This course introduces students to advanced topics in microeconomic theory. The topics offered will depend on the faculty teaching the course.
On completing this course students should:
- Understand dynamic and static contracting models with hidden information
- Understand the career concern’s model and the relational contracting model.
- Have a good understanding of the equilibrium concepts used in static and dynamic games.
- Understand the canonical multistage games and their equilibrium sets.
- Have a good understanding decision theory.
- Understand something of the recent developments in this theory such as choice from menus and ambiguity aversion.
- Understand the major results on mechanisms design.
- Be able to apply these results.
|Taught by:||Martin Cripps, V Bhaskar, Suehyun Kwon|
|Assessment:||2 Hour examination in January and a 2 Hour examination in the summer term.|
|Prerequisites:||Useful introductory texts are: Fudenberg &Tirole “Game Theory”; and MasColell, Whinston and Green “Microeconomic Theory”. It is assumed you have taken a graduate level course in microeconomics.|
|Moodle page:||ECONG106 – Microeconomics|