya language programme, which had been broadcasted on the Burmese Broadcasting Service as an ethnic language programme. In 1974 he changed the Arakan state to Rakhine, an ethnically driven name. In 1982 he introduced the Citizenship Law that stripped Rohingya of their rights as citizen of Burma (Rahman, 2015, p. 289; Ullah, 2016, p. 295). The Citizenship Law will be discussed further in the next section.

In its efforts to reinforce a Buddhist state, the military regime targeted the Rohingya and dismantled their social and political organisations (Jilani, 1999; cited in Farzana 2017, p. 49). It also launched operations to check the identity of residents in order to control “illegal immigrants” in northern Arakan (Rahman, 2015, p. 292). One of the significant operations was the Operation Nagamin (Dragon King Operation) in 1977, which allowed the government to check documents and identity cards of all citizens and to find who had been in the country “illegally” and to take action against them (ibid). This operation demonstrates that the recent problem of the Rohingya is not new but rooted in their history, notably during the periods of military regimes, which tended to see them as “aliens” (Farzana, 2017, p. 50). The operation also led to one of the humanitarian crises in the region. In 1978 large numbers of the Rohingya became internally displaced and 200,000 sought refuge in Bangladesh (Wake and Yu 2018, p.2; Lewa, 2009, p. 11). The Myanmar regime denied responsibility of those who crossed the border and refused to refer to them as Rohingya (Peiris, 1978; cited in Farzana, 2017, p. 50). By contrast, international human rights organisations referred to these uprooted people as “Rohingya”, an identity the Rohingya preferred (ibid). Later, and after a short period of time, the Myanmar government under a bilateral agreement agreed to allow the refugees to go back to Myanmar (Dhaka Tribune, 2017).

3.3. Causes of Rohingya Exodus

The causes of exodus of the Rohingya from Myanmar have political and economic dimensions. Moreover, structural violence such as statelessness (Kinston, 2015, p. 1164) and direct violence (including rape, torture) are regarded as major factors that triggered exodus, notably in 2017. This section looks at these causes of departure of the Rohingya from Myanmar.

3.3.1. Political Causes

The political sphere in Myanmar, notably since independence, has been characterised by the exclusion of the Rohingya, as ethnic minority from the political sphere. Historically, different government institutions have shown discrimination and exclusion in the way they have dealt with the Rohingya population. For example, in the 1947 Panglong meeting between the government and ethnic minorities that led to the Panglong Agreement, several ethnic minorities, except the Rohingya in Arakan State, were allowed to participate and to represent their own community. Only the Rakhines were allowed to represent Arakan (Farzana, 2017, p. 47). This demonstrates an earlier political exclusion of the Rohingya from the political domain and a cause to leave Myanmar.

Another dimension in the political situation of the Rohingya that may have contributed to their departure from Myanmar is their lack of strong civil society and political parties to politically represent them. Yegar (2018, p. 204) argues that the Rohingya lacked proper leadership to unite them and to politically negotiate on their behalf. They also failed to build strong networks to connect them to international Muslim networks and to Islamic nations (ibid). Rahman (2015, p. 288) argues that when civic and political culture is weak, dominant ethnic groups, backed by the state, tend to oppress minority groups.

One of the few organisations that represented the Rohingya was the Rohingya Association of Ulama developed in the late 1950s. The Association then entered the political scene and demanded the foundation of an autonomous district in northern Rakhine with its own independent council. This demand was overruled by the central government in May 1961 (Yegar, 2018, p. 200). Efforts by the Myanmar government to politically side-line the Rohingya continued. Mercy Corps (2019) listed two incidents that were meant to limit the Rohingya involvement in the political affairs and political process of their country. The first incident was to forbid the Rohingya from participating in the first official census in decades that was held in 2014, to be followed by preventing them from participating in the democratic election held in 2015 as voters and candidates.

Political persecution of the Rohingya by different Myanmar governments, notably in 1962, led to a limitation in ethnic minority political activities. This was followed by further persecution of the Rohingya by local Buddhists. In response, many Rohingya were forced to flee Myanmar to Bangladesh (Yegar, 2018, p. 2018; Ibrahim, 2016, p. 80). Lack of trust between different ethnic groups triggers conflicts. The strongest ethnic group, backed by the state and its political apparatus, may try to exploit others (Rahman, 2015, p. 2-3). This argument seems relevant to the Rohingya case as a minority group in a state dominated by Buddhists. Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and who was once seen as an iconic leader of Myanmar to advocate for peace and democracy, kept silence on the persecution of the Rohingya and their political marginalisation (Lee, 2014, p. 321). This led to criticisms from the international community, notably human rights organisations.

3.3.2. Economic Causes

Since the military took power in Myanmar in 1962 the Rohingya ethnic minority have faced continuous economic hardships and violations of their economic rights (Ball and Moselle, 2018, p. 114). A report by IOM (2018) referred to Rakhine State, where the majority of Rohingya have lived, as an economically marginalised state, and as the least developed state in Myanmar with poor infrastructure, widespread of poverty and lack of economic opportunities (ibid). The majority of the population in Rakhine State were living in poor conditions. The World Bank suggested that 78% of its households were living below poverty line (ibid). These economic conditions led many of the Rohingya to flee to neighbouring countries seeking better economic opportunities (ibid). A report by Human Rights Watch (2013; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 291) stated that the Myanmar government treated the Rohingya in an unjust way by restricting their movement. Over time, the restrictions on movement, as claimed by MacLean (2018, p. 92) have contributed to loss of the Rohingya farmland and led them to engage in other unsustainable economic activities including fishing and day labour.

The depriving of the Rohingya from their economic rights by the Myanmar government can also be illustrated by the unjust treatment of the Rohingya by the Myanmar government, which has included financial isolation and confiscation of their land (Sassen 2017; cited Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 166), making them vulnerable to forced labour. This has exacerbated their economic hardship and made it difficult for them to maintain their livelihood (Ullah, 2016, p. 291). NaSaKa, which is a border security force made up of police, military, intelligence and customs officers, also exploited and abused the Rohingya. It imposed weekly fee on them to pay in order to

avoid forced labour. As many could not afford such fee, they were forced into forced labour, including construction, agricultural work and portering (Andrew, 2012; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 294; Human Rights Watch, 2000). Those who refuse to do forced labour could be killed (Lowenstein, 2015; cited Ullah, 2016, p. 294). The burning of shops, houses and villages was a scorched earth policy committed by the government to destroy the Rohingya' livelihood and to drive the Rohingya out of their homeland (Ullah, 2016, p. 295). The scorched earth policy in Myanmar has been experienced elsewhere, notably in Sudan, when the Sudanese army drove civilians in Southern Sudan from their homeland. It burned civilians villages, destroyed their crops and stolen their cattle, to ensure no one will return (Christian Aid, 2001, p. 1).

3.4. Statelessness as Structural Violence

The Rohingya are subject to structural violence that includes statelessness as a result of the Citizenship Law that strips them of their citizenship (Kingston, 2015, p. 1167). Statelessness also denies the Rohingya proper education, adequate health services, employment and equality before the law (Goris et al., 2009, p.4-6). Manly and Pesaud (2009, p. 7-10) argue that generally, stateless people experience difficulties in exercising their civil rights, including travelling and marrying. In this sense, stateless people are seen as one of the most vulnerable people in the world (Goris et al., 2009, p.4-6).

The Rohingya in Myanmar fit in this criteria of statelessness, which involves continuous exclusion and marginalisation, legally reinforced by the introduction of the Citizenship Law in 1982. However, there were attempts to strip the Rohingya from their citizenship before the Law was introduced, and structural violence and discrimination against the Rohingya by the Myanmar government existed prior to the Citizenship Law.

The timing of the introduction of the Citizenship Law, which was developed shortly after the repatriation of some refugees from Bangladesh in 1979 suggests that it was meant to deny the Rohingya their citizenship rights (Lewa, 2009, p. 11). In 1989, Citizens Scrutiny Cards (CRCs) were issued. Pink cards were issued for those who were classed as full citizens, blue for associate citizens and green for naturalised citizens (Ullah 2016, p. 286; Lewa, 2009, p.11). Unfortunately, the Rohingya were not given any of these cards (Lewa, 2009, p. 11). In 1995 and in response to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) pressure to document the Rohingya, the Myanmar government started giving the Rohingya a white Temporary Registration Card (TRC). The card does not have its holder's place of birth, nor can be used to claim citizenship (ibid). In other words, it reinforces Rohingya statelessness.

Furthermore, the Citizenship Law denies the Rohingya their legal, political and economic rights and deprives them from access to welfare services including health and education. It also restricts their movement and makes them subject to abuse (Lewa, 2009, p. 13; UNHCR, 2014; cited in Ullah 2016, p. 287; The Telegraph, 2018). For instance, Rohingya have been denied permission to leave their villages in order to study outside their villages (Lewa, 2009, p. 13).

The Rohingya's civic rights are further abused by marriage restrictions. Those who want to marry need first to obtain official permission from the authority which is NaSaKa. They have to pay fees for the permission and it takes longer, up to several years, which disproportionately affects the poor as they may not be able to afford the fee (ibid). Couples who apply for marriage permission have to sign a commitment not to have more than two children (ibid). This puts women and their children at risk, notably women who become pregnant and give birth before getting official marriage authorization. Some of these women tend to abort their babies, a practice which is illegal in Myanmar and has led to some maternal deaths. Others gave birth but registered their children with a legally married couple. Some sneaked into Bangladesh to deliver their babies there and renounced them there (ibid).

Despite international condemnation, the Law still remains in the current constitution and makes Rohingya subject to discrimination and persecution (Thevathasan, 2014, p. 3; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 295). The Law also perpetuates their statelessness and denies them the land of their “fathers, grandfathers, and ancestors”, a new identity that contradicts their Arakanese identity (Farzana, 2017, p. 50). This legal discrimination is associated with violence, verbal and physical abuses. This will be the focus of the next section.

3.5. Direct Violence - Chronology of Violence in Myanmar

Violence against Rohingya is not an isolated incident, rather it is institutionalised (Ullhan, 2016, p. 291) and backed by the state and its apparatus including the army and the police. Buddhist monks have their share in the violence. Yegar (2018, p. 204) mentioned that some local Buddhists assisted the police and army to enter Rohingya villages to assault the residents. The Buddhists' involvement in the violence against the Rohingya reinforces the religious dimension of the conflict. As will be shown in the next section, verbal abuse and denial of identity are also relevant to the violence faced by the Rohingya and can indeed be seen as forms of violence.

3.5.1. Narrative of Verbal Abuse

There are two contrasting narratives on the history of Rohingya in Burma – the pro- and anti- Rohingya. The pro narrative advocates for the Rohingya rights and argues that the Rohingya settled in Myanmar in the ninth century and then have mixed with people from different ethnic backgrounds, including Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls and Turks (Human Rights Watch, 1996; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 286). By contrast, the anti-narrative views the Rohingya as illegal Chittagonian Bengalis who came to Burma as a “by-product” of British rule (Human Rights Watch, 1996; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 286). Moreover, since the 1960s, the government has been supportive of the anti-Rohingya narrative by referring to the Rohingya as Bengali, which “implies immigration status” (ibid). In fact, several terms, such as “resident foreigners” and “stateless” (ibid) are used to deny the Rohingya their citizenship rights.

In February 2009 an article in the *New Light of Myanmar*, a government-owned newspaper stated “In Myanmar there is no national race by the name of Rohingya” (ibid p. 12), thus promoting the official anti-Rohingya narrative. One of the most abusive narratives on Rohingya was from a Myanmar envoy in Hong Kong, who referred to the Rohingya as:

In reality, Rohingya are neither 'Myanmar People' nor Myanmar's ethnic group. You will see in the photos that their complexion is 'dark brown'. The complexion of Myanmar people is fair and soft, good looking as well... They are as ugly as ogres. (Human Right Watch 2009, p.26; Ibrahim, 2018, p. 4). Here it is worth mentioning that Myanmar has a small civil society movement. Networks such as Pan Zagar challenge the language of the Buddhist extremists. Moreover, the Rohingya seem lack well established political parties to challenge government actions against them and to lobby for justice, as mentioned earlier. Osman (2002, p. 38) argues that there is substantial debate about the role of civil society, its relation to the state and its relevance to social and political life. Prasse-Freeman (2012, p. 371) states that civil society addresses citizen needs and has the potential to act as a "wedge" between the state and its citizens.

The history of civil society in Myanmar is connected to the post-colonial era, where the post-colonial elites have established a strong military state influenced by imperial structure (ibid). Moreover, the state oppressed opposition political groups, and under such a history of oppression, citizens can view "open politics" as dangerous. In this sense, civil society in Myanmar usually does not get involve in political affairs, and the state prefers a civil society that is less concerned with the political affairs of the country and does not present a political threat (ibid, p. 381). A Yangon-based Myanmar NGO leader said "...you always have to deal with the authorities, convince them there is no danger" (ibid). This perhaps partially explains the low voice of Myanmar civil society in criticising the role of the state in the Rohingya crisis. Egreteau (2012) argues that, despite its rising role in political affairs, Myanmar's evolving civil society is still not strong enough to take a leading role in Myanmar politics.

3.5.2. Contested Identity

The Rohingya believe that they should have full citizenship rights equal to other Myanmar citizens. These rights include state protection. By contrast, the government of Myanmar sees them as "foreigners" who never been part of the country and denies them full citizenship rights and identifies them as "Bengali" and "illegal immigrant", as mentioned earlier. The latter strips the Rohingya of their identity as "Rohingya in Myanmar" and imposes on them a new identity – that is belonging to a different country. At the same time, the Bangladeshi government views them as "refugees" who fled Myanmar seeking sanctuary and their stay in Bangladesh as being temporary (Farzana, 2017, p. 7). The issue of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will be elaborated on latter. The Rohingya in Myanmar are also called *kala*, which literally means 'strangers', with South Asian origin. *Kala* is a derogatory name and has been described as similar to calling Afro-Americans 'niggers' (Harvery, 1946; cited in Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. xv).

Ware and Laoutides (2018, p. xv) argue that conflict can marginalise identities and give people unaccepted identities. For instance, during civil war in Former Yugoslavia, many Serbs refused to use the name Kosovars for those who were living in Kosovo, instead they called them 'Albanians', believing them to be Albanians that migrated to the area between seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Similarly, many Israelis refuse to use the name 'Palestinian', instead they refer to the Palestinians as Israeli citizens of 'Israeli Arabs' origin (ibid, p.xvi). These verbal abuses are often associated with physical violence.

Several trends of violence against the Rohingya have emerged since the military took power. In 1962 ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya were suppressed and their civic rights violated (Ball and Moselle, 2016, p. 118). As a result, hundreds of thousands fled to neighbouring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Bangladesh. In 1978 violence led to 200,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh and during the oppressive military regime in 1991-2 another wave of exodus of the Rohingya headed to Bangladesh (Cheung, 2011, p. 52; Smith 1995; cited in Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 16-17). Oppressions escalated and became more brutal, with forced labour, destruction of mosques, rape and killing taking place (Asia Watch 1992; cited in Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 17). The situation was aggravated by subversive cyclone in April 1991, which the government ignored and failed to provide the necessary relief assistance needed for the affected population. As a result, thousands headed to Bangladesh (Maje, 1991; cited in Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 17; Yegar, 2018, p. 201).

In 2012 violence erupted between Rohingya and Buddhists in Rakhine State. As a result, more than 200 people lost their lives and nearly 140,000 people became homeless. By 2014, the UNHCR estimated that there were 500,000 refugees from Myanmar in neighbouring countries (Ullah, 2016, p. 289). Moreover, between 2017 and 2018 nearly 700,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar to Bangladesh (IOM, 2018; Noor et al., 2017, p. 1193; Wake and Yu, 2018, p.2). As the violence continuous so does exodus to Bangladesh. By the end of 2018 immigration statistics in Bangladesh recorded more than a million Rohingya in Bangladesh (Laoutides and Ware, 2018, p. 6). The Myanmar government admits that almost 90% of the Muslims in Mungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung have left Myanmar, This is an indication of ethnic cleansing as revealed by Laoutides and Ware (2018, p. 6), and the series of violence that forced the Rohingya to leave their homeland fit in the theoretical debates that link violence to forced migration.

3.5.3. Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)

UNHCR argues that statelessness makes people vulnerable to abuse by several parties including the police, smugglers, security forces and pirates (UNHCR, 2016; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 290). The case of the Rohingya supports this claim. Moreover, in the absence of state protection and in the context of escalating ethnic violence, women and girls become more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

Women have become targets of NaSaKa (Ullah, 2016, p. 293). They were raped in front of their families, people witnessed the abuse of their female relatives and were unable to help them, and shops and other means of livelihoods were burnt down. People often had no option but to leave their homeland, carrying with them painful memories, as the following narrative by a husband whose wife was raped several times in Myanmar shows:

“I attempted to commit suicide many times because I could not help her. She looked at me helplessly. I could not commit suicide when I thought about my daughter (ibid, p. 295)”

Human Rights Watch (2017) has documented the killings of innocent people, the burning of houses and rape of many survivors. In Tula Toli village in Maundaw area, for example, the Myanmar army first separated men from women and children, then started indiscriminately killing men, dumping their bodies in pits and then set them on fire. The scale of the brutality reached its height when children were taken away from their mothers and thrown into the river. The soldiers then took women away where many of them were raped by soldiers, and many of those who resisted the sexual assaults were killed. Women who survived the killing and rape told this story (ibid). The horrifying practice of throwing children into the river adds a terrifying dimension to the violence and abuses experienced by the Rohingya in their homeland. As the violence continued people were left with no other options but to leave their homeland seeking safety elsewhere. The majority headed to Bangladesh.

3.6. State of the Rohingya People in Bangladesh

This section looks at how the Rohingya who escaped Myanmar to Bangladesh managed to survive and what assistance they received from stakeholders, including relief organisations and the Bangladeshi government.

The Rohingya who sought safety in Bangladesh were accommodated in temporary restricted camps referred to as “exceptional spaces” (Farzana, 2017, p. 146). These camps lacked proper assistance and protection (including protection under 1951 Convention), because the Bangladesh government did not recognise them as refugees under the Convention (Wake and Yu, 2018, p.1).

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, 2018) has stated that refugees in Bangladesh are accommodated in crowded camps which are at risk of natural hazards such as landslide and flooding (ibid). Kutupalong-Bulukhali "mega camp", which hosts 626,000 refugees is believed to be the largest refugee camp in the world. Further south, the Nayapara camp hosts more than 100,000 people. Overcrowded camps with poor infrastructure means that aid materials may not reach all of those who need them (ibid).

Wake and Yu (2018, p. 3) state that most Rohingya now live in precarious and overcrowded refugee camps prone to mudslides and flooding. Living conditions for the refugees need to be massively improved with a particular focus on improvements to water and sanitation, shelter and reducing population density. Camps are overcrowded with poor sanitation facilities and might collapse in monsoon season, making the situation a “disaster within a disaster” (ibid, p. 4). However, due to the larger influx of refugees, the Bangladeshi government was unable to shelter all of them in official camps. Therefore, many refugees ended up unregistered and living in unofficial makeshift camps (Milton et al., 2017, p. 942).

Kiragu et al. (2011) mention that those who live in makeshift sites seem unrecognised by relief organisations, including the UNHCR as they live in sites inaccessible to these organisations. These sites tend to be in remote and economically improvised areas. They host unregistered refugees and, as Milton et al. (2017, p. 942) argue, residents of these sites will not get legal protection. This puts the residents at higher risk of violence, arrest and detention (ibid p. 942).

By 2010 there were 36,000 living in makeshift sites (Kiragu et al., 2011). This number jumped to 80,000 by 2017 (Milton et al., 2017, p. 942). Living conditions in these sites are appalling. They lack proper hygiene facilities and health care, and malnutrition is widespread among their residents (ibid, p. 942). Although the camps are not fenced, there are restrictions on entering and leaving the camps. Refugees who want to leave the camp for whatever reason have to get an Exit Pass (Farzana, 2017, p. 149).

In the camps, refugees live in limited spaces, usually a one-bedroom hut for a family, irrespective of the family size. In Nayapara camps for instance, a family of five – a parent, two adult sons, one adult daughter and a baby granddaughter - all had to share a one-bedroom hut (a 10-span-by-10-span) (ibid, p. 152). The parents made a partition so that the sons and daughter can have some privacy. Farzana (20-17, p. 153) mentioned that huts in the camps are close together, which risks family secrets becoming known to strangers. In such environments where people are sharing a limited place and are restricted in their movement outside the camps, sometimes conflict happens, including fights between family members as well as between neighbours. Moreover, families do not have their own bathrooms and toilets and they have to share them with neighbours (ibid, p. 153-59).

To survive, refugees are given food and non-food items so they do not leave the camps to look for food. UN agencies and NGOs are involved in distributing relief materials, whereas the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is providing health services including family planning (ibid, p. 150). By 2018, the UNHCR had managed to distribute core relief packages to newly arrived refugee families in Cox's Bazar camps. Each package contained tarpaulin, kitchen utensils, blanket, sleeping mat and solar lamp (UNHCR, 2018).

International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) working in refugee camps and makeshift sites to provide humanitarian assistance include Mercy Corps, Care, Save the Children Fund (SCF) and Oxfam (Mercy Corps, 2018). Many of these INGOs work in partnership with local NGOs. For instance, Mercy Corps is working in partnership with Friendship Bangladesh to install solar street lighting in some toilet clusters. This is believed to help women to feel safe when they walk to toilets at night (ibid). By 2019, there were more than 120 local and international aid organisations operating in Rohingya camps and other refugee sites (Dhaka Tribune, 2019).

In relation to food aid, some refugees said the rations were not enough and they did not get firewood, although it was listed as a ration they would get. This may suggest that they have to find other alternative to get firewood, such as buying them from shops in the camps if they have money, or sending their children to collect firewood from the forest nearby the camps, raising issues surrounding children's safety (Farzana, 2017, p. 154). Farzana (2017, p. 154) referred to incidents where some children who were sent by their parents to collect firewood from nearby mountains were captured and held by kidnappers who then asked for ransom from the parents before releasing the children. Refugees said that was how some of the locals get money, however, some Bangladeshi people said that refugees were destroying their natural resources by cutting trees. Some villagers complained that they did not feel safe while raising their cattle because refugees may steal their cattle (ibid, 2017, p. 154). This lays the foundation for possible dispute and conflict over natural resources and entitlement, as well as mistrust between refugees and the host population (ibid, p. 155).

As no cash is given to refugees, some women formed *SomobaySamity* (cooperative), where each woman contributed a small amount of rice every two weeks, and every two weeks a woman took that rice to be sold. The money can be used to cover items not listed as relief materials such as clothing (ibid, p. 156).

More than two years on since the 2017 exodus, and despite basic humanitarian assistance from NGOs and the Bangladeshi government, living conditions in camps have not improved and the refugees are still living in overcrowded camps, which are prone to hazards during monsoon and cyclone seasons (Unicef, 2019). Moreover, lack of employment opportunities and proper education for children are still two of the top concerns for refugees (Rahman 2010, p. 238, Unicef, 2019) and without education the Rohingya children are at risk of becoming “lost generation” (ibid).

Education for children and skills for youth are crucial for self-reliance and have a potential to help the youth to provide for their families in dignity (ibid). In this regards, Oxfam, SCF and World Vision are appealing to the international community to support the Government of Bangladesh to deal with children and youth education as a top priority. A more recent report from Aljazeera (2019) stated that the number of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh had reached 1.2 million in 2019. As there is no durable solution to the crisis so far, the Rohingya refugees need to build skills and to contribute to their families and communities, as stated by the UN High Commissioner for refugees (ibid). In this respect, the UNHCR and the Ayesha Abed Foundation, a local charity, run training projects in some refugee camps, including Cox’s Bazar. These projects train women to sew clothes for women, men and children. During the project cycle, which is six months, women get a stipend. Apart from assisting women to gain new skills, the project also helps them to earn an income (UNHCR, 2019).

3.7. Implications of Rohingya Exodus in Bangladesh

The Rohingya crisis which has led to large scale refugee flows to Bangladesh has impacted the country in multiple ways. First, there has been a political impact as it strengthens the influence of the government, which unlike other ASEAN countries, offered temporarily refuge to nearly a million Rohingya refugees. However, the public have concerns on the longer term impact of refugees, notably in Cox’s Bazar, which is the largest host area of refugees. In this respect, the government of Bangladesh was reluctant to announce that the Rohingya would be staying in Bangladesh for a long period of time, and it restricted humanitarian and development agencies in building infrastructure for refugees that would suggest a long-term settlement (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Second, there has been an increased administrative burden relating to the management of the refugee flows into Bangladesh. In this respect, the government of Bangladesh has created several departments, such as Refugee Repatriation and Relief Commissioner (RRRC) to manage the influx of refugees and their camps (Farzana, 2017, p. 149-150). Third, it has increased the regional and international role of Bangladesh in handling one of the recent refugee crisis. Here it is worth mentioning that the Bangladeshi government was praised for the way it has handled the refugee crisis by, for instance, opening its border to refugees despite Bangladesh not being a party to the 1951 Convention or to the 1961 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Fourth, it has had an environmental impact, which can be demonstrated by the construction of refugee camps in forest areas and cutting of trees for firewood. Such practices are more likely to contribute to deforestation (Wolf, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, poorly constructed shelters for refugees are prone to risk of hazards such as landslides, as mentioned earlier.

Fifth, there have been social impacts which include the competition of Rohingya with local people in the employment sector (Crabtree, 2010, p. 41-50) and the lower pay they receive (Wolf, 2014, p. 6). This claim is supported by Rahman (2010, p. 237) who argues that the much cheaper labour of the Rohingya refugees has impacted negatively on the local labour market and led to clashes, tensions and conflicts between the desperate refugees and the host community.

Sixth, the presence of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is also viewed by some, notably security analysts in Bangladesh, as a potential security threat to the country (Rahman, 2010, p. 233; Wolf, 2014, p. 3-4). This is due to the assumption that the Rohingya in Bangladesh are a soft “recruiting base” for some Islamic militant groups (Rahman, 2010, p. 235) and that some Rohingya organisations, such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) have links with Al-Qaeda (Wolf, 2014, p. 5-6).

Seventh, some of the Rohingya refugees in camps are accused of being involved in some illegal activities, such as drug trading, trafficking and illegal money transfer using transnational networks (Rahman, 2010, p. 233; Wolf, 2014, p. 4-6). Others are accused of obtaining Bangladeshi passports using fake documents (Rahman, 2010, p. 237). These activities and accusations led to tensions and mistrust between the Rohingya and host community (ibid). Some Rohingya were accused of paid bribes to officials in order to help them in getting Bangladeshi passport (Rahman, 2010, p. 237). Apart from being an illegal activity, getting a Bangladeshi passport and using it to travel abroad has also affected the international labour market for Bangladeshis (ibid). For instance, Palma and Azad (2009; cited in Rahman, 2010, p. 237) refer to an incident where nearly 700 Rohingya who travelled to Saudi Arabia using Bangladeshi passport were arrested after accused being involved in crimes and were then held in a deportation centre in Jeddah. The Saudi authorities pressurised Bangladesh to take the Rohingya back and stated that Saudi Arabia would not address Bangladeshi worker’s problems in the Kingdom if Bangladesh did not take them back. The economic impact of such an incident can be significant as Saudi Arabia is the largest labour market for Bangladeshi migrant workers and Bangladesh depends on its overseas workers’ transfer/remittances for its foreign currency reserve (ibid).

3.8. Rohingya Repatriation

The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have been offered temporarily accommodation in order to be repatriated later when the situation in Myanmar would be improved (Farzana (2017, p. 145). Here it is worth mentioning two previous repatriation agreements in 1978 and 1991-1998 (Kiragu et al., 2011) before then exploring the recent repatriation agreement in 2017.

3.8.1. The 1978 Repatriation Agreement

In 1978 and immediately after the arrival of refugees to Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi government began to negotiate with the Myanmar government to repatriate the refugees. The Bangladeshi government complained about the social and economic burden caused by the influx of refugees and opposed their integration (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The UN intervened and urged the Myanmar leadership to permit the repatriation. The Myanmar government responded positively and carried out negotiations with the Bangladeshi government, which resulted in the development of a repatriation agreement between the Bangladeshi government and the then Burmese government. The agreement was marked secret but was published by Princeton University in 2014 (Princeton University, 2014). At the beginning of the repatriation programme only a few Rohingya agreed to be repatriated. Later the number increased as the Bangladeshi government limited food rations, as claimed by Human Rights Watch (2000). The repatriations started on August 1978 and ended on December 1979. Under this repatriation agreement a total of 187, 250 refugees were returned to Myanmar (ibid).

A significant element in the 1978 agreement is acknowledgment of the legal residency of returnees in Myanmar (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). The agreement was also seen as a peace building process between Bangladesh and Myanmar, as neighbours. A Bangladeshi official said “the government of Bangladesh’s stand on the refugee problem was that they should be repatriated in the interest of good neighbourliness and in the interest of border peace” (Huq, 1993, p. 138; cited in Farzanz, 2017, p. 67).

3.8.2. The 1991-92 Repatriation Agreement

After the repatriation, as mentioned earlier, violence erupted in 1991-2 and some of the Rohingya people had to escape Myanmar. Therefore, new repatriation negotiations started between the Bangladeshi government and the government of Myanmar (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). Under the 1992 repatriation agreement 236,000 Rohingya were repatriated to Myanmar between 1992 to 2005. The main difference between the two agreements is that the 1991/92 agreement failed to refer to the Rohingya as citizens by law in Myanmar and insisted that returnees needed first to show evidence/identity cards to verify their belonging to Myanmar (ibid).

