



PRIME

Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremism

Communication Requirements Report

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PREventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremist events: Defending against lone actor extremism



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Executive Summary

Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremist events (PRIME) is a collaborative research project funded under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The main purpose of PRIME is to improve understanding of lone actor terrorism and to deliver a knowledge-base that can inform the design of counter-measures and communication measures for the prevention, interdiction and mitigation of lone actor extremist events.

PRIME Work Package 8: Communication Measures Requirements (WP8) encompasses all activities involved in the formulation of requirements for communication measures aimed at preventing, interdicting or mitigating lone actor extremist events. For the purposes of this work package, communication measures are defined as deliberate attempts to share specific information or messages in order to prevent extremist radicalisation, to detect or disrupt attack planning and/or to limit negative impacts during and after a terrorist attack. Communication-based interventions may be delivered in a variety of formats - from leaflet and poster campaigns, to web-based materials, to face-to-face briefings – and may also be directed at a number of different audiences. Target audiences range from those who are vulnerable to extremist radicalisation, to extremist themselves, to directly affected communities (in relation to potential stigmatisation or increased likelihood of being targeted by attacks), to public and private stakeholders with the potential to contribute to counter-terrorism activities. This work was conducted in the UK and Denmark, countries with comparable counter violent radicalisation programmes, but quite different experiences of lone actor extremism. The similarities in policies and differences in experiences make these countries ideal for assessing how communication measures and their effects might depend on national discourses and experiences.

This report presents findings from WP8 that relate to policy and have direct practitioner relevance. 27 communication policy requirements are presented that officials with responsibility for designing, commissioning or delivering counter-terrorism communications should consider. The recommendations address all phases of lone actor terrorism: radicalisation, attack preparation and attack, with a particular focus on key message categories and audiences and the timing of communication interventions. These evidence-led, context-sensitive communication measures were developed by (1) reviewing existing communication measures intended to defend against terrorism, (2) establishing a systematic method for the identification of communication measures requirements, (3) identifying communication requirements, (4) integrating the communication requirements into a unified framework, and (5) validating and optimising these requirements with stakeholders and end-users. Data collection informing the policy requirements included reviews of the academic and grey literature, interviews with practitioners in the UK and Denmark, and three large national surveys with the public in the UK and Denmark that tested the impact of current communication campaigns and tested new messages designed to improve the behavioural impact of existing messaging.

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1. Communication requirements: Preventing radicalisation

1.1 Introduction

The nature of communication measures designed to prevent radicalisation means that, unlike activities designed to interdict or mitigate lone actor terrorism, communication pinch points based on specific events or actions are frequently less precise or time specific. There are a range of reasons for this, such as the often lengthy and uneven radicalisation process (Borum 2011), the fact that many of the communications are broad and centred on improving community awareness rather than responding to specific events, and that identifying potential lone attackers is a difficult and imprecise science. Indeed, as Bouhana et al. (forthcoming) note '*little of any specificity is known about the nature of the places where lone actor radicalisation happens*', which can make targeted communications particularly difficult. Furthermore, as the PRIME Communications Review Summary Report¹ highlighted, practitioners in both the UK and Denmark frequently emphasise the importance of consistent or 'as soon as possible' communications as opposed to temporally specific communications.

Nevertheless, by combining understandings derived from the Communication Review with insights concerning the unique features of lone actor radicalisation identified in the literature (e.g. Gill 2015, Spaaji 2012) and through PRIME research², it is possible to produce a broad set of communication requirements. These requirements are supported by an 'at a glance' communication framework with examples of when the eight distinct message categories outlined below will be of particular importance for one or more of the six key communication audiences. Some of these intervention points (or specific times when the message category is of particular importance) are reactive, such as following an extremist incident. Others can be predicted and factored into long-term communication plans, such as during periods of heightened religiosity, like Ramadan. The majority are targeted towards the broad audiences identified below, although a smaller number are relevant to targeting towards individuals where vulnerabilities are already known to the authorities, through mechanisms such as Channel in the UK.

The following sections outline the primary message categories and key audiences, broad communication requirements for practitioners and policy-makers to factor into communication plans and strategies and, finally, examples of communication timings within a communication requirements framework. The communication requirements draw on existing practice and practitioner recommendations identified through interviews carried out for the PRIME Communications Review and on empirically informed theoretical insights undertaken by PRIME researchers.

¹ D8.1 Communication Measures Review summary report is available at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

² See D5.1, D5.2 and D5.3 and D7.1 public summary reports also available at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

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1.2 Message categories and key audiences

Identified in the Communications Requirements Report (summary available on PRIME website) and synthesising the insights from both UK and Danish experiences, the most important eight communication categories and six audiences for radicalisation prevention communications are outlined in the Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below.

Communication Category	Purpose	Example
Counter / alternative narratives	Challenge extremist narratives to undermine their credibility in order to build resilience in the vulnerable and create cognitive dissonance in the radicalised	It is possible to be both British and Muslim
Topic specific education	Build knowledge, and challenge misperceptions, around issues of grievance to increase community resilience to extremist narratives	Details of UK government aid and support to people of Syria
Inclusion and identity	Promote the idea of an inclusive society and encourage individuals and communities to engage with wider society, providing practical examples of how to do so	Information about how the UK system works, such as how to become a school governor
Encouraging specific actions	To increase the number of individuals that actively contribute to the aims of preventing radicalisation	Teachers should report concerns about a student's vulnerability to Channel
Dissuading specific actions	To dissuade actions that could contribute to an individual or community's vulnerability to extremism	Do not host extremist speakers in your venues
Condemnation of terrorist acts / extremist groups	Reinforce the message that terrorism is not legitimate and extremist groups are not a viable way to express grievance	Far-right are not welcome in our community
Encourage critical thinking	Enhance the capacity of potentially vulnerable individuals to critically assess information and to better understand credible sources of information	Understand who has produced the website you use to learn about current affairs
Radicalisation prevention programmes	Widen stakeholder and community understanding of radicalisation prevention, such as Prevent and Channel, to encourage support for its aims amongst key partners	Prevent is about safeguarding, not spying

Table 1.1: Preventing radicalisation communication categories

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It is important to note that whilst each category serves a distinct purpose, the Radicalisation Prevention Programmes category is unique. The other seven categories directly work to increase resilience or to minimise vulnerability. They have clear outcomes or outputs. Radicalisation Prevention Programmes is distinct in that it is a facilitative communication. Many of the other communication categories have less credibility or impact if audiences do not understand the purpose and context – in particular that the strategies are based on safeguarding principles and operate in the pre-criminal space. Much of the push-back in the UK to the Prevent Strategy is the consequence of a lack of information about the strategy which has been filled by misperceptions and anti-Prevent narratives. It is essential that, while it may seem less important, practitioners are consistently clear and transparent about programmes or the impact of the other seven categories may be significantly diminished. Asides from briefings about the strategies, sharing examples of success, publishing statistics to illustrate scale, endorsement from senior professionals and empowering community organisations to voice their support are all likely to increase buy-in from potentially sceptical partners and to enhance the impact of the seven other communication categories.

Audience	Description
Internal staff	Front-line public sector colleagues, such as social workers, that government and security professionals delivering radicalisation prevention activities need to work in partnership with because of their daily contact with vulnerable individuals and affected communities.
Schools and other public institutions	Staff in public institutions, such as schools, universities and health services. Unlike ‘internal staff’ this audience is independent of most radicalisation prevention professionals but their support is necessary for the same reason; their regular access with potentially vulnerable individuals.
Vulnerable or radicalised individuals	Individuals or communities considered to be particularly vulnerable to terrorist ideologies and narratives or individuals that may already be radicalised (although for the radicalised many communications would sit within interdiction messaging).
Affected communities	Communities for which issues associated with radicalisation may have more direct or distinct impacts, such as being victims of hate crime following an attack. Affected communities may also have a unique role to play in supporting the aims of preventing vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalised because of their access to vulnerable people and potential credibility.
Private sector	Private sector organisations – primarily venues that hire out facilities for private meetings and conferences and so play a role in ensuring that extremist speakers are denied a platform.
Media	Primarily mainstream media platforms (e.g. newspapers) that cover extremist events as well as the radicalisation prevention agenda more generally. This category may also include social media platforms, such as Twitter, in terms of ensuring radicalising propaganda is removed from the internet wherever possible.

Table 1.2: Primary preventing radicalisation communication audiences

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1.3 Communication Requirement Principles

Across PRIME Work Packages addressing radicalisation, several core principles that practitioners and policy-makers should recognise when designing and delivering communications were identified. Many were very context specific but, for the purposes of maximising transferability across different settings and partners, the issues identified are summarised and synthesised below as nine core communication principles. Illustrative examples of the practical implications for practitioners to consider in communication plans are included.

i) Rapid and Responsive Messaging

Practitioners interviewed in the UK and Denmark emphasised that being able to deliver communication quickly in response to events or extremist narratives is essential. There are a range of reasons for this, including the need to respond quickly to propaganda calling for extremist actions, condemning terrorism to prevent lone actor copycat events and being quick enough to keep up with the complex and changing political and security events that inform terrorist narratives designed to fuel grievances. To date this remains a challenge in both countries because of difficulties such as a lack of expertise on some political and theological issues, sensitivity of language, the number of partners involved and an aversion to risky communications that could have a reputational impact.

