

A Century of Philosophy at University College, London

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Source: *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Oct., 1928, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Oct., 1928), pp. 468-482

Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3745678>

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## A CENTURY OF PHILOSOPHY AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON<sup>1</sup>

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THIS year we have been celebrating our centenary, and, when so much has been said, and justly said, of the contributions to various branches of science and learning that have emanated from University College, it seems fitting that the part which the College has played in the advancement of philosophical research should not be left out of account. For in spite of the manifold difficulties that stood in the way of instituting a school of philosophical study in London, what has been achieved here, both in the way of original investigation and of effective teaching, constitutes a record of which we may well be proud.

Let me note, at the outset, certain facts of general interest. The original project from which the institution of University College resulted was to establish in London a great University, somewhat after the model of the University of Berlin, which had been founded in 1809. Largely through the persistence of Thomas Campbell, the poet, the project took practical shape in 1825. The proposed University was to be first and foremost a centre of liberal education in the natural sciences and in the studies which in Oxford are grouped together under the name "*litteræ humaniores*"—a fitting centre of intellectual culture for the metropolis of the empire. There was, indeed, to be no Faculty of Theology. So far as the Church of England was concerned, there appeared to be no need to furnish instruction for which ample provision was already made at Oxford and Cambridge; while, so far as the numerous Nonconformist sects were concerned, it was deemed to be beyond the range of human ingenuity to devise a scheme of theological training that would be acceptable to them all.

The foundation-stone of the intended 'London University' was laid on April 30, 1827, and in October 1828 the building had so far progressed as to be ready for the initiation of courses of lectures in Arts, Laws, and Medicine. The Charter which the pioneers had sought was, however, never obtained. In 1830 a Petition was presented to the King, praying the grant of a Charter of Incorporation for the 'London University,' enabling it to confer Degrees in subjects not theological. And in point of fact the Charter was

<sup>1</sup> Introductory Lecture in the Department of Philosophy at University College, London, delivered on October 10, 1927.

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actually prepared, the only requisite being the affixing of the Great Seal, when an *impasse* was occasioned by the opposition of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Meanwhile King's College was instituted in 1829, as "a College in which instruction in the doctrines and duties of Christianity as taught by the Church of England should be for ever combined with other branches of useful education." Thus, on the application for a Charter for the 'London University' being renewed in 1833, the Government of the day found itself in a difficulty by reason of the existence of a rival College, which could neither be merged with the proposed 'London University' nor left out of account. The expedient was adopted of creating a University over the heads of both institutions—a University the sole function of which was that of examining and of conferring Degrees. The University of London was founded in 1836; and, at the same time, the institution which had hitherto been known as the 'London University' obtained a Charter of Incorporation as "one Body Politic and Corporate . . . by name of University College, London."

Among the promoters of the scheme for instituting a 'London University' there had been Lord Brougham, James Mill, and George Grote, then a young man very much under the influence of Mill. The claims of philosophy to a place in a programme of liberal education were, therefore, little likely to be neglected. Two significant *Statements* of what it was proposed to undertake were issued by the Council of the new institution, the first in 1827 and the second in 1828. According to the first, there were to be two philosophical Chairs—one of Logic and the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and one of Moral and Political Philosophy. According to the *Second Statement*, the one Chair would have for its province "that department of mental phenomena in which all that relates to knowledge or the acquisition and formation of ideas is concerned;" while the other Chair would have for its province "that department of the mental phenomena in which all that relates to action is concerned." These Chairs were advertised in the spring of 1827, but no candidates of any distinction made application for them. A follower of Bentham, Dr. Southwood Smith, was recommended in Committee for the Chair of Moral Philosophy, and he might have done some useful work, but he was not elected. For the other Chair, the name of the Rev. John Hoppus was seriously considered; but, in consequence of Grote's opposition on the ground that in an unsectarian institution no minister of religion could consistently occupy a Chair of *Philosophy*, he was not recommended. So that when the 'London University' opened its courses of lectures in 1828 neither of its philosophical Chairs had been filled.

