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Migration, Development, and Diaspora Governance

A comparative analysis of the diaspora engagement policies of India and Ghana

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Abstract

In response to the rise in diaspora institutions, this dissertation compares the diaspora engagement policies of India and Ghana in an effort to better understand how governments define and perceive 'their' diaspora, the strategies they use to engage it, and whether governments can act to ensure emigration translates into development. This research is comprised of data and information primarily from government reports and websites and utilizes Alan Gamlen's typology for comparative diaspora policy research. As India and Ghana have dismantled their original diaspora institutions and replaced them within the past four years, much of the existing literature is outdated. This paper provides a necessary update. Embedded within theoretical frameworks of diaspora governance and literature on the migration-development nexus, this dissertation explores how diaspora institutions are increasingly prioritizing investment capture and argues there are certain conditions that enhance the diaspora's willingness to invest. Further, it examines efforts aimed at 'brain circulation,' including skill and knowledge transfer networks. Through comparative analysis, it demonstrates how diaspora institutions are evolving, or failing to evolve, in response to global changes regarding technology and social media. In particular, it analyzes how diaspora institutions harness the immense power of social media for symbolic-nation building and the ways they develop digital identities to boost the home-state image. More generally, this paper explores the state-diaspora relationship and the ways that diaspora engagement is increasingly becoming a mechanism of global migration governance.

Word Count: 11,975

Table of Contents

5.3.3 Extracting obligations

Facilitating remittances

Encouraging investments

Knowledge and skill transfer programs

1. Introduction

The last decade has witnessed a renewed sense of optimism in migrants' potential to contribute to origin country development. This has caused a global increase in governments developing policies and institutions to engage diaspora communities for resources to further development plans. Within these diaspora institutions, migrants are viewed as a 'bottom-up' development resource with the potential to combat 'brain drain' through boosting the economy and mitigating increasingly rampant socio-economic inequality (de Haas 2008). In practice, however, these aspirations have proven harder to deliver than the logic suggests. The core puzzle remains: how can governments act to ensure emigration translates into development?

This paper explores and compares the diaspora engagement policies of Ghana and India in efforts to understand how governments define and perceive 'their' diaspora, the strategies they use to engage it for national development, and their respective outcomes. Further, it examines the state-diaspora relationship and the ways diaspora engagement is increasingly becoming a mechanism for global migration governance. I attempt to answer four research questions:

(1) What are Ghana and India's diaspora engagement policies, and what are their interests in harnessing the diaspora?

(2) How do current socio-economic conditions affect the 'effectiveness' of diaspora engagement policies for national development?

(3) How have diaspora institutions evolved in response to global changes?

(4) Can governments act to ensure that emigration contributes to national development?

There is extensive discussion on global migration governance, but in most of the discourse on migration policy, migration management is synonymous with *im*migration management (Ahouga 2018; Geiger and Pécoud 2010; Hollifield 2004). Diaspora institutions are a mechanism for managing *e*migration. Thus, they have been frequently overlooked, as sending governments are 'often presented as pawns rather than players in issues of migration management' (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.3). While policymakers have focused on diaspora institutions (IOM 2013; Agunias and Newland 2012), they remain under-researched in academia (Gamlen 2014a).

There is literature on migration and development in Africa (de Haas 2012, 2010; Mohapatra *et al.* 2011; Mercer *et al.* 2008; *Ghana specific:* Tonah 2017; Marini 2013; Ankomah 2012) and India (Rahman *et al.* 2013; Sahai 2013; Naujoks 2009), but there is a paucity of literature on diaspora engagement initiatives, and even less on diaspora institutions. Further, India and Ghana have recently replaced their original diaspora institutions, leaving much of the literature outdated. This paper provides a necessary update. Moreover, most of the research is single country case studies, in which case study bias prevents a comprehensive understanding of how and why diaspora institutions are spreading globally (Gamlen 2014a, 2006). As the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies is assumed to be dependent on country conditions and capacity, comparative policy analysis (CPA) is required to mitigate case study bias to advance diaspora-state relations theory (Gamlen 2014a; Levitt 2001).

CPA is an emerging research method in social sciences used to study policy diffusion across countries (Peters and Fontaine 2020; see Cairney 2016; Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen *et al.* 2013). While a CPA of multiple states would be ideal, Ghana and India vary greatly in diaspora size, migration history, diaspora engagement motivations, and strategic approach, which provides a better understanding of how diaspora institutions shape migrants, what conditions facilitate effective diaspora engagement, and how global ideas influence policy.

Diaspora institutions merit research because they provide insight into the interplay between new systems of global migration governance, emerging trends and transformations in 'transnational sovereignty and citizenship,' and how migrants construct their identity in relation to new collectivities (Gamlen 2014a, p.S180). Most importantly, they are reconfiguring the boundaries of state power by testing whether domestic influence can successfully transcend national borders (Délano 2014) and are thus actively 'changing the relationships between place, power, and identity that define politics' (Gamlen 2014a, p.S183).

This paper ultimately concludes that determining the impact of policies on development is extremely challenging due to insufficient evaluation frameworks. Both case studies demonstrate how policy frameworks, despite genuine intent, often fail to transform into practical initiatives. Moreover, this study reveals that governments are increasingly prioritizing the extraction of diaspora investments. Though investments have potential to contribute to long-term

development, I argue that governments must create a suitable investment environment for diaspora members to be willing to invest. Most significantly, this paper is one of the first to analyze how diaspora institutions harness social media's immense power and the first to focus specifically on Ghana and India's efforts. I argue that social media has the potential to be one of the most powerful tools for diaspora governance and thus must be prioritized in future research.

2. Literature review

This dissertation is embedded within the literature on the migration-development nexus and diaspora institutions. It further draws on theoretical frameworks of diaspora governance grounded in the literature on transnational governmentality and policy diffusion. Lastly, it is written largely in conversation with Alan Gamlen's research on diaspora engagement (2019. 2014, 2006).

There is extensive research on immigration management, but not on the complex challenges emigration poses to origin countries and the ways governments manage it. In particular, there is a lack of recent literature on the diaspora engagement strategies of both Ghana and India and nearly no research since both countries made changes to their diaspora institutions. A typology for comparative diaspora policy research does exist (Gamlen 2006), but it has rarely been applied, resulting in gaps in understanding of diaspora institutions and the conditions that allow governments to ensure emigration contributes to national development.

The literature also engages minimally with various changes in the past twenty years, including increased securitization of migration in response to widely publicized terrorist activity, heightened xenophobia, and the 2016 refugee crisis. This has left some countries more eager for a decentralized system of global migration management, which has undoubtedly influenced diaspora institutions. There has also been significant advancement in communication, social media, money-transfer technology, and accessible transport. Moreover, much of the research is from the early 2000s, predating many current diaspora institutions (Gamlen 2019). Further, as the existing literature primarily focuses on the emergence of diaspora institutions, there remains a paucity of literature on their resilience and evolution — a gap I hope this paper begins to fill.

2.1 The Migration-development nexus: 'brain drain' versus 'brain gain'

The migration-development nexus is a complex and controversial relationship characterized by a pendulum of ideological shifts (Bastia and Skeldon 2020; Bakewell 2008; de Hass 2007, 2012). Policymakers, development organizations, and governments have long crafted migration strategies reflecting 'brain drain' migration pessimism and migration optimism (de Hass 2012).

Concerns of brain drain from the emigration of 'underdeveloped' countries' most skilled workers and its effects on public sectors is a critical driver of the argument that migration is a symptom and cause of 'underdevelopment' (Groenhout 2012; Ratha *et al.* 2011; Bakewell 2009). For example, a 2016 study revealed 24% of nurses trained in Ghana were working abroad (Ministry of the Interior 2016, p.40).

However, in recent years pessimism has mainly been replaced with emphatic optimism whereby actors render migration a 'development fix,' and emigrants are seen as reservoirs of financial and human capital with the potential to benefit their origin country (Gamlen 2015; de Hass 2012; Castles 2009). Further, perspectives on brain drain have become less one-dimensional, with some arguing that emigration of the highly skilled can have net-positive effects, such as increased rates of enrollment in higher education at home (Gamlen 2014b; Ratha *et al.* 2011; Stark 2004). Other scholars argue that migration promotes 'brain exchange,' whereby the vacancies left from emigration are filled with higher or equally skilled migrants (Glass and Choy 2001; Straubhaar 2000). For example, one study found that immigrants in New Zealand were often higher skilled than New Zealander emigrants (and the general population) (Glass and Choy 2001). The concept most relevant to this paper is 'brain circulation,' in which migrants share valuable skills and knowledge through transnational networks that link sending and receiving countries (Saxenian 2005; Meyer 2001). Unlike brain gain and brain drain, which emphasize the outcome for states, brain circulation is the 'process, in which people and knowledge are circulated in the global context' (Blachford and Zhang 2014, p.205). For example, knowledge networks among Chinese-Canadian academics in the Chinese diaspora have allowed for innovations in science and technology, and strengthened diplomatic relations between China and Canada (Blachford and Zhang 2014).

Remittances

In 2003, data from the World Bank showing migrant remittances had surpassed ODA (official development assistance) and FDI (foreign direct investment) (see Figure 1) led to the belief that remittances could be a 'bottom-up' approach to income redistribution and reduce household poverty (Bettin and Zazzaro 2016; De *et al.* 2016; Bakker 2015; de Hass 2012; Raghuram 2009, World Bank 2003). As poverty reduction strategies within 'underdeveloped' countries have had

limited success, sending governments have pushed a 'remittances-to-development' (R2D) agenda through policies aimed at increasing low-cost money transfer channels (currently the cost of sending $1 to Africa is about 9% higher than the cost of sending it to Asia) (World Bank 2019, p.6; Bakker 2015, p.22; de Hass 2012; Raghuram 2009; de Hass 2006; Nyberg-Sorensen *et al.* 2002).

Figure 1: Remittance flows to LIMC countries, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows 1990-2018

Source: World Bank 2019a, p. 15

Note: Due to the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, global remittances in 2020 are currently projected to decline by approximately 20% in LIMC from $554 billion to around $445 billion, making it the most significant decline in recent history. The World Bank projects that remittances will recover and increase by 5.6% to reach $470 billion in 2021, but this figure is only an estimate as the pandemic and its effect on remittances is constantly changing at the time of this paper (World Bank 2020).

Evidence supporting the R2D agenda varies, with some scholars supporting its effectiveness (Gibson *et al.* 2019; Bangake *et al.* 2019; Clemens *et al.* 2016; Matuzeviciute and Butkus 2016; Giovanni *et al.* 2015) while others find no relationship (Clemens and McKenzie 2018; Adams and Klobodu 2016) or a negative relationship in which remittances stunt growth by decreasing work effort (Vadean *et al.* 2019; Chami *et al.* 2018; Justino and Shemyakina 2012). A general consensus is that remittances benefit development only if favorable development conditions are present (i.e., suitable investment climates, less restrictive mobility) (El Hamma 2017; Chappell

and Glennie 2009). In order to secure resources from migrants, policymakers develop strategies to engage the diaspora in attempts to recoup valuable human and financial capital lost through emigration.

