


# PRIME

PReventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremists events: Defending against lone actor extremism

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# PRIME

Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremism

D8.1

Communication Measures Review  
Summary Report

February 2016

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# PRIME

**Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremists events: Defending against lone actor extremism**

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## Executive Summary

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PReventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremist events (PRIME) is a collaborative research project funded under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The main purpose of PRIME is to improve understanding of lone actor terrorism and to deliver a knowledge-base that can inform the design of counter-measures and communication measures for the prevention, interdiction and mitigation of lone actor extremist events (LAEEs). This report summarises the findings of Task 8.1 of PRIME Work Package 8: Communication Measures Requirements (WP8). WP8 encompasses all activities involved in the formulation of requirements for communication measures aimed at preventing, interdicting or mitigating lone actor extremist events. This work is being conducted in the UK and Denmark, countries with comparable counter violent radicalisation programmes, but quite different experiences of lone actor extremism. The similarities in policies and differences in experiences make these countries ideal for assessing how counterterrorism communication measures and their effects might depend on national CVR discourses and experiences.

The objective of this review was to analyse good practice and identify gaps in communication measures intended to defend against lone actor extremist events. This objective was met using four data sets: i) an academic literature review, ii) a review of public facing reports and documents (grey literature), iii) a media analysis and, iv) interviews with stakeholders. A framework and definitions for analysis were developed to support systematic analysis of communication materials and guidance. This framework identified 15 communication categories of interest for outward facing communication materials, according to two dimensions of interest; message type and audience type. To capture communication measures across all stages of LAEEs, messages were identified and analysed according to whether they were aimed at (1) preventing radicalisation, (2) detecting, disrupting or stopping terrorist activity, or (3) responding to – or preparing for response to – terrorist activity in order to minimise impact and facilitate return to normal following an attack. The second dimension of interest – audience type – maximised the range of communication measures included in this analysis. Five broad categories of audience were identified for this purpose: the general public, business/private sector, educational sector, affected communities and the potentially vulnerable or already radicalised.

Clear across these sources, particularly the interviews and grey literature, was that stakeholders view LAEEs as a prominent concern and recognise the importance of communications within wider counter-terrorism activity. Several practitioners indicated that additional communications, greater coordination or focus on communications is required. Despite this, data sources in both countries indicate that there has been little focus to date on communication measures designed to address LAEEs. Very few communications specifically focused on LAEEs having been developed although some relevant issues, such as online radicalisation and public vigilance, feature within existing wider communications. There is a spectrum of views amongst practitioners regarding the importance (or possibility) of communicating about this threat. There are several reasons for this, including the perception that existing communications already address the issues in sufficient terms, that officials do not know enough about the unique characteristics of lone-actors and are subsequently not confident to produce

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specific communications, that it could generate disproportionate fear and that it is difficult to know how to target communications to potential lone actors.

Although very little academic research has been conducted concerning communicating about LAEEs, the literature does identify effective communication as an integral component in the prevention, interdiction and mitigation of terrorism more broadly. The main insight for communication from the academic literature that focused specifically on lone actor events was in relation to the importance of information leakage in the interdiction of LAEEs and the need, therefore, for communication measures that encourage reporting behaviour. However, very little guidance was provided either in the lone actor literature reviewed or the wider terrorism literature regarding good practice for communicating to encourage this behaviour. As such, despite insights from neighbouring areas, this appears to be an important gap to be addressed.

Analysis of UK and Danish media coverage of 'lone wolf terrorism' found that in both countries reporting has been largely event driven and that more attention has been afforded to Islamist than Far-Right LAEEs (in large part because there have been more Islamist LAEEs). Few official counter-terrorism campaigns featured in articles that focused on 'lone wolf' terrorism in either country although a small number of specific pieces of advice were provided. Following LAEEs UK messages primarily focused on the need to be vigilant and report suspicious behaviour, whereas Danish articles tended to focus on reassuring the public. The typical Danish framing of lone actors characterised them as mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated and did not particularly differentiate between Islamist and Far Right actors. The UK media used similar framings, but tended to distinguish between Islamist lone actors (framed in relation to crime and violence) and Far Right actors (who were more likely to be framed in relation to mental health issues or as being 'evil').

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## 1. Introduction

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Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremist events (PRIME) is a collaborative research project funded under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The main purpose of PRIME is to improve understanding of lone actor terrorism and to deliver a knowledge-base that can inform the design of counter-measures and communication measures for the prevention, interdiction and mitigation of lone actor extremist events (LAEEs)<sup>1</sup>. This report summarises the findings of Task 8.1 of PRIME Work Package 8: Communication Measures Requirements (WP8). WP8 encompasses all activities involved in the formulation of requirements for communication measures aimed at preventing, interdicting or mitigating lone actor extremist events. WP8 will support the development of evidence-led, context-sensitive communication measures by: (1) reviewing existing communication measures intended to defend against LAEEs, (2) establishing a systematic method for the identification of communication measures requirements, (3) identifying communication requirements and integrating them into a unified framework, and (4) validating and optimising these requirements with stakeholders and end-users. This work is being conducted in the UK and Denmark, countries with comparable counter violent radicalisation (CVR) programmes, but quite different experiences of lone actor extremism. The similarities in policies and differences in experiences make these countries ideal for assessing how counterterrorism communication measures and their effects might depend on national CVR discourses and experiences.

The objective of Task 8.1 was to review and analyse good practice and identify gaps in communication measures intended to defend against LAEEs. Communication is an integral part of response strategies in advance of, during and after terrorist events. Policies and practices that do not incorporate the concepts underpinning effective communication are much more likely to fail. Communication plays a key role in conveying the priorities and advice of law enforcement and security services, in minimising unintended consequences of counter-measures, in countering extremist narratives and in intelligence gathering and deterring offenders. Effective risk communication is vital for mitigating the social, psychological, health and economic impacts of terrorist events and can support resilience and recovery. Conversely, failure to successfully communicate can reduce the efficacy of prevention efforts and compound the negative impacts should a terrorist attack occur.

This objective was met using four data sets: (1) academic literature, (2) national newspapers, (3) stakeholder interviews, and (4) existing communication materials and guidance (grey literature). A framework and definitions for analysis were developed to support systematic analysis of communication materials and guidance. This framework identified 15 communication categories of interest for outward facing communication materials, according to two dimensions of interest; message type and audience type (see Appendix A). To capture communication measures across all stages of LAEEs, messages were identified and analysed according to whether they were aimed at: (1) preventing radicalisation, (2) detecting, disrupting or stopping terrorist activity, or (3) responding to – or preparing for response to – terrorist activity in order to minimise impact and facilitate return to normal following an attack. The second dimension of

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<sup>1</sup> For more information about the PRIME project see [http://www.fp7-prime.eu/home\\_page](http://www.fp7-prime.eu/home_page).

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interest – audience type – maximised the range of communication measures included in this analysis. Initially five broad categories of audience were identified for this purpose: (1) the general public, (2) business/private sector, (3) educational sector, (4) affected communities (communities that may be particularly affected by terrorism in a range of ways, such as becoming the targets of hate crime following a terrorist event) and, (5) the potentially vulnerable or already radicalised. During the research process it became apparent that internal staff (e.g. front-line officers, social workers) were also a key audience and this group was added to the analysis.

