The Regulation of Parliamentary Standards—
A Comparative Perspective

by Oonagh Gay

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Summary and Conclusions

The scope of the report

This research for this report was commissioned by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in order to provide some comparative information on other systems of regulating parliamentary standards.\(^1\) The Committee is conducting an inquiry into the regulation of standards in the House of Commons.\(^2\) The research is being published by the Committee. This Constitution Unit publication offers some policy options for the Commons, based on the results of the comparative research, and constitutes its submission to the Committee inquiry.

The parliaments/assemblies selected for study include the new devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which are described in Part One. The basis for regulating parliamentary standards in Australia, Canada and Ireland, including at sub-national level, is the focus of Part Two. The main points are summarised separately at the beginning of each part, but this section draws together some overall conclusions and offers some evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the various models in the report.

The framework for regulation

The frameworks for the schemes of standards regulation for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were included in the devolution legislation. These provided for standing orders or legislation to set out a detailed scheme for the registration and declaration of (mainly financial) interests by the new members and a prohibition against paid advocacy by members. The framework was based on the system in operation in the House of Commons, but was introduced by statute, rather than relying on parliamentary resolution. A crucial difference was that the main offences, failure to declare or register, or involvement in paid advocacy became criminal offences, which would not be handled by the parliamentary machinery. The decision to make these criminal offences was taken against the background of perceived difficulties by the Commons in handling serious allegations against its members.\(^3\)

Within the framework, the devolved bodies had varying degrees of autonomy to establish rules for their own members. As a general point of principle, it would seem best for each assembly/parliament to be responsible for the drafting of its own code of conduct and

\(^1\) Other than issues about parliamentary behaviour, such as use of inappropriate language in the chamber

\(^2\) For full details see the *Issues and Questions* paper issued by the Committee on 25 February 2002

\(^3\) The then Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Sir Gordon Downey, had been conducting investigations into a series of allegations by Mr Al Fayed against Neil Hamilton, Michael Howard and 25 other MPs in 1996-97.
detailed scheme. This enables the institution to fit in with the general ethos and methods of operation. In fact, only the Scottish Parliament could claim to be responsible for its code. In Northern Ireland and Wales the assemblies began life with a ready-made code. Inappropriate drafting has caused particular problems in Wales where the Committee on Standards of Conduct has in theory a role in investigating all types of breaches of standing orders. The lack of primary legislative powers in Wales means that the scope for improving the system of regulation is considerably limited. Although Scotland also faced difficulties with the initial statutory definition of paid advocacy it was given the power under the devolution settlement to create its own ethical rules by legislation within the devolution framework. The Standards Committee is planning to introduce a bill later in 2002. It is already legislating for a statutory Standards Commissioner.

**The role of parliamentary privilege**

The devolved bodies were established without the parliamentary privilege customary at Westminster and other Commonwealth parliaments. Parliamentary privilege is not a concept which is well understood. It derives from the ancient laws and customs of Parliament, and is considered essential to maintain the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of free speech by the representatives of the people. Judicial and executive authority over the internal affairs of a parliament are seen as breaching these principles of parliamentary autonomy. Parliament needs to react quickly and effectively to events so that its role of scrutinising the executive can be upheld. Statutes drafted by the executive do not always offer sufficient protection of those rights.

Westminster-style parliaments/ assemblies operating without privilege need some form of statutory protection, for example, to enable them to summon witnesses and reports, and to ensure that parliamentary publications are not the subject of defamation actions. They also require some form of statutory authority to enable proper self-regulation, including the imposition of sanctions against their members.

A useful analogy to keep in mind when considering the value or otherwise of parliamentary privilege is the use of the royal prerogative. This prerogative is used as authority for executive action where there is no specific regulation by statute law. It offers the executive the flexibility of inherent authority. The legislature operates under the authority of parliamentary privilege, but this authority can also be supplemented or replaced by statute law. A new form of exercise of these inherent powers would depend on the passage of legislation. The Commonwealth Parliaments of Australia and Canada have valued the use of privilege, for example to assert rights to call upon a minister to produce documents.4

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4 The High Court of Australia has recently pronounced on this right in *Egan v Willis* [1998] HCA 71 (19 November 1998)
If all the powers of a parliament are dependent on detailed statutory authority, it is very difficult to react quickly to events. The parliament may be dependent on the executive to initiate legislation, when it is against the perceived interests of the executive to take action. An illustrative example is the current controversy in the Australian Parliament over the actions of special advisers, where a Senate committee is demanding information. The Senate is not controlled by the governing party but without parliamentary privilege special legislation to clarify the powers to summon special advisers would need to pass both Houses to take effect. It might then await interpretation by the courts.

The decision not to confer privilege on the devolved parliaments/assemblies was not the subject of major debate during the passage of the devolution legislation, and so the reasoning behind this policy change was not explored in any depth. The allegations made against Neil Hamilton and others by Mohammed Al Fayed had been a backdrop to the devolution legislation of 1997-8 and the controversy over the processes of investigation by the Commons became part of the policy environment. The underlying policy assumption seems to have been that privilege would have been at best unnecessary and at worst positively harmful.

But as part of a wider Commonwealth development, the establishment of Westminster type parliaments without parliamentary privilege was atypical. Wales perhaps was a special case, as a body incorporating both assembly and executive, but the Stormont parliament had been established in the 1920s with parliamentary privilege and so the Scottish and Northern Irish legislatures might have expected the same level of self-governing powers.

The devolution legislation gave the new bodies some statutory protection for the issuing of reports, the summoning of witnesses and the regulation of their members in varying degrees. But these statutory powers do not equal the breadth of parliamentary privilege enjoyed by the Commons. They are also reviewable by the courts.

Moreover, changes to this broad framework are dependent on legislation at Westminster, not in Scotland or Northern Ireland, since the devolution legislation is amendable by the UK Parliament only. The devolved bodies are not in a position to clarify their own powers. In retrospect, it might have been more appropriate for the devolution legislation to confer on

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6 The Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 provides a statutory codification but leaves the Parliament free to summon any witness
7 The Northern Ireland Assembly had full parliamentary privilege conferred on it by section 26 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
8 Lord President Rodger of Eastferry left very little room for the concept of parliamentary autonomy over internal processes in his judgment in Whaley. See Realising the Vision: A Parliament with a Purpose Constitution Unit Barry Winetrobe 2001 pp 135 for details
devolved bodies a general power to regulate themselves, on the Irish model, where the Oireachtas (parliament) is given powers of self-regulation under the Constitution.

**Parliamentary privilege under review**

Parliamentary privilege has been under growing pressure as offering insufficient defence for individual human rights and as bestowing on parliaments an unnecessary ‘firewall’ against judicial intervention.

The use of parliamentary privilege has been subject to review recently. There are particular problems with the application of its disciplinary procedures to non-members. The recommendation of a Joint Committee of the Lords and Commons was for its statutory codification in 1998, so that archaic aspects could be dispensed with and its modern operation defined. This recommendation awaits implementation. In an era of judicial review, the operation of parliamentary self-regulation without the possibility of judicial intervention seems out of place. There is a new emphasis on individual human rights, for example, the rights of witnesses before parliamentary committees, or of those named by members on the floor of the House.

At least one case relating to the privilege of freedom of speech under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 is due to be heard by the European Court of Human Rights. The decision of Speaker Boothroyd to deny Sinn Féin members access to the facilities of the Commons was recently the subject of an ECHR decision as to admissibility. A sub-national Canadian parliament has already had its use of parliamentary privilege challenged by reference to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. In New Zealand, the House of Representatives thoroughly revised its Standing Orders (SOs) and practices to take account of its Bill of Rights from 1990. It continues to use its powers of parliamentary privilege, illustrating that the concept of privilege can be adapted to the existence of human rights legislation. ECHR judgments indicate that a large degree of discretion is acceptable when parliaments regulate their members.

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9 HL Paper 43/HC 214 1998-99 session. This committee was chaired by Lord Nicholls.

10 For a discussion from the Australian viewpoint, see *The Parliamentarian* April 2000 ‘Privileged debate’.

11 *A v the United Kingdom* 5 March 2002. The decision on admissibility has not yet been issued by the end of March 2002.

12 *Decision as to the admissibility of application no 39511/98 by Martin McGuinness against the United Kingdom*. 8 June 1999. The background and judgment are discussed in House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/116. Sinn Fein members now have access to facilities, following a motion in the Commons on 18 December 2001.

13 *Pierre Bloch v France* (120/1996 732/938) 21 October 1987. The case involved an appeal against expulsion from the National Assembly for election expenses offences. The McGuinness case was also resolved against the petitioner, as the oath requirement could be considered a reasonable condition of elected office.
Parliamentary privilege gives the Commons its authority for creating and regulating its own standards machinery. The Commissioner for Standards carries out investigations, as an Officer of the House, but the power to summon witnesses and recommend sanctions belongs to the Standards and Privileges Committee. The operation of this machinery has been criticised as failing to meet the standards of natural justice and as too subject to political pressures. However, the first report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Nolan Committee) was conscious of the practical as well as symbolic value of self-regulation, proposing its preservation with the addition of an independent element.14

It is possible to make aspects of privilege subject to statute law and to the courts, while leaving the principle of autonomy untouched. This happened to the inherent power of the Commons to adjudicate on disputes on the election of members, which became the province of the courts in the nineteenth century, following statutory regulation. There are arguments for following this precedent in the area of standards, by creating a statutory commissioner and investigation process. The most obvious model is being developed in Scotland, but there are a number of Commonwealth examples.

Models of investigation

The devolved bodies have all preferred the model of an investigative official, employed by the parliament/assembly to carry out investigations of allegations. Control of resources remains with the managing authorities of the devolved body, apart from Northern Ireland, where the Commissioner is currently serviced by the Assembly Ombudsman’s office. The clerks, following concerns about possible conflicts of interests, have retained the role of advising members as to their responsibilities. This division is not commonly found in parliamentary practices in Australia, Canada and Ireland.

The UK investigator model uses inquisitorial-style methods for handling allegations. Each devolved body has established a multiple-stage investigative procedure, but the involvement of lawyers is very limited. This appears to be the general pattern in Australia and Canada, but in Ireland the processes are more adversarial. However its statutory commission has recently obtained powers to use inquisitorial-type officers for the initial investigative stages of allegations against office-holders.

Apart from two Scottish investigations in 1999, the devolved bodies have had relatively minor cases to deal with and have not had a major case of conflicting evidence to contend with.15 The main issue of conduct worthy of full investigation by the Commissioner is probably the leaking of committee reports. In this respect, the robustness of the new models has not been tested. The Standards of Conduct Committee in the National Assembly for

14 Cm 2850 May 1995
15 There have been some inconclusive inquiries into the leaks of committee reports in the Scottish Parliament. See for example Standards Committee 7th report 2001
Wales has already instituted a thorough review of standards regulation and Scotland and Northern Ireland envisage statutory regulation of the investigation process.

Sub-national parliaments in Australia and Canada have tended to take the lead in promoting new forms of regulation and enforcement, presumably due to a greater ability to take action, legislative or otherwise. Queensland and New South Wales have established well resourced statutory bodies to deal with allegations of corruption and misbehaviour, but these bodies cover office holders as well as members of parliament. This is the model favoured in Ireland, which has faced a series of major scandals. The tribunal of inquiry model, initiated by parliament, has been seen as cumbersome and ineffective against serious allegations of wrong-doing. But independent tribunals have been criticised for over-enthusiastic investigations to justify the scale of their budgets and for being remote from the parliamentary institutions.

The scale of allegations of political corruption in New South Wales, Queensland and Ireland has perhaps made the adoption of the investigative tribunal model essential, but it is not commonly used elsewhere. The Canadian provincial legislatures have preferred a statutory parliamentary ethics commissioner with an advisory and investigative role. He/she is appointed by the legislature, normally on a fixed term contract and is categorised as an Officer of Parliament. The remit generally covers the executive as well as the legislature.

A statutory framework

The Standards Committee in the Scottish Parliament has introduced legislation to create a statutory Commissioner with specific powers and responsibilities and this model will offer an interesting comparison when in operation. The Northern Ireland Assembly has recommended that the Assembly Ombudsman be given statutory power to become its Standards Commissioner (the Ombudsman is already discharging this responsibility on an interim basis).

Such legislative powers are seen as essential to supplement the general statutory rights conferred on the devolved bodies in place of privilege. However, the detailed drafting necessary to ensure that the process of investigation is capable of bearing judicial scrutiny is without precedent in the UK, Australia, and Canada. The nearest comparison is with Ireland. The Canadian sub-national legislatures commonly have ethics commissioners established by statute. But they also have the benefit of parliamentary privilege, which limits the scope of judicial scrutiny. Ireland has created statutory machinery for the investigation of allegations against ministers and members. The Members’ Interests Committees of the Oireachtas (parliament) take responsibility for investigating members, with an adversarial process, which is regulated by statute. The concept of parliamentary privilege was not fully adopted by the post-1922 state. But the Irish constitution protects the right of parliamentary self-regulation and there are limits to the extent of judicial intervention.
The Irish legislation lacks the detail of the Scottish bill, for example with regard to the precise time limits set out for the investigative stages. The legislative model lacks the flexibility of the inherent powers to take action given by parliamentary privilege. It also means that all possibilities must be catered for at the outset. For example, the initial drafting of the Scottish bill does not appear to allow for full legal protection for complainants against defamation actions. Some qualified privilege might well apply. Yet a more extensive right might be worth conferring, to protect against intimidation.

The use of statute to regulate parliamentary behaviour in UK parliaments/assemblies has not yet been tested in another respect. There have not yet been any prosecutions in respect of the new criminal offences of failure to register or to declare interests or the practice of paid advocacy. There is no defence to the charges, which leaves the question of the treatment of inadvertent breaches unresolved. In Wales and Northern Ireland, the relevant law officers must be consulted before a prosecution is attempted. The Scottish Standards Committee has noted the issue in its recent consultation on new legislation to replace the devolution legislation on standards of ethical behaviour. In addition, issues of overlap between parliamentary and legal investigations have not yet been faced. Potential problems include sub judice rules and double jeopardy.

If serious breaches of the codes of conduct are to be handled by the courts, it is perhaps questionable if the detailed regulation planned in Scotland is necessary for minor breaches. The Canadian Commissioners appear to be handling more serious cases, such as the use of insider information. They also investigate government ministers for actions in their ministerial capacity.

**Adaptations for the Commons**

However, these criticisms would have less force, should the Scottish procedures be adapted for the serious investigations undertaken by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. A statutory system could overlay the traditional privilege powers for disciplining members, and be used only for serious allegations concerning financial interests. The model might also clarify the current confusion in the title of Officer of Parliament, in use both for member of the senior Commons staff and for those constitutional watchdogs designated as such in statute.

The Scottish model would need adaptation for use in the Commons. The advantages of statutory powers for a Commissioner would include:

- Clarity of function, status and appointment
- Powers independent from the Standards and Privileges Committee

A statute is unlikely to resolve potential problems with the resourcing of the Commissioner’s office, unless this was determined externally.
A major difficulty is that the Scottish legislation would not assist with the difficult issue of the acceptance or rejection of the findings of the Commissioner. The Bill makes clear that the Scottish Parliament is entitled to reject the facts and conclusions reached by the Commissioner. The Parliament will remain open to accusations of political partisanship in its judgments. A statute for the Commons would probably involve more statutory regulation of the appeals process, which is left for the Scottish Parliament’s standing orders to establish.

