I should like to start with some thanks. To UCL for giving me this chair in Gobierno and the Constitution. To CIPFA for sponsoring tonight’s lecture. To all our other funders: to the nine charitable trusts who have generously funded the Unit, and to Stephen Rubin, our latest benefactor. And finally to all the Unit’s friends and collaborators, many of whom are here tonight. I don’t really regard this as a personal chair: it is a tribute to the work of the Constitution Unit. That work has from the start been a team effort - so I should like if I may to regard it as a collective chair.

The Unit has been extraordinarily fortunate in the quality of all the people who have worked for us and with us, both as staff and as volunteers. I’ve been fortunate in their ability, which is first class, and in their dedication. Working for the Unit is quite high risk. If I tell you that of my four Research Fellows one is funded until next summer, one until the autumn, and two currently have no funding at all, you will get the picture. I’m not complaining about this. It is a good discipline that all our projects have to be funded. But to those of you who judge the Unit by our steady stream of new projects and publications you should know how hand to mouth it is behind the scenes.

Think tanks and Whitehall

There is an irony here. People often ask me why our work isn’t funded by government. It is true that government is our best customer, in terms of buying our reports. And one of the things that distinguishes the Constitution Unit from other think tanks is our closeness to Whitehall, aided by the fact that for most of my working life I have been a civil servant, and I still think like one. That is my professional deformation. So what interests me in research is its implications for policy: and a hallmark of all the Constitution Unit’s work is that we try very hard to get our policy recommendations right. But there is clearly an advantage in being independent of government in that we can plan our own work programme, we can say things which we believe to be true but which are not always welcome, and we can look further ahead than government can.

For a whole range of reasons the kind of strategic planning and forward looking policy making which went on in Whitehall when I joined the civil service now hardly exists. The reasons include the hollowing out of the senior Civil Service, which has been severe; short termism of Ministers, which applies to governments of all persuasions; a collapse in Ministers’ confidence in the policy making capacity of the Civil Service, which goes back to Mrs Thatcher, and which creates a vicious circle in which Ministers increasingly look outside for policy advice, and the Civil Service loses confidence in itself.
Constitutional Futures
But I must come back to my text. It is not wholly a digression because what I want to discuss tonight is a piece of forward looking work which one can no longer imagine being done in Whitehall - although Whitehall has been an eager customer and has organised a seminar series around our findings. It is a piece of work to which all members of the Unit have contributed, plus half a dozen distinguished outsiders. It has been a genuinely collective effort, so it seemed appropriate to celebrate what I have dubbed my collective chair. It is appropriate for this room and to this audience, because it has been generously funded by the Gatsby Charitable Trust and the Friends of UCL, an alumni group who support research projects here in UCL. And it is appropriate because it picks up nicely from where I left off in the CIPFA/Times lecture I gave last year, when I talked about the way the new government was organising itself to deliver the constitutional reform programme, and what the first year programme was going to contain.

The first year legislative programme
Now at the end of that first year we can start to judge the results. The government’s achievement in legislative terms has been quite extraordinary. We said in our very first report *Delivering Constitutional Reform* that the government would be sensible to plan for no more than two constitutional bills per session. In this - admittedly 18 month - first session of the new Parliament, out of a legislative programme of some 50 bills 11 have been constitutional bills, of which at least four are major - the three devolution bills to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Human Rights Bill. These are the bills I have in mind in the title of my lecture Reinventing the Constitution: and in addressing their impact on the state I want to look ahead to what the new constitutional settlement will look like in five or ten years’ time, when these changes have had time to bed down. It will be transformed in a manner which would startle many of the Ministers involved in putting these changes through. As one Whitehall insider observed to Peter Hennessy “Most senior Ministers involved in constitutional reform either don’t believe in it, aren’t interested in it or don’t understand it”. Mr Blair is reported to have said in private discussions in Blackpool that the constitution was a Year One issue: by legislating for it they have been there and done that, and the government can now move on.

Extent of constitutional change
By legislating what forces have they unleashed? The first point to make is that these are irreversible changes. They are not like the poll tax, where the government having made a mistake was able to throw the policy into reverse. Technically Parliament could repeal the Scotland Act or the Human Rights Act, because neither is entrenched; but politically it is inconceivable. These are new pillars of our constitution. They will in turn release a political and legal dynamic which is much greater than we can currently foresee. In part this is because of interactive effects which will make the cumulative impact greater.

Let me give you an example of what I mean. Take our dominant two party system. It is well known that PR breaks up two party dominance, by fragmenting the major parties and encouraging the creation of minor parties. It is less well known that devolution has a similar effect. Devolution will encourage minor and regional parties - we have already seen that with the boost to the SNP in Scotland - and will force the
major parties to allow far greater independence to their Scottish and Welsh branches. Now overlay the two effects in combination, PR on top of devolution, and you have a more powerful political dynamic fragmenting the party system than if you take on change in isolation. Similar interactive effects will be at play in the role of the courts. We all know that ECHR incorporation will require the courts to adjudicate on social and moral questions with a high political charge; but devolution will as well. The two changes taken together will give the courts a much higher political profile.