## **2. Academic literature review**

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The literature included in this review was selected using combinations of terms for lone actors, their acts and CT responses using multiple academic databases. This review highlighted that there is very little academic research concerning communicating about LAEEs. This is important because, as scholars such as Spaaij (2012) identify, several features particular to lone actor terrorism, including motivational patterns, surveillance of targets and weapon selection, suggest that LAEEs are likely to present unique challenges and opportunities for counter-terrorism. The considerations of lone actor terrorists mean general guidance regarding terrorism needs to be adapted for those tasked with communicating before, during or after a lone actor attack. Given the paucity of academic literature that focuses directly on communication in the context of LAEEs, literature on neighbouring problem areas (terrorism, mass fatality events and counter narratives) was also reviewed.

The academic literature reviewed identified effective communication as an integral component in the prevention, interdiction and mitigation of terrorism. Effective communication can manage public responses to terrorism, improve knowledge and encourage at-risk populations to support counter-terrorism efforts, increase doubt about terrorist ideologies in the minds of vulnerable individuals and engage the public in preparedness activities ahead of events. The review highlighted a lack of empirical and evaluative research concerning counter radicalisation communication measures although it did demonstrate an emerging consensus that different approaches may be necessary for different individuals, and that different approaches should be seen as complementary, rather than in competition. There is also recognition of the potential impact of strategic communication designed to undermine terrorist ideologies and offer alternative ideologies and narratives. Such communications can potentially disrupt the radicalisation process by deconstructing and delegitimising extremist messages. These narratives have the dual aim of de-radicalising individuals and causing doubt amongst individuals who are 'at risk' of exposure to extremist content.

Similarly, there is limited research directly addressing communication for terrorist interdiction although the literature does emphasise the importance of regular communication about possible threats and capabilities to deal with them to reassure the public and sustain public trust. However, a balance must be found whereby useful information is communicated to the public without generating fear. Evidence suggests that the cooperation of communities and businesses plays an essential role and that communication measures should be used to educate communities regarding what to look out for, to make them aware of the warning signs that they should be vigilant about

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and to encourage the reporting of any suspicious behaviour. The literature reviewed provided no guidance regarding the most effective way to deliver these messages.

There is more academic literature concerning communications to mitigate terrorism. This literature outlines the centrality of factoring in public perceptions of risk and the importance of communication in mitigating the social, psychological, health and economic impacts of terrorism. The information provided should be accurate and consistent to maintain trust, which is the biggest predictor of responses to messages. Timing is important; delays in the provision of information should be avoided where possible to avoid increasing fear levels and counter rumours. Balancing the need to provide strong enough messages for not particularly interested audiences to pay attention to without being seen as scaremongering is extremely challenging for prevent communications. Contextual and cultural differences need to be accounted for and communication should be tailored to meet the needs of the population at risk. Media portrayal of events can alter risk perceptions; trusted relationships with the media should be established in order to manage this. Traditional practices of crisis communication, based on the notion of a crisis as a consequence of a single cause and characterised by a clear beginning and end, may not be appropriate for terrorist attacks because of the potential multiple causes, different dynamics and involvement of various actors and environments that characterise terrorism. Although relationships between organisations and agencies may be complex, intra and inter-departmental co-operation is an essential part of any communication strategy and recent analysis has indicated that a lack of co-ordination of information flows is a severe problem during terrorism crisis situations.

### 3. Media analysis

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A content analysis of UK and Danish national newspaper coverage of LAEEs between 1st January 2009 and 28th February 2015 was conducted in order to: (1) establish the extent to which the media acts as a conduit for counter-terrorism messages and guidance in the context of LAEEs, (2) review the content of counter-terrorism messages and guidance in the context of LAEEs, and (3) explore the ways that the media frames lone actor extremists in order to establish the communicative context in which counter-terrorism messages are likely to be received. Online databases were used to source articles that included synonyms of 'lone wolf' and 'terrorism'. Articles that were under 200 words long, that appeared in regional editions or that, on review, did not pertain to lone actor terrorism were excluded from the analysis. This produced a final sample of 219 UK articles and 97 Danish articles.

#### 3.1 UK media coverage of LAEEs

UK media coverage of LAEEs increased during the period under focus, rising steadily from 2 articles in 2009 to 69 in 2014 (the last full year analysed). This reflects the fact that coverage of 'lone wolves' is primarily event driven, with clear spikes following incidents and there was a cluster of lone actor events towards the end of 2014. Media commentary often depicts lone actors as an increasing or significant problem. Of the 106 articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat posed by LAEEs, 63.2% characterised lone actor terrorism as a frequent or large problem and 28.3% described it as an increasing problem. Only five articles framed lone actor terrorism as a rare phenomenon.

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The majority of articles (73.5%) focused on Islamist terrorism, with the second largest category being the Far Right (10.5%). The greater focus on Islamist terrorism can be partially accounted for by the fact that more attacks were carried out by Islamist actors than Far Right actors during the period of analysis. However, a comparison of the two lone actor events that took place in the UK during this period - the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich London (an Islamist attack) and the murder of Mohammed Saleem and attempted bombing of mosques in Birmingham (a Far Right attack) – suggests that the category of terrorism may also have an impact on the volume of media coverage of an event. These attacks took place in the same year, in the same country and resulted in the same number of casualties (one fatality). There were important differences in the way that the events unfolded in that the Woolwich attack was filmed, whereas the Birmingham attacks were covert. Nonetheless, there are notable differences in the UK media coverage of these events, not only in relation to the focus drawn by the publicity-seeking nature of the Woolwich attacks (which resulted in 21 articles focusing on this attack in the immediate aftermath in comparison with the 6 articles that focused on the Birmingham attacks) but also in relation to the on-going symbolic value of the attack. In 2014, the Woolwich attacks were mentioned in a further 20 articles whereas the Birmingham attacks were not referenced again.

As a conduit for CT messages and guidance, 104 articles (47.5%) included messages from state officials. The majority of these (68.3%) reported general comments from politicians and senior security services staff as opposed to specific information that could deter future attacks or highlight vulnerability. Across the remaining 33 articles, 22 included deterrence content and 21 highlighted counter-terrorism challenges posed by LAEEs. Deterrence messaging occurred primarily prior to major public events and following terrorist incidents. Statements concerning the difficulties in preventing, interdicting or mitigating LAEEs tended to be covered following terrorist incidents in order to explain why it was not possible to prevent lone actor events from occurring and frequently focused on the challenges of online 'self-radicalisation'. 19 articles (8.7%) directly quoted messages from lone actors and 13 articles (5.9%) indirectly acted as a conduit for lone actor's messages.

Far fewer articles reported on official counter-terrorism campaigns (6 articles / 2.7%), although the 2014 police-led National Counter Terrorism Awareness Week did feature in 4 articles addressing 'lone wolf' terrorism. 35 articles (16%) described or contained counter-terrorism guidance on how to prevent, interdict or mitigate LAEEs. This guidance was primarily targeted towards the general public (although there were limited examples describing guidance to businesses and affected communities), usually followed an incident and most frequently focused on the importance of vigilance as well as the importance of maintaining order and returning 'to normal'.