Illustrative practical implications: Considering the evolving situation with Islamic State (e.g. loss of territory, efforts to establish influence in Libya and the increase in propaganda explicitly encouraging lone actor attacks in Europe), and growth in concerns about far-right extremism in Europe, policy-makers and practitioners will need to consider long-term communication strategies that: i) include horizon scanning future threats and narratives so that responses are speedier, ii) have established communication protocols so that agreement between partners can be smoother and, iii) enhance in-house expertise to increase real-time responsiveness to extremist propaganda.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Dissuading Specific Actions).

ii) Pre-prepare messages for specific points in the year

There are points in the calendar when it can be predicted that communication will either be of greater importance or more likely to find a receptive audience. For example, for the past two years Islamic State have explicitly increased their propaganda efforts during Ramadan, calling for lone actor attacks against the West. Ramadan is also a time when Muslim communities (often affected communities in this context) are more likely to be attending evening and weekend lectures at Mosques and community venues. As such, this is a period where communications are

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likely to be particularly important to discredit and provide counter-narratives to terrorist propaganda as well as an opportunity to reach an audience more likely to be willing to attend events and talks related to religious and political matters – the types of issues that terrorist seek to frame and distort in order to radicalise. Preparing positive communication messages in advance and seeking the support of community and faith partners ahead of this period to set up talks with credible speakers could be a vital area of work for practitioners working in the prevention space.

There are also specific junctures where other audiences are likely to be more receptive. For example, schools are reportedly often most open to hosting training sessions at the start of the academic year and often these need to be booked significantly in advance. Other events, such as International Women's Day, offer the opportunity for prevention narratives to be promoted within a broader thematic context. In this case working with event organisers could afford the opportunity for the promotion of women as a key part of the solution to keeping young people safe from radicalisation (e.g. promotion of the Prevent Tragedies campaign in the UK).

Illustrative practical implications: Communication leads should produce 12-month forward plans that identify points within the year where distinct audiences are likely to be open to dialogue. Themes to influence this will include religious and cultural celebrations, workloads of partners and internal staff (e.g. communications at the end of the financial year or the end of the term in schools are likely to be diminished because of competing priorities) and wider national or regional events that preventative communications can be incorporated into. For each of these themes key dissemination partners will need to be identified and engaged well in advance so that preventative communications can be built into partners' agendas and planning.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Dissuading Specific Actions, Encouraging Critical Thinking)
- Affected Communities (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Inclusion and identity, Topic Specific Education)
- Schools and other public institutions (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Media (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes)

iii) On-going and diverse delivery of core messaging

While some communications are likely to have greater resonance at specific times of year, practitioners in the UK and Denmark strongly emphasised that many of the core messages need to be continually delivered (even if at a slightly less intense level) because of their importance and on-going relevance. As one interviewee put it, *"the stuff around Syria is just continuously*

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rolled out” (Interviewee 1, UK Security Services, 2015). This, of course, has the risk of messages losing effectiveness if audiences become habituated to them and stop paying attention. However, this can largely be avoided by tailoring messages to specific audiences and delivering across a variety of modes and in different formats. For instance, counter-narratives can be continually updated and delivered in a variety of ways, such as in school assemblies, online and through media interviews.

Illustrative practical implications: While flexibility remains important, the most crucial communications with the longest-term relevance should be identified during regular communication reviews. These communications should be developed for delivery across multiple platforms and to a range of audiences. They should be outlined and explained in detail to partners, preferably with guidance notes, so that consistency of delivery is ensured.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Dissuading Specific Actions)
- Schools and other public institutions (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Internal Staff (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)

iv) Credible messaging following an extremist incident

Research by a range of scholars, such as Gill (2015), has identified a ‘copycat’ element associated with lone actor terrorism, with attacks often happening multiple times in a short space of time, as has been the experience in both Germany in 2016 and France in 2014. As such, speedy condemnation and deconstruction of the legitimacy of such attacks following an incident is essential. As important is that this communication is delivered by someone (or an organisation) that is credible to a likely attacker, such as a religious leader. Indeed, research by Gil, Horgan and Deckert (2014: 430) found that one in six lone actors seek legitimisation from religious, political or civic leaders prior to committing an extremist act. As such ensuring that communications are delivered by someone that has credibility in the eyes of the radicalised individual is essential. This will vary depending on the attacker but respected religious and cultural figures are likely to be important figures. As one experienced intervention provider working with individuals associated with the extreme far-right noted:

“With all due respect, politicians and even police, they’re seen by these guys as the system. They don’t listen to people like that, they don’t, that’s a fact, that’s like asking an Islamist to listen to, I don’t know... David Cameron, Tony Blair, even more, you know what I mean? Of course they won’t listen to them, why would they?”

(Interviewee 18, UK Intervention Provider, 2015)

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The hours and days following an incident are also important windows for engaging other audiences. For example, messaging following an event is important to secure the support of internal staff and other public and private sector partners whose willingness to engage is likely to be heightened in the context of an attack. Practitioners in the UK and Denmark reported that securing the support of some front-line public sector staff, such as social workers and teachers, could at times be challenging and highlighted that such audiences were often more open to discussions following an extremist incident. As such extremist events frequently provide a crucial window for communications promoting and explaining counter-radicalisation programmes, such as Channel in the UK.

Illustrative practical implications: Practitioners should consider preparing condemnation content that can be modified and used when events happen, establishing and working with credible voices ahead of any event. This can ensure that they are ready to deliver the condemnation quickly (rather than trying to find someone following an event) and that those individuals have the knowledge and capacity (e.g. online presence) to deliver the communications in an effective manner. Furthermore, training sessions offered to staff and partners should be heavily promoted in the weeks following an incident.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Condemnation of terrorist acts / extremist groups)
- Schools and other public institutions (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Internal Staff (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Affected Communities (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)

v) Message as early as possible in the radicalisation process

A key theme emerging across interviews was that messaging around vulnerabilities should go out as early as possible, not only in response to incidents. This is primarily because the sooner concerns are raised about an individual (or addressed) or an extremist narrative is challenged, the more potential there is to recognise and support a vulnerable individual or discredit a radicalising narrative. As such this message will be shared with vulnerable individuals but also internal staff, schools and other public bodies. As one UK local authority Prevent officer noted:

“The sooner the better, obviously, because the more entrenched you become, the more indoctrinated you become, the harder it is going to be to unweave that, definitely. And I think some people, probably, can get to the point where they just couldn’t face changing [...] the earlier you can put a communication in that challenges that, that counters some of that narrative, the better”

(Interviewee 3, UK Local Authority, 2015)

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The theme of early communication also relates to vulnerable individuals going through transitional periods. For example, during an inmate's induction in prison, the quicker communication can take place, while there is a potential cognitive opening, the more effective it may be. Identifying vulnerable individuals is, of course, hugely challenging but where vulnerabilities are known to practitioners, engagement should start as quickly as is practical.

Illustrative practical implications: Besides from preparing a broad suite of interventions that can be used when a vulnerable individual is identified, identifying particular cognitive openings that may be particularly relevant for different services can help ensure that communications are targeted at individuals at potentially their most vulnerable point. It is known that sudden life changes can influence patterns of personal relations, such as trauma or prison, and can lead to short-term crisis or social isolation. If these points can be identified for national, regional and service area contexts, such as when someone who has converted to a new religion in prison leaves the institution, early communicative interventions can be employed if necessary. If all relevant services, such as social services, schools and prison services, identified the three most vulnerable points that might be apparent in their area (or indicators that someone was engaging with a radical milieu) then a compendium of early intervention points could be compiled.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Dissuading Specific Actions, Encouraging Critical Thinking, Inclusion and Inclusion and Identity)
- Schools and other public institutions (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Internal Staff (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)

vi) No communication can be better than inaccurate or non-specialist communication

The sensitive and complex nature of many messages centred on radicalisation and counter-narratives means that there is significant potential for negative unintended consequences, such as increasing fears or generating feelings that some communities are stigmatised. Similarly, communication disseminated before sufficient expertise is developed can also have negative consequences. For example, local authority officers and police in Denmark report that when they first began delivering workshops for front-line staff they were ineffective in securing buy-in as the content was not effective with that audience. A UK police officer recalls receiving proposed communications that potentially undermined Islam, not by design but because of the lack of expertise around specific language. As such, while speed is important, it should not be at the expense of accuracy or expertise.

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Illustrative practical implications: It is important that communication campaigns are designed in consultation with representatives of the intended audience in order to ensure that lack of knowledge around theological, culture or language does not have unintended negative consequences. Furthermore, staff involved with designing or disseminating communications will require regular training and it is likely that in-house specialisms will need to be developed (e.g. it is unlikely that the same person will be able to develop detailed theological narratives to undermine Islamic State and design arguments that unpick the cultural elements of far-right discourse). The use of social media must be carefully regulated or, at the least, guidance provided for those that will be using it to avoid inconsistent or ill-informed communication. A focus on communications that include universal messages and promote ideas of similarity and inclusion mitigate some of this risk and have a more positive framing.

Key audiences and message categories:

N/A

vii) Engage with the media, researchers and other agenda setters regularly

A media analysis (presented in the Communications Measures Review summary report³) identified that media coverage and comment on lone actor terrorism is an increasing trend. It also found that some messages are reassuring (e.g. preparedness for terrorism) whilst others might alarm the public if not handled sensitively (e.g. the difficulty of detecting and disrupting lone actors). The impact of the media was also a theme of interviews with UK and Danish practitioners, with officials highlighting that the media could have a positive but also a negative impact on their efforts to communicate effectively. Positive features included instances of large radicalisation prevention campaigns, such as Prevent Tragedies, getting picked up and disseminated by the media. Negative aspects included elements of the media that portrayed extremist Muslims as representative of the wider Islamic community, indirectly perpetuated the grievance or message of a lone attacker or directly undermined state efforts to prevent radicalisation through criticisms of either the agenda or the approach.

