The possibility of constitutional theory

Speaker: Dimitrios Kyritsis, University of Reading
Series: UCL Legal Philosophy Forum

Abstract

In this presentation Kyritsis explains the main features of a moralised constitutional theory and offers some arguments in its favour. In particular, he defend two characteristics of moralised constitutional theory: firstly, its generality and secondly, its doctrinal relevance.

In a nutshell, moralised constitutional theory treats questions of constitutional law (such as questions about the scope of judicial review of primary legislation in this or that jurisdiction), as questions of political morality. Thus, it takes principles of political morality to be essential conditions of propositions of law. In connecting doctrinal law with moral principles, moralised constitutional theory purports to make claims that transcend specific legal systems.

At the same time, though, if it is to be doctrinally relevant and help determine the correct answer to concrete legal questions, it must be continuous with the constitutional law of the relevant legal system. Reconciling generality and doctrinal relevance, establishing the continuity between political morality and constitutional doctrine, is the challenge on which the possibility of moralised constitutional theory depends. To meet the challenge, Kyritsis explains the way moralised constitutional theory accounts for practice, history and politics, three forces that exert their own gravitational force on the content of constitutional law.

Speaker

Dimitrios Kyritsis is Associate Professor in Law at the University of Reading since 2014. Prior to that he was Lecturer at the University of Sheffield and Hauser Global Law Fellow at New York University. He holds a DPhil from Oxford. His primary research interests are legal philosophy and constitutional theory.

His monograph Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory was published by Hart Publishing in early 2015.

Other major publications include ‘Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy’ (2012) 32(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 297-324, ‘Principles, Policies and the Power of Courts’ (2007) 20(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 379-397 and ‘Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 733-751.

He is currently writing a monograph on the legitimacy and scope of constitutional review.

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