98 articles (44.7%) described actors in terms that provided a frame for understanding lone actor types, with 70 articles (71.4%) framing actors in the context of Islamist terrorism. However, articles were more likely to be coded as providing a frame if they focused on Far Right terrorism, with 78.3% of articles focusing on Far Right terrorism containing an actor framing compared with 43.5% of articles that focused on Islamist terrorism. Islamist actors tended to be framed in relation to crime and violence. Only in the context of Islamist terrorism were lone actors characterised as being indoctrinated. In contrast, Far Right actors were more than twice as likely to be associated with mental health issues. The most frequent 'other' framing of Far Right lone actors was

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the characterisation of these actors as evil. Far Right actors were also more likely to be described as skilful or well-educated in comparison with Islamist lone actors.

## **3.2 Danish media coverage of LAEEs**

Danish media coverage of LAEEs increased between 2009 and 2012 (from 0 to 28 articles), but declined between 2012 and 2014 before increasing again in the first two months of 2015 following the attacks in Copenhagen in February. As with the UK media sample, this reflects coverage that is largely event driven. The majority of articles (60%) focused exclusively on Islamist terrorism, 6.1% focused on Far Right terrorism and approximately 32% dealt with more than one type of terrorism (although this last group dealt predominantly with Islamist terrorism). The greater focus on Islamist terrorism reflects the fact that in the period analysed there were three LAEEs in Denmark, all of which were carried out by self-proclaimed Islamists. Of the 76 articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of threat posed by LAEEs, 48.6% characterised lone actor terrorism as a frequent or large threat and 46% described it as an increasing problem. Only one article framed lone actor terrorism as a rare phenomenon.

53 articles (54.7%) acted as a conduit for state messages. 27 of these articles included statements that communicated either Danish counter-terrorism strengths (17 articles) or weaknesses (10 articles) as related to LAEEs. Most messaging covering state strengths, such as a history of foiling plots, and weaknesses, such as problems in passport control, appeared during post-event reporting. In line with the UK data-set, the Danish media were more likely to include state messages than to amplify messages from lone actors, with only 2 articles directly quoting lone actors and 4 indirectly conveying their messages by describing their claims.

As with the UK data-set, only a small proportion of Danish articles that focused on LAEEs reported on official counter-terrorism campaigns (2 articles) or contained or described counter terrorism guidance (12 articles). Both articles that covered official counter-terrorism campaigns provided details of 'Project Aware', a campaign and workshop targeting businesses in crowded places in order to increase their ability to identify suspicious activities and to encourage businesses to update crisis management plans. The majority of the 12 articles containing or describing guidance included messages targeted at the general public and were primarily focused on pre-event messaging that encouraged the public not to be concerned about terrorism.

Only 30.9% of articles described actors in terms that provided a frame for understanding lone actor types. Lone actors were most often framed as mentally ill and / or violent. In general, there was very little difference in the framing of Islamist and Far Right actors in the Danish data. However, Islamist actors were twice as likely as Far Right actors to be framed as criminal and violent. Frames of mental illness, crime, violence and isolation often appeared together in the coverage of lone actor terrorists, portraying them as social outcasts at the margins of society for whom terrorism could be an opportunity to achieve status.

## **4. Stakeholder interviews and grey literature review**

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Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to: (1) identify and better understand existing counter terrorism communications pertaining to the prevention,

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interdiction and mitigation of LAEEs, and (2) identify potential gaps and opportunities to support existing work. The interview schedule was designed for use with government and security services stakeholders and then adapted for interviews with businesses, community groups and faith institutions that act both as an audience and a conduit for government and security services messages. Interviews lasted one hour and were conducted between May and October 2015 at times and locations that were convenient for participants. In total 22 UK stakeholders were interviewed; 9 from police and security services, 3 from central government, 4 from local authorities, 4 from community/faith organisations and 2 business representatives. A total of 8 stakeholders were interviewed in Denmark; 4 from police and security services and 4 from local prevention programme providers and community outreach programmes. Transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis.

The grey literature review focused on: (1) reports and other official documents that describe or provide guidance for communication measures that have been used to prevent, interdict or mitigate terrorism, and (2) examples of written communication measures (e.g. leaflets, web-pages) that are currently used to prevent, interdict or mitigate terrorism. As such the grey literature review included all current communications designed to prevent, interdict or mitigate terrorism. The grey literature review identified 197 official documents across the UK (149 documents) and Denmark (48 documents) that describe or provide guidance for communication measures used to prevent, interdict or mitigate terrorism or are examples of written communication measures. These were used to supplement data collected through semi-structured interviews. The grey literature and semi-structured interviews revealed that there are very few communications focused specifically on LAEEs and those that do often provide general information rather than guidance. For instance, an Mi5 webpage provides case studies of lone actor attacks but no information on how the public could contribute to the prevention, interdiction or mitigation of lone actor attacks. However, some existing communications list lone actors amongst a range of potential threats or include content that could be relevant to lone actor terrorism, such as NaCTSO guidance for businesses that included information about protective measures to take against suicide bombers.

### ***4.1 Communication to prevent lone actor radicalisation in the UK***

Interviews with stakeholders and a review of existing communications identified that while LAEE issues are included within some broader communications, there are very few communications about lone actor radicalisation specifically. The current review therefore included all communications aimed at preventing radicalisation, irrespective of whether they specifically referred to LAEEs. Eight broad message categories were identified in these communications as follows:

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Message Category	Purpose	Example
Counter / Alternative Narrative	Undermine terrorist narratives and introduce doubt into minds of vulnerable individuals	It is possible to be both British and Muslim
Topic-Specific Education	Increase knowledge of sensitive topics thus increasing resilience to extremist narratives	Details of UK aid and support to Syrian population
Inclusion and Identity	Promote idea of an inclusive British society and encourage integration	Information about how UK system works / opportunities available
Explaining Prevent and Channel	Widen stakeholder understanding of Prevent to bust myths and encourage support	Prevent is about safeguarding, not spying
Promoting Specific Actions	Increase number of actors contributing to work designed to prevent radicalisation	Have a robust policy for assessing groups hiring public venues
Dissuading Specific Actions	Dissuade actions to could increase vulnerability to extremism	Don't travel to Syria
Condemnation of Extremist Acts	Reinforce the message that terrorism is not legitimate and extremist groups are not welcome	Attacks by ISIS are barbaric and counter to Islamic principles
Encouraging Critical Thinking	Increase ability to analysis the credibility of narratives individuals are exposed to	Consider who has made the website and their motivation

Prevent communications were primarily targeted towards five audiences: i) internal staff, ii) schools and other public institutions, iii) vulnerable individuals and communities, iv) affected communities, and v) businesses. Internal staff communications were primarily designed to secure buy-in and encourage support for the aims of the UK's counter-terrorism programme and therefore focused on 'Explaining Prevent and Channel' and 'Promoting Specific Actions'. Key messages within these categories included: i) radicalisation being a real and serious problem, ii) there being a range of different extremist types, iii) preventing radicalisation being part of the safeguarding agenda and, iv) information about how to recognise vulnerabilities and refer concerns. The motivations for engaging with schools and other public bodies were similar and the same message categories were dominant. This similarity stems from the fact that these audiences have the best access to potentially vulnerable individuals through their day to day work activities. The messages were also similar, such as explaining what Prevent is, but the promotion of specific actions was often wider, such as i) encouraging the discussion of extremism and critical thinking with students as part of the curriculum and, ii) building the issue of radicalisation into existing safeguarding policies.

