Does Multilateralism Have a Life Cycle?

Professor Harlan Grant Cohen, from the University of Georgia School of Law, set out to answer this question at a recent GGI keynote lecture. He argued that understanding institutional arrangements in terms of a 'life cycle' can help explain the current anti-globalist turn. He also explored the future of multilateralism: will it remain largely unchanged, will it be abandoned or is it simply reaching a new stage of development? 

What's Going On?

A number of current events have reinforced the narrative that multilateralism is facing serious challenges, including US President Trump's decision to withdraw  from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. However, Cohen also highlighted a number of positive developments that we should be encouraged by. For example, China has showcased support for multilateral institutions, such as the Paris Agreement, and the TPP - now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) - has been salvaged despite US withdrawal. 

This suggests that we are not witnessing a decay or failure of the multilateral governance system. The post-World War II institutions have succeeded in providing us with, to quote Cohen, "wealth and power… across the world." However, this success has come at a cost. Cohen believes that multilateralism has reached a state of maturity. A mature system is different from a young one. Success fundamentally changes the calculus of individual states and, in turn, their views on multilateral efforts to solve global or transnational problems. 

The Effects of Multilateralism on Global Negotiating Dynamics

Cohen pointed to five specific effects of successful multilateralism which explain the increasing anti-globalist backlash. These effects also reinforce one another. Therefore, the more successful multilateralism is, the more difficult further multilateral cooperation will become.

1. Rising Multipolarity 

While overall global trade has been decreasing there has been a general dispersion of economic power. The World Bank states that, by 2025, six emerging economies - Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Russia - will collectively account for more than half of all global growth. Also, there are dispersions of military power, as illustrated by India's and China's efforts to project themselves militarily into the Indian Ocean. This new multipolarity, fueled by the rise of new powers, is radically changing the dynamics of multilateral negotiations. Current institutions were founded against the backdrop of a bi-polar post-World War II international system. With the traditional major powers being challenged, these institutions will have difficulties withstanding the changing power landscape.

2. Decreasing Value of Linkages

Following from the above, in a bipolar system, less powerful states placed high value on entering agreements with traditional powers, as these would come with reputational and material gains that outweighed the sovereignty costs they would be faced with. Multipolarity has changed the value of these linkages. Emerging countries, to quote Cohen, "no longer need powerful ones in the same way." 

3. Increased Effectiveness of Institutions Imposes Additional Costs

Cohen suggested that states are engaging in a cost-benefit analysis when assessing multilateral institution membership. If institutions are seen to provide "little benefit but more headaches," states may prefer to withdraw or disengage. An example may be Venezuela's withdrawal from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the Philippines' decision to leave the International Criminal Court. 

4. Increased Effectiveness Encourages Free Riding

On the other hand, if multilateral institutions are seen to provide concrete benefits this may invite free riding. Certain states will bet on the fact that because every member of a regime is so invested in its success, they will look past some degree of cheating. For example, China, the US and the EU have played "hard and fast" with WTO rules, negotiating free trade agreements that are hard to square with WTO rules, whilst going unchallenged. 

5. Wider Dispersion of Wealth and Power Increases Focus on Relative Wealth 

Multipolarity has changed how states perceive and value multilateral institutions. States are now focused more on relative or positional wealth compared to absolute and overall wealth. In other words, they are assessing if they are relative winners or losers of multilateral institutions. This is reflected, for example, in President Trump's complaints about NATO and how European allies have benefited from but paid too little for American security guarantees. 

What Comes Next?

There are four key suggestions Cohen proposed to address the challenges above. First, the norms of institutions need to become anchored before states pursue their rational calculus for discontinuing membership. Cohen suggested that socialization and norm dispersion strategies are "on a clock" and therefore "must not take forever." 

Second, providing public goods in a multipolar world may require smaller deals that can guarantee specific and desirable "club-sized" goods, therefore, Cohen called for right-sizing international organizations. Despite the drawbacks from regional multilateral agreements in providing the broader good, perhaps these are sometimes more durable than attempts to work through global multilateral conventions. 

Third, we should be more open to pluralism and local solutions, refocusing attention on benefiting local populations rather than 'teaching universal lessons.' Local, bilateral and regional governance can be more effective than multilateral governance in getting actors to change their policies and it can ensure that people feel the benefits of certain governance solutions more directly. 

Finally, policy-makers will have to think hard about whether universal or near universal participation is indeed required when providing a particular public good. For example, an agreement between top emitting states may be more important for progress on climate change than a broader agreement that can win everyone's support. Therefore, Cohen believes that breaking problems into component parts should be a key consideration for policy-makers.