This state of things did not, however, continue long. In the spring

of 1829, or earlier, Grote tried to secure the election of his friend Charles Cameron to the Chair of Moral and Political Philosophy. But although Cameron was recommended by the Education Committee in June, the Council in July, at the instigation amongst others of Zachary Macaulay, the father of the great Macaulay, threw out the recommendation.<sup>1</sup> Then, during the vacation, some of the members of the Council proceeded to seek out clerical candidates; and, apparently with the concurrence of Brougham and Mill, Mr. Hoppus was recommended in November for the Chair of Logic and the Philosophy of Mind, which had been refused him in 1827. Grote was absent from the Committee when the recommendation was made, and, notwithstanding his disapproval, the recommendation was endorsed by the Council.

John Hoppus became, accordingly, the first Professor of Philosophy at University College, and he entered upon his duties in 1830. He was an Independent minister, who had for a time been educated at the Rotherham Independent College. Afterwards he had studied at Edinburgh, under Dugald Stewart, but, in order to hear Chalmers's sermons, he transferred later his terms to Glasgow, where he graduated. He received the LL.D. degree of Glasgow in 1839, and became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1841. For a short time (1824-1825) he had been minister of Carter Lane Chapel, but had resigned on account of theological differences with his congregation. Probably what secured his election to the Professorship was a book of his on Bacon's *Novum Organum*, which appeared in 1829. Dr. Hoppus was much interested in educational problems, and he took a prominent part in the controversy waged in regard to popular education in 1847. In philosophy he was a follower of Dugald Stewart, and his lectures on 'The Philosophy of Mind' were mapped out very much on the model of Dugald Stewart's lectures in Edinburgh. His principal course of lectures was given on three days a week throughout the session. It was divided into three sections, the first comprising the treatment of sensations and the cognitive states and faculties, the second the treatment of logic as the analysis and art of reasoning, and the third the treatment of the emotions. But he lectured also on the History of Philosophy and on Moral Philosophy. On the former subject, I should imagine his lectures must have been fairly exhaustive. For instance, in the session 1853-1854 he appears to have dealt at length with the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte; and in the session 1854-1855, with those of Locke, Wolff, Kant, and Fichte. So again in the session 1857-1858 he gave a course of lectures on Schelling—Schelling's first philosophical period 1795-1800; and he continued the course

<sup>1</sup> On the ground, so far as I can gather, that Cameron was *not* a minister of religion.

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in the next session, taking Schelling's later period from 1800 onwards for discussion. He seems to have made a careful study of Kant and the post-Kantian thinkers, with whom at that time there was very little acquaintance either in England or Scotland. Dugald Stewart, for example, confessed that he could never understand Kant. The lectures of Dr. Hoppus on Moral Philosophy appear to have been mainly historical in character; but in his last courses he handled critically the problem of Free-will and determinism.

His classes were not large, but several of his students afterwards became men of note,—for instance, William Shaen, head of a large firm of London solicitors, who was medalist in the M.A. examination in 1841; Walter Bagehot, who was medalist in 1848; and Richard Holt Hutton, the well-known editor of the *Spectator*, who was medalist in 1849. John Clifford, the Congregationalist, took the class-prize in the History of Philosophy in 1862. It ought to be mentioned that in those days every candidate for the B.A. degree of the University of London was required to pass in Logic and Moral Philosophy. It is true that what was demanded in these subjects was not excessive. Parts of Whately's *Logic* and of Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, together with Butler's three *Sermons on Human Nature*, made up the curriculum. The higher degree of M.A. could, however, be obtained in Philosophy, and under this head the subjects were Logic, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of the Mind, Political Philosophy, and Political Economy. Several men who later became distinguished followed this course. Furthermore, it was required that Doctors in Medicine should pass an examination in the Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, Logic, and Moral Philosophy, unless they had previously taken a degree in Arts. At first, the scope of this examination was left to the discretion of the examiners; but in time it came to be confined to the first book of the *Novum Organum*, Cousin's Analysis of Locke's *Essay*, the first part of Butler's *Analogy*, and Dugald Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*—not so mean a bill of fare of its kind, after all.