However, the increased instances of lone actor attacks and prominence of radicalisation prevention programmes means that regular engagement with the media is essential. This is important for challenging misperceptions about prevention strategies, countering reporting that could make tackling extremism more difficult and filling information gaps. Information provision is also important in relation to sharing examples of successes to enable academic researchers to produce well-informed critical analysis. Positive engagement with the media is particularly important following an attack, when there is likely to be significant media interest and an opportunity to inform the discussion. Danish practitioners emphasised that radicalisation events or terrorist attacks are also important opportunities to engage with the wider public through the press. For instance, intense media interest following the February 2015 Copenhagen terrorist

³ Available at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

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attacks allowed practitioners to explain counter-terrorism approaches and successes. Similarly, Danish officials described how local cases of foreign fighters uncovered in the media in 2009 paved the way for more effective communication with frontline personnel.

Illustrative practical implications: As media interest in both radicalisation prevention and lone actors continues to grow, practitioners have an opportunity to: i) improve public understanding of their agenda and thus increase support and protective behaviours (such as reporting signs of radicalisation), ii) showcase successes to enhance the buy-in of any sceptical public and private sector partners, and iii) undermine the narratives of groups that are hostile towards prevention efforts, which can make engagement with affected communities more challenging. Officials should consider preparing case studies of successes and wider activity that can be shared with the media, provide detailed interviews to reporters across different media platforms (e.g. radio, television, newspapers) and facilitate access to community partners to lend further credibility. Regularly sharing simple briefing notes, or inviting reporters and researchers to observe prevention activities, are also good opportunities for increasing understanding of the work programmes in order to avoid damaging misreporting and, potentially, to secure support for promotion of communication campaigns.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Media (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)

viii) Face to face communication is particularly important for prevention

While a range of delivery modes are necessary for radicalisation, interdiction and mitigation stages, face to face communications are particularly important for preventative communication. There are several reasons for this, including the complexity and sensitivity of the topics, the need to develop trusted relationships to avoid misunderstandings and suspicions that undermine effective delivery, and the need to recruit, develop and work with community and faith partners. Face to face communication could take the form of detailed training sessions for front-line staff, standing engagement forums with local community groups and faith institutions or wider public engagements to address specific topics. Standing groups with affected communities are especially important for two-way communication and for quickly disseminating messages in the wake of an incident. This mode of delivery, while potentially more resource intensive, is essential for audiences to be able to ask questions and for relationships to be developed – crucial both for work with vulnerable / affected communities and sceptical but essential partners.

Illustrative practical implications: The two primary implications of this are resources and consistency. Face to face communication, especially if delivered by full-time community engagement officers, is relatively costly in terms of time and finances. However, if the Radicalisation Prevention Programmes communication category and detailed counter-narratives are to be effective they require discussion and the development of trust. As such policy-makers will need to consider which geographic areas and communities (community engagement officers

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will be most effective if they have an understanding of the affected or vulnerable communities' cultural or religious background) are most relevant and target resources accordingly. Secondly, interviewees in both the UK and Denmark provided examples of the negative impacts of inconsistent or poorly delivered face to face communications, such as an unintended increase in perceived stigmatisation. It is therefore important that those delivering communications are properly trained and provided with resources to ensure consistency and positive outcomes, particularly around complex counter-narratives. As such the provision of centrally designed guidance notes or handbooks, including a method for sharing new information quickly with engagement officers, is essential.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Vulnerable / Radicalised individuals (Counter / Alternative Narratives, Encouraging Critical Thinking, Inclusion and Identity)
- Schools and other public institutions (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Internal Staff (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Affected Communities (Radicalisation Prevention Programmes, Inclusion and Identity, Counter / Alternative Narratives)

ix) Identify credible actors and support their capacity to deliver communications effectively and widely

Differences in extremist influences and audience priorities, as well as mistrust by some groups in society of activities designed to prevent radicalisation means it is important to maximise the range of individuals and groups disseminating messages. This is particularly important in the context of condemnation and counter-narrative communication, where credibility with vulnerable or radicalised individuals is essential but for whom the government is often not a trusted source. It is therefore essential to work with credible voices from affected communities as they are likely to have a greater chance of influencing vulnerable or radicalised individuals than government or security officials. As well as regular engagement and topic-specific education, individuals from these communities may also require support in developing their capacity to deliver communications widely, such as training on social media. It is also important to identify suitable communicators for messaging audiences who may not be mistrustful, but may have alternative agendas. For example, private sector businesses that are likely to prioritise branding and profit margins over radicalisation prevention may be more open to communications from peers who can more effectively convey the benefits to business of engagement.

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Illustrative practical implications: Securing reliable partners will be time consuming in terms of identifying who is credible, actually securing their support and, finally, developing competencies and capacities. Practitioners will need to consider the audiences they most wish to influence dependent on their context and seek to secure partnerships with schools, religious institutions, businesses and so on accordingly. Securing their support will require detailed briefings in terms of the importance of the work and the support that will be provided (as well as the benefits of engagement). Consideration will need to be given to issues of information sharing between government and non-government bodies / individuals as well as issues of sustainability (i.e. several representatives from all sectors should be engaged at all times).

Key audiences and message categories:

N/A

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
A	Counter / alternative narratives	Challenge terrorist / extremist narratives to undermine their credibility	Affected community	Post terrorist incident Following significant terrorist propaganda release Seasonal (e.g. Ramadan)
			Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Post terrorist event to deconstruct the legitimacy of the act / its motivation During cognitive openings (e.g. on entry into prison) Built within existing structures (e.g. schools assemblies) Following significant terrorist propaganda release
B	Topic specific education	Build knowledge around issues of grievance to increase community resilience to extremist narratives	Affected community	In response to policy initiatives or political events (e.g. new foreign policy) Built within existing structures (e.g. lectures after Friday prayers) Following significant terrorist propaganda release
			Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Built within existing structures (e.g. part of Channel intervention) Following significant terrorist propaganda release
			Media	In response to (in anticipation of) community tensions
C	Inclusion and identity	Promote the idea of an inclusive society and encourage individuals and communities to engage with wider society	Affected community	Continuous (e.g. opportunities provided by the national political system) Intensified following a terrorist incident
			Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Continuous (e.g. possible to be British and Muslim) Intensified following a terrorist incident Intensified during de-radicalisation interventions
D	Radicalisation prevention programmes	Widen stakeholder and community understanding of p to bust myths and encourage support for its aims	Internal staff	Post attack when recognition of importance or prevention is heightened Continuous
			Schools and other public institutions	Post attack when recognition of importance or prevention is heightened Start of academic year / term when schools have more time for training
			Media	Post attack when recognition of importance or prevention is heightened
			Affected communities	Continuous Post attack when recognition of importance or prevention is heightened

Table 1.3a: 'At a Glance' Communication Timings Framework – Prevention

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
E	Encouraging specific actions	To increase the number of individuals that actively contribute to the aims of preventing radicalisation	Private Sector	Seasonal (e.g. during a lull in business for hotels in winter)
			Internal Staff	Continuous (e.g. report signs of vulnerability to officials) Intensified following a terrorist incident
			Schools and other public institutions	Seasonal (e.g. embed CVE messages into recurrent curriculum themes) Continuous (e.g. build radicalisation vulnerabilities into safeguarding policy) Intensified following a terrorist incident
			Media	Following a terrorist incident
			Affected communities	Continuous (e.g. report concerns about vulnerability) Intensified following a terrorist incident
F	Dissuading specific actions	To dissuade actions that could contribute to an individual or community's vulnerability to extremism	Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Following specific propaganda (e.g. 'travel to Syria') As soon as a vulnerability is recognised, especially during periods of cognitive openings and enhanced stressors (e.g. on entering prison)
			Media	Post terrorist incident (e.g. don't repeat the terrorist's propaganda message)
G	Condemnation of terrorist acts / extremist groups	Reinforce the message that terrorism is not legitimate and extremist groups are not welcome in the UK	Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Continuous Intensified following a terrorist incident Following specific propaganda or event
H	Encouraging critical thinking	Increase the ability of individuals to analyse the credibility of narratives that they are exposed to	Radicalised / vulnerable individual	Continuous
				Following specific propaganda or event

Table 1.3b: 'At a Glance' Communication Timings Framework – Prevention

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2. Communication Requirements: Interdiction

2.1 Introduction

Academic research and practitioner experiences both indicate that interdicting lone actor terrorism can often be more challenging than group-based terrorism. In large part this is because more traditional interdiction activities may not be as effective when actors are operating largely alone or planning less sophisticated attacks without the aid of organised training (Striegher 2013). This makes communication uniquely important for lone actor terrorism, as interdiction relies even more heavily on, (1) securing the support of the public to report suspicious behaviours and, (2) deterring potential attackers.

Drawing together insights from the PRIME Communications Measures Review⁴, data collected from an online survey with the public in the UK and Denmark testing the impact of an existing communication campaign, and insights regarding attack planning trends identified across the PRIME project⁵, the following sections detail the most important communication categories and audiences for interdiction communications. Following this, eleven communication requirements for counter-terrorism practitioners to draw on when preparing communication plans are outlined, along with illustrative examples of the potential implications.

