Dworkin's Legal Monism and Authoritarian International Law

Speaker:
Professor Thomas Bustamante
Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil; and National Council for Scientific Development (CNPq), Brazil)

Chair: Professor Kevin Toh (UCL Laws)

About this talk

It is often assumed that the debate between legal positivism and non-positivism is undecided since it is possible to take up these metaphysical positions without disagreeing about how to adjudicate actual legal cases. I argue, however, that Dworkin’s legal monism is better equipped than legal positivism to deal with a recent threat to the legality and authority of international law, namely the practice described by Ginsburg as 'authoritarian use’ of international law. ‘Authoritarian’ use of international law implies disavowal of some inferentially articulated commitments of international law, which are crucial for the legitimacy of international law. Dworkin’s philosophy of international is well-positioned to make sense of these commitments. Based on an interpretivist account of international law, I provide a theoretical analysis of the legitimacy conditions of international law, to show that these commitments cannot be disavowed without undermining the rationality of international law.

About the speaker

Thomas Bustamante is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais and a Senior Researcher of the National Council for Scientific Development (CNPq), both in Brazil. He is currently a Research Fellow at King's College University with a Grant from CAPES Foundation.

Pre-Reading

Note to Seminar participants: Given the length of this draft, readers are invited to read only sections 2 to 5 of this paper (pages 9 to 33 of this paper), skipping the introduction and the final section. I kept the remaining sections for those who might be curious to learn more about the context of the argument I present. Thanks for the audience!

Download the paper

Download the paper

Reserve your place