These developments will hammer more nails into the coffin of parliamentary sovereignty. I don’t think parliamentary sovereignty will ever die - it is too powerful a myth for that - but it will be further eroded, by forces from above and below. It is part of a world wide phenomenon. We are seeing the power of nation states squeezed by the forces of globalisation from above, and in Europe by the onward march of the EU; and now we will see Parliament squeezed from below, with the creation of other parliaments within the UK. Parliament will have to get used to sharing power with these rival institutions above and below, and will have to adapt to survive: Westminster may become more of a gearbox than a powerful engine. Taken together this decentralised, more pluralist, more legally controlled system will amount to a new constitutional order. I wish I could find a good label to describe it: quasi-federalism is the best I can come up with, but it doesn’t exactly have a popular ring. There is a small Constitution Unit prize for anyone who comes up with a better title.

**Devolution in Scotland**

Let us now look at some of the main changes, starting with devolution. In Scotland the Scottish Parliament is strongly based, with a clear referendum result which owes much to the work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention - a remarkable body which was part political coalition, part a movement in civil society which worked long and hard developing its plans for the new parliament. It will have a high level of legislative devolution, but very little fiscal power. I don’t think the SP will use its tax-varying power - the economic gain of 3 per cent on the total budget will not be worth the political pain. So there will be major tensions over finance; and over Europe, because the legislative powers devolved to Scotland - in fields like economic development, agriculture, fisheries, the environment - are all in areas where the main legislative competence now resides in Brussels, not Westminster. That is why Westminster needs to be like a gearbox, with plenty of synchromesh, to incorporate Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish views when advancing the British case in Brussels.

Politically, we will see the Scottish Labour Party distancing itself from the national Labour Party in order to compete electorally in Scotland. The same has already happened with the Conservatives. The SNP will continue to ride high: the SP gives it a much more effective than Westminster, where with only six out of 659 MPs its voice is drowned amongst the much larger noise. The SNP is quite likely to form an administration in the SP sooner or later, but the State can survive that: just as the Spanish state has survived with nationalist parties in power in Catalonia and the Basque country, and the Canadians with the Parti Quebecois. Differential patterns of voting between regional and national elections are common there and will happen here. Whether it will go further here and we will find ourselves, as Tam Dalyell has warned, on a motorway with no exit depends on the lead given by the politicians. For
devolution to work will require a spirit of trust and generosity on both sides, in Edinburgh and in London. If that breaks down, what are the factors which might drive the Scots towards independence? Scotland no longer needs the Union for access to markets, which are now guaranteed in Europe by the EU, and globally by the World Trade Organisation; nor for defence, guaranteed by NATO. But Scotland may find it worth remaining for financial reasons, because of the much higher levels of public expenditure Scotland currently enjoys - the Treasury’s latest figures put levels of government spending in Scotland 24 to 32 per cent higher than in England, on comparable programmes. And Scotland may choose to remain because of the other ties - the long history of movement between the two countries and of intermarriage, and the close links in civil society which bind us together. I shall say more about those at the end. If Scotland did decide to seek independence, that is not something which can be achieved unilaterally. It is not within the power of the SP to amend the Scotland Act - that is reserved to Westminster, which is the guardian of Scotland’s new constitution. But more generally as the Canadian Supreme Court recognised in their landmark judgement this year on the question of Quebec’s right to secede, it is a matter not simply for Quebec, or in our case for Scotland - it would require a negotiation with the rest of the Union. If that negotiation ever took place many of the fundamentals in terms of people’s everyday lives would remain unchanged - the Scots would continue to live and vote here, we would be able to live, work and vote in Scotland, the two countries would remain close neighbours, closely intertwined.

Devolution in Wales
In Wales the story is very different. The referendum passed by a whisker - 50.3 per cent. The turnout was only 50.6 per cent, so only one in four of Welsh voters approved the government’s proposals. The Neill Committee recently criticised the conduct of the referendum, saying “”. Neill was right to criticise the one-sidedness of the referendum campaign; but I would make a much wider point. The real criticism is that in Wales the referendum was rushed, and the people of Wales were bounced into a decision for which they weren’t ready. Wales never had anything like the Scottish Constitutional Convention, to prepare the ground and to lead a public debate about the plans for a Welsh Assembly. There was no proper debate because the Wales Labour Party didn’t want to expose the divisions within its own ranks. The Labour Party in Wales has always been split over devolution, going back to the 1979 referendum when the Gang of Six Labour MPs (including Neil Kinnock) campaigned against. And it is because of Labour’s ambivalence that the proposals in Wales are so half hearted, with the peculiar compromise that the Welsh Assembly will have powers of secondary legislation only. This was the most that Ron Davies could extract from his anti-devolution colleagues on the executive of the Wales Labour Party. For him it was a start. He has often said that Devolution is a process and not an event. If it works, and if it helps to generate a stronger national identity and greater self confidence in Wales, then in time the Welsh Assembly will want to catch up with the parliaments in Scotland and Northern Ireland - bodies which are to have real legislative power.

