At the end of the Spring term in 1866, the Rev. John Hoppus, who had served as Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy at University College London since 1829, submitted his resignation. Few of his colleagues or students regretted the professor’s decision. Deadly dull, if knowledgeable and diligent, Hoppus “almost killed the study of philosophy in the College,” according to its historian.[1] Some senior members of the College’s governing Council especially welcomed the resignation. Quite apart from his dismal performance in the classroom, he was a clergyman, and his philosophical opinions were therefore suspect.

University College had been founded as a refuge for those barred by their religious beliefs from attending Oxford or Cambridge.[2] In 1866, as in 1826, the year of the college’s founding, the primary mission of both universities remained the training of clergy for the Church of England. Dissenters could matriculate at Cambridge without subscribing to the Thirty-nine Articles, but until 1856 only Anglicans could receive scholarships and degrees (at which time
Oxford’s doors were also opened to Dissenters). Non-Christians and non-trinitarians were still excluded, and college fellows and university professors were obliged to subscribe. These restrictions were abolished only in 1871.

Naturally the University of London established that there were to be no “religious tests or doctrinal forms, which would oppose a barrier to the education of any sect among his majesty’s subjects.”[3] The dissenting sects agreed to disagree: there was to be no teaching of theology and their spokesmen were persuaded to withdraw a declaration that “nothing contrary to revealed religion should be included in the instructions.”[4]

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The appointment of Hoppus’s successor raised important questions about the college’s mission. The controversy offers a revealing glimpse into the perspectives of upper middle-class secularists in mid-Victorian London, specifically, the aging Philosophic Radicals who had done so much to found the institution.[5] Ultimately, the College’s governing board had to decide the meaning of the phrase “religious neutrality.” Was it to be interpreted as a willingness to select the most qualified candidate irrespective of his religious beliefs? Or would a clergyman inevitably introduce unverifiable theological dogma into discussions of philosophic questions, thus compromising the pursuit of truth? Were “religious neutrality” and toleration synonymous, in short, or were they incompatible?

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Teaching appointments were made by the University’s Council, which generally followed the recommendation of the Senate, composed of all faculty and several unaffiliated scholars.[6]. The twenty-four-member Council was itself elected by a General Meeting of the Proprietors and constituted something like a Board of Trustees.[7]

On August 4, 1866, the Senate submitted to the Council its choice for Hoppus’s replacement, having spent a month assessing the applications. James Martineau was
recommended unanimously.[8] Martineau, then 61, was Professor of Mental, Moral, and Religious Philosophy at Manchester New College. Though his book-length publications at this time consisted only of a collection of sermons and a hymnal, he was regarded as the preeminent Unitarian divine, an authority on Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, and the leading English exponent of Idealism.[9]

Only nine members of the UCL Council were present at the August meeting. George Grote, the former Benthamite M.P. and historian of ancient Greece, and one of the College’s founders, moved a resolution before a vote on Martineau’s candidacy was taken. It barred ministers of any denomination from holding the Chair of Philosophy of Mind and Logic. The motion was defeated, 5 to 4. However, the next motion, to appoint Martineau, was itself defeated by the same margin. The Council adjourned until its next meeting in November.[10]

The position was again advertised, but no new candidates came forward. The Senate filed a second report with the Council, under the pretext that additional testimonials had been submitted by one of the candidates. This time the Senate recommended George Croom Robertson, concluding awkwardly, “But there yet remains upon the list the name of Mr. James Martineau. As the Senate has already recommended the appointment of Mr. Martineau, and the Council has declined to appoint him, the Senate does not think it necessary to present a second report concerning him.”[11] At its November 3 meeting, the Council again rejected Martineau. A month later, by a vote of 8 to 6, it appointed Croom Robertson, then twenty-four.[12] Robertson, a protege of Alexander Bain, had received an M.A. from Aberdeen University with “high honours.” A two-year fellowship enabled him to study in France and Germany. For the previous two years, he had taught Greek at his alma mater.[13]
At the December 8 meeting at which Robertson was elected, supporters of Martineau submitted a requisition convening a Special General Meeting of the Proprietors to consider the Council’s actions in bypassing Martineau. The Council rebuffed this move; it referred the requisition to lawyers of the Crown for an opinion as to its legality. By the time a report was issued, Robertson had been appointed. The Proprietors, meeting on February 2, 1867, confirmed the Council’s vote. At its annual General Meeting later in the year, supporters of the requisition (which included fourteen Fellows of the College and six other Proprietors) again moved an inquiry into the Council’s actions. Croom Robertson’s allies argued that passage of the resolution would be tantamount to a vote of censure and would result in the resignation of all Council members. The motion failed.[14]

One resignation did follow, that of Augustus De Morgan, the esteemed Professor of Mathematics. He was not acquainted with Martineau or his work, and acted solely on principle.

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I propose to look at the Martineau affair Rashomon-style, from the perspectives of various participants and interested bystanders. The assessments of Harriet and George Grote, John Stuart Mill, James Martineau, Augustus and Sophia De Morgan, and Charles Beard will be considered, along with appraisals of Martineau by Henry Sidgwick and W. S. Jevons. Apart from whatever it may reveal about the depths of Utilitarian hostility to religion, the controversy sheds some additional light on the erratic intellectual trajectory of Victorian England’s premier public moralist. The shifts that occurred in Mill’s relationships with Grote and Martineau are significant, and the dispute over Hoppus’s successor throws them into relief. It provides as well, I believe, a fresh take on Mill’s much-discussed intentions in *On Liberty.*
GEORGE AND HARRIET GROTE

George Grote, the principal opponent of Martineau, had been very active in establishing the University of London. He was a member of the first Council, which included a mix of prominent utilitarians, dissenters, and Whig aristocrats (and one Evangelical representative, Zachary Macaulay).[15] At the time of the Martineau controversy, Grote had been a trustee and benefactor of the college for the better part of four decades.

The George Grote we know is doubly mediated by the imagination of Harriet Lewin Grote. Mrs. Grote wrote the first (and, for nearly a century, the only) biography of her spouse, but she also did much to shape the life she chronicled. It was she who turned her banker husband into “The Historian”--the writer perpetually at work on what was to be a twelve-volume study of ancient Greece. She found him a publisher and did much to promote his literary career. She also stage-managed his entry into politics.[16] Harriet Grote, in addition, made the couple’s Threadneedle Street home the gathering place of the Philosophic Radicals and their subsequent Saville Row home one of the preeminent salons for advanced thinkers in the early Victorian years.

*The Personal Life of George Grote* elaborates two familiar Romantic turns before it settles into a pedestrian account of travels and letters: the revolt of the sensitive, intellectual son against the vulgar, worldly father, and the triumph of romantic love against the selfishness and
caprice of the same hard-hearted paterfamilias. The narrative nicely complements John Mill’s rendition of the same themes in his *Autobiography*.

Space does not permit a discussion of the filial conflict over vocation and love, but what is of some relevance is the fact that James Mill emerged as something of a surrogate father; George Grote became Mill’s most loyal disciple, John Mill claimed. After some initial reservations about the Scotsman’s “cynicism and asperity,” Grote fell under his spell. “Before many months,” writes Harriet Grote,

the ascendancy of James Mill’s powerful mind over his younger companion made itself apparent. George Grote began by admiring the wisdom, the acuteness, the depths of Mill’s intellectual character. Presently he found himself enthralled..., and after a year or two of intimate commerce there existed but little difference, in point of opinion, between master and pupil. Mr. Mill had the strongest conviction as to the superior advantages of democratic government over the monarchical or the aristocratic; and with these he mingled a scorn and hatred of the ruling classes which amounted to positive fanaticism. Coupled with this aversion to aristocratic influence..., Mr. Mill entertained a profound prejudice against the Established Church and...its ministers.[17]

Harriet Grote goes on to summarize shrewdly the appeal of the charismatic ideologue and his version of the religion of humanity:

Moreover, he possessed the faculty of kindling in his auditors the generous impulses towards the popular side... So attractive came to be the conceptions of duty towards mankind at large, as embodied in James Mill’s eloquent discourse, that the young disciples, becoming fired with patriotic ardour on the one hand and
with bitter antipathies on the other... prepared to wage battle when the day should come, in behalf of ‘the true faith,’ according to Mill’s ‘programme’ and preaching.[18]

When Grote eagerly adopted James Mill’s two great hatreds, the aristocracy and organized religion, Harriet Grote reluctantly acquiesced to the first, though she “had numerous friends and connections among the aristocratic portion of society.”[19] Grote’s antagonism to religion she managed to help divert into more useful and socially acceptable channels: the study of Greek history. Early in 1823 he wrote to his best friend George Edward Norman, “I am at present deeply engaged in the fabulous ages of Greece... I am quite amazed to discover the extraordinary greediness and facility with which men assert, believe, and re-assert, and are believed. The weakness appears to be next to universal...”[20]

Harriet Grote, elsewhere melodramatic, recounts her strategic intervention with the deceptive casualness that doubtless made it so effective. “Towards the autumn of the year 1823, Mrs. Grote, hearing the subject of Grecian History frequently discussed at their house in Threadneedle Street, and being well aware how attractive the study was in her husband’s eyes, thought it would be a fitting undertaking for him to write a new History of Greece himself; accordingly she propounded this view to George Grote: ‘You are always studying the ancient authors whenever you have a moment’s leisure; now here would be a fine subject for you to treat. Suppose you try your hand!’”[21] The rest, she resists saying, is History.

