

# Susan Sell

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## SPEAKERS

Jessica Knezy, Zoe Varenne, Susan Sell, Tom Pegram

### Tom Pegram 00:01

Hi, and welcome to 'Imperfect Utopias' based out of the UCL Global Governance Institute. This is a podcast about the challenges facing humanity and possible global responses. If you're new to the show, and you want to get a list of our favourite books are the resources, listen to past shows, and join our community go to [ucl.ac.uk/global-governance](https://ucl.ac.uk/global-governance). Okay, it's a real treat to have Susan Sell with us on the podcast today. Susan's a long standing supporter of the Global Governance Institute. She joined us way back when at one of our first events on Global Governance of non-communicable diseases, if I remember correctly, back in those halcyon days of 2014. Susan really is a true pioneer in the field of International Relations. I put her alongside a handful of other scholars in the 1990s, who really helped put private power onto the map in a mainstream discipline, which has tended to privilege the state in its analysis. She's published very widely on the topic over the past three decades, including co editing the seminal book, 'Who Governs the Globe' with Deborah Avant and Martha Finnemore. She's one of the most prominent critical international political economy theorists in the field and has made major contributions to questioning the neoliberal functionalist accounts of global health, including when it was perhaps rather less fashionable to do so obviously, now everyone's piling in. And I'm sure we're going to get to the WHO and COVID in our conversation. Susan has also done really important work on access to medicine, in the shadow of the World Trade Organization's intellectual property agreement or the TRIPs. So we've got lots to talk about. We've got lots of questions. Thanks for being here with us, Susan, to kick things off. As I mentioned, you've long been associated within IR as someone who has taken private power and the abuse of private power very seriously. Perhaps reflecting more generally, on the state of the field, do you think the IR Academy is now getting to grips with the domain of private power? To what extent do you think that the dominant frame, the sort of the dominant metaphor or imaginary of state sovereignty continues to serve as a barrier to that?

### Susan Sell 02:46

Well, thanks so much for inviting me. I'm really happy to be here and Tom, I well remember the 2014 event, which was really great and I kept trying to make you laugh because you're being filmed and making faces at you, but it didn't really work you kept your composure, which is amazing. Anyway, I'm really happy to be here. I think, in International Relations theory that private power has gotten more attention over time but I still think the state framework is dominant, and the idea of sovereignty is still dominant. What I see is different, I mean, there's always been some work well, I guess what the

constructivists really started working on non-governmental organisations. And so that work was out there civil society, especially people like Sidney Terrell had written important work and Snow and so there was a lot of good work in that space of mobilisation of non-state actors, but not so much on corporations. I mean, I can think of very few that were writing about it. Bob Gilpin, of course, Robert Gilpin had written about it. And there were a few, but not a lot. And so I think that spaces opened up in the late 90s. There was an important book by Virginia Hoffler, Clare Cutler and Tony Porter, on private authority and I think that work emerged out of interest. Everybody was interested in Susan Strange's work she was one of the few she and Robert Gilpin, I'd say were, among the few that even took that seriously or were thinking about the role of corporations and private actors and Stopford and Strange was an important, and Henley, it was an important book about three kinds of power, which is corporate power, state power and then what was the third? Anyway, it was three. But she focused on private power in a way that nobody else really had been doing and I think inspired by her work, especially the book her 1996 book, Cutler, Hoffler and Porter took that agenda forward and I think that that created a really important conversation and later Biersticker(?) came along and started really looking at the question of private power and one of the things - And 'Who Governs the Globe' started with me Debbie Avant and Marty Finnemore, we were all in the same hallway and we started talking to each other about all the globalisation, global governance literature and it was all pretty positive, it was really sunny. "Oh, cooperation works. Oh look at all the cooperation." But Debbie was working on at the time on private security firms like Blackwater. Marty was working, Marty Finnemore was working on the pathologies of international organisations. And I was working on intellectual property and access to medicines, that that lack of access was causing a lot of unnecessary death and so we would just start talking in the hallway and say, you know, I read all this global governance literature it doesn't speak to any of the stuff I'm finding on the ground, you know, a lot of unnecessary death, in my case, like, no accountability with private security firms, and then pathologies of IO. So yeah, because the assumption with the functional literature was cooperation is good, more cooperation is better, but they weren't looking at power at all, or who gains from cooperation and who doesn't benefit from it and I think that's how we started to, you know, putting those three things together with security, international organisations and IPE, saying, there's something really wrong with the way people are thinking about this. They're not capturing so much of the dysfunctional things that we're seeing and the dysfunctional outcomes. So you know, that's where that book came from and then there was an interesting book that came out afterwards, following on from 'Who Governs the Globe' a book, Acharya, Amitav Acharya edited, called 'Why govern?' and I thought that was an important book that pushed the question of what's the purpose? What's this? What's? And Susan Strange used to always talk about that? What's the purpose of governance? Why, why govern? What, you know? What's it for? What are you supposed to be trying to achieve? And I thought that was an important move forward to think about questions of legitimacy and, you know, the, because the purpose of global governance was never really interrogated either in the mainstream literature. There's just cooperation, per se, is a good thing, not even what it's for. And a lot of the, most of the mainstream literature, especially Keohane, and all his minions, you know, assumed without question, that the neoliberal privatisation, you know, all that agenda was good and that wasn't even interrogated or discussed, it was just like, "Yay, you know, world trade organisation, liberalisation. That's positive, that's cooperation." But it was all implicit, but they never really asked the question, you know, who's winning and who's losing? Which to me, is the, that's the heart of political economy. That's the heart of politics. You know, there's winners and losers

with every decision that's made and if you're not looking at what's happening to the losers, you're really getting less than half the picture, I'd say.

**Tom Pegram 08:20**

Yeah, I mean, this is obviously the critique that Susan Strange levels at the whole regime analysis community in her 1982 rather abrasive piece: 'Cave! hic dragones' I can't remember the rest of the title, but it's, it's well worth a read and she essentially said that, you know, regime analysis, IOs are all well and good, but what's missing? And, you know, well, how did we arrive at this institution? You know, what, what, how is this masking some of that value power conflict that you're pointing to? Of course, then you have Barnett and Duvall's book in 2005, right, which kind of opens up that whole power and global governance agenda, which is really helpful. But it's it has struck me as some something slightly peculiar that doing research into this space, it is sometimes a bit of a process of excavation and there have been people like Jim Rosenau, like Robert Cox, like Overbeek, who were pointing the finger at illicit covert activity, the dark underbelly of global governance, private power, but it seems as if a lot of that agenda just got swept to the side for a long time.