2.2 Message Categories and Key Audiences

The five most important communication categories and six key audiences for interdiction communications identified from PRIME research are outlined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below:

Communication Category	Purpose	Example
Understanding the threat	Ensure that relevant audiences understand the threat context, including risks specifically relevant to them / their organisation	Promotion of the national security threat level
Vigilance	Educate individuals and organisations to understand suspicious signs and to actively look out for them	Be aware of, and look out for, signs of hostile reconnaissance
Effective security	Encourage and support relevant organisations to have systems and measures in place to increase their capacity to detect or disrupt an attack	Ensure you have CCTV and a clear security policy for visitors
Deterring and disrupting threat	Dissuade or prevent potential attackers from committing an attack	Highly visible promotion of an organisation's CCTV and effective security measures
Encouraging specific actions	Ensure individuals and agencies other than security services contribute to efforts to detect or disrupt a planned attack	The public can prevent terrorism by reporting suspicious behaviour to the terrorist hotline

Table 2.1: Interdiction communication categories

⁴ Communication Measures Review public summary report is available at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

⁵ See for example D5.2 Lone Actor Attack Preparation Data Inventory also at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

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There is considerable overlap between these five communication categories. For example, communication about vigilance is likely to often also include recommendations for specific actions. Likewise, communication designed to promote effective security may also influence information about deterring and disrupting threat. Nevertheless, the five purposes are distinct and central to efforts to interdict lone actor terrorism.

Audience	Description
General public	The general population, who can support interdiction efforts by reporting suspicious activities that they might encounter in the course of their day, such as when commuting, visiting a tourist attraction, attending a sporting event or recognising unusual behaviour by a neighbour.
Internal staff and partner agencies	Individuals working for the government or partners, who may be best placed to recognise and report attack planning, such as hostile reconnaissance (often because they may work in buildings that could be terrorist targets).
Affected communities	Distinct communities or groups of professionals that are a priority for interdiction messaging and require specific communications because they may be a target (e.g. military personnel) or be best placed to recognise suspicious signs within their community (e.g. community leaders).
Radicalised individuals	Individuals that may be attack planning and who need to be deterred, detected or disrupted.
Businesses	Private sector organisations that may be targeted by lone actors or have materials that terrorists may want to steal or acquire. Communications are required for the sector broadly and for specific industries, such as farms with fertilisers (materials) and shopping malls (targets).
Media	Primarily mainstream media platforms (e.g. newspapers) that reach a large audience and can therefore be used as a conduit for communications.

Table 2.2: Primary interdiction communication audiences

2.3 Communication Requirement Principles

Across the PRIME Work Packages addressing interdiction eleven key requirements or insights have been identified that can inform and support professionals with responsibility for communicating about terrorism. These are outlined below:

i) Large scale public campaigns can significantly increase reporting behaviour

Large national surveys conducted with the public in the UK and Denmark highlighted the positive impact that communication campaigns can have on public reporting intentions, which practitioners should consider as a key tool to securing information from the public.

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Using the UK's 'See it, Say it, Sorted' communication content⁶, which encourages rail passengers and people using train stations to report unusual items or activity on the railway, it was possible to measure the impact of this type of guidance on public attitudes towards reporting and their perceived ability to do so. Results indicated that individuals exposed to 'See it, Say it, Sorted' messages were significantly more likely than participants in the 'no information' condition to agree that they have '*an important role to play in keeping public spaces secure by being vigilant and reporting suspicious behaviour or unusual activity*'. This perception was reflected in participants' responses to a hypothetical scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they had observed a young man filming CCTV cameras on a mainline train station concourse, with a higher proportion of participants who had received the guidance reporting that it was likely that they would tell a member of rail staff / police officer than in the 'no information' condition.

Not only did the provision of guidance increase the perceived importance of public reporting, it also increased confidence about how to report. Respondents exposed to the communication were significantly less likely to indicate uncertainty about how to report than respondents in the 'no information' condition. Indeed, the data indicated that information provision had a significant positive impact on several drivers of reporting.

Illustrative practical implications: A range of agencies within both the UK and Denmark have responsibilities for counter-terrorism communication, with many designing and delivering their own communications independently. This is likely to be similar across other European countries. The significant impact of large public campaigns indicates that prioritisation of communications across agencies to identify shared messages that could be delivered jointly with pooled resources could enable the most important communications to reach the public through large public campaigns. Messages should seek to address both the drivers and barriers to reporting.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Encouraging Specific Actions).

ii) Posters and leaflets are an important mode of delivery for interdiction

Unlike some prevention communications, which may be highly targeted to sections within a community, interdiction communications will often be broad and designed to reach the largest possible audience. This is because the cooperation of the general public is required to draw the authorities' attention to lone actor leakage behaviour. Consequently, large regional or national campaigns are likely to be an important mode of communication in order to reach as large an audience as possible.

⁶ Content available at http://www.btp.police.uk/advice_and_information/see_it_say_it_sorted.aspx

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Some messages may be complex, such as what constitutes ‘suspicious’ behaviour, and require focused training or tailored communication. For instance, guidance manuals or training sessions with security managers of venues likely to be targets will clearly remain a crucial activity, such as *Project Caution* in Denmark. Likewise, specialist leaflets will remain important, such as guidance to businesses in the UK that sell chemicals that terrorists may be keen to acquire. However, many interdiction communications are more straightforward than other counter-terrorism communications, such as theological counter-narratives. The fact that messages are frequently targeted towards the general population further reinforces the need for generic, broad information rather than highly specialist or complex content. As such campaigns should focus on clear, simple and easy to understand messages. Whilst a variety of delivery modes are important, campaigns should afford particular attention to adopting large scale delivery models, such as posters, social media and leaflets. For instance, a UK local authority interviewee described the distribution of approximately 200,000 leaflets across London on a single day as part of the *Support Charity Not Crime* campaign.

Illustrative practical implications: If posters and leaflets are to be effective, practitioners will need to consider the practical aspects of content, such as the necessary range of languages, as well as the tone of content to secure the buy-in of some more challenging partners. For instance, communications that have softer branding and imaging may be effective in engaging luxury businesses that have previously refused to share counter-terrorism communications with staff and customers for fear of undermining their brand. Simple, memorable phone numbers / contact details should also be considered, with several practitioners suggesting that current counter-terrorism hotlines have phone numbers that the public cannot remember from simply seeing them on a poster.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance).
- Internal staff and partner agencies (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)
- Businesses (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance / Effective Security)
- Affected communities (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)

iii) Security services are a credible and important ‘voice’ but others messengers are also important for distinct audiences

Section 1 of this report addressed the lack of credibility that the security services and government have in the eyes of some target audiences in the context of preventing radicalisation. This may be less relevant in the context of interdiction communication in

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countries where there are generally high levels of trust in the police. For example, the security services are frequently perceived as credible and appropriate in this context according to interviews conducted with practitioners and audiences in the UK and Denmark. This perception was supported by PRIME survey findings which found perceived procedural justice, police legitimacy and social identification with the police amongst the public were high in both countries (particularly Denmark). This is important as these factors were all found to be positively associated with intention to report to the police. As such police and partners should continue to be pro-active as the face and voice of interdiction campaigns and recognise that police branding can enhance a communication. However, other deliverers also have credibility and should be enlisted for specific campaigns and audiences. Rather than as an alternative to the security services, these partners are an addition to lend sector or community credibility. This may be particularly important in southern and eastern European countries where levels of trust in the police tend to be lower (Torrente, Gallo and Oltra, 2016).

Illustrative practical implications: There are two primary implications. The first is that security agencies and officials should ensure that they are appropriately trained and resourced to be the leading voice and brand of interdictions. This may involve the development of in-house communications expertise to maximise brand credibility. Similarly, training for officers at more junior levels to maximise the impact that communications have by increasing the number of credible 'outlets'. This could be media training or technical training. For instance, if the majority of offices had Twitter accounts that all released communications regularly (guidance would be required) the reach would be expanded in a managed form. The second implication is that agencies should seek to secure credible (often peer) partners to support communications with specific sectors where it has been challenging to secure consistent support. For example, PRIME interviewees described the benefits of having businesses present to other businesses, alongside the police, to emphasise the relevance and importance of the police recommendations to the private sector. Preparing case studies of sector impact and securing partners ahead of a new campaign will help agencies to deliver new communications as effectively as possible.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Internal staff and partner agencies (Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Businesses (Encouraging Specific Actions)
- Affected communities (Encouraging Specific Actions)

iv) Map communications onto existing audience concerns

To secure the cooperation of private sector partners in adopting, or disseminating, key messages it is often necessary to frame the benefits in terms of their existing business concerns. Practitioners in both countries described the challenges of securing the active

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cooperation of some public and private partners, either because of competing service / business demands or because they did not fully appreciate the severity of the problem or its relevance to their organisation. This issue was particularly relevant for the private sector. Practitioners described three primary reasons why some businesses were reluctant to spread interdiction communications with staff and customers. The first is that some high-end, luxury stores feel that such communications undermine their branding. Others, such as some sports stadiums, have concerns about creating the impression that they are a target in the eyes of fans / customers. Finally, some firms reportedly do not see the threat as high or pertinent to them. This is often because officials are sometimes unable (because of data restrictions) to fully share the evidence that has influenced their security recommendations. As such, future communications with businesses may need to be: i) increasingly tailored either in the tone / content of communications for dissemination with staff and customers, ii) more firmly coupled with evidenced security risk of the suggested actions for the businesses and iii) framed within existing businesses concerns, such as staff welfare or reputation management.

