The Role of Experts in Global Public Policy

Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of England, has argued that economists face a 'twin deficit' when engaging with the general public: a lack of understanding of the economy and economic policy as well as a lack of trust in experts' ability to supply that understanding. Indeed, a recent YouGov poll indicates that, in the UK, 44% of the public do not trust economists when they speak about their own field of expertise. 

What has produced this profound sense of distrust? Wendy Carlin, Professor of Economics at UCL, suggested that part of the blame may lie with journalists and politicians that have either rejected the notion of economic expertise altogether or drawn on it in selective and contradictory ways. In the UK, for example, David Cameron and George Osborne largely ignored the advice of economists on their 2010 austerity programme - yet, in the lead-up to the Brexit referendum, the only case they made for remaining in the EU was an economic one. In the US, Donald Trump has cultivated an explicitly anti-elitist, anti-expert narrative that resonates widely with constituencies in low-prospect towns and rural areas that feel left behind by globalisation. 

However, Carlin argued, the underlying story may be deeper and more complex. After all, economic expertise has been dismissed not just by Brexiteers or Trump voters. To explain why broad swathes of the public on both the left and the right increasingly distrust economists, we also need to address economics' deep association with neoliberalism. Carlin acknowledged that the idea of 'laissez-faire' has always played an important role in economic discourse, however, she argued, it was only at a certain point that a decisive shift in thinking took place. Economists extended the scope of the model of purely self-interested behaviour to policy-making, replacing the classical idea of a hypothetical benevolent and well-informed public servant with that of a self-interested and poorly-informed agent. This shift in thinking, Carlin argued, delivered the 'intellectual firepower' for the rise of neoliberalism as a policy orthodoxy in the 1980s.

However, change may be afoot. Carlin contended that a new paradigm is emerging in economic thinking, challenging both the narrow neoliberal model and the old 'social-engineering' vision of policy-making. Contemporary economic research has replaced the simplistic model of 'homo economicus' with a much richer version of what people are like, demonstrating that human interaction is not just, or even primarily, driven by markets and monetary incentives but also by social norms and power relations. This paradigm shift is now also taking off in teaching, spearheaded by initiatives such as the CORE project, a global collaborative effort (directed by Carlin) that seeks to build new ways of learning economics. 

Thus, Carlin concluded, there are reasons to be optimistic. First, initiatives such as the 2017 Citizens' Assembly on Brexit demonstrate that, under the right conditions, access to experts can change people's views. Second, a more holistic, problem-oriented approach to studying, teaching and communicating economics is emerging that can help reinstate public trust in economic expertise as well as provide better tools to address pressing issues such as inequality, financial instability and environmental sustainability.

Wendy Carlin is Professor of Economics at UCL and Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Her research focuses on macroeconomics, institutions and economic performance, and the economics of transition. She is a member of the Expert Advisory Panel of the UK's Office for Budget Responsibility and has acted as a consultant for international organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. She is leading an international project - the CORE project - to reform the undergraduate economics curriculum. 

While health experts may enjoy higher levels of public trust than economists, certain conditions need to be in place for their knowledge and expertise to drive real change. According to Sarah Hawkes, Professor of Global Public Health at UCL, experts are most likely to have a fundamental impact on policy-making if they become part of global advocacy coalitions. She presented two historical examples of successful coalition-building between experts and civil society: the global HIV movement and the movement for ensuring women's access to safe abortion. 

When HIV first emerged as a global health problem in the early 1980s, it was seen as fatal. The development of the first antiretroviral marked a major scientific breakthrough. HIV was now a chronic but treatable disease, however, with costs above 10,000 USD per year per person, the drug was completely unaffordable for many of the most affected countries. It was in this context that the global HIV movement really took off, demanding full access to treatment in both developed and developing countries. The combined action of experts and civil society groups in countries such as the US, South Africa and Brazil eventually led to the price of the drug to drop to less than 100 USD per person per year. 

