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Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralised school choice
12 October 2022, 1:00 pm–2:00 pm
Join this event to hear Professor Christopher A. Neilson discuss his recent paper which assesses the efficacy of school assignment mechanisms.
This event is free.
Event Information
Open to
- All
Availability
- Yes
Cost
- Free
Organiser
-
Per Engzell
Location
-
Room B0336-38 Gordon SquareLondonWC1H 0PD
Many school districts with centralised school choice adopt strategyproof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants of the need to strategise based on beliefs about their admissions chances.
However, in this event Christopher will explain that beliefs about admissions chances shape choice outcomes even when the assignment mechanism is strategyproof by influencing the way applicants search for schools, and that `smart matching platforms' that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants search more effectively.
This event will be particularly useful for those education or economics.
This is a hybrid event and you can attend either virtually or in-person.
Related links
About the Speaker
Professor Christopher A.Neilson
Professor of Economics and Global Affairs at Yale University
His research looks at how government policy affects students, families, and education providers - drawing on methods from industrial organisation, labour economics, and development economics. He works closely with governments, particularly in Latin America, to help them leverage their data, existing evidence, and technology, to design, evaluate, and implement new education policies
More about Professor Christopher A.Neilson