A Commons statute would also need to examine the interface with inherent powers of the House under privilege to summon witnesses and publish reports. Sub-national parliaments in Australia and Canada offer useful precedents as a number have statutory commissioners. In Canada, this model has been influenced by developments in the United States, where state legislatures have appointed ethics commissioners. These legislatures have their own form of self-regulation, based on the concept of parliamentary privilege.

An important obstacle to statutory regulation on the Scottish model is the detail of the investigatory process, which is designed to cover every eventuality. Statutory modification of the investigatory process would be difficult to achieve, due to the pressure on parliamentary time at Westminster. It is hard enough to envisage sufficient time being granted to enact a statutory framework for a Commissioner at all. In contrast, Commons standing orders can be adjusted with ease. Framework legislation which did not offer sufficient guarantees of natural justice might well be subject to challenge in the courts.

There would be difficulties with an external review of the Commissioner’s findings. The question of using parliamentary proceedings as evidence in judicial actions would need to be addressed. The operation of another aspect of privilege, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, prevents their use in most cases. The decisions of the Commissioner would need to be clarified as outside the scope of parliamentary privilege for the findings to become judicially reviewable. Should the findings become the subject of court action, there might be problems of double jeopardy and questions about the value of any separate internal Commons procedures. An alternative might be to insert a specific statutory prohibition against review and to institute an extra-parliamentary tribunal system for appeals.

**The Ombudsman model**

Given these drawbacks, the model being developed in Northern Ireland is of considerable interest. The parliamentary ombudsman there is acting as Standards Commissioner on a temporary basis, pending legislation to give the office a statutory role as Commissioner. The Ombudsman was available and willing to act on a temporary basis, using the resources of

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16 The most important is the use now made of parliamentary proceedings when interpreting Act of Parliament, following *Pepper v Hart* [1993] AC 593. See also the discussion in the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege report on the use of Hansard in judicial review of ministerial decisions at paras 46-55
his own office. Legislation can be passed by the Assembly, which has devolved power for the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman model is of potential relevance for the Commons because:

— The office is already established by statute and the ombudsman an Officer of Parliament
— The investigatory model used is inquisitorial and so has similarities to the procedures adopted by the Commissioner. The ombudsman has statutory rights to summon witnesses and publish reports, which attract absolute privilege, rather than parliamentary privilege
— A Commons select committee has a general oversight role, but cannot intervene in individual cases
— Although official bodies are not legally required to accept the findings of the ombudsman, in practice failure to implement recommendations is rare, due to the prestige of the office
— The recommendations of the Commissioner are subject to judicial review
— Decisions on the resourcing of the office are not subject to the parliamentary authorities

There are disadvantages as well. Under current legislation, the Ombudsman only investigates maladministration where an MP endorses a complaint from the public. The Standards Commissioner has inevitably had the more difficult function of regulating the people responsible for his/her appointment. The Ombudsman might encounter similar difficulties, although more protected by institutional independence. The investigatory procedures do not incorporate an appeals system and are designed to cover failures by an official body rather than an individual. The role of the Standards and Privileges Committee would need to be considered. It might need more powers of intervention and guidance than those possessed by the Public Administration Committee for the Ombudsman, for example over types of sanctions. There might be scope for an advisory panel to undertake this role in place of a select committee.

More generally, the office of the parliamentary Ombudsman has been developing in a different direction. The Colcott review has recommended a college of ombudsmen, incorporating local government, health and others, as a less confusing model for the public. The Scottish Public Sector (Ombudsman) Bill is creating a one-stop shop for all complaints currently dealt with by the Health Services Ombudsman, the Local Government Ombudsman and the Housing Association Ombudsman. Any changes following

17 Review of Public Sector Ombudsmen in England. The Government announced that it accepted the conclusions of the review on 4 July 2001. The new body will be expected to resolve disputes more informally, avoiding formal investigations where possible. Primary legislation will be necessary to implement the recommendations. See comments and memorandum by the junior minister, Christopher Leslie, to the Public Administration Committee on 31 January 2002 HC 563-i
implementation of the review would be likely to diminish the parliamentary nature of the office.

**Codes of conduct**

The devolved bodies do not have separate procedures for privilege-type investigations, in contrast to the Commons which maintains separate investigative systems for offences such as the leaking of select committee reports. These offences are not the responsibility of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. The broad-ranging nature of the requirements in the codes of conduct for members has caused difficulties for the devolved bodies. There is a time-consuming initial filtering stage where a number of trivial complaints have to be assessed, which relate to aspects of parliamentary behaviour conceivably within the scope of the codes.

The main types of complaints against members resulting in investigations have involved allegations of abuse of stationery, publication of inappropriate comments on public officials and leaks of parliamentary reports. There have also been complaints that members are not performing in line with their ‘job description’. This has enabled the Standards Committee in Scotland to undertake investigations against MSPs who communicate complaints against other MSPs to the press, before contacting the Commissioner. It has also covered complaints about ‘poaching’ the constituents of another MSP.

Commonwealth Parliaments initially used the language of privilege to operate a disciplinary system. Offences by members were categorised as contempts of Parliament. Questions about the behavioural standards of individual members were dealt with by the Speaker/Presiding Officer, and gross failures by the committees on privileges. Following the adoption by Westminster of registration and declaration of interests in the 1970s, Commonwealth parliaments began to follow suit.

Separate procedures were developed alongside the traditional privilege machinery specifically for offences relating to the failure to make public financial interests. The division is not altogether satisfactory, as there are areas of overlap. The Code of Conduct developed at Westminster, which incorporated the Seven Principles of Public Life, potentially covered behavioural aspects, such as failure to discharge the duties of a Member and also breaches of

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18 In the Commons, leaking a report would be considered a breach of privilege rather than an offence against the Code of Conduct. Abuse of stationery and inappropriate comments would be investigated by the Speaker, through senior parliamentary staff. The Standards and Privileges Committee would investigate serious allegations of breach of privilege, after referral from the Speaker. See House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/102 Parliamentary Standards for background. The procedures used in privilege cases were criticised by the Joint Committee at para 292 as not meeting ECHR requirements.

19 SP Paper 478 Tenth Report 2001 Complaint against Lloyd Quinan MSP. The Committee decided that the current wording of the Code was ambiguous and should be clarified. It did not find a breach of the code. SP Paper 452 Ninth Report 2001 Complaint against Tommy Sheridan MSP.
privilege, such as the leaking of reports or improper influencing of committees. In practice, the Standards Commissioners rarely examined behavioural aspects and were precluded under standing orders from investigating allegations of breach of privilege, which were examined solely by the Committee. But the practice of devolved bodies in handling all behavioural aspects has its own difficulties.

Some Canadian and Australian sub-national parliaments have adopted wide-ranging codes with detailed statutory rules. The Canadian Parliament has yet to adopt any system for the effective regulation of the declaration and registration of interests. The federal parliament in Australia has a non-statutory scheme, but the enforcement and investigative mechanisms have not developed to an equivalent extent as in the UK.

**Statutory regulation of donations**

An area which needs to be addressed is the interaction with the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Those holding elected office, including MPs and members of devolved bodies, are required to register donations over £1,000, used in connection with any ‘political activity’. This may well be interpreted more widely than the term ‘parliamentary duties’, used in connection with registration and declaration of interests. The definition of donations in PPERA includes sponsorship arrangements.

In addition, candidates are required to register donations over £50, to be filed with their election returns to the Electoral Commission. Donations may only be received from permissible persons, that is, individuals appearing on the electoral register or UK companies, registered parties, trades unions and certain other categories.

There is an inevitable overlap with the registration requirements in the Commons and in the devolved bodies. In particular, the categories of sponsorship, gifts, benefits and hospitality and overseas visits are potentially affected by the new legislation. Differences in interpretation between the Standards Commissioner and clerks and officials in the Electoral Commission have already been noted. This problem has also been encountered in Ireland, where there have been legislative attempts to integrate the registers. It is likely to become

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20 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, Schedule 7, para 1(3) (c)

21 Schedule 16 para 6(3)

22 Full details are available from the Electoral Commission website. Form RD1A Report of an Accepted Donation by a Regulated Donee and the accompanying guidance notes Donations to Regulated Donees: Guidance on Completion of Forms RD1A and RD1B. give assistance on interpretation of the law for all regulated donees. More detailed notes, Donations: Explanatory Notes for Regulated Donees, are also available

23 The Electoral Commission has recently encountered some difficulty with the overlap in registration requirements, notably over the treatment of the provision of BAA passes to Members, and of the treatment of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union and select committee visits abroad
more acute in the UK shortly, as the PPERA is fully implemented in the next round of elections.

It is possible to offer certain defences to prosecution for failure to register under PPERA, but no such defences currently exist for members in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland who fail to register their interests under the requirements of the devolution legislation. This area needs to be reviewed for consistency of treatment, so those members are not subject to overlapping requirements and different levels of defence against prosecution.

The full implication of the potential for prosecution under PPERA for failure to register donations has yet to be appreciated by the Commons, but in theory the new offences cut across the self-regulatory standards system underpinned by privilege. There would appear to be some difficulties in bringing prosecutions against Members at Westminster under PPERA because of the operation of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The evidence necessary would need to be additional to parliamentary proceedings, which include within its scope the register of interests or reports by the Commissioner.

The role of the criminal law

There is little logic in making members of devolved bodies subject to the criminal law in respect of registration, declaration and advocacy offences, but not members of the Commons (or Lords). The difference is due to historic circumstances. It might be sensible to redraw the boundary across all UK parliamentary bodies, so that only breaches with the potential of corrupt action or of financial advantage would become criminal offences. Other minor or inadvertent infringements would be dealt with by the parliament/assembly. This would not necessarily preclude a statutory investigative framework or some outside involvement in the imposition of sanctions, such as an advisory panel.

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24 Schedule 7, para 12(3)
Part One: The Regulation of Parliamentary Standards in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Key points

The standards machinery in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is underpinned by statute, in contrast to Westminster where a non-statutory scheme operates under the protection of parliamentary privilege.

Scotland and Northern Ireland can make changes to their schemes, within the confines of the parent devolution legislation. Scotland is developing its own legislation for an independent Standards Commissioner, through a Committee Bill introduced by the Convenor of the Standards Committee. Northern Ireland has proposed amendments to the legislation for the Assembly Ombudsman to incorporate a Standards Commissioner role. Wales has no primary legislative power, so can make changes to standing orders only. It has currently commissioned a fundamental review of its procedures.

The most serious offences—of failure to register and to declare interests and paid advocacy are criminal offences and so would not be investigated by the parliamentary body. Corruption offences are also covered by statute, in contrast to Westminster.

Committees in Scotland and Wales have access to the parent body’s statutory powers to summon witnesses, and to protect its reports against defamation actions. These are not as broad-ranging as the Westminster powers, based on privilege, to send for persons, papers and records. The legislation being prepared in Scotland will confer equivalent powers on the Standards Commissioner and in Northern Ireland the Assembly Ombudsman, who is acting as Standards Commissioner, already has broadly similar statutory powers. The Standards of Conduct Committee in Wales is constrained by both the drafting of the devolution legislation and the Assembly standing orders.

The initial mechanisms establishing the codes of conduct and associated guidance gave Scotland more time and scope to develop a tailor-made scheme. Each code contains the Seven Principles of Public Life and other principles relating to conduct. The broad nature of these principles has caused some difficulties, particularly in Wales, when filtering complaints. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have made some adjustments to the details of the original schemes adopted and the former is developing its own legislation as a full replacement.

There has been particular difficulty in Scotland with the wording of the original prohibition on paid advocacy. The committee in Wales is undertaking a review, and has made changes in particular relating to non-pecuniary interests. Its requirements on registering membership of the Freemasons have been the subject of representations, and concern has also been
expressed about the extent of the requirements to register for close relatives of members. There has been extensive registration of unremunerated interests in Northern Ireland.

Each institution has decided to adopt a commissioner/adviser model, with primary responsibility for investigating breaches of the code and guidance. The Adviser in Wales works primarily to the Presiding Officer in this role. All have decided not to allow this individual a role in advice-giving to members, which remains with the clerks to the committees. This is due to concerns about a potential conflict of interest.

None of the committees has any involvement in the initial filtering of complaints, a task undertaken by the commissioner/adviser, who can dismiss complaints without reference to the committee. Scotland and Wales have experienced relatively high numbers of complaints, mainly from the public, which rarely involve allegations of substantive breaches of the code. These can include complaints that members are not performing their ‘jobs’ correctly.

Each body has established a multiple-stage investigation procedure, designed to separate out initial inquiries from a full-scale investigation. The commissioner/adviser adopts an inquisitorial style of inquiry. In Scotland and Wales the committee is required to review the decision of the commissioner/adviser and in general reserves the right to undertake its own investigation, but in practice exercises more of a judicial review function. In Wales, the committee is limited to the latter role. The appeal stage is generally to the plenary parliament/assembly, but the procedures adopted remain as yet untested by conflicting testimony.

The member who is the subject of allegations has a right to appear before the committee, and to bring an adviser, but the adviser has no right to address the committee. In general, there is no access to paid legal advice for the member. Committees have access to advice from assembly/parliament legal offices.

Breaches of the registration and declaration of interests requirements and of the prohibition of paid advocacy are criminal offences, and under arrangements made with the relevant police forces and procurator fiscais in Scotland are not further investigated by the assemblies/parliaments. No prosecutions have yet been undertaken.

Sanctions for breaches of the code and guidance are relatively undeveloped. There is some legal uncertainty about the enforceability of suspension without pay, which is the most severe sanction developed, but not yet attempted.

The Standards Commissioner legislation in Scotland sets out detailed procedures and time limits for the stages of an investigation preceding consideration by the committee. Later stages, including decision and appeal, will be regulated by standing orders. The legislation is probably unique in the Westminster tradition. Although there are examples of other sub-national parliaments with similar statutory procedures, this is underpinned by parliamentary privilege, restricting to some extent the scope of judicial scrutiny.
In the initial months of the Scottish Parliament two major cases were dealt with by the Standards Committee before any machinery had been adopted. In general, however, the models of standards regulation developed subsequently by Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have not yet been tested by serious allegations. The devolution statutes have in any case made major breaches of the codes of conduct criminal offences, which would be investigated by the prosecuting authorities.
Introduction

The major plank of the 1997 Government’s constitutional programme was the creation of devolved parliaments/assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The devolution legislation of 1998 contained provisions designed to create a framework for the regulation of ethical standards in respect of the new members of the institutions. Since their initial establishment, the devolved bodies have developed their own codes of conduct, and investigative machinery.

This report examines some broad themes common to each system and looks at their distinctive features, noting divergences from the self-regulating model in use in the House of Commons. This model is currently being reviewed by the Committee on Standards in Public Life.  

This report covers for each devolved assembly/parliament:

— The statutory basis for the regulation of standards
— Initial establishment of standards regulation
— Proposals to develop distinctive models of regulation
— Procedures for standards commissioners/advisers
— Processes for filtering of initial complaints
— The investigation process in formal stages
— The use of legal processes
— Codes of conduct and associated guidance

The Framework for Standards Regulation

Parliamentary Privilege

The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly have developed varied schemes to regulate the ethical standards of their members. They have been constrained by the statutory framework set out in the devolution legislation that created them as separate entities. It is important to appreciate that parliamentary privilege, as operated at Westminster, does not extend to any of these parliaments/assemblies, which are creatures of statute. The decision not to extend privilege to these devolved bodies by legislation stands in contrast to the privileges of the House of Commons conferred on the Stormont Parliament under the Government of Ireland Act 1920.  