Whether the single suggestion sufficed, we have no way of knowing. But Harriet Grote did much to convince her husband and his friends that destiny had appointed him “The Historian” of ancient Greece. And, of course, “Mrs. George” always took “care that he should have his ‘study’ entirely to himself whenever he was minded to work at his Greek history.”[22]
Grote’s secularism found a more direct and hardly less eventful outlet in his work on behalf of University of London. It was to be, first and foremost, a place “where a general system of instruction should be established, independent of all religious teaching.”[23] Controversy developed right from the outset over the appointment of the two chairs in philosophy—in Logic and the Philosophy of the Human Mind and in Moral and Political Philosophy. No suitable candidates were found among the applicants responding to the initial advertisement in 1827. But the following year, when the Benthamite Southwood Smith was nominated by the Search Committee for the Chair in Moral Philosophy, he was turned down by the Council. While there are no records of the debate over Southwood Smith’s candidacy, clearly the utilitarians were arrayed against the nonconformists. When the Rev. John Hoppus was being considered for the other chair, the Benthamites retaliated. Grote led the opposition, arguing forcefully that at a non-sectarian institution, it was improper for any minister of religion to occupy a chair of philosophy. When the University opened its doors in autumn 1828, there were, in consequence, no philosophy professors. It was again the turn of the utilitarians in the spring of 1829. Grote nominated his friend Charles Cameron to the Moral and Political Philosophy Chair. Zachary Macaulay emerged as the chief opponent in the Council, after the Education Committee had recommended Cameron. Macaulay argued that “there could be no satisfactory teaching of ethics except on a religious basis,” and the nomination was shelved.[24] A modus vivendi was inevitable, and Brougham and Mill reached a compromise with the clerical party. Hoppus was again nominated and this time elected. Preoccupied by additional responsibilities at the bank in the fall of 1829, Grote missed a number of Council meetings, including the November session when Hoppus’s candidacy was considered. Grote resented what he regarded as his mentor’s
laodiceanism, and he resigned from the Council two months later. (He rejoined that body in 1849)[25]

Hoppus had been a student of Dugald Stewart, Adam Smith’s first biographer, and this perhaps helped make him acceptable to Mill, also a former student. It is possible that Hoppus distanced himself from what was repellant in Stewart’s version of “Common Sense” doctrine—a fairly thoroughgoing inductivism coupled with the assertion that key moral perceptions and claims about the mind are self-evident.

Never had Grote imagined that the candidate who had slipped through while his back was turned would go on to serve for 36 years. He was resolutely determined not to permit another minister to occupy the chair. “‘To have endured Hoppus for a quarter of a century [sic] was bad enough,” he told his wife,” but, when a ray of light was about to break upon that benighted chair, to be threatened with an eminent theologian, with a Unitarian minister!”

It was overpowering, for the moment. The effect could only be compared to that made upon the mind of “Christian,” when he beheld the figure of Apollyon “bestraddling the pathway.” Grote, however, felt, along with that excellent person in the allegory of Bunyan, nowise disposed, “to give it up,” and again like Christian, “felt for his sword.” Not a weapon of steel, certes, but the instrument of the age in which he excelled, namely, persuasive speech.”[26]

Thus the Radical “Christian” of mid-Victorian England prepared to wage holy battle with the heathen Theist in defense of secularism.
Harriet Grote, along with other friends, prevailed on the Historian not to publish a paper he wrote on the controversy, though “the partisans of Mr. Martineau worked the organs of the daily and weekly press lustily, and the controversy became at once bitter and noisy.”[27] In her memoir, Harriet Grote contents herself with quoting excerpts from an article on the controversy from an unidentified source, but one she feels represents the opinion of “‘the man in the omnibus.”’[28] Grote’s paper has not survived, but some fragments of a letter he wrote to the Proprietors concisely express his sentiments on the subject.

The letter is devoted primarily to Grote’s objections to the Proprietors assuming an active role in the appointment of professors. This would be contrary to the college’s charter and likely to be exploited by malcontents in the future: “Whenever any unsuccessful candidate happens to have friends or partisans among the Proprietors, we are likely to have a meeting called for the purpose of challenging the vote by which the Council have rejected him.”[29] If the meeting of the proprietors were to “assume the functions of a court of appeal”--with reporters present--the “free, unrestricted, confidential communication” between Council members, essential to their deliberations, would cease. Though happy to discuss the reasons for his vote with other Council members, he refused “to bow to any other authority” and gave notice that he would decline to attend any meeting of the Proprietors examining the appointment.
Early in the fragment, however, Grote discusses some of his objections to Martineau. To appoint him Professor of Mental Philosophy “would be nothing less than transferring the lectures of a Unitarian Theological College” to the “neutral lecture-room” of UCL. It would establish “a theological chair within their own walls,” the Council majority had felt. Martineau is no less objectionable than Manning, Newman, or Pusey. “Whether Mr. Martineau’s theology is of a more liberal character than that of these other divines, is a point which the Council do not undertake” to determine. Grote carefully explains that he has no objection to a professor holding any particular creed, so long as he is not “engaged in teaching and preaching [it] publicly and eloquently.” Far from representing a precedent, the appointment of Dr. Hoppus was a regrettable violation of the College’s principle of religious neutrality; and Hoppus’s performance constitutes “a strong additional reason against naming another minister of religion as his successor.”[30]

In his letter, Grote does not elaborate on the particular biases any theologian would introduce into his lectures. But, clearly, the most objectionable would be a tendency to explain motives and actions with reference to an immortal soul and a Creator whose will is revealed in the Old and New Testament, in Nature, or is directly apprehended by that soul.

Denied the opportunity to publish his objections to Martineau, Grote contented himself with reissuing a book long out of print, by one “Philip Beauchamp.” The author was in fact Grote himself, an earnest twenty-seven year-old working from four volumes of notes by Jeremy Bentham. To no one’s surprise, the book’s approach was utilitarian through and through: did the belief in a God who created and populated heaven and hell, Beauchamp asked, increase or decrease human happiness on earth? The answer, of course, was a decisive “no.” While not effectively deterring crime, the prospect of eternal punishment gives rise to much irrational anxiety and perverts true morality, which must be based on reason and experience. Christian
dogmas encourage various pernicious practices, including both celibacy and concupiscence. Priests in particular are denounced at some length; they constitute a “standing army” perpetrating “force and fraud.” In 1866, as in 1822, Philip Beauchamp’s identity was not revealed.[31]

JOHN STUART MILL

The article cited by Harriet Grote raised two objections to Martineau--his profession and his opposition to “the Lockean school.” If Grote was moved primarily by the former, his friend John Stuart Mill was more preoccupied with the latter.

John Mill was dragged into the controversy against his wishes. Both Martineau and, eventually, Grote, made requests of him he felt obliged to decline, Martineau seeking his endorsement for the chair, Grote urging him to join the UCL Council to bolster its slender anti-clerical majority.

