I. INTRODUCTION: THE CITY

A. URBAN CONTEXT

1. National Overview

Brazil is one of a group of poor countries with high levels of urbanisation. In 1940, 31 per cent of the country’s population lived in cities. In 2000 that figure reached 81 per cent — 138 million people (IBGE, 2000). That means that many of Brazil’s social problems, such as poverty, violence, crime, and inequality, are now urban and demand solutions in cities.

The country has nine metropolitan regions, almost all located on the coast. This is a consequence of the colonial exploration of the territory, with the formation of port cities or cities on plateaux near the coast, which channelled the wealth brought from the interior. This pattern has not changed, despite initiatives by the Brazilian Government to colonise and develop the inland regions. (see Map1)

Among the nine metropolises, São Paulo stands out as being the largest in South America, with approximately 16 million inhabitants, followed by Rio de Janeiro, with 10 million inhabitants. Only 500 km apart, the two cities form an urban agglomeration that could be compared with the “single metropolis” form of other Latin American countries, despite the federal government’s relocation at the end of the 1950s, from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia, the modernistic capital built in the central region of the country.

Historically the relation between urbanisation and modernisation in Brazil became relevant in 1930, with the reduction in the importance of export crops and the rise of industrialisation. The economic crisis that reduced international trade at that time led to an “import substitution” policy, and the transfer of capital from agriculture to industry. São Paulo played a crucial role in this change.

During the entire period referred to as the Brazilian “National Development” (“desenvolvimentismo”), from 1930 to 1980, the process of urbanisation accelerated greatly, with an intense process of migration from the countryside to the main industrial hubs in the large metropolises (Santos, 1993). During this period, there were significant advances in all social indicators, including a reduction in infant mortality (from 149 per 1,000 in 1940, to 34.6 per 1,000 in 1999) and an increase in life expectancy (from 42.7 years in 1940, to 68.4 years in 1999).

In the 1980s with the foreign debt crisis, the drop in economic growth rates and the explosion of inflation, Brazil’s urbanisation pattern began to present changes. The 1980s, known as the “lost decade”, would represent an increasing unfeasibility of life in the metropolises, and growing poverty. It is in this period that the spiralling growth of shantytowns, known as “favelas”, in São Paulo, occurred, with the disappearance of prospects for social ascent and decent housing for a growing portion of the population. During this same period, medium-sized cities, between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, grew at rates much higher than...
shift in migration toward cities with lower costs of living and housing. However, in large metropolises, an internal population shift could be observed: while the central nucleus reduced its rate of growth, or lost population, the peripheral areas or regions with physical restrictions to occupation continued to grow at an accelerated rate.

In the 1980s, adjustments to the Brazilian economy took place: the market opened up, privatisations occurred, the state was reformed, financial deregulation and labour flexibilisation took place. The economy’s internationalisation, de-industrialisation and the resulting “financialisation” and increase in drug trafficking produced evident social and urban maladjustments (Soares, 2001 and Maricato, 2001). The significant and simultaneous increases in unemployment and violence in large cities reproduced this situation in part.

These economic changes are associated with a new form of social production of space in large Brazilian cities: the concentration of wealth and investments in areas of the city progressively equipped according to “global standards” (see Photo 1), and the disposal of growing portions of the population (Fix, 2001), assisted, if at all, by public complementary income programmes and charity organisations, and forming the emerging “third sector”.

2. History of São Paulo

The history of Brazilian urbanisation is intimately linked to the history of the city of São Paulo. Unlike Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, capitals of colonial and independent Brazil, and urban and political nuclei consolidated since the 17th and 18th centuries, São Paulo gained importance later on.

A Jesuit village founded in 1554 and from which incursions into the inland regions of the country’s south-east departed, São Paulo was no more than a small trading town until the mid 19th century, physically unimpressive and socially mixed. In this period, the small village’s history took a different path, with coffee exports gaining great importance in the Brazilian economy. It was also the moment of the change from slave labour to salaried labour, which would produce a modernisation in productive relations. At the end of the 19th century, the São Paulo State Government would promote European and later Japanese immigration to provide labour for the coffee plantations.

São Paulo became the coffee capital of Brazil, a wealthy city that tried to emulate Paris, building an elite neighbourhood, named “Champs Élysées”, and a copy of the French capital’s “Opéra”. In the early 20th century urbanism began to be used as an instrument that would establish a spatial order in the city in terms of class segregation: on one side the central region, intended for the elite and a place of urban interventions, and outside it, on flood plains and basins along railway lines, a city without rules that received the poor, where budding industries were set up (Brant et al, 1976).
Successive waves of immigrants from rural areas, and migrants, continued to be excluded from the plans, associations and urban zoning, defined according to "verticalisation" and densification criteria. However, the "outlaw" form of solving the housing problem at low cost, without home ownership, even through self-help construction, ended up making popular settlements in the periphery increasingly unfeasible: on the one hand, hard-won infrastructure (often the result of residents' political action) and the reduction in demand produced an increase in the land value, on the other hand, unemployment and the reduction in incomes made access to home ownership, even through self-help construction, more difficult. From then on squatting in the central areas intensified and the number of favelas exploded (from 5.2 per cent of the city's population living in these settlements in 1980, to 19.8 per cent in 1993 [FIPE/Sehab, 1994]).

Starting in the 1980s, the centre-periphery opposition continued to mark the city, but the processes that produced this peripheral pattern of urbanisation changed considerably. The emergence of condominums in the peripheries (in consolidated areas of the city there was not much space left for these enclaves) and, at the same time, the expansion and densification of cortiços in the central region, besides various areas of favelas, shuffled the position of classes in the city. Different social groups now lived in close proximity, but separated by walls and security equipment (Caldeira, 2001). A paradigmatic case in São Paulo would be the neighbourhood of Morumbi, with favelas and luxury mansions ended up being vacated, little by little, and turned into boarding houses and slum tenements, as the coffee elite's old mansions ended up being vacated, little by little, and turned into boarding houses and slum tenements, known as "cortiços".

São Paulo’s elite thus began its process of relocation, associating the construction of exclusive neighbourhoods with real estate speculation. Until 1980, therefore, the pattern of socio-spatial segregation continued to be one of "centre and periphery", in which the middle and upper classes were concentrated in neighbourhoods with infrastructure, and workers in the peripheral areas, thanks to a combination of "buses, illegality and self-help construction" (Bonduki, 1981).

In the 1950s São Paulo changed from a city to a metropolis (Morse, 1954; Meyer, 1991). This was when it became the country’s largest urban nucleus (see Map 2), and the main financial capital, unseating Rio de Janeiro. Conurbation took place with neighbouring municipalities to form a metropolitan region, made up in part by the “ABC” region, the heart of the country’s automobile and metallurgical industries. The model of growth was no longer that of French-style, beautifying urbanism but rather the US car-based model, with that country’s decisive support – its actions in Latin America being intensified after World War II (Langenbuch, 1971). São Paulo was therefore cut through by immense freeways, overpasses and beltways, paving the way for the automobiles produced by multinational companies set up in the city.

The first overall Master Plan for the city was only drafted during the military dictatorship in 1971, and aimed at establishing guidelines for all municipal policies and urban zoning, defined according to "verticalisation" and densification criteria. However, the "outlaw" city, the periphery that housed thousands of poor people and migrants, continued to be excluded from the plans, policies and public investments (Maricato, 1996). This was a clandestine model, with the state’s consent, a form of solving the housing problem at low cost, without urban and civil rights. Optimism, the belief in progress, social mobility and order produced at the same time a spirit of pax urbana.

At the end of the 1970s this pattern of centre-periphery segregation began to be transformed (Taschner, 1998 and Caldeira, 2001). Decelerated growth and the emergence of strong social movements, demanding public services, infrastructure and housing, were the main motives. From these a contradiction was born that ended up making popular settlements in the periphery increasingly unfeasible: on the one hand, hard-won infrastructure (often the result of residents’ political action) and the reduction in demand produced an increase in the land value, on the other hand, unemployment and the reduction in incomes made access to home ownership, even through self-help construction, more difficult. From then on squatting in the central areas intensified and the number of favelas exploded (from 5.2 per cent of the city’s population living in these settlements in 1980, to 19.8 per cent in 1993 [FIPE/Sehab, 1994]).
condominiums side by side. During this period of deconstruction of the previous segregation pattern, those in charge of the municipal government were no longer the authoritarian governments of the military regime, but were democratically elected. Instability and social conflict manifested themselves politically in São Paulo through a strong polarisation between left and right. Of the five municipal administrations since the end of the dictatorship, three were right wing, two were left wing and none was from the political centre. Two phenomena of ultra-conservative populism constitute the right: “janismo” (from Jânio Quadros, of the Brazilian Labour Party [PTB]) and “malufismo” (from Paulo Maluf, of the Brazilian Progressive Party [PPB]). The first, an old local politician and former president, died at the beginning of the 1990s. The second and more recent is a descendent of the military regime and works by combining major urban construction projects, violent police action, influence peddling and corruption. On the left is the Workers’ Party (PT), in power twice with female mayors (Luiza Erundina [1989-1992] and Marta Suplicy [2001-present]). The PT comes from the new labour movement born in the ABC region in the late 1970s, made up of popular organisations, the progressive church, some intellectuals and activists.

3. The Physical City

Located on the São Paulo Plateau, above the Serra do Mar and 100 km from the port of Santos, São Paulo has an average altitude of 860 m. The municipality has a total area of 1,509 km², of which 826 km² are urban, 627 km² are rural areas and 56 km² are watersheds. Average temperatures vary between 22.4°C in summer (January to March) and 15.6°C in winter (July to September). Precipitation varies according to the season, with the rainy season in summer (with 250 mm per month) and the dry season in winter (with 40 mm per month). (PMSP, 2002)

Two major rivers run through São Paulo, the Tietê, which starts in the Serra do Mar, and runs upstate, and the Pinheiros, its tributary. Between the two flood plains there is the spur of Paulista Avenue, at an altitude of 900 m. Located at the top of the city, it is no coincidence that Paulista Avenue is the main expression of its financial and business might, also congregating radio and TV broadcasting, and many of the best hotels, museums and cultural centres.