There can be little doubt that the teaching at the College was more than adequate to meet the requirements of those who were working for the London degrees. During the thirty-six years that he held the Chair, Dr. Hoppus evidently devoted himself assiduously to his teaching. So far as original philosophical work was concerned, it was, in England, a particularly barren period. There was no philosophy, Bain averred, south of the Tweed. No philosophical journal was in existence as a medium for communicating the results of research, and it was far from easy to induce publishers to undertake the publication of philosophical books. Dr. Hoppus did not, in those years, add anything to philosophical literature; and, in all likelihood, his thoughts moved more or less on conventional lines. But he

certainly laboured to maintain a high standard of learning at the College, and some at any rate of his pupils were destined to make their mark as philosophical thinkers.

When Dr. Hoppus retired in 1866, James Martineau, then universally recognized as one of the greatest of living thinkers, offered himself as a candidate for the Chair, and the Report of the Senate was in his favour. But, at the Council meeting of August 4th, Grote moved a resolution to the effect that it was "inconsistent with the complete religious neutrality proclaimed and adopted by University College to appoint to the Chair of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic a candidate eminent as minister and preacher of any one among the various sects dividing the religious world." This resolution was lost by a majority of one. On the motion that Mr. Martineau be appointed, the votes were equal, and the Chairman, Lord Belper, gave his casting-vote against it. Martineau's election was thereby negatived, though no one else was chosen. The vacancy was advertised afresh, but no additional applications were received. At the Council meeting of November 3rd, a motion in favour of Martineau's election was once more defeated. In consequence of this vote the College lost the services of one of the most brilliant of its teachers, Professor Augustus De Morgan, who, although he could ill spare its modest emoluments, resigned his Chair of Mathematics by way of protest. "I came here," he said, "on the understanding that a man in office may have *any* theology, provided he sticks to his own subject in his class; if the stipulation be that a man shall have *no* theology, I am just as much disqualified as Mr. Martineau." The Council met again on December 8th, and Croom Robertson, then a young man of twenty-five, who had been a pupil of Bain's at Aberdeen, and who had spent some part of his student life in Germany, was appointed. There was, and indeed still is, considerable difference of opinion in regard to the Council's action in this matter, and no purpose would be served by reviving an old controversy.<sup>1</sup> But whatever view one may take upon the merits of the case, I think we may agree that, in one sense, it was perhaps well that things turned out as they did.

<sup>1</sup> Grote died in 1871, and bequeathed the reversion of £6,000 for the endowment of the Chair of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic. According to what seems to be the literal meaning of the terms of the will, the income of the endowment cannot be paid to a man who either is or has ever been a minister of religion. That the Chair shall not be held by a minister of religion is, no doubt, a provision that may be defended on more grounds than one. But to debar a man from holding it who, perhaps, through change of view has relinquished the ministry is a piece of intolerance for which there can be no defence, and which is wholly out of keeping with the principles on which the College was founded. Such a condition would have precluded a man of the eminence, for example, of James Ward from occupying the Grote Chair. I cannot think that that could really have been Grote's intention.

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Martineau was unquestionably a thinker of rare power and originality; I doubt, however, whether he would have found the elementary teaching of logic and psychology congenial to him. Indeed, he himself tells us that so soon as it became evident that the Chair in University College was filled by a thoroughly efficient teacher, he resigned into his hands the instruction of the undergraduate students of Manchester New College, of which he was soon to become Principal.

George Croom Robertson entered upon the duties of the Chair in January 1867. He had, it is true, no alternative but to devote the greater part of his work at the College to quite elementary teaching. He usually lectured three hours a week during the first term on the Philosophy of Mind, or Psychology, giving two additional hours for the discussion of exercises, for the same number of hours in the second term on Logic, while in the third term he would lecture two hours a week on the History of Philosophy and one hour a week on Ethics. In the third term he also lectured to an advanced class on some philosophical classic, such as Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* or Kant's *Prolegomena*. These summer courses, which were adapted to the requirements of the M.A. degree, generally led him into fresh ground, and were the occasion of a special study of the original authorities.