**Susan Sell 09:26**

Phil Cerny had important stuff in that space, too. I'd say Rosenau, Cherny or Cerney however you say the name. Yeah, they were asking those questions, but it did get swept to the side because of the dominance of the neoliberal institutionalist agenda.

**Tom Pegram 09:42**

We see some of that now being revived, I think in contemporary debate, particularly perhaps in historical context, looking at the role of private power going back, you know, centuries looking at the role of the East India Company, for example, course also the work by Craig Murphy, and others looking into those dynamics. So it has been part of the conversation but hasn't really been in the mainstream. Do you think its time has come?

**Susan Sell 10:05**

Well, I think it has, but I, I thought it should have been for a long time. And it really hasn't. But I just was asked to review a book for perspectives on politics. And I haven't received it. This was like yesterday, and I was really excited just to see that such a book exists. And it's called Billionaires. And it's really about the role of Billionaires in world politics. So there's a chapter on George Soros. There's a chapter I, maybe on Bill Gates, who we'll get to in a bit, I'm sure talking about the WHO. And you know, 'The Dark Money' that Jane Mayer has written so compellingly about with the Koch Brothers. I think the Koch Brothers is a chapter. So I can't wait to read it. I mean, you know, so I think that there is, especially in the last 10 years, and what we saw under the Trump administration, but it's gone, you know, it goes back much further than that. But the role of money in politics and the United States with the Citizens United decision, the Supreme Court calling corporations as persons who, you know, it's their free speech rights to give as much money as they want to whatever they want, has really, really tipped the balance and made people less confident in democracy, because it's clear that it's almost like an oligarchy. In terms of, you know, the money is buying the political influence and the political power and so the leadership has really gotten out of step, I think, with what people want and, you know, you see that in poll after poll. So, you know, there's really some structural imbalances and they caught the

attention and when you see dysfunction on such a massive scale, well, around COVID, is one example. But, and corruption on a massive scale, it's making people look harder at sort of what's behind the curtain, I still think the mainstream is, you know, the whole open economy, politics and political economy, international political economy, they went super micro. And Tom Oatley had a really, I think, devastating critique of that whole David Lake line of analysis of going super micro looking just at, you know, trying to decide what, or figure out what interest groups were based on their economic interests, and then starting at that level, and then aggregating up to some outcome, whereas it missed the whole structural picture, the interactive picture. And I think in the quest to be like economists thinking that they're being much more rigorous and precise, and their models are much more tucked up, and all the rest of it, they've gotten more and more out of touch with what's really going on. So I think that stuff has gone in the wrong direction, it's subject to quite a bit of critique at this point, because it's very clear how much they're missing, like the global financial crisis, there are contagion effects that you can't pick up from a super micro analysis. And I think the world is kind of pushing back against some of that type of analysis and I think there's a recognition at least among some, that a more structural perspective is necessary to in terms of political economy, and OEP will only get you so far. And even historical institutionalism there's been a really strong revitalization and development with the work by Henry Farrell and Dave Newman, their weaponized interdependence stuff is just brilliant. The weaponized interdependence argument does bring power into which is really important, but a lot of the other historical institutionalists literature, again, doesn't, to me, take the big structural power picture seriously enough. I mean, it gets you so far but it suffers, I think, a bit from what the neoliberal institutionalists suffer from, which was proceeding as if the parties were relatively equal, you know, and it's just who has the better regulation who has the better legislation, who has the better way of dealing with competition policy, and that's going to prevail. Well, that's true when you're talking about the US and the EU but when you're deriving analyses of global politics based on the US and the EU, and maybe Japan back in the day, which is what neoliberal institutionalism did and historical institutionalism does to some degree, you're going to really miss the pervasiveness of wildly asymmetrical power, and the outcomes that come from that. That you can't really explain by the excellence of their regulatory framework or how strong their institutions are, it just doesn't capture that at all, you know, Gabon could have the best legislation or regulation in the world, but it's not going to prevail because it's Gabon. You know, it's not one of the big powers. So I think that's where, and I always found Susan Strange so interesting because she was a funny combination of realism, meaning state power, the powerful states get their way, but also looking at non state actors, business in particular, and the role of corporations. So she was a really interesting combination that I think opened up a lot of, and she was ahead of her time, certainly on the casino capitalism, and the GFC, it still has a lot to tell us but you know, she was one of the few that combined realism, and without being a Marxist, combining realism and the focus on power and asymmetrical power, but also then with non-state actors, so that's why I found her work so inspiring.

#### **Tom Pegram 16:04**

There does seem to have been a bit of a retreat from the macro systems perspective, but perhaps that is being revived by Oatley, which I think is a fantastic piece and the weaponized interdependence as well.