Devolution in Northern Ireland
I turn next to Northern Ireland. To understand the politics you need to understand the psychology, which is that there is not one but two beleaguered minorities - the nationalists feel an oppressed minority within Northern Ireland, and the Unionists fear
they would be oppressed within a united Ireland. They also risk in demographic
terms becoming the minority community within Northern Ireland because of
differences in the birth rate. That realisation is what has driven the more far sighted
Unionists to the negotiating table. The Good Friday Agreement which is the result
will introduce compulsory coalition government, in which the Executive must reflect
the balance between the two communities in the assembly, and must be led by a First
and Deputy First Minister who are linked like Siamese twins. There are elaborate
protections in the voting rules for the Assembly to ensure that neither community
tramples on the rights of the other, through the requirement of parallel consent on all
important issues, or in its absence qualified majorities. There is also to be a separate
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, which will pay special attention to the need

Underpinning all this there will be an array of interlocking machinery, knitted
together in the three Strands of the Belfast Agreement. Strand One is the careful
balance between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Strand Two is the
machinery which links Northern Ireland to the South, through the North-South
Ministerial Council. Strand Three runs across the other way, linking the British and
Irish governments through the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. And spun
around the whole, in a slightly gossamer thread at this stage, is the Council of the
Isles - a body which brings together the sovereign governments of the Republic of
Ireland and the UK, the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, and for good measures the Crown dependencies of the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man. It was hailed by some as the keystone in the devolution architecture, the
missing piece which would tie all the other pieces together, but that is a
misconception. For the British-Irish Council, to give it its proper title, can only
discuss issues with an Irish dimension. It cannot discuss issues such as the
distribution of spending to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or their
representation in UK delegations to Brussels, because these are issues internal to the
UK.

Those issues will be dealt with by yet another intergovernmental forum, announced in
a typically low key British way one evening in the House of Lords, when during the
Committee stage of the Scotland Bill the junior government Whip announced a new
Joint Ministerial Committee on Devolution as a forum in which the British
government will meet with the devolved governments. The government sees it as
having a purely fire fighting role, but I believe it will quickly become a permanent
fixture, with summit meetings of the Prime Minister and the respective First
Ministers, and regular meetings of Education Ministers, Health Ministers etc - much
like the standing machinery to handle intergovernmental relations in federal systems,
or the network of committees we are familiar with in the Council of Ministers in
Brussels.

Regional government in England
What about England? The idea of devolution for England is often dismissed because
there is not the same level of demand, or the same history of administration as
separate units. But the English regions are waking up: and they will awake more
sharply when devolution goes live next year, and they see what is happening in
Scotland and Wales. This is a rolling programme of devolution, but with two very

5
different approaches on the part of the new government, deriving from separate strands developed in Labour’s policy when in opposition, which appeared in separate chapters in Labour’s manifesto. On the one hand there was a policy of devolution on demand, developed by Jack Straw, with regional chambers which are voluntary groupings of local authorities, indirectly elected, moving on to become directly elected Regional Assemblies in those regions which want, following a regional referendum. On the other there was a policy of economic development, developed by John Prescott, with the English regions perceived as lagging behind not because of any democratic deficit, but because they lacked powerful development agencies of the kind Scotland and Wales have had for the last 20 years. With John Prescott in the lead in government, as Secretary of State for the Regions, the economic approach is in the ascendant: so they have created nine new RDAs for England, but as national quangos appointed by Ministers and accountable through Ministers to Parliament. There is a nod to Regional Chambers, but as non-statutory bodies, and the accountability of RDAs to them will be secondary, giving an account to them as one of a number of regional stakeholders, but not being called to account.

Will it rest there? At this stage it is hard to say, but I think it is unlikely. The RDAs may prove to be a disappointment, because they have neither the budgets nor the powers of Scottish Enterprise or the WDA. And at that point the regions may demand more. Already the Campaign for a Northern Assembly has hoisted its flag in the North East, and last year the Regional Planning Forum to the south changed its name to the Yorkshire and Humberside Assembly. These regional groupings, found with different names in all the English regions, have joined together in the English Regional Associations [quote] to keep interest in regional government alive.

But they face some high hurdles if the Labour government adheres to its other policy of Regional Assemblies developing only after a regional referendum. For that policy also demands a ‘predominantly unitary structure of local government’, so that regional government should not be yet another tier - but that amounts to the counties committing suicide, something they are unlikely to do voluntarily. It also requires no overall increase in public expenditure, which we should know from previous reorganisations of local government is wishful thinking. But the greatest threat of all to regional government is a late entry on the inside track of directly elected Mayors.

**Quasi-federal Britain**

Before leaving devolution, what can we say about the devolution settlement as a whole? How will it reshape the State? It will introduce what I can best describe as a form of quasi-federalism. Its federal characteristics include a formal division of legislative power, of the kind found in federal constitutions; entrenchment, but by the political means of a referendum; the creation of a new constitutional court in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is the body chosen to adjudicate in devolution disputes; formal machinery to handle intergovernmental relations, of the
kind I have described; and **dual national identity** - the new devolved assemblies will sharpen people’s sense of dual identity, with people seeing themselves as being Scottish, Welsh, Irish and English as well as being British.