His lectures on psychology were a masterly treatment of the whole field, and can only be ranked with James Ward's lectures at Cambridge and Robert Adamson's at Manchester. They went at once to the fundamental problems, and his discussion of these was always penetrating and suggestive. Although he had been brought up in the school of Bain and the Associationists, he was constantly breaking away from and criticizing the doctrines of his former teacher. He propounded, for example, to his class a view of the nature of perception that was essentially original and which deviated markedly from that which he had heard expounded in Aberdeen. He recognized distinctly that discrimination and comparison are involved in every act of perception. Only in so far as we differentiate one sense-quality from another, only in so far as we are conscious that 'it is this and not that,' can we be said to be perceiving. And, in consequence, he insisted that sensation bare and simple is never an actual fact of conscious experience,—that it never constitutes *all* that we are conscious of at any given moment. Any sense-experience whatsoever that we can make the subject of consideration, that we actually find ourselves having, is something more than sensation, is never pure sense. We get nearest to such a condition, no doubt, in so-called systemic or organic sensations, but even here our sense-experience is always, though in different degrees, somehow *related* or *referred*. Even these vague confused systemic sensations are regarded as connected with some part of the body, as being within the organism.

And in the case of the special senses the fact is still more obvious. A sound is never thought of as purely subjective, but always as 'proceeding from' somewhere. The coloured band round the wall is referred, not to ourselves, but as a *quality*, to a certain *thing*. Most of all in touch we relate roughness, weight, solidity, etc., to an *object*, as its *attributes* or *properties*. In fine, sense-data appear, never as mere affections of ourselves, but invariably as qualities of things; and it is only by an effort of abstraction, and for the purposes of psychological study, that we ever come to conceive of them as subjective. What, then, he asked, is implied in being aware of an *object*? How do we come to refer what we call sensations, some to the body, some to 'things' apart from the body? In a very suggestive manner he emphasized the consideration that perception is never mere passive receptivity, that there is always involved in it the putting forth somehow of muscular activity. It is, he argued, through the fact of *resistance* that we arrive at any knowledge of objects. Once let there be experience of something as resisting, then the touches that are got from it are apprehended as definite facts in an external world. We do not first have a perception of objects as extended; we first have a consciousness of being pulled up or obstructed. At the outset, a vague consciousness of activity, then of this being impeded—such is the start towards apprehension of an object. Touch is intensified progressively with consciousness of impeded activity; and these two *are* resistance. Psychologically, the real meaning of the term 'object' is, in the first instance, *obstacle*,—a significance that is also involved in the German word *Gegenstand*. Moreover, Croom Robertson maintained that no satisfactory psychological theory of space-apprehension is possible so long as we *begin* by trying to explain the apprehension of extension or extendedness. Bain, for instance, had attempted to account for the experience of extension by supposing (*a*) that certain serial sensations of touch come to appear as co-existing in time, and (*b*) that such co-existences come to be interpreted as the quality of extension or spatial apartness. But, Croom Robertson insisted, simultaneity is not extension, co-existence in time is not the same as co-existence in space, so that the explanation turns out to be a failure. If, however, we assume that object, as bare obstacle to the muscular activity of a touching organ, has already become to any degree differentiated in consciousness, then a basis is obtained by reference to which the conjoined sensible experiences shown by analysis to be involved in any perception of extension may begin to appear, not as simply intensive experiences of one kind or another, but as constituents of what is objective. In point of fact, the development of the apprehension of the two aspects of external (or bodily) object—resistance and extension—will proceed *pari passu*, so soon as a beginning of the apprehension

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of both has been made; a thing will not come to be perceived as *definitely* external until it is also perceived as *definitely* extended. Yet a first beginning must somehow be made; and, he contended, the first beginning must be sought in that aspect of object which we call resistance rather than in that aspect which we call extension.