**Susan Sell 16:17**

Well also people like Shahar Hameiri are doing really interesting work on global governance or state transformation. So I really think these are important interventions in pulling back and saying, look, what's the big structural picture, and they have different ways of doing it, but I think the work of Oatley, Farrell, and Newman, Hameiri are really offering very important interventions that open up a lot of questions and a lot of research agendas for people in a way that speaks more to the pathologies of our time and I think they're helpful. As contrasted with you know, I'm sure it's all very, I mean, it is, but there's a fad going on now in the United States, political science, it's all about experiments, and going even more micro. So I just, I'm more interested in looking at structure and then trying to trace the mechanisms where structure becomes translated into the micro, and then things at that level, feed back into the structure and lead to structural change. So it's that movement. It's that dynamism. And people like Dan Nexen and Patrick Jackson, have done a lot of work on process ontology. And I think that has a lot to tell us as well. So there are very different ways of thinking about things. But to me, what's exciting about all those things I'm mentioning is that it's opening up a lot of different agendas for for younger scholars, because I can't tell you how mind numbing it was during the 1980s as a graduate student, to have to deal with the Neo liberalism, Neo realism debate and then in the 90s, it was constructivism versus rationalism, debate and at the end of each of those decades of a lot of wasted graduate student time, the, you know, main protagonists of those debates, "Oh there's really not that much difference Are you know, we can find ways to work together, never mind." And then it was until then it was OEP, you know, in the 2000s. So, you know, I get a little tired of that. And I, I also appreciate that old essay by Susan Strange you mentioned about these fads and they just completely dominate the mainstream and to me, there's so many missed opportunities around those kind of fake grand debates. There's some stuff at stake with them, but boy, oh, boy, what a waste of time a lot of that stuff was. I mean constructivism has been positive, you know, it gives all these perspectives offer us something, right. There's, I mean, I'm completely let 100 flowers bloom, you know, look for the right tool for the job you're doing. There's nothing inherently better or worse about any of the methods or the theories or whatever. But, you know, what's your question? And what, what's going to give you some purchase on that question is, I think a better way to think about it. And that's why those big debates, you know, Mearsheimer versus, you know, I don't know who else but versus a lot of people I guess, but you know, that they just get sort of stuck and they, they block thinking. I mean, when I was at Berkeley, I studied with Ken Waltz, of course, Neo, the, you know, the Neo realist guy, and Ernie Haas, who was my supervisor. And you know, Haas was much more of a constructivist, he called himself a pragmatic constructivist but he was the role of ideas and believing, you know, interested in chan- explaining change. And then Waltz was what are all the things that endure and you know, as graduate students about to take the International Relations, comprehensive exam, we're like, "oh my god, we're gonna make mad by writing these exams." But you know, I learned both of them had a lot to offer, and they weren't stuck in some grand debate with each other. It's what happens out there in the field and what people do with these things and, you know, I felt really privileged to be able to study with both of them and but to define a whole field by one debate, that last, they last like a decade, oh, my goodness, it makes it. Yeah, it just closes off a lot of conversation. So what I find exciting about the work I've been mentioning today, is how it's opening up a lot of research agendas. And there's a lot of exciting directions to go that feel more vitally connected to the world, instead of just, you know, writing for three fellow scholars who, you know, in these sort of inside baseball debates, which I'm not that interested in.

I'm interested in what is it I can take from here to help me understand the world and explain it, and maybe think about ways to do something about what I see that I think isn't working.

**Susan Sell 18:26**

Yeah, Mearsheimer against the world. I mean, he's a powerful personality. And well, that's very helpful, Susan, thank you. I know, Jessica's got a question. So do come in Jess.

**Jessica Knezy 21:25**

Yes. I agree with everything that you've said about the phases that the field has gone through, and how, perhaps a little bit more overlap and a little bit more systems thinking as we will get to maybe in the later parts of the interview, would really help us understand kind of the more macro level connections that make the world run. I was also of the mind that the field itself is very white dominated and dominated by a lot of men and you yourself, it was a great inspiration to me, as I was in undergrad and graduate school, as you were frequently the only female scholar on my reading list. So it's very exciting for me to interview you today. But I was wondering, how do you think that mainstream IR has been impacted by limited racial and gender diversity? And do you think that the field is improving in any way? What can we do as young scholars to open up the conversation and get more perspectives that, as you say, may actually address the problems facing the world today?

**Susan Sell 22:28**

Yeah, I mean, I think it's a good moment for that. I think the field has been terrible in terms of racial and gender diversity, and I remember many conversations with Debbie, Debbie Avant and I talking where we'd be the only women at, on a panel, the only women, you know, and then her in national security, it was all white men. And so she was a real pioneer in being a woman in the national security area. And, yeah, I mean, I didn't have, I didn't have any female professors. When I when I was doing my degree, there were some at Berkeley for, you know, just to mention, but I wasn't taking those classes in international relations there were very few. And if there were any, they were, they were doing like, like IOs. But there still were very many Marty and I and Debbie, we there, we didn't have role models of women that I know of. I mean, and when I took my first job at Claremont Graduate, or what was it called Claremont Graduate School at the time. I was the only woman and all these women at the bar, welcome BBQ came up to me said, "oh, we're so glad you're here. You know, you're a woman, you're a woman. We haven't had one and everything." And I said, "You don't know anything about me. Right? I mean, I might be horrible. You have no idea." But I'm like, so just I'm not representing for a category here. And, you know, it's just trying to find out or, you know, to make your way and be valued for what you're contributing not that your category was really important and I think necessary at the time, but I think it's getting better. I think, you know, generally, generationally, there's a change, I think, you know, I think about my aunt, my late, great aunt Marie, who, you know, everyone expected, she was interested in medicine, and everyone expected that you would go into nursing and her dad said, "why not go be a doctor?" And, you know, I think, and she became a doctor, but I think of those women opened up doors for me, and I like to think that I've opened up some doors for women and going forward, I see a lot more women in the field, and I see a lot more women doing different kinds of work, and it's getting better, but we still have a very, very long way to go. And I'm hoping, you know, in terms of what matters in the world and what people care about. I'm hoping that the whole, I mean, it's funny for me to think about because when I was going through grad school in my early days, as a professor,

or you know, as a starting out assistant Professor, feminism was considered to be super marginalised. It was really marginal in the field, environmental politics was considered super marginal, in the field. I mean, Paul Walker was one of the pioneers of that. But, you know, there were very few people writing about it. And the attitude, frankly, was that, and I don't agree with this attitude, but the attitude that I heard a lot, was, it's not the best scholars that go into feminism, it's not the best scholars that go into the environment. And now I see the world that they were on to the really important, I mean, I didn't share that view, but I heard it a lot. And you know, there's like hierarchies in what you do, and I are and security was at the top, and you'll and then maybe politically economy below that. And below that IOs. But, you know, people really poo pood the early stuff on an environment, not because it wasn't important, or it wasn't good. But there was this real hierarchical attitude of what we should be studying and what's important in the world. And what I find now is a vindication of people that were working in feminism, people that were working in, you know, gendered international relations, which you know, and also the post-colonial stuff, and environment. I mean, those are the really important things in the world. And those people were onto something, and they were pioneers, and they were on to some really important things where, you know, we're not talking as much about the real weight of missiles today, as we are about, you know, destroying the planet. Or the fact that in this pandemic, Kamala Harris has made a big point of this. But in the pandemic, a huge percentage of the female workforce has stepped out of the workforce, because the kids are, you know, taking their classes on zoom, they're staying home, they can't do a full time job with their partner having a full time job, with the kids learning remotely, the kids at home all the time, there's been a huge exodus of women from the workforce, which is devastating on a lot of levels. So I think that the world is finally catching up to some of those scholars who were not ridiculed is the wrong way to say but not respected. You know, like at the ISA back in the day, you go to a panel of feminist scholars, and there weren't really a lot of them, you know, a lot of people in the audience or whatever, even the environmental ones. So I think that's really changed. So sometimes it takes the profession too long to catch up to the world. And so, you know, with Black Lives Matter, and all the rest of it, I think, going forward, this is going to open a lot of new agendas, and also more appreciation of the pioneers who will lay the ground where people like Paul Wagner, people have laid the, you know, Cynthia Enloe, people that have laid the groundwork for really, and Tickner, you know, important gender important, environmental, and then the post-colonial literature too, and JP Singh has been writing a lot of good stuff on race, and that, you know, the world, the profession is starting to catch up with them. But the world is going, the world is what's happening in the world is happening. And we as scholars need to be able to understand it explain it, come up with ideas to improve it. So I think there's a lot of opportunities to take it for both, but the profession's too slow. You know, but the world is pulling us along. A few people saw it back in the day, but not enough. But now, you know, now it's okay, now it's like, safe, it's respectable to pursue your career in environmental politics. That's a good thing. You know, it wasn't considered that way. It wasn't, you know, it was sort of minor. And I would hear these conversations when there would be I've been on a lot of hiring panels. And back in the day, they'd say things like, our departments too small to have an environmental scholar, or departments too small to have a gender scholar, a feminist scholar, because we need to have security, we need to have IPE, and, you know, American politics or whatever. So it was, I think that's changing. Now, it's like, we have to have a gender scholar we have to have someone who does environmental politics, or we're not really addressing what's going on in the world. So that's, that's those are positive changes. But I'd say still too slow.