Parliamentary privilege has two main components:

25 For further details, see the Issues and Questions paper issued by the Committee on 25 February 2002, Standards of Conduct in the House of Commons, available from www.public-standards.gov.uk
— Freedom of speech, which is guaranteed by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689
— The exercise by Parliament of control over its own affairs, known technically as ‘exclusive cognisance’.

The first aspect gives protection to comments made in, and reports issued by Parliament in relation to the conduct of its Members. The power to regulate the behaviour of its Members and to discipline them if necessary is based on the second aspect of privilege, which also underpins the right to compel witnesses to attend and give evidence. Parliamentary privilege has an ancient foundation. It derives from the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Parliament and the development of separate law and customs for Parliament, often won following conflict with the Crown and the courts. It forms part of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, preventing the internal regulation of Parliament from being subject to judicial scrutiny.

In modern times, the justification for parliamentary privilege is that it enables Members and Officers of each House to carry out their parliamentary duties without interference, thus upholding the ability of Parliament to discharge its functions of scrutinising the executive and acting as a forum for the grievances of the nation.⁷ The value of privilege is that it enables Parliament to consider any matter it chooses and to react immediately and flexibly to events. In the past few decades the Commons has become wary of using its powers to proceed against non-Members where the work of Parliament have not been the object of substantial interference.²⁸

The exact boundaries of privilege have not often been examined by the courts, which have tended to exercise caution in this area. But developments in the area of judicial review are likely to alter this state of affairs. ²⁹ A Commons/Lords joint committee on parliamentary privilege has recently recommended that parliamentary privilege be the subject of legislation in order to clarify its extent and codify its provisions.³⁰

More fundamental questions exist about the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the operation of privilege, which have relevance for the ability of

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²⁶ Section 18. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, section 26 also conferred the Commons privileges on the Northern Ireland Assembly. This was not repeated in the Northern Ireland Act 1998


²⁸ See Joint Committee report, para 20 for a 1977 Commons resolution on the use of its penal powers

²⁹ The two major cases are Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 and Prebble v Television New Zealand [1995] 1AC 321. Both cases related to freedom of speech. See the Joint Committee for a summary at para 28

³⁰ The Joint Committee was established as part of the 1997 Government’s agenda for constitutional change. There is no indication that any legislation will be forthcoming
Parliament to regulate its standards. Although the UK Parliament is excluded from the Human Rights Act 1998, since it does not fall within the definition of a public body for its purposes, the necessity of ensuring minimum standards in its disciplinary procedures to meet the requirements of fairness in Article 6 of the Convention has been under consideration in both Houses.

The jurisdiction of the domestic courts in the regulation of parliamentary standards has recently been examined by the House of Lords. The judgment endorsed the Court of Appeal decision that proceedings before the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, his reports and acceptance by the select committee were all ‘parliamentary proceedings’ and attempts to investigate or to challenge them in a court of law were a breach of privilege.

The Statutory Regulation of Standards in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Introduction

Without the protection of privilege, the parliaments/assemblies must act within the scope of their legal powers and duties, and become subject to full judicial scrutiny. Their processes of investigation and regulation must be set out in detail and in advance of the event, which can cause difficulties when unexpected developments occur.

The devolution legislation also made clear for Scotland and Wales that members of the new bodies would be subject to criminal proceedings relating to the corrupt making or accepting of payments. The legal position at Westminster remains unresolved. Although bribery or acceptance of a bribe by an MP is a contempt of Parliament, it is generally believed that such conduct is not a statutory offence under the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916, and

31 The Joint Committee considered briefly a Maltese case Demicoli v Malta (1992) 14 EHRR 47 in paras 283-4. At least one case in relation to the use of freedom of speech has been launched (Guardian March 6 2002 ‘Woman branded ‘neighbour from hell’ takes former MP to court’). This was heard on 5 March 2002 as a decision on admissibility. No decision has yet been issued (A v United Kingdom).

32 Section 6

33 For details see House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/102 Parliamentary Standards, Part V

34 Hamilton v Al Fayed [2000] 2 All E.R. 224

35 This was brought home to the Scottish Parliament as a result of Whaley v Lord Watson of Invergowrie 2000 SLT 475 where the actions of the Standards Committee faced immediate scrutiny in the courts in November 1999. The judgment set out a narrow interpretation of the scope of parliamentary autonomy. See a discussion of the case in Realising the Vision: A Parliament with a Purpose Barry Winetrobe, Constitution Unit pp 133-5

there is some uncertainty on whether the common law offence of bribery of a person holding public office extends to MPs.\textsuperscript{37}

The third main difference is that the failure to declare and register interests and incidences of paid advocacy are criminal offences, and therefore generally outside the jurisdiction of the committees of the devolved bodies. This restricts the range of their enquiries considerably and needs to be borne in mind when considering the detail of their schemes.\textsuperscript{38}

In Wales and Northern Ireland, criminal prosecutions require the consent of the DPP where a member has taken part in proceedings in contravention of the rules.\textsuperscript{39} This presumably gives a measure of discretion where the offence has been minor or inadvertent. The Standards Committee in Scotland has noted that decriminalising the rules on Members’ interests would require legislation at Westminster and has not pressed for this. It has however referred to the desirability of providing for possible defences in the replacement for Members Interests Order, particularly if new registrable interests such as non-pecuniary interests were added, so that contravention did not attract a criminal sanction.\textsuperscript{40} The classification as a criminal action of speaking in a debate without declaring an interest appears severe in a Westminster context.\textsuperscript{41} The law may well be clarified in respect of the relevance of intent in a breach of the provisions, when or if a prosecution is undertaken.

There are some important differences of emphasis in the construction of the schemes:

**Scotland**

The Scotland Act 1998, section 39(1-4) requires the Parliament to establish rules for the declaration and registration of financial interests, and prohibits paid advocacy. Parliament is given express power in section 39(5) to exclude its members from proceedings where there has been a failure to comply with the section 39 provisions. Delegated legislation set out the initial scheme for regulation on a transitional basis, but section 39 required separate

\textsuperscript{37} See Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege HL Paper 43/HC Paper 214 1998-99, paras 135-169 for further detail. The Committee recommended that the principle of bringing members within the statute law on bribery should be accepted, but to date no legislation has yet been brought forward, despite Government support for such a change.

\textsuperscript{38} The Scottish Parliament Standards Committee did consider whether Mike Watson had breached the advocacy rule in its fourth report of 1999, SP51, perhaps indicating that the bodies have a residual role. The Committee have also reported on allegations of failure to register interests against Dr Richard Simpson SP Fifth Report 2001

\textsuperscript{39} The offence is punishable up to level 5 on the standard scale, currently £5000

\textsuperscript{40} Standards Committee 2\textsuperscript{nd} report 2002 SP Paper 512, paras 59-60

\textsuperscript{41} In a local authority context, failure to declare can be seen as more significant where a member is in a position to take an executive decision. The Standards Board for England will monitor suspected breaches of the codes for councillors in England. See http://www.standardsboard.co.uk/
provision to be made by the Parliament in an Act of the Scottish Parliament.\textsuperscript{42} The Standards Committee is currently consulting on proposals for an Act, and is examining the scope of the registration requirements, with a regard to introducing a bill later in 2002.\textsuperscript{43}

**Wales**

Section 72 of the Government of Wales Act 1998 is more tightly drawn than the Scottish equivalent, requiring provisions in standing orders to include rules on declaration and registration of interests, and prohibiting advocacy. There is explicit authority for non-financial interests to be included within the registration requirements. Standing Order 4 requires the Presiding Officer to maintain the register of interests, with an independent adviser and Standards of Conduct Committee provided for in SO16.

**Northern Ireland**

The Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 43 requires provision in standing orders for the registration and declaration of interests and the prohibition of paid advocacy. The term ‘registrable interests’ was to be defined in standing orders. There is specific power to exclude members. SO 52 creates a Committee of Standards and Privileges and provides for an Assembly Commissioner for Standards.

**Enforcement Powers for Inquiries**

The new devolved bodies were given statutory powers in the devolution legislation to assist with inquiries into standards, in the absence of parliamentary privilege. These are:

**Scotland**

Sections 23-25 give the Parliament powers to enforce its ability to call for persons, papers and records, in Westminster terminology, and to require oaths from witnesses. Section 41 gives absolute privilege for statements made in proceedings of the Parliament and publications of the Parliament, for the purposes of the law of defamation. Without the parliamentary privilege this provision was necessary to give it legal protection against action in the courts. The term ‘proceedings in Parliament’ is defined in section 126, to some extent, but this does not establish clear boundaries. The Presiding Officer made a statement in August 1999 which explained the limited nature of ‘privilege’ in the Scottish Parliament. During the passage of the Bill, the Government spokesman referred to the ‘same broad construction’ being placed on the definition as for the extent of privilege at Westminster.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44} HL Deb vol 592 c1447-48
The Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Bill will give the new office similar powers to call for persons and papers, but these powers do not extend beyond the scope of section 23 which imposes restrictions on the Parliament’s powers in relation to persons outside Scotland, Ministers of the Crown, reserved matters, judges and members of tribunals. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill give further detail.45

Wales
Section 74 gives the Assembly an overall power to require attendance and production of documents in relation to its sponsored public bodies, but may be used by committees only when given specific authority under standing orders. This gives very limited rights to the Committee. SO 16 does not give it such authority. Section 77 gives absolute privilege from defamation actions.

Northern Ireland
Under sections 74-6 of the Act, the Assembly has powers equivalent to those in Scotland to call for persons, papers and records, in devolved areas only. The Standards and Privileges Committee has specific authority in SO 52 to exercise this power. Section 50 gives Assembly publications absolute privilege for the purposes of defamation.

Initial Establishment of the Code of Conduct for Members
In Wales and Northern Ireland the code of conduct was given to the Assemblies as a finished document. In Scotland, the Standards Committee was responsible for its drafting. Further detail is given below:

Scotland
A initial draft code was developed by the Consultative Steering Group (CSG) in January 1999, embodying 9 key principles, and incorporating the 7 principles of public life, but including a new duty to constituents.46 A CSG working party reported in April 1999 with more detailed recommendations on categories of registrable interests.

Under Rule 1.6 of the Standing Orders adopted on 9 December 1999, the Parliament was given power to establish a code of conduct for members, following a motion from the Standards Committee. The Committee therefore has the power to draw up the code. Earlier attempts at drafting had been delayed by two major cases in 1999.47 The final code was not

45 SP Bill 48-EN para 79
46 A full history of the initial drafting of the Scottish code is given in Scottish Parliament Information Centre Research Note 00/10 The Code of Conduct and MSPs Standards by Barry Winetrobe
adopted until 24 February 2000, after the Standards Committee issued its final recommendations. SO 6.1.5 establishes the remit of the Standards Committee.

Wales

Standing Order 16 sets out the role of the Committee on Standards of Conduct, which only allows the Committee to make modifications to the Code already adopted by the Assembly on 18 May 1999. The Code was developed within the Welsh Office, building on recommendations made by the National Assembly Advisory Group48 and the Commissioners who drew up the initial standing orders for the Assembly.49 SO 16.3 provided for the appointment of an independent person to provide advice and assistance to the Presiding Officer.

Northern Ireland

The standing orders allow the Committee of Standards and Privileges to make changes to the code of conduct for members, but an initial code was approved on 14 December 1999 by the Assembly which was identical in wording to the Commons code.50 The Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members was similarly modelled on the rules for the Commons. SO 52 (now 57) and SO 64 govern the work of the Committee, allowing it to make reports to the Assembly recommending exclusion of Members where they have contravened provisions of the Code.51 SO 65 also allows it to consider matters of privilege, but in fact the Committee has had no role in this area, given that the Assembly does not have parliamentary privilege on the Westminster model. Its role is to look at issues such as leaks, which in Westminster would be a privilege-type inquiry, not conducted by the Standards Commissioner.

Recent developments in regulatory schemes

There are significant differences in the powers of each parliament/assembly to make adjustments to the schemes set out in the devolution legislation. Scotland, and Northern Ireland have primary legislative powers and so have the power to make significant alterations as long as the framework set out in the Scotland Act and the Northern Ireland Act are complied with. Wales in contrast has no primary legislative power, and can make amendments on its own initiative only by amending its standing orders. Yet these are constrained by the terms of the Government of Wales Act.

In each devolved institution developments are underway to make changes in procedure.

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48 Report to the Secretary of State for Wales August 1998, paras 6.18-6.24
49 Appointed under s51 of the Government of Wales Act 1998
50 Approved by the Commons on 24 July 1996
Scotland

The Standards Committee has introduced the Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Bill into the Parliament to provide for a statutory Commissioner. The bill regulates in some detail the Commissioner’s role in the investigation process. It does not deal with changes to the rules on the registration and declaration of interests, which is the subject of a separate consultation launched by the Committee on 19 February. The Committee plans to introduce a separate bill to enact recommendations following consultation by the end of 2002. This will replace the original Members’ Interests Order made at Westminster. There are precedents for statutory investigative officials in a number of Canadian provincial legislatures, but these also have the protection of parliamentary privilege (see Part Two).

Wales

Following a paper from the secretariat to the Standards of Conduct Committee on 28 June 2001, the Committee approved at that meeting a comprehensive review of procedures, designed to address:

— Lack of clarity about the jurisdiction of the Committee
— Weaknesses in the complaints procedures
— The role of the independent adviser

The review is being conducted by an external adviser, Professor Diana Woodhouse, of Oxford Brookes University, who is due to report in September 2002.

Northern Ireland

The Committee has decided to recommend that the role of the Commissioner for Standards become a statutory function of the Northern Ireland Assembly Ombudsman. The proposal has been communicated to the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, which is due to launch a consultation on the role of the Ombudsman, and which would have responsibility for introducing the legislation into the Assembly. In the interim, the Ombudsman has agreed to act as Commissioner for Standards for the Assembly.

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51 SO 64 was last amended on 3 July 2001 by the Assembly. A new SO 57 was added on 4 July 2001 at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/sopdf/all_amendments.htm#20 to clarify the powers of the Committee and provide for the appointment of a Standards Commissioner by the Assembly
52 The Bill was introduced on 4 February 2002 SP Bill 48 and has passed its first stage on 28 February. Committees in the Scottish Parliament have power to introduce their own legislation
53 See Committee press notice at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/whats_happening/news-02/cstan02-004.htm
54 The office of the Ombudsman was established in 1969 under two separate pieces of legislation to firstly handle complaints about government departments and secondly as a Commissioner for Complaints to deal with the wider public sector. The current legislation is The Ombudsman (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 SI no 1298 and the Commissioner for Complaints (Northern Ireland) Order 1996. See the Committee minutes of 20 November 2001 and the Committee press notice 17 January 2002 at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/standards.htm
Procedures for Commissioners/Advisers

Each body has established a mechanism to give an independent adviser a role in investigating complaints against members. All three have decided not to allow the commissioner/adviser a role in advising members about the registration of interests, which remain the province of the clerks to the committees. There have been concerns that allowing the commissioner to take on this role might lead to a conflict of interest.\textsuperscript{55}

Scotland

The Standards Committee sought approval from Parliament’s Bureau and the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB) to appoint a standards adviser on a temporary basis at its meeting of 3 May 2000.\textsuperscript{56}

The adviser’s role and remit is to:

- Sift initial complaints
- Conduct investigations independently and in private
- Submit reports to Standards Committee detailing facts
- Attend meetings of the Committee

The Standards Committee recommended the appointment of an interim Standards Adviser pending legislation in its fourth report, which was endorsed by the Parliament on 23 November 2000.\textsuperscript{57} The first appointment was Gary Watson in September 2000, who was Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman. The advert specified one or two days a month, with ability to work full time if a major investigation was underway. He has since been replaced by Bill Spence in September 2001. Both appointments were made following an open competition, and were made by the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB) on the recommendation of the Standards Committee. Since September 2000, the Adviser has worked on average 5-10 days a month.