Human Rights Watch (2014) reported that the 1992 repatriation had some problems from the beginning because of its forced nature. In order to be involved in the monitoring of the repatriation process, the UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Bangladeshi government in 1993 and started interviewing refugees on individual base to ensure that the Bangladeshi authorities were following the principle of voluntarily return. The UNHCR survey showed that less than 30% of the refugees agreed to be repatriated.

By 1993 nearly 50,000 Rohingya had returned to Myanmar (Yegar, 2018, p. 201). However, the Bangladeshi government insisted that all refugees should be returned by 1994. After visiting the return sites in Myanmar, the UNHCR agreed to become involved in the repatriation process. By 1996, the number of returnees reached 200,000 (ibid, p. 201). Between 1993-1997 about 230,000 Rohingya refugees returned to Myanmar (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

A question raised here is why the Bangladeshi government went ahead with the 1992 repatriation plan despite the Myanmar government's refusal to grant the returnees Myanmar citizenship (Farzana, 2017, p. 69). One possible answer is that the Bangladeshi government believed it would be better to proceed with the repatriation, as a temporary solution, otherwise the Myanmar government would refuse to allow the refugees to go back to Myanmar (ibid, p. 69).

Farzana (2017, p. 145) argues that in 1978 the Bangladeshi government managed to repatriate all refugees to Burma. However, when the Bangladeshi government tried to repatriate refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 1991-92, it received international attention because it was believed to be a forced repatriation. This slowed down the repatriation process and eventually put it on halt (ibid, p. 145). Wake and Yu (2018, p. 1) pointed out that plan for repatriation would be “premature” because of violence still taking place in Myanmar and refugees refusing to go back. As the persecution of the Rohingya continues in Myanmar, more Rohingya are fleeing the country seeking safety elsewhere, in particular Bangladesh, as indicated above. This gives a clear answer to why people refused to be repatriated.

3.8.3. The 2017-2018 Repatriation Agreement

An initial repatriation plan was signed between the Bangladeshi government and the Myanmar government on 15 January 2018 to repatriate more than 600,000 Rohingya refugees to Myanmar within two years. The repatriation process started on 23 January 2018 but it was stopped due to logistical issues, as claimed by (Kapur, 2018, p. 4; The Guardian, 2017). The repatriation agreement has many drawbacks. First, Myanmar does not seem to have a political will to accept the returnees but has signed the agreement under diplomatic pressure (Kapur, 2018, p. 4) and without a political will. This implies that safety of the returnees may not be guaranteed (The Guardian, 2017). Second, the returnees will be accommodated in temporary camps with poor infrastructure (Kapur, 2018, p. 5). Third, the agreement requires refugees to present evidence of their residency – national identification cards issued by previous governments (Aung et al, 2017; cited in Kapur 2018, p. 5). Fourth, the agreement has been seen as forced repatriation (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

The Guardian (2018) reported the voluntary return plan of Rohingya failed as no one was willing to go back voluntarily. Trucks and buses were ready to take the would be returnees who registered their names for repatriation from Unchiprang (The Economist, 2018) to a temporary camp by the border. Despite the preparation plan, many of those who were registered “have gone into hiding”. However, the report says that more than 2,000 Rohingya were on the repatriation list without their consent and the vast majority of them had left the Unchiprang camp in order to hide in other camps or forest for fear of being forced to go back to Myanmar (ibid).

International human rights organisations expressed their concern about the repatriation plan agreed between the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar because conditions in Myanmar have not changed to a degree that allows the Rohingya to be repatriated. Issues of concern include lack of safety and the destruction of assets, and Human Rights Watch (2018) called for both the Myanmar and Bangladesh governments to immediately stop their proposed repatriation process of Rohingya refugees to be implemented in mid-November 2018. Their concern was

that the refugees who were registered for repatriation were not consulted and instead they were picked up from a refugee registration in Bangladesh (ibid). This process obviously did not apply the international principle of voluntary return which is based on informed consent and people's willingness to return without forcing them to do so (ibid). This shows lack of proper co-ordination and a rush to return refugees to Myanmar despite no or little changes in the conditions that led to their departure. These conditions include dispute over land ownership and property, which many returnees would face, because the land they previously owned has been occupied by others (Amnesty International, 1997). This could lead to communal conflict over land and may jeopardise peaceful coexistence. In this sense, conditions for repatriations need to be seriously addressed before people return back to their homeland. Moreover, issues of grievances, fear and mistrust need significant efforts towards their resolution before repatriation on a large scale is implemented (Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 12). Without addressing these issues repatriation will be sporadic and lack sustainability.

A refugee from a camp in Bangladesh opposed the repatriation plan and said "This is forced. This is involuntarily. Not one person in the camp wants to go back", and then added "they will kill us if we go back" (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Green et al. (2018, p. 4) states that the repatriation agreement signed in 2017 has been criticised for not addressing the security issues of the returnees. The Rohingya want to go home but not before the issues of concerns that drove them out of their homeland are addressed. These issues as expressed by the Rohingya include security and safety, access to land and livelihood, freedom of movement, and citizenship rights (ibid).

The repatriation plan was condemned in strong words by a refugee rights advisor who said "This repatriation plan is just Myanmar's latest attempt to deflect international criticism from its brutal ethnic cleansing campaign for which no one has been brought to justice" (Ibid). Stateless people and refugees should be protected by international human rights mechanisms as will be elaborated later. In the case of the Rohingya, refugees in Bangladesh who were registered by UNHCR were given a card. The condition for repatriation is clearly stated on the cards, which read:

"The bearer of this UNHCR Card, whose photography appears on the front, is a refugee registered by the Government of Bangladesh. As a refugee he/she is a person of concern to UNHCR and should, in particular, be protected from forced return to a country where he/she would face threats to his/her life of freedom (Farzana, 2017, p. 149)".

3.9. Rohingya Politics in the Region

This section addresses the way regional actors notably, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have dealt with the Rohingya crisis and what policy, if any, they have implemented to handle the crisis. To begin with the ASEAN have to bear the burden of refugee crisis. If the situation in Rakhine does not improve, further refugee flows are unavoidable, leading to a situation of protracted displacement. However, the ASEAN do not have a coherent policy on refugees and are divided on how to intervene (Wake and Yu, 2018, p. 2). Ibrahim (2016, p.134) argued that ASEAN first adopted a "non-interference" approach but as the refugee crisis evolved their approach had to be changed.

Ullah (2016, p. 294) stated that most Rohingya host countries are not signatory to the 1951 Convention. They are reluctant to give the stateless Rohingya who entered their countries refugee status (Wake and Yu, 2018, p.2). However, under the customary international law principles of non-refoulement, these countries should not send refugees back to their country of origin (Ullah, 2016, p. 295). Bangladesh, for instance, is a non-signatory state to the 1951 Geneva Convention as well as to the 1961 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, therefore, it has no obligations to follow the convention rules and procedures (Rahman, 2010, p. 238). However, the Bangladeshi government invited UNHCR to provide assistance to the refugees but on restricted conditions. Other international NGOs are also there providing humanitarian assistance to the refugee population (Farzana, 2017, p. 146).

Rohingya who fled to Thailand and Malaysia did not get the protection they deserve and many of them were caught up in immigration raids and risk being subject to deportation. However, as Myanmar would not accept them, Thailand, in many occasions drove out Rohingya boat people to border areas under the control of Burmese insurgent groups (Lewa, 2009, p. 13). Malaysia also did not treat them better. Using brokers, it usually deports them into Thailand's border. However, if the deportees pay fees to brokers, they could be smuggled back into Thailand or Malaysia (ibid). Those who could not afford to pay ended up as slave labourers on fishing boats or plantations (ibid). Thailand continued its anti-Rohingya actions and in 2008, for instance 1,200 boat people were referred to the Thai military on an island off Thai coast to be ill-treated and pushed back to the sea on poorly equipped boats. After two weeks, three boats were rescued in two Indian islands, two were rescued in Indonesia and more than 200 people went missing, probably drowning (ibid). However, the practice of turning away boat people was globally condemned. The condemnation, pressure from international community and media coverage forced Thai and Malaysian authorities to change their behaviour and to allow refugees to land temporarily (Shivakoti, 2017, p. 76).

In Thailand and Malaysia Rohingya women have experienced SGBV. Some of them were kidnapped and taken to human trafficking camps and then raped by their kidnappers (Iaccino, 2015; cited in Ullah, 2016, p. 293). These inhumane responses by Malaysia and Thailand are a betrayal of Rohingya and a breach to international human rights conventions.

3.10. Global Responses

This section addresses international response to the Rohingya crisis and violence committed against them and demonstrates how different international actors have responded to the Rohingya crisis. Although the violence against the Rohingya is not new as there were incidents of violence against the Rohingya more than fifty years ago, the recent violence attracted international attention (Yegar, 2018, p. 197). Despite the global attention Yegar (2018, p. 204) claims that Islamic countries showed little interest in the Rohingya, in particular Indonesia and Malaysia previously prevented the Rohingya from entering their countries.

Wake and Yu (2018, p. 2) stated that political and diplomatic pressure to address the crisis in Myanmar were inadequate or insufficient in particular when influential countries like Russia and China acted as a shield for Myanmar government and

blocked positive actions, including aid workers access to Myanmar, returning of refugees and granting returnees full citizenship. On the other hand, different UN organisations have strongly condemned the brutality against the Rohingya, for instance Zeid bin Ra'ad al-Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights states "Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya appears to be a textbook example of ethnic cleansing" (Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 7). The commissioner also did not rule out the genocide and suggested a new mechanism to investigate crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya (ibid).

It is relevant here to mention that the international community has failed to prevent genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as Myanmar, however, the international community can still facilitate bringing the perpetrators of genocide in Myanmar to justice, refer the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC), protect the Rohingya refugees and assist the survivors to rebuild their lives and livelihoods (Reliefweb, 2018).

The ICC is an international mechanism to monitor human rights violations and to prosecute criminals who commit serious human rights crimes including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Bharadwaj, 2008, p. 6). Its treaty, the Rome Statute, was adopted in July 1998. It deals with cases when national legal mechanism is absent or ineffective and it is obligatory to signatories of the treaty (Bharadwaj, 2008, p. 6-8). In 2003, it dealt with war and genocide crimes committed during the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

More recently, Myanmar's de facto leader, has been widely criticised by the international community for not sufficiently condemning the renewed violence. (Shivakoti, 2017, p. 75). Leaders of several countries including the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America condemned the ethnic cleansing. International human rights organisations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights also reported on ethnic cleansing and alleged genocide (Ware and Laoutides, 2018, p. 7). International figures such as Pope Francis condemned the persecution of the Rohingya and three Nobel price Laurates said that "Rohingya faced nothing less than genocide" (ibid, p. 7-8). Other important figures including Dalai Lama and Ban Ki moon expressed their concerns and called for action (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 134).

3.11. Rohingya Diaspora

This section highlights how some of the Rohingya in exile have brought the plight of the Rohingya to the international community, and demanded international intervention to solve the crisis. Generally, diaspora communities are seen as vital links between host communities and places of origin. Many of them are actively involved in addressing human rights violations in their homelands (Fortify Rights, 2019).

Rohingya in the Diaspora have set up several Diasporic civil society organisations in order to lobby, campaign and advocate on behalf of the Rohingya who have been subject to systematic abuse and persecution by the Myanmar government and its military forces, as indicated above. Their campaigns vary from using social media, to report on the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar (Fortify Rights, 2019), to lobbying

international actors to take action in order to stop violations against the Rohingya (The Telegraph, 2018). For instance, the Europe Rohingya Council based in Denmark has campaigned the European Council to recognise the atrocities of the Rohingya as genocide and urged the West and the UN (including the UN Security Council) to provide evidence they are holding to support claims against the Myanmar government (The Telegraph, 2018). The Burmese Rohingya Organisation in the United Kingdom has aimed to inform the international community about the atrocities committed against the Rohingya. The organisation has managed to brief the US Congress and the Swedish Parliament and advocated for a sustainable solution (ibid).

Rohingya women in diaspora have also formed their own networks to address the needs of Rohingya women in refugee camps. An example is Rohingya Women Development Network based in Malaysia (Fortify Rights, 2019).

3.12. Future Direction

As the above literature demonstrates the exodus of the Rohingya is likely to continue as long as violence and violations to their human rights are not addressed. In this sense, refugee camps are more likely to expand to accommodate new comers. A lot of research has been done to understand the role of the state and its military force in the violence but less has been conducted to understand the role of different community-based actors, notably civil society to defuse the situation. In this respect, further theoretical research is needed to understand the role of civil society in Myanmar, as a grassroots actor, in conflict resolution and potential peace building. From a practical stand, a pro-active approach from the ASEAN countries and the international actors is also required to back grassroots initiatives and to pressurise the Myanmar government into seriously addressing the political and economic marginalisation of the Rohingya and grant them full citizenship. These grassroots and top-down mechanisms have the potential to build trust between different communities and to go further towards safeguarding peaceful solutions to the plight of the Rohingya. It also has the potential to confine the crisis and prevent it from expanding and becoming a regional and/or global threat to security and stability.

The literature on conflict and migration provides a useful understanding of the connection between violence and forced migration, and the role of violence as an important factor that leads to forced migration. The conflict and migration literature also highlights relevant themes in the field of forced migration which include the impact of refugees on the host community, which is useful in exploring the Rohingya case.

The Rohingya have been subject to violence and abuse of their fundamental human rights by the Myanmar government. These included denying them political participation and economically marginalising them. They have also been denied citizenship and made stateless. All forced them to leave their homeland seeking safety elsewhere, in particular in Bangladesh, a country that has welcomed them and offered them temporarily shelter.

The humanitarian needs of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have been met by different stakeholders that include Bangladeshi government, UN agencies and local and international NGOs. Nevertheless, the presence of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has some positive and negative impacts on the country. On the positive

side, for instance, it promotes the role of Bangladesh on an international level and Bangladesh has been praised for opening its border to the Rohingya. The negative impact has administrative, social, environmental, security and economic sides. The latter includes viewing the Rohingya by host communities as competitors in the labour market.

As the presence of the Rohingya in Bangladesh is perceived to be temporary, the Bangladeshi government and the government of Myanmar have been involved in negotiations since 1978 to repatriate the Rohingya refugees. Moreover, several stakeholders including the UN have been involved in addressing the plight of the Rohingya in order to reach a solution that takes into account dignified repatriation, safety of the returnees and their fundamental human rights. The ICC may also serve as an international mechanism to deal with crimes against humanity and genocide and to bring those who committed them to justice, as some actors have suggested. Despite some efforts of the Rohingya organisations in the diaspora to inform the international community about the Rohingya crisis, the role of the Myanmar grassroots organisations including the Rohingya civil society to address the root causes of the Rohingya crisis/conflict and to lay the foundations for conflict resolution, peace building and peaceful coexistence of different ethnic minorities seems to be less explored in the literature, and is an area which would benefit from further exploration.

Chapter 04: Results and Discussion

4.1. Quantitative Analysis: Rohingya Population

Rohingyas' Perception of Repatriation in Myanmar

This section highlights the challenges for a successful repatriation of the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)/ Rohingyas in Myanmar. To understand the overall context, we randomly interviewed 600 Rohingyas in the Kutupalong Rohingya Camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh in September 2018. We asked questions related to their demographic information, life in Myanmar and decision to leave, life in the camps in Bangladesh, and their overall perception of repatriation in Myanmar. The Rohingya SPSS database has been analysed to write this quantitative section. Please see supplementary document (S4) for reference.

4.1.1. Demographic Information

The respondents were primarily male (62%) and aged between 25-54 years (71%). No children and vulnerable people were interviewed (Table 4.1). All of them were Muslims, born in Myanmar (97% from Maungdaw township) and they speak Rohingya language. Among the respondents, 94% were married, and 74% of them never entered Bangladesh before the 2017 exodus.

Table 4.1. Age distribution of the Rohingya respondents.

Age Group ¹	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Youth (18-24 years)	91	15.2	15.4
Primary Working (25-54 years)	422	70.3	71.3
Mature Working (55-64 years)	57	9.5	9.6
Elderly (>= 65 years)	22	3.7	3.7
Valid Total	592	98.7	100.0
Missing	8	1.3	
Total (n=600)	600	100.0	

Source: Fieldwork in Cox's Bazar, September 2018.

4.1.2. Life in Myanmar

The primary occupation of the male respondents in Myanmar were farming (40%), business (20%), and day labourer (10%). The women were mostly involved in non-income generating activities like housewives (75%). However, 20% women were involved in agricultural activities (Figure 4.1). About 62% of the respondents used to live below the poverty line and 25% had no land in Myanmar. The average household poverty line was calculated considering the mean household size equals 4.8 persons in Sittway township (UNFPA Myanmar, 2014) and the threshold of 1241 Myanmar Kyat² in per capita terms (The World Bank Myanmar, 2017).

¹ The age group was classified as per the definition set by IndexMundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/burma/age_structure.html (accessed on 8 June 2019)

² 1 US Dollar (\$) = 1,025 Myanmar Kyat on 1 January 2015




Figure 4.1. Profession of the respondents in Myanmar by gender. Source: Fieldwork in Cox’s Bazar, September 2018.

4.1.3. Gender based Violence and Torture

Women respondents from the households living below the poverty line were found to be most vulnerable. For example, about 65% of them in Myanmar did not enjoy right to gender equality (Figure 4.2a), 45% of them left Myanmar because of sexual violence (Figure 4.2b), 72% of them faced physical torture (Figure 4.2c), 78% of them did not enjoy right to free speech (Figure 4.3a), 62% of them had no job opportunities/income-generating activities (Figure 4.3b), and approximately 55% women from low-income households in Myanmar had no freedom of movement (Figure 4.4a). About 90% and 50% male respondents confirmed that women in their households confronted gender inequality and sexual violence, consecutively (Figures 4.2a,b). It proves undeniably that violence towards Rohingya women were extremely severe in Myanmar.

Men had no access to formal job market, but they were involved in farming and fishing for survival. The male respondents had no freedom of speech (92%), they were also subject to physical torture (85%), and they were not allowed to move freely (80%) in Myanmar. Both genders equally (80%) faced restrictions on practicing Islam in Myanmar (Figure 4.4b).

Among the surveyed respondents, 92% had no citizenship right, 95% had no right to identify themselves as Rohingya, 73% had no right to marriage, 97% had no right to justice, 77% had no right to properties, 57% had no access to healthcare facilities, 58% had no access to education, 47% had no housing facilities, 34% had no facilities for pure drinking water, and 56% had no sanitary facilities (see supplementary document S4).

Overall, both male and female respondents confronted different types of violence and tortures. They were deprived of basic human rights, and community services and facilities in Myanmar, particularly respondents from low-income households.




Figure 4.2. Responses on (a) gender equality, (b) sexual violence, and (c) physical torture by gender and income. Source: Fieldwork in Cox’s Bazar, September 2018.




Figure 4.3. Responses on (a) free speech, and (b) employment opportunities by gender and income. Source: Fieldwork in Cox’s Bazar, September 2018.

4.1.4. Criteria for Repatriation

Here, we tend to understand the factors that forced the Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. It will also help us to identify the criteria for a successful repatriation in Myanmar. We have applied the ‘Binomial logistic regression’ model (Hosmer et al., 2013; Laerd Statistics, 2015) in SPSS Statistics software (version 25). Before conducting the analysis, it was tested that all the observations were independent, the data did not show multicollinearity, there was no significant outliers, and the categories of the dichotomous dependent variables and all independent variables were mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Laerd Statistics, 2015).




Figure 4.4. Responses on (a) freedom of movement, and (b) religious oppression by gender and income. Source: Fieldwork in Cox’s Bazar, September 2018.

Interpreting Results

A detailed interpretation of results obtained from the Binomial logistic regression model for the dependent variable – ‘Do you think the right to citizenship is important for your return to Myanmar?’ – is explained in Table 4.2.

The first table (Table 4.2a), "Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients", provides the overall statistical significance of the model (namely, how well the model predicts categories compared to no independent variables). The model is statistically significant ($p < .0005$; "Sig." column).

In order to understand how much variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the model, for which Table 4.2b, "Model Summary" can be consulted. This table contains the Nagelkerke R Square value. The explained variation in the dependent variable based on the model is 22.3% (Table 4.2b).

Table 4.2. Logistic regression predicting likelihood of ensuring citizenship rights for repatriation in Myanmar based on household income, educational facilities, experience of physical torture, and availability of jobs in Myanmar.

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	44.926	4	0.000
	Block	44.926	4	0.000
	Model	44.926	4	0.000

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Nagelkerke R Square
1	191.311 ^a	0.223

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001.

	Observed	Predicted			
		Do you think the right to citizenship is important for your return to Myanmar?		Percentage Correct	
		No	Yes		
Step 1	Do you think the right to citizenship is important for your return to Myanmar?	No	0	30	0.0
		Yes	0	551	100.0
	Overall Percentage				94.8

a. The cut value is 0.500

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Avg. Monthly Household Income(1)	0.921	0.407	5.122	1	0.024	2.512
	Did you enjoy educational facilities in Myanmar?(1)	2.169	0.748	8.411	1	0.004	8.750
	Did you leave Myanmar because of physical torture?(1)	1.862	0.472	15.562	1	0.000	6.437
	Did you enjoy employment opportunities in Myanmar?	1.447	0.756	3.666	1	0.056	4.251
	Constant	0.204	0.453	.202	1	0.653	1.226

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Avg. Monthly Household Income, Did you enjoy educational facilities in Myanmar?, Did you leave Myanmar because of physical torture?, Did you enjoy employment opportunities in Myanmar?.

After determining model fit and explained variation, it is very common to use binomial logistic regression to predict whether cases can be correctly classified (i.e., predicted) from the independent variables. Logistic regression estimates the probability of an event (in this case, importance of right to citizenship for repatriation) occurring. If the estimated probability of the event occurring is greater than or equal to 0.5 (better than even chance), SPSS Statistics classifies the event as occurring (e.g., 'yes' to citizenship rights as a repatriation criterion). If the probability is less than 0.5, SPSS Statistics classifies the event as not occurring (e.g., no for citizenship rights). The model correctly classifies 94.8% of cases overall (see "Overall Percentage" row in Table 4.2c).

Finally, one can assess the contribution of each independent variable to the model and its statistical significance using the Variables in the Equation table (Table 4.2d). The Wald test ("Wald" column) is used to determine statistical significance for each of the independent variables. The statistical significance of the test is found in the "Sig." column. From these results it is found that households from low-income group ($p = 0.024$), without having access to educational facilities in Myanmar ($p = 0.004$), left Myanmar because of physical torture ($p = 0.000$) and did not enjoy formal employment opportunities in Myanmar ($p = 0.056$) added significantly to the model prediction (Table 4.2d).

The odds ratios of each of the independent variables in the "Exp(B)" column informs the change in the odds for each increase in one unit of the independent variable. For example, for the educational facilities variable, an increase in one unit (i.e., a household not enjoying educational facilities in Myanmar) increases the odds by 8.750. What this means is that the odds of demanding the right to citizenship for repatriation in Myanmar ("yes" category) is 8.750 times greater for households that did not have access to education as opposed to who had access to educational facilities in Myanmar (Table 4.2d). In simple words, the results can be summarized as follows:

A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of monthly household income, educational facilities, experience of physical torture, and availability of jobs in Myanmar on the likelihood that the Rohingya respondents will demand the right to citizenship for a successful repatriation in Myanmar. The logistic regression model was statistically significant $\chi^2(4) = 44.926$, $p < 0.0005$. The model explained 22.0% (Nagelkerke R^2) of the variance in demanding citizenship right and correctly classified 95.0% of cases. Respondents from households lived below the poverty line, who had no access to education, who fled Myanmar due to physical torture, and who had no jobs in Myanmar are consecutively 2.5, 8.8, 6.4, and 4.3 times more likely to support citizenship rights for repatriation in Myanmar (see Table 4.2).

Following Table 4.2, the binomial logistic regression method was applied for the remaining repatriation criteria as dependent variables (rights to decision making, Rohingya identity, gender equality, marriage right, religious freedom, free speech, justice, property, peaceful situation, and other basic provisions) and their association with Rohingya living experiences in Myanmar as independent variables. The results are summarized in Table 4.3, see supplementary document (S4) for detailed statistics.

Table 4.3. Criteria for safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingyas in Myanmar.

Parameters for Judgement		Rohingya Repatriation Criteria [p-value/Exp(B)]											Sum of Importance			
		Citizenship	Decision Making	Rohingya Identity	Gender Equality	Marriage Right	Religious Freedom	Free Speech	Justice	Property Right	Peaceful Situation	Basic Provisions				
Life In Myanmar	Demographic and Socio-Economic	Age													0	
		Gender					0.000 (2.068)								0.037 (2.174)	2
		Income Level/ Poverty Status	0.024 (2.512)													1
		Employment/ Profession													0.027 (2.374)	1
		Land Ownership			0.014 (2.145)					0.007 (1.835)	0.000 (2.481)	0.000 (2.897)			0.002 (2.100)	5
	Civic Rights	Citizenship		0.003 (3.150)			0.001 (3.451)									2
		Decision Making														0
		Rohingya Identity				0.013 (3.616)				0.021 (2.681)		0.045 (4.500)				3
		Gender Equality														0
		Marriage Right									0.036 (1.633)					1
Facilities and Services	Religious Freedom		0.000 (3.268)					0.000 (2.882)		0.000 (3.647)					3	
	Free Speech														0	
	Justice			0.003 (4.706)											1	
	Property Right		0.005 (2.217)		0.001 (2.217)	0.006 (1.828)					0.005 (2.407)				4	
	Healthcare Facilities				0.036 (1.670)						0.000 (2.658)			0.000 (3.119)	3	
Facilities and Services	Educational Facilities	0.004 (8.750)			0.011 (1.799)										2	
	Vaccination													0.007 (1.850)	1	
	Housing			0.000 (4.591)											1	

The independent variables were broadly classified into four groups: demographic and socio-economic, civic rights, community facilities and services, and experiences of violence and torture. For each statistically significant association ($p < 0.005$), a tally was marked for an independent variable, and then it was summed up to calculate the overall priority. Later, the independent variables were labelled as high ($\Sigma > 5$), medium ($\Sigma = 3-5$), low ($\Sigma = 1-2$), and no-priority ($\Sigma = 0$) based on applying a random classification method (Table 4.3).

The results show that the Rohingyas are keen to repatriate subject to the Myanmar authority ensure their free movement, religious freedom, and stop sexual violence towards women (high priority). They also demand rights to land and property ownership, healthcare facilities, and recognising their Rohingya identity (medium priority). Lastly, they require access to employment, education, marriage and citizenship rights, no military attack in their villages, and bringing justice for them (low priority). No major influence of demography and socio-economic conditions (except land ownership) were found in their decision making. Overall, the Rohingyas want protection from violence and torture followed by ensuring their civic rights, and providing community facilities and services. We strongly recommend to listen to the Rohingya voices for an effective repatriation in Myanmar with safety and dignity.

4.2. Quantitative Analysis: Host Community

The host community SPSS database has been analysed to write this quantitative section. Please see supplementary document (S5) for reference.

4.2.1. Demographic and Socio-Economic Information

Close to 98% of the respondents reported their ages between 18 years and 72 years and 79% of them fall between 18 and 48 years. The largest age group is that of 28-38 years (178) and the smallest that of 68-78 years. The mean age of the total sample is 39.1 years, ± 0.9 years at the 95% confidence level with the standard deviation of 12.1 years (Figure 4.5). This indicates that mostly young and middle-aged persons compared to elderly people of the Cox's Bazar have participated in the survey. About two-thirds of the respondents (66%) of the household survey are male and one-third (34%) are female. In other words, participation rate of males in this host community survey is double that of females.

People from different professional backgrounds have taken part in the study (Figure 4.6). Large portions of the respondents are business persons (33%) and housewives (27%), followed by service holders (8.6%), farmers (8%), day-laborers (7%), shop-keepers (3%), fishermen (2%), drivers (2%), carpenters (2%), students (2%), unemployed (2%), tailors (1%), NGO workers (0.3%), and others (2%).




Figure 4.5. Distribution of the respondents by age.




Figure 4.6. Distribution of respondents by gender and profession.

The vast majority of respondents (92%) are married. In terms of religious affiliation, (513) 92% of respondents of the survey have identified themselves as Muslim and only (40) 8% as Buddhist or Hindu. This means married people and Muslim people have participated in the survey at a higher rate (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4. Cross-tabulation on marital status and religion of respondents.

Marital status	Religion of respondents			
	Muslim	Buddhist	Hindu	Total
Married	473	7	31	511
Unmarried	30	1	0	31
Widowed	10	0	1	11
Total	513	8	32	553

Table 4.5 shows the distribution of respondents by educational qualification and profession. About 68% of the respondents have educational qualification that is under Grade VI. Graduates and post-graduates constitute about 3% of the total. The former group consists of most of the farmers, fishermen, housewives, day-laborers and unemployed people while the latter mostly consists of students, NGO workers and service holders. This table indicates that people with less institutional education have participated in this survey more than highly educated people.

Table 4.5. Distribution by profession and educational qualifications.