**Jessica Knezy** 29:43

Yeah, I agree. I think a lot of that hierarchical paradigms you're mentioning in terms of the importance of fields and you know, having security at the top, political economy, then, you know, etc. that stuff. That's definitely shifted, and I think that there's a a freedom now to be a bit more disruptive in the field. But there's a lot of also a lot of influence in terms of where we get our knowledge. And that actually links back to our conversation about private power. So how do you think that the influence of academics has changed in the last few decades in terms of, of work and research having real impact on world order and structure?

**Susan Sell** 30:28

Boy, that's a tough question. And I think the field is really divided by, you know, what I always am interested in having these conversations with people in the field, like, what makes you get out of bed in the morning. And I find that a surprising answer, sometimes people whose work is very, you know, for what, for lack of a better word, you know, woke or very, you know, critical, or whatever, they might tell me that they, their interest is to get the top three people in the field to read their work, when I assume that they're writing that way, because they actually want to make an impact in the world. And then some people that are writing things that I might consider more inside baseball, want to have an impact in the world. And, you know, I think that in IPE, the OEP stuff has just made itself more and more irrelevant to policy and more and more irrelevant to understanding the world, going in the wrong direction if that's the impact. But if you want to have a super teched up model, and, and these kind of a, you know, want to be economists or something like that, then maybe that's an important thing to you, and you want to have a really, really rigorous model of something. But I think that the value of political science is to ask about who wins and who loses and why, and how, and not to have a really, you know, great model of something that only five people in the world care about. So, you know, we get more and more rigorous and, and so I think there's been a lot of professional socialisation that is then not helpful in terms of having an impact in the world. And you know, but it's true. I mean, I understand why political scientists would want to adopt all the methods and logic of economics, because it seems like economists get a seat at the table, and political scientists really don't. So I can see that. But then, you know, the value of what that contribution is, I think, is maybe it's not, I think putting our energy in the right place of what the superpower political economy is, as opposed to the superpower of economics, you know, in terms of rigour and all that. But I mean, I'm not saying political economy is not rigorous, but it's the questions we ask and the things we're concerned about. And I think political science is about power, and who has it, how it's used, who benefits from it, and who loses from it. And whether that's power of the fossil fuel industry, of, you know, gender power, post-colonial power, power of the Koch brothers to shape elections and outcomes. I think that's the stuff that we're good at and the stuff that we should be looking at. But, you know, I would be fooling myself if I were to say that I think political scientists have had a huge impact on policy I mean we try. You know, I like to think conversations get changed as a result of it. And I think that matters a lot. I think that really matters a lot. How you frame issues matters a lot. You know, I saw that looking at intellectual property when intellectual property owners were successfully able to frame it as a trade issue. All of a sudden, they had access to all these institutions and actually had clout that, it completely changed the landscape just by connecting those two and saying this is a trade issue. And then I think the access to medicines campaigners have had clout by framing it as a health issue. Now, you can't have a conversation about intellectual property without talking about public health. So, you know, I think people can make a difference in the way we think about things and talk



about things and frame things can really change the agenda. And I think that's very powerful. And even changing the conversation is important, even if it takes too long for the world to change in ways that save the planet or make sure everybody's got access to health care and medicine that they need or, you know, it's still it's still, I think putting your energies in the right place. Even if things don't, change doesn't happen fast enough. I think it's important to get out there and participate in that conversation.

**Tom Pegrum 35:26**

Yeah, it's interesting question to ask who is the Amartya Sen or the Peter Singer of International Relations? And as you say, it's also I don't know what Paul Wagner thinks whether he feels vindicated but is a bit of a tragic vindication when we think that over half of all co2 emissions have been emitted since 1990. So, you know, we just weren't paying enough attention to the science there. There's a quite a serious lag effect, both in the science and in the orientation of the field, perhaps.

**Susan Sell 35:56**

Well, part of that is about private power. Part of that is about the power of people like the Koch brothers, and all the money that the fossil fuel industries put into climate deniers how they co-opted, they co-opted academics to go out there and mean I remember many years ago, I was on a panel with Paul Wagner in gosh, it might have been 1993 or something. And it was something in Maine, tribute around environment stuff, a tribute to Edmund Muskie who'd been a senator from there, whatever, who actually cared about the environment and yeah, I was on a couple environmental panels, because I'd written something in 96, so I ended up on some environmental panels and I was at this one, where a young guy who was the father of an infant or a little baby, and he was a climate scientist, and he was someone who was sounding the alarm and he had to spend an entire year of his life while he had a new baby at home, travelling around the world defending himself, because these editorials in the Wall Street Journal, were ripping him by name and this was in the early 90s. So that was the... I mean, he was almost in tears telling us the story, like when you're an academic, this isn't how it's how it should be and he had science on his side and everything. But this very powerful, very well resourced campaign against him personally, for being right about climate, it was harrowing, to listen to his story. And that's been going on... I mean, that was early days, but they kept with that strategy and the Wall Street Journal editorial page, and I mean, it was national, and they just trashed him. And, you know, you're a young assistant professor somewhere with a new family, and you have to spend your career not doing the science and not doing the research But getting out there and defending your work. It was shocking to me. But that's been going on since.. I mean, what's interesting to me now in the environmental space is how investors are saying, we're not gonna invest in coal anymore. I mean, it's money that's changing it at that level. I mean, people have been out there trying to persuade and doing good science since they found the ozone hole for Pete's sake. You know, a long time ago, first Earth Day was 1971 and look at where we are, you know, bushfires catastrophic tsunami, I mean, it's just insane but, yeah, we've been way too slow and a part of that, again, is private power. They put a lot of money and a lot of muscles, same things happen in the pharmaceutical industry to discredit alternative arguments, discredit science and, you know, the fact that climate denialism Boris Johnson, Donald Trump, you know, they figure this is where my bread is buttered, and Scott Morrison here in Australia who actually brought a lump of coal to Parliament. You know, talking about, yeah, it's, it's shocking, especially Australia, which is at the pointy end of climate change, with the droughts, with the fires. It's even the sea rise. So and the bleaching of the of the Great Barrier Reef, you know, one of the world's biodiverse