Illustrative practical implications: There are several practical actions that counter-terrorism officials could adopt in order to increase the support from other sectors. For example, practitioners could consider options for increasing the amount of information that can be shared with the private sector. This could be security clearance for security managers or special classified briefings approved by senior intelligence officials. Another option is to produce tailored, 'softer' versions of existing campaigns for firms that are nervous about the impacts of counter-terrorism communications on their business (e.g. loss of customers). Officials should also consider working with a consultant from the relevant private sector when designing new communications for this audience in order to best frame the message to their industry specific concerns.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Businesses (Understanding the Threat)
- Affected Communities (Understanding the Threat)

v): Introduce doubt into the mind of potential attackers – especially during hostile reconnaissance

Whilst interdiction communications are frequently targeted towards the public and staff working at specific targets of terrorism, it is also important to direct communication towards potential attackers. This will not usually mean pre-selected individuals, rather broader communication that potential attackers are likely to see – primarily deterrence messaging designed to introduce doubt into the mind of the attacker and project a message of likely failure. Ensuring that deterrence communications remain a priority is important for several reasons, but two of are particular note based on PRIME findings. Firstly, lone actor acquisition of capability takes place over a period of time, with political violence rarely a spontaneous

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decision. Most attacks occur at the end of a lengthy process (even if the length of time between the desire to commit an attack and its execution varies considerably between cases). As such, a clear window of opportunity to deter is evident if effective messaging can be produced.

A second important issue is the influence of target restraints. PRIME analysis of detailed case studies found that target reconnaissance was conducted by 43% of the 47 lone actors studied. Based on these findings, Bouhana et al. (forthcoming) have identified reconnaissance as a vulnerable stage of lone actor activity, when the potential for detection and disruption is at its highest. The majority of lone actor extremists weighed the pros and cons of the targets available to them and 62% of the cases studied were influenced by one or more constraints during the target selection process. Constraints included target accessibility and degree of protection. The high rate of lone actor reconnaissance and their concerns around target protection highlights the importance of deterrence communications.

Illustrative practical implications: There are various ways that the idea of failure can be projected to potential attackers. Research conducted as part of the PRIME Communication Review outlined how official government statements reported by the leading UK tabloid and broadsheet newspapers convey a mixed message of vulnerability (e.g. it is very difficult to detect lone actors) and of preparedness (e.g. confidence about delivering a secure Olympics). A greater focus on providing preparedness messaging to present a more consistent picture of capability could act as a deterrent to potential lone attackers. This, of course, has to be balanced with the need to encourage public reporting but is, nevertheless, a factor for officials to consider when producing press releases – particularly concerning high profile events or venues, such as a football cup final. Another option is to encourage high profile targets, whether they be public or private, to make at least some of their security as visible as possible (without diminishing capacity). For example, clear signage about the presence of CCTV or bright jackets for security staff. On a larger scale, *Project Servator* in the City of London floods an area with police officers without providing a specific reason or announcement to ensure that potential attackers know that they cannot predict when and where they will find security officials.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Radicalised individuals (Deterring and disrupting threat)

vi) Plan to intensify communications at specific points in the year, particularly following an incident

While core messaging will be continuously rolled out across multiple platforms, there are specific points during the year when there should be a particular emphasis on promoting and disseminating specific interdiction messages. Some of these can be pre-planned based on known cultural, religious, professional and political events. For example, UK practitioners

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discussed the importance of communicating in the run up to Hajj pilgrimage in PRIME interviews. This is due to concerns around lack of awareness that some travel organisers may use profits to fund terrorist activities. Another practical example is tailored communication for military personnel on their return from overseas postings. In recent years attacks on police and military personnel, as well as propaganda produced by terrorist groups such as Islamic State, make it clear that these individuals are targets. As such, preparing bespoke vigilance briefings for military personnel on their return from overseas postings can be pre-planned and delivered at set times.

Likewise, communication about reporting suspicious behaviours or packages is likely to be especially relevant in the run up to a major national event. Conversely, there are periods where communications are likely to have their weakest impact for some audiences and so significant resources should not be prioritised to these periods. For example, practitioners described the periods immediately before or during holiday seasons as the time when the private sector was least likely to be receptive to time consuming modes of communication delivery, such as workshops. Other periods are known to be of importance but can be less easily pre-planned because of their reactive nature. For example, following a terrorist incident rapid communication is important as this when the public and other audiences are likely to most receptive to and recognise the importance of reporting.

Illustrative practical implications: Practitioners are advised to identify the key political, social, religious, practical and cultural points in the year and to plan communication bursts around these times as relevant. For instance, unattended package messaging might be particularly pertinent during the Christmas season, whilst messaging about hostile reconnaissance is likely to be important in the lead up to a significant public political event. Building a 12-month timetable of these events can help officers to allocate resources efficiently and to secure the appropriate partners well in advance to ensure dissemination is well prepared. Authorities could also seek to create points in the year that make the public more responsive to interdiction communications. For example, in the UK the police have created an annual ‘*CT Awareness Week*’ which is heavily advertised and each day has a specific theme which is promoted across the country through various modes and platforms. This runs in November ahead of the holiday season when crowded spaces are likely to become busier. The week is usually covered by the mainstream media. Officials should also have interdiction messages pre-prepared ahead of an attack that can be quickly adapted to specific circumstances to allow speedy responsive communication, such as reporting information about potential follow on attacks.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)
- Internal staff and partner agencies (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)

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- Businesses (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance / Effective Security)
- Affected communities (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)

vii) Develop positive relations with the media

Despite identifying some challenges with working with the media, UK and Danish security professionals were nevertheless clear in PRIME interviews that the press are vitally important to the success of their work and that building positive relations is important. Indeed, many examples of the media acting as an important conduit for official interdictions were identified. For example, UK media reporting on terrorist incidents often concludes with a police request for the public to report any concerns to the Anti-Terror Hotline whilst others gave examples of the media's usefulness in disseminating police requests for specific information that could disrupt a planned attack, such as the location of named individuals. As such building and sustaining positive relations with the press is an important goal.

Illustrative practical implications: Practitioners should consider developing a series of engagements and products to facilitate better relations with the media. For example, the most important media outlets should be identified (based on factors such as circulation size, nature of audience etc.) and provided with regular briefings both formal but also informal, smaller meetings where relations can develop. A series of standard press releases to be quickly released after an attack should be prepared (that can be modified to the nature of the event) so that the media quickly has appropriate information available to minimise their reliance on speculation or commentators who may not fully understand the situation.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Media (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions).

viii) Empower the public to recognise and report leakage

One of the fundamental roles of interdiction communication is to encourage the reporting of information that could help the authorities to detect and disrupt an attack. Leakage (i.e. intentional or unintentional signalling of extremist motivations or plans) is a common feature amongst lone actors (Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014; Ellis & Pantucci, 2016). The cases analysed as part of PRIME provided further evidence of this characteristic. For instance, that lone actors show a predisposition towards conducting preparatory activities at their place of residence. This is a clear point of potential intervention, as activities such as bomb making have the potential to be noticed by neighbours. Furthermore, PRIME analysis of 47 detailed case studies found that lone actors only infrequently took operational security precautions. For

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example, only 6% of the lone actors in the sample analysed implemented data protection measures, leaving incriminating evidence in plain sight. 89% of lone actors communicated their radical or extremist convictions to others, such as family members, friends, colleagues or strangers online. 66% gave others the idea that they were involved in suspicious and potentially violent activities. Indeed, more than a third communicated their desire to commit an (as of yet) unspecified attack, for instance by stating online that they ‘wanted to kill someone’. Such findings make empowering the public to report essential. Communication should make the public aware of the important role they can play and provide easily understood guidance for what types of comments and activities they should report and how to do so. This type of communication can also address barriers to reporting, such as uncertainty as to whether information provided will be treated seriously.

Illustrative practical implications: Practitioners seeking to empower the public to recognise and report leakage should devise communications across a range of platforms relevant to different audiences, including public spaces, leaflets and through the media. Communication targeting will be dependent on the likely leakage in different contexts. For example, message targeting towards housing estates may prioritise signs, such as materials that could be used to make bombs. Social media users could be informed about reporting extremist statements, whilst religious leaders may be informed through briefings about unusual questions and angry outbursts from their congregation. As discussed above, the use of context specific credible voices to support communication can increase impact based on perceived legitimacy of deliverer.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)

ix) Shape the environments in which potential lone actors operate

Communication has the potential not only to increase reporting behaviours amongst the public, deter potential attackers and increase the protective behaviours around terrorist targets. It can also shape the contexts within which lone actors operate. Increasing public reporting and business vigilance clearly does that, but communications can also influence more specific settings. PRIME findings indicate that outside influence may play just as significant a part in lone actor terrorism as it does in other forms of political violence. For example, 64% of the 47 lone actor cases that were analysed had contact with clearly radical, extremist or terrorist individuals whilst 36% of these individuals undertook firearms training. As such legitimate and illegitimate social environments are potential targets for messaging to deter or detect attack planning. For example, the significant number of attackers that undertook firearms training suggests that bespoke guidance on reporting suspicious behaviours for gun clubs, such as *Operation Solitaire* in the UK, should be a sustained feature of communication plans across Europe. Communication with a disruptive intent could also target extremist and radical settings to minimise the support lone actors might receive.