Defining diasporas

Historically, the notion of 'diaspora' was primarily limited to cultural studies (e.g., Zack-Williams 1995); however, in recent years the term has proliferated across the social sciences (Zapata-Barrero and Rezaei 2020; Clemens *et al.* 2015; Gamlen 2014a; Ratha *et al.* 2011; Bakewell 2009; Mercer *et al.* 2009). Once used to refer to individuals forcefully dispersed from a central homeland to a peripheral nation (Safran 1999, 1991; Cohen 1997, 1995), the term evolved to encompass a variety of migrant groups and their descendants (the 'genealogical diaspora') who *become* a diaspora based on shared identity and homeland orientation (Fischer 2018; Quinsaat 2018; Scully 2018, p.1; Cohen and Brah 1996). Diaspora institutions have transformed the term further — rather than indicating a form of resistance, it now denotes a 'dispersed belonging *defined by* nation-states' (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen 2014a, p.S183). This reconceptualization is debated, but will not be covered due to space constraints (see Tölölyan 2018; Bakewell 2008; Brubaker 2005; Vertovec 2005; Brah 1996).

The term diaspora is too complex to be reduced to an all-encompassing definition. Nonetheless, in this paper diaspora refers to 'extra-territorial groups,' including 'temporary or transnational migrants' and 'longer-term emigrants…and their descendants who may identify as diasporic' that share a 'state-centric identities (Gamlen 2019, p.303).

Diasporas and critical development studies

Some scholars argue that harnessing migration for development is problematic as it perpetuates neoliberal, functionalist ideologies that make migrants, rather than states, responsible for overturning structural failures and fostering socio-economic reform (Rother 2019; de Hass 2012, 2010; Raghuram 2009; Bakewell 2009, 2008; Sorensen *et al.* 2002). de Hass argues migration can contribute to improving economic conditions in countries of origin; however, it cannot singlehandedly undermine macro-structural failures (2012). Geographers have also questioned the new optimism, arguing that policies serve economic and political interests such as

strengthening immigration control and justifying importing labor (Gamlen 2014b; Faist *et al.* 2011; Datta *et al.* 2007). Datta *et al*. argue that development policy built on remittances is 'unethical' (2007, p.43) as migrants often endure 'exploitative labor-market conditions… to send money home' (Gamlen 2014b, p.589). Faist *et al.* assert that the 'new' optimism is not new, and argue that the relationship between migration and development should be approached with a transnational perspective focused on diaspora-state relations and 'associated transfers beyond the limited but dominating focus on financial remittances' (2011, p.2).

Moreover, post-development scholars (primarily anthropologists) argue the notion of development and its associated terms used to define 'progress' (i.e. 'underdeveloped,' 'developing,' 'developed') are a constructed discourse (Foucault 2009; Escobar 1995) impregnated with Eurocentric teleology and economic bias that makes 'underdevelopment' a mechanism for capitalist expansion (Edelman and Haugerud 2005; Escobar 1995; Hobart 1993; Ferguson 1990). As a result, development discourse is frequently rooted in the contested theory of modernization (Page and Mercer 2018). Thus, Raghuram's question 'whose migration for whose development?' draws attention to a more skeptical account of the social and geographical distribution of the benefits of migration. However, due to space constraints these arguments are not examined. Development terms and concepts are used in this dissertation because they are included in the working language of governments, policies, and diaspora institutions, upon which this paper focuses. This is not intended to imply uncritical acceptance but to work with the discourse that is being analyzed.

2.2 Diaspora institutions

Governments in the global South have taken significant strides to strengthen their relationship with the diaspora to further development plans (Page and Mercer 2018; Gamlen 2014a, 2014b, 2006). Over 50% of United Nations member states (see Figure 2) have developed a governing institution to engage 'their' diaspora (Oonk 2018; Gamlen 2014a; Collyer 2013). In this paper, diaspora institutions are defined as 'formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants,' which are 'named, funded, and staffed…within the executive and legislative branches of national governments' (Gamlen 2014a, p.S182, p.S184). Though some are located within the office of the prime minister or president, most sit within foreign affairs departments

(Gamlen 2014a). I have chosen to remain aligned to existing literature (e.g., Dickerson and Ozden 2018; Gamlen 2018; Kuschminder and Hercog 2011; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Choate 2008; Margheritis 2007) and operate at the national-state level because I am interested in the ways states '(re)produce citizen-sovereign relationships with expatriates' and how they maneuver these relationships to achieve development goals (Gamlen 2006, p.2). This definition also provides a clear boundary for data collection.

Figure 2: Number of UN Member States with Formal Offices for Emigrants and their Descendants [by Institution Type], 1980–2014

Source: Gamlen *et al.* 2019, p.294

How do states engage the diaspora?

Diaspora institutions have several aims, such as strengthening remittances, increasing investments, and transferring skills and knowledge (Gamlen 2014a; Ratha *et al.* 2011; Bakewell 2009). They signify a policy shift away from restricting emigration to prevent brain drain; benefits are now offered to the diaspora to promote the circulation of capital (i.e., brain circulation) (Kone and Özden 2017; Blachford and Zhang 2014; Kunz and Maisenbacher 2013; Castles 2009; de Hass 2008; Saxenian 2005). For example, after centuries of emigration due to

economic difficulty, the Irish government created the Emigrant Support Program in 2004 to fund business networks and capital, heritage, and welfare projects for Irish emigrants. This program 'prove[d] that the diaspora could be a tremendous source of knowledge and human capital' (Dickerson and Özden 2018, p.222). As a result, Ireland established a formal diaspora policy in 2015 stating, 'drawing upon [the diaspora's] experience and expertise' helped create jobs and 'get [Ireland] back on its feet' (DFA 2015, p.7).

In most cases, states do not have a singular diaspora engagement policy, but rather a 'patchwork of policy directives issued from time to time, in response to changing conditions' (Sahai 2013, p.51). In this paper, 'diaspora policy' is defined as 'an explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted by a sending state…aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate communities, diaspora populations, and foreign constituencies' (Boyle and Kitchin 2011, p.4). This definition is suitable for analyzing Ghana and India's policies because it allows for a broad, diverse approach to the diaspora without being limited to a rigid policy framework.

There are three types of policies set forth in Gamlen's typology for comparative diaspora engagement research: (1) capacity building, (2) extending rights *to* the diaspora, and (3) extracting obligations *from* the diaspora (2006, p.6). Capacity building policies aim to discursively construct a state-centric 'transnational national society…towards which policies can be directed' (Gamlen 2006, p.5). Central to this is the idea that states may recover 'lost citizens' — emigrants who did not maintain links and their subsequent generations. This involves initiatives such as cultural conferences (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Demetriou 2003; Panossian 2003) and inclusive rhetoric and images (Nyiri 2004). One example is Serbia's annual event to celebrate the diaspora's involvement in boosting 'the unity of Serbia' and 'image of Serbia abroad' (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010, p.33). Another example is Nyiri's study on China's use of media to discursively (re)produce the diaspora's allegiance by 'celebrating migration as a patriotic and modern act' (2004, p.635). Policies that extend rights aim to establish the origin government as a 'legitimate sovereign' and thus provide benefits to the emigrant *in order for* obligation extracting policies to be successful under the premise of reciprocity and state loyalty (Gamlen 2006, p.22). Such policies include dual nationality and welfare protection, and member responsibilities may involve mandatory payments, knowledge transfer programs, and taxation (e.g., Eritrea's 2% tax on diaspora income) (Gamlen 2006, p.5; Hirt 2015).

Though this framework is comprehensive, states' policies sometimes overlap between extending rights and extracting obligations. One example of this is diaspora pension schemes, which Gamlen classifies as 'extending rights' (2006, p.12). As many states issue these as a mechanism for harnessing investment funds (e.g., Ghana's diaspora pension scheme), I argue that this framework may need to include a fourth category in the future as diaspora engagement policies evolve in ways that benefit both the state and migrant.

2.3 Theoretical perspectives: tapping, embracing, and diaspora governance

The literature proposes three theoretical explanations for the emergence of diaspora institutions: tapping, embracing, and governing (Gamlen 2014a). 'Tapping' suggests that diaspora institutions arise as sending countries 'tap' the resources of the diaspora to combat brain drain (Darkwa 2018; Docquier and Rapoport 2012), alleviate poverty (Pellerin and Mullings 2013), and in some cases provide allies in the interests of foreign security (such as Israel recruiting the Jewish diaspora for the Israel Defense Forces) (Agarwala 2015; de Haas 2012, Koinova 2010; Sheffer 2010; 2008; Iskander, 2010; Chappell and Glennie 2009). However, this perspective fails to address the relationship between diaspora institutions and state power and assumes that states are 'territorially sealed' with 'bounded identities,' thus disregarding transformative notions of transnationalism (Gamlen 2014a, p.S88).

'Embracing' suggests diaspora institutions indicate 'state-led transnationalism' (Gamlen 2014a; Margheritis 2007) or 'long-distance nationalism' (Ember *et al.* 2005; Glick-Schiller 2005) because they extend domestic policies across state borders. Some scholars argue this reflects an ethnic bias and assumes homogeneity of foreign nationals (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004), while others claim that the pursuit of emigrants is 're-ethnicizing' citizenship (Joppke 2005, p.243). However, many argue that cross-border co-ethnic engagement can be 'grounded in contractual/civic considerations' (Brubaker and Kim 2011; Kalicki 2009, p.177) and business opportunities (Xavier 2011), though these relations are not always as harmonious as this implies. Some academics argue that diaspora institutions embrace the diaspora out of democratic ideals and thus extend rights to those who have been marginalized by previous hostile regimes (such as in The Gambia, see Zanker and Altrogge 2019) (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). Unlike 'tapping,' 'embracing' explains diaspora membership by acknowledging that states are not

territorially sealed but rather an 'imagined' space that may include individuals located worldwide. However, though it accounts for questions of modern geopolitical imagination and identity, it still fails to address global power interests that shape diaspora institutions and states' tendency to use comparable models (Gamlen 2014a).

'Diaspora governance' is informed by literature on governmentality and policy diffusion (Gamlen 2014a). Gamlen argues that diaspora institutions are emerging as a bottom-up effort to create a 'coherent but decentralized system of global migration governance' to eliminate a need for a 'central world migration organization' (2014, p.S192, S200). This perspective is informed by Foucault's theory of governmentality through its examination of how government policies gain traction not by force but through the consent of self-disciplined subjects (1991). Governmentality is useful when examining the state-diaspora relationship because governments ultimately 'lack reliable coercive powers beyond their legal jurisdictions, and therefore, the effectiveness of extra-territorial policies depends on the ability to make migrants self-identify as loyal, self-disciplining subjects' (Gamlen 2014a, p.S193). One exception is when governments use illegal force to make expatriates comply, such as the Eritrean state's coercive tactics to collect funds from the diaspora (Hirt 2015). This concept also relates to notions of transnational governmentality, which is especially relevant when nations do not necessarily have large diasporas and therefore attempt to 'build' one (Page and Mercer 2018; Collyer 2006).

