Oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc learns to consolidate authoritarianism in Moldova

Stephen Hall

Authoritarian learning involves regimes engaging in dialogue with one another, copying each other, or ideas diffusing from one polity to another. The phenomenon remains understudied, and opening up the black box of an authoritarian regime to peer inside and locate these processes, remains the researcher’s hardest task. 

Regimes always adapt to changing circumstances. For example, the Kremlin, after seeing the Ukrainian regime’s failure to clear the Euromaidan, decided that street thugs (known as the Titushki in Ukraine) would no longer cut it, and created the National Guard. Officially it is tasked with fighting terrorism. But, its procurement of equipment to disperse protests belies official rhetoric and highlights the Kremlin’s tactics to stop a potential Russian Maidan. Such is the beauty of understanding authoritarian regimes and their learning processes. Does A occur because of B, or is it due to C, or does it merely happen on its own? Very rarely do regime elites explicitly speak of using authoritarian methods. In the 2015 Ukrainian local elections, Poroshenko’s Presidential Administration announced it would be using new regime parties to take votes from the Opposition Bloc, the rump of Party of Regions after the demise of Yanukovych. 

Moldova has often been the forgotten European state sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine. It is most often mentioned, if at all, as the poorest European state. It is riven by a frozen, unresolved conflict in its east, after the the Transnistrian region fought a brief war to secede from Moldova upon Moldovan independence from the Soviet Union. Moldova’s politics has often been polarised with some wanting stability, a strong state and a closer relationship with Russia, whereas others want a warmer affiliation with the EU. Moldova, importantly, is not Belarus—its level of authoritarianism is marginal so far. Still, what has occurred there this year is similar to playbooks used by other regimes, across the post-Soviet region, in consolidating authoritarianism. 

The Grey Oligarch Puppet Master (păpușar) 

In February 2015, a series of protests began, largely missed internationally. They are ongoing today. Essentially, they attack the corruption that has engulfed the current governing pro-European coalition. These protests have been skilfully manipulated, allowing a puppet master (păpușar) to gain control. 

Having been overruled by the President for the position of Prime Minister on grounds of integrity, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc has set about controlling the state from the shadows. Researcher Kamil Całus, among others, has begun to warn of the route that 

Moldova is taking. Plahotniuc has distanced himself from a corruption scandal and the disappearance of $1 billion (£646 million) from three Moldovan banks. Other politicians have been consumed, by contrast. One casualty was the former Prime Minister, Valeriu Streleţ. He was replaced by Pavel Filip a cadre of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), financed by Plahotniuc. President Nicolae Timofti attempted to stop Filip’s ascendency, but backed down when pressured. After all Presidential powers are limited. 

Another casualty was Vlad Filat. He is an oligarch and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PDLM) a member of the current Alliance for European Integration coalition and apparent ally of the PDM. He was arrested for alleged links to the corruption scandal. Whether those links are there remains to be seen, but his arrest leaves the PDLM without a leader, allowing Plahotniuc to increase control of the pro-European coalition. There are allegations that many politicians in the PDLM and the Communists are already in the pocket of Plahotniuc meaning that he controls a majority in parliament. New legislation means that the next President will be popularly elected. Całus has suggested that Plahotniuc has a paid for cross-party majority in parliament and in the judiciary. The new legislation could allow Plahotniuc to choose a favoured Presidential candidate. It also conveniently divides the protest movement. The demonstrators were split between pro-Russian and pro-European camps and have been further harmed by the emergence of competing candidates in each faction. 

In the pro-Russian camp are Renato Ustatii and Igor Dodon. The legislation stipulates that all presidential candidates must by over 40 years of age. This barred Ustatii, who promptly accused Dodon of being in cahoots with Plahotniuc, therefore splitting the pro-Russian faction into two competing camps, reducing the likelihood of a large vote for Dodon. 

The two pro-European candidates, in turn, do meet the age requirement and can legally run. Maia Sandu has no ties to oligarchs and wide societal support. Andrei Năstase, however, has oligarch links, which affects his support, but provides financial backing. Neither candidate wants to leave the race for the other. The result is that this bloc’s prospects are hampered. 

Opposition groups which emerged from the protest movement have played into Plahotniuc’s hands. A divided opposition at the election will take votes from each other. Having taken control of parliament and the judiciary coupled with his media resources, Plahotniuc can then beat any candidate in a second round. 

Bad News for the EU? 

So what does this mean for the EU? Moldova is not likely to become a Member state, but it did sign an association agreement with the EU in 2014. In response to the developments in Moldova since then, the EU has reduced budgetary support in the hope to force change. However, overcoming weak institutions was always going to be a challenge. 

There was the likelihood that Moldovans would tire of being in the faux EU Membership that is the association agreement. Yet, increasingly Moldovan politicians are talking about state sovereignty rather than European values. This tends to be rhetoric used by aspiring authoritarians. 

The puppet master has been learning 

With a controlled Parliament already and a presidency up for grabs, Plahotniuc has started manoeuvring. President Timofti seems less than enthusiastic to remain. The opposition have been split. The Presidential elections will be interesting to gauge. The puppet master has been learning. It is easier to control the political system from the shadows. After all doing it publicly leads to unwelcome focus. 

Stephen Hall is a PhD student at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies. 

Note: The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and not of the UCL European Institute, nor of UCL.