In order to illustrate Croom Robertson's extraordinary keenness and penetration as a psychological investigator I have referred to this analysis of perception; but I might have pointed to his treatment of many other subjects—of memory, of the process of thinking, of the nature of feeling, of conation and volition—in confirmation of the same thing. In truth, he was beyond question the most original mind that has ever worked at psychology within these walls; with the instinct of genius, he knew at once what was a genuine psychological problem and what was not, and his mode of handling the former was invariably stimulating and suggestive. Furthermore, he saw clearly enough that psychology, as the science of mind, stands to philosophy in a relation very different from that in which the physical sciences stand to it, that an account of the way in which knowledge is realized in the mental life cannot be arbitrarily severed from the inquiry into the nature of knowledge as such, and that when that separation is effected a hybrid results which is as little entitled to be described as science on the one hand as philosophy on the other.

In the fields of philosophical literature Croom Robertson's erudition was notorious; he had an intimate knowledge of most of the great metaphysical systems, and he brought to bear upon them the critical scrutiny of one who had carefully explored the whole range of thought in which they moved. With regard to any piece of work he undertook, he was conscientious almost to excess. In preparing, for instance, his monograph on "Hobbes," in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics—the one volume he was enabled to publish during his tenure of office at the College—he spent an immense amount of time in minutely examining the Hobbes manuscripts in the possession of the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth; and in making himself familiar with all the details of the curious and obscure controversies in which Hobbes was engaged with the mathematicians as well as with the philosophers of his day. Small in compass though it is, the book is in its way a masterpiece; it contains a wonderfully skilful portraiture of the man and a thoroughly judicious estimate of his speculation.

It was, however, round the philosophy of Kant that Croom Robertson's own constructive philosophic work was mainly done; he was persuaded that experience, as it had been treated by the English empirical thinkers, needed to be reinterpreted in the light of Kant's critical investigation, and that an experientialism which

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had not reckoned with the Kantian analysis of knowledge was doomed to sterility. In the later years of his life he reached, indeed, a definite metaphysical position of his own—a system of monadology, based on that of Leibniz, though deviating from it in many important respects. The ultimate unit of a material thing, he argued, finds expression in the notion of an atom, and the notion of an atom when further inspected resolves itself into the notion of a centre of force or energy. Theoretically, then, an atom is to be distinguished from an extended corporeal entity, and in the conception of force or energy we possess a means of avoiding the dualism between matter and mind. For the reality of our psychical being consists most fully in the exercise of activity, in our function as conative. In the last resort, force or energy, whether in the individual or in the atom, constitutes real existence. But force or energy is, he urged, always, so far as we can discover, the expression of a mind. He would conceive the physical universe, therefore, as composed ultimately of mental entities, of non-extended elements, which appear when in conjunction as extended.

A signal service rendered by Croom Robertson to the progress of philosophical research remains to be mentioned. Through the public spirit and generous support of Professor Bain, it became possible to start in January 1876 the quarterly Review, called *Mind*, the first English Journal devoted to the interests of philosophy and psychology, and Croom Robertson undertook the editorship. With his usual thoroughness, he bore the brunt of the requisite preparations for the start, settled the plan and arrangements of the numbers, procured the requisite pledges of articles in advance, and drafted the programme. The title of the periodical, which commended itself at once to every one concerned, was due to his happy inspiration. From every point of view he was an ideal editor; and the Journal rapidly became, it may not unfairly be said, the leading organ of philosophy in the world. One of its original objects was to keep the English reader informed in regard to foreign philosophical publications; and not only did the editor spare no pains in getting contributions that should fulfil this purpose, but he took upon himself no small part of the burden of supplying them. Nor was that all. A large number of the reviews and notices of new books, both English and foreign, were from his pen, and in several closely reasoned articles he unfolded his mature reflexion upon many of the more outstanding questions of psychology and metaphysics. Some of these have been fortunately reproduced in book-form in the volume of *Philosophical Remains* which was published in 1894, under the supervision of Professor Bain and Mr. T. Whittaker.