Policy diffusion: transfer and mobility

The literature on policy transfer is grounded in sociology, political science, and international relations, and attempts to explain 'institutional isomorphism' (homogeneity of organizational structures) by tracing the life of policies from inception to the point they become internalized as a norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Checkel (1998, p.337) describes 'diffusion pathways,' which Dimaggio and Powell (1983, p.152) argue consist of 'coercive,' 'mimetic,' and 'emulative' processes that policy models move through. By contrast, literature on policy mobility situated within political and economic geography is critical of the rational-choice framework of policy transfer and how it assumes that ideas and models are fully developed by rational actors before proliferating (McCann and Ward 2013; Clarke 2012; Peck 2011). Scholars argue that policies are always in motion, continuously being transformed, and

that the effectiveness of policies does not depend on their previous success in other locations but on '*local* economic and institutional conditions' (Peck 2011; Peck and Theodore 2001, p.427). For example, Locke and Jacoby describe a case where Germany unsuccessfully embedded Western labor market policies into the post-unification East due to the absence of strong business organizations and associative networks (1997).

Literature examining links between policy diffusion and diaspora institutions is minimal and thus requires further research, particularly on the ways diaspora engagement policies are adopted by states and remodeled to match respective priorities. For example, states will engage consultants from states with more established diaspora institutions to help develop policies (India did this for Ethiopia) (Kuschminder and Siegel 2011; Kuschminder and Hercog 2011). Though policy diffusion research can provide insight into the conditions that facilitate the emergence of diaspora institutions and the reasons that certain models become normative, it does possess shortcomings such as 'de-emphasiz[ing] the role of ['agentic others'] in introducing policy ideas' (Gamlen 2014a, p.S196). In this case, 'agentic others' refers to NGOs, international organizations, consultants, and other experts.

The literature does not adequately address the ways organizations with Western stakeholders, such as the UN or IOM, contribute to diaspora engagement policies aimed at migration management and diaspora governance. It is no coincidence that the United Nations' effort to create a decentralized 'global governance regime for migration' to monitor international population movements ramped up following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Gamlen 2019, p.38l, 2014). This event prompted global decision-makers to devise a 'solution' to the perceived 'problem' of migration and the issues that arise from it, such as threats to national security (Faist 2002). Since the early 2000s, the UN, World Bank, and IOM have encouraged diaspora institutions globally, promoting the benefits of diaspora engagement and offering support to states that take part (as evidenced by the aforementioned exponential rise of UN Member States with diaspora institutions). Moreover, Gamlen observes that researchers focus on the states 'whose emigrants are a cause for concern in host-countries that are wealthy enough to fund research into the 'problem'' (2006, p.15). Future studies must dissect the ways global pressures affect prominent stakeholders and how this shapes diaspora engagement policy.

3. Methodology

3.1 Data collection and analysis

This dissertation is desk-based and is comprised of data and information primarily from government reports and websites, supplemented with information from financial institutions, academic literature, IGOs, migrant associations and news reports. The organizational and analytical approach is derived from Gamlen's framework for comparative diaspora engagement research; therefore, Ghana and India's diaspora engagement policies are divided into three types (2006, p.5-6, 7-8):

- Capacity buildings — policies aimed at *symbolic-nation building* through discursively constructing a cohesive transnational community characterized by a state-centric national identity, and *institution building* through developing corresponding state systems to 'govern' the diaspora;

- Extending rights — policies that extend social and civil benefits to the diaspora;

- Extracting obligations — policies directed at extracting economic and political benefits from the diaspora.

To begin, I conducted an initial search on government websites to determine all diaspora institutions (i.e., centers, bureaus, or offices that had any role in communicating with the diaspora). Next, wherever applicable, I located their individual websites and searched for evidence of diaspora programs and initiatives, as well as any policy documents or reports. In reports, it was fairly straightforward to locate information on diaspora initiatives. On the occasion the report had a significantly wider scope, I searched for key words, including 'diaspora,' 'emigrants,' and 'abroad,' which proved successful. After collating all policies into a document, I used coding and Gamlen's framework to inform which 'type' each policy fit into (2006). For example, for 'symbolic-nation building,' I looked for words such as 'celebrate,' 'roots,' 'heritage,' and 'youth'; for 'extracting obligations,' I looked for 'knowledge,' 'skills,' 'mobility,' 'bond,' 'FDI,' and 'remittance'.

Next, I analyzed the policies comparatively in relation to seven categories: (1) consular services and missions abroad, (2) identity and symbolic-nation building in the digital age, (3) dual

citizenship and membership concession, (4) civil and social services, (5) facilitating remittances, (6) encouraging investments, and (7) skill and knowledge transfer programs.

3.2 Comparison

The policies are analyzed comparatively for a number of reasons. First, the literature suggests that theoretical approaches to state-diaspora relations cannot advance without 'a body of comparative case-studies' on 'states using diaspora engagement policies' (Gamlen 2006, p.4, 2014). This paper will hopefully contribute to this advancement. One of the advantages of comparative policy analysis (CPA) is the analysis accounts for context and acknowledges that polices are not created in a vacuum but are shaped by economic, cultural, social, and environmental factors (Peters and Fontaine 2020). Further, as the world is a 'laboratory for policy change, where individual policies are tantamount to natural experiments,' comparative thinking enhances our understanding of the ways policy solutions and ideas diffuse across different countries and political systems, and the practical challenges of implementation based upon varying country contexts (Peters and Fontaine 2020, p.4).

This methodology had limitations, especially as both diaspora institutions are relatively new. I often encountered broken links on websites. Further, because of inconsistencies in public data, at times I found useful data for one country that was not available for the other. To fill these gaps I contacted directors of India and Ghana's diaspora institutions. Both replied but sent me to their websites and did not provide me with any further information.

4. Case study context: emigration histories and diaspora geographies of India and Ghana

4.1 India

The region that became present-day India has been a source of migrant labor for centuries, and its migration patterns have historically been shaped by British rule (Kuschminder and Hercog 2011). From the 1700s, laborers from the region were taken to British plantations located in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean (Khadria 2009) and recruited to work as indentured servants in South East Asia (Dickinson 2012). It is estimated that 30 million Indians migrated between the abolition of slavery in 1834 and Indian independence in 1947 (Kuschminder and Hercog 2011, p.8). Before independence, India's migration patterns were predominantly South-South, but afterward migration reoriented South-North, particularly to the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Europe and, in line with Migration Networks Theory (Boyd 1989), still maintains this trajectory (Dickinson 2012; Kuschminder and Hercog 2011; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010).

India has the world's largest diaspora, with an estimated 32 million members (~2.3% of its population of 1.37 billion) dispersed across 130 countries (MEA 2020a; UN 2019). It has remained the top migrant-sending country for the past twenty years with a net annual emigration of 478,000 (UNDESA 2019, p.23). Beginning in the 2000s, there was significant high-skilled emigration of doctors, information technology (IT) experts, and engineers in search of opportunities in Europe and North America (Chishti 2007). Today, the US and Europe remain the top destinations for high-skilled Indian migrants, while 90% of low-skilled, temporary migrant laborers reside in Gulf countries (see Figure 3) (Un 2019; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010, p.9). Though the Constitution of India prohibits dual citizenship for emigrants, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has devised three different statuses for diaspora members (2020a; Sahai 2013):

> (1) Non-resident Indian (NRI): a residential status given to Indian citizens living overseas;
> (2) Person of Indian Origin (PIO): an identification status given to individuals with Indian ancestry (parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents born in India) who hold foreign citizenship;

(3) Overseas Citizen of India (OCI): an immigration status granted to persons with foreign citizenship as an alternate to dual-citizenship.

Figure 3: Indian diaspora by destination, as of 2019

Indian Diaspora by Destination, 2019

Source: Data from United Nations 2019

India is the highest receiver of remittances, with the majority coming from the UAE, US, and Saudi Arabia (see Figure 4). From 2017 to 2018, India's remittances grew 14% to $78.6 billion, with 61% or $48 billion coming from the Gulf region (MEA 2020c, p.20; World Bank 2019b, p.22). Indians are the wealthiest immigrants in the US and founded 8% of US high-tech companies and one-third of Silicon Valley's tech start-ups (Chakravorty *et al.* 2016). This is mainly due to the global tech-boom of the 2000s, which allowed Indian tech-experts to migrate to the US on H1-B visas (Chakravorty *et al.* 2016; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). These migrants' success has broadened India's interest from solely diaspora remittances to recouping skills and human capital. Though once indifferent and occasionally hostile, India's attitude toward the diaspora has evolved into active engagement upon recognizing the potential of overseas Indian contributions (FICCI 2016).

Figure 4: Top 10 Origin Countries of Remittances to India

Country	$
United Arab Emirates	$13,823,000,000
United States	$11,715,000,000
Saudi Arabia	$11,239,000,000
Kuwait	$4,587,000,000
Qatar	$4,143,000,000
United Kingdom	$3,941,000,000
Oman	$3,250,000,000
Nepal	$3,016,000,000
Canada	$2,877,000,000
Australia	$1,944,000,000

Source: Pew Research Center 2019

4.2 Ghana

The region of present-day Ghana has a complex history of international migration that, similarly to India, has been characterized by British colonization. From the mid-1700s to the 1850s, many laborers emigrated to other parts of Africa for agricultural opportunities, but this changed during colonization when Ghana's demand for plantation farming and mining increased, causing positive net migration (Teye *et al.* 2015; Anarfi *et al.* 2000). In the 1970s, economic downturn and political instability caused massive groups of Ghanaians to migrate to other areas in West Africa, specifically Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire (Awumbila *et al.* 2014; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). Ghanaian emigration to Nigeria declined in the 1980s and migration to other regions, specifically Europe and North America, drastically increased (Teye *et al.* 2017; Quartey 2009). Though the bulk of emigrants remain in West Africa (71%), many Ghanaians continue to migrate to these locations today (Teye and Yaro 2017).

Data is scarce and often conflicting, but there are an estimated 1.5 to 3 million Ghanaians in the diaspora (approximately 5-10% of Ghana's population), dispersed across 67 countries (see Figure 5) with less than half settled in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development) countries and the majority residing in ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) (UN 2019; Hall 2018, p.13; Ministry of the Interior 2016; Awumbila *et al.* 2014; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Quartey 2009). Unlike India, Ghana does not have clearly defined categories for the diaspora, aside from non-resident Ghanaians (NRGs), which is ambiguously applied to 'all Ghanaians living abroad' (DAOOP 2020). However, in 2000 Ghana amended its constitution (est. 1992) to allow dual citizenship to 'recognize the diaspora for citizenship' (Teye *et al.* 2017, p.18; Ministry of the Interior 2016).

Figure 5: Ghanaian Diaspora by Destination, 2019

Source: Data from United Nations 2019

Ghana received $3.8 billion in remittances in 2018, which accounted for 7.3% of GDP (World Bank 2019b, p.23). A 2018 IOM report found 12% of Ghanaian households receive remittances from abroad, with return migrants more likely to receive international remittances than those who have never migrated (19% compared to 9% respectively) (Hall 2018, p.24). While just over half of remittances come from the EU (see Figure 6), the US and Nigeria were the top remitting countries to Ghana (see Figure 7) (Pew Research Center 2019; Hall 2018, p.24). This is a significant point of interest as Ghana's diaspora engagement strategies primarily target emigrants in the US, UK, and Europe, and rarely focus on the ECOWAS (Teye *et al.* 2017).

