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UCL Department of Economics

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Theory Seminar presented by Ian Ball (MIT)

29 September 2020, 4:30 pm–5:45 pm

Theory Seminar Logo

"Scoring Strategic Agents"

Event Information

Open to

All

Organiser

Konrad Mierendorff, Deniz Kattwinkel

Location

LG10
056: Bentham House
4-8 Endsleigh Gardens
London
WC1H 0EG
United Kingdom

Abstract:  I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver takes a decision. The sender wants the most favorable decision, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the most accurate scoring rule. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so that the score is correct on average. The receiver prefers this score to full disclosure because the aggregated information mitigates his commitment problem.

Zoom Meeting ID: 991 0547 9347
Password: 251249

Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99105479347?pwd=M2UrT0ZrUlpFWDIxbWNQWkpDODJsQT09

 

Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Vlr1MFe_JhL7_IHAGEABhKmEIfZXpDF_/view?usp=sharing

 

About the Speaker

Ian Ball

at MIT