The cruel disease which ultimately proved fatal began to exhibit itself twelve years before his death. During the sessions 1883–1884,

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1886-1887, and part of 1887-1888, he had to absent himself from his teaching work. Professor Sorley, Dr. Coupland, and James Sully acted for him, at different times, as deputy; and during one term Professor Adamson travelled every week from Manchester to London in order to give lectures for him. He tendered his resignation in April 1888; but the Council declined to accept it, until he should have had the relief of another session by means of a substitute. He finally resigned on May 7, 1892. His wife died three weeks afterwards, and on September 20th he himself passed peacefully and painlessly away, within four months of his wife's decease. "Few men, if any," Leslie Stephen wrote at the time, "have done so much in their generation to promote a serious study of Philosophy in England. . . . No more true-hearted, affectionate, and modest nature has ever revealed itself to me; and if anything could raise my estimate of the quiet heroism with which he met overpowering troubles, it would be his apparently utter unconsciousness that he was displaying any unusual qualities in his protracted struggle against the most trying afflictions." Many great and distinguished men were colleagues of Croom Robertson on the staff of the College, among them W. K. Clifford, who held the Chair of Applied Mathematics from 1870 to 1879, and who was himself a metaphysician of remarkable acuteness. But I doubt whether any of them were men of deeper mental grasp or of wider intellectual vision than this modest occupant of the Chair of Philosophy.

Croom Robertson's successor was James Sully, who in 1892 was already fifty years of age. He had been educated at the Independent College, Taunton, at Regent's Park College, and also at Göttingen and Berlin, under Lotze; and by this time he was well known through his writings. He had been a frequent contributor to *Mind*, and had published in 1874 a work entitled *Sensation and Intuition*, comprising a series of studies in psychological, æsthetic, and ethical subjects. Moreover, his *Outlines of Psychology*, which appeared in 1884, had become a recognized textbook in most of the English Universities.

In the main, Sully followed, so far as his classes in the College were concerned, the method of his predecessor. He gave what was called a General Course of lectures, three times a week, which dealt in the first term with Psychology, in the second term with Logic, and in the third term with General Philosophy and Ethics. But, in addition, he had an advanced class for the special subjects of the M.A. degree in the History of Philosophy during the first and second terms. And in the third term he gave, during several years, a course on Æsthetics, a subject which he had made peculiarly his own, and on which the article in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* had been written by him.

As a psychologist, Sully, like Croom Robertson, had been brought up in the traditions of the Associationist school. But in his two chief works on the subject—that already mentioned, and the larger book, entitled *The Human Mind*, published in 1892, the year when he entered upon the duties of the Chair—he is constantly to be found breaking away from the familiar tenets of associationism, and nearing the point of view presented by James Ward in his *Encyclopædia Britannica* article. While following in large measure the method of the older empirical psychologists, Sully recognized the importance of regarding the mind as an organic unity and of emphasizing the intimate connectedness of its fundamental processes. He made at any rate an approach towards tracing genetically the development of mental life into the specially marked phases which it manifests in our mature experience. And particularly in the prominence he assigned to attention as a general condition of our mental operations, and in his attempt to show how so-called voluntary attention may be conceived as having gradually emerged from attention of a more rudimentary type, he was deserting the pathway of Mill and Bain.

It was through Sully's initiative that a Laboratory for Experimental Psychology was started at the College in October 1897, under the superintendence during the first session of Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, of Cambridge. A considerable part of the apparatus collected by Hugo Münsterberg, at that time about to migrate to Harvard, was secured through the help of many contributors, including Francis Galton, Henry Sidgwick, A. J. Balfour (as he then was), Sir John Lubbock, and Shadworth Hodgson. In the session 1898–1899 Mr. E. T. Dixon, of Cambridge, who had done some valuable experimental work on the sense of depth, superintended the work of the Laboratory, while in 1900 Dr. W. McDougall was appointed as its head, a post he held for several years.