you know, magic kingdoms, bleaching, and, you know, to have climate denialism here is really, it's quite something, but that's how powerful that private campaign funded by fossil fuel industry has been you know, in creating this alternative reality that's politically convenient, but ecologically disastrous.

**Tom Pegram 39:55**

Yeah, well, let's get into that a bit, Susan. So I mean, a lot of your work has been on sort of looking at the micro politics that underlie private power and how it's exercised, particularly within domestic settings, you have this, this great kind of framing or going granular how these actors will circumvent and shift away from public forums and really operate in the shadows and indeed, there's an article today in The Guardian. Some leak revealing that Monsanto Bayer now had been pressing the US trade office to force the Mexican government not to ban glycosides. So it's very interesting dynamics, very hard to research, though, perhaps one, one might suggest, but you've had a good stab at it. And I've been thinking about your research on access to medicines. Why? Why is it that these international instruments like the TRIPS agreement, really do end up being pretty ineffectual in preventing health harms? There's probably a range of different factors I mean, which one would you weight as perhaps most significant in terms of trying to really understand why these international agreements, these international organisations just fall down when it comes to actually protecting these vulnerable groups and ensuring they have access to basic public goods, including generic medicines?

**Susan Sell 41:17**

Well, I mean, I would go back to the question of asymmetric power. And I go back to the question of private power. And, you know, because I've been, I'm often the only political scientist on a panel of lawyers. And I can't tell you how many times lawyers are sitting there and God bless lawyers, right. They've got their super powers. And they're important, and they've been very important in the access to medicines campaign. But some of them will be looking at the, you know, the black letter of the law. "Look, look, look article seven and eight of TRIPs, it's like, you know, for nationals, you know, for development and technology transfer. Why don't they use this? Why don't they use compulsory licencing? Why don't they use all these flexibilities?" And my answer usually just has to do with the fist and the pony. But the, and here's where sovereignty does matter, because you need as a private actor, like I'm a pharmaceutical firm, I need the United States to represent me in the WTO, in the WHO, right, I can't just walk in there and say, "Yeah you have to do what I want," but they've gotten, you know, the US government, certainly to go on board and the fact that the US government is a very powerful state internationally, it's got a big economy that matters, that matters a lot. So what the private actors in the United States want is going to have a lot of, a lot of impact, globally. And that's why, you know, like, yeah, and so a lot of the reason that they don't do, there's multiple reasons why they won't implement flexibilities, some is that they've gotten tethered to TRIPs plus agreements through bilaterals and plurilateral agreements, they're asked much more strict requirements that are way beyond what TRIPs requires them to do and remove flexibility. So that's one reason. But another reason is that it's usually trade ministers that are at the table and not health ministers and when they can say, well, we're going to get market access for, you know, for other goods and the things that we export, we can bite this bullet, you know, because on balance, it's going to be better for our economy. They can be promised carrot, foreign investment. "We'll invest in you, if you adopt high intellectual property protections." And I think in the case of Jordan, that was one of the first bilaterals that had really stringent intellectual property. I think what happened is they did get investment, but it was all subsidiaries of multinational

corporations that were in pharmaceuticals that were controlled in the United States. So yeah, investment. But you know, what are the spill over effects for the economy at large? Is technology being transferred? Probably not. You know, so another big issue, I think around why they don't is because a lot of the development pathway in the last 10 years anyway, has been to be part of a global value chain. And if you want to be part of a global value chain, one of the requirements for that may be that well, you better protect intellectual property, do you want to be part of this global value chain, even if it's going to be at the bottom end of the manufacturing and not get a huge amount, well it's better than what we had so, you know, I'm not going to make them mad. I want to be part of this global value chain, you know, I want to.. And then, and then there are some cases where in which, China, for example, has gone pretty much whole hog on intellectual property protection. Now, if you listen to US policymakers will say, "Oh, no, they're stealing all our stuff. And they're cheating, and they're not respecting it." But in fact, the central government is very committed to it and I think they're gonna adopt all the bad habits of the West, they want to be on the side of the table getting the royalties, so they have really trained up their people, they've got these IP courts, they've become incredibly litigious, even within China, about intellectual property rights. So the sectors that they're strong in, they are being very forceful about their intellectual property rights. So, you know, they they've sort of seen what we did. The US did, and, you know, got rich from doing that. They're doing the same thing. So yeah, there's, there's still breaches of it, and all the rest of it, especially in poor areas because there's so many different China's right, there's, but, you know, in terms of Central government's commitments, they're all in now. So they're not going to be the avatars of access and, you know, they're not going to be what Brazil used to be before Bolsonaro. So, yeah. Gosh, did I answer your question?

**Tom Pegram** 46:13

Yeah, I think so. That's very interesting insights from China, something to keep an eye on there as you say, it's a quite a challenging context to make sense of, and scholars like Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri are really working hard to try and get a sense of the state transformation dynamics within China, of course, as you say it's different China's within...

**Susan Sell** 46:33

Yeah, it's super complicated. I mean, yeah, I've been there a couple times doing field work and, and, yeah, it's, it's, I just, it's fascinating, but the more I learned, the less I understand, I think is probably fair to say.

**Tom Pegram** 46:49

Sounds quite wise. So I know that Zoe's got a question

**Susan Sell** 46:54

It's wisely humble, I think.