For individuals or communities considered vulnerable to terrorist ideologies and narratives the key purposes of communication were to increase resilience to (or doubt about) extremist narratives and to dissuade involvement in activities that could increase vulnerability to radicalisation. A broad range of message categories were used for these purposes: 'Counter / Alternative Narratives', 'Topic-Specific Education', 'Inclusion and Identity', 'Dissuading Specific Actions', 'Condemnation of Extremist Acts' and 'Encouraging Critical Thinking'. The content of the messages within these categories varied considerably based on the nature of the vulnerability (e.g. Far-Right or Islamist) but the message categories remained consistent. Specific messages included: i)

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theological undermining of ISIS narratives, ii) explanations of how policing in the UK works and, iii) dissuasion of travel to Syria.

Communications targeted towards affected communities primarily fell within the message categories: 'Explaining Prevent and Channel' and 'Promoting Specific Actions'. Combined these categories can help to counter negative representations of radicalisation prevention programmes and encourage communities to support the work of the authorities. Specific communications within these categories included: i) an explanation of why Prevent is not about spying on Muslim communities, ii) encouraging mothers to discuss radicalisation with daughters and to dissuade their children from travelling to Syria and, iii) outlining the important role parents can play in keeping young people safe. The final audience, businesses, were a lower priority than the previous four audiences but were targeted by a small number of specific communications. The primary communication was to businesses that hire out facilities for meetings and conferences, encouraging them to perform due diligence checks on those hiring the facilities to ensure that they are not being leased to extremist speakers or groups.

The timing of delivery was recognised as important and it was suggested that it should reflect audience needs. For example, the increased emphasis on attending lectures and supporting charities during Ramadan may make this a particularly good time for communicating with some potentially affected communities. Other considerations given to timing included the importance of swift communication following a terrorist event (in order to condemn the event and promote specific actions whilst individuals are more acutely aware of the need to address the issue of terrorism) and the importance of early messages to the vulnerable (to build resilience and critical thinking before they may become exposed to radical influences). Modes of delivery varied depending on the audience, but face to face communications with all audiences and wider community engagement were identified as particularly important. The use of credible voices was considered crucial and it was suggested that communications can often be most effective when slotted into existing communications, such as weekly school bulletins, rather than presenting them in stand-alone counter-terrorism communications.

A wide array of challenges associated with delivering communications designed to prevent the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals were identified. These included issues related to the intended audience, who may be either hostile to the aims of the work (or may not understand the agenda) or simply disinterested or there could be difficulties in identifying or reaching the appropriate audiences or conveying the message consistently because of issues such as language barriers. Further challenges stemmed from the communication deliverer, such as the Prevent branding itself, (which has a negative image within many communities), the lack of credibility of the deliverer and difficulties of recruiting alternative credible voices. A third group of challenges concerned what content could be included in communication campaigns. Challenges within this category included difficulties associated with communicating about highly complex issues and the speed at which events can change, an inability to include important or convincing information for security or data protection reasons and political and reputational sensitivities that can limit what communication campaigns politicians and senior management are prepared to sign-off. Other challenges included the effectiveness and scale of terrorist communications (particularly ISIS) or counter-Prevent messaging as well as the potential for unintentional consequences, such as

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reinforcing a perception of stigmatisation or introducing individuals to extremist subjects when there was no need to so do.

### **UK stakeholder recommendations for prevent communications:**

Continue and expand emphasis on safeguarding to secure buy-in of partners
Face to face communication is an essential delivery model and must be maintained
Affected communities need to play a greater role in message delivery
More vocal support for Prevent from senior stakeholders would support local messaging
Need to more open about Prevent activities and share success stories
Range of different messages and delivery modes necessary, including non-Islamist
Communications should focus on inclusion and avoid reinforcing 'us and them'
Further tailored communications required for: women, youth and mental health staff
Increase the range of actors disseminating messages (credible voices key)
Greater national and local coordination required but local flexibility is important
Publicly deconstruct the counter-Prevent messages of groups like CAGE
Further embed CT messaging into wider existing communications
Communications must be sustained – one off messaging less likely to be effective
Communications responding to new events and narratives need to be more rapid

### **4.2 Communication to prevent lone actor radicalisation in Denmark**

As in the UK, a very limited number of communications specifically focused on LAEEs were identified in Denmark, although some features consistent with LAEEs featured as part of broader communications, such as a lone shooter scenarios. This review therefore included all communications aimed at preventing radicalisation, irrespective of whether they specifically referenced LAEEs. Particularly key audiences in the Danish context were i) educational institutions, ii) internal staff and partners, and iii) radicalised/vulnerable individuals.

Educational institutions were one of the highest priority audiences for radicalisation communications. Communication in the mid to late 2000s focused on urging schools to prepare students for living in a democratic and free society. That inspections of the degree to which schools were actually doing this took place primarily at Muslim schools was understood by practitioners to have potentially undermined the agenda by tacitly communicating that Muslim independent schools could be particularly prone to radicalisation. Targeted inspections have since been dropped and more recent communications to teaching staff, primarily delivered through workshops, focused on: i) the importance of understanding risk factors, ii) the need for teachers to promote active citizenship, iii) that radicalisation work should be understood as crime prevention and therefore should be dealt with as 'other risk behaviour', and iv) details of help and advice available. Workshops were also conducted with students (primarily secondary school) which communicated a set of core messages that included: i) that there are legal consequences to extremist behaviour, ii) active citizenship is essential to democracy, iii) students should apply critical thinking to what they read online and, iv) that stereotypes inform perceptions of who we think are radicals / terrorists.

Communications targeted towards internal staff and frontline personnel were very similar to the messages delivered to teachers, with special attention being afforded to prison staff. Handbooks for staff working with potentially vulnerable individuals

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communicated the importance of: i) utilising existing relationships to talk about any concerns and having an open and empathetic approach, ii) speaking with colleagues about concerns and arranging a network meeting for any required intervention and, iii) accessing government support for a mentor and other resources. Communications with radicalised individuals occurred primarily through mentoring programmes which, through coaching techniques, were designed to generate a positive change in the mentee's life and lead the individual away from radicalisation and radical milieus. Messages to the individual varied on a case by case basis but the key messages at the onset were that: i) having a mentor is voluntary, ii) information shared will be confidential but will be shared with a 'mentor consultant' (a senior member of the counter-radicalisation task force) and, iii) that the process is not about imposing some kind of 'thought police' – people can think what they want and the arrangement is about preventing crime and improving the mentee's life. The Aarhus exit programme, which targets returned foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq, could be seen as a borderline example in that supporting returned fighters with re-integration into society may prevent radicalisation. The implicit message was that authorities are ready to help and offer returnees a fresh start.