A similar dynamic, Hawkes argued, was at play in a number of countries in the context of ensuring women's access to safe abortion. Experts were able to draw attention to the enormous implications for women's health, with unsafe abortions accounting for at least 15% of maternal mortality rates in low income countries. However, expert evidence in itself did not drive new policies - it was only when experts teamed up with activists that real change was possible. 

Hawkes suggested that to understand what drives or inhibits change we need to pay careful attention to the interactions of institutions, interests and ideas. Powerful moral framings played a significant role in both the struggle for affordable HIV treatment and the fight for access to safe abortions. As the recent Irish abortion referendum showed, ideational factors continue to be relevant in public health. Moral framings cannot easily be changed, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, posing significant challenges for both experts and activists.

However, Hawkes suggested that the biggest future challenge for global health experts may not be overcoming persistent moral discourses but powerful economic interests. As she pointed out, the leading causes of death globally are now non-communicable diseases (NDCs), including cardiovascular disease, cancer or diabetes. These health problems are driven primarily by an overconsumption of products such as tobacco, salt or sugar, and the industries behind these products are expending considerable money and lobbying efforts to influence the global agenda on NDCs, with notable success. For example, a recent report by the Independent High-Level Commission on NDCs refrained from recommending higher taxes on sugary drinks, despite broad support for such measures from most health experts. Going forward, Hawkes concluded, experts can draw lessons from the history of global health: in order to drive forward real change in the governance of NDCs talking to policy-makers is likely to be insufficient - experts will also need to engage and team up with civil society actors. 

Sarah Hawkes is Professor of Global Public Health at the UCL Institute for Global Health where she leads a research theme analysing the use of evidence in policy processes, particularly in relation to gender and health, and sexual health. She has lived and worked for much of the past 20 years in Asia, where she has gathered evidence, built capacity and helped develop policy for programmes focusing on gender, sexual health and human rights. She works closely with national governments, research organisations, WHO and UNFPA in Asia and the Middle East. She also leads the UCL Centre for Gender and Global Health. 

What are climate scientists for? How can they communicate their findings better? And how can they deliver better value to civil society? Chris Rapley, Professor of Climate Science at the UCL Department of Earth Science, addressed these three questions, drawing on the work of the UCL Policy Commission on the Communication of Climate Science (which Rapley chairs). 

The first and most obvious role of climate scientists is a purely scientific one: studying climate-related Earth system processes, without any direct consideration of potential policy implications. While this remains the core role of climate scientists, Rapley argued that it is not sufficient. Climate scientists also have to act as 'science communicators', discussing their findings and alerting society to its potential implications. A third role for climate scientists is that of 'science arbiter.' As Rapley put it, facts are 'slippery things' and, especially in a field as complicated as climate science, they rarely speak for themselves. Therefore, scientists need to help decision-makers make sense of the data they produce. 

In each of these three roles, Rapley contended, climate scientists should seek to stay out of normative debates and refrain from making explicit policy recommendations. However, alongside other actors, they can support policy-makers by acting as 'honest brokers', illuminating the scope of choices available. Rapley acknowledged that individual climate scientist may want to step out of this purely professional remit and take up the role of 'policy advocate.' However, he cautioned, they should make clear that they are acting in a personal not a professional capacity to avoid risks to their scientific standing. 

Increasingly, climate scientists also need to think about how they can best address a lay public. Rapley observed a trend whereby climate scientists use a personal narrative to convey facts while also connecting with people's emotions and values. However, he cautioned that emotional narratives can sometimes have unintended effects. 'Alarmist' messages may not be a useful motivator for action but rather evoke apathy, defensive avoidance and disengagement, especially if the threat feels vague and impersonal. 