**Zoe Varenne** 46:58

Yeah. So I was sort of wondering, how do you think that COVID-19 illustrates or maybe exposes the challenges and constraints that global health has to confront existing within the structural reality of neoliberal capitalism?

**Susan Sell 47:16**

Well, I think COVID 19 has really, I look at it as an opportunity, a hideous opportunity, the way that I looked at HIV/AIDS as a hideous opportunity. And I thought, you know, there were some victories in HIV/AIDS campaign of access to medicine, but ultimately disappointing. And I see a lot of the same activists mobilising around COVID and with the young generation as well joining in, which is really hopeful and I'm hopeful that this, COVID's an opportunity to rethink some of these, the business as usual and I'm heartened by the new director of the WTO, who has some real commitments around access to medicines and equitable health outcomes from Nigeria. But I still see the same obstacle, which is global pharma, but now it's not just, although global pharma's not a monolith anymore, it used to be more monolithic. Now, there's some firms that are more open to flexible approaches, but most are not. Most are interested in the profit. And some will say, well, we'll give you a low price during the pandemic and after that all bets are off. Well, you know, that's not sustainable but the fact that all these, you know, powerful countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing capability are resisting a waiver. A waiver for COVID products is really not surprising, but I find it horrifying. This is, this disease, has no class, it has no borders, it has no race, it has no gender, it has no anything. It is equal opportunity destroyer, rich, poor, wherever you are, and I think, you know, if there's ever going to be an impulse for let's pull together as, as people and try to nip this, I mean, to crush this thing. This would be the time, but I'm still not seeing that, sadly and there are a lot of things that have changed. I'd say I think 21st Capital, 21st century capitalism is super different than the neoliberalism of Reagan and Thatcher about privatisation and all the rest of it and deregulation. Now it's really about financialization, where that which is bad for innovation but pharmaceutical firms now are spending much of their money in buying back their own shares to keep the price the market value inflated, because executive compensation is based on that. Most of the Big Pharma firms about 96% of an executive salary comes from the market value. So the incentive is to keep buying back these shares, not reinvesting in the company but buying startups that have a blockbuster are buying, you know, just buying up things not innovating and to keep the market, you know, the value of the share price up, which is all the, that's the incentives for the executives, I don't blame them. This is a structural problem, financialization is a real structural problem that's harming innovation, and harming competition. Another factor is the intensification of intellectual property, ownership and in combination, and then we've seen everything that happened with medicines, with the financialization with the IP intensification. All, now it's very much the case in medical devices. So there's ventilator stores in the United States, there was a firm that the government had contracted with, it was a small firm that made ventilators and they made them, like they were portable, they were easy to use, and they were only cost \$3,000 and it was a small company in California, they had a really good product, they got a contract with BARDO, which was a biological, I forgot what it was, but the government, you know, defence, biological defence agency, whatever that is research and defence agency. So they got a nice contract with them. They made these ventilators for \$3,000 and then that company was bought by a bigger one, that, whose main business was ventilators, also. They had a diverse portfolio, but they also made ventilators and they sold their ventilators for \$10,000 and they went and asked for a higher price from the US government for the ventilators they bought up. This little company that was making a good product for significantly cheaper and then they said, "Well, this isn't a priority for us anymore." So all of a sudden, the US didn't have ventilators. They didn't, I mean, you know, that they contracted and the reason that that firm had bought the little company was because of the competition and they didn't want to lose their \$10,000 per item, so they bought up the one that sold them for \$3,000, which was actually a better mousetrap for the COVID

thing and that meant no supply. So you know, killing competition is a big problem. There's a lot of monopoly power that needs to be addressed and so, you know, structurally, I think the really big differences are financialization, intellectual property intensification, and then digitization, which is a whole nother factor but all these things have changed even non digital businesses, they've changed non intellectual property intensive businesses, they've changed the banking and finance in incredible ways. There's a very good book by Walter Mattli, called 'Darkness by Design' and it's all about how the use of algorithms and high speed computing is what really destroyed the New York Stock Exchange, and now it's dominated by a handful of banks instead of the old boys version of the stock exchange, which is a bit more equitable and not dominated by top firms. So there's a very good, a very good article or concept the guy that founded Acer computers wrote about the smile curve in economics and I think that tells us a lot about what's gone wrong. And in the smile curve of economics, if you think about a smile, either corner that, the top corners of that smile are dominated by intangibles. So it's brands, intellectual property, r&d, and then on the other side be marketing distribution etc. So at the bottom of that, and in those areas are super economic concentration, just a handful of firms dominate those ends of the smile curve at the bottom of that smile curve are workers and there's a lot of competition there for cheap labour to, in these global supply chains. So you know, Foxconn they get pennies on the dollar for every iPad or, you know, Apple product that they produce, iPhone. They get pennies on the dollar. Apple gets the lion's share of the money. And one thing that's happened, because everyone now is also talking about shocking levels of inequality that have not been seen since I don't know, 1890s or something maybe worse.

#### **Susan Sell 55:13**

What's happened is that smile has gotten steeper, after the war, after world war two up until about mid 1970s, maybe the differential of value between those of the top of the smile curve, owners of intellectual property, for example, and those at the bottom workers, because there were unions, that smile was not so steep and executive compensation was not stock based it was performance based, is your firm diversifying? Is it selling good mousetraps? Are people buying them, and then workers were paid living wages, that is all gone and now that smile curve is so steep, and it also has exacerbated inequality, and the concentration of wealth at the top 0.0001% and the miseration at the bottom and I think this, these big structural stories are part of you know, we hear "Oh, everyone's worried about inequality. Oh, everyone's worried about, you know, why aren't they getting the vaccine, everyone's worried." But they're all part of this bigger story and until we start to address even things like corporate governance. How do you compensate an executive? Not by share buybacks. You know, that's William Lazonick, a very interesting economist, he calls it a licence to loot, you know, loot your own company, focus on shareholder value, inflate the value by buying your own stocks back on the open market so it looks like they're really in demand and in the meantime, you're not reinvesting in innovation. You're not reinvesting in the company, and you're not reinvesting, you're not investing in your workers. So you know, part of the smile curve and the concentration at the top means you want to have a very small labour footprint, you want to have a very small physical footprint, because you can get much more money, you contract out all the other stuff, so you have these global value chains you have Foxconn at the bottom. So there's no competition, not much competition at the top. But at the bottom, there's ultra-competition to the point where people can barely live on the wages they get. So you know, unions, we need to think about that again. But there's some real structural pieces of this that need to be rethought, reimagined, and revised, or, you know, tinkering here, and there is not going to change this big picture

and I think the majority of people today feel like the big picture has gotten really out of whack, and that it's not good for the planet, it's not good for humans and so I think it's really important to have this big structural picture, on top of which all this other stuff sits and if you don't go deeper in terms of reforms, it's just gonna be, you know, rearranging the deck chairs of the Titanic.