Efforts to communicate about the prevention of radicalisation with the general public and businesses have been more limited. A small number of public dialogue meetings have been held which informed the public about local threats from radicalisation and efforts to counter these. The key messages were that radicalisation prevention should: i) be approached in the same manner as crime prevention, ii) entail a simultaneous focus on combatting discrimination among vulnerable youth, iii) be a joint responsibility, iv) be comprehensive, targeting different phases of the radicalisation process, and v) radicalisation prevention can help to contain the threat of terrorism. 'Dialogue Forums' with representatives of civil society groups that have been affected by radicalisation were the major communication mechanism with affected communities. The key messages in these talks were: i) that there is zero tolerance of illegal activity, including political violence and, ii) that preventing radicalisation requires the efforts and cooperation of a range of different actors. There were no initiatives aimed directly at businesses although some interdiction and mitigation publications mentioned that employees should be conscious of sudden and profound changes in co-workers' attitudes (i.e. radicalisation). A key meta-message cutting across communications with all audiences was that the ambitions of prevention work can be undermined by the use of imprecise language (e.g. 'Muslim' instead of 'Islamist') and stereotypes by authorities and the media.

As in the UK context, the mode and timing of communication delivery were considered important and to vary depending on audience, context and message type. Practitioners particularly highlighted the importance of face-to-face communication in order to be able to take the time to deliver complex messages and to adapt messages to a particular context, target group and situation. Practitioners also emphasised the importance of early prevention communications and on-going communication about risk assessments from a multi-agency perspective, but warned against 'premature' communication about radicalisation prevention. Building on concrete experiences, they stressed how fielding communication on radicalization prevention to frontline personnel which is ill-designed and unconsolidated can be counter-productive.

Several challenges to communication about radicalisation prevention were identified in the Danish context. Five challenges in particular were deemed by practitioners to be

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particularly important: (1) the legal and organisational challenges of collaboration and partnership working between agencies, such as information sharing, (2) cultural differences between agencies that may prevent agreement on what intervention is required. For instance, teachers will usually focus on the student's general well-being, a social worker could prioritise the wider family situation whilst police officers may be more concerned with illegal activity, (3) the difficulty of communicating about objectives and success criteria, (4) communicating with audiences that have low levels of trust in the government, and (5) lack of experience or expertise amongst the many bodies contributing to the agenda can hinder effective communication, especially when radicalisation prevention efforts expand into new sectors and geographic places.

### **Danish stakeholder recommendations for prevent communications:**

Develop and consolidate key messages in advance to avoid premature communication
Differentiate message and delivery models according to target groups
Communication delivery mode should ensure flexibility and scope to amend
Align communicator characteristics and messages, delivery mode and audience
Anchor communication in cross-sectional and cross-disciplinary collaboration
Prevent 'restricted code' communication and conduct pre-communications tests
Communicate clearly how sensitive data is handled among stakeholders
Manage mutual expectations by clearly stating expectations and success criteria
Develop standardised procedures for transfer of knowledge and expertise
Secure political support by keeping local politicians 'in the loop'
Be aware of the interaction between media and counter-radicalisation agendas
Specify that relationship building with affected communities takes time / resources

### **4.3 Communication to interdict LAEEs in the UK**

As with preventing radicalisation, practitioners identified communication as an important feature of interdicting terrorism. Whilst several communication measures included content that could be relevant to lone actor terrorism very few communications designed specifically to support the interdiction of LAEEs were identified. This review was therefore also based on an analysis of communications that are used to support the interdiction of terrorism more broadly. Five broad message categories were identified in these communications as follows:

Message Category	Purpose	Example
Understanding the Threat	Ensure that relevant audiences understand the threat context, including specific risks to them	Promotion of the national security threat level
Vigilance	Individuals understand suspicious signs and actively look out for them	Be aware and look out for signs of hostile reconnaissance
Effective security	Organisations have systems in place to detect or disrupt terrorist activity	Ensure you have effective CCTV and a visitor security policy
Deterring and Disrupting Threat	Potential attackers are dissuaded or prevented from committing an attack	Highly visible promotion of high-tech security measures
Promoting Specific Actions	Individuals and organisations contribute to detecting and disrupting a planned attack	Report suspicions of attack planning to the terrorist hotline

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The primary target audiences for interdiction communications were: i) general public, ii) internal staff and partners, iii) businesses, iv) affected communities, and v) radicalised individuals. Communications for the general public communications focused on two message categories: 'Vigilance' and 'Promoting Specific Actions'. These were primarily designed to encourage awareness, and reporting, of suspicious signs. Specific messages included: i) the importance of reporting suspicious behaviour to the police, such as a neighbour storing chemicals for no obvious reason or someone being vague about long periods of travel, ii) being vigilant in crowded public spaces and, iii) ensuring that all donations go to registered charities to avoid accidentally funding terrorists through bogus charity collections. As with Prevent communications, internal staff and partners were also considered an important audience because they may be most likely to recognise issues of concern during their daily business as well as the need to communicate threat intelligence quickly. The message categories matched those for the general public but the specific communications differed. Examples included: i) information about recognising suspicious packages at transport hubs and, ii) the importance of being especially vigilant when patrolling shopping malls.

Businesses were the third key audience for interdiction, both in general terms and for specific business types (such as farmers that store fertilizers). This audience received targeted communications from the widest range of message categories. Communications falling under 'Effective Security', perhaps the most prominent message category, included specific advice for different industries, such as a 'counter terrorism protective security advice for bars, pubs and clubs' leaflet, broad messages about how to produce effective crisis plans, information about what details businesses should not make public in case it aids potential attackers (such as floor plans) and guidance during site visits about how to target-harden a particular building. Communications within the 'Understanding the Threat' category included briefings to business sector representatives about new or emerging threats to their industry, such as information about increased terrorist targeting towards shopping malls, as well as workshops to explain the aims of potential hostiles. 'Vigilance' communications included general vigilance messaging as well as industry or location specific messaging, such as encouraging businesses in coastline areas to be aware of, and report, seemingly illegal landings. The final message category was 'Deterring and Disrupting Threat', with communications including 'Operation Solitaire', which encouraged gun clubs to be conscious of individuals asking unusual questions and reporting suspicions of an unhealthy interest in guns.

For affected communities the main audience was those that might be a specific target, such as police and military personnel. To increase their safety, communications were based on the message categories 'Understanding the Threat' and 'Promoting Specific Actions'. Communications included: i) warnings that they may be a target, and ii) specific advice about how to minimise the chances of an attack, such as police covering their lanyard when appropriate, being aware when leaving their place of work and not speaking about work in online or offline social settings. Communications targeted at radicalised individuals that may be planning an attack focused on 'Deterring and Disrupting Threat'. Some were direct, such as publicly promoting the negative impacts of terrorist activity (e.g. prison sentences). Others were indirect, making use of 'dual communications' where the apparent audience is the public but the real audience is a potential attacker. For example, communications about new forms of security and

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visible examples of their effectiveness (such as staff at the entrance) provide reassurance to the public but can also serve to deter potential attackers by conveying a message of likely failure.

The content of the communication and its intended audience meant that a range of different modes of delivery were used, with specific emphasis at different times. While face to face communications remained important, there was a greater emphasis on leaflets and posters for interdiction communications due to the need to reach a wider audience and because some messages in this context were considered to be less complex or sensitive. Guidance packs for businesses were also described as especially useful. Although continuous messaging was considered important it was nevertheless the case that stakeholders identified specific timings where additional emphasis on communications was necessary, such as when troops return to the UK, prior to the holiday periods for the public and post-holiday periods for businesses, immediately following an incident and when new information about an impending attack becomes available.