	No Formal Education	Grade 1-5	Grade 6-10	Grade 11-12	Graduate	Post-graduate	Total
Farmer	21	23	2	0	0	0	46
Fisherman	4	6	0	0	0	0	10
Housewife	63	52	25	6	0	0	146
Day-laborer	29	11	1	0	0	0	41
Driver	0	8	4	0	0	0	12
Business	42	74	58	12	0	1	187
Shop-keeper	4	6	5	2	0	0	17
Carpenter	1	7	3	0	0	0	11
Student	0	0	0	7	2	0	9
Tailor	0	5	2	0	0	0	7
NGO worker	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Service holder	1	8	14	16	5	2	46
Unemployed	5	3	1	0	0	0	9
Others	1	4	2	1	1	2	11
Total	171	207	118	44	8	6	554

Distribution of respondents by monthly income (Figure 4.7) shows that the income of respondents ranges between BDT₁ 500,000 and BDT 2000 (n=589). However, the majority of respondents earns less than BDT 10,000 per month. The mean monthly income of respondents is BDT 19,514 with the standard deviation of BDT 35854. It can be inferred from these numbers that people of Ukhia, Cox's Bazar have large income differences at the household level.




Figure 4.7. Distribution of respondents by monthly income.

4.2.2. Perceptions of Socio-Economic Implications

(a) Overall perceptions of the host community about socio-economic impacts

The vast majority of the host community appeared to hold negative perceptions about the socio-economic impacts of the Rohingya presence in this area. When asked, a large number of respondents (n=586) opined that the exodus has had adverse socio-economic implications for the Cox's Bazar region, although a handful of them (n=11) disagreed (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6. Perceptions of the host community about the Rohingya influx.

	Observed n	Expected n	Residual
Yes	586	299	288
No	11	299	-288
Total	597		

¹ BDT = Bangladeshi Taka, the currency of Bangladesh. 1 GBP (£) = 104.92 BDT as of 16 July 2019.

A Pearson's chi-squared test was performed (Table 4.7) to test whether the result is statistically significant. The vast majority of the respondents (586) have negative perceptions about impact of the Rohingya Exodus at: $\chi^2(1) = 554$ and $p < 0.0005$.

Table 4.7. Chi-squared test summary on socio-economic impacts.

Do you observe any negative effect of Rohingya influx at your area?	
Chi-Squared	554 ^a
Degree of freedom	1
Asymp. Sig.	.0

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 299.


Figure 8 provides a detailed explanation on perceived socio-economic implications of the Rohingya Exodus for Cox's Bazar. The following sections of this report draws on this figure to assess how people perceive these implications for, inter alia, the environment, economy, social condition, and health sector.

(b) Competition in the local business

The vast majority of the people (n=581; 96%) of the host community say that local businesses has been affected by the Rohingya exodus due to intense competition (Figure 4.8). Over 90% of respondents have identified this economic impact irrespective of age. Male respondents (97%) are slightly more likely than women (94%) to say that there is an increase in competition in local business. This opinion is shared by 100% of respondents with graduate and post-graduate degrees, which is higher than the percentage of respondents with lower educational qualifications (95%). Business people and people of other occupations appear to have similar perceptions with regards to the increasing competition in the local business. This indicates that the opinion on negative impact may be rooted more in perception than in lived experience.

(c) Price of daily commodities

Nearly 100% of respondents (Figure 8) report experiencing price hike of daily commodities in the Cox's Bazar after Rohingyas enter into the area (n=588). Respondents with high educational qualifications (93%) have comparatively less negative perceptions about prices than those with lower educational qualifications (100%). There is no any significant variation in the opinion of business persons and that of people from other professions. There is no indication from this data whether some groups of local businessmen within the host community are benefitting from price hikes.



Note: The figure shows only the percentages of the respondents who answered "yes".

Figure 4.8. Perceptions of the respondents about adverse socio-economic impacts.

(d) Scarcity of jobs

The vast majority of respondents (96%) have reported (Figure 4.8) the problem of scarcity of jobs ($n=589$). Interestingly, there is not much difference in opinion according to gender: both male (96%) and female respondents (95%) have expressed their concerns. There is not much difference of opinion between business people (97%) and people of other occupations (95%). On the other hand, there is some difference in terms of educational qualification - respondents (96%) with lower educational qualifications reports job crisis to be a problem at a higher rate than respondents with higher education (87%).

A simple logistic regression was performed to examine the effect of the marginalization of low-income people in the job competition in creating negative perceptions amidst the host community about the Rohingya Exodus. The model (Table 4.8) is statistically significant at $\chi^2 = 553.811, df = 1$ and $p = .000$, which can also explain 30% of variance (Nagelkerke R-square) of the dependent variable and correctly classify 99% of cases. The regression output table given below demonstrates that respondents of the survey who perceive "low income people have been marginalized in the job competition" are 80 times more likely to express negative perceptions about the Rohingya influx than those of respondents who think that "low income people have not been marginalized in the job competition" ($\beta = 4.39, OR = 80.5$ and $P = .000$).

Table 4.8. Logistic regression on negative perceptions about the Rohingya.

Predictor	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Low income people	4.388	1.257	12.1941	.000	80.462	
Constant	-6.260	1.001	39.1081	.000	.002	

(e) Environmental destruction

In reply to the question about the destruction of hills, 92% of the respondents were of the opinion that the Rohingya Exodus caused an increase in the destruction of hills in the Cox's Bazar (n=587). Male respondents of the survey (95%) are more likely to agree with this environmental impact of the Rohingya Exodus compared to female respondents (86%). The differences in the opinions of male and female respondents about this environmental impact are statistically significant at $x^2 = 13.474, df = 1$ and $p = .000$ (see Table 4.9).

Table 4.9. Chi-squared test summary on environmental destruction.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-Exact sided)	Sig. (2-Exact sided)	Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.474 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	12.334	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	12.695	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	13.451	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	587				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.44.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Similarly, 92% of less educated respondents of the survey expressed the opinion that the destruction of hills has increased in the Cox's Bazar compared to 87% of the respondents with higher education. It is also noteworthy that more business people (95%) have this perception than respondents with other professions (90%), and 98% of farmers who have taken part in the survey have this perception of the destruction of hills compared with 90% of respondents with other occupations. The differences in the perceptions of respondents as to the destruction of hills are statistically significant at $x^2(1) = 4.796$ and $p < .05$ (see Table 4.10).

Table 4.10. Chi-squared test summary on destruction of hills.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.796 ^a	1	.029		
Continuity Correction ^b	4.120	1	.042		
Likelihood Ratio	5.251	1	.022		
Fisher's Exact Test				.036	.018
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.788	1	.029		
N of Valid Cases	588				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.84.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Again, the vast majority of respondents (96%) identified land erosion and deforestation as negative consequences of the Rohingya Exodus in Cox's Bazar (n=589). Male respondents (97%) have more negative perceptions compared to female respondents (93%) with regards to the impact of Exodus on land erosion and deforestation. This difference in opinion is statistically significant at $\chi^2(1) = 6.380$ and $p = .012$ (see Table 4.11). Among the respondents of different educational backgrounds, 96% of those with low educational qualifications have expressed their concerns, which is higher than those with higher educational qualifications (93%). On the other hand, more than 90% respondents irrespective of their occupations thought there was an increase in land erosion and deforestation in the Cox's Bazar. Farmers have been found to be more concerned with this environmental problem than the people of other professions.

Table 4.11. Chi-squared test summary on land erosion.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.380 ^a	1	.012		
Continuity Correction ^b	5.319	1	.021		
Likelihood Ratio	5.995	1	.014		
Fisher's Exact Test				.015	.012
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.369	1	.012		
N of Valid Cases	588				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.24. b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

A large section of respondents (89%) expressed the opinion that the Rohingya Exodus created impediment for the movement of elephants - the rest (11%) did not agree. The opinion did not vary much among male respondents (94%) about the impact on elephant movement, whereas one-fourth of the female respondents disagreed. Interestingly, the variation in the perceptions of both males and females is statistically found as significant at $\chi^2(1) = 36.096$ and $p = .000$ (see Table 4.12).

Table 4.12. Chi-squared test summary on movement of elephants.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Squared	36.096 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	34.472	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	34.059	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	36.034	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	588				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.02. b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Less educated people (89%) are more likely to perceive an environmental impact of exodus than their more educated counterparts. Moreover, respondents of the survey (96%) who have identified “business” as their occupation are more likely to have this perception in comparison with the people of other professions (85%).

(f) Agriculture/ Decrease in land and crop production

It has been found that 97% of respondents perceive a decline in the quantity of cultivable land and crop production in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar (n=589). Both genders – males (97%) and females (98%) – have this perception. Similarly, around 90% of both less and more educated respondents and the majority of respondents from business (97%) and other occupations (98%) have expressed similar views on the impact of the exodus on availability of cultivable land.

(g) The outbreak of infectious diseases

The survey also asked respondents about whether the outbreak of infectious diseases has gone up in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar in the wake of the Rohingya Exodus. The vast majority of respondents (95%) answered “yes” in contrast to the 5% that answered “no” (n=589). Irrespective of age groups, more than 90 of respondents of the study have perceived such increases in the outbreak of infectious diseases. Compared to female respondents (93%), male respondents (96%) of the survey are more likely to support the statement that the outbreak of infectious diseases has increased in the Cox’s Bazar. There is some variation in the opinions of married (95%), unmarried (88%), divorced (100%) and widowed (91%) respondents. In terms of educational qualification, the less educated respondents (95%) appear to be more concerned about this health impact than the respondents with higher education (80%).

(h) Deterioration of social condition of women

The majority of respondents (96%) have identified the deterioration of social conditions of women as a result of the Rohingya Exodus (n=589). Respondents aged between 18 and 58 years have reported this perception. This is a higher proportion than those of the respondents whose age is more than 58 years. In comparison with female respondents (94%), male respondents (96%) are slightly more likely to support the statement that social conditions of women has been worse in the Cox's Bazar since the Rohingya exodus. Widows (82%) are less likely to perceive a deterioration in social conditions of women compared with married women (96%) and unmarried respondents (94%). It is also worth mentioning that almost all the respondents of the survey irrespective of their religious identities have highlighted the deterioration of social conditions of women as a consequence of the Rohingya exodus. The majority of the respondents with higher education (93%) and the entirety of the respondents with lower educational qualification have perceived this to be an issue (100%). On the other hand, more business people (99%) have perceived this than those of other occupations (94%) when asked about this social problem. This result of the survey indicates that the differences in the opinions of respondents across professions are statistically significant at $\chi^2 = 5.639, df = 1$ and $p = .018$ (see Table 4.13).

Table 4.13. Chi-square test summary on social condition of women.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.639 ^a	1	.018		
Continuity Correction ^b	4.671	1	.031		
Likelihood Ratio	6.693	1	.010		
Fisher's Exact Test				.018	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.629	1	.018		
N of Valid Cases	589				


a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.56.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

(i) Education

The survey has asked respondents whether they perceived a deterioration of the security of students and educational environment (Figure 4.9). The vast majority of the people (97%) surveyed in this study have said that the security of students has decreased (n=316). In terms of the deterioration of the local education system, similar portions of respondents held negative perception. About 93% of the respondents said there was "a deterioration of the educational environment" (n=316). In other words, 5 out of 10 persons answered "yes" while 4 out of 10 persons replied "no" with a small portion of the respondents (6%) answering "don't know" (n=599).

When asked whether their local educational institutions have been used as temporary shelters for Rohingya peoples, more than half of the total respondents (58%) answered “yes” while 42% of the respondents did not (n=317). In addition, 85% of the respondents of the survey agreed that teachers are doing part-time jobs in different institutions (n=316) and 96% agreed that students were now engaged in part-time jobs (n=316). Interestingly, only 8 persons out of 100 have reported other impacts (e.g. traffic accidents, decrease in success rate in public examinations and shut down of academic institutions etc.) of the Rohingya Exodus on the local education (n=316).



A chi-squared test has been run to test whether perceptions of respondents of the household survey about adverse impacts of the Rohingya Exodus on local level education are statistically significant. It has been found that there are significant differences in the opinions of respondents, in terms of answering “yes” (observed n=314 and expected n=200), “no” (Observed n=250 and expected n=200) and “don’t know” (observed n=35 and expected n=200). The Chi-squared test result is statistically significant at $\chi^2 = 213.960, df = 2$ and $p = .000$ (see Table 4.14).

Table 4.14. Chi-squared test summary on local level education.

Have you observed any impact on education in the last 12 months?	
Chi-Square	213.960 ^a
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 199.7.

(j) Sense of Deprivation

In reply to the question about the sense of deprivation, the majority of the respondents have answered “yes” (N=541) while comparatively a small number of the respondents have answered “no” (N=50) and “don’t know (N=8). As the following table reports, the variation in the perceptions of the respondents about the sense of deprivation is statistically significant at $\chi^2(2) = 879.689$ and $p < .001$ (see Table 4.15).

Table 4.15. Chi-squared test summary on sense of deprivation.

Do you think there is a sense of deprivation among local people on the account of influx of Rohingya people?	
Chi-Square	879.689 ^a
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 199.7.

The study has measured the sense of deprivation of the host community with a set of questions which can be categorized into two broad categories: material and non-materials facilities. It has been observed that 90% of respondents said that they have a sense of deprivation. When asked whether the local people are feeling deprived of local and foreign assistance, 95% of the respondents said they have been deprived of assistance (n=542). Interestingly, the majority of Muslim (465), Buddhist (10) and Hindu (36) respondents said they were being deprived. Most of the people with different educational qualifications have said the same. There is statistically significant variation in perceptions about deprivation of the host community from local-foreign assistance according to occupation of respondents at $\chi^2(2) = 23.572$ and $p < .05$ (see Table 4.16).

Table 4.16. Chi-squared test summary on facilities.

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Squared	23.572 ^a	13	.035
Likelihood Ratio	20.320	13	.088
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.796	1	.029
N of Valid Cases	537		

a. 14 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .11.

About 94% of respondents said that the government of Bangladesh is currently more focused on the Rohingya issue than important local issues, although 6% of the respondents have disagreed with this statement (n=542). When we disaggregate the respondents according to religious identity and educational qualification, vast majorities across groups have similar perception about the government focused on issues concerning the Rohingya.

However, more of the fisherman, drivers, carpenters and students have this perception compared to people of other occupations (e.g. farmers, housewives and business people). The variation of perceptions across occupations is statistically significant at $\chi^2(2) = 43.670$ and $p < .001$ (see Table 4.17).

Table 4.17. Chi-squared test summary based on occupation.

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.670 ^a	13	.000
Likelihood Ratio	30.344	13	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	.067	1	.795
N of Valid Cases	537		


a. 14 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

When asked if the local people were becoming minorities in their own land, 95% of the respondents answered in the affirmative (n=542). There is no significant statistical difference amongst respondents of different religious groups with regards to answering this question (Figure 4.10). The vast majority of respondents with different educational qualifications (481 out of 506 persons) answered the same way. More farmers and housewives have identified this security impact than those of other occupations. Finally, the survey asked respondents about marginalization of low-income people in employment competition, to which 97% of the respondents opined that local people were becoming increasingly marginalized in the job competition (n=540). Respondents irrespective of their religious identity, educational qualification and profession have provided similar answer to this question (Figure 4.10).

Table 4.14 shows, more than half of the respondents (59%) said that the Rohingya exodus has produced positive impacts for the local people of Cox's Bazar (observed n=355). This is in contrast with the 38% of respondents (observed n=230) that did not say there was a positive impact and the 2% of respondents that answered "don't know" (observed n=11).

Table 4.14. Cross-tabulation on positive impacts of the Rohingya Exodus.

	Observed n	Expected n	Residual
Yes	355	198.7	156.3
No	230	198.7	31.3
Don't know	11	198.7	-187.7
Total	596		



A Pearson's chi-squared test was done to see whether differences in the perception of respondents with regards to positive impacts of the Rohingya exodus in the Cox's Bazar are statistically significant. Table 4.19 below shows, the chi-squared test value is: $\chi^2 = 11.325, df = 2$ and $p < 0.005$.

Table 4.19. Chi-squared test summary on positive impacts of the Rohingya exodus.


	Do you think Rohingya influx has produced positive impacts in your area?
Chi-Squared	305.238 ^a
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 198.7.

The study asked respondents several questions related to the positive impact of the Rohingya exodus. Figure 4.11 illustrates how the local people of Ukhia, Cox's Bazar perceived positive impacts of the Rohingya exodus. 97% of respondents have said that employment opportunities have increased for the host community due to the Rohingya Exodus (n=355). Moreover, 91% of respondents have said that there was an increase in the demand of hotel and housing (n=355). When asked whether local people had access to local and foreign assistance, just above half of respondents (51%) have said they did not while 49% said they did (n=355). With regards to the development of local transportation system, 48% of the respondents said that transportation has improved whereas the rest (52%) did not share this perception (n=355).

The respondents were also asked whether commercial activities had increased in the Cox’s Bazar, and the overwhelming majority of the people (97%) who took part in the survey said that there was an increase in commercial activities.

Figure 4.11. Perceptions of the respondents about positive impacts of the Rohingya Exodus.




4.2.3. Perception of Safety and Security

The respondents were asked whether the rate of crimes had increased in Cox’s Bazar in the recent past. About 93% of respondents thought that criminal activities have gone up while 4.7% answered “no change” (Figure 4.12). A small portion of the respondents (2%) thought there was a decrease in crime. Nearly 1% of the respondents did not answer this survey question (n=599).

(a) The sense of fear and insecurity

Table 4.20 demonstrates that more than four-fifth of respondents (86%) thinks that the level of personal security in the Cox’s Bazar has declined after the Rohingyas arrived in the area. A significant portion of respondents (8.5%) did not perceive any change in the level of personal security and about 5% of the people said “security improved” (n=599). In other words, a few said of “security improved” (n=28) compared to those that said “security decreased” (n=516) or “neither security increased nor decreased” (n=51).



* The figure shows only the response-wise percentages of the respondents who answered "yes".

Figure 4.12. Respondents perception about adverse impacts of Rohingya influx on stability, law and order situation.

Table 4.20. Cross-tabulation of perception of any change of personal security.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
Valid	Security improved	28	4.7	4.7	4.7
	Security decreased	516	86.0	86.1	90.8
	Neither increased, nor decreased	51	8.5	8.5	99.3
	Don't know	2	.3	.3	99.7
	No comment	2	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	599	99.8	100.0	

A chi-squared test was run to test whether the proportion of cases expected in each group of the categorical variable is equal. The Table 4.21 reports the actual result of the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. As the table reveals, the test is statistically significant at $\chi^2(3) = 762.622$, $p < 0.0005$.

Table 4.21. Chi-square test summary on sense of fear.

What kind of change do you observe in case of overall security?	
Chi-Square	762.622 ^a
Df	3
Asymp. Sig.	0.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 146.8.

It has been observed that the majority of male (345) and female respondents (170) have reported that personal security of local people has deteriorated. Most respondents with different religious affiliations perceived a decrease in security level (Figure 4.13).




Figure 4.13. Perception about any change in your personal security.

(b) Perception of criminal violence

The survey posed five questions to respondents to gauge perceive change in criminal violence such as minor crimes, murders, internal conflicts amidst Rohingyas, conflict between Rohingya community and the host community and other types of criminal activities. Almost all the people who have taken part in the survey have said that minor crimes have gone up in Cox’s Bazar in the recent past (n=558). Almost all the respondents from both genders (100% of females and 99% of males) share this perception. The study did not find any statistical differences among respondents with different religious affiliations as 99% of the Muslims, 100% of the Buddhists and 100% of the Hindus share this perception. The majority of respondents with different educational qualifications had the perception that murders have increased in Cox’s Bazar. Newspapers referring to law enforcing agencies have reported that 32 Rohingyas who were engaged with unlawful activities in the camps were murdered and got killed (Kuddus, 27 May 2019). It should be highlighted that almost all the respondents from all occupations except students (11%) have answered that they perceived an increase in the rate of minor crimes in the area

When asked about murders, 9 out of 10 respondents answered that murders had increased, in contrast to a tiny portion of the respondents who did not (n=558). Male respondents are slightly less likely (89%) to perceive a rise in murder in Cox’s Bazar compared with females (92%). No significant variation was found in the responses of the people with different religious affiliation. Statistically, 90% of the Muslims, 90% of the Buddhists and 94% of the Hindus have answered that murders had increased. It is worth mentioning that graduate respondents of the survey are less likely to perceive an increase in murders in comparison to respondents of other educational qualifications.

Among various professional groups, farmers, housewives, day-laborers, business persons and shop-keepers are more likely to perceive a rise in murders in their area compared to the fishermen, drivers, students, tailors and carpenters.

When asked, about 94% of the respondents of the survey said that internal conflict among the Rohingya community had increased (n=558). This is irrespective of gender. As for religious groups, Buddhists (100%) and Hindus (100%) are more likely to perceive an increase in internal conflict among Rohingyas compared to Muslims (94%). Respondents who have completed graduation and post-graduation are more likely than others to perceive increasing conflicts among Rohingyas. As for professional groups, more drivers (100%), business people (100%), service holders (98%), tailors (86%) and shop-keepers (88%) have this perception compared to other groups such as students, NGO workers and the unemployed.

The vast majority of respondents (92%) of the survey have the perception that conflict between the members of host community and Rohingya community is on the rise (n=588). There are some variations among groups in this regard. More male respondents of the survey hold this perception compared to female respondents whereas more highly education respondents hold this perception compared to less educated ones. Again, fewer Muslim respondents (91%) perceive a rise in inter-group conflict compared with Buddhists (100%) and Hindus (100%). The vast majority of the respondents from all professions share this perception. However, while 100% of the unemployed respondents have this perception, fewer carpenters (82%) than other occupations do.

When asked, over 90% of respondents of both genders said there was no change in other types of criminal activities (e.g. sexual harassment, bribery and land grabbing etc.) in Cox's Bazar. The perception rate of Muslim and Buddhist respondents do not vary in this regard, but fewer of the Hindu respondents share this perception. Across all occupations, the majority of respondents have perceived an increase in other types of criminal activities in the area. However, a significant portion of the respondents from among tailors (14%), service holders (13%), unemployed (11%), housewives (11%), farmers (10%) and fishermen (10%) did not. Moreover, respondents with educational qualifications of grade VI-X, graduate and post-graduate have said that they did not perceive change in other types of criminal activities in their area.

(c) Threat of terrorism

Respondents have also been asked about the incidence of terrorist threats in Cox's Bazar. About 77% of the respondents perceived an increase in terrorist threats in the district while 23% do not have this perception (n=557). There is statistically significant difference of perception among people of different age groups, as the following chi-squared test statistics Table 4.22 which reports that $\chi^2(5) = 17.253$ and $p < 0.005$.

Table 4.22. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on threat of terrorism.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	17.253 ^a	5	.004
Likelihood Ratio	16.645	5	.005

Linear-by-Linear Association	3.701	1	.054
N of Valid Cases	553		

a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.12.

However, the association between gender and the perception of increase in terrorist threats in Cox's Bazar was not found to be statistically significant. More female respondents (90%) are likely to hold this perception compared to male respondents (85%). More than three-fourth of the married respondents (78%) perceive an increase in such threats, as do 53% of unmarried and 64% of widowed respondents. Marital status has statistically significant relationship with the perception of increase in terrorist threats at $\chi^2 = 10.882, df = 2$ and $p = 0.004$ (see Table 4.23).

Table 4.23. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on marital status.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	10.882 ^a	2	.004
Likelihood Ratio	9.557	2	.008
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.738	1	.017
N of Valid Cases	528		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.65.

Far fewer of the Muslim respondents (75%) perceive increase in terrorist threats compared to the Buddhist (90%) and the Hindu (91%) respondents of the survey. More of the highly educated people (63% of graduates and 60% of post-graduates) share this perception compared to other education groups. In addition, the majority of respondents (77%) from all professional backgrounds have opined that the threat of terrorism has increased.

(d) Illegal small arms

With regards to the availability of illegal arms, 91% of the respondents perceived an increase while 9% of them do not (n=558). No variation was found in the perceptions of male and female respondents. More Buddhist (100%) and Hindu (97%) respondents perceived an increase in the availability of arms compared to Muslim (90%) respondents. As for education groups, 13% of the graduates and 20% of the post-graduates did not think there was such an increase. The majority of respondents from all occupations, except tailors (43%), service holders (15%), drivers (17%) and fisherman (20%), said that small arms have become more available in Cox's Bazar.

(e) Human trafficking

When asked about human trafficking, 73% of the respondents perceived that it has increased. However, 27% of respondent did not think it has increased (n=556). The majority of respondents between ages of 28 and 68 years are likely to perceive an increase in human trafficking, compared to two other age groups (18-28 years and 68-

87 years). This clearly indicates that perceptions of the respondents vary from age group to age group regarding human trafficking. This result of the survey is statistically significant at $x^2 = 29.847$, $df = 5$ and $p = 0.000$ (see Table 4.24).

Table 4.24. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on human trafficking.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	29.847 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	29.874	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.171	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	552		

a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.19.

In reply to the same question, similar proportions of male and female respondents perceived an increase in human trafficking. Marital status (Table 4.25) has statistically significant relationship with the perception of the increase in human trafficking ($x^2 = 12.844$, $df = 2$ and $p = 0.002$), with more married respondents (74%) expressing support for this claim compared to unmarried (53%) and widowed respondents (55%).

Table 4.25. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on marital status on human trafficking.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	12.844 ^a	2	.002
Likelihood Ratio	11.563	2	.003
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.761	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.07.

Buddhists (90%) and Hindu respondents (92%) held the perception of an increase in human trafficking. This compares with 71% of Muslim respondents who held such perception. This suggests that perceptions about human trafficking vary from religious group to religious group, and it is statistically significant at $x^2 = 8.188$, $df = 2$ and $p = 0.017$ (see Table 4.26).

Table 4.26. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on religion on human trafficking.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	8.188 ^a	2	.017
Likelihood Ratio	9.990	2	.007
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.824	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	544		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.70.

Mostly respondents with higher secondary (45%) and graduate (75%) degrees are likely to say that human trafficking has increased in Cox's Bazar. By contrast, 78% of respondents with no formal education, 73% of respondents with grade I-V education, 71% of respondents with grade VI-X education and 60% of post-graduates have said in answer to this question that there was an increase in human trafficking. More of the respondents from some occupational backgrounds, namely farmers (82%), housewives (74%), day-laborers (76%), drivers (75%), business people (76%), shopkeepers (77%) NGO workers (100%) and service holders (70%), perceived an increase of human trafficking. In comparison, fewer fishermen (60%), students (33%), tailors (43%) and the unemployed (44%) held this perception.

(f) The trade of fake ID cards

When asked about the use of fake national identification cards, 9 out of 10 persons perceived that the use of fake ID has increased (n=557). Men and women held this perception at an equal rate (91%). Except for 9% of the Muslim respondents, the overwhelming majority of respondents from all religious groups said that the fake ID card business had increased in the Cox's Bazar.

The majority of respondents from all educational backgrounds had this perception; the highest percentage of this response came from the group with grade XI-XII (95%) education and the lowest from the group of post-graduates (80%). Similarly, the majority of respondents from all occupational backgrounds thought there was an increase in the use of fake IDs, but 15% of day-laborers, 11% of the students, 14% of tailors, 11% of service holders and 22% of unemployed did not share this perception.

(g) Drug trafficking

Participants of the survey were asked about the recent trend in drug trades. The vast majority of respondents (96%) answered that drugs trade had gone up in recent time in Cox's Bazar (n=557). The majority of both male and female respondents gave this answer, although men were slightly more likely to support this option. The association between gender and drug trafficking perceptions is statistically significant at $\chi^2(1) = 6.426$ and $p = 0.011$ (see Table 4.27).

Table 4.27. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on drug trafficking.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Sig.Exact (2-sided)	Sig.Exact (1-sided)
Chi-Squared	6.462 ^a	1	.011		
Continuity Correction ^b	5.294	1	.021		
Likelihood Ratio	6.024	1	.014		
Fisher's Exact Test				.015	.013
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.450	1	.011		
N of Valid Cases	556				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.73. b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Almost all the respondents from three religious groups (96% of Muslims, 100% of Buddhists and 100% of Hindus) shared the perception that there was an increase in drugs trade. No statistically significant variation in the opinion of people of different educational qualifications was found. The majority of people from all occupational backgrounds appear to share this perception about drug business, including all of the day-laborers (100%), drivers (100%), shop-keepers (100%), carpenters (100%), tailors (100%), NGO workers (100%) and service holders (100%) among them.

4.2.4. Solution to the Rohingya Exodus: Return, Repatriation and Resettlement

The study posed several questions to respondents about return, repatriation and resettlement of Rohingya people. Figure 4.14 presents the percentage distribution of responses regarding different solutions to the Rohingya Exodus: return, repatriation and resettlement of Rohingyas.




Figure 4.14. Perceptions of the host community about return, resettlement and rehabilitation of Rohingyas.

(a) Perception about the repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar

In reply to a question about the repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar, almost all the respondents (588) said that the Rohingyas should be repatriated to their country of origin while only 1% of respondents has opposed to this proposed solution (n=593). This response was given by almost all the people from all the age groups, religious affiliations, educational backgrounds and professional groups. A very small number of housewife, day-laborers, carpenters and service holders did not agree with the proposed solution.

(b) Perceptions about the resettlement of Rohingyas into a third country

Just above 50% of the people (316) participating in the survey agreed with the proposed resettlement of Rohingya people in a third country compared to

approximately 48% of respondents (277) who have answered the negative (n=593). Respondents aged between 18-28 years and 68-78 years are more likely to disagree with this proposed solution compared to other age groups of the respondents. A chi-squared test was performed to test the relationship between age and support for resettlement into a third country. The differences in perceptions among respondents imply that the relationship is statistically significant at $\chi^2 = 20.383, df = 5$ and $p < 0.001$ (see Table 4.28).