On the other hand there will be big differences from classic federal systems, which mustn’t be ignored. There will be no constitutional entrenchment of the kind found in federal systems, where the constitution defines and protects the powers of the states. In the UK Westminster can unilaterally rewrite the constitution of the devolved nations: as it did when it abolished the Stormont Parliament in 1972. Secondly, devolution will be asymmetrical, unlike the uniform division of powers normally found in a federation. Third there is the problem of English dominance, with 85 per cent of the population: in most federations no state represents more than one third of the whole. Fourth, there is the lack of English political institutions: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are to have their assemblies, but there will be no parliament for England. Fifth, there is to be tight financial control by the centre: in no federation does central government retain such tight control as it will in the UK, where two out of the three devolved governments will be wholly dependent financially on central government grants.

There is also the fluidity of the devolution settlement. It will continue to evolve, and may never reach a steady state. We shouldn’t necessarily be dismayed at that. It is in the nature of territorial politics that the balance of power between the centre and the regions is continually renegotiated - even in federations. We have just witnessed a dramatic renegotiation, which will take time to settle down; but it will never settle down completely. France and Spain introduced a regional tier of government 20 years ago which has still not settled down. The tensions and accommodations between Quebec and the rest of Canada will continue to trouble every generation. That gives part of the answer to those who preach a fully federal solution for this country. It wouldn’t work because as I explained in the CIPFA lecture last year we are a union, not a unitary state, whose component nations joined at different times and on different terms. We need to recognise and allow for that difference, that underlying asymmetry, and to put in place machinery at the centre which can cope with the new tensions which will arise now the devolution genie is out of the bottle.

**Rebalancing required at the centre**
Generally there needs to be far more adjustment and rebalancing at the centre than is currently appreciated. In the remainder of this lecture I want to look at the changes required at the centre for the new constitutional settlement to function properly. I will look at them under the headings of the three main branches of government: the changes required in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

**Pressures on the courts**
Let me start with the judges and the courts. The courts will play a central part in shaping the new constitutional settlement; and will themselves come under much greater public scrutiny. They will be called upon to adjudicate in high profile political cases, whether devolution disputes or clashes of controversial human rights; and they will experience a significant increase in their workload, from ECHR incorporation and from devolution. Will the courts be able to take the strain?
The strain will be particularly great on the higher courts. Judicial review, which has been a major growth industry, will see another surge of activity; leading to an increase in the number of Queen’s Bench judges who specialise in the ‘new administrative law’. And in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords the lack of back-up for the judges will become more sharply exposed: they may decide to follow the example of other Supreme Courts and institute a system of law clerks or assistants to provide them with research support.

Inside Government more thought has been given to the impact of ECHR than of devolution. In terms of the workload on the courts that is probably right; but devolution will impose a different set of strains. It will require a strong legal system, and a system which commands confidence and respect on all sides, to hold the Union together when the politics comes under strain. In this respect the choice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final arbiter of devolution disputes looks rather odd. It is not the final court of appeal in the UK legal system, but stands largely outside it; and its constitutional jurisdiction in the rest of the Commonwealth has declined almost to zero. It may prove to be a temporary arrangement which will be re-opened when wider reform of the House of Lords opens up the question of whether we now need a supreme court which stands clearly at the apex of the legal system and outside the legislature.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council risks creating a dual apex for the legal system in devolution cases (although the House of Lords has discretion not to refer devolution issues across to the Privy Council). But it does offer flexibility in providing a larger pool of judges which can be increased more easily than the House of Lords to include some with connections with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (although it may be difficult to identify ‘Welsh’ judges, since there is no separate judiciary in Wales).¹

Finally, ECHR incorporation and devolution may revive interest in the idea of a Judicial Appointments Commission, to make appointments to the judiciary more transparent and less the exclusive preserve of the Lord Chancellor. Hitherto calls for such a commission have been linked to the need for the judiciary to include more women and ethnic minority judges and a broader spread of social and political opinion. Those pressures will increase with ECHR incorporation; but devolution may introduce the idea of territorial balance, and we may see pressure from the devolved governments to put forward their own candidates for senior judicial appointments.²

My main concern about the higher courts is whether they will be able to handle the volume and the weight of cases which is likely to come their way. We are fortunate in having a senior judiciary of very high calibre, but we expect an awful lot of them. In the House of Lords they have no research support at all. In the Court of Appeal they have recently introduced on an experimental basis a dozen judicial assistants. The Unit is about to do an evaluation of the new scheme in the Court of Appeal, and a comparative study of the use of judicial clerks, amicus curiae and other forms of support to the higher courts in Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States, to see what lessons we can learn about the kinds of research support which

¹ Other problems may arise if it is felt that Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish judges should sit in every devolution case because the decision might have implications for the rest of the UK. This could reduce the number of English judges to one or two, which might be politically unacceptable. One way out would be to increase the size of the court to seven.