Another important river is the Tamanduatehy, which separates the hill of the central region, on which the city was founded, from the basin of the eastern zone, the city’s main blue-collar and industrial region. Since the end of the 19th century, the city was socially divided between the high and low areas, with the elite occupying the former and the poor occupying the latter, which are subject to floods and epidemics (Prado Jr., 1983). The exception to this logic was a major real estate project by the Canadian company Light and Power, which straightened the Pinheiros River and sold plots to the elite on the former flood plain, no longer subject to flooding, forming the Jardins (“garden-city”) neighbourhoods, the most expensive and sophisticated of São Paulo (Seabra, 1987).

Starting in the 40s and 50s, with the car-based model of city development, the beds of hundreds of streams in the city began to be confined in channels or under-
ground sewers to make way for the new avenues. Nearly all the city’s major avenues were thus built at the bottom of valleys, producing an unavoidable ecological disaster. With growing urbanisation and the ground being made impermeable, waters began to converge on the surface towards avenues, producing large floods. The solution found by recent administrations has been to build massive open or underground reservoirs – the so-called piscinões (“big pools”) that accumulate rainwater and allow for later drainage – another reason for recent major urban construction projects.

Associated with this problem, the Tietê and Pinheiros Rivers became huge, open sewage channels. Their silting has become inevitable, producing uncontrollable flooding during the rainy season and interrupting access to the city. In the face of the huge cost of cleaning the rivers, the government has merely dredged their beds to reduce the impact of floods.

The location of favelas in São Paulo, meanwhile, is intimately linked to the city’s physical and environmental situation. They have been formed predominately in municipal and private areas near gullies, flood plains and on riverbanks. In general, they are areas where building is difficult and without interest for the formal real estate market and, for this reason, had remained unoccupied. The superimposition of favelas and risky or environmentally fragile areas is not, therefore, a coincidence.

The issue becomes more serious with the occupation of the area along the city’s watersheds by illegal land subdivision and favelas, in the southern region of the city (see Photos 4 and 5). In these places residents are subject to floods and have their sewage drained to the watersheds, whose water becomes undrinkable.
and requires chemical treatments that are increasingly expensive. Tensions between environmental preservation and a lack of housing are intensely present in these areas. As will be seen, a programme of favela upgrading was planned for these areas during the first PT administration (1989–1992) (see Photo 16).

Besides uncontrolled occupation of those areas close to watersheds in the southern zone, there is currently an extremely critical situation, with the rampant growth of favelas and clandestine land subdivisions in another environmental preservation area, the Serra da Cantareira. In this case, the central problem is not flooding and water contamination, but rather the destruction of the original Atlantic forest and landslides.

It can be seen, therefore, that social, physical and environmental issues in São Paulo are intrinsically linked and demand common solutions.

4. Demographics

The population of the city of São Paulo was 10,434,252 inhabitants in 2000 (IBGE, 2000 Census). Its annual growth rate dropped from as high as 3.67 per cent, in 1980, to 0.85 per cent during the period 1991-2001, a rate lower than the growth rate for the Brazilian population as a whole (1.63 per cent). This phenomenon represents part of the change in the pattern of Brazilian urbanisation starting in the 1980s.

The city’s internal population growth, however, varies greatly from district to district. While central neighbourhoods, which are wealthier and provided with infrastructure, reduced their population in absolute terms, the precarious peripheral neighbourhoods grew at rates of up to 3 per cent per year, almost double the Brazilian rate.

In the last 20 years, the central area lost 230,000 inhabitants (CMSP 2001: 7). Districts in this region suffered a 30.4 per cent decrease between 1980 and 2000, at the same time peripheral districts, such as Cidade Tiradentes, in the eastern zone, Parelheiros, in the south, an area of watershed protection, and Anhanguera, in the north, had population growths of 2.11 per cent, 223 per cent and 619 per cent, respectively (CMSP, 2001: 8). During this period, the central area’s population density fell from 181.5 to 110.3 residents/hectare, while the density of peripheral districts such as Sapopemba rose from 132.6 to 208.8 residents/hectare.

With regard to the population makeup, there has been an increase in the female share in recent decades. Currently there are 4,972,678 men and 5,461,574 women (IBGE, 2000). Age profile has been changing in the last few decades, with those over 60 gaining a greater share (6.3 per cent in 1980, 8.6 per cent in 1996 and 9.3 per cent in 2000).

Regarding ethnic makeup, Brazil has the world’s second largest population of African descent, with 80 million individuals. The country was the second-to-last to abolish the slave trade (1850) and the last to abolish slavery (1888). Even today, there remain major differences in socio-economic indicators for the black population. These inequalities are reflected in housing conditions. For example, while 35 per cent of whites have inadequate sewage conditions, 63 per cent of blacks are in this situation – with the same occurring for water and power supply, garbage collection etc. (Martins, nd: 4)
The coefficient for infant mortality in the municipality (number of deaths of children under 1 year of age, per 1,000 live births) was 15.8 in 2000, versus 30.9 in 1990. Homicide accounts for 64.5 per cent of deaths due to external causes in São Paulo, and is more predominant among adolescents and young adults. Deaths observed among indigenous persons, blacks and mulattos are mostly at an early age and the main causes are infectious diseases (tuberculosis and AIDS) and violence (traffic accidents and homicides), while for the white and Asian populations, deaths are predominantly at a later age, from chronic, non-contagious diseases. (Pro-AIM, 2000)

5. The Urban Economy

São Paulo is the country’s main economic and financial hub. The city’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in 1997, was US$ 77 billion (nearly 15 per cent of the national GDP) and per capita income was US$ 7,600, while the national average was US$ 3,300.

Since 1980, the city has been losing its character as a manufacturing city, with diverse sectors moving upstate and to other regions in the country, in a process of “industrial deconcentration”. In 1970, the metropolitan region was home to 44 per cent of the country’s manufacturing activity, while this figure is currently less than 25 per cent. However, this number is still high enough to affirm that the city has not stopped being an important manufacturing hub, receiving large investments in the last decade in sectors such as publishing, printing, IT, Internet, foodstuffs and chemicals/pharmaceuticals. Despite the reduction in manufacturing industry employment by 38.1 per cent from 1988 to 1999, 18 per cent of the economically active population is still employed by the sector. (SEADE-DIEESE, 2000).

São Paulo, nevertheless, is losing its identity as a manufacturing metropolis to become a “service metropolis”. This is a transition responsible for an economic and social polarisation of the city: increasing informal and domestic services on one hand and advanced services related to the international economy on the other.

São Paulo is Brazil’s main link to the global economy, and holds almost all local branches of foreign companies and banks, as well as their support services (consulting firms, auditing firms, legal counsel, press agents, advertising agencies, etc.).

At the same time, São Paulo has the country’s highest unemployment rate as well as in its recent history: 17.9 per cent (1999) (see Figure 1). Unemployment among women is 19.8 per cent and among men is 16.2 per cent. SOURCE Of employed persons in the Metropolitan Region that live or work in the city, nearly half are in activities considered informal. In the 1990s, there was a continuous increase in this percentage, which went from 36.3 per cent in 1990 to 49.8 per cent in 1999, resulting in a growth of 34.4 per cent in the decade.

6. Governance

All levels of government in Brazil are currently elected by direct vote, have the power to make laws, plans and projects, and have budgets made up of specific taxes. The Federal Constitution of 1988 determines the actions at each level and the budget funds available to them. At all levels of government, the executive branch is the one which elaborates public policies and budgets, submitting them to the legislative branch for approval.

The municipal administrative structure is made up of the executive branch (City Government) and the legislative branch (City Council). There is no legal branch or public safety body in the city’s administrative structure, which are left to the federal and state governments. São Paulo, due to its budget, is the only city in the country to have a municipal court of auditors, an autonomous and powerful body that became a political instrument of support or roadblock of actions by elected administrations.

The municipality is responsible for establishing standards for zoning, plots, land use, land occupation, road networks, environmental protection, cultural heritage protection etc. In 2001 the Statute of the City was passed, a federal law (10.250/01) regulating articles of the Brazilian constitution regarding the social function of property. The Statute of the City defines instruments for urbanisation and land ownership regularisation, raising real estate valorisation, participating in planning processes, etc. Several of these instruments should be included in the municipalities’ master plans. According to the Brazilian Constitution, any municipality with a population above 20,000 inhabitants should have a master plan for urban development. São Paulo is currently in the process of approving a new master plan in the City Council.

The level of municipalities’ autonomy and decentralisation was expanded by the Constitution of 1988. Municipalities are in charge of a large portion of healthcare, education and housing policies, and therefore receive often-insufficient budget funds from the state and federal governments for their management and investment – which has produced contradictory effects.

The municipal revenue base is made up of local taxes such as those on urban building and territory property (IPTU), on services (ISS) and improvement fees and contributions, and transfers from the state government and, on a smaller scale, from the federal government. Estimated budget funds for 2002 total approximately US$ 3.2 billion, or US$ 320 per capita.

Mayor Marta Suplicy, of the Workers’ Party (PT), heads the current city administration (2001-present). She was elected leading a coalition that included PC do B, PHB and PCB. The PT has 17 of the 55 City Council members and makes up the majority coalition with other parties from the left (PPS, PSB, PC do B and PDT) and the centre (PMDB). The opposition is formed by the
right (PPB, PTB) and the PSDB, the party of President Cardoso and the São Paulo State Governor. However, the number of votes required to pass a draft bill varies according to its nature. In addition, a portion of the city council members, even when part of the so-called ruling coalition, negotiate their support for each bill up for vote according to technical and political-ideological motivations, personal interests or influence peddling motivations. Therefore, although the government has managed to pass important bills, such as progressive urban property tax rates (the progressive IPTU), it has frequently faced a lot of difficulty in getting its bills passed, such as the creation of sub-city governments and representative councils (for administrative decentralisation), and the new master plan.