**Zoe Varenne 58:10**

So I kind of wanted to just pick up on what you said about vaccines as part of that. I know, it's just an example. But in terms of fixed well, structural, how am I gonna phrase this? In terms of structure of trying to fix that broader picture, what do you make of the like, the way that vaccines have been distributed? Because on the one hand, you have the EU and the UK squabbling over, "Well, you said this, and now I'm gonna do that" and acting like children, basically and then. On the other hand, the UK having bought, I mean, just off the top of my head, like 10 times the amount of vaccines, they need to vaccinate the population and saying, "Yeah, we're gonna donate everything extra to countries that need it," which seems like a step in sort of righting structural inequalities in level at, well, not quite levelling the playing field, but trying to level things up. How genuine do you think that is? I mean, maybe I'm being a bit cynical, and sort of like, what do you make of that as a step towards having COVID-19 is maybe a more of a hopeful, not business as usual?

**Susan Sell 59:14**

Well, that's not enough. I mean, that that vaccine nationalism is a disaster. And most of the rich countries have way more than they need. And, you know, that's partly what the waiver is all about. The waiver is not a panacea, the waiver's not going to fix everything. But what you do need to do and what I think is important about the waiver, is to increase the production capacity, because if the global South doesn't crush COVID, we're all going to get COVID. I mean, we're all, we are all in this together. There's no way, we've seen, it's globalisation. It's spread, it's everywhere. So the idea of the waiver is to relax some of the or double down on the flexibilities, relax some of the TRIPs requirements to scale up production and manufacturing. That's the whole idea. We've had shortages, partly because of supply chain failures, but we've had shortages of, and partly, that's because of, there's a lot of patents on N95 masks I'll tell you. And there's only about four big companies that make them. So, you know, they're all part of this larger picture I'm painting but we have to be able to increase manufacturing capacity, whether it's masks whether, you know, any kind of PPE, whether it's ventilators, whether it's vaccines, whether it's treatment, testing, all that stuff. And the waivers, I think are important for that to increase production capacity so that, you know, any company that has the capacity to make it, they need to know how they need to know, you know, they need to have access to the information that they can roll this stuff out and that is in everybody's interest and that's why, you know, I was just looking over yesterday, you know, some of the statements from the International Federation of pharmaceutical manufacturers, saying "Oh this will crush innovation, we can't have a waiver, it's gonna destroy intellectual property." No, it won't. And they've been doing just fine. You know, profits have been through the roof. But they've been making that argument since the 1970s. You know, it's all about innovation. Well, financialization has really crushed innovation in a lot of important ways in the pharmaceutical industry. They don't have much stuff in the pipeline, the stuff they do get they buy, because somebody else is making it, not the big pharma firms. So, you know, that's a disingenuous argument. And, and they used to, yeah, so and then the language also, which now it's all about innovation, and they're saying, "Oh, look, we've made these vaccines in record time." That's true. But

oh, my gosh, how much of that money and research came from government, came from taxpayers. So taxpayers are paying for this stuff twice. I read this fascinating thing, I think it's called that MRNA, it's a, it's a technology they're using for one of the vaccines and the New Yorker had this long article of scientists who had gotten interested in this technology back when the first Ebola cases came out and then he was a government scientist and then they kind of shut it down when Ebola came and went. But he kept, he didn't let the bug go, you know, he kept he kept thinking there's something to this technology. Well, partly because that was developed over a long period of time in a government laboratory, it was ready to roll. And you know, I mean, pharmaceutical firms don't want to be transparent about how much money they've invested in things versus what governments have invested, or how much of the research was actually done in federally funded, public funded programmes, so that they can charge their super rents. But if they were transparent about it, especially like in the United States, you say, wait a minute, you know, 80% of the value of that I'm making up a number, but 80% of the value of the thing actually came from me, taxpayer. Why do I have to pay this money for this? Or why isn't it available to me when I was 80% of the, of the answer? So they don't want that stuff to be known and I think, you know, that's another, to me, it's kind of low hanging fruit, but they're going to resist it like crazy, but low hanging fruit in terms of transparency. They don't want to be transparent about how they price their things and, you know, the Gates Foundation has stepped in and but I think people in the access to medicines community realise that philanthropy capitalism is also not the answer. It's more of a, you know, relying on these billionaire philanthropists is more of a recognition that the public system has failed and, and it's not sustainable because what if Bill Gates decides he's interested in something else all of a sudden? I mean, it's just not a sustainable approach. And, you know, as much, you know, I give him props for donating or invest in a lot of money through his foundation, I mean, very generous, I'm not gonna... But he's undercut the power of the WHO, he's undercut the WHO it's more... Gates gives much more money. I think a huge part of their budget comes from the Gates Foundation. SO their hands are a bit tight, because they can't tick them off because they need the revenue or the you know, the funding, even if it has strings attached. They need it, because governments have stepped away but one thing I hope a lesson that's going to come out of COVID is in many cases that you know, after all those libertarian years of "Governments the problem! Government's the problem." Many governments have really stepped up to the plate and done a good job and show that they can mobilise in an emergency and show that they can do what is necessary, whether it's, you know, quick development of vaccines, or helping people who have lost their jobs because of COVID to kind of keep things going, so... All that, you know, "Starve the government! Starve the government!" That's coming home to roost. Now, we're realising it doesn't have to be that way. And in fact, when you get into a situation like this, maybe some big stimulus package is the way to go. Maybe, maybe governments can actually do this with competent leadership. We're not helpless. We can't just, you know, we're not relying only on the private sector right now. Far be it from that with, under COVID. So I think, you know, there's, that's kind of like a kaleidoscope. You look at, you know, some of the things look really positive and hopeful and some of the things just are disaster and you wonder how can we ever come out from under this, but that's why I think it's just a time of opportunity and a time of framing things and a time of opportunity to frame things in a constructive way that more people could get behind and, and translate this experience in a way that could lead to transformative policy change. I think that's, that's an opportunity. Hideous opportunity.