Finally, Rapley addressed the implications of the 2015 Paris Agreement. He argued that the Agreement fundamentally changes the work of climate scientists, prompting them to re-evaluate whether their research helps to deliver value for society. Going forward, he concluded, climate scientists need to make sure they are asking the right questions and that the implications of their findings are well understood by policy-makers and a general public. However, this will also depend on research institutions offering different academic training systems and rewards structures that encourage climate scientists to take up roles beyond that of the 'pure scientist.'

Chris Rapley is Professor of Climate Science at UCL and Chair of the UCL Policy Commission on the Communication of Climate Science. He is also Chair of the London Climate Change Partnership, and a Board member of the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust. Prior to joining UCL, he was variously Director of the Science Museum, Director of the British Antarctic Survey, and Executive Director of the International-Geosphere Biosphere Programme. In addition to his commitment to understanding and adapting to the impacts of climate change, his recent work has focused on the public understanding of climate change and the role of scientists in engaging with policy makers and the public.

Leading up to the 2016 UK referendum on leaving the EU, Michael Gove infamously declared that "people in this country have had enough of experts." The vote for Brexit appeared to reflect a wide-spread sentiment that academics and other experts had overstepped their remit by overwhelmingly advocating for Remain. At the same time, the aftermath of the referendum suggested that many voters may have lacked the information necessary to make a well-informed decision. A day after the results of the referendum were announced, Google Trends reported that the most searched question in the UK was 'What does it mean to leave the EU?', closely followed by 'What is the EU?' 

Uta Staiger, Director of the UCL European Institute, encapsulated this dilemma: On the one hand, experts face the charge of being too dominant in political decision-making, on the other hand, they are clearly not dominant (or articulate) enough to help people make sense of some of the most basic questions. She reflected on two important dimensions of this dilemma - 'trust' and 'framing.'

According to German sociologist Georg Simmel, trust occupies "the middle ground between knowing and not knowing." Staiger argued that this middle ground has vastly expanded in the context of growing global interdependence and complexity. As a result, the question of who we should trust to reduce this complexity for us has come under intense scrutiny. This has important implications as trust plays a fundamental role in the functioning of social and political organisations. As Staiger pointed out, trust was an essential ingredient for European democratisation, with John Locke defining his 'government of trust' as a close relationship between (a very restricted circle of) citizens and their representatives in parliament. Today, this relationship of mutual trust can no longer be taken for granted and, in fact, it appears to have turned into a relationship of mutual distrust, sometimes even 'disgust.'  

Regaining public trust after Brexit, to quote Staiger, "is not just about demonstrating that you were right." Rather than assuming that the facts will speak for themselves, experts need to pay more attention to the 'framing' of particular ideas and policies. Some of the most successful framings employed by Brexiteers during the referendum campaign explicitly targeted the reliability and objectivity of experts. Going forward, universities and academics should think about how they can better tackle those framings and present more convincing ones, while taking serious the concerns of the people they interact with. 

These lessons can also be applied to expert engagement with policy-makers. Speaking from a practitioners perspective, Staiger argued that, to engage in meaningful exchange, experts need to build a personal relationship of trust and a 'track record' of reliability with policy-makers. They also need to be aware of the particular institutional environment that decision-makers operate in and the political constraints they are under, as well as the necessity to frame policy options in ways that make them politically feasible. Yet, at the same time, experts should not lose sight of questions of legitimacy, transparency and accountability. While confidentially may be essential to establish trust and enable frank and open discussions, informal exchanges between experts and policy-makers must happen in parallel to public and more participatory discussions of different policy options.  

Uta Staiger is the co-founder and Executive Director of the UCL European Institute. Since 2010, she has led the Institute in its mission to both create and curate opportunities for research on Europe, within and beyond UCL. She has been actively involved in driving UCL's policy engagement on EU and European matters, including relationships with key stakeholders. In June 2017, she was appointed as UCL's Pro-Vice-Provost (Europe), a strategic role shaping UCL's engagement with Europe. In this role, she also contributes to UCL's institutional strategy and research-based response to Brexit.