Table 4.28. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on resettlement.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	20.383 ^a	5	.001
Likelihood Ratio	20.677	5	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.762	1	.029
N of Valid Cases	589		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.22.

Slightly more male respondents (56%) compared to female respondents (49%) agreed with the proposed solution of resettling Rohingya people in a third country. More Muslim respondents (48%) found this proposal disagreeable compared to Hindus (27%). All of the respondents from the Buddhist community (100%) agreed with this proposed solution. The Pearson chi-squared test results presented below show that the association between religion and the support for the resettlement into a third country is statistically significant at $\chi^2 = 15.102, df = 2$ and $p = 0.001$ (Table 4.29).

Table 4.29. Chi-squared test summary on third country repatriation.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	15.102 ^a	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	19.176	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.748	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	580		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.62.

Respondents who have completed secondary (51%), graduation (67%), and post-graduation (50%) are more likely to agree in comparison with the respondents with no formal education (46%) and grade I-IV (42%). Business persons, tailors, service holders, NGO workers and unemployed persons are more likely to agree with the proposal of resettlement of Rohingya people in a third country compared to people of other occupations such as farmers, fishermen, housewife, day-laborers, drivers, shopkeeper and students.

(c) Perceptions about the stay of Rohingyas in Bangladesh for a long time

When asked, nearly half of the people (48%) participating in the survey answered in favour of continuing providing assistance to Rohingyas during their stay in Bangladesh for a long time (it means until the situation is favourable in Myanmar for their return,

they will be forced to live for a longer period in Bangladesh). However, 52% have disagreed (n=593). There are statistically significant differences the replies to questions regarding continuing assistance for a long time. Over 60% of the respondents from two age groups (18-28 years and 68-78 years) are more likely to disagree with this proposed solution compared to people of the other four age groups (28-38 years, 38-48 years, 48-58 years and 59-68 years). Table 4.30 shows that it is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 30.549$, $df=3$ and $p<0.0005$).

Males (51%) who participated in the survey are more likely to support this proposed solution compared to the females (43%). Buddhists (90%) and Hindus (73%) are more likely to express their support compared to Muslims (46%) when asked about the proposal of providing long-term assistant to the Rohingya people. This difference in the perceptions of respondents across religious identities have been found to be statistically significant at the $\chi^2 = 16.936$, $df = 2$ and $p = 0.000$ (see Table 4.31).

Table 4.30. Pearson Chi-squared test summary on long-term stay.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	30.549 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	31.153	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.792	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	589		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.32.

Table 4.31. Pearson Chi-squared test summary based on religious belief.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	16.936 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	18.189	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	13.454	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	580		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.86.

It should also be highlighted that the higher education people have, the more likely they are to disagree with the proposed solution for the stay of Rohingyas in Bangladesh with long-term assistance. Statistically, 67% of post-graduates and 56% of graduates have said that Rohingyas should not be provided assistance to stay in Bangladesh for a long time. By contrast, 51% of respondents with no formal education and 48% of respondents who have completed grade I-V have disagreed with the proposed solution of the stay of Rohingyas in Bangladesh for a long time. Within professional groups, tailors, business persons, NGO workers and service holders are more likely to agree with this proposed plan, whereas the majority of the people from other occupations (e.g. farmers, fishermen, housewives, day-laborers, drivers, shopkeepers, carpenters and students) have disagreed.

A binary multiple logistic regression has been performed to measure the effects of the perception of increase in drug trade, availability of illegal arms as well as occupation and religion on the likelihood that the respondents of the survey support providing assistance to Rohingyas to stay in Bangladesh for a long time. The regression model can explain 37% of the variation in the support for the Rohingya people staying in Bangladesh with assistance for a long time (Nagelkerke R-square = 0.373), and the result of the Hosmer and Lameshow test demonstrates that the model can fit data at $\chi^2(4) = 2.999$ and $p = .809$. In addition, the model can classify correctly 83% of cases. The regression output in Table 4.32 demonstrates that respondents who perceives an increase in the availability of illegal arms are 3.9 times more likely to agree with the proposal for the providing assistance to stay of Rohingyas in Bangladesh for a long time.

Table 4.32. Variables in the equation on providing assistance to Rohingyas.

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Illegal arms availability	1.367	.741	3.405	1	.065	3.923
Foreign assistance to local people	2.318	.416	31.027	1	.000	10.158
Religious similarity	1.243	.441	7.944	1	.005	3.465
Helping Rohingyas	2.031	.555	13.391	1	.000	7.623
Constant	-3.154	1.138	7.683	1	.006	.043

However, the result is not statistically significant ($\beta = 1.367$, $OR = 3.923$ and $p = .065$). Moreover, participants of the survey who have agreed with the proposal of providing foreign assistance to local people are 10.2 times more likely to answer in favor of the Rohingyas staying in Bangladesh ($\beta = 2.318$, $OR = 10.158$ and $p = .000$). By contrast, the people who said that there is religious similarity between the host community and Rohingya community are 3.5 times more likely to agree with this proposed solution to the Rohingya Exodus ($\beta = 1.243$, $OR = 3.465$ and $p = .005$). Further, respondents who have said that marriage is a way of helping Rohingyas are 7.6 times more likely agree with it ($\beta = 2.031$, $OR = 7.623$ and $p = .000$).

(d) Perceptions about the role of international organizations

When asked, the vast majority of respondents (94%) have said that international organizations should play an active role in the repatriation of the Rohingya people to Myanmar. Only 6% of the respondents answered differently (n=597). Close to 10% of the respondents from the age group of 18-28 years have disagreed that international organizations should be involved in the repatriation process.

Almost all other groups have agreed with this proposed solution to the Rohingya Exodus. It is worth mentioning that there is no statistically significant variation in the perceptions of genders (95% male and 94% female) with regards to the role of international organizations in the Rohingya issue. Surprisingly, people of all religious groups (94% of Muslims, 100% Hindus and 100% of Buddhists) who took part in the survey have asserted that they think international organizations should have a role in

repatriating Rohingyas. People of all educational qualifications have also agreed with this proposed solution to the Rohingya crisis. By contrast, people irrespective of all occupations have agreed with it, except small variations in the perceptions of farmers, housewife, drivers, day-laborers, shopkeepers and carpenters.

(e) Perceptions about the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island

When asked whether they support the rehabilitation of displaced Rohingya populations into an isolated island of Bangladesh, 50% of respondents said yes and the other 50% disagreed (n=597). Statistically significant variations in the perceptions of the respondents of different age groups have been found $\chi^2 = 17.820, df = 5$ and $p = 0.03$ (see Table 4.33). In other words, respondents aged between 18 and 28 years are more likely to disagree with this proposed solution compared to other age groups. In particular, 59% of respondents from the age group of 38-48 years support the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh.

Table 33. Chi-squared test summary on rehabilitation of Rohingyas.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.820 ^a	5	.003
Likelihood Ratio	18.021	5	.003
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.681	1	.017
N of Valid Cases	589		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.48.

A slight difference was observed in the answers of male and female respondents to this survey question. 52% of male respondents and 47% of female respondents who took part in the survey said they support this proposed solution. Among religious groups, just over half of the Muslims respondents (52%) said that they support the proposal for the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island. On the other hand, 73% of Hindus and 100% of Buddhists agreed with this proposed solution to the Rohingya crisis.

The difference in answers by respondents from different religious groups to this question concerning the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh is statistically significant at $\chi^2(2) = 18.381$ and $p < 0.005$ (see Table 4.34).

Table 4.34. Pearson Chi-squared test summary based on gender segregation).

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	18.381 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	22.542	2	.000

Linear-by-Linear Association	12.566	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	580		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.93.

In addition, less than half of the total respondents from two groups (grade XI-XII and graduates) have supported this proposed solution compared to other four groups (no formal education, grade I-V, grade VI-X and post-graduates) with regards to the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh. Among professional groups, 56% of farmers, 70% of fishermen, 57% of housewives, 85% of drivers, 78% of shopkeepers, 64% of carpenters and 90% of the students have disagreed with this proposed solution while 57% of housewives, 49% of day-laborers, 61% of business persons, 71% of tailors and 61% of service holders have supported this proposed solution to the Rohingya crisis.

A multiple binary logistic regression has been run to examine the effects of perception of increase in murder, human trafficking, use of fake ID cards, terrorist threat, internal conflict among Rohingyas, profession and religion on the likelihood that people support the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh. It is worth mentioning that the model can explain 23% of the variation of the response variable (Nagelkerke R-square = .225), and the result of Hosmer and Lameshow test tells us that the models fits the data ($\chi^2 = 6.917, df = 5$ and $p = .227$). In addition, the model can also correctly classify 66% of cases. As the following regression output table (see Table 4.35), respondents of the survey who have reported “murders have increased in the Cox’s Bazar” are 4.2 times more likely to support the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh ($\beta = 1.442, OR = 4.231$ and $p = .001$).

Those people who have supported for the claim “human trafficking has increased” are 1.7 times more likely to support this proposed solution ($\beta = .548, OR = 1.730$ and $p = .047$). By contrast, respondents who perceive an increase in the trade of fake ID cards in the Cox’s Bazar are 0.13 times less likely to support for rehabilitating Rohingyas into an isolated island of Bangladesh ($\beta = -2.048, OR = .129$ and $p = .000$). However, people who have expressed their opinion that terrorist threats have increased are 2.9 are more likely to agree with the proposed solution ($\beta = 1.051, OR = 2.860$ and $p = .001$).

Table 4.35. Variables in the equation for support rehabilitation of Rohingyas.

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Murder	1.442	.424	11.571	1	.001	4.231
Human trafficking	.548	.276	3.937	1	.047	1.730
Fake ID cards	-2.048	.442	21.426	1	.000	.129
Terrorists threat	1.051	.316	11.086	1	.001	2.860
Internal conflicts amidst Rohingyas	1.908	.579	10.853	1	.001	6.739
Businessmen	.638	.202	9.951	1	.002	1.893
Muslims	-1.036	.335	9.551	1	.002	.355

Constant	-1.784	.683	6.822	1	.009	.168
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In addition, people who have reported “internal conflicts among Rohingyas have increased” are 6.7 more likely to support the plan of rehabilitating Rohingyas in Bangladesh ($\beta = 1.908, OR = 6.739$ and $p = .001$). Interestingly, supporting the rehabilitation of Rohingyas into Bangladesh is 1.9 times greater for business people compared to people of other occupations ($\beta = .638, OR = 1.893$ and $p = .002$). By contrast, Muslims are 0.36 are less likely to support the rehabilitation of Rohingyas compared to non-Muslims ($\beta = -1.036, OR = .355$ and $p = .002$).

(f) Perceptions about other solutions to the Rohingya crisis

Respondents were also asked whether there were other possible solutions with regards to the Rohingya Exodus, to which more than fourth-fifth of respondents (84%) have answered “no”, while only 16% have replied “yes”. A chi-squared test has been performed to measure the association between age and other solutions to the Rohingya Exodus. According to the statistical Table 4.36, the chi-squared test value is: $\chi^2(5) = 29.683$ and $p = 0.000$ which signifies that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that age is statistically associated with the support for other solutions to the Rohingya Exodus.

Table 4.36. Pearson’s Chi-squared test summary on other solutions.

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Squared	29.683 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	32.809	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.288	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	589		

a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.42.

Further, respondents aged less than 38 years are less likely to offer new suggestions compared to those who are above 38 years with regards to other solutions to the Rohingya crisis. Despite both male and female respondents having offered new suggestions regarding the solution to the Rohingya Exodus, males have offered other solutions at double the rate compared with their female counterparts.

To express it statistically, 19% of male respondents have come up with other solutions, while the percentage of female in this regard was 10%. Surprisingly, Hindus (24%) and Muslim respondents (16%) are more likely to offer other solutions to the Rohingya crisis whereas 100% of Buddhist have not offered any solution.

What is more interesting to add here is that respondents with different educational qualifications except graduate degree are more likely to suggest other solutions to the Rohingya crisis. The respondents of the survey have also shown their indifference with regards to the question about other solutions to the Rohingya exodus, although 36% of carpenters, 22% of unemployed, 20% of fishermen, 26% of day-laborers, 18% of

farmers and 19% of service holders have recommended other solutions to the Rohingya crisis.

4.2.5. Summary of Host Community Quantitative Analysis

Overall, what key insights can we draw from the host community survey with regards to impacts and solutions to the Rohingya problem? Although the majority of participants of this survey have agreed that the Rohingya exodus has brought a number of positive impacts at the local level such as new employment opportunities, demand of hotels and accommodation, local and foreign aid flow, construction of new roads and increase in commercial activities, qualitative interviews can be more useful in this regard to understand the dark side of positive impacts of the Exodus as several local key informants during their interviews have raised their concerns over the question of who are the real beneficiaries: local or outsiders, educated or illiterate, farmers or local businessmen, the wider local community or local administration? Now, the question is: what are the adverse impacts of the Rohingya exodus that the host community has witnessed? This survey reveals that perceived socio-economic implications of the Rohingya exodus include increased competition in the local business, price hike of daily commodities, scarcity of jobs, environmental destruction, decrease in land, outbreak of infectious disease and deterioration of social condition of women. In addition, the vast majority of respondents of the survey have also reported deterioration of education at the local level and their sense of deprivation of local and foreign aid.

On the law and order side, this exodus has contributed to grow a sense of fear and insecurity amongst host community population, who also perceived that criminal violence, threat of terrorism, illegal arms, human trafficking, the use of fake national IDs and drug trafficking has been in rise. In terms of solution of the Rohingya crisis, this survey result demonstrates that the host community has expressed their strong support for the repatriation of Rohingyas into their country of origin and the role of international organizations has been lighted in addressing this crisis. Respondents of this survey have put less emphasis on three other options for addressing Rohingya crisis: resettlement into a third country, provide support for their longer stay in Bangladesh and rehabilitation into an island of Bangladesh.

4.3. Qualitative Analysis: Rohingya Population

The qualitative section is written based on data collected through the 4 FGDs and 33 key informant surveying (see supplementary document S6 and S7). This section relies on qualitative data, which includes narratives of Rohingya to allow them to air their voices and to highlight their concerns. By adopting such an approach, the study adds the Rohingya' perspective to the study of their plight, such as violations of their human rights in Myanmar, fleeing their homeland, lives at the camps and repatriation issues.

4.3.1. Life in Myanmar and Decision to Leave

Rohingya' lives in Myanmar - most notably in the last ten years - have been shaped by systemic violations to their human rights by the Myanmar government and its military forces. In Myanmar they have experienced denial of their basic rights, denial

of facilities and services, physical violence, torture, destruction of property, religious persecution, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), military attacks and restrictions on movement (FGDs no. 1 and 2). All contributed to their departure from their homeland and to them seeking safety in Bangladesh. It seems that the decision to leave their homes, property and the way they used to live was not easy, but in the end hundreds of thousands of Rohingya decided to leave, and in most cases in a hurry. They did not have time to take with them what was needed for their journey to safe refuge. The following section will discuss reasons for fleeing Myanmar as viewed by focus group and key informant respondents. These reasons were violence, denial of civil rights, destruction of assets and livelihoods, ethnic discrimination and identity card and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).

4.3.2. Violence

Violence as a major reason for fleeing Myanmar was mentioned by many respondents in both focus group discussions and key informant interviews. People have been subject to violence in several ways and witnessed many of these acts, including their own assets being burnt down by the army, their neighbours' houses set on fire, the torture of relatives, the killing of family members and on many occasions the raping of female relatives. Here it is worth mentioning that violence, as revealed by many respondents, was a common denominator and linked to other factors that led to them fleeing Myanmar, as the following sections will show. A female key informant (no. 9) said:

“I ran away in fear as the police and military in Burma set neighbouring houses on fire. The army in fact came several times. Once they burned down my husband supplies, so he had to shut down his (construction) business”.

Another female respondent recalled her own terrifying experience by narrating “This time I saw that they were shooting guns, firing from planes, take away men and cut them down in front of my very eyes” (KII no. 11). Another female key informant (no. 16) said:

“Suddenly we heard the news that our village (there were 5-7 houses) was being attacked. Before we could leave the house by packing all our gold and money, they surrounded us and tied us up. They took away all the money and jewellery in my possession and even the car”.

Torture and killing of relatives were also mentioned by some respondents as the following narratives showed:

“The Rakhine army captured my husband and my son through a Rakhine translator. They tied them up. They slit his fathers' throat in front of my son. I was detained in a place beside this. I heard my son's wails as he watched his blood-soaked father. Around 10 army members beat up my husband and then decapitated him with a sharp weapon. They killed my son. I was hit as I was screaming....they wrapped my husband's and son's dead bodies in tarpaulin. I could not even burry them. I am so very sad that they did not return them to me. If I had

buried them. I would have been able to visit their graves if I ever went back to Myanmar in this life” (KII no. 16).

This was supported by data gathered from male discussion groups (no. 1), as the following narrative from a respondent revealed:

“After an incident between Muslim Rohingyas and Marmas², there was a lot of violence. The army and Marmas burned down our villages. That’s when we left. We could not stay any longer after our houses burnt down. Around three thousands houses burnt down in my village. They were shooting bullets at us. Many of us died. Many old people, unable to come out of the house, and small children were burnt alive”.

The above narratives reveal that the actors of violence were the police, the military in Burma, the Rakhine army and the Marmas. I will later discuss how the involvement of Marmas/locals in violence affected the relationship between the Rohingya and Rakhine, notably in neighbourhood settings.

4.3.3. Denial of Civil Rights

Violence also affected the education of children as revealed by data gathered from key informants, which demonstrates positive correlation between violence in Myanmar and disturbance of children's education. This is supported by the following narratives from a female key informant (no. 17):

“The young boys went to school in Myanmar and young daughters to madrasah; they stopped going during the fighting because all schools, madrassas, mosques were put under lock and key. Whenever girls used to go out of the house, they would be harassed”.

The Rohingya were also denied the right to progress through their education by other means; these included their studies being limited to grade six and they were rarely able to progress beyond that grade. Before 1992 some tried to use false names to be able to study, but this stopped being the case as discrimination became widespread and the Rohingya people could be identified by their physical appearance (Male focus group discussion (no. 1). This issue of physical appearance as a base of discrimination against the Rohingya is supported by the official narratives, as the above literature review has demonstrated.

The Rohingya could not even get educational materials such as textbooks unless they paid a tax of bribe as expressed by a male teacher in male only focus groups (no. 1). The Rohingya were also denied the ability to run their own informal schools (madrassah). A madrassah teacher (FGD no.1) narrated:

“On the day the government asked us to keep the madrassah closed, we would have to; otherwise we would be tortured. They used to ask us

² Marmas are the local Buddhist communities residing in Rakhine state, they are also known as Rakhine people or Mog people or Arakanese

to keep madrassa close whenever they wishes. I had to do according to Burma government's wish. When they put restriction sounding".

Denial of rights and discrimination against the Rohingya in Myanmar also included their civil right to marry, which was made complicated and full of bureaucratic procedures. These included the requirement to "get permission from the Myanmar government, pay fees and wait for up to a year to get the permission" as expressed by a male in a focus group discussion (no. 1). Their movement was also restricted, as revealed by a male respondent in a focus group discussion (no. 1) who said "No restriction for the Rakhine while we need permit for everything – raising cattle, getting medical help, moving from one place to another – in everything". The Rohingya also risked being searched or stopped from going outside their village if found walking in the afternoon and could be arrested if found wondering at night (woman key informant no. 16).

Restriction on religious practices is evident in preventing the Rohingya from practicing the way they used to pray, which involves praying in a group of more than six people. However, this was restricted by the Myanmar regime, which constrained their group prayer in mosque to not more than six people, as mentioned in a male focus group (no. 2).

4.3.4. Destruction of Assets and Livelihoods

Destruction of assets and livelihoods was another factor that forced people to leave their homeland. A woman whose husband was first reluctant to leave narrated:

"After the making of women sit on the mosque...I told my husband to come before, but he said "where would we go leaving our own place". This time after returning from 3 days hiding he told me, 'get ready, we are going'. I suggested carrying a round pan to cook on the way but he said no" (KII no. 11).

Exploitation of farmers was raised by a woman who revealed that in order to secure their livelihoods such as rice farming, some of the Rohingya had to give soldiers some of their rice harvest (KII no. 16). Fishermen were also exploited and forced to pay tax for their catching. A man in a male only focus group (no. 1) said "we had to pay tax for fishing. If 20 fishermen earned 5 lakh, half of it would have to be given away. Those who had shops to sell different goods were forced to "sell them off at a lower price within the locality of the *mogs or Marmas*. A man who was a shopkeeper mentioned "I had to pay tax in order to buy inventory for my shop. When I failed, they would snatch away the products. This was done by the police and the Myanmar army" (FGD no. 1).

Other forms of exploitation included forcing them to work as labourers in construction of houses and roads. If they refused to do so they would be beaten (KII no. 16). Forced labour exploitation is a form of modern slavery. Apart from the physical harm the beating would cause, it is also a humiliating act. Forced labour and labour exploitation of the Rohingya is confirmed by the literature mentioned above.

4.3.5. Ethnic Discrimination and Identity Card

Rohingya people are discriminated against in Myanmar. Although no respondent has mentioned it as a sole reason for fleeing, it was mentioned as a factor, among others, which contributed to their leaving home (KII no. 12). The ethnic discrimination is also evident by the government's efforts and actions to strip the Rohingya of their citizenship rights by issuing them a new identity card. This new card is seen by many Rohingya as a symbol not only to officially perpetuate ethnic discrimination against them but also to strip them of their identity as Rohingya in Myanmar. In this sense, many individuals including the respondents refused to take the card. In return, those who refused were attacked, tortured and some were killed. Respondents spoke about their experience in relation to these new identity cards and how the government forces tried to force them to accept the card. A female key informant (KII no. 16) narrated:

“The Myanmar forces with red headband surrounded our village in order to distribute a special card. When we refused to take the card, they attacked, tortured and murdered. That card was against our freedom. Had we had accepted the card, we would have become outsiders. Prisoners of the Myanmar authorities in all aspects including banking, agriculture and transport. We would have been named Bengali...to protect the freedom of religion and movement, we refused to accept the card”.

Identifying the Rohingya as ‘Bengali’ by the government is meant to deny them equal access to education and employment opportunities mentioned earlier. A male key informant (no. 18), who completed class ten and then worked as a teacher for over ten years said:

“We could not get any jobs. We had to earn by whatever means we could. It has been like this since I have been born. There was a bit less restriction before, now it is worse. The Burmese government does not consider us to be citizens of the county; they call us ‘Bengali’. They say, so why do you need an education in this country? They tried to shut down the schools. They did not allow studying after class ten”.

A male key informant (no. 12) voiced some aspects of discrimination between Rakhine people and Rohingya by saying:

“Rakhine people have free access to travel..., but Rohingya Muslims are discriminated. Laws are different only for Rohingyas. They call us illegal immigrant Bengali, not Rohingya. They call us ‘*colla*’. So, it is a kind of discrimination which indicates lower level or marginal level people. Because of skin Colour, they call us *colla*”.

He added:

“Discrimination is a major problem. When a Muslim of Rakhine is arrested, it has a brutal consequences over entire community. Before ethnic discrimination had begun, we Rohingya and Rakhine people same national documents. After discrimination action plan, our documents were invalid before authorities”.

4.3.6. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Women and girls have become vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence. Many of those who survived shootings and killings were tortured and raped. The army was abusing its power and "...sometimes take away young women" as stated by a female key informant, in camp 3, (KII no. 16). None of the respondents mentioned that the perpetrators were brought to justice. Narratives from those who witnessed the capturing of girls confirmed the abuse of women and girls, stating that "members of the army tortured women and girls in front of our eyes. In the hills they deliberately raped women in front of our eyes. When I remember I still cry" (Female key informant, no. 17). Then she added:

"The army members snatched away my sister in law and two of my female sisters, took them to the hills and raped them. Two of the women returned in bad shape and I have heard that another woman was in critical condition".

Rape and the degradation of women is used by many perpetrators as a weapon with which to hurt the community. It seems that the Myanmar military regime and its forces was using SGBV, notably rape as a weapon against the Rohingya, to both hurt women directly and to degrade their families and communities.

Violence and discrimination against the Rohingya have damaged their relationship with their non-Rohingya neighbours. A woman key informant (KII no. 17) described how the violence affected their relationship with Rakhine by saying:

"They used to live nearby; they used to come to the canal to collect water and wash clothes and we used to try and keep a good relationship. After the incident our relationship deteriorated. They provided information about us to the army".

Another woman key informant (no. 11) confirmed the involvement of some Rakhine '*mogs*' (or *Marmas* or Rakhine people) in the violence against the Rohingya and then said they came from different neighbourhoods and that the Rakhine '*mogs*' in her neighbourhood went to other areas to commit violence against the Rohingya. Committing violence outside one's own residential areas could be explained by arguing that the '*mogs*' in the neighbourhood did not feel comfortable being involved in violence against their Rohingya neighbours, or perhaps more likely wanted to abuse the Rohingya but did not want to be identified by their neighbours, so they preferred to commit violence in different areas, where they were not known to the residents.

A man in a male only focus group (no. 1) said "not all *mogs* were the same – some were good, some bad". The bad ones "...accompanied the police as assistants when they attacked us. They mainly work as collaborators for the police and help the police by supplying various information". A further narrative revealed that "*mogs* assisted the police by giving information" (FGD no. 1). However, a male key informant in camp 3 (KII no. 12) seemed to have a different view. He was asked "Were the Rakhine near your village good people"? He replied "Yes. They didn't say lie". Although the informant did not elaborate, his narrative demonstrated a positive perception of his Rakhine

neighbours. Another positive view came from a male key informant (no. 18) who narrated:

“The (Rakhine) people did not create problems, army and the police did. There was curfew after 8:00pm....If they could catch anyone outside the block after 8:00, they would capture them and take them to the office to beat them up and put them in jail”.

The above narratives reveal different opinions, therefore it would be misleading to group all Rakhine people as anti-Rohingya. The issue of the relationship between the Rohingya and Rakhine in Arakan needs to be considered in any future repatriation plan.

4.3.7. Journey to the Unknown

Many of the Rohingya who escaped violence had to walk days and nights to reach Bangladesh. Their journey was long and in many occasions was associated with violence. Some of them felt sick but were able to continue their journey. Some were unfortunate and lost their lives on the way to safety and others witnessed the murder of their relatives. “...on the way my eldest son was murdered. They tied me up and killed my son in front of me”, said a key informant mother (KII no. 16). Physical abuse, torture and the killing of male relatives have been mentioned in narratives of many Rohingya refugees in several camps in Bangladesh.

In some cases people walked for several days before reaching a safe destination, as expressed by many respondents. A female key informant (no. 9), said “I walked 14 days straight. I had nothing but a bundle of clothes. My legs were swollen”. Another widow had to walk 13 days with her children, starving and walking over many dead bodies. Her journey was disturbed when she was detained by Myanmar forces at the border before they released her to continue her journey and she finally arrived in Bangladesh (KII no. 16). Another woman explained her terrifying journey without proper food or water. She said:

“I walked for 4 days to come here. There was no food, only water on the way. After coming here, at first I could not find my husband. I had two sons, I could not bring one, had to leave behind, died??” (KII no. 10).

Others fled asset-less, leaving behind their homes and in some cases wealth and successful businesses (KII no. 9). That meant arriving in the camps without any assets to help them rebuild their lives. Narratives from interviews and key informant data show a pattern of males/husbands fleeing first, leaving their wives and children behind without any means of protection from violence, but hoping the family would join them later.

This trend of men/husbands fleeing first and leaving their families behind could be attributed to three main factors. First, the military first targeted men and kept searching for those who tried to hide themselves for fear of capture, torture and death. A male key informant (no. 12) said:

“...sector commander sent me a letter to visit him. Then I hide myself when police and border guard inspected my area. After I crossed Buthisong, Mongdu, entered Bangladesh, I stayed in Rothidong”.

Second, in such a traditional society like Rohingya society, men were the main providers and protectors of their communities and families. By capturing men, the livelihood and protection of the family would often be jeopardised. Third, perhaps men were more mobile than women, who in many cases needed to take their children with them.

On the way to safety, survivors of violence and torture witnessed their neighbours, relatives and friends, who were unable to make it and complete their journey to safety captured, tortured or killed. A woman who witnessed the killing of her relatives praised God for being alive “they had us lie face down on the ground. We were spared unharmed by the grace of Allah” (KII no. 17). Here it is worth mentioning that religion is a strong factor in violence and alleged genocide against the Muslim Rohingya. People were abused while they were praying in mosques, their mosques were destroyed. A widow whose husband had two shops in Rakhine and was a local chairman who was killed there narrated “Myanmar army desecrated the religious places; they even entered mosques with shoes on and urinated inside. They desecrated the religious book” (KII no. 17). This is an insult to holy places which are often places for calm, worships and prayers. This was supported by a narrative from a male who used to be a farmer before fleeing Myanmar, he said:

“...they put restriction on sounding the azan with mic, we could not use mics for azan anymore. If someone did, they would be tortured. Sometimes they would deter you from praying after azan. We used to put children on the lookout as we prayed. When we congregated from *Namaz*, the government would see conspiracy in it. Out of this suspicion the government would ask us to not to pray together. If some people disobeyed, they would open fire. Many people died while praying this way” (FGD no 1).