² There is an interesting balance in the Scotland Act (s 89) over the appointment of Scottish judges. The UK Prime Minister will continue to advise the Queen on the appointment of the two senior Scottish judges (Lord President of the Court of Session and Lord Justice Clerk); the Scottish First Minister will advise on all other judicial appointments in Scotland.
might be needed here, and how judges can best tap into it and make use of it. We are also planning a wider study of the higher courts, related again to devolution and the ECHR, but also to the second stage of Lords reform, to explore whether the time has not come to have a free standing Constitutional or Supreme Court.

Rebalancing at Westminster

Mention of Lords reform brings me to the next branch of government which will need rebalancing at the centre, and that is Westminster. At Westminster both Houses of Parliament will need to rethink their structures and their procedures as Westminster adjusts to becoming a quasi-federal Parliament post-devolution. In the House of Commons there will be a small reduction in the size of the House, when the number of Scottish MPs is reduced at the next boundary review to bring their numbers down to the same electoral quota as England - a reduction from 72 Scottish MPs to 57. Wales is similarly over-represented, but for reasons which have not been explained the government proposes no reduction in Wales’ 40 MPs. I hope that fairness will prevail here too, and that Welsh representation will also come down to the English quota, which would give her 33 MPs. There will also be a reduction in the number of Ministers. The Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices currently have 14 Ministers between them. All except the Secretaries of State are likely to go, representing a small but significant loss in prime ministerial patronage: the Government payroll will shrink from 96 Ministers and Whips to around 85.

Second, there will need to be a new set of rules defining those devolved matters on which debate will no longer be allowed at Westminster. Here the best precedent is to be found in the history of the Stormont Parliament, and the Speaker’s ruling in 1923 that matters devolved to the new Government in Northern Ireland could no longer be raised at Westminster. It did not prove wholly watertight, and any new ruling will be challenged and tested far more vigorously than was the Stormont one - not least because in place of the dozen Northern Irish MPs at Westminster in the Stormont era there will be over 100 Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland MPs post-devolution, who will lose much of their constituency business to the new devolved assemblies and will all be in search of a new role.

More important is the reverse question, of whether there will need to be new rules governing the debate of English issues. This is one aspect of the West Lothian question, which is at bottom a question about fairness: whether it is fair for Scottish and Welsh MPs to intervene in English debates. One possible way forward would be the development of a self-denying ordinance whereby they did not seek to do so. Another which would be less drastic than a separate English Parliament would be an English Grand Committee. This would avoid the need for a separate body with its own powers, staff etc; it could be set up under existing Standing Orders, and make use of existing Westminster facilities and resources. However, an English Grand Committee might demand more effective powers than have hitherto been ceded to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Grand Committees.

Alternatively the English question might be addressed instead through changes to the other committees. Committees such as the Health and Education Select Committees
are already almost de facto English committees, since in Scotland and Wales these matters fall within the remit of the Scottish and Welsh Office. With minor modifications this arrangement could be formalised, with ‘English’ Standing Committees and Select Committees to deal with exclusively English matters. This, perhaps coupled with more specific ‘English’ ministries, with their own question times, might make the omnibus scrutiny provided by an English Grand Committee superfluous.

Finally it is worth noticing a side-effect of the devolution scheme in Wales, which if it is to work will have a significant impact on the drafting of statute law at Westminster. This is because the Welsh Assembly will have powers of secondary legislation only: its powers will therefore depend on the amount of discretion offered by the laws passed at Westminster. The Assembly is likely to demand greater room for manoeuvre within a broader statutory framework. The extremely detailed, complex statutes in which the parliamentary draftsman seeks to cover every eventuality will no longer meet the case. The pressure from the Assembly will add to the voice of those who have called for clarity, simplicity and brevity in drafting, with statutes laying down general principles in the European manner, rather than dealing with problems in detail.

Reform of the House of Lords
As important will be the changes in the House of Lords. Since time is limited I will talk only about stage two. The Unit has advocated a step by step approach to Lords reform, and an inquiry of a more high powered kind for stage two than can be achieved by a parliamentary committee, which was the proposal in the government’s manifesto. So I was delighted when Baroness Jay announced last month that there was to be a Royal Commission for stage two; and particularly pleased with the terms in which it was announced, which could have come word for word from our own Briefing. The breakthrough is that for the first time the government has started to make connections between different parts of the constitutional reform programme. What Margaret Jay said was that she wanted the Royal Commission to think about the role of the House of Lords against the background of the other changes - devolution, the growing influence of the EU, the incorporation of the ECHR, and possible changes to the electoral system for the House of Commons. This has to be the right approach: it moves the debate on from narrow arguments about composition, and it recognises that the whole of our constitutional architecture is changing, and the role of the Lords is likely to change with it.

The Unit hopes to contribute to that debate, through a major study we are conducting of the role, functions, powers and composition of second chambers in seven other countries - Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain. For me the most interesting question is how the second chamber integrates with the other parts of the political system. In a quasi-federal Britain one role for the Lords would be to represent the nations and regions, as second chambers in federal systems represent the states and provinces. This could help counteract the centrifugal political forces released by devolution, and give the devolved governments and assemblies a stake in the institutions of the centre. How strong a stake would depend upon how they were represented. It does not follow that to be ‘democratic and representative’ (to quote the Labour manifesto) a second chamber has to be directly elected: something the
government understands but many knee jerk reformers do not. Of the second chambers in our comparative study only two out of the seven are directly elected. Interestingly direct election would do little to help bind together the devolved governments and assemblies into the Union, because it would be the people of Scotland, Wales etc who would be represented rather than their institutions. (It has been said of the Australian Senate - which is directly elected - that it does nothing for the federation).