Municipal politics are highly polarised and the parties from the centre (PSDB and PMDB) do not have much political influence locally. The last five electoral runoffs have always been decided between candidates from the left (PT) and the right (PPB e PTB), with opposing views on priorities for public policies. Overall, the right’s priorities for the city are major public construction projects (in general, for road building), public safety, populist social programmes, real estate business, dialogue with the business community and privatised administration. The left’s priorities are improving public services (education and healthcare), housing, transportation, democratic management, participatory budgeting and dialogue with social movements. Nevertheless, these differences have been a little shuffled in recent administrations, in which both sides have shown themselves to be open to carrying out all kinds of policies.

The current administration has prioritised programmes involving complementary income, training and solidarity. This turnaround occurred because the administration considered that the worsening of social issues reached the point at which it was necessary to act through direct transfer of income to the most impoverished, as a question of survival.

II. SLUMS AND POVERTY

B. DIFFERENT TYPES OF SLUM

1. Types

São Paulo has two important types of slums: the “favela” and the “cortiço” (see Photos 2, 3, 4, 6, 7,8). Besides these, there are two more significant forms of housing provisions for the poorer classes, but they may not be considered slums: illegal plots in the periphery, that imply the buying and selling of demarcated plots, and government-sponsored housing projects.

Among the fundamental differences between the favela and the cortiço is that the former is a form of housing whose ownership, in general, is the dweller’s, even if it is located on an invaded lot (whether public or private land) and without security of tenure; while the cortiço is a type of precarious rented housing. Until the beginning of the 1980s, before the recession and the end of the pattern of peripheral urbanisation, the cortiço was the dominant type of slum in São Paulo. Since then the favela began to dominate, growing sharply.

Among the different types of housing described in the Global Report on Human Settlements, the cortiço could be defined among the types of “rental accommodation”, and its most usual form could be summarised as a “rented room in subdivided inner-city tenement building” (GR, 1996: 216). The favela is a type of “owner occupation”, defined as “building a house or shack in a squatter settlement” (GR, 1996: 223).
2. Location

Popular housing in São Paulo has almost always been established in the city’s periphery, with the formation of clandestine plots and houses built by their inhabitants. *Cortiços* and *favelas*, however, do not always follow this logic and penetrate the formal and central city.

Most *cortiços* are traditionally located in the central and semi-central districts of the city, in general in areas that are deteriorated but contiguous with zones with jobs and services. The reason for living in a *cortiço* is to be able to be in the central region: all the sacrifices of cramped, unhealthy and expensive housing are compensated by the proximity of work and public services. The proliferation of *cortiços* in the periphery is a recent phenomenon in the city: residents build other rooms on their lot to rent out, increasing their monthly income. Although the sources on *cortiços* in São Paulo are imprecise, there are indications that this type of housing is shifting towards the periphery (Taschner, 1997).

*Favelas* spring up everywhere: in wealthy areas, poor areas, in the central region or in the periphery, wherever there is an empty and unprotected lot. Their appearance during the 1970s and 1980s mixed up the pattern of centre-periphery segregation in São Paulo. The public authorities’ constant actions in repressing and removing *favelas* in the areas valued by the market, and the action of private property owners in regaining possession, however, has driven favelas to the poorest, most peripheral and environmentally fragile regions. There are few remaining in well-served regions, although the largest two, Heliópolis and Paraisópolis, are located in these areas.

3. Age

The phenomenon of the *cortiço* in São Paulo dates back to the 19th century, with the city’s growth not being accompanied by the corresponding growth in new housing. Recently arrived migrants took shelter in boarding houses, a highly profitable activity for speculators. The *cortiço* is a market alternative that has always been present as a form of popular housing in São Paulo, with demand rising or falling according to the migration, growth and poverty cycles in the city.

Favelas in São Paulo, unlike in Rio de Janeiro, are a recent phenomenon, less than 50 years old, whose current sharp growth dates back to 1980, with their share of the population having jumped from 5.2 per cent to 19.8 per cent since then. Their appearance is associated with the end of the peripheral pattern of urbanisation for the working class and the impoverishment resulting from the end of uninterrupted economic growth since 1950.

From 1980 to 1991, 60 per cent of the population’s differential growth was absorbed by São Paulo’s *favela* population, according to Taschner (1997), based on demographic census data by the IBGE, while noting that the IBGE underestimates the number of favelas in São Paulo.

4. Population Size and Characteristics

The most recent survey on the size of the population living in *cortiços* and *favelas* in São Paulo is from 1993 and was conducted by the Economic Research Institute Foundation (Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, FIPE), of the University of São Paulo (USP). That year the city supposedly had 595,000 *cortiço* dwellers (6 per cent of the population) and 1.9 million *favela* dwellers (19.8 per cent of the population). São Paulo has at least 1,582 nuclei of favelas and 23,688 of cortiços (FIPE/Sehab, 1994).

The official Brazilian census (conducted by the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute – IBGE), however, in a 1996 count affirmed that there were only 748,000 *favela* dwellers in the city, the equivalent to 7.6 per cent of the population. Such a disparity is the result of differentiated methodologies adopted by the two institutes. That includes the fact that IBGE does not recognise nuclei with less than 50 units as *favelas*. However, they account for 1,100 of the 1,600 *favela* nuclei in the municipality. The disparity is not a coincidence, since the official census seeks to restrict all negative social indicators, thereby diminishing the size of Brazil’s social issues. After suffering diverse criticisms IBGE is reformulating its concept of *favelas*.

*Cortiços* and *favelas* have a wide variety of sizes, from 3 or 4 families up to 30 or 40 in the same building, in the case of cortiços, (or many more in the case of vertical cortiços), and 10,000 to 15,000 families in a single *favela*. They are therefore phenomena that may have critical situations and of great amplitude.
Below we summarise the characteristics of the population living in favelas and cortiços, in the FIPe study (all figures from FIPe/sehab, 1994).

**Favelas**: dwellers are nearly equally divided between men (49.4 per cent) and women (50.6 per cent). Most of the heads of families are men: 77.9 per cent, versus 22.1 per cent women. Regarding age distribution, it is a young population, in which the group up to 24 years old accounts for 62.9 per cent, of which 40.3 per cent are those no older than 14. The 25 to 59-year old age group concentrates 34.8 per cent of favela dwellers. The phenomenon of migration is important in the formation of São Paulo's favelas. Only 17.6 per cent of heads of families were born in São Paulo State, and the majority (60.8 per cent), were born in the Northeast. Most (77.6 per cent) were born in inland towns and 22.4 per cent in state capitals, with 10.9 per cent of these being from the city of São Paulo.

**Cortiços**: dwellers are mostly men (52.8 per cent), but only a bit ahead of women (47.2 per cent). Among heads of families in cortiços, 68.6 per cent are male and 31.4 per cent are female. It is a predominantly young population, 54.3 per cent of which is between 15 and 34 years old, along with a significant portion between 35 and 49 (31.5 per cent). Only 19.2 per cent of heads of families were born in São Paulo State, and 63.8 per cent were born in the Northeast. The majority (70.7 per cent) are from inland towns and 22.4 per cent from state capitals. Only 10.7 per cent were born in São Paulo capital.

The State Government, along with SEADE, is elaborating a survey on cortiços dwellers. The survey is being made in sectors selected for the Action on Cortiços programme (Programa de Atuação em Cortiços – PAC), as being those concentrating the highest numbers of cortiços in São Paulo's central area. Official results have not been published. There are only preliminary data available (results still being checked).

### C. OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SLUMS

The official definition of a favela by the City Government of São Paulo was not an important point of public debate, as were the different initiatives for removal, maintenance, renovation or city marketing based on the favela. The current administration is elaborating an official definition for its policy. There is, however, an official municipal definition in effect until now, which dates from 1972 (HABI 1, 2000: 27) “Favelas are agglomerations of dwellings with reduced dimensions, built with inadequate materials (old wood, tin, cans and even cardboard) distributed irregularly in plots almost always lacking urban and social services and equipment, forming a complex social, economic, sanitary, educational and urban order”. It was agreed upon that agglomerations with up to 10 domiciles would be denominated “nuclei”. The municipal census of favelas in 1987 and the FIPe study of 1993 used the same definition.

The IBGE, for its part, considers favela to be a “substandard agglomeration”, which is “a group made up of over 50 housing units located on plots belonging to others (public or private), with disorderly and dense occupation, in general lacking essential public services”. Other research institutes such as SEADE and DIEESE also have as a determining factor in the definition of favela, more than the type of construction, the characterisation of irregular and disorderly occupation of land, without land ownership or deeds at the time of installation.

In the academic definition of Laura Bueno, one of the main specialists on the issue in São Paulo: “favelas are urban agglomerations in public or private areas, occupied by non-owners, in which dwellers build houses outside the legal codes of allotment and building. The favelas' illegality, however, is determined by the conflict between the land's owner (public or private) and the possessor, and by the non-observance of legal rules for occupation of urban land. Their existence within the urban fabric also results from the devaluation of the plots around them”. (Bueno, 2000: 17)

Maria Ruth Sampaio, a pioneer researcher of clandestine plots and favelas in São Paulo, characterises favelas as “invaded land, in general in public plots, belonging to federal, state or municipal governments; few are on private plots. Those that occupy municipal plots, for the most part, are established mainly in areas denominated as being of ‘common use of the people’, which are

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**Table 2: Number of Cortiços by Sector (preliminary results)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>no. of cortiços</th>
<th>no. of non-vacant houses</th>
<th>no. of vacant houses</th>
<th>no. of houses total</th>
<th>no. of residents</th>
<th>no. of blocks</th>
<th>no. of buildings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pari</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>2,776</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brás</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>7,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Belém</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>3,321</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mooca</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>15,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cambuci</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Liberdade</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>7,294</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bela Vista</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>3,411</td>
<td>7,896</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Santa Cecília</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>3,116</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Barra Funda</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>3,624</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>14,828</td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td>16,931</td>
<td>35,881</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>61,016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CDHU/SEADE
precisely those donated to the city government for the construction of urban infrastructure, squares and green areas. In plots intended for the low-income population, in general the ‘areas of common use’ are the worst areas, prone to floods, near gullies or banks with a worrying slope. As they are unoccupied, that is where favelas are set up” (Sampaio, 1998: 125).