On the way to safety many were unable to even take what was needed for their journey, which included kitchen utensils for cooking. The vast majority have headed for Bangladesh and “on the way some had to ask for direction” (KII no. 11). People did not have time to prepare for their departure or to pack their belongings. Some thought it would be a short term disturbance and they would be back home soon (3-6 months). Nevertheless, their journey was long and often filled with horror. For some it was a journey to the unknown during which, and before reaching a safe destination, some were captured and tortured, others lost their lives. Some left in a hurry without any plan on which direction to take as the case with a male respondent who narrated:

“We did not even have a plan that we were coming to Bangladesh. After the army burnt down the houses, we took shelter in the woods. When all the habitats burnt down, we took position in the border area. We did not have any idea about what we were doing, where we were going; finally we decided to cross the water” (FGD no. 1).

4.3.8. Current State of Rohingya in the Camps

Some of the Rohingyas in the camps started making their own shelter before they received any support from NGOs or the government as revealed by the following narrative from a male respondent who relied on the labour of his family to construct their own house:

“...one member from each of our families collectively finished cutting down the woods. We cleared the forest and built houses there. At first the houses were made of bamboo and polythene. At first we made arrangement for our own toilettes by digging holes on the ground. We cut down the trees within a limited area where there was permission...later on we received construction materials from the various NGOs” (FGD no. 1).

In the following subsections we have elaborated how the Rohingya managed their daily lives at the camps, which included access to humanitarian assistance, health services, state of security, SGBV, men losing their breadwinning status and their perception of the host community.

(a) Access to humanitarian assistance

The Rohingya in the camps received support from local and international NGOs as well as the Bangladesh government (KII no. 9). The government provided shelter, though this was often not appropriate for families with children. A family with a wife, husband and three children (one of them aged 12) was given a room to share (KII no. 9). The government also provided ration cards for people to get food from different shops (KII no. 9). People also got firewood instead of gas for cooking (KII no.10), along with food items such oil, lentils and rice as well as non-food items including plastic mats and blankets. No cash was given to them. However, not all families received gas and an expert from *The Daily Star* suggested “subsidised kerosene” for all camp residents (KII no. 1).

Food distributed by humanitarian agencies was often not enough, especially for families with children. A widow whose husband was shot dead in Myanmar and who arrived to the camp with two children said “I get in trouble when the ration runs out. Because we get a supply of rice rather than any green grocery (vegetables), sometimes we do not get to eat” (KII no. 15).

Another single parent revealed that “Food items distributed lacked vegetables and without vegetables medications would not work if you get sick” (KII no. 16). This narrative reveals the importance of variety when food items were distributed.

(b) Access to health services

Health services at the camps were provided by NGOs (KII no.1). These services were mainly primary health care services (KII 03). The director of HMBD Foundation said:

“...in health they are being given primary care not specialist care or complete treatment. Symptomatic treatment is covered although they can be referred to other hospitals for specialist care and this may be paid for” (KII no. 3).

Access to health services was available during the day only. A female key informant (no. 15) mentioned that “doctors leave the camp at night and if there is a problem at night, one has no means to address it. Access to health services has been quite a hassle since the beginning”. Another female respondent said “The problem I face here is lack of good medicine. My husband has diabetes and we have to get medicine from far away” (KII no. 10).

Victims of torture or those who witnessed torture, notably children, had experiences flashbacks as expressed by a single mother who said:

“My youngest one cries every day for his father and others in the family console him. Whatever at night someone enters the camp with a torch light he calls out ‘father’!, and goes towards them. In the middle of the nights he stays up waits for his father, repeatedly asks me where father is” (KII no. 16).

Despite that there seems to be no psychological support for those who have been tortured, abused, raped and/or witnessed the torture and killing of their relatives and neighbours. No respondent who was victim of such atrocity mentioned any psychological support at the camp or outside the camps. This may leave the victims to suffer in silence and mean that they take longer to recover as a result.

(c) State of security

Some believe that law and order were maintained in the camps (KII no. 18) and there were no issues of concern as the authorities were taking care of it (KII no. 12). In contrast to Myanmar, people felt more secure at the camps. A male key informant added “I think refugee camp is better than Rakhine’s worse situation, where I cannot save my life. If I was there in Burma, I was killed” (KII no. 12).

Rohingya at the camps were also responsible for the security and safety of the camps on a voluntary basis. Apart from being involved in food distribution, *majhis* were also part of the security system to safeguard the camps. Their roles included protecting the camp and acting as bodyguards watching elephants or thieves. The latter were believed to be some refugees coming from other camps (not from the local community). If suspecting any serious crimes such as murder, the *majhi* would alert the camp residents using a microphone (FGD no. 1). To keep order and to resolve conflicts between families, a committee of 20 people was formed to trial/deal with such matters. However, in the case of serious crimes, notably when arms such as machetes were used, the case was then dealt with by the Camp in Charge (CIC) (FGD no. 1).

Trafficking of children and women was raised in a male only focus group discussion (no. 1), but it was mentioned that they heard about it rather than witnessing trafficking cases. To safeguard the community against trafficking, young men became involved in guarding camps, such as Camp 3 in Modhurchara (FGD no. 1).

(d) SGBV

A Women's Rights Officer with Action Aid working in the camps raised her concerns on SGBV at the camps and stated that child marriage was on rise at the camps and that some women were forced into prostitution to earn an income. Other forms of SGBV such as beating of women and rape were also evident (KII no. 4). Some houses also lacked proper locks which made the women heading the households feel unsafe at night, and there were some incidents of trafficking (KII no. 4).

Here it is worth mentioning that although experts (KII no. 4) had raised their concerns on SGBV, the issue was nearly absent from focus group discussions as well as key informant interviews. This could be attributed to two main factors. First, as indicated by the Women's Rights Officer with Action Aid, SGBV was often seen as an internal family matter, which had to be solved within the household (KII no. 4). However, a respondent in a male focus group (no. 1) mentioned that violence within the household, notably between women and men was solved by a group of people locally known as "*Alems*" (or the educated people) and the "*Majhis*" (or block level Rohingya representatives in the camps in Cox's Bazar)", who would meet with the couple and give them advice not to fight again. Second, making domestic disputes known to the public was sometimes associated with shame as mentioned by the Women's Rights Officer with Action Aid (KII no. 4). However, if the domestic dispute continued then *Alems* would refer the case to CIC or the army to solve it (FGD no. 1).

(e) Men losing their bread-winning status

Some husbands who were unable to provide for their families as they used to before leaving their homeland were seen by their wives in a negative way. A woman whose husband was no longer able to provide a proper shelter and a sustainable way of living referred to her husband as a "zombie" (KII no. 9). This metaphoric referral implies two things. First, it reveals the powerless of the husband after losing his livelihood as a result of the traditional gender role which views men as providers. Second, it seems that the husband had no skills required for the jobs available at the camps, such as daily labourer. His wife narrated that "the husband did major work in Burma. He does not know how to do the work of a day labourer available in the camp" (KII no 9).

No respondents mentioned any means of livelihood at the camps. Total dependency on relief materials is evident. A male key informant spoke of how he tried to make himself busy and offered help to his new community by, for example, reporting to NGOs the absence of latrines and bathrooms and arranged with these NGOs to build them (KII no. 18). The key informant (KII no. 18) who used to work as a teacher in Myanmar but had to escape to camp 3, Block J says:

"There is nothing to do in the camp all day. I go to mosque, pray and read Koran. Then I walk around. Today I went for a meeting with the head *Majhi* and then came to this tea stall".

In this sense, it seems that both NGOs and the government were focusing on providing relief materials while providing little, if any, help to the Rohingya refugees at the camp to rebuild new livelihoods.

(f) Perception on host community

Narratives from Rohingya who arrived to the camps in Bangladesh expressed positive views and hospitality from the host community, notably in camp blocks where the local population were residents with the Rohingya refugees. In Camp 3, Block J, for instance, there were five Bangladeshi families living in the camp (KII no 18). Many of the interviewees expressed positive views on how the host community treated them. A male key informant (KII no. 18) said:

“We are brothers to village people. We are living in their space. In my block there are five families... The army has made cards for them as well so they get grains. If there is an opportunity to get something with token, they also get the chance. We collect those things for them”.

The hospitality of the host population was expressed by many respondents: “...the local people came forward to help us, each from their own position. The local people sacrificed a lot for us”, as expressed by a man in focus group discussion (no. 1). They gave us a lot of support to the bigger Rohingya families”, as narrated by a man in a men only focus group (no. 1). Another male respondent responded to a question related to complaints of local people by narrating “We are not here to cultivate land. We have heard nothing about land encroachment in Kutupalong. We did not encroach upon anyone’s land, we got it through UNHCR” (KII no. 1).

4.3.9. Return, Repatriation and Resettlement

The Rohingya expressed different views on return, repatriation and resettlement. Their views were mainly related to the security situation in Myanmar, citizenship rights (KII no. 18), and connections they have in Bangladesh. Others simply left it for the government of Bangladesh to decide for them. The latter was expressed by a woman who said “we will do according to the (Bangladesh) government’s action” (KII no. 9), but then added “we will go back if they give us ‘Rohingya’ status. We have no job here, what would we do there when we return empty handed? They have to give us a house and cattle” (KII no. 9). Two main issues arise from this narrative as condition for return. First, the issue of status/citizenship was a pre-condition for return and seemed to be a crucial issue, as demonstrated by the literature mentioned above. A male key informant narrated: “...we actually want to go back to Rakhine, if our nationality and citizenship is reassured or granted. Our hope is going back to Myanmar” (KII no. 12). Being identified as Rohingya not “Bengali”, and recognising their Rohingya citizenship were mentioned by some respondents as an important issue. A male key informant (KII no. 18) said:

“We want to go back to Burma but they have to stop calling us Bengalis. The people of the world call us Rohingya and they have to as well. If they recognise us a ‘Rohingya’ – one ethnicity like the 135 other ethnicities – we will be able to live like the rest of them; we will get the things they get, be it house or land. So citizenship is the important thing”.

Second, as mentioned earlier people fled with no assets either because they did not have time to pack their belongings, and/or because their assets, including houses

were burned down. Therefore, in order to return people demanded shelter and a means, such as cattle to rebuild their destroyed livelihood.

A female key informant (KII no. 16) said:

“Please tell the world about the torture and about the conditions needed for repatriation. The conditions are – justice, return of lost property, rebuilding of houses, security of life, freedom of movement, arrangement of livelihood. If these are given, we will go back”.

Her narrative illustrates that security and livelihood were at the heart of return issues and this raised a question of whether the international community and the Bangladeshi government would facilitate a repatriation process, bearing in mind these burning issues expressed by the Rohingya in the camps, which included no return to violence, attacks, and no destroying of properties “if we go back to Myanmar without guarantee, we will be murdered” (KII no. 17). The respondent added “It is my request to Bangladesh authorities that they repatriate us in Myanmar only after proper justice and ensuring a just situation. Do not repatriate us without ensuring the proper environment” (KII no. 17). This proper environment as stated by many respondents was very relevant to their return and violence free environment.

The involvement of the UN and the UNHCR in the repatriation process was required as expressed by a male respondent in a focus group discussion, who also narrated “we will go if peace and security is ensured under the supervision of the UN and the UNHCR. The UN must be allowed to judge the condition (good/bad) of repatriation. We will definitely return if we are recognised as Rohingya” (FGD no. 1). The role of the UN in the repatriation process was confirmed by an Oxfam International Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Advisor in Bangladesh, but she added involvement of other powerful actors, mainly China, Russia and India (KII no. 2).

4.3.10. Summary from Rohingya Qualitative Analysis

Narratives of the Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh and resided in camps revealed several factors that triggered their departure from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Escaping violence was mentioned by the majority of respondents as the most significant factor. Other factors for fleeing the homeland included denial of their civil rights, such as their fundamental rights to education and employment and their right to marriage without restrictions. Women suffered from SGBV and some were separated from their families, tortured, raped or/and killed.

Violence has also damaged the social relationship between the Rohingya and Rakhine neighbours. Some of monks in neighbourhoods were involved in the violence against the Rohingya and others provided intelligence to the army.

When life at the homeland became unbearable the Rohingya had to flee seeking safety in Bangladesh, where the Rohingya were accommodated in camps. At the camps they received relief materials from different aid agencies as well as services from the Bangladeshi government. Their opinions on their life there revealed sense of security and positive views on the host community. However, being recipients of aid without the ability to rebuild their livelihood was viewed negatively, notably by wives

whose husbands lost their former livelihood and were unable to develop a new one at the camp.

Returning to Myanmar requires the resolution of issues linked to security, livelihood, freedom of movement, justice and recovering of assets as well as being identified as Rohingya, instead of Bengali. However, international actors, notably the UNHCR, have a leading role to play to facilitate a voluntary departure when the conditions in Myanmar have dramatically changed.

4.4. Qualitative Analysis: Host Community Perception

The following sub-sections of this chapter attempt to elucidate and analyse wider impacts of Rohingya exodus on the local host community. These impacts are mainly divided into two categories: socio-economic implications and impacts on safety and security. This part of the report also highlights host community perception and expert opinion of possible repatriation and rehabilitation of Rohingya people to their home country. Please see supplementary documents S6 and S7 for detailed narratives.

4.4.1. Socio-Economic Implications

Socioeconomic implications have been discussed under the categories of prices of daily essentials, scarcity of jobs, environmental destruction, impact on agriculture, impact of education, impact on social bonding and sense of deprivation. It has been observed that the impacts of Rohingya influx is mixed – some sectors and some groups of people are experiencing benefits from the sudden and massive increase in population while some others are suffering.

(a) Price of daily essentials

Almost all the respondents from KIIs and FGDs said that the prices of daily commodities are increasing in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh especially in the camp adjacent area, (Kutupalong and Nayapara) because the demand of daily commodities is very high in the camp area. The prices of daily essentials like fish, vegetables etc. have increased immensely. For example, the price of potatoes in the Cox's Bazar Sadar is 20 BDT/KG and the price of potatoes in the market alongside the Rohingya camp is 40 BDT/KG (interview 26). A college teacher (ibid) from the study area responded that:

“We used to make the market/shopping on those days from the UKHIYA BAZAR, UKHIYA (Adjacent to camp). But now we could not buy our daily commodities from the market because of huge price hike. We have to buy our daily commodities from Cox's Bazar”.

Respondents of a FGD (No 03) reveals that Rohingya people sell daily essentials such as rice, lentil (DAL), oil etc. to the local people at a cheaper price. A local representative (interview 08) confirmed the claim and mentioned that the low market price of rice is good for those who buy rice to eat but not for those who cultivate rice to sell. He further added that everything except oil, rice and soap has gone up more than double in price. For instance, whereas 3 bundles of water cabbages were sold

for BDT 15 before the Rohingya exodus, just one bundle was sold at 15 BDT (interview 31) after the exodus. So according to an academic (ibid) the low income people may not be able to buy the vegetable that is perhaps the only food item for them to intake. On the other hand a local politician (interview 14) interestingly said that local businessmen have also been benefited from this crisis as Rohingya people sell some of the aid commodities that they receive from various organizations. So the local people get quality daily goods at a cheaper price.

(b) Scarcity of jobs

Rohingya workers used to work on less payment in the day labour market and the availability of the Rohingya is higher than the local people. Our respondents of KIIs and participants of the FGDs said that the day labourer used to earn BDT 500-700 per day by selling their labour. However, after the influx of the Rohingya, the price of day labour has reduced to BDT 150-300. People also prefer Rohingya people as day labourer due to their cheap labour. For this relatively low rate, the local laborers are falling behind and falling into hardship. According to a local representative (interview 08) the cheap labour would not do better in the long run for our host community as he said:

“It is true that the Rohingya people work for a lot less price but employing Rohingya laborers for anything other than digging soil or something else will incur loss because they are inexperienced and therefore may not do the work properly”.

Participants of a FGD (No 03) claimed that the local people do not get job in NGOs rather they (NGOs) mostly recruit people from other parts of Bangladesh. We also get a reverse finding from some other interviews. A few number of respondents said that there is a positive impact of Rohingya influx in the local community. They point out that new employment and income opportunities have also been created due to the arrival of Rohingya people. Some people have got secured jobs in various NGOs and INGOs operating in the camp area. For example, a respondent working in a camp (interview 20) stated that -

“I am a university graduate who was unemployed; the government could not provide me a job or I could not get one for myself. Since the NGOs came I have been able to find an employment. But not all families have members with the ability to work”.

However, an executive director (interview 03) of a national NGO that works on Rohingya health issue in the camp area said that there is employment for all those who are literate. Even students have good salary jobs. This has a good impact as they can help their family but also a bad impact as they do not continue to study and when the NGOs leave, they will be unemployed.

(c) Environmental destructions

“First of all, I have lost my forest and hill forever. Secondly, I have lost the natural settings of my area. Finally, I have lost my agricultural land”.

The above statement was given by a local politician (interview 24) in an interview. Actually, the environmental consequences are most severe in the area and the environmental impacts of this crisis are manifold. Deforestation is the most visible consequence of this crisis. The whole camp area used to be a forest area. Now, it will be difficult to find any tree inside the camps as the makeshift camps were built destroying the forest of the area. Not only the trees but also the hills have also been destroyed to build the makeshift camps. As the hills become barren due to deforestation, the risk of landslide has also increased (interview 14).

Another respondent addressed that the trees held the place together and now the trees including their roots have gone, there is a big threat of landslide so he urged that there is a need for reforestation and replanting, this has started but it is too little and too late (interview 6). Almost 10,000 acres of forest have completely been destroyed to set up camps for the Rohingya people. A respondent (interview 20) informed that he learnt from local NGOs that the loss of a small forest cost us 700 dollars. *We observed a discrepancy in rainfall rate at this area. On an average every year there is 120 ml rainfall takes place in the Teknaf area which didn't happen this year*, he added (ibid).

An employee of an international NGO informed that environmental consequences are most severe in the area due to the destruction of hills, forest and the eco-system and therefore the path of elephants has been restrained or even destructed (interview 27). A Journalist of national daily also added *it has been seen that the elephants have already found other routes* (interview 01).

From FGDs we found that selling forest wood is one of the ways of the livelihood of local people. However, due to Rohingya influx in the area, this profession has become under threat. As a FGD (4) reveals that:

“Local people used to run their family by selling trees in the local market. But, after the arrival of the Rohingya people, the whole forest area of the locality has completely been destroyed. For this reason, the local people who used to earn from the forest by selling trees are living in great difficulty”.

Respondents from different interviews claim that also Rohingya people enter into the forest area and cut down wood to meet their fuel. One of the respondents (interview 01) recommends that the government and NGO's should focus on provision of cooking fuel. The NGOs have already supplied the Rohingya camps with some LP Gas. They also need to think what could be done to give an alternative fuel supply to all e.g. LPG or subsidized kerosene. Current efforts in this area are negligible. So long as there is no alternative fuel, they will use trees.

(d) Impact on agriculture

Most of the respondents of KIIs and FGDs claimed that they have lost their agricultural land due to the huge exodus of Rohingya people in the land. Moreover, those who have lands they are afraid of paddy cultivation, because the market price of rice is relatively much less than the cost of cultivation.

Most of the land here belongs to government (i.e. *Khas* land). The local people lease out the land from the government for cultivation e.g. betel leaf. In the recent time they have lost this opportunity and fell in economic crisis. A journalist from a local newspaper (interview 24) said that though local people lost their land they were compensated with relief items and in some cases with few cows and goats. He further added that there is a lack of adequate grazing land for cows and goats in Ukhiya-Teknaf area due to the construction of Rohingya camps.

Respondents of FGDs (FDGs 3 and 4) stated that due to Rohingya exodus lands including housing land have completely been destroyed. There are huge toilets in the land. As such the farming or land cultivation seems impossible over there, even after their departure, the cultivation may not possible. As it is stated that: *We have lost our agricultural land as houses for Rohingya people were built on those lands. We don't have any land left to cultivate* (FGD 4).

(e) Education

According to several key interviewee, education has been the sector most adversely affected by the 2017 influx. This sector has suffered in terms of human resources, infrastructure as well as institutional capacity.

Damage to physical infrastructure

As soon as the influx started, schools, colleges and madrassahs became temporary shelters for the newcomers awaiting relocation to camps and settlements. A college teacher confirmed these concerns with personal experience. He (interview 26) added:

“We had to provide shelter for Rohingya people in an academic building. It disrupted the academic exercises so much that in the end we had to take help from the administration to get them resettled”.

Many of these buildings were later requisitioned by the government as offices for security agencies and relief organizations, and even as warehouses to store relief materials. For example, the only government-funded college in Ukhiya was then being used by the WFP.

Disruption of lessons

As the physical infrastructure of educational institutions had been or continue to be used for various relief-related purpose, the academic activities of those institutions suffered. For example, the 700 students of the Ukhiya College had to endure disruption and noise as vehicles from various organizations came and went all day long to access the WFP facilities. Besides, the teachers had no room to sit and carry out their administrative and academic duties (interview 20). Similar scenario could be found in the primary schools and madrassah as well. According to a journalist, 32 of the primary schools in Ukhiya, as well as high schools, madrassahs and colleges were being used to store relief material or house the government's security organizations at the time of the interview (interview 20). He pointed out that the schools were holding examinations in due time despite repeated disruption in lessons (interview 20).

The one year (or more) of disruption in academic activities is likely leave a long-term impact in the district's education. Even after academic activities resume, disruption makes students lag behind and is likely to leave a long-term impact on performance of students, said a local politician (interview 14). The people of Ukhiya have become worried for their future generation, as a journalist (interview 20) expressed:

“In the recent past, the ratio of educated in Ukhiya rose from 35% to 47% and was expected to keep rising. In the 35th public service education, 7 people from Ukhiya got selected. But now it is doubtful whether we would be able to produce another public service cadre in the next 50 years’ expressed the journalist”.

Absence of students and teachers

Since the beginning of the influx, school and college attendance have dropped down for various reasons. Primary school students are sometimes too fearful of the traffic to go to school. Parents are also afraid of road traffic accidents. Some parents have stopped sending children to schools, leaving an impact on rate of success, said the local politician (interview 14). A journalist (interview 20) stated that *these roads now have heavier traffic than highways*.

A more worrying trend is that undergraduate students are reportedly abandoning studies to join this sector. The college teacher (interview 26) described the problem by saying:

“Students in the first year of undergraduate study receive such high salaries that they neglect to come to classes and skip important exams; some of them want to take final exams without attending classes”.

Even teenagers were working in the camps for the NGOs instead of going to school (interview 13 and 22). Not many of them are mindful of the long-term consequence of these short-term jobs (interview 20). As a staff of an international NGO points out: *They are getting high-paying jobs now, but when these jobs are gone they will not receive another one without the degree they threw away* (interview 27). Academic activities also suffered as many of the teachers were pulled into the lucrative and burgeoning NGO sector in Cox's Bazar, leaving educational institutions in a lurch (interview 13).

(f) Social bonding

As their stay in the country prolonged, the local people's solidarity with the Rohingya people dwindles, and even the local communities suffer from social problems due to the rapid demographic and economic change.

Rohingya and Bengali relationship

According to interviewees, Rohingya people's relationship with the local people have deteriorated in recent time. There have been quarrels and clashes between the two communities, for example, over access to water (interview 27). Local people living

alongside refugees are now less inclined to help and cohabitate, said the staff of a national NGO (interview 19).

Physical safety and social security of local women

The influx has created crisis in the social lives of the local people. Some parents, fearful of their daughters' safety, have sent them away to live with relatives, said a woman working freelance with local NGOs (interview 29). On the other hand, polygamy increased as local men marry Rohingya women and live inside the camps to collect relief, she said. Since such marriage is illegal, the Rohingya wives of local men don't receive any papers. In many cases the polygamy created tension between the local and the Rohingya women and has also created general anxiety about sexually transmitted diseases, according to a faculty at the University of Dhaka (interview 31).

(g) Illegal trades

The influx has opened the area up for various illegal businesses. Local people join Rohingya people and become middlemen in these illegal activities, such as drugs trade. A freelancer women (interview 29) speculated that *even the children carry to Ukhiya drugs in their school bags*. There is also concern about increased drugs abuse and prostitution as well as presence of traffickers (interview 31). In the survey, some people mentioned a social change as strangers with bad intentions are entering and outsiders are setting up illegal businesses; one (interview 8) said *we cannot seem to differentiate between the good and the bad*. *'They are destroying the lives of our youth'* says a survey respondent (242 (179)).

(h) Local communication system

Transport is another sector that experiences multitudes of problems since the influx. The problems include damage to roads and highways, increased traffic and traffic accident, rise of transport cost and competition for vehicles.

- Transport cost is a major problem, according to many of the respondents (e.g. interview 19). The chairman of a union with large Rohingya presence (interview 8) blamed transport sector challenges, especially the sharp increase in cost, for a drop in attendance and consequent drop in success rate in examinations. He (ibid) added: *I made a request for two buses to reduce the transportation problem of students going to school and college, but it was denied*.
- In the survey, people mentioned that increase of the number of vehicles and reckless driving by new drivers result in an increase in road traffic accidents. This has become a security concern. A journalist puts it in numbers, *since they came (in 2017) 33 have died and 300 lost a limb on the Teknaf-Ukhiya highway* (interview 20). Moreover, roads are dilapidated and accidents increased, he said.
- Heavy traffic is not only a source of major inconvenience but also a hindrance to productivity. As one teacher puts it, *'Before the influx it took 45 minutes to reach Teknaf from Ukhiya; now it takes between 1.5 and 2.5 hours* (Interview

26). 'Because of the high demand due to NGO activity, a good seat in the vehicles has become scarce, she said. A lot of people in the survey mentioned that the delay caused by traffic created problems in their jobs or academic endeavour.

(i) Sense of deprivation

The various types of inconvenience, combined with real as well as perceived discrimination by government and non-government agencies have created a strong sense of deprivation among the local people. They remark bitterly on the suspension of local government's services, exclusion from relief distribution, perceived bias in the activities and attention of both government and non-government agencies, among other things. An interviewee (interview 20) stated:

"We must submit papers to buy a sim card and procure trade license to set up a shop whereas they don't seem to need any papers for anything".

A comprehensive humanitarian support system has developed for the Rohingya people by national and international NGOs, military and law enforcing agencies, which did not include the local people at first. Locals have especially developed a grudge about perceived discrimination and neglect, especially since many of them are nearly as poor as the refugees. This has resulted in grievance against the relief providers and NGOs, especially international ones. One interview (interview 20) raised concerns over NGO activities by saying *If the international NGOs can provide relief to 1 million Rohingyas, why can't they provide it for merely 3 hundred thousand people?*, while another person (interview 25) exclaimed *NGOs only provided help to locals when they were forced to*. The relationship between the Bangladesh government and its citizens has taken a toll. As a by-product of the influx, the local people are also being deprived of the service that the local government is supposed to provide for them. An interviewee (no. 25) stated: *we did not have the ability to procure a birth certificate for the last one year; It's as if we are immigrants in our own country' said one.*

More seriously, complaints were voiced against the authorities as another interviewee (interview 29) stated: *there have been cases where Rohingyas beat local people up, but the administration and security agencies did not respond*. However, the sense of deprivation is stronger for the lack of recognition. Local people are suffering in multiple ways. For example, one person said that transport sector workers do not pay respect or attention to local passengers now due to a massive increase in demand; she also said NGO tenants are raking up house rent, essentially forcing local people out (interview 26). Products in the market have become out of reach (interview 8). In the words of a journalist from Baharchhara *At first, people shared their own food with them when the help from government and the NGO hadn't fully materialized* (interview 23). A local government agent at the Union level echoed these words by saying *Local people provided all out support when the Rohingya influx started, but are now in a situation of extreme sufferings. We didn't imagine that we will be put in such a situation* (interview 7). People seem to feel unappreciated or even punished despite all the help they provided in their limited capacity at the beginning of the influx.

There is indication that corruption and lack of planning is behind much of the problems. One journalist said: *When a high quality pen is sent to me through an NGO, it becomes a low-quality one by the time it reaches me* (interview 20). He insinuated that even the relief allotted to the host community by the government is not being distributed properly. Another journalist pointed out the problem of planning and management of aid. Some people received rice, cattle and poultry, but their loss outstrips what they got, he said, adding that people did not benefit fully from the cattle aid as there is no grazing field for them anymore (interview 24). Again, a lot of the people who lost land had no legal claim to that land and therefore weren't compensated at all (interview 28). All of this has deepened people's resentment about relief provision.

The grievance is further fanned by a perception rather than the reality of discrimination and inequality. For example, one interviewee (interview 25) thought *Locals receive relief worth 300-400 BDT whereas Rohingyas received relief worth 10000 BDT* (interview 25), and another, a freelancer working with various NGOs, believed *they have laptops in most houses inside camps* (interview 29). There is a perception that Rohingya people receive undue advantage not only in aid distribution but also NGO jobs (interview 8, interview 13, interview 28), which even resulted in demonstrations on the road (interview 14) and that they are flush with cash (interview 8).

The sense of deprivation deepens due to the attitude of the newcomers. Respondents report a perception of hostility coming from them. *It bothers us that they consider the shelter a right rather than a blessing; we are frustrated at the possibility of having to spend the rest of our lives with them* said one (interview 26), while another elaborated, *They got all kinds of assistance because of us and now they are the ones charging at us to hit us... we did not receive the appropriate response from them for the sacrifices we made* (interview 22).

