Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralised school choice
Join this event to hear Professor Christopher A. Neilson discuss his recent paper which assesses the efficacy of school assignment mechanisms.

Many school districts with centralised school choice adopt strategyproof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants of the need to strategise based on beliefs about their admissions chances.
However, in this event Christopher will explain that beliefs about admissions chances shape choice outcomes even when the assignment mechanism is strategyproof by influencing the way applicants search for schools, and that `smart matching platforms' that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants search more effectively.
This event will be particularly useful for those education or economics.
This is a hybrid event and you can attend either virtually or in-person.
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His research looks at how government policy affects students, families, and education providers - drawing on methods from industrial organisation, labour economics, and development economics. He works closely with governments, particularly in Latin America, to help them leverage their data, existing evidence, and technology, to design, evaluate, and implement new education policies
Further information
Ticketing
Pre-booking essential
Cost
Free
Open to
All
Availability
Yes