The temporary adviser reports to the Committee via the clerk. He has no powers to call witnesses or demand documents. Legal advice is provided to the adviser through the Standards Committee clerks. He provides a quarterly report detailing numbers of complaints and proportions not passing the initial sift, with details of the individual members removed. Administrative support is provided by the Standards Committee clerks.

The Scottish Standards Commissioner Bill

The Bill sets out detailed arrangements for the appointment and servicing of the Commissioner, and gives him/her statutory powers.

\textsuperscript{55} See SP Paper 186, para 23

\textsuperscript{56} The Role and Remit of the Temporary Standards Adviser—A paper to Committee on Standards in Public Life secretariat seminar on 17 November 2000

\textsuperscript{57} SP Paper 186
Terms of appointment

Section 1 sets out the appointments process. The appointment is to be made by the SPCB, with the agreement of the Parliament. The method of obtaining agreement will be set out in standing orders, probably an appointment on a motion of the Standards Committee. Current staff and members, and those who served for the two preceding years are ineligible for appointment.

The maximum period of the initial appointment will be five years, with one re-appointment which cannot be for more than another five years. (Section 1(4) and (5)). This is in accordance with guidance issued by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The grounds for removal by the SPCB are not set out in the Bill but will be set out in the Commissioner’s terms and conditions of appointment in para 1(1) of the Schedule. But removal is subject to subsection (7) and can only follow upon a resolution by the Parliament. This is only carried if at least two-thirds of the total number of votes cast by those present, including any abstentions, are in favour.

The Financial Memorandum to the Bill expected that the post would be on a ‘part-time basis’, with total costs not exceeding £100,000 per year. The Schedule set out that the SPCB appoints the Commissioner on such terms and conditions as it determines and the Commissioner is permitted under para 2 to appoint staff with the consent of SPCB. Presumably, the recruitment process will be handled entirely in-house, although the selection board may contain an external person, under Nolan principles.

Section 2 allows for the appointment of an acting Commissioner, for example to deal with an individual case, where there might be a conflict of interest for the existing Commissioner, or with exceptionally large caseload, or where the Commissioner is ill. This appointment is made by the SPCB, without the formal agreement of the Parliament to avoid delay.

Functions of the Commissioner

Section 3 sets out the functions of the office. The Commissioner is required to investigate an MSP only where a complaint has been received by him/her that a relevant provision has been breached. Investigation is restricted to the conduct complained of only, and the commissioner would not be able to investigate any other aspect of the Member’s conduct. There is a category of excluded complaints under 10.2.13-10.2.17 of the Code of Conduct which are referred elsewhere.58 The definition of MSP includes former members in relation to conduct which took place when they were members59 and also the Scottish Law Officers (who do not currently sit in the Parliament). The relevant provisions breached are set out as the Code, the Members Interest Order and any relevant Act passed subsequently.

58 For instance, complaints about treatment of staff which might be referred to the Presiding Officer, the SPCB or the Parliament’s Personnel Office. The Ombudsman also has power to investigate
59 This presumably raises some issues of legal competence.
Amendments subsequent to the conduct complained of would be ignored by the Commissioner.

Section 3(6) prohibits the Commissioner from giving advice to an MSP or the public as to whether conduct would constitute a breach of the relevant provision. The Commissioner is also prevented from making comments generally on the efficacy of the provisions of the Act, except in the context of a specific investigation and a relevant provision.

Under section 4, the Commissioner will be under a general requirement to comply with directions from the Standards Committee, and in particular to follow directions on the conduct of investigations. The Explanatory Notes (EN) state:

39. Subsection (2) provides that directions may be given in relation to the procedure that the Commissioner should follow when conducting investigations. Procedural aspects could include requiring the Commissioner to ensure that all persons interviewed by him or her are given a right to have a third party present and are advised of this right. The directions can be general, so as to cover all complaints. In addition, the Standards Committee can make different provision in the directions to cover different classes of complaints. It might, for example, be considered appropriate to make different procedural provision to deal with unusual types of complaints, such as those that are anonymous or in which a member of the Parliament is not named, as compared with the vast majority of complaints which identify the complainer and the member.

A direction could also be made under (2)(b) for example to require the Commissioner to report upon the reasons for the dismissal of complaints at Stage 1. Such information could assist in monitoring the efficacy of the relevant provisions. The Standards Committee could also direct the Commissioner to report on the existence, progress and investigation of a particular Stage 1 complaint, and on any decisions taken.

Subsection 3 provides that directions may not be given in relation to the specifics of a particular investigation, and the EN note that this preserves the independence of the Commissioner in relation to the carrying out of individual investigations.

Under section 14, the Commissioner and staff are prohibited from disclosing information relating to the complaint apart from the purposes of carrying out the functions under the Bill and to report to the Committee, or to allow the investigation of any offence or suspected offence. The restriction does not extend to the Standards Committee and to the Parliament, so that they may publish a report. The ENs state that it is envisaged that the report will include a copy of the Commissioner’s report to it.

Section 15 gives the Commissioner protection from defamation by providing him or her with absolute privilege for all reports, statement and communications on a complaint. Section 16 provides for an annual report from the Commissioner, giving details about the number and progress of complaints, and Stage 1 and 2 investigations. Section 17 provides for the Standards Commissioner to direct the Commissioner to take over all existing complaints.
when the Bill comes into force. There are provisions similar to section 12, allowing the Standards Committee to direct the Commissioner to treat a complaint as admissible.

The public actions of the Commissioner are therefore subject to strict statutory regulation in a Parliament whose proceedings are not covered by parliamentary privilege. This is unique in the UK, and the specified time limits and procedure for investigations is probably unprecedented in Parliaments of the Westminster model. A number of Canadian provincial legislatures have equivalent statutes establishing investigative officers, but few contain as much detail as the Scottish legislation, and in any case Canadian legislatures retain the protection of parliamentary privilege. The Oireachtas members’ interests committees in Ireland have statutory procedures for their inquiries, but parliamentary self-regulation is protected under the Irish constitution.

Wales

SO 16 requires the appointment of a person ‘who is not an Assembly member or a member of its staff’ to carry out investigative work on behalf of the Committee for Standards of Conduct and to advise the Presiding Officer on his role in receiving complaints. There was also provision for the Committee to appoint its own adviser to assist it with investigations. There was some initial discussion as to whether the dual role should be carried out by two separate people—this would have required change to the standing orders and clarification of the complaint procedure, so the possibility was not investigated at this stage.60

The Assembly resolved on 24 November 1999 that the appointment of an Independent Adviser on Standards would be made in accordance with arrangements to be made by Presiding Officer, taking into account the principles of Assembly’s Code of Practice on Public Appointments. The Adviser would not be a member of staff under section 34 of the GOWA, and the post would be reviewed after first year to decide on level of duties and time commitment. The initial assessment was 2-3 days a month. In practice, the Adviser has worked more than this, at one or two days per week. The Adviser provides his own services, and works mainly from home. All the party leaders in the Assembly were consulted on shortlisted candidates. Richard Penn was appointed on 15 March 2000 by resolution of the Assembly to

— advise and assist the Presiding Officer ‘on request in respect of any matter relating to conduct of members’
— by invitation from the Committee he is asked to investigate factual matters arising out of any complaint received by the Committee

The appointment made for three years initially, subject to termination by ‘a substantive resolution of the Assembly.’

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60 Appointing the Standards Adviser in the Welsh Assembly committee secretariat paper for the Committee on Standards in Public Life secretariat seminar 17 November 2000
Clarification of Mr Penn’s role in relation to Members was provided by means of a protocol entitled *The Role of and Access to the Assembly’s Independent Adviser on Standards of Conduct*. This protocol notes that the Adviser’s responsibilities do not include advising members on individual cases or complaints as ‘this would be in direct conflict with his role as an independent investigator and could prejudice any future involvement should a complaint arise.’ Nor does he receive complaints directly. The protocol also stated that the Adviser would be responsible for handling press contacts in consultation with the office of the Presiding Officer and Committee; he would simply confirm or deny that an investigation was underway and would not issue press notices. In evidence to the Northern Ireland Committee on Standards and Privileges, Mr Penn noted he was not line-managed by anyone. If he had a line of accountability it would be to the Presiding Officer.\(^61\)

**Northern Ireland**

The Standards and Privileges Committee issued a report in October 2000, recommending the appointment of a Commissioner who would not have a role in the compilation and maintenance of the register.\(^62\) This followed a lengthy enquiry which took extensive evidence from Scotland, Wales, Westminster and Ireland. The administrative arrangements provided for the clerk to service the Commissioner. The report noted: ‘Should a need for additional resources arise, this would be considered in conjunction with the Assembly Commission’.\(^63\) The terms and conditions of employment and recruitment process would be discussed with the Commission. The initial workload of Commissioner was considered to be 3-4 days per month.\(^64\) In practice, since the appointment of the Assembly Ombudsman as acting Commissioner, the administrative support is provided from within the Ombudsman’s office.\(^65\)

SO 52 provided for a Commissioner to undertake investigations, and stated that the Commissioner should not be subject to control or direction by the Assembly. He/she can only be dismissed on a motion supported by a vote of two thirds of the total number of Assembly members.\(^66\)

The report proposed that the Commissioner would deal with breaches of privilege as well, and would also have a general role on matters relating to the conduct of Members referred to

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\(^{61}\) Northern Ireland Assembly Standards and Privileges Committee First Report 1/00 October 2000 Q90

\(^{62}\) ibid

\(^{63}\) ibid, para 22

\(^{64}\) ibid, para 64

\(^{65}\) There are strict arrangements to ensure that the standards aspect of the Ombudsman’s work is kept private from other Ombudsman functions

\(^{66}\) These provisions are now set out in SO 57, inserted on 3 July 2001, following a resolution of the Assembly
the Committee that Committee wished to pass on. In practice, the Commissioner has restricted the work to standards issues.

Further development of the role awaits decisions on conferring statutory powers to investigate on the Ombudsman.

Filtering of Complaints

Each body has established separate procedures to deal with this initial stage of investigation. None of the committees have any involvement in this filtering stage, due to concerns that the impartiality of the committee might be compromised. Statistics on these initial complaints are not maintained.

Scotland

Complaints are made to the clerks, who pass them to the Standards Adviser for an initial sift. If a complaint is rejected, the clerks are informed, and also the Committee, if the complaint has featured in the media. Following the first ‘Lobbygate’ enquiry, about one to two complaints a week were received, mainly from members of the public. The rate of complaint remains similar, but the great majority relate to fairly trivial issues, such as the use of stationery.

Wales

Initially, the committee took responsibility for sifting complaints, but this procedure was abandoned after criticism. Complaints are made to the Presiding Officer, but in practice, they are passed straight to the independent adviser, Richard Penn, who will decide whether there is a complaint to investigate. Where a complaint is dismissed, the committee is not informed, but the Presiding Officer may have a role in very minor cases. The great majority of complaints are trivial, but need to be processed by the Adviser. A relatively high number of complaints are made by the public.

Northern Ireland

Complaints are received by the clerks to the committee, who forward them to the Commissioner for an initial sift. Only a handful of complaints have been made, mainly by Assembly members, in contrast to Scotland and Wales.

67 ibid, para 11


69 The Committee would also be informed if the complaint was procedurally defective, for example, no MSP was named and the Committee might need to decide whether to proceed. This has occurred in the leaking of committee paper type inquiries.
The Investigative Procedure

Scotland

The Standards Committee’s Fourth Report recommended a four stage investigative procedure. It decided not to use the distinction made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life between serious and trivial cases, because allegations initially trivial could become more serious in the investigation process. It also built into the process provision for complaints which disclose a criminal dimension, as MSPs are liable to the criminal law.

The stages were:

*Stage 1 Initial Consideration*

This is an initial review of complaint by the Commissioner, conducted in private. Where there were allegations of criminal activity, there would be reference to Procurator Fiscal, where there was no foundation, the complaint would be dismissed without reference to the committee, unless there had been publicity. Where further investigation was necessary, the Commissioner would give notification to the committee that it would undertake an investigation.

*Stage 2 Investigation of Facts by Standards Commissioner*

This stage is conducted in private and independently of the Committee. The report recommended that the Commissioner should have powers to compel witnesses to cooperate. On the completion of an investigation, he/she would report to the Committee, without specific recommendation or sanctions. The report would be given at this stage to the member who would be offered the option of appearing before the committee.

*Stage 3 Committee consideration of Standards Commissioner’s report*

This would be considered in private, together with the response from the Member. Where the Commissioner had identified a breach of the Code, then Member would have the right to appear before the committee, with hearings normally in public. The committee could refer back the report to the Commissioner for further investigation—done privately. Or it could conduct its own full review. in public or private. The report did not specify whether this would involve a complete review or a judicial review type investigation. The committee reserved the right to undertake its own investigation of a complaint at any stage. At the end of Stage 3 the Committee, rather than Commissioner, would report to Parliament, setting out findings and upholding or dismissing complaints, but also recommending appropriate sanctions. The Commissioner’s report and relevant evidence would be published, together

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70 SP Paper 186. The report was endorsed by the Parliament in a debate on 23 November 2000

71 Reinforcing Standards, Sixth Report 2000 Cm 4557

72 Developing Models of Investigation Standards Committee secretariat paper to the Committee on Standards in Public Life secretariat seminar 17 November 2000
with the Committee’s report. The imposition of penalties would require a resolution from Parliament, following a motion for debate.

**Stage 4 Parliament’s Consideration of the Committee’s recommendation**

Section 39(3) of Scotland Act and Rule 6.5.2 of SOs require the Scottish Parliament, on recommendation from Standards Committee to decide whether to impose sanctions. The report recommended a change to SOs so that reports are debated within specified timetable. Members of Standards Committee should not be entitled to vote in the debate, and this should be set out in SOs. The report considered that the facts should have been settled at this stage, but the Member should have an opportunity to speak in the debate to challenge law or procedure or scale of sanction.

**The Investigative Procedure in the Standards Commissioner Bill**

**Initial Stages**

The Explanatory Notes to the Bill explain that the Bill is only concerned with the Commissioner’s role in the complaints process envisaged under the fourth report i.e. Stages 1 and 2 of the investigatory process, and does not deal with the parliamentary aspect of the investigation process ‘because it is a matter for Parliament itself by its own internal rules to set out the procedure that is to apply.’ This means that in order to give full effect to the investigative model set out in the fourth report, it will be necessary for the Parliament to make separate provision in the standing orders and the Code of the Conduct for the way in which the Commissioner will make reports to the Parliament and for the procedure that will follow once the Commissioner has made a report to it (Stages 3 and 4).

Section 5 sets out the two stage procedure. Stage 1 consists of investigating and determining whether the complaint is admissible, and Stage 2 of investigating and reporting to Parliament. S5(4) sets out that apart from Stages 1 and 2 it is for the Commissioner to ‘decide when and how to carry out any investigation at each stage’.

Section 5(2) provides for the investigation by the Commissioner to be held in private. Section 10.2.1 of the Code provides that MSS should not communicate any complaint to the media until a decision has been made on how to deal with the complaint. At the end of Stage 2, normal standing order rules about the meetings of a committee apply. Rule 15.1 requires a committee meeting to be held in public unless the committee otherwise decides. The fourth report envisaged that the report and the response from the MSP would be considered in private, but any hearing at which the MSP appeared before the committee would be in public. The decisions of the Committee on whether there had been a breach of the code and the imposition of sanctions would also take place in public.