Regarding cortiços, the official, municipal definition is that taken from Law no 10.928 of 1991, known as the Moura Law (Lei Moura): “Cortiço is defined as a unit used as a collective, multifamily dwelling; totally or partially presenting the following characteristics: a) made up of one or more buildings constructed on an urban plot; b) subdivided into several units which are rented, sublet or ceded on any ground whatsoever; c) several functions performed in the same room; d) common access and use of non-constructed spaces and sanitary installations; e) in general, precarious circulation and infrastructure; f) overcrowding of persons”. The Fipe study of 1993 uses the same concept expressed in the Moura Law to quantify the population living in cortiços.

The IBGE does not have an exclusive definition for cortiços, but rather of “rooms”, insufficient to define cortiços technically, but quite useful: “it is a private lodging made up of one or more rooms located in a boarding house”.

Professor Flávio Villaça, a theoretician on urban issues in Brazil, defines a cortiço as “a ‘market’ solution, rented housing, a product of private initiative. In its diverse forms it was the first physical form of housing offered to the Brazilian “free man” in the same way that rent was the first economic form” (Villaça, 1986: 35).

Luiz Kohara, one of the main researchers on the issue in São Paulo, affirms that: “among cortiços, there are differences in levels of habitability, types and forms of rent relations, but some characteristics are common to all of them, such as overcrowding, the common use of sanitary installations, the lack of privacy, several functions performed in the same room and exploitation in rents” (Kohara, 1999: 29).

Suzana Pasternak Taschner points out that: “the current trend is to introduce to statistics a broader concept of precarious, rented housing”. Rooms with an exclusive bathroom should also be included in this definition, especially in cortiços in the periphery, groups of congested domiciles on the same lot, both domiciles with individual and collective bathrooms. (Taschner, 1997: 30).

D. UNOFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SLUMS

1. Popular Understanding of Slums

Both favelas and cortiços are popularly seen as a space for the city’s “shady characters, bums, trouble-makers and the dirty”. The medical metaphor of a “cancer” and a “wound” are recurrent. The prejudice is quite deeply ingrained, especially among neighbours, who see their property devalued by the cortiço or favela.

Unlike the cortiço dweller, who is subject to the laws of the market, rent and payment for water and electricity services, favela dwellers are seen as having an “easy life”, “not paying for anything”. The image of the favela dweller is confused with that of the “marginal population” (and not so much with the crook or drug trafficker, as in Rio de Janeiro).

In contrast to the cortiço, which even in poor conditions is recognised as a building, favela housing is seen as a simple “shack”, a fragile construction that could be torn down either by the rain or a bulldozer. Likewise, cortiços are almost always located in the formal city, facing an asphalted street with a gutter, while the favela, full of alleys and winding paths is seen as a “hiding place for bandits and criminals”, through which few dare pass.

2. Relevant Local Language Terms

To define favela: the terms “favela”, “comunidade” (community), “núcleo” (nucleus), “vila” (group of houses) are used.

To define cortiço: the terms “cortiço”, “casa de cômodos” (boarding house), “pensão” (pension), “quintal” (backyard), “moradia coletiva” (collective housing) are used.

3. Slum Dwellers’ Perception of their own Status

Those who live in favelas or cortiços do not like to be called “favelados” or “encortiçados”, since they suffer all kinds of prejudice. To get work, financing, even to buy common objects, those living in these conditions almost always hide their condition, giving as their own the address of relatives or people they know.

Cortiço dwellers prefer less pejorative denominations, such as boarding house or pension, using the expression cortiço only to refer to housing in which precariousness and disorganisation are extreme. “To give an example: we found a collective habitation where the walls were humid, the stairs were broken, sewage flowed in the open air and there was a lot of filth. When a resident was asked if that was a pension, she answered: – this here is a real cortiço” (Kohara, 1999: 31).

In the case of favelas, self-reference can be positive or negative. It is generally positive in the sense of belonging to a “community”, which has its meeting points, parties and friendships. It is negative when referring to violence, “there’s gunfire everyday”, “the cops come in kicking”, and the precariousness of housing, “this here really is a dump”.

Regarding the issue of “property”, feelings are mixed: in cortiços “there is the freedom to move but, at the same time, there is no prospect of having one’s “own
house", where the risk of eviction is not imminent. According to Regina Oliveira, from the Gaspar Garcia Human Rights Centre, among cortiço dwellers, especially, there is the acceptance that being poor means living in these conditions. Dwellers do not believe they have rights. Their contact with the public authorities is distant and in general takes a paternalistic form.

E. OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF POVERTY

1. Definitions and their Predominant Use

Official definitions at all government levels are aimed at determining who are the target populations in poverty-reduction programmes. Two basic criteria are generally adopted: income and consumption (which determine the poverty line) or the HDI (human development index).

According to the World Bank’s criteria (US$ 1 a day per capita income), Brazil has 35 million people (22.6 per cent of the population) living below the poverty line. According to the HDI, Brazil is 79th in the ranking with 0.73. São Paulo’s index is 0.85.

The federal government uses for complementary income programmes the criterion of half a minimum monthly wage per capita income (US$ 40 a month).

Priority targets are female-headed families. Projeto Alvorada, the main regional imbalance-reducing programme, adopts HDI criteria. Target states and towns are determined according to lower HDIs.

In the city of São Paulo, the Minimum Income Programme run by the city government targets a portion of 10.1 per cent of families residing in the city who have children and adolescents aged 0 to 14, and an income of up to three minimum monthly wages (SM). Within this population sector, the priority is assisting families with an income lower that half a minimum wage per capita, representing 5.4 per cent of the total families (733,000 people). In this case, the average total family income is 1.04 minimum monthly wages and the average per capita monthly income is 0.23 SM (US$ 18).

IBGE, the Brazilian institute that conducts the official census, has no definitions for poverty levels. The institute organises its data according to “income levels” and does not promote cross checking of data to form a multidimensional poverty index. This job is done later on by researchers after the census is carried out.

Recent debates have demonstrated that there is a lot of variation in the demarcation of a poverty line, with differences ranging up to 127 per cent. For example, while IPEA researcher Ricardo Paes de Barros states that 22 million of Brazilians live below the poverty line, Marcelo Néri, of FGV-RJ, says that 50 million do (Folha de São Paulo, “Especialistas cobram critérios do governo para apurar pobreza”, 5/28/2002, p.A10).

Map 4 – Number of Favelas by Regional Administration District, 1987 and 1993.

2. Changes to Definitions over Time

Up to the 1990s, both official and academic definitions comprised one type of poverty, which was conventionally called “Old Poverty”: Brazilian secular poverty. In São Paulo, the traditional conditions associated with poverty were black or mulatto families with low levels of schooling, a large number of children, and migrants from poor rural areas (from the north-eastern or northern states).

After 50 years of sustained growth, the economic stagnation during the 1980s and 1990s, associated with the opening up of the Brazilian markets and reforms by the Collor (1990-1992) and Cardoso (1995-present) administrations, produced new impacts on poverty. Side by side with persistent secular poverty, a new form of poverty, the so-called “New Poverty” emerged. It represents the impoverishment of urban workers in the large urban and economically dynamic centres. In São Paulo, the new poor are characterised by families with higher schooling and fewer children, formed by people who were born in the city.

Social policies had to change not only due to the emergence of new forms of poverty, but also in order to seek an alternative response to the old social exclusion. In the 1990s, the prevailing focus was on poverty-reducing actions, some of them sometimes unrelated to comprehensive public policies. The new host of social policies and social inclusion policies implemented by administrations of different ideological approaches suffers from this brand-new ambiguity.

F. UNOFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF POVERTY

1. Popular Understandings of Poverty

The definition of poverty as an absence of prospects for change, and not restricted to income parameters, prevailed in the interviews conducted. Three of the interviewees work for NGOs involved with assistance to poor people in São Paulo, especially cortiço and favela dwellers and the homeless. According to Regina Oliveira, from the Gaspar Garcia Human Rights Centre, being poor is being deprived of access to basic civil rights. It is a condition that affects the individual’s self-esteem and is reflected in statements such as “I am not assisted at the hospital because I am poor”. Francisco Comaru, an engineer of Ação Direta, says that poverty is not having access to perspectives of change; “It is the absence of prospects for the future”. Cristina Peres, a social worker of the Obra Social Pio XII defined poverty as a lack of prospects for the future, including restricted access to services and goods, to material resources, cultural assets and recreation, education, and health-care, that is, no opportunities, and exclusion from public policies. “It is living in a vicious cycle in which one plants
### Table 3. Urban and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Slums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cortiço</th>
<th>Favela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td>40% of the buildings housing cortiços were built for the purpose of room rental and 47.8% of cortiços resulted from adaptations of buildings that formerly had other uses. 64.4% of these have been subdivided to produce smaller rooms.</td>
<td>In the past 20 years there has been significant improvement in housing conditions: In 1973 wood was the only or basic construction material. Currently it is brick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Walls</strong></td>
<td>98.6% masonry</td>
<td>74.2% masonry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roofs</strong></td>
<td>64.2% tiled roofs</td>
<td>84.1% fibre-cement roofing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.5% slab roofing (aiming at vertical expansion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Floor</strong></td>
<td>63% cement</td>
<td>81.7% cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.5% wood</td>
<td>Only 4.5% tamped soil floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.9% brick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ventilation</strong></td>
<td>Poor. Average of two windows per domicile. Presence of mould, allergies, bronchitis, pneumonia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to water</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated water</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Unofficial connections&quot;</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>54.5% &quot;borrowed&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.2% clandestine connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connection to main sewers</strong></td>
<td>81.2%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open-air sewers</strong></td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single family toilets</strong></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular garbage collection</strong></td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power supply connections</strong></td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public lighting</strong></td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximity to public transport</strong></td>
<td>Access to public transport by foot; generally a 10 to 20-minute walk. 81.5% of bus stops are located 2 blocks away.</td>
<td>No data available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery quality</strong></td>
<td>Located in consolidated urban area with ample accessibility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to health care</strong></td>
<td>Access to health care</td>
<td>Reaching the nearest healthcare centre after a 10 to 20-minute walk. Reaching hospitals after a 20-minute bus ride.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 4 to 6 attending school (% of demand)</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 7 to 14 attending school (Primary school)</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children over 14 attending school (High school)</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime rates</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under five mortality rates</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure Tenure</strong></td>
<td>In only 7.5% of buildings were eviction situations found. According to Kohara (1999), dweller turnover is high in cortiços (47.5%), and dwelling time is short (39.5% less than 1 year). Threats of eviction and pressure of intermediaries generate uncertainty. In the small survey in one cortiço 85% of tenants feared eviction.</td>
<td>Favellas on public land prevail (61.5% on municipal areas and 77.7% in partially municipal areas) because they pose lesser risks for tenure conflicts. Relative improvements of house size and quality are associated with certainty about remaining in the place. “The fear of removal has been significantly reduced, due to housing policies and the action of social movements.” In the past 20 years, the slum has changed from a provisional housing arrangement into a long-term or permanent domicile.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FIPE 1994
but does not harvest the fruit from work: it means hard work and risks of diseases early in life, no access to good healthcare, being subject to easy replacement in the job; at the end of the month, one reserves the money for transport to go to work and leaves the rest to pay the grocer for the food the family ate in the previous month”.