Figure 6: Origins of International Remittances as of 2018

Other 8%
Africa 14%
USA 27%
EU 51%

Figure 7: Top 10 Origin Countries of Remittances to Ghana

Country	$
United States	$610,000,000
Nigeria	$412,000,000
United Kingdom	$298,000,000
Italy	$151,000,000
Germany	$120,000,000
Togo	$83,000,000
Canada	$82,000,000
Burkina Faso	$73,000,000
Netherlands	$55,000,000
Spain	$53,000,000

Large-scale skilled emigration has left major gaps in Ghana's public sectors, particularly in health and education (Groenhout 2012; Owusu-Yeboah 2009; Chanda 2002). As of 2013, 13% of public hospitals were without a doctor, and as of 2016, 56% of doctors trained in Ghana were working abroad (Ministry of the Interior 2016 p.40; Ratha *et al.* 2011, p.132). A 2009 IOM study found that over 60% of faculty positions at polytechnics and 40% at public universities were lost

through emigration (Ministry of the Interior 2016, p.40; Quartey 2009). This has led to an interest in harnessing diaspora knowledge and skill transfer (such as medical expertise) in addition to financial resources (Alhassan 2010; Schmelz 2009). In 2017 Ghana's economy strengthened and caused an increase in both investment interest and remittances from the diaspora (Frimpong 2020). The same year, President Nana Akufo-Addo was elected on a campaign that promoted his agenda to achieve 'Ghana Beyond Aid,' which encouraged diaspora involvement for development (DAOOP 2018, p.4). This acted as a catalyst for Ghana's current diaspora engagement efforts.

5. Findings: diaspora institutions and policies

5.1 Diaspora institutions

India

In 2004, India established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) to 'proactively engage with Overseas Indians to meaningfully serve India' (MEA 2014, p.2). This was one of the first diaspora institutions to emerge as a full ministry and resulted in India becoming a global leader in diaspora engagement (Sahai 2013). However, is 2016 the director of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and MOIA concluded that the works of both ministries were overlapping (MEA 2017). To tackle duplication issues and unnecessary bureaucratic delays, the MOIA merged with the MEA and now operates as a 'consular service' of the MEA under the 'Overseas Indian Affairs' (OIA) department (MEA 2020a). This merge sparked public debate (see Duttagupta 2016 and Sathish 2016) and left Indian associations and NRIs worried it would result in decreased diaspora services and increased burden on short-staffed Indian Missions Abroad.

Though this merge was controversial and signifies a reversal back to the pre-MOIA diaspora engagement structure, many of the most successful policies have been implemented since 2016. This does not necessarily indicate whether 'full ministries' or 'departments' are more successful, but merely suggests that India's administrative capabilities and resources were not suited to a long-term full ministry (Gamlen 2014a, p.S182). In addition to OIA, there are various institutions that take part in India's diaspora engagement (see Table 1 below). It must be acknowledged that the 'Efforts/Activities' column contains claims made by the respective organization, rather than evaluated activities.

Table 1: Diaspora Institutions in India

Institution / Year Established	Type of Institution	Position within Government	Mission	Efforts/Activities
Overseas Indian Affairs (OIA) / 2016*	Diaspora engagement / protection of Indians abroad	Department in the Ministry of External	'Engage with Overseas Indians to	• Provides information, partnership, and facilitation for all matters related to the Indian diaspora

*Result of the MEA/MOIA merge in 2016	/ facilitate trade and investment	Affairs (MEA)	meaningfully serve India'	• Three service divisions: Diaspora Services, Emigration Services, and Financial Services. • Promotes trade and investment schemes for the diaspora
India Centre for Migration (ICM) / 2009	Protection of Indians abroad/ migration governance	Research think-tank situated within the MEA headed by the secretary of OIA	Inform migration policy-making regarding employment of overseas Indians	• Capacity building workshops on 'safe and legal migration' in collaboration with state governments • 2019 India-EU seminar on Talent Mobility focusing on the IT, automotive, and start-up industries vis-à-vis mobility of professionals, businesses and entrepreneurs along the India-EU corridor • 2019 seminar on 'Sharing of Good Practices on Migration Governance' • Empowers women migrant workers in the Gulf
India Development Foundation for Overseas Indians (IDF-OI) / 2008	Diaspora engagement	Non-profit trust under MEA	Engage the diaspora to supplement India's development efforts	• Connects overseas Indian philanthropists with development projects in India • Offers projects pertaining to sanitation, education, women's empowerment, and other areas of need
Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) / 2007	Diaspora engagement/ facilitate trade and investment	Partnership between the MEA and the Confederat-ion of Indian Industry (CII)	Serve as a 'single-point contact' to assist the diaspora in engaging with India economically, culturally, emotionally, and intellectually	• Promotes diaspora investments and provides all investment related information • Facilitates business partnerships between entrepreneurs in the diaspora and in India • Maintains a diaspora knowledge network • Works in conjunction with Indian states, Indian missions and Indian diaspora associations

Indian Missions Abroad (196 as of 2020)	Diaspora engagement/ protection of Indians abroad	Under Ministry of External Affairs	'Expand diplomatic presence, promote economic opportunities, and support Indian citizens'	• Visa and passport services • Birth, death, marriage registry • 'Provides assistance in case of any emergency, including medical emergencies' and repatriation, and various other services

Sources: MEA 2020a; MEA 2020b p.34; MEA 2014, p.2

Ghana

Ghana established the Diaspora Affairs, Office of the President (DAOOP) in 2017 to 'efficiently harness, mobilize, and steer Ghanaian resources in the Diaspora for political inclusion, economic and socio-cultural development' (DAOOP 2020). Prior to the DAOOP, minimal diaspora engagement occurred through the Diaspora Affairs Bureau (2014-2017) under Ghana's foreign ministry and the Diaspora Support Unit (2012-2014) (Ministry of Interior 2016). Before this, Ghana had no formal diaspora institution and implemented brief pilot initiatives to test the effectiveness of migration and development strategies instead of making long-term fiscal commitments to diaspora engagement (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). As a result, there is little research on Ghana's formal diaspora engagement efforts.

Ghana's decision to move the diaspora ministry to the office of the President was to '[emphasize] the importance the government places on the contributions Ghanaians in the Diaspora make to the economy,' signifying a shift in Ghana's mentality toward diaspora engagement efforts (DAOOP 2020, p.1). The DAOOP works mostly with its Missions abroad and the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (see Table 2).

Table 2: Diaspora Institutions in Ghana

Institution / Year Established	Type of Institution	Position within Government	Mission	Efforts/Activities
The Diaspora Affairs, Office of the President (DAOOP) / 2017	Diaspora engagement	Office of the President	Harness Ghanaian diaspora resources for 'political inclusion, economic and socio-cultural development'	• Lobbies for increased political participation of diaspora • Coordinates diaspora events at home and abroad

				• Releases the Ghana Diaspora Magazine
Ghana Missions Abroad (55 as of 2020)	Diaspora engagement/ protection of workers abroad	Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MoFA)	Provide services, information, and protection to Ghanaians abroad	• Facilitates diaspora passport, visa and dual citizenship services, repatriation, and welfare services • Administers diaspora surveys
Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) / 2013	Facilitate trade and investment	Government agency located in the Office of the President	'Be the official and most accurate information hub for investors in Ghana'	• Promotes and monitors investments • Creates policies to enhance the investment environment • Hosts workshops on investing in Ghana in conjunction with Bank of Africa (ex: 'Ghana, An Ideal Destination for Diaspora Investments (August 2020)

Sources: DAOOP 2020; Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) 2020; DAOOP 2018

5.2 Diaspora engagement policies

The following tables display policies aimed at (1) symbolic nation building, (2) institution building, (3) extending rights, and (4) extracting obligations, and will be the basis for the analysis that follows. Tables 3-6 display India's policies, and 7-10 display Ghana's policies.

India

Table 3: Symbolic-Nation Building

CAPACITY BUILDING			
Symbolic-Nation Building			
Policy / Year Established[1]	Goal	Description	Participation[2]
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)	Celebrate the diaspora's contribution to the development of India	• Celebrated on 9th of January • Biennial convention in India to discuss diaspora issues and award top-contributors • Theme-based PBD conferences in Indian cities and Regional PBD conferences (e.g. Singapore's RPBD event in 2018) are held in intervening periods	
Know India Programme (KIP)	Familiarize diaspora youth with their Indian roots	• A 25-day orientation program followed by a nearly fully funded 10-day visit to one or two Indian states • Six KIPs each year with 40 diaspora members per program • Includes presentations on the country's political processes and various developments, visits to rural villages, interaction with prestigious university faculty, and visits to various corporations and NGOs	As of 2020, there have been 59 KIPs with over 2300 PIO youths
Pravasi Bharatyia Kendra (PBK) / 2016	Commemorate the history of the diaspora its achievements	• Currently a government convention center but is expected to develop into a hub for economic, social and cultural engagement between India and the diaspora • Hosts workshops and conferences with the diaspora to discuss pertinent issues	

[1, 2] If applicable/known (for all tables)

Bharat Ko Janiye Online Quiz (BKJ)	Motivate diaspora youth to learn about India	• A quiz on Indian art, democracy, economy, geography, and cinema is administered by missions abroad and the MEA in New Delhi • Top 10 finalists are invited to participate in a 15 day tour of India	There have been two BKJs: 2015-16 and 2018-19

Sources: MEA 2020b; MEA 2019a

Table 4: Institution Building

CAPACITY BUILDING		
Institution Building		
Policy	Goal	Description
Taskforce on International Migration and Diaspora / 2016	Facilitate international mobility of people, skills, and talent	• Partners with governments, IGOs, international organizations, and think tanks to build strong coalitions, exchange knowledge, and develop capacities for demand driven international mobility of skills • Promotes circular migration and return migration
MEA Performance Dashboard / 2019	Monitor MEA initiatives	• Online display of data regarding passports, visas, and OCI cards • Monitors all major schemes concerning diaspora engagement, development, and trade and commerce with the goal of making MEA more user-friendly and accountable
eMigrate / 2015	Prevent the exploitation of low and semi-skilled workers by recruitment agents (RA)	• Online application portal for all emigrants to the Gulf that ensures all stakeholders in the emigration process are on one electronic platform • Maintains digital versions of all documents for migrants to access • Provides the credentials of over 800,000 employers • Allows migrants to file a redressal of grievances against an employer or RA

Sources: MEA 2020b; MEA 2019a

Table 5: Extending Rights

EXTENDING RIGHTS			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
National Pension Scheme (NPS) for NRIs / 2019	Provides retirement security to NRIs	• Annual contribution to investment portfolio to build savings • At age 60, NRI can withdraw 60% of savings with the remaining 40% paid out in monthly pension payments • PIOs/OCIs not eligible	

Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) Scheme / 2005	Provides rights to all PIOs who are not residents in India	• Granted a multiple entry life-long visa to enter India for any purpose and exemption from registration with Foreign Regional Registration Officer • Entitled to general 'parity with Non-Resident Indians in respect of all facilities available to them in economic, financial and educational fields except in matters relating to the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties' • Not dual citizenship and does not confer political rights	As of 2020, over 3.4 million OCI cards have been issued
Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) / 2009	Assists Overseas Indian nationals in times of emergency	• 'On site' provision includes emergency medical assistance, air passage to stranded Indians, legal assistance, boarding and lodging, legal and financial assistance to Indian women facing marital issues and transfer of mortal remains to India.	145,000 beneficiaries as of 2020
Pre-Departure Orientation (PDO) Programmes / 2018	Protect Indian workers abroad	• Supports overseas Indian nationals throughout all stages of the migration process including pre-departure, in countries of destination, and return.	Over 79,500 participants as of 2020
Pravasi Bhartiya Bima Yojana (PBBY)	Protect Indian workers abroad	• Provides Indian workers going to Emigration Check Required (ECR) countries with insurance coverage of 10 Lakhs ($14,000) • Covers accidental death or permanent disability • Revamped in 2017 to be more accessible and more focused on expeditious settlement of claims	Over 368,000 PBBY policies were issued in 2019
Scholarship Programme for Diaspora children (SPDC) / 2006	Make higher education accessible to diaspora youth	• Awards children of PIOs and NRIs up to $4000 per annum towards education fees • Available in 69 countries	2,100 scholarships awarded as of 2020 (150 per year)

Sources: MEA 2020a; MEA 2019a; MEA 2019b; MOIA 2012

Table 6: Extracting Obligations

EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
Global Alliance on Talent, Entrepreneur	Knowledge and skill transfer	• A platform that allows for the mobility of talent, the portability of skills and entrepreneurial collaboration between India and the diaspora	

-ship and Skills (GA-TES)			
Tax Incentives for NRIs and OCIs	Tax breaks and exemptions for NRIs and PIOs	• Foreign income is not taxed • Tax-free interest on NRE (foreign-earnings) and FCNR (foreign-currency fixed deposit) accounts • Can claim 30% tax deduction, deduct property taxes and deduct interest if property owner has a loan • Can claim tax-exemption on income from capital gains if NRI/OCI invests in house property or invests in capital gains bonds • Tax-exemption on specific investments if income is acquired in foreign currency and if profits are reinvested back into qualifying Indian institutions	
FDI Capture Schemes	Gain diaspora funds for economic development	• FDI policies give special rights to NRIs such as full ownership of particular firms, and no minimums • As of 2015: - Investments by NRIs made on a non-repatriation basis are treated the same as investments made by Indian residents -The government changed the definition of NRIs to include OCIs in regards to FDI • Two FDI capture schemes are *Invest in India* and *Make in India*	As of 2015, NRI investments made up approx.05% of FDI
Deposit Schemes	Build foreign exchange reserves	• Accounts for NRIs and PIOs in which currency can be foreign or domestic. The three types of accounts are: Non-Resident Ordinary Rupee (NRO), Non-Resident External Rupee Account (NRERA), and Foreign Currency Non-Resident Banks (FCNRB)	NRI deposits grew from $14 billion (1991) to $115 billion (2015)
Diaspora Bonds	Raise financing for balance of payments when India has difficulty accessing international capital markets	• A debt instrument used to raise money from the diaspora by providing opportunities for financial returns, risk-management, portfolio diversification, and the satisfaction of contributing to India's economic development through fixed-rate bonds • India's diaspora bonds: *India Development Bond*s (1991), *Resurgent India Bond* (1998), and *India Millennium Deposits* (2000)	As of 2010, India had raised over $11.3 billion from diaspora bonds

		2 remittance transfer schemes:	
Remittance Capture	To make the transfer of remittances to India easier and more cost-efficient	• *Rupee Drawing Arrangement* (RDA) is a method of sending remittances through Reserve Bank of India (RBI) authorized banks. Allows for donations, trade transactions and charity funds. No cash transfers are allowed and there is no limit to the amount of private transfers • *Money Transfer Service Scheme* (MTSS) is similar to RDA except it can only be used to send personal remittances to relatives and friends and involves Remittance Service Providers (RSPs) who employ sub-agents. There is also a limit of $2,500 and maximum of 30 remittance transfers per year. Allows cash transfers	

Sources: MEA 2020a; Naujoks 2018, p. 96; Reserve Bank of India 2018; Ketkar and Ratha 2010, p. 252, 2007

Ghana

Table 7: Symbolic-Nation Building

CAPACITY BUILDING			
Symbolic-Nation Building			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
2019 'Year of Return'	'Build stronger bonds between Ghana and African people in the Diaspora'	• Yearlong government marketing initiative to mark 400 years since the arrival of enslaved Africans to the US • Intended to be a 'spiritual and birth-right journey inviting the Global African family' to visit Ghana with the goal of investment and business	
LSE Africa Summits	Inspire diaspora youth to contribute to development	• The president of Ghana visits the Ghanaian Society of the London School of Economics (LSE) to give presentations on the ways diaspora youth can contribute to development	
The Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit / 2001	To harness and mobilize knowledge and skills of the diaspora	• Biannual conference • Encourages the diaspora to access development and investment opportunities in Ghana	About 2,000 delegates attend each summit

| Youth Diaspora Forum / 2018 | To support diaspora looking to contribute to development | • Provides space for dialogue between diaspora youth and Ghanaian youth in Ghana to promote collaboration on development in Ghana | |

Sources: Year of Return 2020; DAOOP 2020; DAOOP 2018

Table 8: Institution Building

CAPACITY BUILDING			
Institution Building			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
National Entrepreneurship and Innovation Plan (NEIP)	'Offer young entrepreneurs the chance to pitch their business ideas'	• Provides funding and consulting support to diaspora youth ages 20-35 who wish to do business in Ghana	
Diaspora Business Conference	Provide a networking opportunity for the Ghanaian diaspora	• Aimed at renewing the diaspora's commitment to support Ghana with resources and knowledge transfer • Encourages Ghanaians living abroad to return home and invest in government initiatives • Facilitates diaspora business interest in Ghana	
Data Compilation	Harness talent, skills, and knowledge from the diaspora	• An ongoing data collection in which the DAOOP is 'compiling a database of talented Ghanaians [abroad], from which government can source for professionals and experts, required to fill specific and key sectors of the economy'	As of 2018, the government has recruited over 50 Ghanaians in the diaspora

Sources: NEIP 2020; DAOOP 2018, p.41, 67, 69

Table 9: Extending Rights

EXTENDING RIGHTS			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
The Diaspora Pension Scheme / 2017	'Provide [Ghana] with huge capital for investment while serving as retirement savings	• Open to members of the diaspora in any country • Savings translate to compounded capital and investment that can be accessed from age 55	

	for the [diaspora] when they return home'	• Tax-free	
Citizenship Act (Dual Citizenship) / 2000	Grant Ghanaians abroad citizenship in Ghana	• Allows for dual citizenship that permits entry without visa, indefinite stay, and voting rights while in Ghana • Dual citizens may not hold certain public office positions and may not vote abroad	In 2019, 1700 Ghanaians were granted dual citizenship
Right of Abode / 2000	Provide rights to 'Ghanaians who have lost their citizenship because they have acquired another nationality'	• Grants 'right to abode' to any 'person of African descent in the diaspora,' which allows indefinite leave to remain, visa free entry, and right to work	

Sources: Ghana Immigration Service 2020; Ministry of the Interior 2019, p.24; DAOOP 2018, p.28; National Pensions Regulatory Authority 2018; Ghana Immigration Service 2000, p.8

Table 10: Extracting Obligations

EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS			
Policy	Goal	Description	Participation
Remittance Capture	Facilitate the transfer of remittances from Ghanaians abroad to Ghana	• 3 formal remittance transfer methods that are somewhat regulated by Bank of Ghana: - *Money Transfer Companies* (MTCs) are private companies that require identification for both sender and receiver (and sometimes pay slips and bank statements), have a withdrawal limit, and sender bears all costs (MCT to bank transfer) - *Inter-bank* (wire transfer) is mostly used by businesses and requires both parties to have a bank account and ID. There are often high costs for transfers (bank to bank transfer) - *Telecommunication Companies (Mobile Money)* offer remittance transfer via phone number through *Web to Mobile* or *Cash to Mobile* channels, no bank account needed for either party, has withdrawal limit, and sender bears all costs	41% of international remittances were received through formal channels in 2014
Ghana Physicians & Surgeons	Medical knowledge	• Aimed at reversing brain drain through knowledge transfer between Ghanaians in the USA and Ghana	As of 2018, GPSF has had 16

Foundation (GPSF) / 2002	and skill transfer	• Promotes diaspora medical volunteering in Ghana • Annual conferences	annual conferences
FDI Capture Schemes	Raise funding to achieve development goals	• African Sankofa Investment Account (2020) for Ghanaians living abroad • Aimed at 'institutional and retail investors' • Goal is to 'encourage the diaspora to see themselves as Ghanaians when conducting business in Ghana or buying a land'	The Ministry of Finance estimates the Sankofa account will raise $3 billion
Diaspora Accounts and Deposit Schemes	Provides diaspora the opportunity to operate a Ghanaian bank account with access to various financial services	• Diaspora-specific, fixed-rate investment and savings accounts such as the GN Bank Diaspora Account and the Non-Resident Ghanaian (NRG) Account, which accrue interest and provide access to loans • Deposit Protection Scheme (2019): a financial insurance scheme that protects small depositors in the cause of an insured event, such as the failure of a bank	In a 2018 study of 452 Ghanaian diaspora members, 43% held savings/deposit accounts in Ghana

Sources: United Bank for Africa 2020; Dawson-Ahmoah 2020b; Commonwealth 2018, p.4; DAOOP 2018; Teye *et al.* 2017b; Teye 2016; Ahinful *et al.* 2014

5.3 Comparative analysis and policy effectiveness

Determining the impacts of policies on development is a challenge primarily due to lack of monitoring and evaluation processes (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Bakewell 2003). Evaluating the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies is more difficult as many diaspora institutions and policies are recently established and have not been thoroughly evaluated, especially in Ghana and India. Nonetheless, it is possible to use the available data to garner insight into the different ways countries 'govern' the diaspora, the varying mentalities and priorities regarding diaspora engagement, and the ways that diaspora institutions adapt to reflect these priorities.

5.3.1 Capacity building

<u>Consular services and missions abroad</u>

Both Ghana and India have established consular services and missions abroad to facilitate passport, visa, and membership services — Ghana has 55 missions abroad while India has 196 (see Tables 4 and 8) (DAOOP 2020; MEA 2020a). Of the two states, India has focused more on modernizing their systems and improving the efficiency of their passport and visa processes. For

example, the 'legally prescribed timeframe' to obtain an Indian passport is 3 days, whereas in Ghana it takes around 15 days (though both are frequently delayed in practice — see Perotti *et al.* 2018) (World Bank 2019a, p.82).

India's digitization efforts are also seen in its Digital India initiative, which aims to implement 'e-governance and automation' systems in the MEA and Missions abroad, such as the eMigrate portal that protects emigrant workers in the Gulf and provides easily accessible digital versions of all documentation (MEA 2020a, p.31; MEA 2020b). Further, India created the MEA Performance Monitoring Dashboard in 2019 to demonstrate its commitment to becoming more 'user-friendly, accountable, and transparent' (MEA 2019a, p.11). The online dashboard depicts data on passports and services like visas/OCI cards and aims to monitor all initiatives of the MEA, including diaspora engagement programs.