Indirect election would give the devolved governments or assemblies a direct stake. It is then a nice question whether it should be the devolved governments which are represented, as in the German Bundesrat, or the assemblies, as in the second chamber in India. The Bundesrat plays a highly functional and integrating role in the conduct of intergovernmental relations in Germany, but leaves the state parliaments rather marginalised. Finally there is the possibility of appointment, as in the Canadian Senate. It produces a body of doubtful legitimacy - the Senate suffers from the same patronage difficulties as our own House of Lords: but still on the links with devolution, it could prove a useful option so long as there are no regional assemblies in England. Representatives of the English regions could be appointed, while representatives of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were indirectly elected.

Other roles have also been posited for the House of Lords; that it should integrate upwards as well as downwards, and strengthen links with the EU; or that it should be a human rights watchdog and guardian of the constitution. Not all these roles are necessarily compatible; different expertise would be required, and there is a risk of the House of Lords becoming overloaded with different wish lists. But there is also a risk of undershooting on Lords reform: it creates a unique opportunity to underpin other parts of the constitutional settlement, and would be a major opportunity missed if reform simply stopped at removal of the hereditary peers. That is the necessary first step; but I hope it does not turn out to be the last.

THE HOLE IN THE CENTRE: WHITEHALL

Lastly I turn to Whitehall. I will mention first some of the likely consequences of the reforms introduced so far, and then how Whitehall needs to adapt to follow the programme through. Devolution represents the largest, the most significant and the least certain of the changes to the machinery of government. It is one thing for Whitehall to relate to the Scottish and Welsh Office as parts of the same administration, and quite another for it to conduct business with devolved legislatures and governments. It is difficult to predict the many changes this will bring in train, but they are likely to include the following:

**End of the Territorial Secretaries of State**

Although their present transitional roles are indispensable, it is difficult to see that the posts of the present Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Secretaries can remain individually viable when devolution is up and running. The Scottish Secretary is likely to be the first to go. The Northern Ireland Secretary may remain so long as the security situation and North-South relations warrant it; and the Welsh Secretary may remain so long as the Assembly requires a godfather figure to promote primary legislation for Wales at Westminster. But these must be transitional arrangements; if either situation endures devolution will have failed.
That is the logic of devolution; but the politics may dictate otherwise. The Secretaries of State may remain in being for symbolic reasons, or political balance, or patronage for some time after there has ceased to be a real job to do; and the titles may remain long after that, rather like the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (who still has vestigial responsibilities in Lancashire). But over time the individual Secretaries of State are likely to be replaced in Whitehall with a single minister responsible for the generality of territorial affairs i.e. continuing rather than residual business. This minister’s principal role will be to manage intergovernmental relations, the annual block grant negotiations etc. The minister is likely to be a senior member of the Government. He or she could have a small central department, but could equally well be based within a reformed Cabinet Office. That is where the Canadian Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs is located, within the Privy Council Office which services the Canadian Prime Minister and Cabinet.

End of the Unified Civil Service

The Government proposes that there will continue to be a unified Civil Service. The guidance issued to civil servants in Wales says:

‘Constitutionally, the position of the Civil Service will be unchanged by devolution. While the ultimate loyalty of civil servants will remain to the Crown, in practice, the loyalty of individual civil servants will be to whichever administration they are serving. Individual civil servants will continue to take their instructions from the Assembly as a whole, or from its Committees or Assembly Secretaries, to the extent that the Assembly has delegated power to them.’

This is obviously intended to be reassuring, and there is an understandable wish to preserve a common basis of employment and professional behaviour. But this is unlikely to be proof against the new loyalties and alternative (and sometimes opposing) centres of power that are to be established. Even where the controlling political parties are the same in Westminster and a devolved assembly, it cannot be assumed that there will be any automatic unity of purpose e.g. if there is a ‘New Labour’ government in Westminster but ‘Old Labour’ regimes in Edinburgh or Cardiff.

There will be pressure from the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly to have their own civil service, like the Northern Ireland Civil Service. This may arise because of some triggering event or scandal; or simply because of a wish to control the recruitment and career development of their own officials. It cannot long be acceptable in Edinburgh and Cardiff for the professional head of their civil service to be the Cabinet Secretary in London. For how long will their political leaders be willing to consult him about the promotions and postings of their senior officials?

Pre-legislative scrutiny: ‘human rights proofing’

Over the last decade, pre-legislative scrutiny of bills within Whitehall has become more systematic and has focused particularly on confirming compliance with the ECHR: a process known as ‘Strasbourg proofing’. By its nature it involves making difficult legal judgments, and the decision on whether to press ahead with legislation will be based only in part on the legal assessment. But in future the legal assessment will loom much larger: see the account of the impact in Canada in Figure 8.1 below.