In conclusion, socioeconomic implications of the Rohingya influx has been observed in the form of changes in prices of foodstuff, availability of jobs and workforce, impact on the environment, agriculture, education and a sense of security and stability in personal and social life. Whether or not the impact would be positive depends on a variety of contextual factors. For example, due to the provision of relief, prices of grains went down while that of fish and vegetables doubled; labour have become cheap for businessmen but competition increased for the seasonal day labourers. Changes in social norms are felt more by the women in the families. Where the government and non-government agencies have made investment to educational institutions and security sector, the damages caused by disruption in lessons and the sense of security appears to be enduring. In some cases the damages are more perceived that empirical, indicating the necessity of conciliatory intervention beside the economic ones. The loss of ecological and environmental resources is more or less indiscriminately felt.

4.4.2. Impacts on Safety and Security

This part of the report depicts the security implications of the Rohingya exodus to the host communities in Bangladesh. Based on the findings of key informant's interviews, expert interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs), it is evident that the presence of around 1 million Rohingyas have affected the security of the host communities in

several ways. It has led to different types of conflict and violence between Rohingya and host communities. It has also increased the risk of radicalization and terrorism as the vulnerability of Rohingyas has made them susceptible to such threats. Furthermore, Rohingyas have also increasingly been involved in different types of criminal activities in and around the camps. The following discussion is an attempt to understand such implications which have undermined the safety and security of the host communities.

(a) Conflict and violence

There are some reported incidences of violence and conflict between locals and the Rohingyas in recent times. This is a very contrasting development given the sympathy and support that the locals demonstrated at the beginning of the crisis. While narrating the response of the local people at the beginning of the Rohingya influx, a local journalist (interview 23) who was responsible to cover the situation mentioned:

“At the early stage of the influx, local people provided all sorts of support to the Rohingyas that they needed. In certain cases, they did more than the government. At the initial stage, the support from the government and NGOs was not sufficient. The all-out support that the host people provided to the Rohingyas at the beginning of the influx helped to avert a disaster and saved the lives of the hundreds and thousands of Rohingyas. The local people provided shelters and shared their foods with the Rohingyas. Even, there are instances that poor local people have given their own foods by keeping themselves hungry”.

The local people have even raised funds among themselves to help Rohingyas. For instance, in Palongkhali, local people formed a committee to raise funds for the Rohingya people and collected 800,000 BDT. With the support of local government, local people then provided different kinds of food items as well as house-building materials to the Rohingyas (interview 14).

But, with the passage of time, such feelings of compassion and support have started to fade out. The relations between locals and Rohingyas have already deteriorated to such a point that the incidences of small-scale violence have started to happen in areas close to the Rohingya camps. One of those incidences was narrated by a local government (interview 08) representative:

“There was a clash between the local and the Rohingya people during the month of Ramadan on the night of lailatulkadr in Tanjimakhola. After the prayer at night a man was returning home with his two sons and the light from their torch fell on some Rohingya people sitting inside the paddy field by the road. They were angry, so they beat up and kidnapped the man. The next day he was rescued with the help of the local administration and the police and sent to the hospital”.

The interviewee blames the Rohingya people for the reported incidence of violence by saying that *if we did not tolerate the Rohingyas, there would have been violent conflicts here every day; they have tortured a lot. For example, they would shove you on their way even though the roads are spacious enough.* The changes in perception of the locals regarding the Rohingyas have also been observed during the interview, as he

further added: *it has to be said that we did not give shelter to good people in Bangladesh, we took in criminals* (interview 08). There are also several cases of conflict over the control of local resources. There are incidences where locals have prohibited Rohingyas when they tried to collect water from local sources, which led to quarrel between them (interview 27).

The host community who once stood beside the persecuted Rohingyas and provided everything that they could, now, have completely different perception regarding the Rohingyas. The locals now perceive the presence of Rohingyas in their locality as a threat to their safety and security which consequently lead to different sorts of conflict and violence between them. This was evident during the interview of a local journalist who opined *no one likes a threat and they are a threat now* (interview 20). The sense of threat among the locals emerges as the presence of more than 1 million Rohingyas have started to cripple the everyday life of the local people. While describing the current relations between host communities and Rohingyas, a staff of Save the Children who works in the camp mentioned: *Rohingyas are the burden for the host people. So, it is natural that the relations between locals and the Rohingyas are not in a state of harmony* (interview 27). A female NGO worker (interview 29) who also belongs to the host community has described the loss and sufferings during an interview:

“The local people initially gave them shelter to their own house, and yard. Now they live on our crop lands, cattle have been finished. We the Bengali people feel scare, can’t even protest. We scare about robbery, stealing. Rohingya people are now doing these activities”.

Local people blame that Rohingyas have become desperate in their behaviour in recent times. There are allegations by the host community that in recent times Rohingyas have even started to claim that the area belongs to them and reportedly argued with locals by saying: *This is our land* (interview 29). Local people blame NGOs as well as camp officials for increasing violent behaviour of the Rohingyas. This was expressed during an interview with a local government representative, who said: *They have become more desperate due to the support given by the NGOs. People are also angry at the administration*’ (interview 08). Local people’s resentment to the administration is created as neither camp officials nor the law enforcing agencies including military pay heed to their concern regarding the increasing violent behaviour of the Rohingyas (interview 29).

The changes in the perception of the host communities regarding the presence of Rohingyas in their locality have also developed due to the inadequate attention that local people have received from the government and other agencies to address their sufferings. Because, locals are the ones who bear the burden of hosting more than one million Rohingya and face sufferings in their everyday life. But, in reality, they are not getting adequate attention from the authorities concerned to curb their sufferings. An NGO official (interview 13) highlighted this during an interview:

“The local people have also been displaced due to the Rohingya influx and face problems in their everyday life...But, we can see that the local people are not getting adequate attention in terms of humanitarian assistance. Besides, Rohingyas are also being recruited in different

jobs by the NGOs. Consequently, a sense of hatred has developed among the locals regarding Rohingyas”.

In addition to the conflict between Rohingyas and local people, there are also cases of conflict and violence among Rohingyas. Several incidences of murder took place inside the camps in recent past.

It is found that the old conflicts among Rohingyas back in Rakhine have started to resurface in the camp as well. This was explained during an interview with a local journalist (interview 23):

“Rohingyas had different types of conflict among them in their place of origin in Rakhine. Those old conflicts have now resurfaced in the camp too. Rohingyas have nothing to do in the camp. Their only job is to collect relief in every 15 days. They spend most of their time by gossiping. When they sit together, they start discussing on the previous contending issues back in Myanmar, which cause dispute among them”.

However, interviewees also predict that there is a possibility of an inter-state war between Bangladesh and Myanmar. They have raised concern that this might happen if Rohingyas carry out any subversive activities against Myanmar in future. In this connection, a local government representative (interview, 08) argued:

“In the future, there will be Bangladesh-Myanmar war. The Rohingya people came here leaving everything behind and we tried to help them; but there is grievance in the depth of their minds and one day it will come out. They might one day attack Myanmar check post and then there will be war”.

(b) Threats of terrorism

“When a group of people have become subject to gross marginalization and don’t see any hope regarding their future, then it becomes a potentially breeding ground for radicalization. The present condition of Rohingyas is a classical scenario to become a breeding ground of radicalization and terrorism (interview 30)”.

The interviewee has also argued that current living conditions of the Rohingyas inside the camp also make them susceptible to radicalization and terrorism. He added: Around 1 million to 1.2 million Rohingyas are now living in the camps. They are not involved in any sort of economic or other activities. They are spending their time without doing anything and they also don’t have any hope regarding their future. These types of hopeless people are very susceptible to extremism and terrorism (interview 30).

There is also a growing concern among the host communities regarding the presence of terrorist groups inside the Rohingya camps. Such fear has raised due to the several incidences of murder which cost more than 20 Rohingya lives since their arrival in the camps. Most of the key informants in the study area mentioned about the presence of two terrorist groups- ARSA and Al-Yaqin. The respondents have claimed that these

two groups are active inside the camps and responsible for all sorts of atrocities happening inside the camps. During a Key Informant's Interview with a local journalist, the interviewee raised a question regarding the current state of ARSA by asking: *Where is the ARSA which launched attack on the military check post in Arakan?* (interview 24). Then he added: *I think the members of ARSA are currently staying in the camps and they also have the reserve of heavy weapons* (ibid). Similar concern has also raised by another journalist who made extensive news since the beginning of the influx by saying: *When the Rohingyas came to Bangladesh, so did members of Al-Yakin and ARSA* (interview 20). A civil society member has referred to an incidence on 25th August 2018- when Rohingyas staged a massive rally to mark the anniversary of their exodus- to justify his claim regarding the presence of ARSA inside the camp. He (interview 25) mentioned:

“On the 25th August they had a huge rally. There was one group wearing Lungi and shirts and holding Myanmar's flag. They want to go back to Myanmar at any cost. Another group had a huge gathering and they were wearing red ribbons on their head. They were giving slogans- long live ARSA and death to Myanmar (ARSA Zindabad, Myanmar Murdabaad)”.

There are also concern among the security experts in Bangladesh that the risk of transnational connection is very high as several international terrorist groups have already expressed their sympathy to the Rohingyas. A security expert (interview 30) based in Dhaka raised his concern by pointing out to some development in this context:

“We have observed that several international terrorist groups have shown their interest to work for the Rohingya people. Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) have expressed their intention to support Rohingyas. We have seen similar message from Islamic State (IS) when the group was active in Syria”.

The risk in such case can be manifold. Because, if the members of international terrorist groups become successful to merge with the Rohingyas, then it will have serious security implications at different levels of state and society. The growing danger of transnational connection is due to the trend of international terrorist groups to search for new places to carry out their struggle, and the present scenario of the Rohingyas which increases the vulnerability in this context as highlighted by a security expert (interview 30):

“When the IS defeated in Syria, the foreign fighters of the group are now searching for a new battlefield. If the IS members become successful to merge with the Rohingyas then it will be a serious threat for us which will have serious security implications at the national level, regional level and international level”.

In addition to the risk of active involvement of the international terrorist groups in the Rohingya camps, there is also a growing risk that the present conditions of the Rohingyas can serve as a potential recruiting ground for the terrorist groups. The concern is raised because there are reports in the media that international terrorist

groups are trying to recruit Rohingyas as their member. Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a counter-terrorism force in Bangladesh has also arrested seven people in this connection. Therefore, it is evident that it has not only become a breeding ground for radicalization but also a potential recruiting ground for local and international terrorist groups (interview 30).

There are also concern about the activities of some NGOs inside the camp with alleged connections with terrorist groups. The government of Bangladesh has blacklisted 47 NGOs against such allegations and banned them to carry out any sort of activities in the camps area. However, despite such measure, many of the prohibited NGOs still working in the camp area. Reportedly, a Pakistan-based NGO named Al Hikmat which is even banned by the Pakistan Government due to its connection with terrorist groups is carrying out its activities inside the Rohingya camps (interview 24).

(c) Sense of fear/anxiety

“I don’t go far even when I go out at night. The farthest I would go is to the hospital in front of the house... I don’t consider myself secure. If someone enters the camps after robbing me of valuables, the culprit would be impossible to trace from among the 16 lakh Rohingya people. Even though the government doesn’t yet recognize the gravity of the safety threat it is apparent to us, the local people” (interview 20).

A sense of fear has already been created among the locals living close to the camps. During various Interviews, the interviewees highlighted several factors such as - massive number of Rohingyas, unrestricted movement, increasing criminal activities in recent past and inadequate number of law enforcing agencies- which have contributed to develop a sense of fear among the host community. The reasons for local’s sense of fear which have come out during various interviews as well as FGD’s have been discussed below.

Sense of being minority

The feeling of being minority has already been created among the host communities. Because, the number of Rohingyas have already exceeded the number of host population. The total number of host population in Teknaf and Ukhia is approximately 300,000. But, the total number of Rohingyas is around 1 million. Consequently, the host communities have become minority in their own areas, which have contributed to develop a sense of fear among them (interview 24).

Unrestricted movement of the Rohingyas

The locals are very much concerned about the unrestricted movement of the Rohingyas. They have claimed that though Rohingyas are supposed to stay within the camp area, their movement is not limited within the camps. The interviewees have also reflected on their past experiences in dealing with the refugees and mentioned that they are currently facing new challenges which they didn’t experience in the past. This was highlighted by a local level political leader (interview 14):

“This is not the first time that we are dealing with the Rohingya refugees. We have experienced the influx of Rohingyas in our area in 1978, 1991, 2001 and 2012...In the past, the movements of Rohingyas were also limited. Their movements were largely confined within the camp area. But, in the present crisis, the movement of the Rohingyas is not confined. They are hovering around every places of the locality. Though, they are supposed to return their camps before dusk, but they move around outside the camp area even at night which have created a sense of anxiety and fear among the local people”.

The interviewee has suggested that the people of the area would feel secure if Rohingyas movement is limited within the camp area (interview 14). Similar concern has also been raised by a local government representative who mentioned that during the previous influxes that they experienced in their locality, Rohingyas were not allowed to go outside their camps without medical or emergency ground (interview 08). But, the scenario of the present crisis is completely different than the past as their movements are not confined at all. Local people are also extremely irritated with the Rohingyas as they are moving freely without any restriction (interview 08). The respondents of the host communities have claimed that due to the unrestricted movement, Rohingyas are increasingly getting involved in various criminal activities. However, allegedly, despite their increasing involvement in criminal activities, locals can't take any action against them on their own, and they even don't get any support from the local administration as mentioned by an interviewee (interview 08): *interestingly, they cannot be beaten up for these crimes, let alone make a complaint at the police or file a case.*

Increasing criminal activities

The host communities have claimed about increasing criminal activities in their area since the arrival of Rohingyas which have created a sense of fear among the locals. Such sense of fear was evident during the interview of a local government representative who stated: *We are in a state of danger. Various types of criminal activities such as drug trade, incidence of theft have increased a lot in our area* (interview 07). A journalist referred to number of criminal cases filed against Rohingyas to justify his claim regarding increasing criminal activities in their area as he (interview 23) mentioned that: *437 criminal cases have been filed against the Rohingyas in the last one year which are particularly related to drug and arms trafficking. 367 Rohingyas have also been arrested so far in this connection.* However, there are also allegations against the local people that they hire Rohingyas for different criminal activities such as robbery (interview 13). Various types of criminal activities that have been highlighted by respondents during various interviews and FGD's have been mentioned below.

- *Drug trafficking* has become one of the major concerns for the host community. Reportedly, Rohingyas are directly and indirectly involved in such crime as mentioned by an interviewee, *Rohingya are threats to us, especially in the context of drugs and arms* (interview 20). It is evident that 'through Rohingyas, excessive aggression of Yaba has spread across Cox's Bazar' (interview 22). *Reportedly, Rohingyas carried huge number of drugs with them when they*

arrived in Bangladesh' (interview 29). The Rohingya camps are also considered as the transit of Yaba (interview 13). The interviewees also referred to the recovery of huge number of drugs by the law enforcing agencies to justify their claim regarding the spread of drug trafficking in the area, as highlighted by a journalist: *BGB recovered 32 lakh pieces of yaba from the Anjumanpara borders. Only one was caught, but we could not search all 16 lakh of them. Most of them are Yaba lords* (interview 20). Similar reference has also been made by an NGO officer (interview 13) working inside the camp, who said: *There are millions of yaba consignment occurred, but only few of them has been captured.*

However, local people are also increasingly being involved in drug trafficking and a 'syndicate' has developed between Rohingyas and local businessmen in this regard (interview 29). In such cases, Rohingyas are used as traffickers in exchange of money by the locals (interview 25). Similar concern has also been raised by a security expert based in Dhaka who argued- 'The Rohingya people...are made as carrier of YABA. Because, it is an issue of their survival. The local businessmen have a link with them' (interview 32). However, the most worrisome picture that has come during the interview is the use of children in drug trade as mentioned by an interviewee (interview 29), who narrated: *The political leaders, the local people are involved in drug related activities. They even use kids as carriers. Kids carry drugs to Ukhiya in their school bags.*

- *The incidents of theft* have also significantly been increased in the area since the arrival of Rohingyas. But, no effective measures have been taken on the part of the concerned authorities to address such crime. Local people have even claimed that they cannot file case against Rohingyas for such crimes as local administration show unwillingness to accept case against them (interview 08). However, one of the interviewees opined that the situation has improved in recent times following various police raids and arrest of criminals. The interviewee argued: *We are a bit relieved because of the recent police raids in which many criminals were arrested. People who used to go out in the morning to exercise would be victims to events like hijacking a few days back. At present, the law and order situation is better compared to early days* (interview 22). In a focus group discussion held in the host community, participants have mentioned that the incidences of theft have mainly increased in areas where the number of local people is less compared to other areas (FGD 4).
- Several cases of *murder* have been reported in the Rohingya camps which consequently created a sense of fear and anxiety among the locals regarding their safety and security as suggested by an interviewee (interview 14), who mentioned: *In the last one year several incidences of murder happened in the camp area. As a result, people living close to the camp are very scared about the Rohingyas. Due to the safety reason, people living close to the camp now return to their house before dusk.* An NGO officer who works inside the camp described two separate cases of murder which cost several lives. In one case, he mentioned that two people were killed due to shooting, and in another case five Rohingyas were murdered inside the camp. The interviewee opined that there are presence of arms and drug traffickers inside the camps and they might be involved behind such crime (interview 27).

- There are also concern among the host community about the *illegal SIM cards* that Rohingyas possess which might have serious implications to their safety and security as mentioned by a journalist (interview 20): *The 16 lakh of Rohingyas have 20 lakh SIM cards. If they commit any crime using these cards, a local Bangladeshi would get caught for it.* A local government representative has also opined that *as a Bangladeshi person you need to register biometrically in order to have a sim card. But the Rohingya people have numerous unregistered SIM cards* (interview 08). The interviewee has blamed the NGOs for providing unregistered SIM cards to the Rohingyas. The interviewee has also mentioned that there are networks of Myanmar mobile operators in Ukhia and Teknaf which might have implications for transnational manoeuvres (ibid).
- The incidence of *human trafficking* has also been on the rise in the area since the arrival of the Rohingyas. Reportedly, Rohingyas are both the perpetrators and victims of such trafficking. Rohingyas who have been living here for many years are involved in such crime and act as broker to facilitate the trafficking of Rohingya women and girls (interview 14).
- There are allegations that Rohingyas are obtaining *Bangladeshi Passport and National ID* with the help of corrupt officials involved in the process. A journalist has claimed that he has information about Rohingyas going abroad with Bangladeshi Passport. The interviewee mentioned a Rohingya woman, who went to live with her husband in Malaysia using Bangladeshi passport. There are allegations that Rohingyas are getting National ID and birth registration certificate in exchange of money. A huge syndicate of middlemen have developed who provide passport to Rohingyas. Generally, Rohingyas need to spend 50,000-100,000 BDT to get a Bangladeshi passport (no. 20).
- Among various types of social crimes, *prostitution* has also increased in the area since the arrival of the Rohingyas, as mentioned by a journalist: *'Prostitution has increased...Adolescents are mostly targeted, then there are girls aged between 10 to 18 years* (interview 20).
- There are also allegations of *kidnapping* against Rohingyas as mentioned by a Union Council Member: *Few days back, Rohingyas kidnapped two people from the host community and demanded 200,000 BDT as ransom to release them* (interview 07). The interviewee claimed that the kidnapped persons were later released after paying the ransom to the Rohingyas (ibid). Similar allegations against Rohingyas has also been made by an NGO official working inside the camp by saying: *We also know about the case of abduction, for example the Rohingya abducted a local person last year and asked for ransom to set him free* (interview 13). In a focus group discussion that was held in a host community, participants have mentioned about the presence of an armed group among the Rohingyas (i.e. Al-Yaqin) and blamed it for the incidence of kidnapping in the area. The participants of the FGD have also mentioned that when any sort of discord happens between Rohingyas and local people, Rohingyas threaten local people saying that Al-Yaqin will kidnap you (FGD 4).

Despite increasing criminal activities, host communities have expressed their despair regarding the role of the law enforcing agencies to address such threats. The respondents have alleged that though they have informed the local administration about increasing criminal activities in their areas, the concerned authorities didn't take any effective measure to curb/prevent such incidences (interview 07). Besides, since the arrival of the Rohingyas, various incidences of murder happened inside the camp, but law enforcing agencies failed to arrest anybody in this connection (ibid).

Inadequate number of law enforcing agencies

“The Ukhia police can barely control the local people, let alone 16 lakh Rohingyas” (interview 20).

Criminal activities are increasing due to the inadequate number of law enforcing agencies compared to massive number of Rohingyas as mentioned by a political activist: *The law and order situation of the camp has deteriorated. One of the reasons for this is the number of law enforcing agencies is not sufficient considering the huge number of the Rohingyas living in the camps* (interview 14). The interviewee further added that the member of law enforcing agencies who have been deployed to ensure security in the camp area stay outside the camp area during night. So, they literally don't have any control over the activities happening inside the camp during night (ibid). A journalist has opined that Rohingyas have higher tendency to become derailed as they have been tortured, violated and subjected to acute cruelty and saw their close relatives die and get raped in the face of such cruelty. So, it would require a large number of law enforcement agency to control them. However, the interviewee informed that only 1100 policemen and Ansar members have been deployed for this purpose (interview 20).

Though it is evident that the sense of fear and anxiety has touched upon all sections of the community, but women as well as an ethnic minority group (Chakma) living in the area feel more insecurity compared to other sections of the society. Regarding the insecurity of the women and girls an NGO official who works for Save the Children mentioned: *The insecurity of women and girls have increased in the area. They don't go outside their home after 5 pm in the evening due to the fear of insecurity* (interview 27).

Among the host communities, there are also some Chakma people (an ethnic group) who live in Balukhali and other areas close to the camps. They have a higher sense of insecurity as they look like Rakhains of Myanmar as mentioned by a member of a political party: *There are some Chakma (an ethnic group) among the local community in Balukhali and other areas. They (Chakma) need to cross the camp to come to the local market. The Chakma people look like Rakhine people of Myanmar. As a result, Rohingyas consider them as their enemy. Due to the fear of violence and attack, the Chakma people have restricted their movement and try to avoid the camp area for security reason* (interview 14).

From the above stated discussion, it is evident that the exodus of Rohingyas into Bangladesh has made negative implication to the safety and security of the host communities. There are evidences of growing conflict between Rohingya and host communities over the control of local resources. The incidence of violence is also

increasing alarmingly among the Rohingyas, which cost more than 20 lives since their arrival in the camps. Besides, the risk of radicalization and terrorism is also on the rise among the Rohingyas. The respondents of the host communities have claimed about the active presence of two terrorist groups namely ARSA and Al-Yaqin inside the camps, which have created a sense of fear among the host communities.

There are also concern about the risk of transnational terrorist connection due to the vulnerabilities that Rohingyas are currently exposed to. A growing sense of fear is also evident among the host communities due to the increasing criminal activities in their area such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, incidence of murder, human trafficking etc. All these factors have contributed to undermine the safety and security of the host communities to a significant extent.

(d) Repatriation and rehabilitation of Rohingya

This sub-section, which is based on host community perceptions and expert interviews, provides an overview and perspective of repatriation and rehabilitation of Rohingya people staying in temporary camps in Cox's Bazar.

Repatriation

The people of the host community, who have been in support of Rohingya people since their arrival, talked in favour of their dignified return to their home country in Myanmar. This is only a viable, durable solution of Rohingya crisis, although there are many other issues and actors involved in this process. A NGO worker (interview 19) located in the Rohingya Camps in Cox's Bazar stated that Rohingyas:

“Should be repatriated as soon as possible, otherwise there will be crisis . . . They (Rohingya) have no education, they seem to have no future [here]. This is no life. If they could return that would have been the solution for them as well as us”.

This implies that future of both host and Rohingya communities are related to the repatriation process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been engaged in this process and is doing its best (interview 20). The government has signed a MoU with Myanmar for repatriation of Rohingyas. There is a claim that it was not consulted with the Rohingya people; therefore, they have demanded different rights to create a conducive environment for them to return to Myanmar (interview 23). The people of the host community in Bangladesh understand that there is a need for a conducive environment in Arakan state for Rohingyas so that their rights related to citizenship, social, political and religious rights can be ensured for which they have been in movement for many years (interview 20).

Nevertheless, the government of Bangladesh has to stress on repatriation process, and for that there is a need to include wider stakeholders including international and regional states in this process so that a conducive environment can be created in Arakan state of Myanmar. However, the repatriation process should start sooner rather than later because *gradually foreign assistance will decrease and NGOs will lose goodwill* as some have already disappeared because of declining assistance

(interview 19). This is related to the commitment of international community too to ensure repatriation of Rohingyas to their homes. A security expert (interview 30) nevertheless paid utmost attention to Rohingya repatriation to avoid further atrocities being committed with impunity. He stated (interview 30):

“I think that Repatriation of Rohingyas to their country of origin is the only durable solution of this problem. We should not focus on any other solution except repatriation. Because, if we think about resettlement in a third country or rehabilitated them in Bangladesh, we will actually legitimize the genocide carried out by Myanmar government. It will encourage similar regimes in different parts of the world to carry out similar atrocities with immunity”.

Starting a quick repatriation process is crucial to avert any kind of potential challenges created to economy, environment and sovereignty of Bangladesh (interview 20). Nevertheless, one of the major aspects of repatriation process is that many Rohingya people living in camps in Cox's Bazar do not have proper documents which Myanmar authority wants to see whether or not they are nationals of Myanmar (interview 25). This signifies one of the complex aspects of repatriation process, which given the context of Rohingya influx is a strategic process too. Although many respondents have opinionated about their return, Rohingyas may not return to Myanmar *without the assurance of complete security. They will stay in the camp if they have to* (interview, 22).

A freelance journalist (interview 28) also argued that in order to go back to Myanmar, Rohingya people need a guarantee of security, freedom of movement and returning their home upon their return. Considering these aspects, the issue of voluntary repatriation process could be jeopardized. As repatriation process is a complex process, the state of *voluntary repatriation is very bleak* as this is related to life and livelihood of Rohingya people back at their home (interview 27).

Another concern of repatriation process coming from the organization called Alekin, which has an anti-repatriation stance (interview 8). There are claims that Rohingya people who talk about repatriation to Myanmar could face different challenges from Al-Yaqin (ibid). Nevertheless, delaying in repatriation process could be challenging for host community, and at worst it could turn to unwanted consequences. A local NGO worker (interview 29) argued that Rohingyas should be repatriated to their home, because in the long-run situation could worsen as many Rohingyas have been shifted to some other parts of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, there is a high chance for Rohingya issue to be a *diffused crisis* in the long-run for Bangladesh (interview 32). This is partly because Myanmar may start strategic repatriation process and take a few people, but rest may stay back and thus a *diffused scenario* will sustain (ibid).

Rehabilitation

Until repatriation process starts and is completed, there has to be a rehabilitation process of Rohingya people. Nevertheless, this rehabilitation process in Bangladesh could be questioned on many grounds. As there are some concerns, there have been some issues that have to be taken into consideration in terms of rehabilitating them in the areas where they have been staying since their arrival like in Palongkhali,

Balokhali, Kutupalong etc. A local councillor (interview 7) in this regard stated that their movements have to be restricted within these areas in order to maintain their safety and security vis a vis ensuring safety of local people. A number of local interviewees (interview 07 and 14) argued to build up fences around all sides of the area where Rohingya people are staying to keep them in a particular place so that their movement inside Bangladesh can be restricted. This is also important for keeping them separate to avert any unwanted circumstances at community level (interview 13).

Nevertheless, Rohingya people, whether or not they are rehabilitating in the Cox's Bazar area, have to be brought under family planning programme as they have high growth rates, but seriously lacks knowledge about family planning (interview, 21).

Although repatriation of Rohingyas to their country currently seems unfeasible, if this issue is not settled it could be a great concern for Bangladesh (interview 26). Nevertheless, the role of UNHCR has been considered critically by a host community personnel in terms of rehabilitation process. There is a claim that organizations like UNHCR and IOM do not pay adequate attention to local contexts. Referring to them, one NGO worker (interview 19) mentioned: *They do not consider our side when it comes to rehabilitation. Sometimes when some things are suggested, they create problems.*

Rehabilitation to Bhashanchar (Thengar Char)

Although there is a plan for a section of Rohingya people to be rehabilitated temporarily in Bhashanchar, there is a misperception amongst Rohingyas that this area could be inundated during high tides and could also be prone to natural disasters (interview 20). Therefore, they may express be unwilling to go to Bhashanchar, and any attempt to take them there could create further complexities (ibid).

Although they could be reluctant to go to Bhashanchar, there will be many opportunities for Rohingyas to explore; and it would *be good for our security if they are relocated there* (interview 28). However, a security expert (interview 30) argued that rehabilitating them in Bhashanchar is *not realistic at all* because it will incur huge cost to sustain refugee camps in such remote areas. What alternatives does Bangladesh have in this regard as there is no other large space where Rohingyas could be relocated? Although Bhashanchar, which has emerged since 1988-89 and has different shortcomings, is *not a good option*; this is the only option Bangladesh has to relocate them for temporary basis (interview 31). There is a fear that relocating them to another lucrative area inside Bangladesh may prevent Rohingyas to return to their country, Myanmar, which in the long-run will undermine Bangladesh's national interests, she added (ibid). Another concern is related to catastrophic natural hazard-induced disaster like Cyclone Sidr in 2007. If similar disaster occurs in Bhashanchar that will have consequences upon them (ibid).