Mill turned down his friend Grote for reasons anyone can sympathize with: he did not wish to spend his vacations in committee meetings. His duties as M.P. for Westminster already kept him in England longer than he desired, to the detriment of his health and writing. As an alternative, Mill warmly recommended Herbert Spencer, who “is as anti-clergymanish as possible.” [32]

Mill turned down Martineau, however, on grounds of principle, and a brief examination of his reasons sheds some light on the way in which he applied “the one simple principle” adumbrated in On Liberty. It is thus of some relevance to at least one of the debates over that much-debated book. The questions this formerly widely-assigned text generates in the classroom are provocative and insoluble (hence its popularity). They have been the foci of scholarly debates for generations. Are there any purely “self-regarding actions”? Is the
maximization of individual liberty invariably compatible with the social good? What is the relationship of eccentricity and originality? Does knowledge progress by the confrontation of opposing views in public debate? Is morality undermined by an investigation of its premises? But the scholarly debate that the Martineau controversy helps illuminate had less to do with Mill’s meaning or the validity of his claims than with his motives. The question was asked in the 1960s and has been asked again more recently: were the freedoms Mill so passionately advocated instrumental—were they, specifically, intended to facilitate the dechristianization of England by a secular elite?[33]

The unwelcome letter from Martineau asking for a recommendation arrived on July 5, 1866. Mill’s response was guarded and tactful. He praised in general terms Martineau’s knowledge, abilities and his “candid appreciation of opponents, of which I have a striking instance in my own case.” However, if he were to write such a recommendation, Mill told Martineau, it would be

prejudicial to another candidate who, though I have no reason to think his claims superior to yours in any other respect, would certainly teach doctrines much nearer than yours to those which I myself hold on the great philosophical questions. Now though this in itself is far from being a paramount consideration with me, the opportunities are so few & unfrequent of obtaining for opinions similar to my own their fair share of influence in the public teaching of this country that if I myself had a vote in the disposal of the professorship, I shd think myself bound, in the general interest of philosophical thought no less than my own form of it, to give the preference to a candidate (otherwise sufficiently qualified) who would teach my own opinions, in one of the very few chairs from
which those opinions would not be a peremptory exclusion. You are perfectly capable of entering into this feeling even if you do not approve of it, & I can only add that I do not think I ever in any instance regretted so much my inability to support a similar candidature.[34]

There are thus two grounds for favoring Robertson, both owing to the scarcity of positions for philosophers of Mill’s orientation—Mill’s own preference for an individual sharing his opinions and his sense that it would be in the general interest of philosophic thought in Britain to have such unorthodox opinions taught, even if he didn’t himself embrace them.

Both points are somewhat vitiated by the assumption that Martineau was a member of a dominant, or at least well-represented, school of thought. This was probably not the case. By most criteria, Mill’s and Robertson’s empiricism was more representative of mainstream philosophy in Britain in the 1860s. Mill’s *Logic* had by 1866 gone through six editions and was required reading at both Oxford and Cambridge.[35] Martineau’s Idealism, on the other hand, was a scarcer commodity, at least until the 1880s. Martineau, moreover, was no more eligible than Robertson to teach at Oxford or Cambridge, where one still had to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles.

Mill’s second point—that he is acting in behalf of the discipline, independent of his own philosophical orientation—also invites some skepticism when one considers the lay of the land in political economy. Millites occupied important positions among the few professorships of political economy that then existed in Britain, and Mill’s *Principles*, then in its 6th edition, was far and away the dominant text. Bonamy Price, Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford and the most prominent academic dissenter, was regarded as something of a dinosaur. While Jevons’s accusations about a Millite conspiracy may have been exaggerated [36], the
economic establishment was completely unreceptive to his initial elaboration of marginalism in 1871, and uniformly hostile to historicism.[37] From a position of prominence in the late 1820s and 1830s, anti-Ricardian economics was marginalized in the following decade.[38] Though Mill was willing on occasion to borrow politically useful arguments from his “heterodox” followers, he never lent any support to opponents of his version of classical political economy purely in the interest of intellectual diversity. His chief lieutenant, Cairnes, campaigned vigorously against continental and native heresies.[39]

The UCL Council represented neither the government nor society. In rejecting Martineau’s candidacy, it was restricting the scope of his influence but not abridging his freedom. Nonetheless, Mill explicitly eschewed any argument for liberty grounded on rights, and the rationale he offered Martineau echoes his utility-based plea. To suppress an opinion is to deny the human race “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth” or simply to refine and clarify truth, “almost as great a benefit.”[40] Mill appeals to the same premise in wishing to reserve the philosophy chair for a persecuted heterodoxy. The problem, as indicated, is that the characterizations of the competing schools are inaccurate. Had Mill contented himself with the claim that Croom Robertson’s understanding of the mind and the world was, in his view, more valid than that of Martineau, his response would have been unexceptionable. But in adopting a line similar to that of On Liberty, he lends some credence to those critics who claim that the specific beliefs of those for whom full freedom of expression was urged had much to do with the zeal with which he advocated this freedom.

Having turned Martineau down, as he thought, Mill was distressed to receive a letter from R. H. Hutton seeking permission to include Mill’s response to Martineau in the dossier
he, Hutton, was forwarding to the UCL Senate. Mill naturally refused; his letter had been an explanation as to why he could not offer a testimonial. His refusal, according to Mill, caused considerable displeasure, and Mill himself was irritated by what he saw as Martineau’s disingenuousness.[41]

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Finally, Mill’s changing relationship with the Grotes sheds some light on Mill’s own much-analyzed intellectual development. The renewal of the friendship in the 1860s, particularly its intensification beginning in 1865, reveals something about the mellowing of his attitude toward utilitarianism, a renewed partiality toward political activism, and a new appreciation of his father. The alliance of Mill and the Grotes in opposing the Martineau appointment is the fruit of these changes, and further cemented the bond between James Mill’s son and his most faithful disciple.

“I crave pardon for addressing you jointly,” an elaborately jocular sixteen-year-old Mill wrote to the Grotes. “It is a liberty for which, like a true lawyer, I have two reasons, a technical and a rational one. My technical reason (for confirmation of which vide Blackstone) is that baron and feme are one person in law. My utilitarian reason is that to do otherwise might imply that I failed of rendering to one of you, the tribute of gratitude which your friendship so justly deserves at my hands.”[42] The letter closes with another tongue-in-cheek observation, so-uncharacteristic of the mature Mill: “ERRATUM in your letter. For STERN MORALIST read DESPONDING PHILANTHROPIST. It is the more correct appellation.”[43] Eleven years and one mental crisis later, Mill had a rather more jaundiced view of the Philosophic Radical non plus ultra. He was writing to Carlyle, then approaching the zenith of his influence over Mill.
You ask me about Grote: I happen to be able to tell you more about him than almost any one, having been intimate with him almost from my boyhood, though less so than formerly in proportion as I have diverged from his opinions: he is a Utilitarian; in one sense I am so too, but he is so in rather a narrow sense; has therefore a belief, a firm one, in him most deep and conscientious, for which chiefly he lives and for which he would die. He is a highly instructed man; an excellent scholar; has made great progress in writing a History of Greece, some of the manuscript of which I have seen; it will be a work of great, though not of consummate merit: he was one of the first of his rank and station to proclaim strong Benthamic-Radical opinions; he published a pamphlet of merit, in defense thereof against the Edinburgh Review, as long ago as 1820, when not so old as I am now, and another two years ago just before the Reform Bill. He is a man of good, but not first-rate intellect: hard and mechanical; not at all quick; with less subtlety than any able and instructed man I ever knew: with much logical but little aesthetic culture; narrow therefore; even narrower than most other Utilitarians of reading and education: more a disciple of my father than any one else: industrious, brave, not very active or spirited; universally beloved for his extreme goodness, his simplicity, uprightness, and gentleness; resembling Ricardo in that particular, though a far inferior man to him in powers of intellect. He is by far the most considered of the radicals in the H. of C.[,] is more nearly their leader than any one else, & would be so altogether but that he has not the kind of talents with fit a man for a parliamentary leader; he has not sufficient readiness, decision, & presence of mind.[44]
Mill, once he reached manhood, had always found Harriet Grote rather overbearing. (Sydney Smith once claimed she was the source of the adjective “grotesque.” As a young child, she had been nicknamed “The Empress” by her family.)[45] As his relationship with Harriet Taylor intensified, so did his antipathy. He broke with the Grote family, as he did with other long-time friends, over his belief that they were gossiping about his liaison with Mrs. Taylor, about which his hypersensitivity knew no bounds. For sixteen years he did not visit the Grote family, though he occasionally exchanged letters with George. When Harriet Grote tried to renew the friendship after John had reviewed her husband’s History of Greece in the Edinburgh Review, the overture was contemptuously rejected: “The impudence of writing to me at all & of writing in such a manner is only matched by the excessive conceit of the letter.”[46]

With his wife’s death, Mill swung back into a more activist mode reminiscent of his twenties and thirties. The Mill of the 1860s resembled the engage journalist of the ‘20s, now able to serve in Parliament, having retired from the former East India Company, and acutely conscious that time was running out. The decade was a sunny era in Mill’s life. He found himself at the center of a group of worshipful young political economists and he reestablished relations with a number of old friends who had been spurned either at his wife’s behest or in her behalf.