Sully's most original contributions to philosophy were doubtless those which he made to the study of æsthetics. He maintained that beauty is certainly not a quality of an object in the same way in which the colour or the form of it is a quality. Indeed, in constructing a scientific theory, it would, he thought, be well to dispense altogether with the assumption of an objective quality of beauty and to substitute for it the relative idea of æsthetic value. He drew up what he conceived to be as exact a classification as possible of the pleasures which afford the raw material of æsthetic appreciation, and such a system seemed to him to furnish "the first dimension in the æsthetic measure, namely, extension." But, furthermore, there is needed a method of measuring the quantity of æsthetic pleasure, so as to justify the ranking of certain forms of it above others,—“a dimension of intension or degree.” And this he would find (*a*) in its degree of universality and permanence in human nature as a whole, the

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utilitarian standard; (b) in the purity, duration, and susceptibility of frequent renewal of the pleasure in question, or in the fitness of the æsthetic object to afford the highest and purest pleasure to a typical æsthetic nature; and (c) by endeavouring to determine the nature of the transformation which the several capacities involved in æsthetic appreciation undergo, the orders of idea and sentiment which appear destined to persist and survive the others, and so on. In the light of what we know concerning human evolution, we are entitled, he held, to conclude (a) that the æsthetic feelings grow in number, subtlety, and variety, that they become more refined and frequent enjoyments *pari passu* with the development of the discriminative and the assimilative functions, and (b) that they grow in range or amplitude with the development of the retentive power of the mind, or, in other words, its capability of ideal aggregation and of ideal revival.

In many ways, other than those I have mentioned, the department of Philosophy at the College was extended during Sully's tenure of the Chair. In 1899 Dr. Wolf was appointed Assistant, and took part in the teaching of the elementary class in Logic, while in subsequent years he lectured on advanced problems in Logic, and in the third term on the History of Modern Philosophy. It is interesting also to record that, in the session 1902-1903, a course of lectures on "The Development and Significance of Plato's Theory of Ideas" was given by Bernard Bosanquet.

A considerable portion of Sully's time at the College was occupied with administrative work consequent on the gradual realization of the project for constituting the University of London a teaching University. This was accomplished by the Act of 1898, whereby an organic connexion was established between the degree-giving authority and the teaching institutions. University College, together with King's College, was given direct representation upon the Senate,<sup>1</sup> and the teachers likewise of other Colleges in London who were considered to be doing work of University character received the right of electing representatives on the Senate and the power of exerting further influence through Boards of Studies on which they were eligible to serve. Sully was, I believe, the first Chairman of the Board of Philosophical Studies, and he was largely instrumental in drawing up the scheme of the new B.A. Honours Degree in Philosophy. Notwithstanding, he contrived while at the College to produce two interesting volumes, the one called *Studies of Childhood* in 1895, concerning which he tells us he received favourable words

<sup>1</sup> Later, on January 1, 1907, in accordance with the provisions of the University College, London (Transfer) Act, 1905, the College was incorporated in the University of London, an example afterwards followed in the case of King's College and Bedford College.

“from men like W. E. Gladstone, Leslie Stephen, and George Meredith”; and the other *An Essay on Laughter* in 1902, a work in which his wide and varied reading, his power of accurate psychological observation, and his well-tempered æsthetic judgment are strikingly manifested.

After he resigned the Chair in 1903, he lived for twenty years (he died on November 2, 1923), beloved and respected by a large number of friends. Like Croom Robertson, he had been one of the “Sunday Tramps,” the celebrated Club of pedestrians, organized by Leslie Stephen, and also a member of the famous “Metaphysical Society,” memorable, *inter alia*, for the vigorous debates between Huxley and “Ideal Ward” (W. G. Ward, the Roman Catholic theologian).

Carveth Read, who was appointed Sully’s successor in 1903, was a graduate of Cambridge, and had studied under Wundt and Kuno Fischer for two years at Leipzig and Heidelberg. He had previously lectured at Wren’s, to candidates for the Indian Civil Service, on Logic and Philosophy, later also on Economics and English Literature. As far back as 1878 he had published a book, *On the Theory of Logic*, as the result of his research in Germany; and in 1898 there had appeared from his pen an introductory textbook on *Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, which has since gone through numerous editions. He had been, too, a frequent contributor to the pages of *Mind*.

