Debiasing International Economic Law
Debiasing International Economic Law
07 Oct 2019, 13:00 – 14:00
Speaker: Prof. Sergio Puig (The University of Arizona)
Chair: Dr Martins Paparinskis (UCL)
About the talk
A flourishing number of bodies evaluate the conduct of government officials against broad standards, decide complex questions of scientific probity, and calculate the present value of past decisions. The effects of implicit biases (systematic patterns of deviation from rationality in judgment) impacts the assessment of these issues, which are central to international economic law. Such effects are well understood by psychologists and increasingly confirmed by experiments involving legal actors. In this talk, I provide three concrete examples of implicit biases affecting international tax, trade, and investment adjudication, and I call for the incorporation of mechanisms to overcome such biases as well as their strategic exploitation by litigants. At a conceptual level, I propose a typology to think of ‘debiasing tools’—mechanisms that can act as a centerpiece of coordination of information, rather than mere inoculants of the habits of mind on adjudicators. At a normative level, I pose that biases may impact confidence in dispute settlement systems and both concerns for sovereignty and a preference for negotiated solutions make international economic law ripe for testing these interventions.
About the speaker
Sergio Puig is a Professor of Law at University of Arizona and Director of the International Economic Law and Policy Program. Sergio’s main academic interests include topics related to international economic law, international arbitration, international law and society, and the legal profession. Sergio attended UNAM and graduated summa cum laude and received a law degree from ITAM. He also earned a masters in International and Socio-Legal Studies (JSM) and a doctoral degree (JSD) in International Economic Law, at Stanford Law School. Before joining University of Arizona, Sergio practice law in Mexico and the US, worked for the World Bank and ICSID and taught at Stanford and Duke Law. His main publications are available in SSRN.