Challenges for interdiction communications included difficulties in reaching or engaging the intended audience (e.g. some businesses did not see terrorism as a relevant risk to them), avoiding unintended consequences (e.g. scaring the public or creating message fatigue), and communicating what 'suspicious behaviour' looks like. Other challenges included the unwillingness of some businesses to support communication efforts because of concerns about brand and reputation management as well as the limits of what information could be shared with the public due to operational or national security reasons.

### ***UK stakeholder recommendations for interdiction communications:***

Greater promotion and development of products to help businesses understand threat context / vulnerabilities
Map CT messaging aimed at businesses onto their existing agendas (e.g. reputation)
Improve consistency of communications and ensure all training products available on a national level
Keep messages to the public encouraging specific actions simple, visual, eye catching and non-patronising
Ensure campaigns use a range of platforms, particularly with the general public
Use education to promote culture change within organisations so that staff play a greater vigilance role
Encourage visible deterrence communications to put doubt into mind of the potential attacker
Continue and expand targeted disruption messages online that seek to deter individuals attack planning
Continue work to develop positive relations with the media

### ***4.4 Communication to interdict LAEEs in Denmark***

Unlike in the UK, there have been no large-scale campaigns communicating with the general public about how to interdict acts of terrorism in Denmark. Whilst there have been small examples, such as audio announcements at airports about being vigilant about luggage, there have been no wide-spread campaigns like the UK's "It's probably

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nothing but..." campaign. As such, the primary audiences for interdiction communications in Denmark have been private businesses and potentially radicalised individuals. No interdiction communications that focused on LAEEs specifically were identified. However, broader communications that could be relevant to LAEEs (e.g. a section in wider security workshop that covered a scenario of a shooting spree in a crowded place) were included in the analysis.

Private businesses were a high priority for Danish interdiction communications, with several campaigns, such as 'Project Aware', targeting businesses in crowded places (e.g. shopping malls and pedestrian shopping zones). The campaign aimed to increase the threat awareness of business and store managers. Its key messages were that: i) terrorism is a genuine threat, ii) there are a few rules businesses can follow to help interdict an attack, and iii) businesses need to be aware of and report suspicious activity. Other communications, delivered through workshops, posters and leaflets, focused on: i) the importance of developing a security culture in the workplace, ii) reporting and sharing knowledge about threats, and iii) providing information about target-hardening, such as systems for detecting and dealing with suspicious mail and avoiding the spread of destructive weapons and other forms of physical security. Direct communications with individuals deemed potentially radicalised centred on a series of 'preventative talks' where individuals identified as radicalised were asked to attend a meeting with the authorities. The key messages delivered at these meetings were that: i) pursuing a radical direction will have severe negative life consequences and, ii) that there are alternative avenues for communicating grievances and political claims. A tacit message of these meetings was to let the individual know that the authorities are aware of them.

The grey literature and interviews revealed relatively little on the timing of interdiction messages although the importance of early intervention was noted as well as the importance of communication following an incident to encourage vigilance. A range of delivery models were identified, with a heavy emphasis on face to face communication through workshops as well as detailed written guidance packs for businesses. One key challenge to interdiction communications was striking the appropriate balance between not scaring the public and providing enough information to enable the public to be able to assist interdiction efforts. This partly explains the lack of communications targeted at the general public. The communications that do exist focused on promoting concrete behaviours (such as not leaving luggage unattended) rather than mentioning the risk of terrorism directly. A related challenge was a conservative mind-set concerning the risk of communicating about terrorism, with public institutions fearful of making mistakes and leadership often preferring minimal public communication on the issue. Further challenges highlighted included budgetary constraints, and avoiding appearances of stigmatizing certain communities.

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## ***Danish stakeholder recommendations for interdiction communications:***

Speak to the target group's immediate concerns (e.g. service, business continuity) when delivering messages
Communicate realistic goals and parameters of interaction / intervention (e.g. sharing of sensitive data)
Adapt delivery mode to the target group and create relevance through simplicity, examples and role models
Consider carefully the physical place of message delivery
The communicator matters –through face-to-face interaction calls for good relational and personal skills.
Communicating about best practices is important in order to store and transfer knowledge and experiences.
Communicate in a timely manner that relationship-building takes time, is costly and is not easily evaluated
Cross-disciplinary/multi-agency communication, risk assessment and collaboration are essential to the timing of interdiction
Not scaring people unnecessarily and raising awareness requires carefully designed communication
Stakeholders must overcome the fear of making mistakes when communicating about interdiction
Be aware that the media may serve as a vehicle for interdict messaging but may also complicate communication
Be aware of the interaction between the media agenda and political agenda in interdiction communication.

## **4.5 Communication to mitigate LAEEs in the UK**

Government policy documents describe communicating with the public as crucial in the context of mitigating the impacts of terrorism. As with the other types of communication measures outlined above, no communications were identified specifically to address LAEEs. However, communication campaigns such as 'Run, Hide, Tell' focus on the type of terrorist incident that could be consistent with an LAEE. For wider mitigation communications four broad categories of communication were identified. Across these four categories examples were identified during three specific time periods: i) pre-event messaging to increase preparedness, ii) event messaging to mitigate the immediate negative impacts of an event, and iii) post-event messages to encourage a swift return to 'normal'.

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Message Category	Purpose	Example
<b>Pre-event messages</b>		
Information / General Guidance	Support individual, community and business resilience	Information about emergency preparedness planning
Promoting Specific Actions	Reduce injury and loss of life during an event	Guidance on how to behave during a terrorist attack (e.g. "run, hide, tell")
Reassurance	Reassure the public they are being protected	You are unlikely to be a victim of a terrorist attack
Reputation Management	Encourage businesses to develop business continuity plans	You need to be able to swiftly respond if a terrorist incident were to happen
<b>Event-messages</b>		
Information / General Guidance	Provide information about the event, counter misinformation, prevent 'panic' and support community cohesion	Correct inaccurate information about perpetrators circulating on social media
Promoting Specific Actions	Reduce injury and loss of life	Provision of evacuation instructions if event takes place in a public place
Reassurance	Reduce fear and prevent 'panic'	Timely information about what is being done to respond
Reputation Management	Mitigate negative economic impacts	Messages to customers regarding business continuity planning
<b>Post-event messages</b>		
Information / General Guidance	Facilitate a 'return to normal'; promote community cohesion and resilience	Terrorists don't represent Muslims (e.g. 'Not In My Name' campaign)
Promoting Specific Actions	Enhance community cohesion	Report hate-crime (e.g. Tell MAMA)
Reassurance	Mitigate negative societal impacts	Reassure communities concerned about hate crime
Reputation Management	Mitigate negative economic impacts and enhance police/community relations	'We're in it together' messages to customers (businesses).

Six broad categories of audience were identified for mitigation communications: i) individuals directly affected by the event, ii) affected communities (e.g. friends and family of individuals directly involved in the attack or communities who may be vulnerable to hate crime following an attack), iii) general public, (iv) the media, (v) businesses, (vi) internal staff and partners.

For members of the public directly affected by the event, communications were primarily designed to mitigate negative health outcomes by promoting specific actions. For instance, pre-event messaging focused on the importance of individuals moving to a safe place, as encouraged through communication campaigns such as 'Go in, Stay in, Tune in' and 'Run, Hide, Tell'. Communications with the public during an emergency sought to provide information about what was happening, implications for health and welfare, advice and guidance and reassurance. An example is the provision of

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evacuation information during an event. Post-event communications seek to create conditions for the 'return to normality'.