2. The Poor’s Perception of their Own Poverty

The poor’s perception of their own poverty is a contradictory phenomenon that unleashes simultaneous reactions of acceptance of one’s conditions and the desire for change, self-rejection or affirmative actions, acceptance of social rules or opposition to them.

Eglantine, a housing movement member who participates in the squatting of empty buildings in the downtown area, does not accept her homeless condition: “I am here (in the occupied building) because I want a solution; I need a place to live”. She said she would not cheer for the Brazilian soccer team in the World Cup 2002: “I am not a Brazilian; I am a consequence of this country”. The cortiço dwellers Maria de Fátima and Marlene defined poverty as “wanting to reach the goals that are beyond our reach”. For them, poverty in our country comes from “laziness” and “self indulgence”. For them, “he who has guts is not poor”.

Mariana Martins, a dweller of a favela located in an affluent neighbourhood, strongly reacts against the imminent removal of the slum: “I just want to see when they arrive at my shack door. I won’t leave it so easily. If they throw me and my children on the street, I will go straight to Meliá (a luxury hotel close to the slum) with a gun and kill myself and my kids” (Fix, 2001:38). Responses to poverty and social injustice sometimes take the shape of cultural expression, such as the hip-hop movement, which is inspired by the break dancing and rap music of Afro-American communities. Hip-hop dance, music, words, and images form the new outcry from the periphery.

**ORIGINS OF THE TYPES OF SLUMS IDENTIFIED**

1. Social, Economic and Political Forces that have Formed and Removed Slums

As we have mentioned before, cortiços emerged in the 19th century with the expansion of the working class in the city as the only housing alternative for newly arrived migrants. It was an economic market alternative conducted by entrepreneurs who constructed buildings for that purpose or converted existing ones, aiming at income from rent. Up to now, it has been a non-regulated business activity characterised by the absence of rent agreements. Cortico dwellers are subject to all kinds of violence and threats by owners or intermedi-
Evictions are carried without respect to residents’ rights, and not even the law protects them: “in many court hearings, the judges refuse to hear the evicted dweller. We instruct them to go to the police, but the officers generally will not take their claims” (Kohara, 1999:31).

Unlike Rio de Janeiro where the renovation of the central area in the early 20th century aimed at “cleansing” the area by expelling cortiço dwellers, in São Paulo, the elite migrated to other city areas to attain exclusiveness (Villaça, 1998). Therefore, São Paulo’s cortiços remained almost untouched and kept steadily growing in number, especially in the central area. Only recently with the process of real estate price recovery in the central area did cortiços start to be targets of governmental or market actions due to the emergence of more profitable activities in the area.

To counteract this process, a strong social movement organised within the cortiços has carried out occupations of empty public or private buildings since 1997 (see Photo 15). Squatters demand the effective implementation of a housing policy for low-income people in the central area. Unlike favelas, cortiços historically had rarely been included as a target of public housing policies.

Favelas on the other hand, have not emerged as a market phenomenon, but are the fruit of public and private incapacity to respond to housing demands. In São Paulo, they mean a solution of last resort for poor classes after illegal land subdivisions, public housing projects and cortiços. The first settlements in São Paulo started in the 1950s, but only gained a relevant dimension in the 1970s with the occupation of large public or private areas.

In the 1970s, favelas emerged as a target for public policies in the city. The first initiatives were the connection of sanitary sewers, and water and power supplies to the slums. These fundamental services were obtained thanks to a strong movement on behalf of slum dwellers that was particularly active in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1979, specific budget funds and a programme, ‘Profavela’, were created. The programme provided infrastructure, new housing units and public services in the slums. It was inspired by the World Bank’s guidelines for slum maintenance and improvement. With the Mario Covas administration (PMDB, 1983–1985), the slums gained a voice in municipal policy-making on housing, which had clear guidelines in respect to upgrading and land tenure legalisation.

From then on, and except for one administration – Jânio Quadros (PTB, 1985–1988), which conducted large slum removal operations – slum removal has not been publicly assumed as a major policy. However it has been carried out by city administrations, especially with slums located in valuable central areas, during the Maluf administration (PPB,1993–1997) (see pictures 2 and 3). Nevertheless most administrations presented plans for slum upgrading or changing slums into housing estates.

2. The Social, Political and Economic Advantages of Slums to the City

Diverse authors, since Engels’ well-known text of 1872, have taken a theoretical approach to relations between housing and the cost of reproducing the labour force. According to Engels, housing in slums (or any other form of housing that dispenses rent payments) lowers the cost of reproducing the labour force and leads to a corresponding drop in wages. Sérgio Ferro (1969) and Francisco de Oliveira (1973) consider this phenomenon to be even more perverse in peripheral capitalism: the immense industrial reserve army and their subordinated insertion in the global economy produces a situation that is chronic, but advantageous for capital, of low salaries, high exploitation of labour and environmental destruction. In this scenario, and without the constitution of a social
### Table 6. Household Indicators in Different Slum Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>CORRICO</th>
<th></th>
<th>FAVELA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male-headed</td>
<td>Female-headed</td>
<td>Male-headed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Household types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPE:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.4% live alone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49% core families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.0% extended families*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4% are “conviventes**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38% live alone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42% core families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost 20% have “agregados”</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38% live alone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42% core families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost 20% have “agregados”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Employment and income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income by quintile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPE:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1% less than 1 SM</td>
<td>7.7% less than 1 SM</td>
<td>20% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6% 1 to 3 SM</td>
<td>53.5% 1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>66% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.9% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td>36.5% 1 SM</td>
<td>42.3% 1 to 3 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.9% more than 5 SM</td>
<td>40.1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>36% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42% less than 3 SM</td>
<td>7.7% less than 1 SM</td>
<td>20% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.5% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td>53.6% 1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>66% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.1% 5 to 10 SM</td>
<td>36.5% 1 SM</td>
<td>42.3% 1 to 3 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2% more than 10 SM</td>
<td>40.1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>36% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42% less than 3 SM</td>
<td>7.7% less than 1 SM</td>
<td>20% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.5% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td>53.6% 1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>66% less than 1 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.1% 5 to 10 SM</td>
<td>36.5% 1 SM</td>
<td>42.3% 1 to 3 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2% more than 10 SM</td>
<td>40.1 to 2 SM</td>
<td>36% 3 to 5 SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of family head</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>R$280.79</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>R$305.36</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>FIPE: 3%</td>
<td>R$300.00</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC: 3.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22.2% (including unemployed and people who are not applying for a job)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Household size (people per household)</td>
<td>FIPE: 2.9</td>
<td>Average of 3.78</td>
<td>Average of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>people per family</td>
<td>people per family</td>
<td>3 people per family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Birth/fertility rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39% of families have children, of these:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59% one child</td>
<td>7% no children</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28% two children</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.6% three children</td>
<td>28.6% 2 children</td>
<td>28.6% 2 children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2% four children</td>
<td>42.8% 3 or more</td>
<td>42.8% 3 or more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1% five or more</td>
<td>34% one child</td>
<td>26.5% 2 children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28% 2 children</td>
<td>18.5% three children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7% 3 or more</td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Type of tenure and house ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPE: Informal rent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.8% pay rent to house owner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.2% to rent management companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75% are rented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21% of domiciles are invaded; occupied by janitor or owner, etc. Kohara: 73.9% only verbal rent agreements 83.4% sublet by intermediaries 20% by owners or their representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39% of families have children, of these:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59% one child</td>
<td>7% no children</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
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<td>28% two children</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
<td>21.4% one child</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.6% three children</td>
<td>28.6% 2 children</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2% four children</td>
<td>42.8% 3 or more</td>
<td>42.8% 3 or more</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>28% 2 children</td>
<td>18.5% three children</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7% 3 or more</td>
<td>16.6% one child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA ON THE CITY’S SLUMS

1. Maps (see Maps 4 to 7)

Map 7: Number of Cortiços and Cortiço Residents by Sectors.

[Map showing distribution of cortiços and residents]

2. Census Data

There is no disaggregated census data on favelas and cortiços in Brazil. The following information is from the most recent survey (1993) conducted by FIPE (University of São Paulo). 2000 Census data is currently being worked on by the São Paulo Housing and Urban Planning Department, including geographical referencing of slums in the city (to be completed in August 2002 – official results not published yet). Several entities and social movements are pressing for a census on cortiços in the central region.