Though there is discussion in Ghana regarding digitization and improvement of consular services, there are few tangible programs aside from the 'E-Transform Ghana' collaboration between the World Bank and Ghanaian government (Ministry of Communications 2020). In part, E-Transform Ghana aims to 'scale-up e-services and applications,' though it is currently only planned for nationwide implementation (Ministry of Communications 2020). However, unlike India, Ghana actively discusses its efforts to use consultative bodies to compile data on 'talented Ghanaians abroad,' which would allow them to regularly contact people and say 'the nation needs you' (MEA 2018, p.41).

Institution building strategies such as missions abroad aim to 'furnish the state with technologies…to govern diaspora populations,' which includes 'selecting actors whom it would be profitable to deal with and forming long-term relationships with these actors' (Gamlen 2006, p.8; González Gutiérrez 1993). Ghana's diaspora monitoring and data compilation efforts directly reflect this strategy and although this gives way to possible tensions, such as beliefs that the MEA is alienating local talent by recruiting externally or that expatriates are being given 'too much influence,' it is proving to be a successful method of strategically mitigating brain drain (Gamlen 2006, p.8). As of 2018, Ghana had already appointed over fifty diaspora members to areas of government (MEA 2018, p.69). However, this project is relatively new thus future evaluation will be necessary to assess any effect on development.

With increasing digitization and the global 'adoption of biometric passports requiring fingerprints and iris scans,' research demonstrates that LMICs are poorly equipped to provide the necessary consular services (World Bank 2019a, p.82). With future-focused policy and practical capacity building, India is adapting to the demands of its emigrants and diaspora in the digital age. In order for Ghana to improve its consular services, it must move away from outdated traditional processes to embrace digitization (Perotti *et al.* 2018).

Identity and symbolic-nation building in the digital age

Symbolic-nation building policies discursively aim to 'increase emigrants' sense of belonging to a transnational community' and 'boost the profile of the state within this community' (Gamlen 2006, p.6). Both India and Ghana strategically build their diasporas through reinforcing a shared national identity and enhancing the diaspora's perceptions of the country (see tables 3 and 7). One method of inspiring allegiance to the home-state is through programs that motivate the diaspora (youth in particular) to learn about their 'roots' (Gamlen 2006). India has a variety of programs and policies to achieve this, including the Know India Programme (KIP) for youth and the Bharat Ko Janiye (BKJ) online quiz on Indian culture and government (MEA 2020a). Ghana does not have programs targeted at cultural education but is committed to engaging youth for development — in seemingly less subtle ways than India. In 2018, the President appointed Jake Obeng-Bediako as Ghana's first Youth Ambassador for Diaspora Affairs to encourage young members of the diaspora 'to access and act on their birthrights and responsibilities as the current and future leaders of the nation' (DAOOP 2018, p.54). Obeng-Bediako is a highly educated, New York-born, London-based Afropolitan with strong familial and emotional ties to West Africa. The DAOOP also demonstrates its dedication to building the diaspora and encouraging commitment to development through its LSE Africa Summits, the Annual Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit, and the Youth Diaspora Forum.

Another method of symbolic-nation building is efforts to '(re)include the diaspora within the national population' through 'high-level rhetoric celebrating emigrants as national heroes' (Gamlen 2006, p.6). India exhibits this through its Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) annual holiday and convention that commends the diaspora's contributions to India's development. It also established the Pravasi Bhartiya Kendra (PBK) convention center in 2016 to commemorate the

history of the Indian diaspora and praise its achievements. In Ghana, the 'Year of Return, 2019 Ghana' campaign commemorated the African diaspora's resilience and encouraged African diaspora members to visit Ghana as a 'spiritual and birth-right journey' (Year of Return 2020). Similarly, the Ghanaian government employs rhetoric that celebrates its diaspora, but some of its claims verge on what Gamlen calls 'paternalistic (or maternalistic),' asserting that 'expatriates are an offshore part of the national population' (2006, p.6). Ghana's president Akufo-Addo has been praised as 'the first President to bring a lot of diasporans on board,' which is evidenced in his appeals to morality (DAOOP 2018, p.35). At a 'Year of Return, Ghana 2019' event, he stated, 'Let us all remember that the destiny of *all black people no matter where they are in the world* [emphasis added] is bound up with Africa. *We* [emphasis] must help make Africa the place for investment, progress and prosperity...' (Dawson-Ahmoah 2020a).

The common denominator of all of these policies is the attempt to generate a 'communal mentality' amongst the diaspora and instill 'a sense of common belonging to the home-state' that allows non-residents to be governed (Gamlen 2006, p.7). Ghana and India's rhetoric of belonging is thus a crucial foundation for its policies aimed at extracting resources. There is abundant research on discursive identity production via government policies (Adamson 2018, 2016; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Ragazzi 2006; Gonzalez Gutierrez 1999; Foucault 1982); but a new form of symbolic-nation building has recently developed as social media platforms grow and inundate the lives of people globally.

Diaspora institutions are quickly remodeling their strategies to harness the power of social media to build a national digital identity through what I will call 'diaspora branding power'. Both India and Ghana are recognizing social media's ability to influence the diaspora, and are therefore prioritizing efforts to brand themselves to establish an online following. This is particularly relevant to younger members, as research shows younger generations are the main users of social media—for example, 90% of Instagram users are under the age of 35, and 45% of US teens said they are online 'almost constantly' (Pew Research Center 2018; LSE 2017).

India's MEA has been a pioneer in digital identity building and outreach via social media. Their initiatives have successfully engaged the online community with @MEAIndia being the third most-followed account of any foreign ministry (MEA 2020b, p.333). Over 170 Indian

Missions/Posts engage with Indians abroad through Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, and the MEA currently has over 6.2m followers across their three Twitter platforms (MEA 2020b, p.333). In the last year, MEA's Instagram following increased by 158% to 400k, and their LinkedIn following increased by 620% to 12k (MEA 2020b, p.333). Through these accounts, the MEA promotes various Indian holidays and diaspora celebrations. At a 2016 conference, Indian policymakers and government leaders encouraged partnering with foreign universities by using social media platforms and 'e-buddy projects' to create and market 'Brand India' (FICCI 2016, p.27). India's 'digitally forward' ministry not only allows for quicker and more direct dissemination of information but is also a modern method of symbolic-nation building by creating an online community based on promoted shared collectivities.

Ghana is also developing itself as a brand to 'promote Ghana as a…hub for the African renaissance' and 'craft a new narrative on Ghana [to] strategically promote to the world' (VisitGhana 2020). It is no coincidence that Youth Ambassador Jake Obeng-Bediako is a successful lifestyle blogger with a significant online following that largely includes millennials. In line with the government's vision, he has expressed his commitment to 'transforming the global narrative of Ghana' through his platform (DAOOP). This appointment indicates the emergence of a new type of symbolic nation-building strategy — one that harnesses the power of a curated social media presence and online influence. A 2018 DAOOP report addressed the use of technology for bridging the gap between Ghana and the diaspora stating, 'Ghanaian[s]…must use social media…to increase connectivity across borders' (DAOOP 2018, p.46). The government has not yet established a strong online presence (@ghanaMFA and @diasporaaffairs.ghana have a combined Instagram following of less than 7k) but has plans to use social media platforms to build diaspora and consular networks (African Union 2019). Ghana also partners with social media influencers to market to diaspora youth through sharing content showcasing Ghana's beauty and history, and events such as 'Afrochella' music festival (DAOOP 2020).

Further, for the 'Year of Return, 2019' the government heavily promoted the hashtags #YearOfReturn and #Ghana2019 to encourage the African diaspora to visit Ghana, with the wider aim of boosting Ghana's image as a travel destination and inspiring investment (Year Of Return 2020). According to news reports, a Ghanaian Minister stated the campaign brought in an

extra 200,000 international visitors and $1.9 billion in tourist spending (see BBC News 2020; Kiunguyu 2020; Simmons 2019). These figures were contested (e.g., Simmons 2019), and with no published fiscal information the actual level of the campaign's economic benefit remains uncertain, but it was undoubtedly a public relations success and enhanced Ghana's image online and in the international press (see Davis and Williams 2020; Kiunguyu 2020). As a follow-up, Ghana is currently promoting 'Beyond the Return' — a campaign built on pillars including, 'Invest in Ghana,' 'Diaspora Pathways to Ghana,' and 'Brand Ghana' (BeyondTheReturn 2020; Dawson-Ahmoah, 2020b).

Symbolic-nation building through social media and diaspora branding, and the relationship between digital identity and diaspora engagement requires future research. A particular area of interest will be the effect of heavy social media consumption on young diaspora members as they grow into adults and gain the ability to contribute political support and resources on a larger scale. As research progresses on the power of social media to influence individuals' identity and actions, studies could assess correlations between social media consumption/exposure and perceptions of the home-state, and links between social media consumption/exposure and likelihood of visitation, return, or investment. Consequently, frameworks for analyzing diaspora engagement strategies and diaspora governance (such as Gamlen's) will need to be updated.

5.3.2 Extending rights

<u>Dual citizenship and membership concession</u>

Leveraging shared identity without providing benefits is ineffective if states hope to extract diaspora resources. A pivotal element to diaspora engagement and governance is extending a 'membership' to the diaspora that can be 'thinner' or 'thicker' depending on the level of statuses and rights granted (Smith 2003, p.303). Both India and Ghana have forms of membership that confer varying degrees of rights (see Tables 5 and 9). Due to persistent demands from the diaspora, India established Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) in 2005, which grants PIOs a life-long visa and entitles them to general 'parity with Non-Resident Indians in economic, financial and educational fields' (MEA 2020a). Though this affords PIOs various civil and social rights, it is not dual citizenship and neither confers political rights nor allows for ownership of

agricultural land or plantation property. In contrast, Ghana's Citizenship Act (2000) allows Ghanaians abroad to apply for dual citizenship, which permits entry without a visa, indefinite leave to remain, ownership of land, and voting rights in Ghana (Ghana Immigration Service 2020). Though dual citizens 'cannot hold certain public offices in Ghana' (usually high-level positions such as director and high commissioner), many hold other positions in government ministries (Ghana High Commission UK 2020). Ghana also offers the 'Right of Abode' for 'any person of African descent in the diaspora' who may have lost Ghanaian citizenship upon acquiring another citizenship that does not allow dual nationality (Ministry of the Interior 2019, p.24). This allows indefinite leave to remain, visa-free entry, the right to work, and other civil and social rights.

Lee (2004) refers to the extension of rights as the 'transnationalization of citizenship,' but Itzigsohn (2000) and Goldring (1998) point out differences in memberships offered by states. In Ghana's case, the rationale behind offering dual citizenship with voting rights is that 'upgraded membership status will flatter or appease expatriates, producing goodwill relationships that help to protect steady flows of remittances and investment' (Gamlen 2006, p.10; Itzigsohn 2000). According to Bauböck (2003) and Gamlen (2006, p.11), political incorporation is a rarity and states 'economize' by conferring 'no more political rights to emigrants than they feel is necessary to achieve the desired result'. In such cases, states provide 'status upgrades' but avoid reconfiguring legal boundaries of citizenship by granting emigrants 'long-term visas or identity cards with attached privileges' (Gamlen 2006, p.11). This is a possible explanation for India's willingness to grant OCI status but refusal to extend dual citizenship to diaspora members. However, as Gamlen (2006, p.11) and Smith (2003) observe, emigrants may see each concession as the 'thin end of a wedge' that will, over time, 'open up a route to full extra-territorial membership'. This is already seen in the Indian diaspora's increasing demands for dual citizenship, which has recently been covered extensively in Indian news (see Indian Eagle 2019; Kainth 2019; Vij 2019).