Carveth Read’s main course of lectures was a General Course on Psychology, consisting of eighty lectures, extending through two terms of each session, and usually followed in the third term by lectures on special psychological problems. At first he lectured also on Elementary Logic, on the History of Modern Philosophy, and on Metaphysics, which subjects, however, he relinquished later to other hands. But it was, he tells us, in preparing these lectures that most of the ideas took shape which were subsequently embodied and worked out in his two elaborate books, *The Metaphysics of Nature*, published in 1905, and *Natural and Social Morals*, published in 1909.

It would be superfluous on the present occasion to refer at length to these striking volumes, the contents of which will be fresh in the minds of most of you. In the first of them there is presented a metaphysical conception of remarkable depth and originality. We have, it is contended, in our own consciousness an immediate knowledge of ultimate reality, while empirical reality, which includes our own bodies and the external world, is phenomenal, but manifests what is ultimately real. Though reality is throughout conscious, its whole being cannot be fully expressed by consciousness; so far as the remainder is concerned, it is transcendent, and can be understood partly from the laws of phenomena, which represent it objectively, and partly from the laws of consciousness, which is reality itself subjectively conditioned. In empirical reality, matter and conscious-

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ness appear as merely contrasted areas of consciousness itself; in physical reality, as interpreted by natural science, matter is reduced to certain quantitative aspects of objective consciousness; whereas in ultimate reality, matter has no place, since it is a phenomenon or representation of that reality in so far as the latter is not consciousness. It follows, therefore, that the ambition to attain to absolutely simple Being is illusory; ultimate reality contains a duality, namely, consciousness and the transcendent Being or Idea that is conscious.

To complete my narrative, I have to add that in 1904 I was elected, as Carveth Read's colleague, to fill the Chair, contemplated as I have mentioned from the start, of Moral Philosophy. Then it became possible to provide a complete course of lectures on Ethics and Greek Philosophy, together with more advanced courses on the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. Moreover, in addition to the General Course on the History of Modern Philosophy, I have been able each session to deal in detail with the Critical Philosophy of Kant, and to make it the point of departure for the consideration of present-day problems. Another noteworthy feature has been the Postgraduate Class, often a large one, consisting for the most part of former students engaged during the day in London, in which the more difficult questions of epistemology and metaphysics have been discussed.

Carveth Read's resignation in 1911 was deeply regretted by all his fellow-workers, and it led to a certain amount of reorganization of the Department. Dr. C. Spearman, who in 1907 had succeeded Dr. McDougall, became Professor of Psychology, my Chair became that of Philosophy, while Dr. Wolf was appointed Reader in Logic and Ethics.<sup>1</sup> Thus provision was made for a very comprehensive treatment of philosophy in each of its branches, so that now it may be fairly claimed that in no College (or University) in the country is a larger number of philosophical studies represented than in our own.

But I must not speak of the present day, or of the teachers and students who are still with us. I have been trying to tell the story of what has been done at the College in one great field of intellectual pursuit, and I think I have said enough to show that it forms no inconsiderable chapter in the history of our hundred years. Adequately to think out philosophical conceptions is, it has been truly said, no easy task; it is not like the spinning of an oyster-shell, but a revolution of the whole soul. "No other subject in the academical curriculum touches so many of the deepest interests of humanity, or touches them so intimately; no other subject is adapted to produce so fundamental a change in the culture of the individual mind." Great, then, are indeed the responsibilities of those who would lead in this

<sup>1</sup> In 1922 Dr. Wolf was appointed Professor of Logic and Scientific Method.

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domain the reflexion of others. Let us trust that in the new century upon which the College is entering philosophical science and learning may still find here a congenial home; and that when we humble seekers after truth have retired from the scene, men of the calibre of Croom Robertson, James Sully, and Carveth Read may be giving to their students and to the world the fruits of their thought and labour.