There are more concerns inside Rohingya camps too, which was highlighted by a journalist (interview 22). He stated that we have learned from newspaper that *a group of Rohingyas at night intimidate other Rohingyas not to go to Bhashanchar. Because of this, there is uncertainty of moving them there. We have seen in Facebook that sometimes they even use threat.* Given these uncertainties, rehabilitating Rohingyas to Bhashanchar may not be a real solution (interview 19). Nevertheless, re-settlement to third country could be another option to address current crisis of Rohingya people.

Some developed countries could consider re-settling a number of Rohingyas to their countries. These countries could learn from Bangladesh in terms of responding to refugee crisis. One NGO worker (interview 19) mentioned that *the big countries do not take more than ten thousand refugees and we took a large number of Rohingyas in two Upazilas of Cox's Bazar (Ukhia and Teknaf).*

As Bangladesh is a densely populated country, third country re-settlement to developed countries like Canada might be possible, where Rohingyas could turn into human resources, once appropriate initiatives are undertaken (interview 28). Nevertheless, this proposal of third-country settlement may undermine Rohingya repatriation process.

The discussion and analysis of this sub-section states that experts and people of host communities have paid highest attention for repatriation of Rohingya people to their home country, Myanmar. This is the only viable and long-term solution of Rohingya crisis. Having any other solution like rehabilitating them in Bangladesh, and even in an island, will not address core issues of the problem, instead will create different kinds of newer problems in communities, which have been hosting them since their arrival. As there are different concerns by host community people and experts, there has to be such an approach that can protect Rohingya people from engaging in such unlawful and risky activities.

Therefore, all relevant stakeholders including the international community, powerful states, regional countries and Bangladesh have to look for a viable, long-term solution of the Rohingya crisis. Other actors have to cooperate with Bangladesh that have shared the burden of Rohingya people by sheltering them on humanitarian ground. Although re-settlement of persecuted Rohingyas to any third country could be a myopic option to address this problem, which would run the risk of not only undermining Rohingya repatriation process but also ignoring fundamental rights of this large number of Rohingya population in longer-term.

Disclaimer: Chapter 04 highlights major findings obtained from primary data collected through fieldwork in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh from August-December 2018. Just to clarify, the overall context in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh is extremely unpredictable and inconsistent because of continuing changes in national and geopolitical policies. Henceforth, the results as discussed in this report solely characterise a given timeframe (August-December 2018) based on a pilot work and are not necessarily related to any national or global policies related to Rohingya repatriation, rehabilitation or resettlement.

Chapter 05: Conclusion

5.1. New Developments

Nothing much has changed for the Rohingya people stranded on Bangladesh camps, while apprehension in Bangladesh grows about the implications of their continued stay³. At the beginning of 2019, the United Nation's special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar advised the host country to prepare for the long term⁴. Between June 2018 and 2019, Bangladesh administration, along with national and international non-government organizations, helped the camp dwellers withstand several natural disasters, including the Cyclone *Fani* and the monsoons, with very few fatalities⁵.

In the meantime, camp-life has become a burden for the hosts and guests alike. Observers notice a surge of criminal activities inside the camps, including abduction, murder and drugs-related crimes^{6 7 8}. Similar crimes involving the Rohingya people were observed in nearby Upazilas and even other parts of the country^{9 10}. A report by International Crisis Group (ICG) published in April 2019 expressed concern about the increasing dominance of criminal groups on the camps. Drawing on the openness and impunity with which these groups operate, the report called for better police presence inside the camps. Currently there are close to 1000 police personnel deployed in 7 check posts in the areas surrounding the camps but they primary focus is on prohibiting anyone from leaving the camps while untrained, unarmed Rohingya guards try to provide security to camp-dwellers^{11 12}.

This creates fear and negativity among the hosts about the Rohingya community, even though the danger is more immediate for regular Rohingya people. According to an AFP report, nearly 60 Rohingya persons have been murdered in the camps since the 2017. These crimes are more likely to happen over territorial control and personal vendetta¹³. However, they fan fear of terrorist presence, especially as the name of ARSA/al-yequin is whispered in and outside the camps¹⁴.

Another danger for the Rohingya people, especially women and girls, is the presence of traffickers who take advantage of the push factors such as the fear of forced repatriation, lack of security and lack of educational/livelihood opportunity to lure

³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197997/Rohingyas-can-be-a-threat-to-country%E2%80%99s-security>

⁴ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/warns-bangladesh-rohingya-long-term-stay-190126143505968.html>

⁵ December-January and in June July 2018; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/monsoon-rains-pound-rohingya-camps-bangladesh-180611094930245.html>

⁶ March 2019 Police recovered the body of a young man (earlier reported missing) of Rohingya community from a septic tank at Kutupalong refugee camp of block-1 of the refugee camp based on the confession of 2 out of 4 arrested Rohingya persons <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/191968/Rohingya-man-found-dead-in-Cox%E2%80%99s-Bazar>

⁷ Police arrested three Rohingyas along with 3 kg gold and Tk 300,000 from Balukhali Rohingya camp in Ukhiya <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196825/3-Rohingyas-held-with-3kg-gold-Tk-300-000>

⁸ Two Rohingya men were killed in what the law enforcers called a gunfight with police at Jadimura Camp <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/195139/2-Rohingyas-killed-in-police-gunfight%E2%80%99>

⁹ Two suspected drug traders, who are allegedly called Rohingyas, were killed in a reported gunfight with Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) at Kharangkhal in Teknaf upazila <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/193151/2-%E2%80%98drug-traders%E2%80%99-killed-in-%E2%80%98gunfight%E2%80%99>

¹⁰ April 2019; <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194775/3-Rohingyas-sentenced-to-jail>

¹¹ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194646/Gangs-militants-taking-control-of-Rohingya-camps>

¹² <https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/news/195818/Rohingya-camps-unprotected-against-traffickers>

¹³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194646/Gangs-militants-taking-control-of-Rohingya-camps>

¹⁴ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194552/A-political-awakening-faces-a-backlash-in-Rohingya>

people into fleeing the camps¹⁵ ¹⁶ Bangladesh law enforcement agencies has been routinely intercepting people trying to leave the camps and sometimes the country, by nearly hundreds on several occasions, using land, sky and waterways; they also detained and engaged in shootouts with traffickers¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹²⁰²¹, including several such incidents in June alone²². A boat carrying 65 Rohingya persons were captured by the Thai police that month, indicating that the efforts still fell short²³.

Those that manage to leave Bangladesh don't always survive the journey²⁴ ²⁵. Most of the time they do not have any legal papers or the refugee status and are therefore excluded from any kind of facility. This includes the mail-order brides in Malaysia and the workers in Saudi Arabia alike²⁶. Some detainees in Saudi Arabia came into news in April 2019 by going into hunger strikes in protest against deportation attempts; the country has already deported a group this year²⁷. There are similar situation in India, where the government, following a Supreme Court ruling, forcibly deported seven asylum-seekers to Myanmar in October, 2018. The country had arrested 230 Rohingya that year - the highest number in years²⁸. This, combined with the fear of violence from Hindutva activists, resulted in the return of at least 1,300 Rohingya people into Bangladesh within first 20 days of 2019; there was also a surge of arrests by Indian law enforcers at the border²⁹ ³⁰. A rights group activist accused India, home to 40,000 Rohingya, and Saudi Arabia, home to 300,000 Rohingya, of aiding Myanmar's genocide³¹.

Besides hosting and supporting the Rohingya people, Bangladesh continues to engage in diplomacy to find a sustainable resolution to the crisis. In a meeting with her defense colleagues in April, the Prime Minister of the country reaffirmed that it will not go to war and solve problems through negotiations as it has done so far³². The same was repeated by the Finance Minister during the budget hearing in June, indicating mounting pressure on the government³³. The negotiations include a 2017 repatriation deal with Myanmar that envisioned the return of the first group of refugees in two years. In that light, Bangladesh tried to send back a group of 2,200 refugees in mid-November 2018³⁴. The initiative came under strong criticism from United Nations and aid agencies who insisted that the situation in Myanmar was not conducive for return³⁵.

¹⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/bangladesh-scores-rohingya-children-expelled-schools-190522102006272.html>

¹⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/rohingya-girls-rescued-trafficers-bangladesh-190512101949513.html>

¹⁷ May 24, 2019; <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196092/54-Rohingyas-detained-in-Chattogram>

¹⁸ <https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/news/195818/Rohingya-camps-unprotected-against-trafficers>

¹⁹ May 18 2019; <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/195776/84-Rohingyas-rescued-5-trafficers-detained>

²⁰ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/195734/Over-250-000-Rohingyas-get-ID-cards-UN>

²¹ April 2019; <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/193411/4-Rohingyas-with-Bangladesh-passport-detained-at>

²² <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/bangladesh-police-kill-three-suspected-rohingya-trafficers-rescue-15-refugees-idUSKCN1TQ19P>

²³ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-thailand/stranded-rohingyas-linked-to-human-trafficking-thai-police-idUSKCN1TE0PC>

²⁴ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/groups-urge-malaysia-ensure-accountability-2015-mass-graves-190327131552825.html>

²⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/rohingya-women-girls-trafficied-malaysia-marriage-190507212543893.html>

²⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/rohingya-women-girls-trafficied-malaysia-marriage-190507212543893.html>

²⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/saudi-arabia-deport-250-rohingya-bangladesh-activist-group-190120155247369.html>

²⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/1000-rohingya-flee-india-bangladesh-fearing-crackdown-190116164623256.html>

²⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/threatened-kill-didn-leave-india-rohingya-190123061742432.html>

³⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/indian-police-arrest-rohingya-group-stuck-bangladesh-border-190122143750499.html>

³¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/broken-rohingya-detainees-hunger-strike-saudi-190417124752481.html>

³² <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/193549/PM-says-we-ll-never-engage-in-conflict-with>

³³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197254/Talks-with-Myanmar-on-Rohingya-repatriation>

³⁴ Myanmar "Arrangements on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State" signed on 23 November <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-traumatized-home-181121091552266.html>

³⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/bangladesh-send-rohingya-myanmar-181106180519007.html>

The refugees presented a list of demands that must be met before they agree to return, including recognition of ethnic Rohingya identity with full citizenship, return under international observation, compensation, reparation and restoration of houses in their places of origin (including for those internally displaced within Myanmar), release of prisoners, removal from the list of terrorists and halting national verification card program³⁶. Myanmar, in its part, did not allow any third party to visit the places where the refugees would return, and insisted on carrying on with the 'transit centres' and identification programme³⁷. In a situation rife with lack of information and fear of violence, none of the refugees volunteered to return and those listed went into hiding³⁸. In the end, the deal was put on hold³⁹. In May 2019, in the fourth meeting of the bilateral Joint-Working Group created to oversee implementation of the 2017 deal, Bangladesh emphasized that Myanmar should focus on adopting trust-building measures⁴⁰.

The willingness of Myanmar to take back its citizens have come under question. A Reuter's special report in December 2018 revealed that officials had razed down places where many Rohingya once lived and even built homes for new people, making the return to their original homes impossible⁴¹. Same month, investigators of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar said an "ongoing genocide" was going on against the members of the largely Muslim minority that stayed back after the 2017 attacks⁴². Less than 30% of the Myanmar Rohingya people, around 240000 in number, were still living in Myanmar and lived under various restrictions; 24000 of them had been murdered by security forces since the exodus started in August 2017^{43 44}.

At the same time Myanmar was also preventing them from leaving, for example, by boat for Malaysia⁴⁵. Moreover, nearly 5000 people were living in a camp at Zero Point, barred from entering Bangladesh and fearful of getting locked inside detention centres upon returning to Myanmar^{46 47}. What is more, first Amnesty international and later the UN reported that the Myanmar government is now repeating the same genocidal behavior with the Buddhist Rakhine people of the Rakhine state^{48 49}. Indiscriminate murder by aerial attack, displacement of over 20,000 people, jailing of leaders for treason and murder in detention has been reported^{50 51 52 53}. The extent remains

³⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/mounting-confusion-forced-rohingya-repatriation-myanmar-181115013128968.html>

³⁷ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194590/Lasting-solution-to-Rohingya-crisis-%E2%80%9Cfigured-high%E2%80%9D>

³⁸ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/15/asia/rohingya-repatriation-myanmar-intl/index.html>

³⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh-exclusive/exclusive-rohingya-repatriation-relocation-plans-set-to-be-pushed-back-to-2019-government-official-idUSKCN1NN0FC>

⁴⁰ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194979/Bangladesh-Myanmar-talks-Friday-amid-%E2%80%98zero>

⁴¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/suu-kyi-investors-pour-money-crisis-hit-rakhine-state-190222101203636.html>

⁴² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/investigator-myanmar-genocide-rohingya-ongoing-181025035804009.html>

⁴³ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/30/opinions/rohingya-repatriation-myanmar-intl/index.html>

⁴⁴ "More than 34,000 Rohingya were also thrown into fires, while over 114,000 others were beaten, said the report, titled Forced Migration of Rohingya: The Untold Experience. Some 18,000 Rohingya women and girls were raped by Myanmar's army and police and over 115,000 Rohingya homes were burned down and 113,000 others vandalized" <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/eu-extends-ban-arms-sales-myanmar-rohingya-crisis-190430005224768.html>

⁴⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/myanmar-seizes-boat-93-fleeing-rohingya-camps-malaysia-181127055559149.html>

⁴⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/displaced-rohingya-lament-life-man-land-180803184749993.html>

⁴⁷ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/17/asia/inside-rakhine-state-intl/index.html>

⁴⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/myanmar-military-committing-war-crimes-rakhine-amnesty-190528090400122.html>

⁴⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-un/myanmar-blackout-may-be-cover-for-gross-human-rights-violations-un-investigator-idUSKCN1TP20K>

⁵⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/myanmar-army-attack-killed-dozens-rohingya-190409062501653.html>

⁵¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/outcry-mounts-deaths-custody-myanmar-rakhine-state-190426103953188.html>

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/myanmar-disturbed-attacks-civilians-rakhine-190405120651039.html>

⁵² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/myanmar-court-jails-rakhine-leader-20-years-treason-190319070726358.html>

⁵³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/outcry-mounts-deaths-custody-myanmar-rakhine-state-190426103953188.html>

hidden by an information blackout⁵⁴. In the meantime, soldiers exposed for committing war crimes against the Rohingya were released having served less time than the reports who exposed them; the reporters, who won a Pulitzer for their act, were later released after over 500 days in prison^{55 56}. Overall, it Myanmar does not appear very keen on repatriation. A Rohingya activist even alleged that the country was trying to forcibly take back some of the the Rohingya to avoid being prosecuted by the ICC⁵⁷. Experts are of the opinion that repatriation would be feasible unless Myanmar generals have been tried for war crimes⁵⁸. All in all, voluntary repatriation would be difficult to attain.

Bangladesh maintains that no one from the Rohingya population would be repatriated against their will⁵⁹. However, it tried to relocate some of the refugees to another camp. Bhasanchar – an islet that have been existence for around two decades, was prepared with embankments and buildings to house around 100,000 people at the cost of around \$280 million. However, the Rohingya people, inclined to stay near the border and within familiar territory, refused to relocate. The first attempt to send a group of 23000 in April 2019 was futile and the plan was put on hold⁶⁰. The UN's refugee organization, while welcoming any voluntary relocation, remained skeptic about the suitability of the new habitats while its independent rapporteur warned of a 'new crisis' in the event of forced relocation ^{61 62}. The government again maintains that no one would be forced to move to the new facilities⁶³.

An interesting by-product of these failed attempts has been the growing solidarity of camp dwellers. Several civil and political societies have been forming from among the displaced people, some of whom lobby for greater involvement at decision-making processes^{64 65}. The complications around repatriation and relocation has somewhat negatively impacted the relationship of the Bangladesh government with the international aid organizations in 2018⁶⁶. However, the two continue to engage in joint endeavours for the betterment of the Rohingya people. For example, as the tensions went on, UNHCR and Bangladesh government's administration continued to register biometric information of the displaced people and issue them with identification card with Myanmar listed as 'place of origin' in an effort to check trafficking and facilitate return to Myanmar in the future⁶⁷.

At the beginning of March 2019 Bangladesh told the UN it was unable to take in any more Myanmar refugees⁶⁸. It also blamed Myanmar for not cooperating in the repatriation process⁶⁹. As the faith on the goodwill of Myanmar waned, Bangladesh in

⁵⁴<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rakhine/myanmar-orders-internet-shutdown-in-conflict-torn-rakhine-state-telco-operator-idUSKCN1TN0AX>

⁵⁵ <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/06/asia/reuters-journalists-myanmar-freed-intl/index.html>

⁵⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/jailed-reuters-journalists-honoured-pulitzer-prize-190416052621870.html>

⁵⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/mounting-confusion-forced-rohingya-repatriation-myanmar-181115013128968.html>

⁵⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/prosecute-myanmar-army-chief-rohingya-genocide-envoy-190125112535665.html>

⁵⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/bangladesh-proposes-safe-zone-myanmar-rohingya-refugees-190213100737893.html>

⁶⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/forget-rohingya-urges-support-refugees-190426183314190.html>

⁶¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/warns-bangladesh-crisis-rohingya-relocation-plan-190311131237440.html>

⁶² <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/192930/UN-official-welcomes-Rohingya-relocation-to>

⁶³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/193171/Rohingya-relocation-to-Bhasan-Char-may-not-happen>

⁶⁴https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194552/A-political-awakening-faces-a-backlash-in-Rohingya?fbclid=IwAR31CI8zp2klwWpuiCyY_8DF5L4kLgaYBwUJgHxMeqvPQNKMgt3Q2DjAIM8

⁶⁵ <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/06/19/rohingya-body-wants-involvement-in-decision-making>

⁶⁶ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196999/Voluntary-organisations-don%E2%80%99t-want-Rohingya>

⁶⁷ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/195734/Over-250-000-Rohingyas-get-ID-cards-UN>

⁶⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/bangladesh-tells-myanmar-refugees-190301012253046.html>

⁶⁹ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197152/Bangladesh-requests-to-diplomats-to-mount-pressure>

recent months extended diplomatic activities to more powerful entities. On separate occasions in May 2019 the country's Prime Minister spoke to the head of Japan, a development partner, about durable⁷⁰ whereas its Foreign Minister spoke to another strategic and developmental partner, China⁷¹. In June, the Chinese ambassador to Dhaka visited the camps ahead of Bangladesh PM's visit to China in July⁷² where she is expected to bring up the matter of repatriation⁷³. Before that in April 2019, the PM spoke to UN convoys that came to visit Rohingya camps and the FM spoke to US representatives about adopting stronger measures to ensure repatriation and justice for the Rohingya people⁷⁴ ⁷⁵. The issue came up for discussions at the third Strategic Dialogue between the United Kingdom and Bangladesh in Dhaka in April 2019⁷⁶. Before that in February FM called on Russia, China and India for help.⁷⁷

Bangladesh also seeks to involve regional organization. In June, the country's president sought support from the regional partners at a summit the UN-backed Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).⁷⁸ Among more renowned organizations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has become actively involved in the matter since a Foreign Minister's meeting in March 2019 and took initiative to launch Rohingya case at International Court of Justice (ICJ). While she was in Makkah in June for the 14th summit of the, Bangladesh PM praised OIC and sought funding and technical help to uphold the legal rights of Rohingyas and ensure accountability⁷⁹. At the same summit OIC called upon its own ad hoc ministerial committee on human rights violations against the Rohingyas in Myanmar to immediately take the matter to the ICJ on its behalf⁸⁰. A representative of OIC's ad hoc body led by the Gambia visited Bangladesh in 2019 as did the state minister for international cooperation of the United Arab Emirates⁸¹.

Among other regional organizations, Association of South East Asian Nations became involved with the matter and published a report in 2019. It came under fire for downplaying the extent of the crimes committed by Myanmar and the problems in facilitating a return⁸². The report also chose not to use the term 'Rohingya' and spoke of the return of only 500,000 people - the position officially taken by Myanmar⁸³. In a diplomatic meeting with representatives of Thailand and Brunei Darussalam, Bangladesh president lobbied with these members of ASEAN for playing a role in facilitating repatriation⁸⁴.

An independent report commissioned by the UN blamed its systemic limitations for its failures to prohibit the crackdown by Myanmar. The report blamed the UN for wavering between censure and conciliation with the newly-open country⁸⁵. The UN has however

⁷⁰ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196404/Hasina-Abe-discuss-durable-solution-to-Rohingya>

⁷¹ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/195679/Dhaka-seeks-Beijing%E2%80%99s-support-over-Rohingya-issue>

⁷² <http://www.newagebd.net/article/75059/chinese-ambassador-zhang-zuo-visits-rohingya-camps>

⁷³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197783/Dhaka-hopes-PM%E2%80%99s-Beijing-tour-to-resolve-Rohingya>

⁷⁴ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194599/PM-Hasina-asks-UN-to-play-strong-role-on-Rohingya>

⁷⁵ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/193824/Bangladesh-seeks-US-sanction-on-perpetrators>

⁷⁶ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194590/Lasting-solution-to-Rohingya-crisis-%E2%80%9Cfigured-high%E2%80%9D>

⁷⁷ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194979/Bangladesh-Myanmar-talks-Friday-amid-%E2%80%98zero>

⁷⁸ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197313/Rohingya-crisis-may-destabilise-region-President>

⁷⁹ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196557/Hasina-seeks-OIC-support-to-launch-Rohingya-case>

⁸⁰ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196711/OIC-to-file-case-at-ICJ-over-HR-violation-against>

⁸¹ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194302/UAE-state-minister-visits-Rohingya-camp>

⁸² <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/197592/Prioritise-Rohingya-rights-safety-ASEAN>

⁸³ <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/196904/ASEAN-predicts-smooth-Rohingya-return-to-Myanmar>

⁸⁴ <http://www.newagebd.net/article/76564/president-seeks-thailand-bruneis-support-for-rohingya-repatriation>

⁸⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/systemic-failure-of-un-ahead-of-myanmar-military-crackdown-review-idUSKCN1T12LM>

been steadfast in its condemnation since the crackdown. In a report in August 2018, an Independent commission of the UN recommended trial of Myanmar generals, including Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, for genocide. It recommended taking the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague or an ad hoc tribunal⁸⁶. The following month, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted to set up “an ongoing independent mechanism for Myanmar that would collect, consolidate, and preserve evidence of crimes that could be used in an eventual court case”⁸⁷. The same month, the ICC ruled that it would be able to prosecute Myanmar even though the country was not party to the international statute that established the court and initiated a preliminary probe into the matter⁸⁸. In March, it sent a delegation to Bangladesh and at the end of June, one of its prosecutors made an application for permission to begin investigation on the grounds that part of the war crimes i.e. those of deportation involves people currently residing in Bangladesh which is a member of the Court⁸⁹.

In general, countries not party to the Rome Statute could be recommended to the ICC by the UNSC, but it is unlikely in this case. Myanmar has friends, namely China and Russia, who would block any such initiative. In December 2018, China and Russia boycotted the talks about a draft resolution, being circulated by Britain, UNSC’s designated representative in this matter, calling for holding Myanmar accountable for its crimes and return of refugees⁹⁰. Even the presentation of the full report of the UN Fact Finding Mission’s report to the UNSC drew objections from six of its 15 members⁹¹. More recently in April 2019, Russian Foreign Minister in a meeting with his Bangladeshi counterpart reiterated his country’s emphasis on bilateral solutions while hinting at lack of mandate of international organizations and their vested interest in keeping refugees in camps⁹².

The diplomatic rival of these countries, the United States of America is hamstrung by an internal division. The State Department of the Trump government hired a legal consultant which present detailed account of war crimes. But the department declines to use the words ‘Genocide’ so that there is no compulsion to take immediate action⁹³. On the other hand, US House of Representatives overwhelming passed a resolution denouncing the genocide⁹⁴.

While the attempts to provide justice meander on, global call for financial ban on Myanmar army get stronger⁹⁵. The EU and the USA currently has several restrictions placed upon the army. EU in April 2019 extended embargo on sales of weapons and other equipment which can be used by the military and border police and anybody for monitoring for the purpose of internal repression. This also includes no support or cooperation with the army as well as asset freeze and travel restriction for 14 of its generals⁹⁶. The USA has similar measures in place for 4 generals. Neither sanctions

⁸⁶ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/27/asia/un-myanmar-genocide-investigation-intl/index.html>

⁸⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/prosecute-myanmar-army-chief-rohingya-genocide-envoy-190125112535665.html>

⁸⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/icc-opens-investigation-crimes-rohingya-180919082206813.html>

⁸⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-war-crimes-myanmar/icc-prosecutor-asks-to-open-an-investigation-on-bangladesh-myanmar-idUSKCN1TR187>

⁹⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/bangladesh-tells-myanmar-refugees-190301012253046.html>

⁹¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-fails-to-stop-un-security-council-myanmar-briefing-idUSKCN1MY2QU>

⁹² <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/194979/Bangladesh-Myanmar-talks-Friday-amid-%E2%80%98zero>

⁹³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/law-firm-myanmar-committed-genocide-rohingya-181204042107254.html>

⁹⁴ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/13/politics/house-resolution-myanmar-genocide/index.html>

⁹⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/mission-urges-cutting-financial-ties-myanmar-army-190514060911024.html>

⁹⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/eu-extends-ban-arms-sales-myanmar-rohingya-crisis-190430005224768.html>

include the commander in chief of the military, Min Aung Hlaing. A rights activist criticized the EU for supporting an army-run police force and for considering a trade sanction, which would impact ordinary Myanmar citizens in the garments industry, rather than a global embargo on the Myanmar army⁹⁷. His group, Burma Campaign UK, in December 2018 published a list of 49 companies from across the globe that are somehow linked with the issue and criticized world's leaders for not holding these companies responsible. More recently, the United Nation's human rights envoy urged countries to reinstate sanctions against two Myanmar corporations that the army members depend on for making investment since the country opened up its economy in 2011⁹⁸.

The World Bank also came under fire for a proposed \$100m project for funding cash-for-work and small enterprises in the Rakhine state. Myanmar-based NGOs wrote to the Bank expressing concern that such project would increase existing segregation and other injustices in the region⁹⁹. The project was a major boost for Myanmar's civilian head, Aung Sun Suu Kyi who has received a lot of backlash for failing to check military transgressions from states and non-state actors alike^{100 101 102 103}.

5.2. Implications for South Asian Region (Peace and Security)

Bangladesh has taken a heavy toll by letting the Rohingyas seek refuge on humanitarian grounds. Besides its wider impacts on the socio-economic conditions of Cox's Bazar, mass exodus of Rohingya may have implications beyond the geographical boundary of Bangladesh. The Rohingya exodus potentially can impact South Asian countries, and thus can effects on changing bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as influence issues of peace and security of the region.

One of the key aspects of recent Rohingya crisis is that it has shown gradual evolution of a bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and Myanmar to reach a consensus of repatriation process. Having a number of bilateral meetings, Bangladesh and Myanmar reach to a MoU to repatriate Rohingyas to their homes. However, in spite of repeated provocations, Bangladesh did not show aggressive attitude towards Myanmar nor did anything offensive. Nevertheless, the extent to which the MoU was respected and undertaken initiatives in line with this document by Myanmar that has been questionable. An academic referred that neither Myanmar nor Bangladesh can leave their coexistence of bilateral relationship since they have ties on economic and geographical lines (interview 31).

In response to a false claim of Saint Martin Island by Myanmar, Bangladesh strengthened its security measures by deploying security forces particularly the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) in this island (08 April 2019, Prothom Alo). Nevertheless, academics have referred that Rohingya population is living in a place in Bangladesh which holds much geopolitical significance. An uncomfortable relationship between two countries, and possible instability in this area, can upset the balance of stability in

⁹⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/campaigners-target-firms-business-myanmar-military-190327061055016.html>

⁹⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/campaigners-target-firms-business-myanmar-military-190327061055016.html>

⁹⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/190517135412845.html>

¹⁰⁰ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/14/asia/mike-pence-suu-kyi-intl/index.html>

¹⁰¹ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/28/americas/aung-san-suu-kyi-canada-intl/index.html>

¹⁰² <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/29/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-nobel-prize-intl/index.html>

¹⁰³ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/12/asia/suu-kyi-amnesty-award-intl/index.html>

at least India, Myanmar and Bangladesh, and if not more, because the Rohingya community could potentially be used by different regional and global actors for their interests (interview 33). India shares borders with both Bangladesh and Myanmar; therefore, it has an essence of dealing with this matter, though this country has taken a strategic position of not engaging directly with any of the sides of Rohingya crisis, which provides a mixed signal. Up to January 2019, at-least 1300 Rohingyas, moreover, came to Bangladesh from India, which mount another pressure for Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 17 January 2019). Besides that, Saudi Arabia has signaled to send back illegal Rohingya immigrants to Bangladesh (Prothom Alo, 2019). Having these push and pull factors could contribute to regional matters of security and peace.

Myanmar questioned seriousness of Bangladesh about Rohingya repatriation process, although the former has not undertaken much initiatives in relation to execution of the 2017 repatriation deal. Although Bangladesh has always been diplomatic and modest in terms of repatriating Rohingya people to their home country, Myanmar, non-repatriation in the mid-term and longer-term may undermine relationship of these two neighbouring countries. Hosting more than a million of Rohingya population has been a complex task associated to many other challenges as discussed in chapter 5. One of the key concern has been that many of Rohingya people can be diffused into all over Bangladesh, as discussed before. Newspaper reports that a large number of Rohingyas has escaped from camps and headed towards different directions for different purposes. Many of them even have managed collecting fake identity card and collected passports to go abroad (Kuddus, 16 May 2019). Since 25 August 2017 to 5 May 2019, 58583 Rohingyas were captured by law enforcing agencies while escaping the camps (ibid). Nevertheless, once a Rohingya person leave the camp and goes to another area that could undermine localized security because hosting them on humanitarian ground is different than accepting them in local society (interview 32).