Though India's OCI policy is a step forward for diaspora members, its limitations mean POIs must either give up their Indian citizenship or forego foreign citizenship, which could hamper business opportunities and economic growth for India. While the Indian government insists that absence of political rights does not affect the diaspora's loyalty to the nation's development (see

Bose 2019 and Kainth 2019), many NRIs and Members of Parliament beg to differ. In 2018, an MP cautioned the loss of diaspora contributions from successful tech-entrepreneurs, arguing '…the law effectively cuts them off their roots and makes them feel like they do not have a real stake in their country of origin' (Tharoor 2019, p.1). Moreover, a 2004 survey found that 85% of NRIs want parliamentary representation (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Van Hear *et al.* 2004, p.15). By contrast, the Ghanaian government heavily promotes dual citizenship as an avenue for expressing 'equal alliance to both countries of origin,' and it is estimated that 2.9% of the population have dual citizenship (High Commission UK 2019).

Civil and social services

In order for a state to establish itself as a legitimate sovereign, it must protect its citizens and guarantee their civil rights (Lee 2004). States thus see the extension of such protections and rights to the diaspora as necessary for 'playing the role of legitimate transnational sovereign' (Gamlen 2006, p.12). Both India and Ghana's missions abroad provide welfare services such as medical emergency assistance, repatriation, and birth, death, and marriage registry (see Tables 1, 2, 5, and 9) (MEA 2020a; DAOOP 2020). However, unlike Ghana, India has created a welfare service specifically for their diaspora that 'assists Overseas Indian nationals in times of distress and emergency' (MEA 2020a). The Indian Community Welfare Fund has provided lodging, air passage, financial, and legal assistance in the case of 'emergency evacuation of Indian nationals from conflict zones, countries affected by natural disasters and other challenging situations' (MEA 2020a). As of 2020, the ICWF has assisted over 145,000 Indians abroad (MEA 2020b).

In addition to welfare services, policies that help prevent the exploitation of low- and semi-skilled overseas workers are beneficial to both the home-states and emigrants (Agunias and Ruiz 2007). In India's case, over 90% of temporary low-skilled emigrant workers are in the Gulf and are particularly susceptible to exploitation by recruitment agents (RAs) (MEA 2020b; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010, p.9). To combat this, the eMigrate portal monitors all stakeholders in the emigration process, provides the credentials for over 800,000 employers, and allows migrants to quickly file a redressal of grievances against an employer or RA (MEA 2020b; MEA 2019a). India's Pre-Departure Orientation Programme (PDO) established in 2018 also supports emigrants

throughout the migration process, including pre-departure, in countries of destination, and return, and has supported over 79,500 migrants (MEA 2020a, p.310).

In Ghana, there are comprehensive written frameworks regarding migrant protection and issues of unlicensed RAs exploiting Ghanaian workers; however, a consistent lack of funding prevents implementation (United States Department of State 2017; IOM 2016). In 2016, a government-IOM joint statement addressed issues of overseas worker exploitation and reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of emigrants. The statement acknowledged Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) data indicating 350 of 2,000 Ghanaian women (17.5%) who worked in the Middle East from 2014 to 2015 reported exploitation and abuse (IOM 2016, p.1). Among many commitments, the government pledged to 'improve access and availability of training and pre-departure orientation opportunities' (IOM 2016, p.2). That same year, Ghana established its first comprehensive 'development sensitive' National Migration Policy (NMP) framework (2016, p.12). The NMP includes many strategies to 'maximize the potential contribution of the diaspora' including 'develop[ing] guidelines on…protections afforded to diaspora by the State' and outlining the involvement of stakeholders (Ministry of the Interior 2016, p.72). However, though Ghana has this framework, it has yet to evolve into substantive measures that protect emigrants, aside from a few bilateral agreements to send workers abroad, such as the Italy-Ghana agreement that facilitates job matching and placement for Ghanaian emigrants (Awumbila *et al.* 2014). Gamlen argues the extension of social services to emigrants is 'one of the least developed areas of diaspora engagement policymaking' (2006, p.12). This remains true in part, but Ghana's creation of the NMP demonstrates that the ideas exist, but the resources to transform ideas into practice are lacking. The fact that India can turn migrant protection plans into action could be a result of the differences in India and Ghana's economies. Although they have a similar GDP per capita, India's population, and therefore GDP, is more than 40 times the size of Ghana's (World Bank 2020c). This means India has more funding and labor for government initiatives at its disposal (World Bank 2020c).

The last key area of extending rights is the provision of pension schemes to non-residents, which Gamlen argued has been 'largely overlooked' and is thus not included in his research (2006, p.12). I argue that the provision of diaspora pensions occupies a grey area between 'extending rights' and 'extracting obligations,' and is thus perhaps the epitome of an attempted 'win-win'

migration scenario as both emigrants and the home-state are intended to benefit (Agunias 2006). Ghana launched 'The Diaspora Pension Scheme' in 2017 to 'provide the country with huge capital for investment while serving as retirement savings for the members when they return home' (DAOOP 2018, p.28). Similarly, India established their 'National Pension Scheme for NRIs' in 2018, which provides 'easily accessible…tax-efficient…portable retirement savings accounts' through investment and contribution (MEA 2019b, p.1). Though policies aim to provide financial security for non-residents and raise capital through investments, this is another case where Ghana is more direct in its motivations to extend rights for economic gain.

5.3.3 Extracting obligations

<u>Facilitating remittances</u>

In line with 'new economics of labour migration theory,' diaspora engagement policy discussions usually focus on the home-state's extraction of resources (Gamlen 2006; de Hass 2010; Stark and Bloom 1985). This holds true in Ghana and India, whereby the diaspora engagement discourse views the diaspora through a neoliberal, functionalist lens that responsibilizes migrants with economic improvement, particularly via remittances.

Remittances are a significant contributor to Ghana and India's economies comprising 5.3% ($3.8 billion) and 2.9% ($78.6 billion) of GDP respectively in 2018 (World Bank 2020; 2019, p.22, 23). In Ghana, there are two remittance transfer channels via regulated financial institutions: money transfer companies (MTCs) and inter-bank wire transfers through financial institutions (see Table 10) (Teye *et al.* 2017b). MTCs are more popular as they do not require the recipient to have a bank account; however, they require valid identification cards for both parties and occasionally payslips, making this channel challenging for irregular migrants (Teye *et al.* 2017b). More recently, telecommunications companies started offering remittance transfers via 'Mobile Money,' which although being fast and accessible is used less as money is lost if it is accidentally sent to the wrong phone number (Teye *et al.* 2017b). India also has two remittance transfer schemes: Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) and Money Transfer Service Scheme (MTSS) (see Table 6). RDA is a non-cash method limited to Reserve Bank of India (RBI) authorized banks and is the most-used channel, accounting for 75.2% of remittances (Reserve

Bank of India 2018, p.48). MTSS is mostly used for cash-transfers (over 90% of MTSS transfers are cash) and is less popular than RDA due to withdrawal limits and risk of unaccounted transfers through sub-agents (Reserve Bank of India 2018).

Neither India nor Ghana's official remittance channels allow for outward remittances. While this appears to be a strategy for securing capital inflow, it may ultimately be a barrier to leveraging remittances for development. Restrictions on outward remittances impede low- and semi-skilled migrant workers from making withdrawals for personal reasons or emergencies (RBI 2018; Quartey 2005). For example, such 'reverse remittances' occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and were essential to migrant workers who were left temporarily unemployed (Goodman 2020). Removing such restrictions may allow senders to overcome short-term hardship and remain abroad to continue long-term remitting.

Ghanaian and Indian financial institutions face many challenges with remittance transfers, including money laundering, fraud, lack of identification documents, incorrect remittance forms, and high costs (Afram 2018). To combat some of these issues, the Bank of Ghana (BOG) recently developed the Financial Intelligence Centre and created a financial regulatory framework for MTCs and remittance services, which imposes withdrawal limits on all regulated transfer channels and requires investigations on transfers exceeding $8,500 (Teye *et al.* 2017b, p.23). Though this helps prevent fraud and money laundering, it has discouraged diaspora members from sending large sums for investment or business. In terms of making transfers more cost-efficient, BOG does not monitor or regulate costs imposed by MTCs but instead appeals to 'moral persuasion' (Teye *et al.* 2017b, p.25). In India, the RBI is responsible for overseeing remittances and ensuring that most RDA and MTSS transfers adhere to RBI remittance guidelines. However, it is difficult to protect and track MTSS cash remittances as RBI does not currently enforce strict governance and compliance across the many sub-agents involved in non-bank MTSS (Afram 2018).

Though the average costs to send remittances through formal channels have declined in both countries, costs still remain high causing many migrants to opt for cash transfers (see Figure 8). Cash remittances are less likely to be saved and invested than remittances to bank accounts and thus rarely impact development long-term (Teye *et al.* 2017b; Karpestam 2012; Ratha 2007).

Studies demonstrate that remittances for immediate household consumption can even have adverse macro-economic effects, causing inflation and increasing poverty rather than reducing it (Vadean *et al.* 2019; Gamlen 2006). Research suggests over half of Ghana's remittances are sent through informal channels, such as cash via personal letters and electronic transfer services — a reality at odds with the government's efforts to direct remittances into investment and business (Commonwealth 2018; Quartey 2011, 2009). While BOG generally encourages financial literacy, it has yet to implement practical educational initiatives to discourage cash remittances and promote saving and investment. As India's remittances are primarily sent through non-cash RDA, they are more likely to have 'multiplier effects' on the broader economy and benefit development (Gamlen 2014a; Karpestam 2012). Nonetheless, neither country appears to be prioritizing the creation of low-cost remittance services (e.g., facilitating the start-up of remittance companies and publishing fee data to increase market competition and keep costs low). Further, neither BOG nor RBI has formed bilateral agreements with banks in destination countries to make remittances cheaper and more accessible for diaspora members (which has proven successful in Mexico and Cape Verde) (GPFI 2019).

Figure 8: Average transaction costs of sending remittances to Ghana and India (% of total amount sent)

Another way states harness diaspora resources for development is through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In particular, states are increasingly pursuing diaspora contributions to FDI through diaspora-specific savings/deposit accounts, investment schemes, and bonds (see Tables 6 and 10).

Ghana and India operate diaspora-specific savings/deposit schemes, which allow members to have bank accounts in either domestic or foreign currency. In addition to the direct economic benefit, this also allows home-states to build foreign exchange reserves. Indian NRI deposits grew from $14 billion in 1991 to $115 billion in 2015, and account for one-third of India's foreign exchange reserves (Naujoks 2018, p.96). While Ghana has widely used NRG accounts (a 2018 survey found out of 452 diaspora members, 43% held accounts), data is extremely limited and is thus not included here (Commonwealth 2018, p.4).