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Illustrative practical implications: Analysis of the known cases within a particular country can help officials to identify any specific trends in the settings within which lone actors trained or received information prior to the attack. Designing bespoke communication for these settings can help to increase the capacities of legitimate social groups to respond and to disrupt illegitimate support networks. For example, in Denmark individuals that authorities are concerned are radicalising are invited to meetings where it is made clear that officials are aware of their actions. No official action is taken but communicating awareness is hoped to be enough to dissuade the individuals. Visits to social environments known to influence extremists could serve a similar purpose.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Businesses (Vigilance)
- Affected communities (Vigilance)

x) Where possible, give examples of 'suspicious' behaviour

There are limits and risks concerning the level of detail that can be provided to the public to help them to recognise and report suspicious behaviours. The actions of potential attackers will be context specific (e.g. location, target, attack type) whilst guidance that is overly prescriptive may inadvertently contribute to the public only reporting listed behaviours and ignoring other signs. However, wherever possible it is important for authorities to include as much detail as is practical. Previous research has found that the public is less confident in reporting suspicious behaviours rather than suspicious packages for a variety of reasons, including a lack of confidence about what constitutes 'suspicious' in this context (FEMA, 2012).

PRIME research extended this insight through an online survey with the public, which analysed intended reporting behaviours in the context of a hypothetical hostile reconnaissance scenario. The survey found that significantly more people intended reporting an unattended item than suspicious behaviour at a train station, with nearly a third of participants (29.9%) expressing uncertainty about their likelihood of reporting suspicious behaviour. Similarly, concern about getting an innocent person into trouble was a barrier to reporting for many, further highlighting the influence of certainty on reporting intention. In response to a two stage hypothetical scenario, in which participants were exposed to suspicious behaviours in a train station, over 90% of participants suggested that they would wait for further information before reporting during the first stage, in which only a limited amount of detail about the suspicious behaviour was revealed. In the second stage, where the behaviours were much clearer, this was no longer the most likely intended behaviour (replaced by telling a member of station staff or police). However, 60% of participants nonetheless continued to say that they would be likely to wait for more evidence before reporting. As such certainty was an important factor in reporting behaviours and there is

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clearly a need for mechanisms to instil greater confidence in the public regarding what constitutes suspicious behaviour.

Illustrative practical implications: Given the importance of public reporting of lone actor leakage and attack planning, practical guidance to help them do so is essential. Practitioners should consider identifying the most significant and likely attack types in their context that they require public support in interdicting. Reverse engineering previous attacks and the methodologies promoted online by terrorist groups can help officials to formulate the most relevant and important suspicious signs for the public to be aware of and understand to increase their certainty regarding what constitutes ‘suspicious’ behaviour, which in turn should increase the likelihood of reporting. These signs can be added to existing communications or form the basis of new products. They are also likely to influence the context of training sessions delivered to security managers from the private sector or private sector staff in locations that could be terrorist targets.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Understanding the Threat / Vigilance)
- Internal staff and partner agencies (Understanding the Threat / Vigilance)
- Businesses (Understanding the Threat / Vigilance)
- Affected communities (Understanding the Threat / Vigilance)

xii) Reporting is more likely in the context of regular communication

Cross national comparisons of UK and Danish responses to the provision of the content of the UK ‘*See It, Say It, Sorted*’ campaign suggests that regular exposure to counter-terrorism communications can influence responses to new campaigns. UK authorities have a long standing history of regularly producing public interdiction communication campaigns, such as ‘*If you suspect it, report it*’ and ‘*It’s Probably Nothing, But...*’, but these types of campaign are not a feature of Danish counter-terrorism activities because of concerns about creating fear amongst the population. In the PRIME survey exploring responses to ‘*See it, Say it, Sorted*’ messages, participants from the two countries were exposed to the same guidance but intended reporting to the police or rail staff (the recommended behaviour) was higher amongst UK participants, even when controlling for differences in demographic and perception variables that predict reporting intentions. Higher levels of intended reporting amongst UK participants suggests that ongoing communication campaigns have been effective in establishing a reporting norm in this national context. However, the impact of guidance was consistent across national contexts (i.e. it increased intention to call the police in both the UK and Denmark), suggesting that guidance that has been designed in a UK context is likely to be appropriate for use in other Member States.

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Illustrative practical implications: Policy-makers in countries that do not regularly disseminate counter-terrorism communications to the general public, such as Denmark, should consider the extent to which public cooperation is required for the interdiction of lone actor terrorism. Whilst regular public communication may not be appropriate in all national contexts – for example where it is not proportionate to the threat profile – where public cooperation is required, it is likely that ongoing campaigns will be needed to establish reporting norms.

Key audiences and message categories:

- General public (Understanding the Threat / Encouraging Specific Actions / Vigilance)

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
I	Understanding the threat	Ensure that relevant audiences understand the threat context, including risks specifically relevant to them / their organisation	Affected community	Seasonal (e.g. when soldiers return from overseas postings) Continuous for community audiences
			Internal staff and partner agencies	Continuous Intensified based on new information (e.g. targeting government offices)
			Businesses	Continuous Intensified based on new information (e.g. new target) Seasonal (e.g. ahead of a busy shopping period)
			Media	Continuous Immediately following a terrorist incident
			General public	Continuous Seasonal (e.g. CT Awareness Week)
J	Vigilance	Educate individuals and organisations to recognise suspicious signs and to actively look out for them	General public	Seasonal (e.g. ahead of holiday season or sporting event) Intensified when threat level rises / specific intelligence Continuous
			Internal staff and partner agencies	Continuous Intensified when threat level rises / specific intelligence
			Affected communities	Continuous Intensified based on new information (e.g. plans to attack Jewish areas)
			Businesses	Continuous Seasonal (e.g. intensified ahead of holiday season or sporting event)
K	Effective security	Encourage / support organisations to have systems and measures in place to increase their capacity to detect or disrupt lone actors	Businesses	Continuous

Table 2.3a: 'At a Glance' Communication Timings Framework – Interdiction

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
L	Deterring and disrupting threat	Dissuade or prevent potential attackers from committing an attack	Radicalised individuals	Continuous
M	Encouraging specific actions	Ensure individuals and agencies other than security services contribute to efforts to detect or disrupt a planned attack	General public	Continuous (e.g. report suspicious packages) Seasonal (e.g. avoid bogus charity collection campaigns) Post attack when recognition of importance of reporting is heightened
			Internal staff and partner agencies	Intensified when threat level rises / in response to specific intelligence Post attack when recognition of importance of interdiction is heightened Continuous (e.g. importance of symbolic deterrence)
			Businesses	Continuous Seasonal (e.g. Ports Awareness Week in the UK)
			Schools and other public institutions	Post attack when recognition of importance of interdiction is heightened Start of academic year / term when schools have more time for training
			Media	Post attack when recognition of importance of interdiction is heightened Seasonal (e.g. in response to new intelligence)
			Affected communities	Continuous with community audiences Seasonal (e.g. military returning from overseas postings)

Table 2.3b: ‘At a Glance’ Communication Timings Framework – Interdiction

3. Communication Requirements: Mitigation

3.1 Introduction

The increased challenges associated with interdicting lone actor attack planning, rising prevalence of lone actor terrorism across Europe, and active encouragement of lone actor attacks by terrorist groups, such as Islamic State, makes preparation for limiting the impact of an attack imperative. Communication plays a central role in this, by preparing the public for how to respond should they become caught up in an attack and in restoring normality as quickly as possible. Communication can support a range of outcomes, for example by reducing loss of life, minimising hate crime and reducing public fear. Exploring the communication requirements for lone actor terrorism is particularly important as, to date, most research on communication to mitigate terrorism has focused on large scale attacks or attacks involving chemical, biological or radiological agents that are likely to provoke considerable fear amongst the wider public (Pearce et al. 2013b; Becker 2004, 2007). Understanding how to respond to the particular features of lone actor terrorism, such as mode of attacks (e.g. usually smaller-scale, focusing on softer targets), makes understanding the unique communicative mitigation requirements essential. For instance, currently there is no widespread communication measure in Europe which focuses on preparing the public for attacks using vehicles. However, the *'Run, Hide, Tell'* campaign provides guidance to the UK public on how to respond to attacks involving firearms and weapons, a mode that is also employed by lone actors. Furthermore, the lack of existing empirical data on public behavioural responses to attacks involving firearms attacks in a European context makes this a particularly important area of research to inform mitigation communication requirements for lone actor terrorism.

Combining insights gained from interviews with practitioners and grey literature as part of the PRIME Communication Measures Review⁷, findings of two large online surveys with members of the public in the UK and Denmark, along with findings from other PRIME Work Packages focusing on lone actor attacks⁸, the following sections describe the key communication categories and audiences for mitigation messaging and sets out seven communication principles. There are already well established protocols for communication during terrorist events. As such, although the requirements address mitigation broadly, this report focuses particularly on pre-event communication, where there is considerably less established practice or knowledge.

3.2 Message Categories and Key Audiences

Insights from UK and Danish experiences highlight four particularly important communication categories and six main audiences for mitigation communication. These are outlined in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. Unlike for the prevention and interdiction stages, a temporal aspect is

⁷ D8.1 Communication Measures Review summary report is available at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

⁸ See for e.g. D5.3 Lone Actor Attack Data Inventory partial report at <http://www.fp7-prime.eu/deliverables>

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relevant for the framing of communication categories, with communications falling in three distinct stages: pre-event, during an event and after an event.