The ambivalences of the ‘30s long dissipated, he did what he could during the decade to resuscitate the influence of his father, devoting much labor to a reissue of James Mill’s Analysis of Mind, and to the filiopietistic Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. Grote was asked to review the latter book for the Westminster Review, and he told Mill how glad he was to “get an opportunity, also, of saying what I think about your ‘System of Logic’ and ‘Essay on Liberty;’ but I am still more glad to get (or perhaps to make) an opportunity of saying something
about your father. It has always rankled in my thoughts, that so grand and powerful a mind as
his left behind it such insufficient traces in the estimation of successors.”[47] Such sentiments,
with their thinly veiled, if unconscious, imputation of John Mill’s own disloyalty, Mill fils would
likely have found offensive two decades earlier.

In the early 1860s, the Grotes rented the Barrow Green House where, nearly half a
century before, James Mill’s family had spent three pleasant summers as Jeremy Bentham’s
guest, and John, according to Harriet Grote, very much enjoyed revisiting his childhood
haunts.[48] But it was always the prospective, not the retrospective, that engaged Mill, and it
was as a fellow laborer in the great project to improve mankind that Mill reembraced his father’s
loyal follower. The Historian no longer sat in Parliament, annually moving the ballot question,
but he was an active trustee of two of the most important institutions that, “in assisting the
destruction of error and prejudice and the growth of just feelings and true opinions”[49] would
make the laws of Britain and the behavior of the British enlightened and civilized--the British
Museum and University College London.

JAMES MARTINEAU

What beliefs made James Martineau anathema to Grote and Mill? Just as John Stuart
Mill reshaped utilitarianism into a more “genial” system, so Martineau–under the influence of
English Romantics, French expositors of Scottish metaphysics, and, ultimately, German
philosophers and theologians–transformed the empirical Unitarianism of Priestley and Belsham,
“Utilitarianism in its Sunday best.”[50] In a double revolution, Martineau (along with his
colleagues Thom, Tayler, and Wicksteed) rejected the mechanistic ontology of Priestley, which
derived motives entirely from sense impressions and denied freedom of the will.[51] Martineau
similarly rejected the appeal to Scripture to validate Unitarian beliefs.[52] He thus elevated, respectively, Conscience and Reason. Mankind shared a common, unconditioned Conscience–God’s presence within–which could be consulted directly through intuition.[53] At the same time, the New and Old Testament must be subject to the scrutiny of Reason. Thus Atonement, the Trinity, eternal punishment, etc. were rejected not because they were non-Scriptural, but because they were irrational. Martineau fully endorsed, though he did not practice, the Higher Criticism, the close philological and historical analysis of Biblical texts that would winnow the chaff from the grain.

It was, naturally, the former doctrine that made him an unacceptable candidate. To derive morality from Intuition was, for the Utilitarians, to appeal to customs, traditions, and prejudices. To locate a God within us who was also the Creator of the universe–and whom we know through a sense of sin–was to make arbitrary and unwarranted assumptions. God’s existence must be an open question, they believed.

In one sense, it is not surprising that Martineau should have sought a letter of recommendation from John Stuart Mill, widely acknowledged the preeminent philosopher in Britain.[54] On the other hand, given Martineau’s lengthy and highly critical review of the first two volumes of Mill’s *Discussions and Dissertations*, which appeared seven years earlier, seeking Mill’s endorsement might be considered a tad presumptuous.[55]

Drawing heavily on Mill’s essay on Coleridge, as well as his *Logic*, Martineau attempts to make the case that Mill stands shakily on two stools: he is both an Idealist and a Materialist.[56] Perverse as the former label may appear, Mill reduces knowledge to self-knowledge: we have no access to the external world; we know only our sense impressions,
and one is thus “shut up absolutely in Egoistic phenomena.”[57] But if “we know nothing but the phenomena of ourselves, we are nothing but the phenomena of the world.”[58] There is no autonomy of Reason or Conscience: “a priori ideas” are merely “a posteriori residues.”[59]

Thus, the paradox that, while “our only sphere of cognizable reality is subjective” it “is generated from an objective world which we have no reason to believe exists.”[60] Citing a lengthy passage from Mill’s *Logic*, Martineau concludes that Mill embraces a far more radical skepticism than he realizes: there is no faculty to authenticate truth.[61]

The ethical implications of sensationalist psychology are even more disturbing for Martineau. Benthamite ethics derives morality from consequences, not motives. Worse, the source of morality is the approval and disapproval of others.[62] Self-love is its basis, and the claims of others will be sympathetically entertained only to the extent that we identify them with our own good. Mill thus “recommends self-denial on the plea of self-indulgence.”[63] Mill’s “more genial” version of Benthamism may enlarge the sphere of self-interest, but he is obliged to deny any distinction between interests and obligations, and is peremptorily and unfairly contemptuous of any appeal to “a common Conscience in mankind.”[64] Martineau clearly resents the implication that the latter is a reactionary doctrine, while the appeal to a common Reason is progressive. (He also strenuously objects to Mill’s caricature of “a priorists.”) No English writer has proposed “‘to discover the laws of nature by mere introspection,’” and to dispense entirely with “‘observation and experiment.’”)[65]

Interestingly, Martineau is also critical of what he calls “an air of suppression” assumed by Mill—“the greatest fault we find in him.”[66] By this he means the implication in some of his writing that he would like to say more, but the “pitiable bigotry of society” compels him to hold his tongue, at least until such time as it ceases to “persecute its benefactors.”[67] Martineau’s
observation is acute--and prophetic. Mill decided fairly early that the goal of dechristianizing Europe, however important, must be pursued with great caution and circumspection, lest it jeopardize other admirable causes.

In the controversy over the University College Chair, Martineau came to feel that he himself was victimized by the anticlericism latent in much of Mill’s work. Martineau, indeed, seemed to harbor more resentment toward Mill than Grote following his rejection.[68] Because his work was familiar to the Council (he had been teaching UCL students for 7 years), he sought testimonials only from Francis Newman, Dr. Thompson, the Archbishop of York, and Mill. In Martineau’s view, Mill’s letter constituted a warm recommendations which “could hardly fail to be decisive, if produced in evidence.”[69] Mill, however, “could not miss the opportunity of planting...a disciple of his own school in a place of influence,” and asked that his endorsement of Martineau be withheld.[70] The Archbishop didn’t reply for a full year, and then wrote to say that if he had told the Senate what he thought of Martineau’s qualifications, he would be assisting to a position of influence someone who did not believe in the Trinity, something he felt he could not in good conscience do. “In this spectacle of Mr. Mill and the Archbishop moving hand in hand, under the common guidance of a sectarian motive, there is a curious irony.”[71]

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Some thirty years earlier, Mill, then editor of the London and Westminster Review, was delighted to have secured Martineau’s services: “He is a clever man, and has consented to be a frequent contributor to our Review. I think him one of the best metaphysicians of the day.”[72] What Mill found especially sympathetic in Martineau, one year his senior, was their common reaction to Hartleyan psychology and philosophical necessitarianism.[73]
Martineau’s views, however, continued to evolve as Mill moved back into his father’s orbit. “Are not your general metaphysical opinions a shade or two more German than they used to be?” Mill asked guardedly in 1841.[74] They were to become more so after a fifteen-month sabbatical in Germany at the end of the decade. Mill was writing to thank Martineau for a copy of a lecture which especially resonated with him: “I shall never forget the time when I was myself under that awful shadow you speak of, nor how I got from under it...”[75] The “awful shadow” was that of “Necessity.” The lecture had been delivered at Manchester New College, where Martineau had just been appointed Professor of Natural and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy. The Unitarian college had returned to Manchester from York, enlarged and improved its staff, and had become affiliated with University of London. (It would eventually relocate to London in 1857 before removing to Oxford in 1889.)