Figure 8.1. Administrative impact of the Canadian Bill of Rights

Canada introduced a Bill of Rights in 1982, entitled the Canadian Charter of Rights and

---

Freedoms. A great effort was made by the federal Department of Justice to review existing legislation and bring it into line with the Charter. Between 1982 and 1985 an omnibus Bill was introduced each year designed to make pre-1982 legislation Charter-proof. On new legislation, the Attorney General must report to Parliament before the Second Reading of any Bill on its compliance with the Charter.

The Charter has had a far-reaching impact on the way policy is made and legislation is prepared. A few expensive landmark cases had a seismic effect on the Government. Many interest groups now frame economic and social policy claims against the Government in terms of Charter rights and freedoms. This has forced Canadian lawmakers and administrators routinely to consider Charter implications when drafting legislation and regulations. It has led one commentator to conclude:

‘Self-regulation has probably been a more important source of rights protection in the long run in Canada than judicial outcomes, although the latter clearly reinforces the inclination to engage in the former’.5

The Canadian Supreme Court has applied a large and liberal interpretation to the Charter. As a result of adverse judgements the Canadian Government and its provincial counterparts began to require that policy proposals were scrutinised with the Charter in mind at much earlier stages of the policy process, and not when the department’s memorandum was being prepared for submission to Cabinet. A survey of senior officials concluded that these new ways of policy making inevitably make a difference to the outcomes:

‘Many governments have instituted new procedures or bureaucratic structures designed explicitly to ensure that the Charter is taken into account at the earliest stage of the policy process ... The senior officials participating in this study believe that ‘Charter values’ have now been deeply and permanently integrated into the attitudes of government decision makers across the country’.6

They also argue that the Charter has altered the balance of power within Government, increasing the status and the role of Attorneys General and their legal advisers as they were involved at an early stage in the policy-making process:

‘In many governments the Attorney General has been constituted as a new central agency with a range of power and influence rivalling only that of the Finance Department’.7

In the UK much will depend on how seriously Ministers take their new obligations under the Human Rights Act; and on early decisions of the courts, which may help to concentrate minds in Whitehall. If the Canadian experience is replayed here there will be a need to tighten up the procedural side of the policy making process, and to make human rights assessment long before Cabinet consideration of legislative proposals. The Cabinet Office is to issue a new circular on Policy Appraisal for Human Rights, and the kind of mental discipline this will impose on administrators is illustrated in the extract from the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual at Figure 8.2. Suggestions have been made that Parliamentary Counsel could be asked to certify that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure compliance. This has few attractions. If certification is desired, responsibility might more appropriately fall to the Attorney-General. That would represent a major change in his role, and also his status: the

---

4 Cases such as Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177, R v Askov [1990] 2 SCR 1199, and R v Schachter [1992] 2 SCR 679 are said to have cost the government unbudgeted outlays of hundreds of millions of dollars.


7 Ibid p508

Attorney is not normally a member of the Cabinet. It would also centralise a process which properly belongs in departments. What the Canadian experience shows is that the process of checking for compliance with human rights should not start when the legislation is being drafted but should be an integral part of the earlier stages of determining policy aims and objectives. Moreover, any central scrutiny for compliance should not absolve Government departments of their primary responsibility, and their need to develop internal expertise and understanding. This will require greater involvement of legally qualified staff in the policy process itself as opposed to retrospectively; with concomitant effects on the organisation of Government legal services, and the professional formation of administrative civil servants. The policy process itself will have to be a more rule based exercise (see Figure 8.2). This will make it both more deliberate and more protracted. Officials, where they are not legally trained, will need to acquire a deeper knowledge of legal requirements and procedure. The gap that has in this respect existed between Continental and UK civil services will narrow.

The first thing which strikes the outside observer is the fragmentation of responsibility for the different items in the constitutional reform programme. The lead is currently divided between eight Whitehall departments: the Home Office, Scottish Office, Welsh Office, Northern Ireland Office, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Foreign Office, Lord Chancellor’s Department and the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office provides the Constitution Secretariat which services the main Cabinet Committee on the constitutional reform programme (CRP), and all its sub-committees: on Devolution, the ECHR, freedom of information and Lords reform. The secretariat performs the classic Cabinet Office role of circulating the papers submitted by departments and briefing the chairman (CRP is chaired by the Prime Minister, and the sub-committees are all chaired by the Lord Chancellor). It does not lead on any of the policy save on Lords reform, where the lead minister has no department to support her.

In time the need will develop for a stronger focus for the programme as a whole, and for a central unit which is responsible for the constitution in a more strategic and proactive way than the Cabinet Secretariat is normally allowed to be. The Constitution Secretariat needs to go on servicing the CRP network of committees, but it also needs to develop a capability to look ahead and to conduct or commission research in a manner similar to the specialist units in other parts of the Cabinet Office, like the Citizen’s Charter Unit, the Social Exclusion Unit or the new Innovation and Performance Unit. This would fit in with Sir Richard Wilson’s wish that the Cabinet Office should develop greater strategic capacity to identify future opportunities and threats, as part of its new corporate headquarters role. But the Constitution Secretariat cannot do this without ministerial cover: there needs to be a strong central minister with a similar strategic role, who can lead the constitutional reform programme and give it coherence.

