UCL Philosophy Department archive of Johnny Watling's published and unpublished writings.
Suggests an amended version of Ayer's "verification principle". First published in Analysis 11, No.2 (1951), pp.87-9.
Argues that causes are neither events nor facts; in fact causes are "not individuals of any type". First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973-4), pp.57-74.
Criticism of Ayer's account of the meaning of statements about other minds. First published in Theoria 20 (1954), pp.1-3.
Critical discussion of Ayer's book, The Problem of Knowledge. First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37, no.3 (1956), pp.340-6.
Discusses and raises objections to Mellor's "dispositional" account of probability. First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society SV xxxii (1958), pp.143-56.
Uses the inconsistency of the principle of induction to argue that there is no logical relation of confirmation, merely a scientific relation of "evidential support". First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 44, No. 64 (1963), pp.1-16.
Argues that an eliminative analysis of counterfactual statements is neither possible nor desirable. First published in Mind 66, No. 242 (1952), pp.222-33.
Exposes some logical flaws in Descartes' attempt to achieve certainty. First published in Philosophers Ancient and Modern. (Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture series; 20), ed. G.N.A. Vesey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.57-72.
Proposes a resolution to a difficulty with transitive entailment proposed by Lewy. First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society SV xxxii (1958), pp.143-56.
Discusses and criticizes an argument of Stuart Hampshire's against determinism. First published in Essays on Freedom of Action, ed. Ted Honderich. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp.15-29.
Claims that two common objections to phenomenalism are "inadequate to their task". First published in Synthese 8, Issue 4, Nos. 8 & 9 (1952), pp.355-66.
Responds to the attempt to establish either phenomenalism or scepticism using Humean worries about induction and the Verification Principle. First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 29 (1955), pp.83-108.
Proposes an explanation of how Kant reconciled his idealism with the necessity of geometrical truth. First published in Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures V (1970-1): Reason and Reality, ed. G.N.A. Vesey. London: MacMillan, 1972. pp.131-44.
Claims that phenomenalism does not satisfactorily accommodate illusory perceptions. First published in Inquiry 6 (1963), pp.196-9.
Proposes a counterfactual analysis of singular causation. First published in Analysis 13, No.2 (1953), pp.31-7.
The causal theory of perception cannot be stated either in a sense-datum language or any other kind of language. First published in Mind 59, No. 236 (1950), pp.539-40.
Responds to an argument that it is impossible to verify a counterfactual conditional. First published in Analysis 17, No. 4 (1957), pp.73-80.
Argues that it is not contradictory to suppose that an infinite sequence of events could be performed. First published in Analysis 13, No. 2 (1952), pp.39-46.
Book Reviews & Critical Notices
First published in Mind 65, No. 258 (1956), pp.267-73.
- Urmson, J. O. 1956. Philosophical Analysis: its Development between the two World Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press - PDF
First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37, No. 3 (1956), pp.340-6.
- R. Borger and F. Cioffi (Eds.) 1970. Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences: Confrontations London: Cambridge University Press - PDF
First published in Inquiry 16, (1973), pp.101-11.
- G. N. Cantor and M. J. S. Hodge (Eds.) 1981. Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories 1740-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press - PDF
First published in Mind 92 (1983), pp.467-470.
First published in Mind 88 (1979), pp.617-21.