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73 Fourth report, para 49
Section 6 gives more detail on Stage 1 and the admissibility of complaints. Three tests are set out:

- The first test (in subsection (2)(a)) is that the complaint is relevant. Subsection (4) provides what is required to meet the relevance test.

- The second test (in subsection (2)(b)) is largely procedural. The complaint must comply with certain specified requirements listed in subsection (5). Failure to meet any of the specified requirements is a matter that the Commissioner must bring to the Standards Committee under section 7(4) for a decision on whether the complaint should nevertheless be accepted.

- The third test relates to an initial investigation of the complaint to determine whether it warrants further investigation. Subsection (6) provides further specification.

47. Subsection (4) relates to the first test and sets out three matters that need to be established for a complaint to be relevant.

- The first matter is that the complaint must relate to conduct of a member of the Parliament. For example, this prevents complaints concerning the actions of SPCB staff for which separate arrangements are in place. Similarly, complaints about the conduct of other public officials are not relevant.

- The second matter is that the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and is not one of the complaints for which separate arrangements are made (see section 3(2)) unless the Standards Committee has directed the Commissioner to investigate such a complaint under section 12.

- Finally, some part of the conduct complained about must relate to a matter that the Commissioner considers may be covered by the relevant provisions. The Commissioner is required to identify at this stage which provisions he or she thinks are the relevant ones.

To fulfil the specified procedural requirements, the complaint must be made in writing, and give the complainant’s name and address and be against a specific member. A detailed complaint should be given with supporting evidence, within a time limit of one year ‘when the complainer could reasonably have become aware of the conduct complained about’.

Section 7(1) requires notification of the member about the complaint, the subject matter and the complainant, unless inappropriate. The EN note that directions could be given under section 4 to set out the circumstances where the identity of the complainant could be protected, and to seek comment from the MSP complained about as part of the Stage 1 investigation, noting ‘it is anticipated that there will be communications between the Commissioner and the member throughout this stage so that the member is kept informed of the progress of the investigation’.
Under section 3, the Commissioner is required to investigate a MSP only where a complaint has been received by him/her. A failure to meet the first or third tests results in the dismissal of the complaint. If a compliant passes the first and third test but fails the second (it is procedurally defective), the Commissioner is required to refer the complaint to the Committee which can then direct whether to dismiss or investigate. The Commissioner must dismiss the complaint where the third test is not met, without having to report on procedural deficiencies. The Bill also gives the Parliament power to direct the Commissioner to report classes of complaints with procedural defects to the Committee for consideration before the Commissioner investigates whether the complaint warrants further investigation. The Committee has indicated that it intends to make a direction to this effect in relation to complaints which do not name a member. Where the three tests are met, the Commissioner is required to inform the Committee that he is carrying out a full investigation at Stage 2.

There is no general requirement to inform the Committee when a complaint is dismissed, but there is specific power for the Commissioner to do so under section 7(10). Stage One complaints are expected to take two months; there is provision in section 7(11) for a report to the Committee if consideration is taking longer than this.

**Stage 2**

Section 8 deals with this stage and is relatively short. It provides for the investigation of an admissible complaint. The Commissioner is required to set out his findings of fact and whether the conduct is in breach of one of the relevant provisions ‘that he or she identified when deciding that the complaint was relevant’. There is provision for interim reports where an investigation was taking over 6 months to complete.

**The Report to Parliament**

Section 9 sets out detailed provisions, listing matters which require to be included within the report. These are:

- The details of the complaint
- The details of the investigation
- The facts found by the Commissioner in relation to the conduct complained about
- The conclusion reached by the Commissioner as to whether the member has, by his conduct, breached the relevant provisions

The Commissioner is specifically prohibited from commenting on appropriate sanctions. 9(3) gives the MSP named in the report a right to a copy of the draft report and to make representations. These representations are to be annexed to the report where they are not given effect in the report. The ENs state:

The inclusion of this provision is in line with the procedure followed by successive governments at Westminster following the 1966 report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Salmon, the report having noted that it is more difficult to counter criticism when
it appears in a report. The requirement is in addition to the right to be informed of the allegations and to be given an opportunity to respond during the investigation. The provision is similar to the rights afforded to councillors and members of devolved public bodies under section 14(2) of the Ethical Standards in Public Life (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 7) in relation to proposed reports of the Chief Investigating Officer.

Stages 3 and 4

The process to be followed in these stages will be set out in standing orders, but section 10 makes clear that the Parliament is entitled to reject the facts and the conclusions reached by the Commissioner in a Stage 2 report, and may direct the Commissioner to carry out further specified investigations using the powers to call witnesses and request documents set out in the Act. Withdrawals of complaints are regulated by section 11 and are made at the discretion of the complainant in writing to the Commissioner, as long as they are made before the report to Parliament. The Standards Committee and the member concerned are also to be informed.

The Bill therefore sets out detailed parameters for the investigative stages, in order to make the process transparent, since it will be judicially reviewable. Although there is provision for absolute privilege against defamation actions for the Commissioner’s reports, there appears to be no equivalent protection for witnesses or complainants, although some form of qualified privilege may well apply. Careful drafting is required in these areas where the protection of parliamentary privilege is not available.74

Wales

At its meeting on 11 November 1999 the Committee endorsed a draft procedure for handling complaints, subject to consultation of all members by 24 January 2000.

A six stage scheme was outlined:

— A complaint would be received by the Presiding Officer, who would check if it fell within terms of reference and, if so, would refer to the Committee. (This procedure has been superseded by an automatic referral to the Independent Adviser)

— A preliminary investigation by the Independent Adviser; an initial consideration to establish if the complaint was genuine and substantial and meriting investigation

— The Adviser would report to the Committee which would not be made aware of the identity of the AM under investigation, but would be given sufficient details of the reasoning to decide whether to follow the Adviser’s recommendation on further investigation or otherwise. If the Committee did not agree with the Adviser it would need to demonstrate clear reasons for its decision. The Committee would report its decision to the plenary

74 For example, a Member is given absolute privilege in forwarding the complaints of constituents to the Parliamentary Ombudsman in section 10(5) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967
Assembly. There was provision for immediate rebuke or warning, if the AM accepts the decision of the Committee, in cases of minor infractions of the rules

— If there were substantial allegations of criminal conduct, the matter would be passed to the police under a protocol agreed following section 72(6) of GOWA

— Where further information was required, the Adviser would undertake a detailed investigation on behalf of the committee, assembling detailed documentary evidence, interviewing witnesses etc

— The Adviser would then lay the report outlining the facts before the Committee. This report would not be made public. The Committee would then give the Member an opportunity to comment, in writing or orally, on the allegations and would make its findings and formulate its recommendations to the Assembly. (Any Member who is the subject of an investigation can, under standing order 16.5, be accompanied at any hearings by another person). The Independent Adviser would not sit on the Committee but could be called to appear before it. The Adviser’s role would be to clarify any item in the report; to answer any issues on the conduct of his or her inquiry. The Committee’s role would be limited to a judicial review role, of checking procedures and facts substantiated by evidence and that representations made by members answered by the Adviser

— The Committee would prepare a full report for Assembly with recommendations for penalties

The formal complaints procedure was approved by the Assembly on 6 July 2000.

Under SO 16.5 the public is excluded from committee proceedings when individual complaints are being considered, including when an AM gives evidence. Otherwise meetings are held in public and agendas and papers available on website. Reports when issued by the committee are anonymised unless a finding of a breach of the code is made.\(^75\) Because the report of the Adviser is not made public, it is difficult to establish much of the facts of a particular case.

The Committee have launched a review of their procedures, as they are aware of dissatisfaction from the Assembly members. This follows a paper from the Committee secretariat considered at the 28 June 2001 meeting of the committee.\(^76\) The investigative stages are seen as relatively unsophisticated, and experience shows there should be greater discretion at initial stage to prevent trivial cases from becoming subject to full procedures.

\(^75\) The Committee Annual Report 2000-2001 sets out the Committee reports issued at Annex B. One breach was found against Mr Cairns for misuse of Assembly stationery. A further breach has been found against Peter Rogers in a report issued to the Assembly on 11 January 2002. The issue was inappropriate criticism of an Assembly official

\(^76\) Standards of Conduct Issues, available from Committee agenda papers at http://www.wales.gov.uk/newsite.dbs?37DE2A13000B4D5F0000060C00000000
Large amount of staff and adviser time spent investigating and recording cases outside the remit. Other issues included:

— the extent to which the procedure is compatible with Human Rights legislation
— the sanctions which are available to deal with Members when a complaint is upheld
— the need for an appeals procedure
— the possibility of developing procedures which are flexible enough to allow a proportionate response to some complaints
— the impact of Freedom of Information legislation; and in particular whether and when to inform the Member being complained about (and any other interested parties) about the complaint
— the extent to which the procedure for complaints about Members’ conduct should be placed in the much wider context of complaints about the National Assembly’s policies, Members and staff

Northern Ireland

After initially attempting to investigate complaints itself, the Committee undertook an enquiry in June 2000 into the feasibility of a Commissioner.

The first report from the Committee on Standards and Privileges did not set out a series of formal stages, but the procedures can be categorised as follows:

— Commissioner would make an initial assessment—where the complaint was trivial, he/she would report accordingly to the Committee and no report of the Committee would be made

— Where the Commissioner made a preliminary investigation only, the findings would be passed to the Committee which would make a report to the Assembly recommending no action. The Commissioner’s report would be appended to the Committee report

— Where the complaint was not trivial, a detailed investigation would be undertaken by the Commissioner and he/she would subsequently report the findings to the Committee

— The Committee would ‘reach a decision on the findings and conclusions of a detailed report into a complaint submitted by the Commissioner for Standards’. The Committee might ask the Commissioner to appear before them or obtain further information, or might require the attendance of a Member (who could read the report beforehand, but not retain a copy). ‘Having considered the Commissioner’s report and taken whatever additional oral or other evidence it considers appropriate, the Committee will reach a decision on the conclusions and findings of the report’ (para 37) Therefore the Committee is empowered to review the whole case, rather than restricting itself to a wholly judicial review function. The Committee report would set out its decision and indicate appropriate sanctions

— The report of the Commissioner would be submitted to the Assembly under cover of a report from the Committee. The chair of the Committee
would pursue with the Business Committee an opportunity for debate at a plenary session. The member would have an opportunity to speak in the debate.

Three procedural guidance notes have been produced for the Committee which give further detail. The Standards Committee have yet to publish a report on a investigation under the new procedures, although the Ombudsman, as acting Commissioner has had complaints referred to him.77

**Types of cases investigated**

With the exception of Scotland, which had two serious investigations to undertake in its initial stages in 1999, the devolved bodies have had to deal with relatively minor complaints. These have absorbed a large amount of time of the commissioners/advisers, but there have been relatively few formal committee reports as a result.

Most of the cases considered by the advisors/commissioners deal with subjects which, in Westminster terms, would be dealt with as privilege issues, and referred to the Speaker or the Committee on Standards and Privileges for action. These include the leaking of reports and dealing with the constituents of another Member.78 The latter development is interesting, as it indicates that the regulation of ‘standards’ can encompass ‘job description’ aspects of being a member. Another growth area is likely to be issues of political finance, campaign donations and office costs. As yet, there has been no overlap problems with the new requirements in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 for holders of elected office to register donations separately with the Electoral Commission. This has already proved an issue at Westminster. But with elections due in 2003, candidates will need to consider the new requirements.

**Legal Processes**

All three bodies have established an inquisitorial style of investigation by the commissioner/adviser, and there is no specific provision for legal assistance to witnesses. The standard of proof adopted is taken as the balance of probabilities, although this is not necessarily set out as an explicit aspect of the investigative process. Further detail is given below:

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77 See Committee minutes for 12 February 2002 at [http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/standards/020212.htm](http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/standards/020212.htm)

78 See for example, the Scottish Parliament Standards Committee 8th Report 2001 *Report on the investigation of unauthorised disclosures* and 9th report 2001 *Complaint against Tommy Sheridan MSP* Only two reports of the Standards Committee deal with registration and sponsorship type issues – Fourth report 1999 (Mike Watson) and Fifth Report 2001 (Richard Simpson). The reports of the Standards of Conduct Committee in Wales are set out in Annex B to the Committee’s annual report, and again tend to deal with these types of behavioural issues.
Scotland

Legal advice has been provided to the adviser through the clerks. The Commissioner can appoint staff with the consent of the SPCB to assist. The Commissioner may also appoint other persons to provide services, which could include legal advice. There are no proposals in the Bill to offer legal advice to Members or witnesses, although at present they may have lawyers present, or any other adviser. These may only speak to the Committee with the Convenor’s permission. Directions to the Commissioner under the Bill will include advice on the burden of proof. The appeals stage is to the full Parliament, with the proviso that members of the Standards Committee should not vote.79

Wales

The Adviser has access to legal advice in the Presiding Officer’s office. Witnesses and AMs are not afforded legal advice. They may bring an adviser before the Committee, but with no powers to address the Committee. The appeal is to the Assembly. There is no provision restricting Committee members from voting in the debate.

Northern Ireland

Legal advice is available to the committee through the Legal Services Office— with a Director of Legal Services just appointed as part of the staff of the Assembly. This Office may also give advice to Assembly members. If a member needed legal advice to appear before the Committee, financial assistance might be considered. A member can bring an adviser, but the adviser has no right to address the Committee. Appeals lie to the Assembly. There is no provision restricting Committee members from voting in the debate.

Sanctions

Suspected breaches of the registration, declaration and paid advocacy requirements are criminal offences, and under agreements made with the relevant police forces, are not further investigated by the assemblies/parliaments. No prosecutions have yet been attempted.80

Lacking parliamentary privilege, the devolved institutions depend on statute and standing orders to enforce sanctions against Members who have contravened the Codes, but who are not to be the subject of criminal prosecution. The devolution legislation refers to the withdrawal of rights and privileges, without providing further definition. None of the bodies has the power to expel a member. The enforceability of suspension without pay has not yet been tested, particularly if the legal processes are subject to sustained judicial scrutiny, and

79 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege had accepted that a review of a report from the Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges was sufficient protection for an MP with respect to the procedures adopted, but recommended that Committee Members did not vote. See paras 295-8

80 In the Mike Watson investigation in 1999, failure to declare sponsorship was found, but not a breach of the paid advocacy rule. Standards Committee, fourth report 1999 SP Paper 51
in the light of employment law. No such sanctions have yet been implemented by the devolved bodies. Further details are given below.

Scotland
The Standards Commissioner Bill does not set out sanctions against MSPs found to have contravened relevant provisions. This is left for standing orders, but section 39 (5) of the Scotland Act does allow for the exclusion of members who contravene the relevant provisions. There is statutory authority to withdraw rights and privileges of an MSP during this period.81

Wales
There are similar provisions in the Government of Wales Act to exclude members who contravene relevant provisions, with the ‘withdrawal of rights and privileges’ during the period of exclusion.82 There is provision for the withdrawal of pay in SO 4.9.

Northern Ireland
The Committee’s first report of 2000 considered that, following amendments to SOs 57 and 64, and para 72 of the Code of Conduct, it would be empowered to recommend the exclusion of a Member and the withdrawal of rights and privileges. Statutory authority for this already existed in the form of section 43(5) of the Northern Ireland Act, allowing the withdrawal of rights and privileges. Amendments have now been made to the SOs.83

The Development of Codes of Conduct and Rules on Registration and Declaration
The Codes of Conduct for each devolved body contain the Seven Principles of Public Life formulated by the first report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The general nature of the principles relating to conduct has caused some difficulties.