The favelas have undergone a significant improvement in their levels of permanent structures and materials, due to residents’ expectations of remaining where they are, as a result of a change in public policies in the past 20 years, from one of slum removal, to one of slum upgrading. On the other hand, the increase in population density, a recent phenomenon in São Paulo municipality, aggravates health conditions. The same happens to the cortiços, which are extremely dense, and, as an aggravating factor, in most cases (60 per cent) they were not even built for the purpose of room rental.

As mentioned before, both cortiços and favelas have been spaces for the emergence of important popular movements demanding better living and housing conditions. Favela movements were more active in the 1970s and 1980s, and the cortiço movements started to grow in the 1990s.
I. POVERTY IN THE CITY

1. Maps (see Map 8)

2. Census Data

Recent data that can be used to match poverty and access to basic sanitation, gender and level of schooling can be found in the IBGE 2000 Census data that separate heads of family according to monthly income ranges (minimum monthly wages). Such data are not available for ethnic groups.

16.8 per cent of family heads of private permanent domiciles earn less than one minimum monthly wage (SM). Among heads of family with a monthly income lower than one SM, 58.6 per cent are men and 41.5 per cent are women. Among female-headed families, 24.9 per cent earn less than one SM while only 13.9 per cent of male-headed families get less than 1 SM a month.

Access to basic services and formal schooling in these domiciles by income ranges in respect to the minimum monthly wage are shown in the Table 4 and Table 5.

III. SLUMS: THE PEOPLE

The information presented in this section is taken from the “Survey of Cortiços and Favelas in the City of São Paulo” (FIPE/Sehab, 1994) and also from a small survey conducted by the authors specifically for this report in a cortiço in the São Paulo central area. In some cases, in order to supplement the FIPE data, we have also used information from a study by Luiz Kohara (1999), and from a survey that is currently being conducted by the State Government and SEADE, for some selected areas in São Paulo central area (see map 8).

We conducted 20 interviews in a 36-tenant family building located on Av. Brigadeiro Luiz Antônio on May 26, 2002 (see Photos 6 and 7). The findings have no statistical value in respect to the city’s cortiços, but they complement the other surveys cited here, including qualitative data used elsewhere in the report. We would like to point out that in May 2000 tenants managed to stop a sudden eviction order and since then none of the tenants has paid rent. This is reflected in some of the data raised, such as families with no income who manage to remain in the building.

J. WHO LIVES IN THE SLUMS

1. Short Histories and Key Events in the Lives of Typical Slum Households

The stories in this section come from interviews with three São Paulo favela residents: a man, Agnaldo, and two women, Jô, who supports her family, and Márcia, who is a community leader.
Agnaldo Henrique de Mello, 55 years old, was born in the state of Paraná (southern Brazil) and came to São Paulo with his parents in 1957. At that time, “you had to come to São Paulo to work. There wasn’t any work there”, but now people have to leave São Paulo to look for work. He makes his living doing odd jobs and considers it impossible to get a steady job. Upon arriving in São Paulo, Agnaldo and his family ended up in a rented house in the working-class neighbourhood of Mooca. After two years, they bought a lot in the eastern periphery, in the neighbourhood of São Mateus, and built a house. In 1967, Agnaldo left his parents’ house to live with his wife. Wanting to live in the same neighbourhood, but without money to buy a plot, he ended up going to the Vila Flávia favela. Agnaldo has very good memories of his childhood in São Mateus: the municipal pools and ball courts, dance halls where young people got together, going home late and not having any problems. Today, young people cannot go out without any worries because it is very dangerous. Agnaldo has technical training in three areas – electricity, hydraulics and technical design, the last of which he did not finish. He now lives “imprisoned” in a house and when he does not go to church, he watches TV. If his son goes out, he cannot sleep – he said that a few days earlier he heard machine gun fire in the favela.

Josenilde Dias da Silva, called “Jô”, and her three small children (Photos 9 and 10) live in a wooden shack, hard to find in the narrow alleys in the Água Funda favela (Photo 8). A 33-year-old woman, she has lived in the favela for five years as head of the family, in a house with two rooms and a bathroom, with a waxed, red cement floor. She came from Sergipe, a poor state in north-eastern Brazil, to São Paulo when she was 21. Since the beginning, she worked as a house cleaner in “family homes”. While she was married, she managed to have a family income high enough to live in rented houses. Nevertheless, lack of money created huge conflicts. She remembers a Brazilian saying: “when there isn’t enough money, love goes out of the window”. This is what she did, leaving home with her third son, newly born, in her arms: “I wanted to seek my independence”. Without income to live alone, she wandered through the streets with her children and ended up in two shelters, where she stayed for three months. “I felt really bad at that time. It’s a period I don’t want to remember”, Jô says. The alternative was living in her cousin’s favela. Jô went to different construction material depots looking for donations, and with the first pieces of lumber and roofing material soon closed in a space and made herself a small shack, with the help of neighbours. Since then she has taken painstaking care of it, painting and cleaning it: “I want a dignified environment for my children”. Still, she says, rats and insects in the house are common. Of her three children, just one is in school; the two younger ones cannot get openings at day care centres and kindergartens, and are taken care of by a teenager who is paid monthly. Currently, Jô has two jobs as a house cleaner and has a monthly income of US$ 160 (approximately two times the minimum monthly salary).

Márcia Aparecida dos Santos de Souza, 34 years old, is the main community leader in the Água Funda favela (Photo 11). She is married to Rafael, who works as a security guard, and has three adolescent children, all in school. Márcia has spent almost her entire life in the city’s favelas, and now lives in an apartment in the Cingapura housing project. Before moving, her shack had two rooms and bathrooms. The apartment, on the
other hand, although small, has four rooms and a bathroom. "I was born in a favela", Márcia says, "my father came from the Northeast in 1966 and personally started a favela, which brought together friends and relatives arriving from [the state of] Paraíba". Márcia tells how modest her life was: "the first time I went to a party hall wasn’t until my graduation, when I was 14". She became an orphan a year later, when she was 15. It was then that she went to live with her four brothers in the home of an alcoholic uncle. As soon as she could, she ran away from home, already accompanied by her current husband. The couple went to live in a small rented house, in a poor and very violent neighbourhood. When her husband lost his job, and they went a few months without income, the alternative was the favela. Luckily, Márcia bought a shack in a favela that was undergoing government interventions and was registered as having demand for the new buildings. She stayed for another three years in the run-down shack and another few months in a lodging facility. As soon as the family entered the new home, on Christmas Eve, its joy was immense. Half of the favela, however, was not as lucky as Márcia and still lives in shacks next to the buildings (Photo 12). "The conflicts increased. Those who are in the building don’t think they are favela residents anymore and want to fence in the project", Márcia says. She became critical of the housing programme (see testimony in assessment of Cingapura programme) and became a community leader, also participating in the Housing Movements Union (UMM – União dos Movimentos de Moradia). For her, one of the moments that made a mark on her life was the caravan for housing, in which she participated last year, travelling with hundreds of homeless to the federal capital, Brasília (Photo 13). "There I carried a sign asking for approval of the National Housing Fund and entered the National Congress", Márcia remembers.

2. Aspirations, Plans and The Barriers to their Fulfilment

Agnaldo affirms he has no plans for his life: "when I could achieve something, I drank it all". He was an alcoholic and drank as much as two bottles of sugarcane brandy per day. He stopped drinking not long ago. He does odd jobs as an electrician and plumber, and he invests all the money he earns in the house. All he dreams of is finishing his house, enjoying good health and seeing his children receive better education, since "the rest is up to them".

The aspirations and plans of the two women from the Água Funda favela are similar: having jobs and opportunities to study, for them and for their children. Jô, who still lives in a shack, wants a house, but does not know what to do: "I don’t have money". Asked why she does not go on a public waiting list or join a housing move-

ment, she responds: "I can’t; I don’t have time". Jô would like to study medicine: "I want to go to college, but the public ones are only for rich people and the private ones are very expensive". According to her, tuition for a paid medicine programme is close to three times her monthly income. "I see poor people, needy children, the difficulties they have at health posts and I would like to help solve this situation", Jô says. She does not blame anyone for her condition, but "the government needs to give us more opportunities and support".

Márcia also has plans to study: she would like to get a bachelor’s in social work, but does not have enough money to do so. She says: "as a community leader, I have already worked as a social worker. I would like to have an education, a title, and power to continue working with it, earning a decent salary". Márcia shows a questionnaire that she made for all the favela’s residents, asking about their aspirations and desires for the future. Responding to the compliment that she has talent, she affirms that "many social workers that come here don’t do half of what I do, and I help everyone without earning anything". As a leader, Márcia’s aspiration is integration and the end of conflicts between residents in the buildings and the rest of the favela. "I am struggling for them to receive the project as well", Márcia says, "but it’s hard. Nobody gives a satisfactory answer. Achievements are minimal". Márcia believes that only when the entire project is urbanised will the violence end: "currently, this favela is a point of drug dealing and the law of silence rules". Lastly, she affirms that "changes begin where people live and from there they move up until one day we have a decent country".

HOUSEHOLD INDICATORS

Households in cortiços are smaller, and the rate of residents living alone is higher. The housing area is much smaller than that of shacks in favelas, an indication of the terrible housing conditions. The time of stay is also more reduced, probably due to difficulties in paying rent, which often leads to threats of eviction. In favelas, several factors influence longer stays in the location: relatively greater security, due to possession of the property, the non-payment of rent, and lower (or non-existent) rates for water and power. Finally, families generally invest more in building and maintaining their shacks, making moving less desirable.