Mill’s remarks in the letter on the college have uncanny bearing on the controversy over the UCL professorship a quarter of a century later: “I had not been an uninterested observer of the affiliation of

Manchester New College with the University of London; but I was not aware till I read your letter that the plan of instruction was founded upon the principle which I have always earnestly contended for as the only one on which a University suitable to an age of unsettled creeds can stand, namely, that of having each Professor unfettered as to his premises and conclusions, without regard to what may be taught by the rest. Besides all the other important recommendations of this principle, it is the only one which in our time allows such professorships to be filled by men of real superiority, whose speculations have the power of exciting
interest in the subject. Such men can less and less endure to be told what they are
to teach.[76]

Clearly, the two camps in 1866 interpreted this stipulation differently. For Grote, no
minister could possibly be “unfettered as to his premises and conclusions.” For Martineau, to
leave each professor unfettered meant simply that it was illegitimate to disqualify a professor or
would-be professor on the basis of his creed. Mill, one has to infer, shared this opinion in 1841.
Unitarianism, without any creeds or articles, did not fetter anyone with prejudices incompatible
with “real superiority” in scholarship and teaching. Mill would hardly have written this to
Martineau, Professor of Mental, Moral and Religious Philosophy, if he felt that it did. Still
another, earlier letter to Martineau shows that Mill was far from regarding the office of
clergyman in the church of England as incompatible with independent and progressive thought.
In it, he warmly seconded Martineau’s endorsement of the idea of an established Church. (That
the Unitarians were far closer to Broad Church Anglicans in most respects than to their fellow
dissenters has long been acknowledged.)[77]

AUGUSTUS AND SOPHIA DE MORGAN

Apart from the two principals, Martineau and Croom Robertson, the individual most
dramatically affected by the actions of the Council was the Professor of Mathematics, Augustus
De Morgan. A distinguished logician as well as a mathematician, De Morgan was the author of
number of popular textbooks and encyclopedia articles and the engaging Budget of Paradoxes, a
compendium of scientific and mathematical lunacies, as well as two highly respected treatises on
logic. Just as he conceived algebra as a system of symbols whose laws could be represented
non-arithmetically, conversely he attempted to express logical principles mathematically,
anticipating Boole. His *Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic* analyzed syllogisms with striking originality. A witty and acute conversationalist, he affected to despise nature.[78]

In 1866 De Morgan had been teaching at UCL for over thirty-six years. He had been the first Professor of Mathematics, selected unanimously over thirty rival candidates at age twenty-two, on the strength of his Cambridge testimonials. (Displaying some of the impetuous idealism that moved him in the Martineau case, he resigned two years later over the firing of the anatomy professor on grounds having nothing to do with his competence. But in 1836, when his successor was drowned, De Morgan was induced to return.)[79] The position was ideal for this gifted teacher. De Morgan’s religious scruples prevented him from affirming the Thirty-nine Articles;[80] a Cambridge Fellowship was impossible. But the bar, for which he was reading, bored him exquisitely. Though sympathetic to Unitarians, De Morgan was not himself one, and did not know Martineau personally.[81] He simply reacted viscerally—and precipitously—to what he saw as a violation of the core founding principle of the College. To reject Martineau solely on grounds of his religious beliefs seemed monstrous. Rashly, he declared that he would resign if Martineau was denied the position because he was a Unitarian. After the Council’s action in November, he at once submitted his resignation. In a lengthy letter to the Chairman of the Council, he informed him that it was unnecessary for him to leave the College; the recent vote “proves that the College has left me.... The Council has decided that a certain amount of notoriety for advocacy of an unpopular theology is a disqualification.”[82]

Having listened attentively to the arguments, De Morgan concludes in his letter that there were two distinct objections to Martineau: his psychology was “too far removed from atheism to please the philosopher,” while his religion was “too far removed from orthodoxy to please the priest.”[83] De Morgan goes on to demonstrate that he is “as worthy to be extruded as Mr.
Martineau to be excluded.”[84] If he were to continue teaching, he would make it a “sacred duty” (it would also be “a malicious pleasure”) to allude pointedly to the existence of an intelligent Creator during classroom discussions of “our mental organization,” and to openly avow his Unitarianism outside the classroom.[85] De Morgan stresses Martineau’s reputation as an “eclectic teacher” able “to prepare students for examinations in which the examiners have no bias toward his views,” and warns that concessions to narrow minds on grounds of expediency will backfire.[86] For in the end, De Morgan appears to have believed that that the Council was determined to make an appointment “best for the worldly prosperity of the institution.” The governing body shrank, therefore, from “a candidate believed to be prominent in an unpopular sect.”[87]

Prudential motives may have animated some Council and Senate members, and some Proprietors. It is likely a few of the latter were simply hostile to Unitarianism. It is difficult today to recall the opprobrium with which Unitarians were regarded in the middle decades of the nineteenth century in Britain. On one occasion, Frank Newman’s wife jumped out of a window and escaped into the garden to avoid having to shake hands with James Martineau. (Luckily, the window was on the ground floor.)[88] Nonetheless, the leading opponents of Martineau were not chiefly concerned with the reputation of the institution nor moved by their aversion to an unpopular sect. As Sophia De Morgan perceptively noted, ideological reasons were likely more important for the principal opponents of the Unitarian philosopher. “Everyone who has watched the progress of thought, especially during the last half century, must have seen that the tendency both in philosophy and in religion, is to the denial...of God. I am not now attempting to condemn this tendency, but its prevalence has had the effect of confusing formerly well-defined distinctions. The ‘Liberal’ has frequently gone from liberality to unbelief; and in the case of
University College many professed Liberals took the part of intolerance because they preferred atheism to theism.”[89]

The Council responded brusquely to De Morgan’s letter of resignation, informing him only that his letter had been received and his resignation accepted. There were no regrets or remonstrances.[90] In the period between his resignation and the end of the term, according to De Morgan, not one of his colleagues as much as mentioned the subject or expressed any acknowledgment of his services to the college. Soon his health began to fail. “At the end of 1867 he was no longer the strong, vigorous man, full of hope and activity, which he had been before his alienation from the institution to which so much of the work of his life had been devoted.”[91]

**CHARLES BEARD**

De Morgan’s resignation provoked the most penetrating and biting of the many attacks on the Council’s decision, an article by the distinguished Unitarian historian Charles Beard in the January 1867 issue of the *Theological Review*, of which he was editor.

At the heart of Beard’s argument is a deconstruction of Grote’s motion at the August 4th Council meeting: “That the Council consider it inconsistent with the complete religious neutrality proclaimed and adopted by University College, to appoint to the chair of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, a candidate eminent as minister and preacher of any one among the various sects dividing the religious world.”[92]

Why should the college’s commitment to “complete religious neutrality” affect only one chair, Beard asks. The holders of other chairs have ranged from orthodox clergymen to believers in “aberrant religious faith,” like Francis Newman, to professed non-believers and Comtists, like
E. S. Beesly. If the chair in Mental Philosophy and Logic is to be treated entirely differently, the university ought to consider abolishing it.

Beard then has some fun with the notion that it is not Martineau’s Unitarianism per se but his *eminence* as a Unitarian that has deprived him of the professorship. This principle obliges the College to choose

its Professor of Philosophy either from the ranks of the laity or from that portion of the clerical body who have the good fortune to be obscure. An academical institution, then, which boasts that in consequence of its abolition of all tests it can go into the open market of talent and buy whatever best suits its purpose, begins by setting a mark of exclusion upon all ministers of religion, except such as are unable, from the poverty of their talents or the lukewarmness of their convictions, to rise to any height of religious influence. ...Whately would not have been suffered to teach Logic in University College, nor Whewell to expound the philosophy of Induction. Butler would be shewn to the door with contempt; but then the balance would be redressed by the reluctant dismissal of Paley. For a thousand reasons the idealist Berkeley...would be driven from the classic colonnades of Gower Street; and surely, in all fairness, the sensationalist Locke, albeit no minister, could hardly be allowed to taint that neutral air with dissertations on ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity.’[93]

After savaging other inconsistencies or hypocrisies in the Council’s position, Beard speculates on the “real motive of Mr. Martineau’s exclusion.” Martineau has

the misfortune to be an Idealist: he is not content to rest in phenomena, but seeks ‘reram cognescere causas;’ he does not believe that thought is a secretion of the
brain, or free-will an intellectual delusion, or duty no more than a desirable social arrangement. In a word, the members of the Council of University College, whose influence is preponderant, are Sensationalists, if not Positivists, and, backed by powerful support outside their own body, are resolved to place in the vacant chair a man of their own way of thinking. Nor is this, be it observed, a case in which the candidates are equal in qualification; there is indeed no pretence of comparison between the two; but inexperience plus philosophical orthodoxy is deliberately preferred to proved competency plus philosophical heresy.[94]

In the end, the distinction between philosophic versus theological differences are more apparent than real. Behind the Sensationalist position is a “cool contempt” for religion. Beard concurs with Sophia de Morgan: the ultimate objection to Martineau turns out to be his belief in God.[95]

HENRY SIDGWICK AND WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS

Was the rejection of Martineau simply an episode–perhaps unique in British history–of anti-clericalism run rampant? Were there not deficiencies in his philosophy serious enough to call into question his fitness to hold the chair? An open letter from fifteen professors supporting the Council, issued on the eve of the Proprietors’ February 2nd, 1867 meeting, hints at these, but does not elaborate them, nor does any other published defense of the Council of which I am aware.[96] This may owe something to the fact that Martineau’s books on philosophy only appeared decades later, though based on lectures dating from the 1840s.[97] In addition, Mill and other Radicals had hitherto regarded Martineau with some sympathy. He had, after all, made the most liberal Protestant denomination more liberal still.
Mill never responded to Martineau’s attack on his philosophy, and by the time the latter’s lectures were published, Mill was long dead and Martineau’s own Idealism had been superseded by the trendier Hegelianism of Green and his followers, with its compelling call to social activism. It may be useful, therefore, to note the response to aspects of Martineau’s philosophy on the part of the two most distinguished representatives of mature empiricism in the final third of the 19th century, Henry Sidgwick and W. S. Jevons. Their reactions are likely to express some of the skepticism of informed opponents on the Council and in the Senate.