All registers of interests are available on the internet and updated regularly. In general, only a small minority of members are registering substantial financial interests.

Scotland
Unlike the Scottish ministerial code, there are no explicit reference to the CSG principles, which are meant to underpin the ethos of Parliament. The Code of Conduct incorporates the relevant provisions of the Members’ Interests Order, so that a breach of the Order constitutes a breach of the Code of Conduct.84 It is a substantial document which sets out key principles,

81 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 3, para 2
82 Section 72(5)
84 At http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msps/coc/coc-c.htm as revised 23 Oct 2000
through registration and declaration of interests, paid advocacy, regulation of cross-party
groups, to general conduct in the chamber and enforcement procedures.

The Committee has issued proposals for consultation on replacing the original members’
interests order, with responses requested by 15 April 2002. This report gives a detailed
overview of the existing categories of registrable interests and raises selected areas for
possible extension:

— The question of requiring registration of non-pecuniary interests, including
freemasonry. Such interests are currently registered on a voluntary basis
— The debate on extending requirements to register the interests of spouses
and close family members
— Agreements relating to the provision of services by Members
— Declaration of interests when communicating with ministers etc outside
Parliament

The report took a generally cautious view in developing new requirements. It noted
difficulties with the paid advocacy rule which had been highlighted during the Mike Watson
case. The Members Interests Order is drafted in wide terms and generated concerns that the
Member could breach the provision if he participated in parliamentary proceedings related
to an organisation from whom he receives remuneration, even when the registrable interest
is declared. The report notes:

A working interpretation of the paid advocacy provisions, based on the relevant
section of the Scotland Act was developed in late 1999 and this was adopted by
the Committee when it adopted the Code of Conduct... this relies on
establishing a link or nexus between remuneration and the action taken by a
Member; a Member must be shown to have advocated a cause in return for some
form of payment

The proposal is to maintain the working interpretation, and apply in future to future or
expected interests and to remuneration and other benefits to partners if related to an MSPs
parliamentary duties.

Wales

Following the general statements of principle in the Code there is a section entitled
Principles in Practice of the Members Code: This gives the Committee a broad role in relation
to policing Members activities by reference to standing orders, since under para 6 of the

85 Standards Committee 2nd report 2002 SP Paper 512
86 Paras 4.12.12 of the Code of Conduct
87 Gifts and interests in shares are registrable, but not remuneration
88 paras 61 and 63. Section 39(4) of the Act referred to advocacy in consideration of payment; these
words were omitted in the Order
89 Section 6.2.3 states: it is the Member’s reason for undertaking any action...which is fundamental in
applying this rule
Principles ‘Members shall comply with the Assembly’s standing orders and its codes of practice and protocols.’

This has caused difficulties for the Committee, as its wide remit has led to possible overlap with the House Committee, which provides advice on the administration and functions of the Office of the Presiding Officer.\textsuperscript{90} It also makes it difficult to dismiss trivial complaints.

The requirements on registration and declaration are set out as an Annex to SO 4. A review of members’ interests was undertaken in 2000 and a revised version of the Guidance on The Registration and Declaration of Members’ Financial and other Interests was endorsed by the Assembly 13 February 2001. Amendments to the Annex were necessary in particular to clarify the requirement to register values in relation to financial interests.\textsuperscript{91}

Non-pecuniary interests must be registered under SO 4, which requires the registration of paid or unpaid membership or chairmanship of any body funded in whole or in party by the Assembly. Freemasonry membership must also be registered, although the legality of this requirement has been challenged by cases considered by the ECHR in another context.\textsuperscript{92}

The Standards of Conduct Committee recently recommended that the registration provisions should be extended to the partners and children of Assembly members, replacing existing requirements on ‘indirect interests’ in the Assembly’s Code.\textsuperscript{93} The motion to amend standing order in relation to spouses and children’s interests and freemasonry was debated on 5 February 2002 in plenary of the Assembly. The amendments were carried, although Conservative AMs voted against.

**Northern Ireland**

The Code of Conduct, together with the Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members was approved by Assembly on 14 December 1999. The guidance was modelled on that for the Commons. At the 29 May 2001 meeting of the Committee, amendments on the procedure for complaints were agreed to allow for exclusion of a member, and re-publication authorised. The Rules were amended by the Assembly on 15 October 2001 and are circulated to Members. A summary is given in the on-line register, but the full guidance does not appear on the Assembly website.

\textsuperscript{90} SO 36 sets out the functions of the House Committee

\textsuperscript{91} A summary of the review is given in the 2000-2001 annual report of the Committee

\textsuperscript{92} Further details are available from the Committee’s papers for March 2002 at http://www.wales.gov.uk/newsite.dbs?37DE2A13000B4D5F00000060C00000000+current+3C8F180B005E2BF0000340400000000+cur_date+03_2002.

\textsuperscript{93} Defined as where another person has an interest (financial or otherwise) in the matter in question and there is an established relationship (of whatever nature) between that Member and another person’. The background to the proposals are given in December 2001 papers of the Committee.
Members of the Assembly are required to list any unremunerated interest which ‘might reasonably be thought by others to influence their actions as Assembly Members’. This wording is modelled on Category 10 (Miscellaneous) in the Commons Guidance, which is voluntary only. This has led to extensive registration of the Loyal Orders, professional bodies, charities etc in Northern Ireland.
Part Two: The Regulation of Parliamentary Standards in Australia, Canada and Ireland

Key Points

These three states retain the Westminster style parliamentary system, but with adaptations. The federal and state/provincial legislatures of each country have developed various types of machinery to regulate parliamentary standards—some are based on parliamentary resolutions underpinned by parliamentary privilege and some have a detailed statutory basis.

The federal Parliaments of Australia and Canada and their sub-national legislatures have formally adopted the parliamentary privileges of the House of Commons in statute. Parliamentary precedents from the UK therefore become relevant both in parliamentary practice and in terms of judicial scrutiny of the parliamentary process. The position in the Oireachtas (Parliament) of Ireland is less clear-cut, as the post-1922 state did not formally adopt UK style privilege. Instead, parliamentary self-regulation was protected in the constitution. The use of parliamentary privilege in all three states is more codified by statute than in the UK Parliament. This procedure clarifies the extent of privilege, but leaves sufficient flexibility for the revision and development of powers by the parliament itself.

The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has some fundamental implications for parliamentary privilege in Canada, but the judicial impact of the Charter on the Parliament has yet to be fully determined. In theory, Ireland will face the same issues as the UK Parliament about the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to the Oireachtas.

Statute law covers corruption and bribery of members of parliament, but there remain some difficulties in Australia and Canada as to criminal prosecutions of members, due to the operation of parliamentary privilege. In some legislatures this has been resolved by statute. There have been amendments to the UK Prevention of Corruption Acts in Ireland, to ensure that Oireachtas members are within its scope.

The Australian and Canadian federal Parliaments do not have statutory schemes of parliamentary standards regulation. Both Houses in Australia have schemes for the registration and declaration of interests of members imposed by parliamentary resolution and monitored by parliamentary committees. The Canadian Parliament has not yet implemented registration and declaration of interests, despite a series of reform proposals, including a new position of Jurisconsult—an independent parliamentary official with both an advisory and an investigatory role—who would report to a parliamentary committee.

Australian state legislatures have adopted the registration and declaration of interests by legislation or by parliamentary resolution. A minority of legislatures has also adopted codes
of conduct. New South Wales and Queensland have established statutory commissions with the power to investigate members for official misconduct. Canadian provincial legislatures have generally established statutory ethics parliamentary officers, who tend to perform an advisory and investigative role. These are classified as Officers of Parliament. Detailed statutory codes of conduct have been developed in some of these legislatures. All have a statutory scheme of registration and declaration of interests, but it is common to make only a summary of the register available for publication.

Ireland has established a Standards in Public Office Commission which investigates allegations against office holders. Committees of the Oireachtas have statutory powers to investigate allegations against their members. The Commission places reports involving office holders who are also members before the parliamentary committee, which has the power to impose sanctions. Investigations have generally been conducted under the adversarial method, with the use of legal counsel, although the Commission gained new powers to appoint investigation officers under 2001 legislation.
Introduction

The various parliaments in Australia, Canada and Ireland were selected for study because of the common inheritance of the Westminster model and similar underpinning of parliamentary privilege. There have been a number of innovations in standards regulation, which bear closer investigation. This Part gives an overview of the systems and indicates models which might be of relevance to the parliaments/assemblies of the UK. It covers for each state:

— The status of parliamentary privilege, and its adaptation by statute
— The regulation of standards of conduct in parliaments at federal and state/provincial level

Parliamentary privilege and statutory regulation

These states have a Westminster style parliamentary system and, due to the historical links to the United Kingdom preserve aspects of parliamentary privilege, modified by subsequent statute. Colonial legislatures were not initially considered to possess all the relevant privileges of the Commons, but it became accepted during the course of the 19th century that legislation enacted pursuant to the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of a colony could confer the privileges of the Commons on each House.94 A brief overview of parliamentary privilege as currently in operation is given below.

Australia

The source for the Commonwealth Parliament’s parliamentary privilege is section 49 of the Constitution of Australia, as established in 1901. As part of the law, privilege can therefore be regulated by statute and has been subject to codification, notably in the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 which regulated the power to commit for contempt and the scope of Article 9 (freedom of speech) of the Bill of Rights 1688. It retains the power to interpret its standing orders and statutory provisions regulating proceedings, unless jurisdiction is conferred on the courts by statute.

The various state legislatures have adopted parliamentary privilege by statute, either by adopting the privileges of the Commons at a particular date (South Australia, Victoria and Queensland)95 or on an ambulatory basis, that is, taking into account statutory changes to Commons parliamentary privilege (Western Australia).96 Suspension and expulsion of members have occurred at state level for serious breaches of privilege or contempt.

94 For background on relevant legal cases, see Members of Parliament: Law and Ethics Prospect 2000 by Gerard Carney pp166-167
95 The advantage of this method is that it prevents automatic adoption of changes not necessarily appropriate for an Australian parliament.
member was expelled for ‘conduct unworthy’ of the New South Wales legislative council in the 1960s, an action upheld by the courts.\(^97\) Such action is rare at Commonwealth level, and the power to expel was lost in the 1987 Act. The most recent case, \textit{Egan v Willis},\(^98\) indicated that suspension of a member might be subject to judicial review although the judgments expressed divergent opinions on the limited scope of the review.\(^99\)

The power to prescribe standing orders of each legislature is derived from statute, under s50 of the Constitution and with equivalent powers in state constitutions at state level. There are powers to call for persons and papers, although some legal uncertainty exists as to whether these powers extend to the exercise of legislative power only.\(^100\) Sections 12 and 13 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 offer witnesses protection against coercion and prohibit the disclosure of evidence or documents without permission. Recent court cases have established the right of a House to require the production of documents by ministers.\(^101\) Houses have power to declare breaches of privilege or findings of contempt, although at Commonwealth level the terms are defined statutorily. There is statutory authority to fine or imprison and a statutory definition of the term ‘proceedings in Parliament’.\(^102\)

The exercise of the freedom of speech has led to a number of recent court cases involving defamation actions.\(^103\) The Final Report of the Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege\(^104\) recommended that both Houses adopt at each session a resolution designed to remind members of their responsibilities in exercising freedom of speech, noting the dangers of unsubstantiated allegations and the rights of others. The Australian Senate adopted a right of reply scheme in 1988 to offer redress to persons who consider that they have been unfairly criticised by Parliament.\(^105\)

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96 The ACT and Northern Territory legislatures have privileges tied to those of the House of Representatives. New South Wales has yet to legislate to clarify its privileges  
97 See Carney p178 for details  
98 (1996) \textit{Egan v Willis} 40 NSWLR 650. This case also dealt with the power of the House to call upon a minister to produce official papers, and is cited in fn 17 of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege report HL Paper 43/HC 214 1998-99 session  
99 See Carney pp170-175  
100 See Carney pp182-83  
102 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987. This definition of ‘proceedings in parliament’ in s16 is advocated by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (HL Paper 43/HC Paper 214 1998-9) as generally suitable for use in a UK statute on privilege  
103 For a full discussion, see Carney, Chapter 6, Freedom of Speech and Joint Committee, Chapter 2 Freedom of Speech and Article of the Bill of Rights  
104 1984  
105 The UK Joint Committee noted that this approach has been adopted in New Zealand and a number of Australian state legislatures but recommended against its adoption in the UK, paras 217-223
Corruption and bribery of members of the Commonwealth Parliament is an offence under s73A of the Crimes Act 1914. This provision was added in 1982, but with no provision for this to override Article 9, so cases involving parliamentary proceedings remain problematic. Provisions in the criminal codes of each state cover members of state legislatures, although problems of interpretation remain.

MPs and ministers appear to be public officers within the scope of the common law offence of misuse of public office.

**Canada**

As in Australia, Canadian legislatures were initially held to have inherent privileges necessary for their operation. For the federal parliament, the privileges of the Commons were conferred by statute. Quebec adopted a list of parliamentary privileges by statute, while other provinces have adopted the privileges of the Canadian House of Commons, again by statute. Courts were generally reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of Canadian legislatures.

The impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was examined in *New Brunswick Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly)* in 1993 which found, on a majority, that there was no ‘blanket rule that the Charter cannot apply to any of the actions of a legislative assembly’. Chief Justice Lamer noted in a minority judgment that even if the Charter did apply to the exercise of inherent privileges, it could well be that the House would itself constitute the ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ for purposes of hearing a claim and granting a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. The majority judgment

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106 Nicholls Committee, para 157 S 73A was recommended by the Bowen Committee in 1979

107 For a full discussion on the law on bribery see Carney, Chapter 8 Abuse of Public Trust—corruption offences


110 First adopted in 1867 after federation in section 18 of the Constitution Act 1867(UK) and section 45 of the Constitution Act 1982, in respect of the provinces of Canada. The privileges conferred were those existing in 1867. The Parliament of Canada Act, section 4, enacted by the Canadian Parliament, is the current authority for this

111 *Act respecting the National Assembly R.S.Q c.A-23*

112 The Charter was adopted in the Constitution Act 1982. Section 32(1) refers to its application to ‘the Parliament and Government of Canada’ and the legislature and government of each province, but the matter at issue was whether this refers to legislative actions only

113 (1993) 100 DLR (4th ed) 212 at 241
accepted that where a House exercised an inherent privilege, it is not reviewable by the courts, which leaves open the question of privileges conferred by statute.

Neither House of Parliament has expressly resolved to apply the Charter to any of its proceedings, and the precise boundary between courts and parliament remains undelineated. Section 7 of the Charter (right to principles of fundamental justice) might well conflict with parliamentary processes. There are nineteenth century cases indicating that the power to punish for contempt is not an inherent privilege necessary to the exercise of legislative functions.114

A mixture of statute and precedent governs the operation of parliamentary privilege. There are offences relating to Parliament in the Canadian Criminal Code115 including intimidation of parliament. Section 12 of the Parliament of Canada Act 1985 provides that false evidence to the House of Commons, Senate or a parliamentary committee is classified as perjury. Section 7 precludes the use of parliamentary proceedings in civil or criminal proceedings. Suspension of members has occurred, most recently in 1979 in the Commons and 1998 in the Senate. There has been no expulsion in the Commons since 1891.116 There is specific statutory authorisation for both Houses to deduct allowances from members.117 The House may exercise penal powers in respect of contempt, but there are practical considerations where the offence is also statutory since Section 11(h) of the Charter provides against double jeopardy. In addition, arguably the House would have to proceed according to natural justice, allowing the accused member an opportunity to answer charges.