Communication Category	Purpose	Example
Pre-event Messages		
Information / general guidance	To support individual, community and business resilience	Information about emergency preparedness planning
Encouraging specific actions	To reduce injury and loss of life during an event	“Run, Hide, Tell” guidance for what to do in the event of a marauding gun attack
Reassurance	To reassure the public they are being protected	You are unlikely to be a victim of a terrorist attack
Reputation management	To encourage businesses to develop business continuity plans	You need to be able to swiftly respond to a terrorist incident to maintain customer confidence
Event Messages		
Information / general guidance	To provide information about the event / its impacts; counter misinformation; prevent ‘panic’ ⁹ and support community cohesion	Correction of factually inaccurate information about attacker that may be circulating in the media
Encouraging specific actions	To reduce injury and loss of life	Provision of evacuation instructions
Reassurance	To reduce fear and increase trust in response	Timely information about what is being done to respond
Reputation management	To mitigate negative economic impacts	Messages to customers / citizens regarding business continuity planning
Post-event Messages		
Information / general guidance	To facilitate a speedy ‘return to normal’; promote community cohesion and promote community resilience	Messages to distinguish terrorists from wider Muslim community
Encouraging specific actions	To enhance community cohesion, encourage appropriate care seeking etc.	Report hate-crime
Reassurance	To mitigate negative societal impacts	Police are addressing the sources of terrorism and working hard to prevent attacks in the future
Reputation management	To mitigate negative economic impacts (for businesses) and enhance police/community relations	Provision of information and apologies if mistakes made (police)

Table 3.1: Mitigation communication categories

⁹ There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that the assumption of public panic is inaccurate (see for example, Rogers and Pearce, 2013; Sheppard et al. 2006; Glass and Schoch-Spana 2002). However, there is also evidence to suggest that a lack of information increases perceived risk/anxiety (Rogers and Pearce, 2013)

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Audience	Description
Individuals directly involved in the event	Individuals who are directly involved in a terrorist event. Communications will primarily focus on encouraging specific actions to mitigate negative health outcomes.
Affected communities	Communities that may be affected by the event more acutely or distinctly than the wider interested public, such as friends and family of people who have been directly involved in an attack or geographic communities (for example, if an event involved the use of chemicals that resulted in actual or perceived contamination).
Wider interested public	The general population who, while not directly affected, are likely to be interested in the event. Communications will typically focus on preparation prior to an event and information and reassurance following an event.
Internal and emergency response stakeholders	Multi-agency partners whose rapid cooperation is essential for dealing with, and recovering from, a lone actor attack.
Private Businesses	Organisations that deal with large numbers of the public (e.g. shopping centres), critical national infrastructure (e.g. airports) and other large organisations, for whom the speedy recovery following attack is especially important.
Media	Traditional media outlets (e.g. television, newspapers) as a conduit for official messages, as well as an audience that needs to be briefed in order to secure support, encourage responsible and accurate reporting and to minimise further negative outcomes and misunderstandings.

Table 3.2: Primary mitigation communication audiences

3.3 Communication Requirement Principles

Across the PRIME Work Packages addressing mitigation seven key requirements have been identified that can inform and support professionals with responsibility for communicating about terrorism. As noted above, there is particular emphasis on pre-event communication. The seven principles are outlined below:

i) Prepare the public with guidance for what to during an attack

As already outlined, lone actor terrorism is a growing threat and interdiction is particularly challenging because traditional methods of intelligence for detection and disruption are considered less effective against individuals working alone. As such, the public need to be prepared to respond to lone actor terrorism. Communicating ahead of an incident is

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important in this context considering the expectation that responders present during an attack will be primarily focused on apprehending the attacker rather than guiding evacuation or supporting the public in the first instance. Two large national surveys with the UK and Danish public conducted for the PRIME project established the potential for pre-event messages to enhance perceptions about security services' preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks, increase trust in police advice to keep the public safe in the event of an attack involving firearms and encourage the public to adopt protective behaviours in the event of an attack. This data also shows that despite important baseline national differences (for example in relation to levels of trust in police advice), the impact of pre-event communication is consistent across the national contexts we tested. This provides good evidence that the overall principles established in this research should hold for different national contexts in Europe.

Illustrative practical implications: The scale of this type of communication means that significant resources will need to be allocated and prioritisation of specific locations may be necessary. The broad nature of the audience means that pre-event communication will need to be delivered across a variety of modes, such as posters, leaflets, the media and internet. As well as mode, practitioners should consider placement priorities, such as in venues with the highest footfalls or likely targets. Officials will need to consider the risks of this type of communication, including indirectly providing information to potential attackers or conveying a lack of preparedness. PRIME survey findings demonstrate that such communication is unlikely to scare the public, but a level of reassurance within the communication is likely to be important. Our research also establishes that pre-event communication has the potential to enhance public perceptions of the security services' preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks and enhance trust that the police can provide information that will keep the public safe during an attack. This is important as trust has been identified as the single most influential factor predicting public willingness to follow official guidance in the context of risk communication (Rogers and Pearce, 2013; Rogers et al. 2007).

Key audiences and message categories:

- Wider interested public (Encouraging specific actions, Information / general guidance).

ii) Balance reassuring the public with the need to raise awareness

The risk of causing fear amongst the public is an important consideration. However, research indicates that this concern is frequently over-estimated (Drury, Cocking & Reicher, 2009). The findings of PRIME extend this insight. Online surveys with the public in the UK and Denmark found that the overall provision of information designed to prepare the public for marauding terrorist firearms attacks (using the UK's 'Run, Hide, Tell' campaign) did not have a negative impact on public perceptions about the likelihood of terrorism involving firearms in their home country or on the perceived likelihood being personally caught up in such an attack,

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which was considered to be low. It also demonstrated that reducing the length of the reassurance message did not negatively impact these perceptions. Consequently, while there is clear benefit to including reassurance content, this should not be prioritised over detailed, actionable guidance. Although those responsible for communicating about terrorism must balance the need to secure public support with the risks of negative reactions, there is a need to move away from a conservative bias and to ensure important information is not left unshared because of inaccurate assumptions about public panic.

Illustrative practical implications: In the UK there is a statutory obligation for Category One responders to warn and inform the public about likely emergencies (Cabinet Office, 2012). Legislation is less clear in other European countries. However, where there is the threat of marauding terrorist firearms attacks, officials should strongly consider delivering public campaigns to prepare the public, such as *'Run, Hide, Tell'* in the UK. Other countries, such as Denmark, do not conduct such campaigns because of concerns about generating fear amongst the public. PRIME survey findings suggest however that, if delivered carefully, communication will not have this impact and that campaigns should be run. These messages should include some reassurance content, but this does not need to be excessively lengthy at the expense of detailed, actionable guidance. Depending on the nature of likely threats, officials should consider designing communication that addresses protective behaviours to mitigate the nature of that specific attack type.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Wider interested public (Encouraging specific actions, Reassurance).

iii) Pre-event communication should include "Don'ts" as well as "Dos"

The limited guidance that does exist to prepare the public for terrorist events consistent with likely lone actor attacks, such as the UK's *'Run, Hide, Tell'* campaign, is focused on what the public should do. However, PRIME survey results indicate that it is as, if not more, important to be clear about what the public should not do. These findings show that the campaign is effective in significantly increasing intention to 'run', 'hide' and 'tell'. However, intended compliance was already high for these recommended behaviours. The more significant impact was in relation to reducing potentially risky intuitive behaviours. For example, 74.2% of participants who did not receive any guidance indicated that they would be likely to call the mobile phone of a friend / family member who may still be hiding from an attacker in the hypothetical terrorist incident that they were presented with. This is a risky behaviour as a ringing phone could put the person hiding at risk if it were to expose their hiding place. For participants who viewed the *'Run, Hide, Tell'* film, the likelihood of this behaviour dropped to 40.6%. When advice which explicitly addressed this behaviour was presented in a second survey, the likelihood of this intention further dropped to 27.1%. As such, including guidance

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on 'what not to do' is likely to increase protective patterns of behaviour and mitigate negative impacts of an event.

Illustrative practical implications: Officials responsible for designing communications should identify and prioritise the most likely and detrimental risky behaviours that the public are likely to adopt in response to the specific attack type that they are providing guidance on. This is likely to require analysis of public reactions to similar events, often in other countries (for instance, there are more instances of mass shootings in the US than Europe which could provide insights into risky behavioural responses to terrorist attacks involving firearms). Having carefully weighed up potential risks associated with including this information (e.g. providing useful information to potential attackers) "don'ts" should be included in future communications as appropriate and across modes.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Wider interested public (Encouraging specific actions)

iv) Make use of multiple modes of communication

Large scale pre-event mitigation campaigns, such as '*Run, Hide, Tell*', need to be delivered across a variety of mediums to maximise reach, including modes that are easy to distribute or be consumed on mass. As such leaflets and films are an important mode of delivery for this sort of communication. Design of posters and leaflets is important, with the public exposed to multiple marketing communications. Communication should be interesting and attractive enough to catch attention and well publicised.

PRIME findings highlight that leaflets and films can both be effective in communicating pre-event counter-terrorism guidance although, when the content is the same, the film has a greater impact on influencing behavioural intentions. Whilst this demonstrated that the film is more effective (possibly because it is a more engaging format or because it can include more information), the leaflet nonetheless had a significantly positive impact on behavioural intentions. The comparative ease and speed of delivering large numbers of leaflets means that they are likely to continue to be a useful resource. Furthermore, research suggests that leaflets are likely to provide a more credible source of information than that which is posted up on websites, due to the perceived permanency of committing advice to print (Pearce et al. 2013a). Multiple modes of communication remain important during and after an event. For instance, in addition to providing information over a tannoy system, large video screens at public events can act as sign posts to direct the public during an evacuation.