Both India and Ghana have diaspora investment schemes to raise funds for development plans. India's initiatives began in 1991 and mainly focus on attracting large-scale investments into the manufacturing industry, such as the *Make in India* scheme (MEA 2020a). Although India is a top receiver of remittances, FDI from diaspora members is minimal and as of 2015, NRI investments comprised only .05% of FDI (Naujoks 2018, p.96; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). To further stimulate diaspora contributions, India established the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) to promote and facilitate diaspora investment (MEA 2020a). It also opened up FDI policies to give OCIs special exemptions that were previously exclusive to NRIs, such as full ownership of particular firms and no investment minimums (MEA 2019).

On the other hand, Ghana's aspiration to harness diaspora investments is relatively new. Though the diaspora is rich in resources, the government has faced challenges in tapping them (Teye *et al.* 2017; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Quartey 2009). Research demonstrates an 'investment gap,' whereby the rate of Ghanaians expressing interest in investing is far less than the rate of actual investors (Commonwealth 2018). This is attributed to fear of corruption, excessive bureaucracy, lack of a coherent legal framework, and overall distrust in the Ghanaian government (Commonwealth 2018). Recently, Ghana has taken measures to combat these issues and enhance its investment environment. In 2018, the government encouraged trust in the financial system by

creating the Deposit Protection Scheme to protect small investors and establishing the Ghana Deposit Protection Corporation (GDPC) as a legal entity to oversee diaspora investments (GDPC 2020, p.1). The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) hosts conferences and webinars to encourage investment, such as the 2020 webinar 'Ghana, An Ideal Destination for Diaspora Investments' that included over 100 diaspora members (Frimpong 2020). Alongside economic growth, these measures have aided the government in promoting the benefits and protections the 'cleaned-up' banking sector can offer the diaspora (Frimpong 2020).

In addition to enhancing investor confidence through initiatives, the government's rhetoric to promote its investment schemes heavily incites the 'communal mentality' necessary for state-loyalty and therefore investment (Gamlen 2006, p.7). For example, the 'African Sankofa Investment Account' (est. 2020) aims to 'encourage the diaspora to see themselves as Ghanaians when conducting business in Ghana' (Dawson-Ahmoah 2020b). The Ministry of Finance is currently collaborating with banks globally to market the account, which is 'targeted at [diaspora] institutional and retail investors' with the goal of 'raking in about $3 billion' (Dawson-Ahmoah 2020b). These policies aimed at large-scale diaspora investment signify a 'postdevelopmental state strategy,' both in their marketing and in practice, in which states believe that a shared national identity can underpin 'strategic alliances with corporate actors' (Ong 1999, p.21; Gamlen 2006).

It must be acknowledged that while many Ghanaians support 'embracing' diaspora investments for development, there are also those who call diaspora engagement a 'misplaced priority' intended to compensate for the 'ill-planning' that is the 'normal routine in Ghana' (Teye *et al.* 2017, p.14). Rather than invest money into diaspora engagement, critics argue Ghana must first focus on strengthening institutions and infrastructure at home to enhance the investment environment rather than expecting the diaspora to spearhead socio-economic and political reform (2019). Nevertheless, there is evidence for the development potential of the diaspora if Ghana can manage its contributions effectively.

Lastly, unlike Ghana, the Indian government has used diaspora bonds as a 'debt instrument' to gain 'hard-currency financing' in times where it had limited access to international capital markets (for example, while under international sanctions following the 1998 Pokhran nuclear

tests) (Ketkar and Ratha 2007, p.1). These foreign currency bonds are sold to the diaspora at discounted prices and often appeal to 'patriotism, the 'desire to contribute to development of the home country,' and the opportunity to diversify investments (Ketkar and Ratha 2007, p.2, 3). India has issued diaspora bonds on three occasions (in 1991, 1998, and 2000), which have collectively raised over $11.3 billion (Ketkar and Ratha 2010, p.252). World Bank researchers Ketkar and Ratha concluded that alongside a level of governability (i.e., minimal civil unrest), the country of origin should possess a large, skilled, and wealthy diaspora to enable the successful issuance of diaspora bonds for development funding (2007). This may explain why India, with one of the largest and wealthiest diasporas in the world, has tapped into diaspora bonds while Ghana has not. Moreover, though diaspora bonds have been used on varying scales in places such as Israel, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria, they are not a common development financing mechanism and are thus under-researched (Ketkar and Ratha 2010).

Knowledge and skill transfer programs

New Growth economics theory and development economics research extensively supports the notion that human capital is a driver of development and is critical for attracting investment into LMICs (Ayentimi *et al.* 2018; Ogundari and Awokuse 2018; Qadri and Waheed 2014; Hartwig 2010; Hanushek and Woessman 2008; Gamlen 2006; Mankiw *et al.* 1992). Ogundari and Awokuse define human capital as 'knowledge, skills, competencies and abilities' acquired through 'training, education, work experience…and migration' (2018, p.131). Brain drain of human capital through emigration of the most skilled and educated remains a concern for both India and Ghana, particularly in education and health (Ayentimi *et al.* 2018). Policies to reduce emigration once took priority; however, there is new optimism that states can recoup valuable skills if diasporas 'remain connected' through knowledge transfer networks that 'transmit expertise' and provide 'access to global decision-makers and opinion shapers' (Gamlen 2014a, p.S186, S187; de Hass 2012; Ratha *et al.* 2011; Portes 2008). The idea is that these networks will lead to net-positive development outcomes such as new ideas and technologies, beneficial trade agreements, access to foreign markets, and direct investments (Ratha *et al.* 2011).

A major priority of Ghana's knowledge transfer initiatives is reversing years of 'medical brain drain,' due to wage differentials, poor working conditions, and lack of professional development opportunities (DAOOP 2018; Ministry of the Interior 2016; Ratha *et al.* 2011, p.130; Chappell

and Glennie 2009; Owusu-Yeboah 2009). While Ghana does not have government-led programs (despite extensive *written* policy objectives), it partners with the Ghana Physicians & Surgeons Foundation (GPSF) and IOM to promote medical volunteerism to rebuild Ghana's health sector (see Table 10). At the 2018 GPSF conference, the DAOOP's director called medical volunteerism a 'typical example of reverse brain drain' (DAOOP 2018, p.66). He further stated, 'This is the time for Ghana to continuously benefit [from] your human capital and knowledge acquired living and working in [the] USA…to harness…your expertise in Ghana's socioeconomic development' (DAOOP 2018, p.66). From 2002 to 2012, Ghana partnered with the IOM on the Ghana Health Project to facilitate the return of doctors to provide training and education (IOM 2012). Though this projects' effect on long-term development is unclear, officials state the initiatives placed 'circular migration higher on the national agenda' (IOM 2012, p.5).

India has been a leader in promoting brain circulation. In 2016, it hosted the second Conference on Mobility and the Business Case for Migration and launched the Global Alliance on Talent, Entrepreneurship and Skills (GA-TES) and the Taskforce on International Migration and Diaspora (see Table 6) (FICCI 2016). These two networks aim to achieve 'mobility of talent, portability of skills and entrepreneurial collaboration' between India and the diaspora (FICC 2016, p.11, 12). Practically, it has negotiated EU-India bilateral agreements to facilitate short-term stays and ease entry requirements to encourage seasonal migration and temporary intra-company transfers. Moreover, the government has implemented initiatives such as 'Skill India' and 'Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana' to 'provide skills and certifications to [emigrant workers] at par with international standards' (FICC 2016, p.16).

Both India and Ghana are focusing their policies on maximizing the benefits of emigration rather than restricting migration. However, it is difficult to quantitatively measure whether such initiatives successfully contribute to development and the 'reversal' of brain drain. Further, most initiatives, especially in Ghana, focus on temporary or permanent return migration rather than the creation and utilization of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Though circular migration is a crucial aspect to brain circulation, researchers argue that ICTs are the necessary building blocks of knowledge and skill transfer networks and should thus be prioritized (Afridi *et al.* 2016; Gamlen 2006; Kuznetsov 2005).

It must be acknowledged that diaspora networks give states the power to simultaneously execute all three functions of Gamlen's typology (*institution building, extending rights, and extracting obligations*) (2006). States can collect data and information on expatriates, which can be used by consultative bodies and governments for migration management and surveillance. Members can be more easily recruited for overseas roles and positions as 'potential investors and lobbyists' (Gamlen 2006, p.17). Governments may also use these platforms to propagate nationalistic sentiments and agendas. This paper begins to answer questions of not only how the emergence of diaspora institutions 'relate to sources of national power' (Gamlen 2014a; p.S187), but also how their resilience and evolution enhance this power.

6. Conclusion

This dissertation examined the diaspora engagement policies of India and Ghana to better understand how governments define and perceive 'their' diaspora and the policies they use to engage it for national development. In doing so, it contributes to the extremely limited research on India and Ghana's diaspora institutions.

In this paper, I demonstrated how India is modernizing its migration processes and systems to adapt to the demands of the digital age, while Ghana is slower to embrace digitization. I further argued that Ghana's use of diaspora networks for digital data compilation is a significant innovation in diaspora governance and migration management and the power this gives the state must not be overlooked. Most significantly, this paper is one of the first to analyze how diaspora institutions harness the immense power of social media for symbolic-nation building, and the first to focus specifically on the efforts of Ghana and India. Through examining the marketing of 'Brand Ghana' and 'Brand India,' this study revealed that diaspora institutions are building digital identities to cultivate online diaspora communities and boost the home-states image. I argued social media has immense potential to influence the loyalties of diaspora members and therefore, must be included in future diaspora governance research.

Though they have different priorities when tapping into human capital, it is clear that both India and Ghana prioritize efforts to encourage financial contributions on a larger scale than personal remittances. The case of Ghana corroborated evidence that most remittances end in household consumption thus limiting their benefit to development (Vadean *et al.* 2019). As such, I argue India and Ghana's initiatives and rhetoric display a shift in the agenda of diaspora institutions from 'remittances-to-development' (Bakker 2015) to 'investments-to-development'. Moreover, this study demonstrated that certain conditions increase migrants' likelihood of contributing financially to the home-state thus I argued that diaspora institutions must first prioritize creating a suitable investment climate.

Ultimately, I set out to answer the same question as nearly all literature on the migration-development nexus: how can governments act to ensure emigration translates into development? I echo those before me in concluding that it is extremely challenging to determine the impact of

policies on development outcomes due to the absence of a sufficient monitoring and evaluation framework, and the involvement of multiple stakeholders. Further, this study showed how written policy frameworks, despite genuine intent, often fail to transform into practical initiatives. As most of the MEA and DAOOP's diaspora engagement policies are relatively new, it is too early to draw major conclusions on how they are impacting the home-state.

In addition to the aforementioned future research areas, this paper calls for research into the ways global discourses on migration place pressure on prominent stakeholders such as the UN and World Bank, and how this consequently informs diaspora engagement policy. Future studies should also question how information and communication technologies (ICTs) manage migration and enhance state power. Additionally, while Gamlen's framework for comparative diaspora engagement proved a useful tool for policy analysis, there is room for this framework to evolve to better include policies that simultaneously 'extend rights' and 'extract obligations,' particularly surrounding pension schemes. Lastly, this paper calls on researchers to investigate the ways states depend on stronger economies and use diaspora institutions to responsibilize emigrants with socio-economic reform instead of addressing internal deficiencies and investing in human capital locally. Diasporas can reasonably be engaged for their resources, but should not bear the burdens of weak public institutions and infrastructure.

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