Bribery is a criminal offence under the Criminal Code. However there is some doubt as to the meaning of official when applied to parliamentarians.118

Ireland

Constitutional authorities have questioned whether the Bill of Rights 1689 applied to Ireland and have doubted that parliamentary privilege was transferred into the post-1922 Irish State.119 Article 15.10. of the Constitution enacted in 1937 gives each House the power to make its own rules and standing orders ‘with power to attach penalties for their

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114 See Canadian Parliamentary Review pp33 for citations
115 1985
116 For a list in the Commons, see Joseph Maingot, Parliamentary Privilege in Canada (2nd ed 1997) p 185, fn35
117 Parliament of Canada Act, section 59
118 A recommendation to clarify the Code was made by the Special Joint Committee on Conflict of Interest in June 1992
infringement and shall have power to ensure freedom of debate, to protect its official
documents and the private papers of its members, and to protect itself and its members
against any person or persons interfering with, molesting or attempting to corrupt its
members in the exercise of its duties.\(^{120}\) Article 15.12 provides for all official reports and
publications and utterances made in either House to be privileged. Article 15.13 states that a
member shall ‘in respect of any utterance in either House, [not] be amenable to any court or
any authority other than the House itself’. Exceptions are made for serious offences (treason,
crimes, and violation of law and order).\(^{121}\)

However the implication of these rights have not been finally determined. In particular it is
not clear whether the privileges referred to in Article 15 attach to individual members only,
or whether the privilege is regarded as attaching to each House of Parliament, in
Westminster practice.\(^{122}\) This has important implications for the ability of a Deputy to waive
privilege in defamation actions.\(^{123}\)

There have been a number of court judgments relating to privilege. In \textit{re Haughey} the
Supreme Court was prepared to supervise the procedures adopted by a Dáil Committee. In
1990 the High Court granted a stay on an application for judicial review in respect of a
suspension imposed by the Senate on the recommendation of the Committee of Procedures
and Privileges where the Senator had not had opportunity to be heard prior to the
suspension. As the case did not proceed, the conflict between Article 15.10 and Article 40.3
(fair procedures) was not further explored.\(^{124}\)

Legislation has established that the rights in Article 15.13 attach to committee proceedings,
and further legislation has clarified the protection offered to witnesses summoned before a
committee.\(^{125}\) This 1997 legislation has also set out the duties on witnesses to respond to
inquiries and the powers to require discovery of documents. The extent to which ‘utterance’

\(^{120}\) The wording of Article 10 is almost identical with that in the 1922 Constitution

\(^{121}\) The judgment of Goeghegan J in \textit{Attorney General v Hamilton (no 2)} 1993 ILRM 821 suggested that
the framers of the constitution would have’ broadly understood that parliamentary privilege in both
England and the United States involved the non-amenability of members of Parliaments to courts or
other tribunals in respect of utterances made in Parliament and Article 15.12 and Article 15.13..must
be read in that context’

\(^{122}\) See Hogan and Whyte pp 146-7

\(^{123}\) In \textit{Attorney General v Hamilton (no 2)} the majority envisaged the waiver by an individual member of
the privilege of non-amenability

\(^{124}\) \textit{The Irish Times} 8 March 1990 , cited in The Irish Constitution J.M Kelly 3rd ed by Gerard Hogan and
Gerry Whyte 1994, p138

\(^{125}\) Oireachtas (Privilege and Procedure) Act 1976. See Hogan and Whyte pp142-3 for background and
Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses)
Act 1997
extends to written statements remains untested, although it is clear that the protection extends only to utterances in both Houses, and not outside.\(^{126}\)

There is a lack of clarity in the power set out in Standing Orders to suspend members, where it might conflict with the rights of members in Article 15 and of Ministers to attend the Oireachtas in Article 28.8. The Oireachtas has statutory power to suspend members for ethical misconduct,\(^{127}\) but the ability to withhold salaries was not clarified until the Standards in Public Office Act 2001.

There have been particular difficulties with the establishment of tribunal of inquiries under the (UK) Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921.\(^{128}\) A 1975 Tribunal of Inquiry was challenged on the basis of the privileges of the two Deputies under investigation in Article 15.13 (non-amenability of parliamentary utterances) and that the 1921 Act was not intended to allow an extra-parliamentary inquiry into things said in Parliament. The latter point did not succeed, but the former argument was not ruled on by the Tribunal, since it made the investigation without questioning the Deputies.\(^{129}\)

In a 1992 case relating to the beef industry tribunal, the Supreme Court rejected suggestions that the resolutions of both Houses pursuant to section 1 of the 1921 Act were an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial domain.\(^{130}\) However it established that parliamentary resolutions might not change the substantive law of the state, since such resolutions are not legislation. Another contentious issue dealt with was the extent of parliamentary privilege in relation to the non-disclosure of sources by Deputies speaking in the Dáil. The Attorney General sought judicial review of a ruling by the Chairman of the Tribunal of Inquiry that by virtue of Article 15, a member could not be made to explain utterances in that House.\(^{131}\) The judgment held that a Deputy was entitled to claim privilege in respect of the confidentiality of his sources.

As well as tribunals under the 1921 Act, other parliamentary enquiries have been established by resolution. Legislation in 1998 allowing the Comptroller and Auditor General powers to

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\(^{126}\) The question of whether parliamentary privilege might violate another person’s constitutional right to a good name was tested in Goodman International v Hamilton (no 2) High Court 18 February 1993. See Hogan and Whyte pp 753-4

\(^{127}\) Ethics in Public Office Act 1995 , section 27

\(^{128}\) As amended by the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 1979

\(^{129}\) Report of the Tribunal appointed by the Taoiseach on the 4th day of July 1975. Prl 4745

\(^{130}\) Goodman International v Hamilton (no 1) [1992] 2 IR 542; [1992] ILRM 145

\(^{131}\) Attorney General v Hamilton (no 2) [1993] ILRM 821
order the discovery of documents\textsuperscript{132} assisted the inquiry into the DIRT (taxation) scandal by the Public Accounts Committee.\textsuperscript{133}

In summary, parliamentary privilege in Ireland is more circumscribed than in Australia or Canada, where legislation has specifically conferred the privileges of the Commons at a certain date.

The (UK) Prevention of Corruption Acts remain in force.\textsuperscript{134} The Ethics in Public Office Act 1995 made amendments to the legislation to bring within its scope office holders and special advisers. In addition, the Office of the Houses of the Oireachtas was designated as a public body under the Acts and legislation in 2001 included Deputies. Criminal investigations are handled by the DPP. The need to undertake a separate criminal prosecution if the tribunal produces evidence of wrongdoing is seen as a major failing of the tribunals of inquiry process in Ireland.\textsuperscript{135}

\section*{Regulation of standards of conduct in Parliaments}

\textbf{Australia}

\textit{The Australian Parliament}

\textit{House of Representatives}

The obligations of members are set out in SO 196 (voting where there is a direct pecuniary interest)\textsuperscript{136} and SO 335 (membership of committee where direct pecuniary interest)\textsuperscript{137} and by four resolutions adopted on 9 October 1984 establishing ad hoc disclosure of interests, and a public register of interests. The definition of declaration did not extend to proceedings outside the House, in contrast to the Commons 1974 resolution. The resolutions are monitored by the House of Representatives Members’ Interests Committee.\textsuperscript{138} Non-pecuniary interests are registrable. The interests of family members are registrable.

Paid advocacy is prohibited under section 45(iii) of the Constitution, which disqualifies any member of the Commonwealth Parliament who ‘directly or indirectly takes or agrees to take

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{132}The Comptroller and Auditor General and Committees of the House (Special Provisions) Act 1998
  \item \textsuperscript{133}Parliamentary Inquiry into DIRT First Report, Public Accounts Committee, 1999. See Chapter 16 for a discussion of recommendations for future parliamentary inquiries
  \item \textsuperscript{134}The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001 made amendments to bring Irish legislation into line with international obligations and to strengthen the provisions. Members of the Oireachtas are specifically included
  \item \textsuperscript{135}Section 5 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1979 ensures that statements to tribunals are not admissible in criminal cases
  \item \textsuperscript{136}This is based on the wording of a UK resolution of 1811, and is severely limited in its effect, which is restricted to votes on topics which are immediate and personal
  \item \textsuperscript{137}Now SO 335
  \item \textsuperscript{138}For full details see L M Barlin ed \textit{House of Representatives Practice} (1997)
\end{itemize}
any fee or honorarium for services rendered to the Commonwealth, or for services rendered in the Parliament to any person or State’. This prohibition appears to have limited the development of paid consultancies by MPs. But there are no general prohibitions on undertaking other paid employment.

**Senate**

The Senate passed resolutions establishing ad hoc declarations and a register of interests on 3 March 1994. They are monitored by a Committee of Senators’ Interests and a clerkly Registrar. The definition of declaration of interests has been more coherent in this House, but covers pecuniary interests only. Registration of family interests is kept in a separate part of the register, with public access only with consent of the Committee. Non-pecuniary interests are registrable, with an obligation on the member to disclose where objectively a conflict of interest may arise. The prohibition on paid advocacy extends to Senators and an earlier resolution prohibiting its use was strengthened by resolution in 1995.

For both houses, the enforcement mechanism is through these parliamentary committees.

The Commonwealth Parliament has not adopted a code of conduct, despite recommendations for one in the 1979 Bowen report and in a Parliamentary Working Group in 1995.

**Australian state legislatures**

State legislatures have similar rules on declaration and registration of interests. Victoria has a statutory requirement to disclose in its 1978 legislation. The codes of conduct in New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland contain duties to disclose. Other legislatures are bound by Standing Orders or resolutions covering prohibitions against voting, now seen as inadequate for modern parliamentary practice. In contrast, registration is a statutory requirement in all but Queensland and the ACT, where parliamentary resolution is used. There are a variety of approaches to registration of family interests, including limited access.

Enforcement mechanisms include a summary offence, as in South Australia or reference to a parliamentary committee, with the involvement of the Clerk of the Parliaments, as

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139 Which has a non-Government majority

140 For full details see Odger’s *Australian Senate Practice* 9th ed 1997


142 See Carney pp353-6

143 See Carney p359 for legislative references

144 Members of Parliament (Registers of Interest) Act 1983, s7
Registrar. Apart from Queensland and New South Wales, complaint procedures are non-publicised and enforcement mechanisms are not well developed. The usual response is to cite the member for contempt of parliament, punishable by reprimand or suspension. The power to fine is not available unless conferred by statute.

A small number of Australian legislatures have adopted codes. The only one adopted by statute is in Victoria. The Queensland Legislative Assembly adopted its comprehensive code in 2001. These codes contain general standards in relation to personal conduct, but these have not yet proved an issue, as for example in Wales or Northern Ireland.

Commissions against Corruption – New South Wales and Queensland

These two commissions were established against a background of corruption allegations, but have themselves attracted criticism for the scale and nature of their investigations.

The New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption is established under a 1988 statute and may investigate ‘corrupt conduct’ by a public official, including MPs and ministers. Following a 1992 case the definition of corrupt conduct was altered to include ‘in the case of conduct of a Minister of the Crown or a member of a House of Parliament a substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct’. This has prompted the adoption of non-statutory codes in New South Wales Houses in 1998, and the appointment of a non-statutory Parliamentary Ethics Adviser for each House to advise members on ‘ethical issues concerning the exercise of [their] role as a Member of Parliament (including the use of entitlements and potential conflicts of interests)’. The advice is at the request of a member only and there is no investigative role. A parliamentary committee monitors the work of the ICAC.

The ICAC may make a finding of corrupt conduct against a member where a substantial breach of the code has been found. The finding is reported to the member’s House which is

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145 The new Code of Ethical Standards sets out a detailed complaints and investigation procedure, undertaken by parliamentary committee

146 Available in the Commonwealth Parliament, Queensland, W Australia and Northern Territory

147 Tasmania House of Assembly, New South Wales; both Houses, Queensland. For a full discussion of these codes see A Research Report on the Development of Codes of Conduct in Australian Parliaments, Noel Preston and Clem Campbell Centre for the Study of Ethics, QUT and Australian Parliamentary Library Research Paper no 2 1998-9 A Code of Conduct for Parliamentarians? by Dr A Brien

148 Members of Parliament (Register of Interests) Act 1978, Part I

149 Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988. For details, see www.icac.nsw.gov.au

150 Greiner v ICAC (1992) 28 NSWLR 125

151 Resolution of the Legislative Council 26 May 1999; resolution of the Legislative Assembly of 5 May 1998

152 For the formal terms of the appointment see the resolution of 5 December 2000 at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/phweb.nsf/frames/1?open&tab=committees
responsible for disciplinary action. A finding of criminal conduct against a member is referred by the ICAC to the DPP for prosecution.

The ICAC is a large and well-resourced institution. It has recently issued two reports with extensive recommendations on the use of parliamentary allowances.\textsuperscript{153} These include clear guidelines and adequate auditing procedures. It has faced criticism that the extent of its resourcing has driven investigations into apparently minor transgressions.

Queensland has established the Criminal and Misconduct Commission with the power to investigate members for official misconduct.\textsuperscript{154} This was formerly known as the Criminal Justice Commission (QCJC), but this body has just merged with the Queensland Crime Commission.\textsuperscript{155} The QCJC had interpreted this as relating to criminal conduct of members, but recently proposed an extension to non-criminal conduct, since implemented.\textsuperscript{156}

A new post of Queensland Integrity Commissioner is empowered to give advice on ethical issues on request to the Premier, ministers, government employees and members of the Queensland Parliament who belong to the government party or parties.\textsuperscript{157} Another recent post, the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Commissioner, now renamed the Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Commissioner, assists a parliamentary committee in scrutinising the Commission.\textsuperscript{158} The appointments process for the position, its servicing and its main functions are set out in statute in some detail.\textsuperscript{159} The QCJC has been criticised for the extent of its investigations and for the leaking of information.

\textbf{Canada}

\textit{The Canadian Parliament}

SO 21 of the House of Commons provides against votes on which members have direct pecuniary interests, with a comparable rule in the Senate. There is only limited registration—

\begin{itemize}
  \item [153] See report on an investigation into an individual MP’s travel claims at \url{http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/pub/summary_pub.cfm?ID=234} The Commission was created under the Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988
  \item [154] The Commission was originally established under the Criminal Justice Act 1989. It was the subject of an commission of inquiry in the 1990s
  \item [156] Report on a Draft Code of Conduct for Members of the Queensland Legislative Assembly no 21 May 1998 Part A pp74-6 Members’ Ethics and Parliamentary Privileges Committee
  \item [157] Part 7, Public Sector Ethics Act 1994, inserted in 1999
  \item [159] Crime and Misconduct Act 2001, Part IV
\end{itemize}
of visits made abroad and not paid for by a member or recognised association or party or the government in SO 22. There are no comparable provisions for Senators.

It is a ‘high crime and misdemeanor’ for a Member to be offered any advantage for promoting a matter before Parliament under Standing Order 23(1) of the House of Commons. There is a statutory prohibition on receiving outside compensation for services rendered on any matter before the House, the Senate or committees, and on holding a government contract or agreement, either directly or indirectly, in which public money is to be paid. The latter are grounds for disqualification. These prohibitions also apply to the Senate. In general, the provisions have been recognised as antiquated. A Joint Committee report of 1997 had recommended disclosure of financial assets, source of income and extra-parliamentary positions, including the interests of spouses and dependants, as part of a code of conduct. Disclosure would be confidential, but a summary made public. These proposals have not been implemented.