Ethics and theology were closely related for Martineau. Spurring his gradual and painful break with the main body of Unitarians was his conviction that we have direct access to God and are not dependent on Scripture. (Before he arrived at that point, a critic had remarked of his reading of the New Testament: “Whenever our Lord’s language is at issue with Dr. Martineau’s philosophy, the Evangelists have been bad reporters.”)[98] We know God through Conscience, the agent that chooses among alternative impulses when we act volitionally.[99] There is, within all of us, a discrete hierarchy of motives. Morality consists in learning to select the higher over the lower motive. What we learn is to listen with growing acuteness to the voice of God speaking from within. Motives, Martineau insists, are much more important than consequences. The latter depend on actions, and actions are themselves contingent both on circumstances and abilities over which we may have little control.[100]

Henry Sidgwick’s objections to Martineau’s ethics, it’s fair to assume, are those of anyone identifying with the utilitarian empiric tradition. He takes issue first, and most fundamentally, with Martineau’s psychology. While the dictates of his own conscience may be compelling, there is no evidence “Conscience” is universal and timeless.[101] For Sidgwick, as
for Mill, values are the result of early education and are reinforced by the need for approbation. The desire for pleasure and aversion from pain are the only fundamental reflexes; morality is acquired.

Sidgwick is also critical of the hierarchy itself, on two grounds. While conceding the general movement from selfish to selfless motives is unexceptionable, Sidgwick finds puzzling various omissions and inclusions. Why is “censoriousness” ranked so low?[102] (It is a full seven notches below “antipathy, fear and resentment,” of which it would seem to be an effect.) Where is the place of “conjugal affection”? And is, indeed, the distinction between the “passions” and “affections” valid?[103]

The major criticism of the ranking, however, is that, at bottom, any theory of ethics must treat consequences. To entertain these is to recognize that ethical judgments are more complex than simply being a matter of choosing a superior over an inferior motive. “Lower” sentiments may be necessary to achieve higher ends. As moralists have long recognized, love of fame can be a spur to selfless acts, and resentment can stimulate the pursuit of justice.[104]

Still more fundamentally, if we only look to intentions, we have no right to condemn the anarchist whose bomb kills innocent people in his pursuit of what may be noble political ideals, nor the Inquisitor who tortures other innocents to effect spiritual goals which may be themselves admirable.

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Stanley Jevons’s verdict on Martineau does not appear in any published writing, but in sundry comments in several letters to his brother Tom in 1861 and 1862. Though it does not consist of a careful analysis of Martineau’s positions, it is at least revealing as to the impression Martineau left on one of the truly first-rate minds in Victorian Britain.
As an older student, extremely well read and already working out original contributions to logic and political economy that he would publish in 1862, Jevons was singularly unimpressed by Martineau’s lectures, which he attended during the 1860-1 academic year. They were

“a jargon...of the Deuce knows what. When he does become comprehensible he generally goes palpably wrong; thus a few days since he astonished me by asserting that the tactual and muscular feelings are all one--that you cannot feel unless your muscles are in play. One day he got us into inarticulable confusion over the words matter and form which, of course, Aristotle and Kant used in diametrically opposite senses; happily Hegel helped us out of the mess by some stray sentence in which he seemed to assert that everything might be matter or form just as you felt inclined. It is a great labour attending him and trying to write down what he reads out...”[105]

That spring he reported that

Martineau still pursues a steady course through the clouds, very much to his own satisfaction, and is now I suppose almost in sight of his happy destination [:] a seat between Kant and Hegel. Lately he came down very heavy on Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Brown and Mill School as being everything that is sceptically horrid. He acknowledges that Kant’s system of a purely subjective origin of everything is pure scepticism and takes away every kind of certainty. Is our only hope then in Hegel and Martineau? God help us if it is.[106]

Jevons had no taste for metaphysics, needless to say, but his harsh verdicts may well have expressed the sentiments of others on the Council and Senate who had the opportunity to hear Martineau lecture or preach.

CONCLUSION
As Sidgwick warned in his critique of Martineau’s ethics, motives are likely to be more complex and actions more constrained than philosophers would have us believe. There is no record of the Council’s debates on Martineau’s candidacy, nor do we have much access to the unspoken assumptions, prejudices, hopes and fears of those charged with governing UCL.

If nothing else, Sidgwick’s and Jevons’s observations make one hesitate to conclude that the decision to bypass Martineau was the result of blind ideological zeal. Indeed, few nineteenth century reputations plummeted as dramatically as Martineau’s. Within five years of his death, he was the subject of at least five biographies. By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, however, he had dropped from sight. The “burning eloquence” that permits readers to glimpse “the Golden Gates of the City of God,” seemed to the next generation “florid” and “diffuse.” Once hailed as the “first among living English thinkers” by Gladstone, the equal of Newman and Maurice, Martineau remained in print during the twentieth century only (and anonymously) in the first Jeeves story by P.G. Wodehouse, where a hung-over Bertie Wooster attempts unsuccessfully to decipher an abstruse passage from *Types of Ethical Theory*.

Nor did Croom Robertson’s subsequent performance in the chair do anything to discredit the Council. Martineau concludes his own account of the affair by noting that “as soon as it became evident that the Chair in University College was filled by a thoroughly efficient teacher, I resigned into his hands, with the consent of the Manchester New College authorities, the instruction of our Undergraduate Students.” Martineau was too conscientious a teacher to have done this without sincerely believing it. But he remained bitter. Writing to Frances Cobbe six months after his final rejection by the UCL Council, Martineau told her

We must never despair of the world: the Divine and the Human Natures are sure to find each other in the long run. But I must say, it is hard to look with equanimity on the succumbing of one fine mind after another to this desolate Positivism. Comte, however, is really great in many
ways and may touch not a few springs of true nobleness. But Bain--whatever Mill may say--is throughout contracted and contracting; and if the younger generation trained by him ever come to rule their age, it is not a happy prospect for this world.[111]

By all accounts, Croom Robertson was an outstanding teacher.[112] However, although he began a major work on Hobbes, he published relatively little.[113] This is attributed by Leslie Stephen to his duties as editor of *Mind*, the first professional journal of philosophy in Britain and to increasing ill-health after 1880, as well as to his devotion to teaching.[114] (He was also very active in the 1870s in the London National Society for Woman’s Suffrage, where he worked closely with Mill, until the latter’s death.)[115]

Nonetheless, Sophia de Morgan may have been correct in believing that the controversy testified to a shift in British liberalism. Some scholars have challenged Halevy’s famous distinction between two important, and antagonistic, strains within Victorian Liberalism—a tolerant Whiggism grounded in individual rights and limited government, and an energetic, reforming utilitarianism bent on rationalizing government and expanding its powers to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number.[116] If the distinction is overstated—if it exaggerates the sympathy for administrative despotism in Bentham (much as this is understated in Dicey’s no less famous coupling of “Benthamism” with “Individualism” in opposition to late nineteenth century “Collectivism”), there is still much validity in the generalization.

Looking southward to Catholic Europe, it is easy to underestimate British anti-clericalism. England, notoriously, had only two sauces but twenty-seven Protestant sects. The Church of England itself, until polarized by the Oxford Movement, was a relatively tolerant institution after 1688. But the followers of James Mill saw in all Christian denominations the most formidable institutional obstacle to the improvement of mankind, to the reliance on utility as a goal and reason as a means.
John Mill was very careful not to display any overt anti-Christianity. Martineau, as noted, hinted darkly at the “air of suppression” in Mill’s work and Mill’s most ardent disciple, John Morley, confident he knew his mentor’s true feelings, was appalled by the compromises and evasions in Mill’s posthumous essay “Theism,” written in part, I’ve suggested, to promote his political objectives by reassuring working-class readers in particular of his warm feelings for Christianity.[117]

In his reply to Martineau, Mill avoided the issue of religion, focusing on his wish to have a persecuted school (with which he identified) represented in an institution of higher education. But intuitionism was pernicious precisely because it buttressed religious orthodoxy, as it buttressed conservatism.[118] Grote, with little of Mill’s subtlety and political acumen, was somewhat more open in his anti-clericism. His giving vent to it, one must suppose, in his lengthy response to the Council’s critics alarmed Harriet Grote and made her determined that he not publish it.