The second key audience was affected communities. In this case affected communities were communities that may have been affected by the event more acutely or distinctly than the wider public, such as friends of people directly involved in the attack, communities within the geographic area of an attack, or communities that may be perceived by the wider public as being associated with perpetrators of the crime and could therefore be vulnerable to hate crime or revenge attacks. Pre-event messages primarily focused on information provision, such as explaining ahead of emergency exercises about what they might expect to see and raising awareness of why these activities are important. Post-event messages primarily fell under Information Provision and Reassurance. Examples included provision of information about the judicial process for the families of individuals arrested on terrorist charges, admitting any errors to address community criticism of police responses and providing reassurance messages about hate crime being punished, providing information regarding the support that is available and encouraging the reporting of hate crime through agencies such as Tell MAMA, which coordinates reporting of anti-Muslim attacks.

For the wider interested public, most communications were designed to provide information and to reassure. Reassurance messages were conveyed directly, such as through posters outlining the protection that is in place, as well as indirectly by the provision of uniformed security staff and initiatives like 'Project Servator', in which highly visible specialist police officers were deployed in the City of London (along with a poster campaign) with the dual purpose of deterring crime and providing reassurance to the general public. Communications during attacks were described as focusing on letting the public know that the emergency services were responding, the provision of regular updates and the provision of practical information, such as impacts on traffic and public transport. It was also considered to be important to counter rumours and misinformation in order to provide reassurance both during and after an event in order to promote cohesion. An example was the 'Not in My Name' campaign which made it clear that ISIS does not represent the Muslim community.

In the context of mitigation, the media is not only considered to be a mode of communication, but is also considered to be a key audience. Messages aimed at the media most often took the form of information provision through briefings in order to keep the media updated and to ensure that information reaching the public was accurate and consistent. Furthermore, it was recognised that if the media do not receive this information from the authorities they are likely to seek footage and commentary from elsewhere which could result in inaccurate and inconsistent reporting. These briefings, as well as admitting and explaining possible errors, were considered to help to build trust and address perceived issues with policing responses.

The fifth key audience was private businesses, especially those that deal with large numbers of the public (e.g. shopping malls), critical national infrastructure (e.g. airports) and other large organisations (e.g. banking headquarters in the City of London). Pre-event messaging focused on information provision and promoting specific actions. Key messages included the importance of developing business continuity plans that factor in terrorism. Such messages were frequently framed in terms of reputation management issues should businesses fail to have effective plans in place. This approach was based on the experience that it can be difficult to otherwise persuade

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businesses to give serious consideration to the issue. This concern about reputation was also reflected in the fact that one key message was that businesses should embed communications about terrorism in the context of wider-resilience planning. Training products such as 'Project Griffin' and 'Project Argus' provided practical advice on dealing with challenges during a major event and recovering from attack, such as ensuring floor plans can be made available quickly to police. The final key audience was internal staff and partners because of multi-agency communication being vital for a successful response to a terrorist incident. Key messages related to information provision and promoting specific actions to ensure that all stakeholders have the knowledge they need to respond to an incident, such as the need to increase patrols round Jewish or American interests for example, as well as to ensure that all agencies are communicating external messages in a consistent fashion.

Seven different modes of delivery for mitigation communications were identified during interviews and in the grey literature: (1) posters/leaflets, (2) face to face, (3) news media, (4) social media, (5) other online methods, (6) telecommunications, and (7) public address systems and LED display boards. This broad range of communication methods is partially reflective of different needs at different points in the communication cycle; for example posters and leaflets were used for pre-event communication, whereas public address systems and LED display boards would be used to convey information during an incident. It also reflects the fact that messages were aimed at a wide range of public audiences and multiple modes are required to maximise audience reach. As with other types of communication measures, interviewees recognised that the credibility of the messenger was as important as the mode of delivery. In the context of mitigation, the need to target the broadest possible audience means that credible voices also need to be drawn from a variety of backgrounds.

Five specific challenges were most significant and commonly reported in the interviews and grey literature. By far the most commonly cited challenge was balancing the need to communicate quickly after an event with the importance of accuracy. The remaining challenges were the need to communicate potentially complex messages in a simple format, the need for multiple agencies to communicate information across multiple channels during an event, the limited resilience of web-based telecommunications and, finally, the need to communicate without alarming the public.

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## ***UK stakeholder recommendations for mitigation communications:***

Have a communication strategy in place in advance of an incident to ensure effective response
Communicate early with the public so that they can better respond to advice if an incident occurs
Communication measures should be exercised in advance of an event - including with the public
Pre-preparing basic messages that can be adapted can facilitate timely warnings in event of an attack
After an attack information should be regularly updated with additions provided as available
Speedy communication must be balanced against need for accuracy and consistency between agencies
Responding agencies must communicate across a range of platforms to maximise audience reach
Communication measures must be designed with clear aims and audiences in mind
Communications need to be based on an understanding of public(s) perception of risk
Communications need to target a wide range of public audiences – each will have different information needs
Develop relations with the media in advance of an event and involve them in emergency planning
Identify credible voices for the target audience – trust in communicator key to responses to guidance

## ***4.6 Communication to mitigate LAEEs in Denmark***

The review of Danish counter-terrorism communications also found little with specific focus on the mitigation on LAEEs. Key themes for mitigation are thus drawn from communications concerned with the mitigation of terrorist attacks in general. Also included in the full review is a document designed to support the mitigation of a school shooting. It is noteworthy that the grey literature review and interviews identified significantly fewer mitigation communications than for prevention and interdiction messaging in Denmark. Of the audiences targeted businesses and public institutions were the most prioritised, with few communications targeted at other audiences.

Communications targeted towards private businesses and public institutions were very similar and centred on the message that although the risk of a terrorist attack is minimal, it is important to prepare for this unlikely scenario. Specific communications to support this over-arching message included advice on the development of crisis response and contingency plans and information about what to do in the event of an attack. For example, communications encouraged managers to designate a common meeting point, test their plans, keep an up to date list of all employees on file and to have a 'grab bag' containing essentials in the case of an attack (first aid kit, contacts information for staff, flash light etc.). Other key messages in preparation for when an attack occurs included 'Stay safe, See, Tell, Act' and explanations of differences between taking cover and hiding. In terms of post-event mitigation communication messages included: i) the importance preparing media statements about events, ii) providing all media with the same information, iii) not speculating on blame for the attack, and iv) not trying to cover up weaknesses or mistakes.

There were no examples of widely distributed or heavily promoted campaigns aimed towards the general public although some basic guidance provided on public authority

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websites was identified. The messages promoted on this platform included: i) the importance of staying calm and listening to the authorities, ii) helping others where possible, iii) limiting phone activity in order to avoid the network breaking down and, iv) to move away from the area under attack and report information to the police using a specific hotline number. Messaging to affected communities focused on emphasising the importance of coordinated efforts to mitigate the negative social effects of terrorist events. For educational institutions a booklet was provided that contains advice on how educational institutions should develop crisis response plans regarding shootings and what these plans should contain. Action-orientated advice in regards to school shootings included: i) the need to inform everybody of the threat, ii) call the police, iii) enter the nearest room and lock the door (if possible in a room where you will not be visible from the hallway or a window) and, iv) to remain in the room until identified help arrives. After the event schools are advised to: i) issue a press release, ii) offer crisis therapy to staff and students, iii) be aware of signs of trauma over the next few weeks and, iv) re-evaluate crisis plans. The grey literature review identified no direct messaging aimed towards vulnerable or radicalised individuals.