**Tom Pegram** 1:06:29

A hideous opportunity that's what we might call this podcast. Yeah, I mean, it's, you know, as you say, it's a really, it's a very complex kind of kaleidoscope. And it's, it's hard to see exactly how the pieces are gonna fall at the moment. We're still right in the middle of it. But I have been struck from time to time looking at the news, thinking about things. You know, I think of James C Scott's book 'Seeing like a State' you look at the problem like a state and you have this repertoire of possible interventions and solutions. So you look at it like a corporation and a whole different set of heuristics and assumptions, and salient landscapes. So how do we get all of these different actors to see the bigger picture? Because yes, I mean, some very high capacity states have performed well, but on the other hand, sometimes, you know, closing national borders will have unintended second, third order effects. We're now seeing sort of food insecurity, of course, throughout Africa because certain supply chains have been disrupted, and so on. So there's a role for the state and there's a role perhaps for other actors operating other levels, I mean other domains. But okay, we're rolling towards the close. Thank you Susan so much.

**Susan Sell** 1:07:43

I'm not saying that corporations are bad actors, but they've done some things that are really bad, like we need them too. But you know, whenever I hear the conversation end with "the answer is public private partnerships." I'm like, no, it depends, right? They can be harnessed for the good, but they can also do things that are very, very damaging and negative.

**Tom Pegram** 1:08:05

Yeah, and the terminology of partnership obviously needs to be critically scrutinised in terms of what kind of symmetry it's actually hiding there underneath that language. But I'm going to give the last question to Jess. So please Jess.

**Jessica Knezy** 1:08:19

I thank you so much, Susan, for being here today and just to close out, what is your verdict on the state of global political scholarship today? And what advice would you give for students who are thinking of pursuing critical theory as a profession?

**Susan Sell** 1:08:34

I say, I would say that it's getting better. Scholarship is getting better, it's getting more connected to the world, which I think is a positive thing. It, it varies. There's pockets where that's not happening. But I think that it's an invitation to do that but my advice for young scholars is do something you're really passionate about, find something you care about in the world, and let that be your lodestar. Rather than, you know, I just, I mean, you know, what gets me out of bed in the morning is problems in the world that I think are urgent, and how can I offer some insights into addressing them or making people talk about them differently or think about them differently and, you know, that's, that's what I find rewarding. I don't get out of bed in the morning, because I really want to engage with this debate between five people on the merits of one particular way of thinking about the role of institutions, you know, something like that. So, so but I think you have to do something you love and be passionate about because the academic route is a hard one. It's, it's, you know, you get knocked back a lot. You got to be pretty tough, but if you're, if you got something kind of burning in your heart that you really



care about, it just keeps you going because there's boring times there's times that are frustrating. There's times when that manuscript gets rejected. And, I mean, there's a lot of those times, but I just think do something you're passionate about, find that and then keep, keep going. But I think critical scholarship needs to be informed by things in the world. Not criticising another scholar, because you don't like their argument. I'm a big believer in empirical research, so yeah, back and forth, you go back and forth from the theoretical stuff, and then what you find on the ground and say, "This doesn't make sense," kind of like those early conversations that Debbie and Marty and I had about the things we were looking at, like, "wow, this isn't... The world they're describing is not the world I'm seeing." And that gets you started on a whole bunch of journeys. I'll tell you one, one more quick story, which has been a super fun thing for me. And when Owen Williams and I did a special issue, a review of international political economy on capitalism, and you know, structural kind of arguments about global health, that came out last year, and we had a really great review process, and the macro reviewer who reviewed the entire issue, came back and said, and I have no idea who it was, but thank, thank you, whoever you are, if you ever hear this, you know, our original article was, you know, capitalism is bad for health, you know, and, and this reviewer said, "Well, yeah, well, feudalism was bad for health, what's different?" And that got me on to this whole journey of trying to figure out because I was like, it isn't Reagan and Thatcher capitalism. That's not what we're looking at. This is not the neoliberal capitalism in the 80s and 90s. You know, something's different, what's different? So ever since I got that review, I've been reading what's new, what's new in the 21st century, that's qualitatively different. What's changed? What's gotten things so dysfunctional? And in terms of inequality, concentration of wealth, bad outcomes for workers, you know, across the gamut and that's when I started looking at financialization, digitization, and I knew IP was a huge part of that and the smile curve. So I'm still kind of working on that what's new, but I'm convinced there's something new and ultra-dysfunctional going on. And so I'm going to make it my life's work in the next couple of years anyway, to keep pushing that question and I'm so grateful that someone posed that way, to me in the review process, because like, yeah, I need to figure this out. So yeah, yeah.

**Jessica Knezy** 1:12:49

Thanks so much for your advice. I think something I've always admired about political scientists is their just tenacity into this search for answers to questions that matter, matter to them and the pursuit of knowledge. I think that's probably what's going to maybe save us eventually from all of this, but you know, hopefully, well, my fingers are crossed.

**Susan Sell** 1:13:09

It would be cool if people start listening to science again, I'd really welcome that.

**Jessica Knezy** 1:13:14

Yeah, me too but Tom, do you want to close out?

**Tom Pegram** 1:13:22

Well, I just, that's, I think that's very sage advice and I think scholars like Saskia Sassen and others have been pointing to the contours of what's new, perhaps in 21st century capitalism, but I'm not sure we arrived yet at a definitive answer so it'll be exciting to see where you land on that Susan. I look forward to staying in touch and we'll also have to check in on on COVID to see whether this horrendous

opportunity is taken or not. So yeah, it's a fascinating time, sobering time, but a fascinating one. So thanks so much for joining us today and for sharing all of your rich insights. Really enjoyed it.

**Susan Sell** 1:14:02

Well, thanks very much for your questions and comments and I think I was just trying out for a slot in the Speaker's Corner at Hyde Park, one of those ranting people, I think I'm well on my way.

**Tom Pegram** 1:14:16

We might call the episode that.

**Susan Sell** 1:14:19

Susan's rant.

**Tom Pegram** 1:14:20

It was great. Great to have you Susan. Thanks so much for joining us.

**Susan Sell** 1:14:24

Thank you so much, and good luck, everybody. Stay safe, stay healthy.

**Tom Pegram** 1:14:30

Thanks for tuning into imperfect utopias to get access to all of our content, and to stay up to date with future zoom calls, workshops and events and more, check us out at [ucl.ac.uk/global-governance](https://ucl.ac.uk/global-governance). If you like this content, please do leave us a comment and subscribe. Till next time!