Family income is lower in families headed by women. According to the FIPE study, the percentage of families without income or earning less than the minimum salary is much lower in cortiços than in favelas. The studies indicate the family income of cortiço residents is higher than that of favela residents. According to Silvia Schor, from FIPE, this is explained by the high rent generally charged in cortiços. The economist Schor affirmed that
this data is important as it indicates the possibility of creating a policy for financing housing, accessible for these residents. Eduardo Trani, from the CDHU, stated that the results of the PAC survey question this information, indicating a large percentage of cortiço residents with low income. However, the fact that these results are preliminary and restricted to a small region of the city makes it even harder to make precise comparisons.

**L. COSTS OF LIVING IN SLUM**

A large proportion of the residents, both in favelas and in cortiços, walk to work. A decisive factor is the cost of transportation, since employers do not always pay for the transport of workers in the informal economy (without signed working papers). In the case of cortiços, another factor that explains this high rate of commuting by foot is the proximity to work, precisely an important factor in the choice of location to live. The time spent in transport is greater in favelas, since a large portion are situated on the periphery, far from the regions with a greater supply of jobs. Nevertheless, many workers combine the use of buses and walking to save money.

Services and rent are large components in cortiço residents’ expenses, contrary to favelas, in which many do not pay for services or have access to reduced rates. Rent in cortiços has a rather high cost; as Kohara showed, the price per square metre in a cortiço is even higher than in commercial properties in the formal market. Besides the small dimensions of the rooms, this high cost per square metre is due to a system of exploitation that is quite profitable for landlords (see Kohara, 1998). Access to financing for housing is very difficult for favela and cortiço residents. In the case of favelas, the main reason is their low income. In the case of cortiços, although their income is little higher, according to FIPE’s data, workers in the informal economy have trouble proving income, which greatly complicates access to financing. Therefore, the possibilities of buying a property in the formal market are very reduced.

In the composition of financial expenditures for typical slum household, we see how food expenses are high, corresponding to a large portion of income, much higher than the city average. In the cortiço we surveyed (small survey), since the residents were not paying rent, almost all their income went towards food, reducing or eliminating their ability to save money.

**M. CAPITAL AVAILABLE TO SLUME DWELLERS**

See Table 8

Urban Slums Reports: The case of Sao Paulo, Brazil

**IV. SLUMS AND POVERTY: THE POLICIES**

In Brazil, changes in ruling parties produce frequent ruptures in public policies, making it hard to achieve positive social results in the medium and long term. The absence of assessments of ongoing policies facilitates interruptions by new governments, since there is nothing proving their efficiency and the need to maintain them, even if revised. With the impossibility of good programmes that resist changes in power, the “marketing” significance of social policies has grown: each new politician in power needs to “sell” the latest programme in an advertising style.

With the exception of administrations that manage to stay in power for several terms and consolidate policies, programmes with greater continuity over time were, not by chance, those financed by international agencies, which establish contractual commitments and have a greater concern for monitoring processes. International organisations, however, try to evaluate policies through “models” of “successful” initiatives. The pasteurisation of initiatives labelled as “best practices”, which could be exchanged in a non-historical and non-geographic space, should be criticised. It is a format of evaluating public policies that is more and more widespread, but whose actual results need to be questioned.

**N. POLICIES AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE SLUMS AND ALLEVIATE POVERTY**

Historically, policies towards favelas in São Paulo were almost always municipal. The federal and state governments made housing investments directed at other areas, especially the building of new housing projects and basic sanitation.

During the administration of Luiza Erundina (PT, 1989-1992), favelas were for the first time the target of widespread action. In less than two years, the favela upgrading programme served 41,338 families, with about US$ 50 million in investments. This administration also began a specific programme to upgrade slums in the areas near watersheds, with the aim of maintaining settlements and improving urban infrastructure, water and sewage services, and the collection and final disposal of garbage (see Photo 16). The programme ended up receiving finance from the World Bank and a quite differentiated institutional arrangement, networking with three neighbouring city governments and the state government. In the programme’s nearly 10 years of existence, roughly US$ 322 million were invested, of which US$ 114 million were in slum upgrading actions reaching 27,000 families.

In the following two administrations (Paulo Maluf PPB, 1993-1996, and Celso Pitta PPB, 1997-2000) a
### Table 7. Costs of Living in Slums Data (continue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>CORTIÇO</th>
<th>FAVELA</th>
<th>City average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Availability of housing finance</strong></td>
<td>FIPE: 2.7% have joined Cohab and/or CDHU housing building programmes.</td>
<td>None of interviewees had access to funding</td>
<td>In one case, the interviewee had been evicted from his previous house in another slum and received R$ 8,000.00 to buy a new one. None of the others interviewees had access to funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Health problems</strong></td>
<td>None of the others interviewees had access to funding. In one case, the interviewee had been evicted from his previous house in another slum and received R$ 8,000.00 to buy a new one.</td>
<td>None of the others interviewees had access to funding. 23% reported, all cases for being poor and living in a slum. 66.7% reported, most cases for being poor and living in a slum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Discrimination</strong></td>
<td>28.6% reported (race, for living in a slum and one lost job because he is homosexual)</td>
<td>60% reported, especially due to race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Victimisation and insecurity</strong></td>
<td>None have been evicted; 92.8% fear eviction</td>
<td>70% fear eviction, none have been evicted</td>
<td>In may 2000, 1,320 eviction actions took place (SECOVI, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Psychological trauma</strong></td>
<td>14.3% have suffered aggression or been aggressive to others (barroom brawls; smacked by parent)</td>
<td>60% have suffered aggression or been aggressive to others (pregnant woman abandoned by boyfriend; pickpocketing; smacked by parent)</td>
<td>20% of the families resident in São Paulo Metropolitan Region were victims of a robbery. 51% percent were victims of physical aggression. (SEADE, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. Financial expenditure for typical slum household: house, food, transport</strong></td>
<td>Kohara: 52.0% of family income to pay rent, water and electricity charges. PAC: 25% rent 22.5% on food 3.5% on transport 1.4% medicine 3.5% other. For families with less than 3SM income: 47.1% rent 32.4% on food 4.0% transport 2.3% medicine 3.7% other. R$ 147.27 food (almost 100% of income for most people) (they have not been paying rent since the eviction order suspension in May 2000) 72.1% have no savings 30% have some savings Destination of savings: 13.7% savings accounts 7.8% household expenses</td>
<td>Average of R$367.58 (94.4%) 15.4% do not have stable wage and spend all earned money in food</td>
<td>São Paulo municipality: 18% on food 5% clothing 6% health 7% education 17% Transport and Communication 44% other expenses (SEADE, 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The values for water and electricity correspond to the value of a “social tax” for low-income families.
(2) Many residents have no income to buy food and receive food staples and milk distributed by government programmes, NGOs, or friends, relatives or neighbours.

n.a. - data is not available
12/31/1998 R$1.21 = US$1.00 (www.bc.gov.br)
Minimum monthly wage constant value mar/1993 (R$ Mai/2002 [INPC-IBGE]) = R$ 147.70
Minimum monthly wage in US$ (mar/1993)= 76.00

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#### Notes

- **FIPE/Kohara/PAC**: Small survey
- **FIPE/others**: Small survey
- **n.a.**: Data is not available
### Table 8. Slum Dwellers’ Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>CORTICO</th>
<th>FAVELA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIPE/PAC</td>
<td>Small survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Social capital</strong></td>
<td>7 participate in their own cortiço dwellers’ organisation - none participate in associations, political parties or social movements (one used to participate in a housing movement)</td>
<td>In 50% of slums there is some kind of organisation - 36.8% participate in residents’ associations - 12.3% participate in dwellers’ committees - 77.3% no participation - 43% are aware of movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Financial capital</strong></td>
<td>5 are supported by friends or relatives - None had access to government or NGO support</td>
<td>Families having no income use savings to pay for shelter or food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Human capital</strong></td>
<td>Low schooling</td>
<td>Low schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Physical capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home base enterprise</td>
<td>Only one family has a home based enterprise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to formal education</td>
<td>FIPE: 24.2% 4 to 6 - 54.9% 7 to 14 - 26.6% High School</td>
<td>Residents do not complain about lack of vacancies in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to day-care centres (% who attend/demand)</td>
<td>FIPE: 9.5% 0-3 years - 6.0% 0-6 years</td>
<td>Most families with small children do not have access to day care due to the lack of vacancies in day-care centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to community centres, parks and squares.</td>
<td>FIPE: Very few have access</td>
<td>The majority of residents use a small park near the cortiço. Very few go to Ibirapuera Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to healthcare services</td>
<td>FIPE: Reasonable</td>
<td>Well attended at local hospital. Fairly well attended at local healthcare centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household appliances</td>
<td>The majority own stoves, refrigerators, electric irons, blenders, as well as radios, TV sets, and few own CD player systems.</td>
<td>85% stove - 80% refrigerator 75% TV set - 70% radio - 5% VCR (one has a donated computer, another has a small electric piano)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Supportive public policy</strong></td>
<td>35% had access to staple food or milk programmes. The majority of them are not aware of existing social programmes.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and agreements. The programme’s aim gives priority for those that work in the central region, cortiço residents and the homeless population. Until now, the Morar Perto project has conducted studies on six intervention perimeters and held bidding on five social rent projects for the low-income population. More studies are currently underway to define the programme’s intervention parameters.

The federal government has a line of credit through publicly owned bank Caixa Econômica Federal – CEF, the Residential Leasing programme (Programa de Arrendamento Residencial, PAR), which has been used to “recycle” buildings for residential purposes in downtown São Paulo. Although it has US$ 1.2 billion in funds available nation-wide, in São Paulo less than 300 housing units are being produced, with an investment of nearly US$ 7.5 million. Another 10,700 housing units have financial contracts signed but have not started being built. Still the programme does not attend families with incomes below 3 monthly minimum wages, where the biggest housing deficit is concentrated. This is due in large part to the absence of sufficient subsidies to allow for the low-income population’s access to expensive land in downtown São Paulo. CEF is now negotiating a partnership with the city government to build housing units for a social rental programme. This programme will attend families with income below 3 monthly minimum wages.