Reform Proposals

There have been a variety of attempts to institute a more rigorous conflict of interest regime in the Canadian parliament, beginning in 1973 with a green paper issued by the federal government. A House of Commons standing committee on management and members’ services recommended against a register of interests in 1985, although a similar Senate Committee recommended a complete review of conflict of interest rules. Four Government bills were introduced in the 33rd and 34th Parliament, which would have provided for an annual declaration of interests, to an independent three member Conflict of Interest Commission. A registrar of interests would have prepared a summary of this confidential information. The Chief Commissioner would have been chosen by the Prime Minister after consultation with party leaders, a member chosen by the government from a list submitted by the opposition and a member chosen by the government. The Commission would have had extensive discretionary power to advise parliamentarians on their interests and investigate allegations that rules had been breached. Imposition of penalties would have been the responsibility of the relevant House. These proposals made little progress. A special Joint Committee on Conflict of Interests reported in June 1992, recommending the appointment of a ‘Jurisconsult’ to serve as advisor and investigator instead of a Commissioner.

160 Parliament of Canada Act 1985
163 For details see Conflict of Interest Rules for Federal Legislators. 23 October 2000. The relevant bills were C-114, C-46 and C-116
The incoming Government of October 1993 campaigned on a platform of reform in the field of governmental and parliamentary ethics, and this led both to the appointment of an Ethics Counsellor for government and ministers and to the appointment of a joint committee of parliament. In 1997 a report of the Special Joint Committee on a Code of Conduct of the Senate and the House of Commons was produced, but still awaits implementation. This Committee recommended the creation of an office of Jurisconsult, an officer of parliament who would be appointed jointly by the Senate and the House of Commons upon the recommendation of their Speakers, following consultation with the leaders of all recognised parties.

The appointment of a Jurisconsult would have been by parliamentary resolution and therefore non-statutory. The appointment would have been for seven years, with possible re-appointment for a further term or terms, removable only after a joint resolution of each House. He would have been under the direction of a Joint Committee on Official Conduct, which would have been under an obligation to ensure that no personal information was disclosed publicly. Investigations would begin following a direction of the Joint Committee, which would have authority to use the privilege powers to send for persons and papers. A two stage process was envisaged:

- Investigation, where if no action was considered necessary this was reported to the Joint Committee which would have no power to intervene
- Investigation where a prima facie case exists; if the Jurisconsult could not settle the matter, it would be referred to the Joint Committee for a full inquiry.

The Jurisconsult would also have had an advisory role with respect to the drafting of confidential disclosure statements from members. A summary would have been prepared for publication. The report did not consider appeal mechanisms. He/she would have prepared a summary for public disclosure. A minority report was produced by the Bloc Quebecois and in the event, there was insufficient parliamentary support for the Committee’s proposals as a package. A Private Member’s Bill to implement the proposals was unsuccessful.

**Provincial Legislatures**

In many Canadian provinces, there is an officer of the legislature that is usually appointed by (or whose appointment is ratified by) the legislature. In such cases, the appointment is for a particular term. Examples of a statutory commissioner are in British Columbia, where there is a Conflict of Interest Commissioner, who reports to the legislature, and in New

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165 For full details see Parliamentary Research Branch *Conflict of Interest Rules for Federal Legislators*, 23 October 2000, Margaret Young
166 See [http://www.legis.gov.bc.ca/facts/officers.htm](http://www.legis.gov.bc.ca/facts/officers.htm)
Brunswick. These statutory officers serve fixed terms, according to the individual legislation. The full list is as follows:

- Nova Scotia has a Conflict of Interest Commissioner, established in 1987
- Ontario has an Ethics Commissioner, established in 1988
- British Columbia has a Conflict of Interest Commissioner, established in 1990
- Alberta has an Ethics Commissioner, established in 1991
- Saskatchewan has a Conflict of Interest commissioner, established in 1987
- New Brunswick has a Conflict of Interest Commissioner, established in 2000

The Canadian Conflict of Interest Commissioners hold annual meetings, and gave evidence to the 1997 Special Joint Committee of the Canadian Parliament.

The background to the appointment of such officers, classified as Officers of Parliament, has been a growth in public concern about the behaviour of politicians. In New Brunswick, for example, the legislature decided to retain in 1997 a retired judge to assess the adequacy of the existing 1978 legislation on conflict of interest. A new Act came into force in 2000 and a Commissioner (a Q.C) was appointed for a term of five years.

Under the New Brunswick Act, the Commissioner performs both an advisory and investigatory role. Requests for investigation must be in the form of an affidavit setting out the grounds for the alleged breach of the Act. The Commissioner then undertakes an investigation and reports the results to the Speaker and to the Member who is the subject of the investigation. The Commissioner may recommend penalties to the legislature of reprimands, fines, suspension or expulsion. He is serviced from the Office of the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly. He has a role in investigating the activities of the provincial government, whose ministerial activities are also covered by the 2000 Act. His first investigation involved an allegation from a member of the Assembly that the Minister for Transportation might have used insider information to further his private interests.

In Ontario, the Integrity Commissioner is appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the address of the Assembly, under s23 of the Members’ Integrity Act 1994. The term is for five years and there is provision for appointment and re-appointment. Removal is only upon an address of the Assembly, and there is provision for employees ‘necessary for the...
performance of the Commissioner’s duties’ from the staff of the Office of the Assembly.\textsuperscript{173} There are confidentiality requirements concerning information disclosed to the Commissioner, which prevail over relevant Freedom of Information legislation.\textsuperscript{174}

Once again, the Ontario Commissioner has a dual advice and investigatory role. There is authority to use the powers of a commission under public inquiry legislation. He reports to the Assembly, recommending penalties of fines, suspension and expulsion. The Assembly must respond within 30 days and has power of final decision, but with limitations concerning the imposition of penalties other than those recommended by the Commissioner.

In provincial legislatures, registration and declaration are governed by statute. A typical provision is the requirement to disclose details of all interests privately to a Commissioner, with a summary being produced for public disclosure. In Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island\textsuperscript{175} members must declare direct and indirect pecuniary interests, and withdraw from proceedings. In New Brunswick a public disclosure statement is made to the Conflict of Interest Commissioner which is then filed with the clerk of the Legislative Assembly and made public. The legislation can be very detailed in its registration requirements.\textsuperscript{176}

Ireland

\textit{Regulation of the Oireachtas}

Following a series of political scandals in the 1980s and 1990s and a number of tribunals of inquiry established by the Oireachtas under the UK 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry Act, there has been legislation to establish a system of regulation for members and office holders.\textsuperscript{177} The Ethics in Public Office Bill was introduced as part of Programme for Government of the Labour/Fianna Fáil government of early 1993, pioneered by Eithne Fitzgerald, Labour minister of state. The relevant Acts are the Ethics in Public Office Act 1995 and Standards in Public Office 2001. The legislation has created three types of supervisory machinery:

1. Standards in Public Office Commission for ministers and public office holders
2. Committee on Members’ Interests of the Dáil for Deputies\textsuperscript{178}
3. Committee on Members’ Interests of Seanad for Senators

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\textsuperscript{173} Section 23(10)

\textsuperscript{174} Section 29


\textsuperscript{176} For instance Ontario’s Integrity Act prohibits the use of air miles for private purposes in section 6

\textsuperscript{177} The Tribunals of Inquiry (Amendment) Act 1979 have amended the 1921 Act. For examples of current tribunals see \url{www.flood-tribunal.ie} and \url{www.moriarty-tribunal.ie}

\textsuperscript{178} This is the only Dáil Committee with a non-Government majority. The Committee on Procedures and Privileges rules on issues such as the use of parliamentary stationery. See Commission Annual Report for 2000 p21 for recent cases
The Dáil and Seanad adopted the 2001 legislation by resolution, to preserve the right to self-regulation in Article 15 of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{179}

The Commission was initially known as the Public Offices Commission under the 1995 legislation. It consisted of:

- Comptroller and Auditor General
- Ombudsman (Chair)
- Chairman of the Dáil
- Clerk of the Dáil
- Clerk of the Seanad

Under section 2 of the 2001 Act it now consists of:

- High Court, or Supreme Court judge or former judge
- Comptroller and Auditor General
- Ombudsman
- Clerk of the Dáil
- Clerk of the Seanad
- Former member appointed by the Government following resolutions in both Houses

The chairman is removable by the President only on resolutions of both Houses for specified misbehaviour.\textsuperscript{180} The members have a term of six years and may be re-appointed for one or more terms. The Commission is therefore part-time in nature, and did not receive a complaint alleging contravention of the 1995 Act in the period 1995-1998.\textsuperscript{181} It made preliminary investigations in two cases, without proceeding to a formal investigation in 1999. Its powers are analogous to that of a tribunal of inquiry with representation of all parties by senior counsel and with witnesses afforded the same privileges and immunities as in a court of law. It also has responsibilities under electoral legislation to investigate alleged offences relating to declaration of donations and election expenditure. The Commission has generally had a low public profile in terms of investigation of corruption claims in Irish public life.

The Government introduced proposals for new legislation in 1998, which were considered by a Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service in July 1998. The Commission gave evidence to the Committee on the feasibility of the government proposals, indicating its preference for a statutory arrangement allowing the Commission to appoint an

\textsuperscript{179} Section 29 stated that the Act did not apply to either House, unless it passed an appropriate resolution. Each House retains the right to pass a resolution disapplying the Act.

\textsuperscript{180} Ethics in Public Office Act, s 21, as amended by s2 of the Standards in Public Office Act 2001

Inspector to make an initial investigation. ¹⁸² Under the 2001 legislation, there is provision for an inquiry officer to carry out a preliminary investigation. ¹⁸³ There is immunity for complainants in good faith. ¹⁸⁴

The Commission undertook its first formal investigation into a minister and provided a report to the Dáil Committee in December 2001. ¹⁸⁵ The report was placed in the Dáil Library and the Deputy was given an opportunity to make representations to the Members’ Interests Committee in the interests of natural justice, although there was no statutory provision for this stage. He has since been suspended for 10 days following a debate in the Dáil. ¹⁸⁶ As a Deputy, it is for the Dáil to impose sanctions.

Sections 8 and 9 of the 1995 Act required each House to establish members’ interests committees and to undertake investigations. Sections 30-34 set out detailed requirement for investigations by the Commission and the Commission respectively, but with no reference to an appeal mechanism other than the House. The Committee was given identical powers to those of the Commission in respect of attendance of witnesses and production of documents. The 2001 Act added to these powers. Witnesses giving evidence before a committee are not entitled to refuse to answer questions or not to produce documents. ¹⁸⁷ In general such evidence is not admissible in criminal or civil proceedings. There are provisions applicable to make obstruction of a ‘person who is a member of staff of a Committee’ an offence. High court discovery rules apply for documents. ¹⁸⁸

It appears that the clerk carries out an initial filtering of complaints from the public. There is provision for the award of costs against vexatious or frivolous complaints in section 11 of the 1995 Act. The Committee was also given powers to advise members and specific protection was given to members who had complied with this advice. ¹⁸⁹ Reports of the committee are

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¹⁸² 2 December 1998. A summary of its investigation procedure is available from the website, entitled Investigation Procedure

¹⁸³ Section 4(4) and section 6, where a detailed procedure for the inquiry officer is set out, including powers to obtain documents

¹⁸⁴ Section 5 2001 Act


¹⁸⁶ Section 27 of the Ethics Act 1995 states that a Committee ‘may’ move a motion relating to a report of the Commission, but there is no time limit. The debate was on March 7 2002, available from http://www.gov.ie/oireachtas/frame.htm The suspension was with pay, as the investigation was undertaken under the 1995 Act

¹⁸⁷ Section 16, 2001 Act

¹⁸⁸ Sections 17 and 18. The Act covers both the investigations of Committee and the Standards in Public Office Commission, which may account for the comprehensive set of powers afforded Committee investigations

¹⁸⁹ Section 12
made to the House under section 29 where the committee can recommend sanctions. The maximum penalty is suspension for 30 sitting days, although where a contravention is continuing suspension for an indefinite period may be imposed until the member complies with the legislation. The Dáil Members’ Interests Committee has recommended that the period be increased to 3 months.\footnote{190 Report on a draft Code of Conduct for Members of Dáil Éireann 1 May 2001 available by searching from http://www.gov.ie/oireachtas/frame.htm}

In evidence to the Northern Ireland Standards and Privileges Committee in 2000, the Chairman of the Dáil Members Interests Committee noted that it had handled over 100 requests for advice since Act came into force in 1996. The Committee engaged legal consultants for the majority of cases and retained legal advice throughout the year.\footnote{191 First Report, 2000 Q793} In 1999 it had begun to hear its first complaint against a member by another member and gave 14 days suspension.\footnote{192 The member was Dennis Foley, with the report being issued on 17 April 2000 at http://www.gov.ie/oireachtas/frame.htm. It gives details of the legal procedures used.} They used a legal team for the investigation and would employ consultants to assist with assembling documents. Hearings took place in private and the Deputy who was the subject of the allegation used a legal counsel to address the committee.

The debates on the adoption of the Code in February 2002 and on the suspension of Deputy Ned O’Keefe in March 2002 indicate complaints by members of the Committee that such investigations are very time-consuming and onerous. There has also been concern that ‘tit for tat’ allegations are developing, with Deputies making public accusations against other Deputies, before a full investigation.

The Code of Conduct and registration of interests

The 1995 legislation introduced a statutory framework for the disclosure of registrable interests by members of the Oireachtas, as well as ministers and public servants. Registers were established for Dáil and Seanad members by the relevant clerks of each House. Registers are published annually and open to inspection in the library of the Oireachtas. The interests to be declared and registered are set out in the Ethics Act 1995, with no requirement to state financial value. Statements of family interests are made to the Commission for ministerial appointees only and kept private. New members elected have to show a tax clearance certificate and a statutory declaration. Similar provisions apply before appointment to judicial office and to senior public office.\footnote{193 Sections 20-24, 2001 Act}

There has been a perceived overlap with the requirements on members in the Electoral Acts 1997 and 1998 to register donations in Donation Statements, which are filed with the Commission. Members must declare donations over £500 annually. Section 20 of the 2001
Act attempts to resolve the issue by requiring the separate forms to be issued jointly by the Commission and the appropriate Clerk and for the form to cover the same period of time.

Section 10 of the 2001 Act requires Oireachtas Committees to draw up codes of conduct, which might be applied to the House by resolution. Such codes were declared to be admissible in court, tribunal and Commission proceedings. The Committees were also empowered to offer advice to members on the applicability of the code and the member was put under a duty to ‘furnish such information as it may reasonably require’.

The Dáil Committee on Members’ Interests published a report on a draft code of conduct on 1 May 2001, following an order by the Dáil on 7 February approving the introduction of a code in principle and referring the draft code to the Committee. The report did not recommend that the Code encompass the statutory requirements on registration and declaration, set out in the 1995 Act and rejected the draft, substituting its own version, consisting of general principles, including the banning of paid advocacy. It considered whether the membership of the Committee should continue to be appointed by party leaders and whether its current membership of five should be enlarged.

A breach of the Code is likely to be a breach of section 4 of the 2001 Act, which is drafted in broad terms to cover acts or omissions inconsistent with the proper performance of a public office. The Code was adopted by the Dáil without amendment on 28 February 2002.

194 Section 10(8)
195 Appendix L of the report
196 For the debate see http://www.gov.ie/oireachtas/frame.htm
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