Illustrative practical implications: Officials should design core guidance that can be adapted (e.g. length) to different modes of delivery, particularly films and leaflets. If resources are available officials should seek professional design and editing assistance to ensure that the products stand out and capture (or sustain) the public's attention. Officials should work with

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local partners and the private sector to identify the most appropriate locations (e.g. footfall) and to develop a delivery plan.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Wider interested public (Encouraging specific actions, Reassurance, Information / general guidance)
- Private Businesses (Encouraging specific actions, Reputation Management, Information / general guidance)

v) Communicate quickly following an event

The importance of communicating quickly following a terrorist incident is stated strongly both by practitioners and in the grey literature. Not only can rapid communication shape protective public behaviours and warn against risky behaviours, it can also provide reassurance and counter misinformation (e.g. who the attacker is) that could lead to negative social consequences, such as hate crime or fear (this is particularly important given the home-grown nature of many lone actor attacks).

Illustrative practical implications: Officials are advised to have a range of pre-prepared mitigation communication templates and crisis plans that can be quickly adapted or modified for use for each specific event. Pre-prepared communications should consider and address public information needs and likely behavioural responses (e.g. healthcare seeking), reassurance (e.g. officers have safely contained the area) and be clear to make statements of unity or positivity (e.g. all communities stand together to condemn the act). As well as the information content, identifying credible voices to support delivery can help to mitigate potential social implications. For example, having pre-existing relations with credible religious leaders can be useful in countering potential fear of hate crime if an attack has been attributed to Islamist motives. Even where officers do not yet have much detailed information, regular updates and assurance that more information will be delivered soon is useful to reassure the public and to provide a sense of authority and control.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Wider interested public (Encouraging specific actions, Information / general guidance, Reassurance)
- Affected communities (Encouraging specific actions, Information / general guidance, Reassurance)

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vi) Ensure communication consistency across organisations

The response to a terrorist incident will involve multiple agencies, including in respect to communication delivery. This can range from top-level media statements from senior security officials to local authority meetings with affected communities. In a context where information may be limited, speculation could be damaging (e.g. media commentary) and the public may be fearful, inconsistent communication between agencies has the potential to exacerbate public tensions as well as undermine confidence in the state's response. Whilst there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that public panic is rare, there is also evidence to suggest that it is more likely when the public do not know what they should do and feel unsupported by authorities (Rogers and Pearce, 2013). Furthermore, lack of consistent information erodes trust – the single most important factor influencing the likelihood that the public will follow official advice (Rogers et al. 2007). It is therefore essential that the different agencies are consistent in what they do (and do not) say. While different agencies may have a different focus to their messages, dependent on audience (e.g. deterrence vs. reassurance), consistency of core information is important if mitigation is to be effective and if communication is not to have unintentional negative consequences.

Illustrative practical implications: Clear protocols for communicating about a lone actor attack should be established and agreed upon by partners and recorded in a guidance document that all partners can use in the case of an incident. These protocols should include clear hierarchy, including on different communication categories (e.g. in some countries central or local government representatives might lead on community reassurance messages rather than the police). Where feasible, standard lines should be prepared in advance to aid speed and consistency. In a fast moving context the lead agency for communication (whether in general or for specific communication categories) should have an established process for sharing communication guidance and lines to all relevant partners. Likewise, clear processes should be pre-established for more junior (often local) partners to feed back on the impact of communication so that changes can be made at the strategic level if necessary.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Internal and emergency response stakeholders (Information / general guidance).

vii) Build trusted relationships with the media as a communication conduit

The importance of building relations with the media in advance of an attack is widely recognised and officials should be aware that using the media as a conduit for official communication is a highly valuable mode of delivery for large scale, pre and post event communication. Officials should seek to secure media coverage of new campaigns and to reference the guidance as part of standard reporting around events. Practitioners in both the UK and Denmark referenced the challenges that the media can present to mitigation

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communication, particularly around reassurance. UK officials referenced media criticism of the initial, limited '*Run, Hide, Tell*' campaign release, with journalists accusing it of needlessly scaring the public.

However, the need to develop relations with the media in order use them as a conduit for official counter-terrorism messaging was emphasised by officials as it adds a further mode of message delivery. This is already common practice for many countries, such as the UK, in terms of interdiction but less so for pre-event mitigation communication. For messaging during and after an event it is important to use the media to engage the public to provide reassurance, but also to brief the media to ensure reporting is consistent and accurate. This can help to minimise factual errors or speculation that could contribute to other difficulties, such as stigmatisation of particular communities or misinformed blame.

Illustrative practical implications: Officials should consider preparing background briefing packs and simple overviews of new campaigns to the press ahead of launches in order to ensure that reporters understand the context of release. This may require the decision to share more preparedness information with the media than has historically been the case for some countries and officials will need to weigh up the benefits against the potential costs. Similarly, even where there is very limited information during and immediately after an event, regular briefings should be provided to the press in order to provide updates, challenge emerging narratives that are known to be false and to communicate through the media to the public to provide reassurance.

Key audiences and message categories:

- Media (Information / general guidance).
- Wider interested public [indirectly] (Reassurance)
- Affected communities [indirectly] (Reassurance)

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
N	Information / general guidance	To support individual, community and business resilience	Individuals directly involved in the event	Post event (e.g. where to go for further support if required)
			Affected communities	Post-event (e.g. where to go for information about loved ones)
		To provide information about the event and its impacts; counter misinformation; prevent ‘panic’ and support community cohesion	Wider interested public	During event (e.g. updates on police response) Short to medium term post terrorist event (e.g. details of incident) Longer term post-event (e.g. society is returning to normal)
			Internal and emergency response stakeholders	Pre-event (e.g. procedures in the case of terrorism) Updates during an event (to ensure communication consistency)
			Private businesses	Continuous (e.g. information about business continuity planning)
			Media	Continuous (e.g. practical arrangements in case of incident) During event (e.g. updates on what is happening and what is known) Post-event (e.g. detailed briefing on attack and police response)
O	Encouraging specific actions	To reduce injury and loss of life during an event	Individuals directly involved in the event	During event (e.g. follow evacuation instructions on screens) Immediately post-event (e.g. seek health care if injured) Medium term after an event (e.g. seek psychosocial support if required)
			Affected communities	During event (e.g. ‘stay away’ message to people in vicinity of attack) Post-event (e.g. report hate crimes)
		To enhance community cohesion, encourage appropriate care seeking etc.	Wider interested public	Continuous (e.g. what to do in the event of an attack) Post-event (e.g. return to normal life)
			Internal and emergency response stakeholders	During event (e.g. coordination of response activities)
			Private businesses	Continuous / pre-event (e.g. prepare contingency plans)
			Media	During event (e.g. do not speculate on attacker) Post-event (e.g. report responsibly and do not repeat propaganda)

Table 3.3a: ‘At a Glance’ Communications Timings Framework – Mitigation

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	Message Category	Purpose	Audience	Timing
P	Reassurance	To reassure the public they are being protected	Individuals directly involved in the event	Post-event (e.g. ongoing support and help available)
		To reduce fear and enhance trust in responders	Affected communities	Post-event (e.g. hate crime will be dealt with seriously)
		To mitigate negative societal impacts	Wider interested public	Post-event (e.g. police have the situation under control) Continuous (e.g. whilst vigilance is important terrorist attacks are rare) During terrorist incident (e.g. police are responding, more info soon)
Q	Reputation	To encourage businesses to develop business continuity plans	Affected communities	Post-event (e.g. apologise for any errors)
		To mitigate negative economic impacts	Wider interested public	Immediately post-event (e.g. police are doing everything that they can) Longer-term post event (e.g. to rebuild confidence in attending large public events)
		To mitigate negative economic impacts (for businesses) and enhance police/community relations	Internal and emergency response stakeholders	Post-event (e.g. ensure consistency of response)
			Private businesses	Pre-event (e.g. prepare communications for customers) Post-event (e.g. advice on recovery)

Table 5.3b: ‘At a Glance’ Communications Timings Framework – Mitigation

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Appendix 1: Policy Considerations

Prevent	Interdict	Mitigate
Respond rapidly to extremist propaganda / after an attack to counter messages/discourage 'copycats'	Large public campaigns can significantly increase reporting behaviour	Prepare the public with guidance for what to do in the event of an attack
Pre-prepare messages for specific points in the year when target audiences are most likely to be receptive	Posters and leaflets are an important mode of delivery for interdiction messages	Balance public reassurance with detailed actionable guidance
Provide diverse delivery of core messaging that requires ongoing reinforcement	Security services are usually a credible voice in this context, but additional actors may be required for specific audiences	Pre-event communication should inform the public what they should not do as well as what they should do.
Ensure messages are delivered by credible voices following an extremist incident	Communications should be mapped onto existing audience concerns	Make use of multiple modes of communication
Message as early as possible in the radicalisation process	Use deterrence communications to introduce doubt into the mind of potential attackers	Communicate quickly following an attack
No communication is better than inaccurate or non-specialist communication	Intensify communications at specific points in the year, particularly following an attack	Ensure communication consistency across organisations
Engage with the media, researchers and other agenda setters and provide examples of success stories	Establish and maintain positive relations with the media	Use the media as communication conduit
Face to face communication is particularly important for preventative communication	Empower the public to recognise and report leakage	
Maximise the range of actors delivering communications and support credible actors to deliver widespread messages	Shape the environments in which potential lone actors operate	
	Help the public to understand what constitutes 'suspicious' behaviour by providing examples where possible	
	Regularly communicate with the public to increase reporting behaviour	