Another function which will fall to the Cabinet Office to lead on is the conduct of intergovernmental relations with the new devolved governments. Here we will need quasi-federal structures: the organisation of bodies like the Council of Australian Governments and the Canadian Department of Intergovernmental Affairs show how the machinery is likely to grow. The Whitehall structures needed to manage IGR with the devolved governments might be based initially around the rump offices of the three territorial Secretaries of State, but in time they must fall back into the Cabinet Office,
where they will be managed by the Constitution Secretariat, just as the European Secretariat manages and coordinates all relations with the EU. The Constitution Secretariat has already been tasked with providing the British secretary for the proposed Council of the Isles, which suggests where the IGR support function will come from. And to lead it the Cabinet Office will need more ministers, and more senior ministers, than are normally assigned to it; intergovernmental relations is not something to be managed by someone towards the bottom of the Cabinet rank order.

A strong ministerial lead is necessary not only in Whitehall but outside, to explain the constitutional reform programme to the wider public. These are fundamental changes in our system of government which are being introduced with a minimum of explanation. For electoral reasons Labour was largely silent about their constitutional reform plans during the election campaign except in Scotland and Wales. In their first session of the new Parliament they have introduced 11 constitutional bills, listed on my first slide, with more to follow. Yet in the first year of the new Government the silence has continued, apart from the referendum campaigns in Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland and London. The English could be forgiven for thinking that devolution is some special deal for the Scots, the Welsh, and the Northern Irish, because no one has troubled to tell them otherwise. This matters because for devolution to work it requires goodwill on both sides.

It will also require a shared sense of national identity and of citizenship. This is not within the control of Government in quite the same way as other levers of power; but it is a matter on which the Government needs to give a lead, in its actions and its words, to bind the Union together in order to counter-balance the centrifugal political forces of devolution. The Government needs to understand and allow political space to those forces, and the regional and national loyalties which underpin them; but it also needs to understand and articulate clearly a sense of the wider loyalties which bind us together at the level of the nation state, and to foster a sense of loyalty to the Union. This is not an easy task, because of the confused national identities which people have as a result of the UK being a multi-nation state (particularly the English). It will require an acceptance of multiple identities, and indeed a celebration of them, as the Government has shown itself ready to accept in Northern Ireland (in the preamble to the Belfast Agreement the Government ‘recognize the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both ...’). And it will require a clear statement of the common core of rights and responsibilities shared by all UK citizens. This goes much wider than formal statements of rights and responsibilities, such as the ECHR, because national identity needs to convey a sense of the mutual obligations which go with being members of the same national family: mutual obligations between communities as well as between individuals, including a willingness to cross-subsidize between one region and another. Here too the Belfast Agreement captures some of the common core of civic values and mutual obligations which must bind together the peoples of the UK when it speaks of the principle of ‘parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of [all] communities’, and of the need for the Government to exercise ‘rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions’. Not in themselves resounding words; there is a project here for the Government's speech writers and the team who worked on 'rebranding Britain' to capture in more ringing language the values and the mutual obligations which bind us together, wherever we come from—English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Asians, West Indians—the common values we hold in being British, and the values which make the UK a state which is still worth belonging to.
These things matter because these are very big changes in our system of government which have been introduced with the minimum of explanation. The Government is silent because constitutional issues are not the top priorities in middle England, among voters generally, or even among Labour supporters. Voters’ priorities are the bread and butter issues of the economy, jobs, the health service, as they have always been. But the delivery of those services will be hugely affected by the constitutional changes being set in train.

The public need to be prepared for those changes, not all of which will necessarily be welcome. The bland theme of modernisation is not a sufficient explanation. There needs to be a strong and coherent story about the benefits of bringing Government closer to the people, and linking constitutional reforms to the delivery of the public services which people value.

To be strong the story needs to be consistent; but the Government’s programme at present is shot through with inconsistency and hesitations. Despite the devolution programme much of the Government’s language is centralising in tone, and in major parts of the constitutional reform programme it is still ambivalent. We may have passed the high water mark in the huge burst of legislative energy in the first session, and from now on we may see retreat and retrenchment: the Government wants a Human Rights Act but no Human Rights Commission - at any rate not yet; devolved assemblies which cannot be trusted with tax raising powers; and it may come to prefer an appointed House of Lords which will not present a threat to the House of Commons. In a number of areas the reforms risk being broken backed for lack of commitment or resources. But this lecture has also tried to bring out how many of the constitutional changes will release powerful dynamic forces which will be beyond the Government’s control. Where devolution takes us will depend now on the new political leaders in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in time the regions of England. To come to terms with the new political culture the centre will have to relax and be willing to let go. It will have to treat the devolved governments as equal partners, not subordinates. The centre needs to understand and respect the political forces which have been unleashed, and to channel and direct them by working with the flow. Constitutions alone cannot bind nations together: but constitutions embody values, and to work they need politicians who accept those values and can give force and expression to them.