As in the UK, a variety of delivery modes were utilised. Communications with the general public appeared to be primarily online although messaging to businesses, schools and public institutions took place more directly through workshops and distributed leaflets and booklets. In terms of timing it becomes clear that early communications are essential to help different audiences prepare in advance for how an event will be mitigated. Rapid and accurate communication during and immediately after an event are also crucial to calming the situation and avoiding escalations or retaliation. A number of challenges to communications about mitigation were identified, many of which are similar to interdiction communication challenges in terms of the difficulties in messaging without causing unproductive anxiety amongst target group audiences. Further challenges included the difficulty of delivering mitigation communications that are transferable and actionable in the chaotic situation of an attack, emphasising to businesses that one-off target-hardening is not a 'quick fix' meaning they no longer need to prepare and finding the balance between rapid but accurate information sharing immediately following an attack.

### ***Danish stakeholder recommendations for mitigation communications:***

During-attack and post-attack guidance must be simple and actionable: bullet points or catch phrases
Plan for the unlikely. Mitigation depends on preparation for distant and unpleasant scenarios
Emphasise the difference individuals can make in minimizing attacks effects to overcome challenges of stakeholders engaging with distant scenarios
'Help to self-help' should be accompanied by other support to lower the cost to stakeholders of engaging
Efficient crisis communication calls for preparation (supported by 'meta-communication')
Mitigation lessons can be drawn for analysis of neighbouring problem areas (e.g. school shootings)
Avoid transmitting premature, inaccurate or speculative communication to the media
Be aware that mediatized elite cues on how to respond are important in mitigating societal effects
Avoid inter-governmental inconsistency and incoherent messaging

## 5. Discussion

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A key finding across all data sources in both countries is that there has been very little focus to date on communication measures specifically designed to address LAEEs. The main insight for communication from the academic literature that focused specifically on lone actor events was in relation to the importance of information leakage in the interdiction of LAEEs and the need, therefore, for communication measures that encourage reporting behaviour. However, very little guidance was provided either in the lone actor literature reviewed or the wider terrorism literature regarding good practice for communicating to encourage this behaviour. As such, despite insights from neighbouring areas, this appears to be an important gap to be addressed.

Analysis of UK and Danish media coverage of 'lone wolf terrorism' found that in both countries reporting has been largely event driven and that more attention has been afforded to Islamist than Far-Right LAEEs (in large part because there have been more Islamist LAEEs). Very few official CT campaigns featured in articles that focused on 'lone wolf' terrorism in either country although a small number of specific pieces of advice were provided. Following LAEEs UK messages primarily focused on the need to be vigilant and report suspicious behaviour, whereas Danish articles tended to focus on reassuring the public. The typical Danish framing of lone actors characterised them as mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated and did not particularly differentiate between Islamist and Far Right actors. The UK media used similar framings, but tended to distinguish between Islamist lone actors (framed in relation to crime and violence) and Far Right actors (who were more likely to be framed in relation to mental health issues or as being 'evil').

Prevent communications across the UK and Denmark share many similarities. In particular, both have sought to increase the number of stakeholders by prioritising communications towards agencies and organisations that have the most frequent contact with potentially vulnerable individuals, such as schools and social workers. Face to face communication is seen as an essential delivery model in order to allow the complexity of the issues to be addressed and to situate the work in the pre-criminal and safeguarding space. Both countries place greater emphasis on communications with community organisations (with a particular emphasis in the UK on utilising credible community voices) than the general public or businesses. There appear to be similar challenges in both countries although domestic criticism seems less of a concern in Denmark. Both recognise the importance of early communications although in Denmark there is a greater concern about potentially communicating too early with some audiences. More examples of evaluation were identified in the UK although in both states evaluations of communications appear to have limited consistency or coordination.

There are key commonalities as well as significant differences in each country's interdiction communications. One important similarity is that businesses are a prioritised audience in both countries, with messaging on vigilance and target-hardening at the centre of communications. In both states workshops and leaflets / guidance packs are the primary mode of delivery, although there appears to be a broader suite of communications around target hardening in the UK. Other commonalities include concerns about scaring the audience and having a mixed relationship with the media but recognising its importance. One key difference is that

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the general public is an important audience in the UK but few large scale communications take place in Denmark. Furthermore, deterrence plays an important role in UK communications towards potential attackers whilst in Denmark there is a greater emphasis on direct communication.

In the context of mitigation communications there are, again, striking similarities. For instance, responders in both countries demonstrate concern regarding the potential for the public to be scared by counter-terrorism communications and consequently pre-event messaging to the public tends to embed discussions about terrorism within the broader topic of emergency preparedness for natural disasters and other non-malicious emergencies. There are also strong parallels in the style and content of public messages, despite some minor differences in the detailed content of messages (e.g. UK guidance during fire arm attacks is to 'run, hide, tell' whereas the Danish instruction is 'stay safe, see, tell, act'). There appears to be more guidance for emergency responders to support mitigation communications produced by the government in the UK in comparison with Denmark. In terms of support and guidance for businesses there are parallels between countries, both in relation to modes of communication (face to face training and online guidance) and in the use of fire safety preparations as an analogy for normalising preparedness activities for terrorism. There is recognition in both contexts of the need to communicate to businesses 'what's in it for them' in order to obtain buy in for business continuity planning. However, in the UK context there is more focus on potential reputational costs whereas in Denmark the focus is more on potential negative economic impacts from failing to prepare.

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## Appendix A: Communication review framework (with examples)

COMMUNICATION CATEGORISATIONS	Prevent	Interdict	Mitigate
<b>General Public</b>	Promotion of the Channel Programme on UK local authority websites	"It's probably nothing but..." UK anti-terror hotline leaflets	"Run, hide and tell" leaflets on UK transport / stations
<b>Business / Private Sector</b>	Guidance on conference bookings due diligence	NaCTSO 'Secure in the Knowledge: Building a secure business' (2011) pamphlets	NaCTSO 'Expecting the Unexpected: Business continuity in an uncertain world' (2006) pamphlets
<b>Schools, Colleges and Universities</b>	Website for school staff explaining the dangers of radicalisation and support available to schools to recognise vulnerabilities (local authority)	Police consultancy sessions with specific schools	Visits to specific schools following terrorist attack in Woolwich to mitigate against hate crime (local authority)
<b>Affected Communities</b>	DCLG 'Letter to Muslim Faith Leaders' (18 January 2015)	Police communications around preventing travel to Syria	Post-Woolwich local authority - community meetings to mitigate against hate crime and organise community messaging
<b>Radicalised / Vulnerable</b>	Local authority counter-narrative programme with vulnerable young people	Deterrence messaging / coms about the success in detecting attacks and the legal implications for anyone involved in planning an attack.	Encouraging credible voices (including government) to deconstruct the narratives of the LAEE.