The law and order situation in Cox's Bazar, as discussed in chapter 5 has gradually become a concern after the crisis. Over the period of last one and a-half years, numerous incidents of murder and other types of crimes have been reported. Such criminal activities are not something that have limited effects to the geographical boundary of Bangladesh. Besides killing and murder within the camps, availability of arms and involvement of some Rohingyas to trafficking of drug, arms and human are concerns for internal law and order situation of Cox's Bazar and beyond. It is an open knowledge that Teknaf Border of Bangladesh has been used by drug traffickers, and the recent influx has allegedly augmented the number Rohingya people involved to carrying and trafficking drugs, mainly Yaba. Statistics show that there have been a large number of cases of arms and drug smuggling against the Rohingyas. This route of drug trafficking is not far from the 'Golden Triangle', a major route of arms and drug trafficking of South East Asia (interview 30). Therefore, this is a serious concern not only for Bangladesh but also to the whole region. Nevertheless, according to newspaper reports 17 Rohingya allegedly involved with drug trafficking, and dealing, died in gunfight with law enforcing agencies (Prothom Alo, 07 April and 23 April 2019).

Experts also expressed concerns over human trafficking in cox's Bazar area. There are various national, regional and international groups allegedly involved in human trafficking. Ever since the influx of August 2017, many Rohingyas had been detained

while they were in pursuit of getting Bangladeshi passport. Within a year of the massive Rohingya influx of Rohingya, 3169 Rohingya people had been detained from all over the country while trying to get fake passports (Kuddus, 16 May 2019). Since September 2017 to 2019, a large number of Rohingyas who have been detained were trying to get a passport or while trying to go to Malaysia by sea. Those who were captured from Cox's Bazar were trying to get to Malaysia, where most of them have relatives. They want to go there to have a good life. However, Thai police had caught 7 Rohingyas who reached there from Bangladesh and were in pursuit to get to Malaysia. These all happen in illegal way: once Rohingyas leave the camp and they become targets of traffickers to take different routes and voyage to go to abroad.

Bangladesh is not in a position to host this large number of Rohingyas for long-period. It could potentially undermine regional stability and tranquillity. Rohingya people can be pampered and used as an instrument to make impact in South Asia. If attempts are made to increase resistance within them or to organize them in a way of not accepting any kind of solution offered by Bangladesh or the international community or any other mechanism other than returning to their home that could create a condition of disturbance in the future (interview 33). A local representative of Rohingya hosting area also highlighted that the current crisis could lead to a protracted situation leading to potential unpredicted disputing relation with Myanmar due to the existence of huge 'grievance' that Rohingya population have since long (interview 08). This could create a complex situation for a country like Bangladesh which has allowed large number of persecuted people to seek shelter on humanitarian ground.

Although a full-scale war or violence is highly unlikely, any kind of small scale tension may find different dimensions to flare up which could have domino effect type scenario amidst the compact nature of South Asian countries. Nevertheless, given such an anticipated situation engagement of regional powerful states may not create a condition for other actors to involve in such matter due to geo-strategic issues (interview 32). Having such a situation might advantage Myanmar executing its wider design related to Rohingya crisis (ibid). Nonetheless, these are all hypothesis, which could lead to a worst possible outcome if Rohingya problem is not well addressed in due process involving the international, regional and national actors, and in light of the principles of international law.

Both security experts and academics expressed concerns over the activities of the ARSA (interview 32 and 33). Given the situation, if Rohingya people get actively involved with the activities of the ARSA in longer-term that could undermine relationship of Myanmar and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, bilateral relationship between these countries could go further level if potential threats of radicalization turn into a reality.

There has been a concern of radicalization raised by a quarter since such an apprehensive environment persists in different parts of the world. Although there has not been any direct evidence of such kind of phenomena in relation to Rohingya people living in the camps, this concern has been raised because of global challenges of extremism. This is an issue highlighted by some academics and experts as some odds might favour different extremist groups finding ways to harness some destitute people to engage in such process.

This is a matter of serious concern and worry not only at national level but also beyond the territory of Bangladesh. A security expert in his interview (interview 30) stressed that organizations like the Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) have expressed their intention to support Rohingyas. He also stated that the IS perhaps has expressed their intention to play role against the oppression of the Rohingya people. Though our law enforcing agencies have not given a perspective about the presence of radical groups in the camps, a number of national dailies of Bangladesh published news and expressed concerns that there are a number of terrorist groups controlling the Rohingya camps (Taher, 2018; Samakal, October 2018). A recent newspaper report (Kuddus, 27 May 2019) states that besides engaging in human trafficking, there are 14 Rohingya groups involved in drug dealing, gun running inside the camps that have undermined overall peace and security conditions of the camps. Nevertheless, concerns of radicalization is also related with the demise and defeat of the IS in Syria and other places, and possibility of targeting in different ways Rohingya people, could be a serious security concern not only for Bangladesh, but also for the South Asian region and beyond.

One aspect is certain is that if Rohingya problem sustains and repatriation process does not progress with adequate attention to addressing root causes of this problem in Myanmar, above mentioned concerns may exist, which would not only undermine relations of neighbouring countries but also create complex dynamic of insecurity and threats beyond Bangladesh. Nevertheless, thinking in absolute pessimistic view would underweight optimistic approach of addressing problems in Myanmar and successful repatriation of Rohingya people to their homes with rights and dignity.

5.3. Summary of Findings

The study is conducted with a view to understanding various aspects of the Rohingya exodus particularly factors which forced them to leave their country of origin i.e. Myanmar and take refuge in Bangladesh, the implications of the exodus in the host communities, and examining the future trajectory of the crisis in relation to their rights and repatriation to Myanmar. The study is carried out with the hypothesis that it is possible to effectively repatriate and rehabilitate the Rohingya in Myanmar given the present geopolitical scenario of the region.

It is evident from the study that the Rohingya have been forced to leave Myanmar in the face of indiscriminate violence by the Myanmar government forces such as military and police, and in some cases Buddhist Monks of the Rakhine state. In Myanmar, they have been subject to physical violence, torture, destruction of property, religious persecution and gender-based violence, and denied from enjoying their basic rights, facilities and services. It is found that Rohingya have been subject to both direct and structural forms of violence in Myanmar. Different kinds of direct violence such as burning down of their houses and properties, physical torture and killing, sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls have been carried out indiscriminately against Rohingya which forced them to leave Myanmar. The Myanmar police and army usually committed rape and sexual violence against the Rohingya women and girls as they used it as a weapon to hurt the Rohingya community and consequently forced this community to leave the country. The study found that about half of the population left Myanmar because of sexual violence.

The Rohingya people have also been the victim of structural violence in Myanmar. They are ethnically discriminated as the Myanmar government did not officially recognize their identity as one of the ethnic groups of Myanmar. They have also been denied to get basic civil rights such as right to education, marry, job and restriction on movement and religious practices. For example, their studies being limited up to grade six, sometimes they have to pay tax or bribe to get educational textbooks. The irony of fact that the Rohingya could not get marry without having permission from the Myanmar government and they even have to pay fees for the marriage permission. Most of the Rohingya respondents claim that they were not allowed to move freely, had no freedom of speech, and did not have access to formal job in Myanmar. Religious restriction has also been imposed for the Rohingya as respondents asserted that they did not go to pray in the group.

The Rohingya have been denied from their citizenship rights in Myanmar. The introduction of the citizenship law in 1982 made them stateless. The Myanmar government introduced the law soon after the Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh in 1979. The law categorized Myanmar citizens into three groups; full citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens but the Rohingya people were not included in any of the categories of the citizenship law. The legal, political and economic rights of the Rohingya people have been denied by this law. The Myanmar government also issued Citizens Scrutiny Cards (CRCs) in 1989 while the Rohingya people were provided with the white Temporary Registration Card (TRC). The card did not have its holder's place of birth which means they could not claim their citizenship status in their own county.

During the current Rohingya exodus in 2018 initially some of the Rohingya people started making their temporary houses by themselves before they received any help from government and non-government authorities. The host community of Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh gave them food, cloth and even temporary shelter in the early stage of their migration. Later on, government systemically built camps in two Upazilas, Kutupalong and Noyapara, Cox's Bazar. Government with the support from national and International NGOs and other agencies built houses for them. In many cases the Rohingya alleged that the houses were not appropriate for families with children. Government also provided them ration card to get ration and food items such as oil, lentils rice, baby food as well as non-food items including plastic mats and blankets. They however did not get vegetables as a ration food staff. Camp dwellers also got firewood for their cooking which really an environmental concern.

The study addresses that NGOs basically have provided the health care services at the camps and the services/facilities at the Rohingya camps are limited during the day time only. Moreover there is no psychological support for those who are the victims of different kinds of violence in Myanmar. However, further treatment may be paid for. The study discloses that law and order were maintained in the camps and security seems good over there. Actually the Camp in Charge (CiC) (an official recruited by Bangladesh Government) looks after all the issues of a camp including safety and security. In serious cases like arms trade, killing, human trafficking etc., the CiC usually deals the issue. The Rohingya *Majhis* were also part of the security and safety management in addition to camp security forces. A committee was also formed to deal with the security, safety and conflicting issues in the camp. Howbeit, we learnt from the daily newspapers that conflict between Rohingya people has been increasing

since 2018 and some Rohingya people were also killed in the camp area. Note that trafficking of children and women was raised in the camp. Sexual and gender based violence against women and girls were also evident. The child marriage was also on rise and the women feel unsafe at night because of poor lock system of their houses. However, the findings of the study suggest that the exodus of Rohingyas has had adverse socio-economic implications for the host communities in the Cox's Bazar region of Bangladesh. The presence of around 1 million Rohingyas has affected lives and livelihoods of the host communities in several ways. It is evident that the prices of most of the daily commodities have increased significantly since the arrival of Rohingyas in areas close to the camps. Though it is found that prices of some daily essentials such as rice, lentil and oil have dropped, as Rohingyas sell their relief items at a cheaper prices in the local market, but the prices of vegetables, fish and other daily essentials have increased significantly in those areas.

The livelihoods of the host communities have severely been affected due to the scarcity of jobs and loss of agricultural land. Most of the respondents of the host communities have mentioned about the growing scarcity of jobs as one of the challenges that they have been facing since the arrival of the Rohingyas. Though, it is evident that the presence and activities of various national and international NGOs in the camps have created different types employment opportunities for the host communities, but majority of the people have not been able to reap benefits from those opportunities. A significant number of people of host communities depend on day labour to sustain their livelihoods, and they are the ones who are suffering adversely due to the exodus. Because, Rohingyas are competing in the local labour market, and the rate of day labour has also reduced drastically due to the cheap labour offered by the Rohingyas. The host communities have also lost their agricultural land as houses for Rohingyas were built on those lands. This has resulted into a decline in the quantity of cultivable land as well as crop production which consequently have had adverse implications on the livelihoods of the host communities.

Rohingya exodus has caused severe environmental consequences due to the destruction of forest, hills and the eco-system. The present camp area used to be a reserve forest and covered by hills. But, after the exodus, about 10,000 acres of forest have completely been destroyed to set up makeshift camps for the Rohingyas. The hills of the area have also been destroyed for the same purpose. Due to the deforestation, the risk of the landslide has also increased significantly. Furthermore, the local communication system has disrupted severely as roads and highways have been damaged due to increasing traffics and the movement of heavy vehicles involved in the transportation of relief items. Besides, people are also suffering due to the increases of fare in the local transport, severe traffic congestion in roads and frequent accidents resulted from increasing traffics.

Education is one of the sectors most adversely affected by the 2017 influx due to the use of educational institutions as temporary shelters, insecurity of students, deterioration of educational environment and involvement of teachers and students in part-time jobs. As soon as the influx started, schools, colleges and madrassahs became temporary shelters for the newcomers awaiting relocation to camps and settlements. Many of these buildings were later requisitioned by the government as offices for security agencies and relief organisations, and even as warehouses to store relief materials which disrupted the academic activities of those institutions to a

significant extent. Furthermore, since the beginning of the influx, school and college attendance have dropped down for various reasons. Parents are afraid of to send their children to primary schools due to increasing traffic and frequent road accidents. Undergraduate students are abandoning their studies and working with different NGOs working in the camps. Academic activities also suffered as many of the teachers have been involved in part-time jobs with different NGOs, leaving educational institutions in a lurch.

The exodus has also disrupted the social cohesion between and among groups. At the beginning of the exodus, Rohingyas were welcomed by the host communities and provided all sorts of assistance that they could to alleviate their sufferings, but as their stay in the country prolonged, the local people's solidarity with the Rohingya people dwindled. It has developed as local communities have started to suffer due to rapid demographic and economic change after the exodus. The relationship between Rohingya and local people have deteriorated and quarrels and clashes between the two communities are happening in recent times. Local people living alongside refugees are now less inclined to help and cohabitate. The presence of Rohingyas has also increased the insecurity of women in the host communities. It is found that some parents, fearful of their daughters' safety, have sent them away to live with relatives. Polygamy has also increased as local men marry Rohingya women and live inside the camps to collect relief.

The various types of inconvenience combined with real as well as perceived discrimination by government and non-government agencies have created a strong sense of deprivation among the local people. This has mainly developed due to the suspension of local government's services, exclusion from relief distribution, perceived bias in the activities and attention of both government and non-government agencies and marginalization of low-income people in employment competition. A comprehensive humanitarian support system has developed for the Rohingya people by national and international NGOs, military and law enforcing agencies, which did not include the local people at first. Locals have especially developed a grudge about perceived discrimination and neglect, especially since many of them are nearly as poor as the refugees. The sense of deprivation is also resulted from the lack of recognition. At the beginning of the influx, local people provided all out support to the Rohingyas when the help from government and the NGO hadn't fully materialized. Even today, they are bearing the burden of hosting more than 1 million Rohingyas in their areas. But, host communities seem to feel unappreciated despite all the help they provided in their limited capacity at the beginning of the influx as well as the current difficulties they are going through in their everyday lives.

The recent exodus has also affected the safety and security of the host communities in a number of ways. It is found that though host communities provided all-out support to the Rohingya people at the beginning of the crisis but with the passage of time such compassion and support faded away. The locals now perceive the presence of Rohingyas in their locality as a threat to their safety and security which consequently lead to different sorts of conflict and violence between them. It happened as the presence of around 1 million Rohingyas has created enormous burden on the economic and social life of host communities. The changes in the perception of the host communities regarding Rohingyas have also developed due to the inadequate attention that local people have received from the government and other agencies to

address their sufferings. Because, locals are the ones who bear the burden of hosting more than one million Rohingya and face sufferings in their everyday life. But, in reality, they are not getting adequate attention from the authorities concerned to curb their sufferings. In addition to the conflict between Rohingyas and local people, there are also cases of conflict and violence among Rohingyas. Several incidences of murder took place inside the camps in recent past. It is found that the old conflicts among Rohingyas back in Rakhine have started to resurface in the camp as well.

The threat of terrorism and radicalization is also very high among the Rohingyas as they have been subject to gross marginalization and don't have any hope regarding their future. According to the respondents of the host communities there are active presence of two terrorist groups (i.e. ARSA and Al-Yaqin) inside the camps, and those groups are reportedly responsible for all sorts of atrocities happening inside the camps. There is also a possibility of transnational terrorist connections as several international terrorist groups have expressed their sympathy to Rohingyas. The potential recruitment of Rohingyas by local and international terrorist groups is also very high due to the vulnerability they are currently exposed to in the camps.

The sense of fear is also evident among the host communities living close to the camps. Several factors such as the presence of larger number of Rohingyas compared to host population, unrestricted movement of the Rohingyas, increasing criminal activities and inadequate number of law enforcing agencies, have contributed to create such fear. A sense of being minority has already been created among the locals which is one of the most contributing factors behind growing sense of fear. The locals are very much concerned about the unrestricted movement of the Rohingyas. They have claimed that though Rohingyas are supposed to stay within the camp area, but their movement is not limited within the camps. The host communities have claimed that due to the unrestricted movement, Rohingyas are increasingly getting involved in various criminal activities. The host communities have claimed about increasing criminal activities such as drug trafficking, incidence of theft, murder, use of illegal SIM cards, Kidnapping, etc. in their area since the arrival of Rohingyas. There are allegations that despite an increase in the criminal activities, the number of law enforcing agencies are inadequate to ensure the safety and security of the local people. Furthermore, though it is evident that the sense of fear and anxiety has touched upon all sections of the community, but women as well as an ethnic minority group (Chakma) living in the area feel more insecurity compared to other sections of the society.

To address the present Rohingya crisis, different proposals of solution have come out in the study which include repatriation of Rohingya people to their country of origin i.e. Myanmar, rehabilitating them into Bangladesh, and resettlement into a third country. Among all these approaches, repatriation of Rohingya to their country of origin i.e. Myanmar appears to be the most viable and durable solution of the crisis. Most of the Rohingyas interviewed during the study also want to go back to their country of origin. However, Rohingyas have set some precondition for their return which need to be materialized before any process of repatriation starts. These include granting of their citizenship right in Myanmar, recognition of 'Rohingya' identity, and ensuring their security in Rakhine. They have also demanded justice, freedom of Movement, religious freedom, right to land and property ownership, access to employment, education, rebuilding of their houses and return of lost property. During the time of

exodus, Rohingya people fled with no assets either because they did not have time to pack their belongings, and/or because their assets, including houses were burned down. Therefore, in order to return people also demanded shelter and a means, to rebuild their destroyed livelihood. However, among all those issues, right to citizenship in Myanmar, recognition of 'Rohingya' identity and their security in 'Rakhine' appear to be the most crucial issues in the process of repatriation.

Having any other solution like rehabilitating them in Bangladesh or resettling them in a third country will not address the core issues of the problem. Instead, it would not only put the repatriation process at risk but also undermine the fundamental rights of the Rohingya community. It will also pave the way to legitimize the genocide carried out by the Myanmar government against the Rohingya minority and encourage similar regimes in other parts of the world to carry out such atrocity with immunity. For this reason, all relevant stakeholders including international community, powerful states, regional countries should play an active role to find out a durable solution of the crisis. The international community also need to cooperate with Bangladesh that have carried the burden of hosting around 1 million Rohingya on humanitarian ground.

5.4. Policy recommendations

- The risk of different kinds of environmental calamities such as land slide is very high in the Rohingya camps. Though the government of Bangladesh has taken different kinds of initiatives such as forming disaster management committee, collecting volunteers from Rohingya people and provided them disaster- related training, preparing shelter centres in the face of any disaster, but considering the massive number of Rohingyas current initiatives may not be sufficient to tackle any calamities. In this circumstance, comprehensive disaster management policy and initiatives should be taken by the government in association with national and international organizations.
- It is well known that at the initial stage of the exodus, the local community welcomed the Rohingya people on humanitarian ground, but recently, the relations between these two communities have been deteriorated. It has developed as local communities are suffering in various aspects of their social and economic life due to hosting approximately 1 million Rohingya in their locality. For this reason, due attention needs to be given to the host community and required initiatives need to be made by relevant authorities to address those sufferings.
- There is a perception among the host community that humanitarian assistance should also proportionately be given to the host community, as vast majority of the host community are economically as vulnerable as Rohingya. In this context, adequate funds should also be allocated for the development of the local community.
- It is found that Rohingya people are engaging in different types of criminal activities such as drug and human trafficking. Both human and technological surveillance of the government agencies should be enhanced to curb such activities.

- The study finds that the Rohingya women, girls are facing different types of harassment or sexual violence in the camp. Some of them are also involved in prostitution work. For this reason, special attention needs to be given to protect the Rohingya women and girls. A special women and child affairs committee could be introduced in the camp. Rohingya women can also be engaged in such endeavour. To guard human trafficking and prostitution the law enforcing agencies and other administrative bodies of the camp should stay 24 hours in the camp.
- The movements of the Rohingya need to be restricted within the camp areas in order to maintain their safety and security vis a vis ensuring safety of local people. In this regard, fences around the camps can be built to keep them in a particular place. This is also important for keeping them separate to avert any unwanted circumstances at community level.
- The number of law enforcing agencies need to be increased to a significant extent. The current numbers of law enforcing agencies are inadequate considering the massive number of Rohingya. Besides, due to increasing criminal activities in and around camps as well as growing mistrust and tension between Rohingya and host community, it is imperative that government of Bangladesh pay utmost attention to ensure the safety and security in and around the camps.

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Appendices

Appendix A1. Project Team Members

Principle Investigator (PI):

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Project Manager:

Dr Bayes Ahmed, Lecturer, Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London (UCL), UK

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3. **Anurug Chakma**, Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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5. **Mohammad Shaheenur Alam**, Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

UCL Postdoctoral Research Fellow:

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Dhaka University Research Assistants:

1. **Tanzina Rahman**, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka.
2. **Md. Abu Yousuf**, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka.
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4. **Muhammad Hamid Reza**, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka.

Project Partners:

1. **Professor Dr A.S.M. Maksud Kamal**, Department of Disaster Science and Management, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh
2. **Dr Taifur Rahman**, Founding Executive Director, Health Management BD Foundation, Block A/2 and A/6, Camp 13, Burma-Para Rohingya Camp, Ukha, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh

Appendix A2. Questionnaire on the Rohingya people's Perceptions

SECTION A – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

- A1. Age:
 A2. Gender: a) Male b) Female c) Other [CIRCLE]
 A3. Marital Status: a) Married b) Unmarried c) Divorced d) Widowed
 A4. Language(s) you speak: a) Rohingya b) Bengali c) Burmese d) English
 A5. Religion: a) Muslim b) Hindu c) Buddhist d) Christian e) Other...
 A6. Where were you born?
 A7. Disability/Impairment (if mentioned):.....
 A8. Did you come to Bangladesh before this recent arrival? YES / NO

SECTION B- LIFE IN MYANMAR AND DECISION TO LEAVE

- B1. What was your occupation in Myanmar?

- B2. What was your/your family's average monthly income in Myanmar?
Kyat
- B3. Did you have any land in Myanmar ?
 a) Yes b) No c) Don't want to answer
- B3.1 If yes, for which purpose did you use land ?
- B4. What rights and facilities did you and/or your family have in Myanmar?

	Rights and facilities	Yes	No
i)	Citizenship		
ii)	Participation in local decision making process		
iii)	Rohingya identity		
iv)	Gender equality		
v)	Right to marry		
vi)	Freedom of religion		
vii)	Free speech		
viii)	Access to justice		
ix)	Property rights		
x)	Healthcare		
xi)	Education		
xii)	Vaccination		
xiii)	Housing		
xiv)	Clean Water		
xiv)	Sanitation		
xvi)	Employment		
xvii)	Others.....		

- B5. Did these rights and facilities in Myanmar change over the years?
 a) Yes b) No c) No comments

B6. Why did you leave Myanmar? [OPEN ANSWER]

[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: a) Physical violence/torture b) Burning house c) Military attack d) Restriction on movement e) Religious persecution f) Sexual violence g) Other:

SECTION C : LIFE IN THE CAMP (In Bangladesh)

C1. What is your occupation in the camp ?

.....

C2. What humanitarian assistance do you and/or your family have access to in the camp?

[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: a) Food b) Healthcare c) Women's health d) Vaccination

e) Education f) Housing g) Clean Water h) Sanitation i) Other:

C3. Have you faced any violence in the camps in Bangladesh? YES / NO / NO COMMENT

[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: a) Theft b) Violent dispute c) Human trafficking d) Kidnap e) Sexual violence f) Domestic violence g) Other:

C4. Have you faced hazards and disease in the camps in Bangladesh? YES / NO / NO COMMENT

C4.1 If yes, what kinds of hazards and diseases have you faced?

		Yes	No
a)	Landslides		
b)	Flash floods		
c)	Cyclone		
d)	Fire risk		
e)	Infectious disease (i.e. HIV)		
f)	Non-infectious disease		
g)	Other.....		

SECTION D : RETURN TO MYANMAR

D1. What would make you feel safe to return to Myanmar? [OPEN ANSWER]

(Note for the Interviewer) a) Citizenship in Myanmar b) Decision making c) Rohingya identity d) Gender equality e) Right to marry f) Freedom of religion g) Free speech h) Access to justice i) Property rights j) Other:

SECTION E : END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

E1. Do you have any other comment ? Observation of the interviewer:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

B2. In your opinion, has crime in this time a) Gone up b) Gone down c) Unchanged d) No comments?(Circle one)

B2.1. If it has gone up, what types of crime have increased in your area?

	Crime and Violence	Yes	No
i)	Petty crimes		
ii)	Murder		
iii)	Drug trade		
iv)	Human trafficking		
v)	Fake national ID cards		
vi)	Threat of Terrorism		
vii)	Availability of illicit small arms		
viii)	Violent clash among the Rohingya people		
ix)	Clash between Rohingya and local people		
x)	Others, please specify....		

B2.2. If crime has increased, who do you think are involved in such types of crime?

.....

B3. In your opinion, has security in this time a) Improved b) Got Worse c) Unchanged d) No comments? (Circle one)

Section C: Socio-Economic Changes

C1. Do you see any positive impact in your area due to the arrival of the Rohingya people?

a) Yes b) No c) Don't know

C1.1. If yes, what types of benefit you are having in your area (multiple answer is allowed)?

- a. Employment opportunities
- b. Increasing demand of local accommodation
- c. Aid to the local people (From government and international organisation)
- d. Development of local communication system
- e. Expansion of business activities
- f. Others, please specify...

C2. Do you see any negative impact in your area due to the arrival of the Rohingya people?

a. Yes b) No c) Don't know

C2.1. If yes, what are your biggest housing, employment, health and ecological concerns at the moment?

		Yes	No
i)	Destruction of the hilly area		
ii)	Worsening the position of women		
iii)	Increases in the price of daily essentials (e.g. vegetables, rice, food, fish, local transportation, and accommodation etc.)		

iv)	Increasing competition in local business		
v)	Land degradation and deforestation		
vi)	Loss of crops and agricultural land		
vii)	Scarcity of job for the low income people		
viii)	Infectious diseases outbreak		
ix)	Obstruction in the movement of elephant		
x)	Other, please specify...		

C2.2. Please explain what you believe the causes of these issues might be?

C3. Has your average monthly income in this time: a) Gone up b) Gone down
c) Unchanged d) No comments? (Circle one)

C4. Has your cost of living in this time: a) Gone up b) Gone down c) Unchanged
d) No comments(Circle one)

C5. Have you observed changes in education in the last 12 months?
a. Yes b. No. c. Don't Know

C5.1. If yes, what kinds of changes have you observed in this context? (multiple answer is allowed)

- a. Educational institutions are being used as makeshift camps
- b. Insecurity of the students
- c. Disruption of educational activities
- d. Teachers are involved in part-time jobs with various organisation
- e. Students are engaged in part-time jobs with various organisations
- f. Others (please specify).....

C5.2. Please explain what you believe the causes of these issues, giving some examples.

C6. Do you think that there is a sense of deprivation among local people due to the arrival of Rohingyas?

- a. Yes b. No c. Do not know

C6.1. If yes, what are the reasons behind such sense of deprivation? (Multiple answer is allowed)

- a. Local people are deprived from foreign aid
- b. Government is giving more importance to Rohingya issue than local problems
- c. Local people are becoming minority in their own land
- d. Low income people are facing competition in getting job
- e. Others, please specify.....

C7. Do you know any incidence of marriage between local people and the Rohingyas?

- a. Yes b. No c. Don't Know

C7.1. If yes, what are the reasons behind such marriage?

- a. Religious similarity
- b. To help the Rohingya people
- c. Language and cultural similarity
- d. Contract marriage
- e. Others (please specify).....

C7.2. When have these been happening? (CIRCLE ONE)

- [a] Very recent (i.e. less than 6 months)
- [b] Quite recent (i.e. in the last 12 months)
- [c] Over the medium term (in the last 3 years)

[d] Over the longer term (more than 6 years)

Section D: Future of the Rohingya who came to Bangladesh

D1. What is your suggestion to address the Rohingya crisis?

- a. To repatriate them in their country of origin
- b. To resettle them in a third country
- c. To keep them in the camps with long-term assistance
- d. Pro-active role of the International Organisation including the UNHCR to repatriate them
- e. To rehabilitate them temporally in an island (i.e. Bashan char) in Bangladesh
- f. Others, please specify...

D2. Do you have any other comments?


Observation of the interviewer:

Appendix A4. Questions for the key informant interviews (KIIs)

1. How do you evaluate the current Rohingya crisis?
2. What is your evaluation of repatriation efforts?
3. How would you evaluate the issue of rehabilitation and resettlement of Rohingya people in Bangladesh and third countries?
4. What can be done to mitigate the adverse impact on local community (i.e. law & order, security, public health and economic competition etc.)?
5. How do you think Bangladesh should address the dilemma between helping refugees and protecting environment in the ecologically vulnerable area?
6. What role the international community (UN) and regional powerful actors (like India, China and Russia) could play in addressing Rohingya crisis?
7. What would you suggest to improve situation in Myanmar and to tackle recurring of violence there?

Appendix A5. Fieldwork Photographs


Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar




Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar



Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar



Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar





No man's land, Tumbru, Naikhongchari, Bandarban



No man's land, Tumbru, Naikhongchari, Bandarban

Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar




Kutupalong Rohingya Camp, Cox's Bazar



**Supplementary document is available on request;
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The Rohingya Exodus: Issues and Implications for Stability, Security and Peace in South Asia



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