On balance, then, the evidence suggests that a wish to further a social agenda—the dethronement of superstition by reason and of tradition by utility—trumped the wish to be tolerant for its own sake—to evaluate individuals without regard to their religious beliefs.

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NOTES
1. H. Bellot, *University College London, 1826-1926* (London: U. of London Press, 1929), p. 111.] He “used to walk into college regularly at his appointed time,” a former student recalled, “with the manuscript of his lecture in his hands, and a book and a newspaper under his arm. He took his seat in the little lecture room that used to be opposite the Council Room door. After his first or his second lecture he seldom had a pupil; because, burying his face in his manuscript, he mumbled so that only an acute ear could catch much of what he said, and those who caught something called it rot. But, nothing if not conscientious, pupil or no pupil, he sat out his hour, reading his book or his newspaper when alone, his manuscript, if any one came in... One day a new student, not very conversant with the topography of the college, wandered by mistake into Professor Hoppus’s lecture room... Down went the newspaper, out came the manuscript. But when the professor’s head was buried in its leaves, the student discovered his mistake and left,
silently and unobserved. For once the Lecture was read through...( J. B. Benson, “Some Recollections of University College in the Sixties,” ms, UCL Spec. Col., cited by Bellot, University, p. 111.)

2. Established as University of London, the institution became University College only in 1836, when the original name was assumed by an exclusively degree-granting institution incorporating Anglican rival King’s College (founded in 1829) and itself.

3. Bellot, University, p. 56.

4. Ibid.
5. Secularism with a small “s” should not be confused with the movement founded by George Holyoake and energized and expanded by Charles Bradlaugh. Anti-clericalism in England is far too complex a phenomenon to be dealt with summarily, but it is tempting to distinguish, among middle-class exponents, “Cambridge” and “Oxford” schools. Two successive generations of students at the former, influenced by Benthamism, shed their Christian beliefs with little anguish. (These would be students like the Austins, the Villiers, Strutt, Romilly, Buller, and Molesworth in the 1820s and those gravitating around Fawcett and Stephen in the 50s.) At Oxford, if the experience of F. W. Newman or J. A. Froude was typical, the break with orthodoxy was more painful and protracted. It might be more helpful, however, to contrast an Enlightenment-derived secularism, confident but quiet, and a more noisy, self-conscious loss of faith resulting from the shocks administered by nineteenth century science, including Biblical criticism. The discretion of the former is worth emphasizing. Followers of Bentham and Mill were perfectly respectable, sitting in the House of Lords as well as Commons. Compared to the anguished “Honest Doubters,” Utilitarians were less “dishonest doubters” than true Fabians: the attack on “the Juggernaut”–Bentham’s term for religion–was to be deferred until the audience was more receptive.

6. More precisely, as Francis Newman explained to James Martineau after Martineau had written a testimonial for a candidate some eighteen years before his own candidacy: “The Senate (of Professors) elects a Committee who report to the Council on the comparative value of the testimonials: (I may be, but I hope not to be, on that Committee:) after which the Council decides generally in accordance with the recommendation. A Member of the Council presides in the Senate, to guard against favouritism and jobbing.”(Newman to Martineau, n.d. [1848], Martineau Papers 8/4, Manchester College).

7. Bellet, University, pp. 49-50.

8. Hoppus himself carefully reviewed everything submitted by and in behalf of the three leading candidates, apart from Martineau. Robertson, though he had glowing testimonials from Bain and several German academics, provided only two samples of his work, a review of Molesworth’s edition of the works of Hobbes, in manuscript, and a published paper summarizing Kant’s view of Swedenborg. Hoppus was not bowled over by either. The two other candidates clearly had more impressive credentials. (“The Committee of the Senate on the Chair of Philosophy,” 23 July 1866, UCL, AM 112)
Referring occasionally to Hoppus’s twelve-page report, the Senate Committee reported that Inglesby, who Hoppus considered the most “learned” and “scientific” candidate, had “shown himself an acrimonious controversialist” and might discredit the college. Having disposed of one rival, Robertson’s supporters then gamely reminded the Senate of “the great public service our College may render by giving to a man whose natural vocation, we are assured, is philosophy the opportunity of following his vocation.” But the committee’s report conceded that Robertson’s never having taught philosophy was a strike against him.

Martineau’s credentials were taken up last. His writing revealed “remarkable literary talents, great extent of reading, and great firmness and independence of judgment.” His examination papers demonstrated an impressively wide range of knowledge. “It is almost impossible to consider Mr. Martineau’s writings quite apart from the reputation which they have gained for him. Mr. Martineau is not merely an able man but an eminent name in the philosophy of the time and a perceptible influence in the history of English thought. He produces much better evidence than any of his rivals of efficiency as a teacher. His pupils speak of him with enthusiastic gratitude.”

The report touched on a pragmatic issue. Martineau’s lectures at Manchester New College had competed directly with Hoppus’s. Other candidates “would have to contend with the same formidable rival.” If Martineau were selected, enrollments in philosophy would rise. But after proclaiming Martineau’s superiority, the report warned that the Senate and Council needed to consider the way in which the College’s commitment to “neutrality in religion” would be affected by Martineau’s appointment. For its part, the committee was convinced Martineau would “refrain from influencing in any manner the religious opinions of his pupils.” (“Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Testimonials of the Candidates for the Professorship of Logic and Mental Philosophy,” UCL AMA 113)
9. This institution had moved to London in 1853. After losing students to UCL for several years, it decided to ally with its rival, restricting its instruction to theology and philosophy. UCL students could attend these lectures, while MNC students were permitted to enroll in the secular courses offered by the Gower Street institution. Martineau commuted to London for four years, then moved to the capital on being offered fuller teaching responsibilities and higher compensation. He also served as minister of the Little Portland Street Chapel. (J. Drummond, *The Life and Letters of James Martineau*, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), pp. 245-256, 296-325; A. W. Jackson, *James Martineau, A Biography and Study* (Boston, 1900), pp. 88-94; A. G., “James Martineau,” *DNB Supplement*, 1910, (Oxford, 1921), pp. 101–1023. Martineau’s book publications as of 1866 were *Endeavours After a Christian Life* (2 vols., 1843) and *Hymns for the Christian Church and Home* (1840). Only in America had his occasional writings appeared between hard covers, and then only very recently. (*Essays, Philosophical and Theological* (2 vols., Boston: Spencer, 1866.)

10. Lord Belper, formerly the Philosophical Radical Edward Strutt, Grote’s old comrade-in-arms, switched sides in the second vote. One anecdote attributes the rejection of Martineau to Henry Crabb Robinson’s manservant, who withheld a notice about the meeting from his master, so that a trip to Brighton wouldn’t be canceled. (Bellot, *University*, p. 343.)


21. *Ibid.*, p. 49. There is evidence that Grote was already embarked on the project before his wife suggested it to him. (G. Grote, *Fragments on Ethical Subjects; being a selection of his posthumous papers* (New York: Franklin, 1971 [1876]), 22, 24.)
22. *Ibid.*, p. 54. *Contra qui?* is usually a useful question, and Grote aimed to supplant the standard histories of Gillies and Mitford, in which, in the latter in particular,
the French Revolution sharpened an already keen antipathy to Athenian democracy. 


Croom Robertson questions the excuse that Grote was distracted by business. He may have boycotted the meeting that approved Hoppus because he had already failed to convince Mill, despite vehement arguments.


28. *Ibid.* The article argues “that to the great school which treads in the steps and develops the theories of Locke, one position of authority should be conceded.”(*Ibid.*, p. 282.) But whether the philosophy chair should be reserved for an empiricist on the grounds of patriotism, diversity, or truth is not specified. The article then dismisses Martineau’s supporters. His “election was advocated only by the Unitarian members of the Council,—swayed, no doubt, by private friendship,—and not even by these, unanimously.”(*Ibid.*) Martineau, in short, though opposed on grounds other than his being a Unitarian, was supported entirely for that reason.

29. UCL MS MISC. 3G “Reasons for declining to justify the rejection of Mr. Jas. Martineau by the Council of UC, 1866.”

30. *Ibid.* The strength of Grote’s feelings can be gauged by a fiery letter he wrote six years earlier to the Home Secretary, his friend Cornwell Lewis, urging him to appoint Bain to the professorship of Logic at Aberdeen, rather than the churchman Dr. McCork. “Now that political hopes have pretty well died out within me,” he wrote, “science and philosophy alone remain. It would be a cruel mortification to see them both humbled in the dust on the present occasion by their old enemy.”(Clarke, *Grote*, p. 169) “[U]nder the calm exterior there lay, as those who knew him best were aware,” wrote Robertson, “enthusiasms and fires of passion which it took all his strength of reason and will to control.”(Robertson, “Grote,” p. 735.)

to UCL to endow the chair in logic and mental philosophy. However, no interest on the principal, he stipulated, was to be paid to any holder of the chair who was “a minister of the Church of England or of any other religious persuasion.” (Robertson, p. 734; Marshall, p. 320.) In 1876 Croom Robertson became the first incumbent of the Grote Chair and the recipient of an additional 300 pounds per annum. No clergyman has succeeded him.

32. J. S. Mill to G. Grote, 2 December 1866, F. Mineka and D. Lindley (eds.), The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, v. 3, (Collected Works 16), (Toronto, 1972), p. 1210. Mill at the same time was being besieged by his friend and disciple John Elliot Cairnes to lead in Parliament a fight against the Catholic Church’s efforts to obtain recognition of, and funding for, its own institutions in Ireland, while eviscerating the nonsectarian Queen’s Colleges. The campaign raised similar issues to the Martineau controversy, and Mill was again made uncomfortable by the zeal of his allies. (For a definitive treatment of the debate, see B. Kinzer, England’s Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question (Toronto, 2001), pp.120-163.


34. J. S. Mill to J. Martineau, 6 July 1866, Later Letters, v. 3, CW 16, p. 1181.
37. See the complaints of Cliffe Leslie in his correspondence with Ingram, D28208, N. Ireland PRO, Belfast.
39. See Mill’s comments on perennial job candidate H. D. MacLeod, the leading opponent of Ricardo in the third quarter of the century (J. Mill to J. Cairnes, 25 March 1863, Later Letters. v. 2 (Collected Works 15), 851.; J. Mill to H. Fawcett, 4 December 1863, Ibid., p 907.
41. Mill to Grote, 12 Nov. 1866, Later Letters, p. 1211.
52. “Nature and God” in *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*, v. 1 (Boston, 1866), p. 124; “Revelation: What It Is, What It Is Not” in *Ibid.*, pp. 327-8: “We believe Bibliolatry has been, and is likely long to be, the bane of Protestant Christianity.”
54. The letter anticipates, and attempts to disarm, Mill’s reservations. “I know that, with your absolute respect for liberty of teaching, you of all men would least ask from me a confession of philosophical faith. But, from regard to old memories, I may perhaps fitly say that, notwithstanding some modifications of early opinion due to a period of Greek and German studies, I have continued to teach the “Association” psychology, with Bain’s additions, in the same way as when I believed nothing else; and have never quitted the fundamental doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge which divides the English schools.”(Martineau to Mill, 4 July 1866, Special Collections, The Milton S. Eisenhower Library, The Johns Hopkins University.)
55. Mill, interestingly, was not put out by Martineau’s review of *Discussions and Dissertations*. Thanking his publisher Parker for forwarding some articles, he noted Martineau’s was “the only one of much importance.”(J. Mill to J. Parker, 5 October 1859, *Later Letters*, v. 2, p. 638.)


70. *Ibid*.

71. *Ibid*.


73. Mill’s reservations about the epistemology and ontology of his father and Bentham, inspired by Coleridge and Carlyle, precipitated a more severe and consequential crisis than the earlier adolescent despair he detailed in his *Autobiography* at the melancholy prospect of all his political ambitions being satisfied. While his father was alive, Mill did not dare publish his criticisms of Benthamite ethics under his own name. In the same letter to Parker praising Martineau, he urges his publisher to consult his views on Bentham printed anonymously as an appendix to Bulwer Lytton’s *England and the English*. The article, he warns, “is not, and must not be, known to be mine.” (*Ibid*.)


75. *Ibid*.

76. *Ibid*.


“In the opinions you express respecting a Church Establishment I entirely agree, and though some of the habitual contributors to the review still differ from us, the general tone of the review will, I have reason to hope, be that which you approve. A considerable change is, I think, taking place in the tone of thinking of the instructed Radicals on that point.... The mistake, I think, is in applying the *test* to the *doctrines* which the clergy shall teach, instead of applying it to their qualifications as teachers, and to the spirit in which they teach.... One of the most important objects which the review could be instrumental to, would be to discredit dogmatic religion and encourage the boldest spirit of rationalism. This too is the spirit which is spreading among the young and cultivated members of the English clergy. “(J. Mill to J. Martineau, 26 May 1835, *Earlier Letters*, v. 1, p. 264.)


84. *Ibid*.
90. *Ibid*.
93. *Ibid*, p. 126-7
97. *A Study of Spinoza* appeared in 1882, but only after he retired from an active career as a teacher and administrator in 1885 did his major publications appear: *Types of Ethical Theory* (2 vols.) (1885), his magnum opus, *A Study of Religion* (2 vols.) (1888), *The Seat of Authority in Religion* (1890), and *Essays, Reviews and Addresses* (4 vols.) (1890-1).
100. *Ibid.*, pp. 270-6. As Schneewind notes, Martineau’s emphases correlate with the Protestant belief stressed by Unitarians that salvation depends on purity of spirit, on
moral goodness, and not on natural abilities which are unequally distributed, or on information accessible only to those with the leisure to read and converse (and, naturally, not on the profession of certain doctrines, and still less on participation in prescribed rites and rituals)( J. B. Schneewind, *Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 238, 243-7.)


105. W. S. Jevons to T. Jevons, 12 January 1861; Mss #5, Fo 2, Jevons Collection, Seton Hall University. Jevons, ironically, was a great admirer of his former teacher Augustus De Morgan, Martineau’s most impassioned defender. (“I find the classes at college a little dull—the charm is rubbed off a few things—but then one learns more and more to adore De Morgan, as an unfathomable fund of mathematics.” W. S. Jevons to H. Jevons, 27 Jan. 1860, R. D. C. Black, *Papers and Correspondence of W. S. Jevons*, v. 2, (Clifton, NJ, 1973), p. 406.

106. W. S. Jevons to T. Jevons, 28 April 1861, Jevons Collection, Seton Hall.


109. R. Waller, p. 228; P. G. Wodehouse, “Jeeves Takes Charge,” *Selected Stories by P. G. Wodehouse* (New York, 1958), p. 4. No doubt Martineau’s reputation owed much to such perishable assets as his character, his eloquence, and his physical presence. With his flowing white hair, penetrating eyes, and gaunt face, Martineau resembled a Victorian rendition of an Old Testament prophet. The Unitarian philosopher has been the subject of one published study since World War I, *The Ethical System of James Martineau*, by J. H. Herz (New York, 1967).


111. Martineau to Cobbe, 20 May 1867, Cobbe Papers CB 588, Huntington Library. “The enthusiasm which his philosophy sometimes calls forth,” Martineau continued, “is a curious sign of morbid excitement; and can be explained only on the principle that the hottest fever loves the coldest draught.”


113. Croom Robertson spent part of the summer of 1868 in France hunting down letters from Hobbes. (Grote Collection MS ADD 88/10 46 and 47). Grote assisted his protege in this endeavor in various ways; Hobbes was in his view a great radical beneath the monarchist veneer. Grote’s warm feelings for the young professor are evident throughout their correspondence. (Grote to Croom Robertson, 9 Dec. 1867, 5 Feb. 1869, MS ADD 88/10 43, 51).

114. Stephen, 1294-5; A. Bain and T. Whittaker (eds.) *Philosophical Remains of George Croom Robertson, with a Memoir* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1894), ix-xxiv. With typical Victorian discretion, neither Bain nor Stephen names the illness Croom Robertson suffered from. *Mind* was funded by Alexander Bain, on the condition that Robertson be editor.


117. Lipkes, *Politics*, 34-43. It is also possible that Mill, in his final years, was inching toward a form of theism espoused by his friend William Thornton.

118. *Autobiography* in J. Robson and J. Stillinger (eds.), *Autobiography and Literary Essays*, CW 1, (Toronto, 1931), p. 269. “Now, the difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition, and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress.”