The state government, through its Housing and Urban Development Company (CDHU), the country’s richest housing company, has a Cortiço Action programme (Programa de Ação em Cortiços, PAC), which, during its six-year life (during the Covas PSDB, 1994-1998, and Alckmin PSDB, 1999-present, administrations) carried out just one project, with 320 units. An agreement recently signed with the IDB (06/23/2002), however, may change the programme’s inaction. The programme will have 2 stages, and calls for US$ 220 million in investments, a volume of funds capable of changing the history of action in cortiços in São Paulo. The first stage will produce 5,000 housing units, aimed at attending families with average incomes of 1 to 10 monthly minimum wages.

While policies for favelas have a history of priorities and major investments in public action, the same does not occur in the case of cortiços. Only in 1989, during the Luiza Erundina administration, were they recognised as the object of public policies, when the first Cortiço upgrading programme was formulated. The pioneer initiative, however, did not go beyond the scale of pilot programme (see Photo 18 below) and was interrupted by the following two administrations. The programme served 227 families, with investments of US$ 2.5 million.

After eight years without investments, the current administration (PT, 2001-present) resumed the policy for cortiços with the programme Morar Perto (“live close by”). The programme has US$ 5 million in funding to invest in 2002. The programme consists of expanding the supply of housing in the central region of the city, which has been losing population, through special social interest zones, recycling old buildings and building new ones. It aims to combine municipal, state, federal and international funds through partnerships
the Bolsa-escola ("school grant"), for families who sent
their children to school) were implemented, and during
the first President Cardoso administration (PSDB 1994-
1998), with the programme Comunidade Solidária,
which invested US$ 4 billion during the first term.

The federal government currently maintains diverse
poverty-reduction programmes, of which the main ones
are called Projeto Alvorada ("dawn project") and
Programa Comunidade Ativa ("active community proj-
ect"). The first, with US$ 4.6 billion in investments
earmarked for 2 years, aims to reduce regional inequal-
ities, with investments focused on municipalities with
low HDI, almost all in the north and north-east of the
country. The second intends to contribute to autonomy
in communities, with social and technical capacity build-
ing, so that in the near future they can be independent
from government investments.

The São Paulo State Government (PSDB, 1994-
present) fights poverty especially through its Renda
Cidadã programme ("citizen's income"), a complemen-
tary US$ 24 per month allowance for 50,000 families in
extreme poverty. The state government forms partners-
ships with local governments and 2,400 social entities
and NGOs in programmes focused on children and
adolescents, the disabled and the elderly.

Neither state nor federal investments significantly
reach the city of São Paulo, supposedly for technical
reasons – poverty-reduction programmes prioritise
small municipalities and those with lower HDI. However,
the metropolis' peripheries, ever more dense, poor and
violent, are left without poverty alleviation policies,
receiving at the most programmes to distribute milk.

The new generation of social policies were late to
arrive in São Paulo, only in the current administration
(PT, 2001-present), in which it appears as the new
government's flagship. The new municipal poverty alle-
viation and social inclusion programmes have six major
social projects: Renda Mínima ("minimum family
income"), for poor families with dependants from 0 to 14
years old; Bolsa Trabalho ("work grants", unemployed
from 16 to 20 years old); Capacitação Ocupacional
("occupational training", unemployed from 21 to 39
years old); Começar de Novo ("begin again", unem-
ployed over 40); Economia Solidária ("solidarity econ-
yomy", co-operative and small business incubators) and
Banco do Povo ("people's bank", popular credit centre).
The municipal strategy is to innovate in relation to
federal programmes, avoiding fragmentation and
excessive focus on investments, as well as promoting
networking between projects and municipal depart-
ments with universal criteria for attending to the
excluded. The city government has US$ 72 million to
invest in these programmes in 2002, and intends to
serve 165,000 families by the end of the administration.

The impact of all these efforts is multiple, not always
convergent and very little evaluated. Public authorities,
at any level, do not have a tradition of monitoring their
initiatives and the change from one administration to
another, when not from the same party, produces sig-
ificant ruptures in policies. In general, programmes are
paralysed and rarely evaluated to know what their real
impacts are. Within academic research, initiatives to

3. Non-Governmental Interventions:
Community-Based Programmes to
Improve Slums and Alleviate/Eradicate
Poverty

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3. Non-Governmental Interventions:
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Improve Slums and Alleviate/Eradicate
Poverty

The 1990s were also the decade of the emergence
of NGOs and the so-called third sector. It is impossible
to define NGOs’ actions within a common field. Their
range is broad enough to encompass the new business
philanthropy to groups supporting Brazilian social
movements. It is not easy to know the number of NGOs
at work in São Paulo, the number of people they employ
and the funds they turn over, especially because they
do not need to publish their finances and often report
them only to their funding sources.

Examples of non-governmental work are to be found
in the favelas of Heliópolis, Monte Azul and
Paraisópolis. The first two have the aid of foreign volun-
teers (Italians, Japanese and Germans) who work with
the population in implementing sex education, Aids
prevention, garbage recycling and professional
courses. These activities led women to develop their
potential and become important community leaders
(Sampaio, 1998: 129). In Paraisópolis, the number of
entities that work in the slum was large enough for a
common forum to network their actions to arise:
“Multientidades” ("multi-entities"). It has integrated
actions, strengthening workers and improving dialogue
with public authorities, increasing their ability to apply
pressure.

In the case of cortiços, the Gaspar Garcia Human
Rights Centre works to defend residents' rights through
legal aid against evictions, as well as an educational
programmes to raise awareness about rights and
conflict mediation. In addition, the centre works with
the street population through a programme to create a card-
board collectors' co-operative and a fellowship house.

Another complementary initiative was undertaken by a
group of 10 technical advisory NGOs, formed by archi-
tects, engineers and social workers, who work on a
housing proposal for the central region, in conjunction
with social movements. The proposal was presented to
the current administration and sparked the formulation
of Morar Perto, a municipal action programme for
cortiços.

O. IMPACTS OF THESE EFFORTS

The impact of all these efforts is multiple, not always
convergent and very little evaluated. Public authorities,
at any level, do not have a tradition of monitoring their
initiatives and the change from one administration to
another, when not from the same party, produces sig-
ificant ruptures in policies. In general, programmes are
paralysed and rarely evaluated to know what their real
impacts are. Within academic research, initiatives to
evaluate programmes are few, but do exist. Nevertheless, they do not have adequate financing, nor are multidisciplinary teams able to handle such a task effectively.

We consider that initiatives should always be analysed historically and geographically, within specific contexts, taking into account the social forces that sustain them and their motivations. Public policies conducted in highly unequal and polarised countries such as Brazil produce their own conflicts, tensions and impasses, since a common development project for all social classes is no longer easily visualised.

We present, below, the evaluation of one public sector initiative in upgrading favelas, one public intervention in cortiços and one NGO initiative.

The description of some of the programmes is enough for us to notice the major differences that exists in formulating and carrying out policies between progressive and conservative administrations. What is interesting is that in the 1990s, both defined actions in favelas as a priority, even though their objectives were opposing. In general terms, the PT tried to carry out favela urbanisation actions, strengthening communities and seeking to tackle the housing deficit, while the PPB, with financial support from the IDB, produced a programme based on major construction projects, interventions located in areas with high visibility and marketing potential. The differences are enlightening and notable, when we observe with whom each party sought to establish dialogue. On the other hand, from the public opinion's point of view, the PT’s programme was not highly recognised, while the PPB’s had great appeal, became an icon of the conservative party’s new “social” profile: Cingapura’s colourful little buildings formed a powerful political image in the city.

Regarding action in cortiços, they were not very significant. As we have seen, cortiços were not the target of public policy in the city until the PT administration from 1989 to 1992. The programme was interrupted during the PPB’s administrations (1992-2000), which did not
Initiative: FAVELA UPGRADING CITY PROGRAMME (1989-92)

Government official: Laura Bueno, co-ordinator of the executive group on favela action of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo (1989-1992)

Residents: Vera Lúcia de Santos and Agnaldo Henrique de Melo community leaders at Favela Vila Flávia

NGO: Geraldo Juncals Jr., Technical advising architect in Grupo Técnico de Apoio/GTA (Technical Support Group) (Geraldo is a former government official. By the time the programme was implemented he was working at the Housing Department. Afterwards, along with other professionals, he started the NGO GTA)

1. Description of the initiative and its impacts

The programme aimed to promote the physical and legal consolidation of existing favelas. Physical action prioritised infrastructure projects, involving the least possible quantity of removals or relocations, and legal actions, partnerships for legal services and a draft bill to grant use. Upgrading projects had the aim of eradicating sanitary risks (water and sewage) and improve accessibility (pavement and lighting). Some interventions were conducted in joint efforts with the support of NGOs. In less than 2 years the programme served 41,338 families, at a cost of US$ 1,100 per family, in an action in favelas whose scale had never been seen before in São Paulo. According to Laura Bueno, maintaining that pace of work, in another 8 years (2 terms) all of São Paulo’s favelas would be upgraded or eradicated.

2. Reasons for successes and failures

The programme had a short life span because it was interrupted by the following administration (Maluf, PPB 1993-1996), which initiated another programme: Cingapura-PROVER. Its main success was having constituted an important reference of public practices in action in favelas, creating paradigms of physical and social intervention, and opening a new field of professional action, with repercussions in universities.

For the community leader, the programme was successful due to the implemented infrastructure projects. The living conditions in the slum improved by 100 per cent. As a result, more people wanted to live in that particular slum, and that is seen by them as an indicator for the better quality of life. As a failure of the programme, they mention that the land tenure was not achieved and they are still fighting for it.

The architect responsible for the co-ordination of the self-help construction considers successful the goals of minimising sanitary risk, risks of landslides, and violence. Also for some favelas, it was the first time they had contact with public policies, which resulted in a better life quality and reduction of violence - police and public services could reach straight alleys were they were not able to before.

3. Lessons Learned

See Table 9

4. Commitment to regular monitoring, feedback and adjustment of policies and programmes

4.1 Budget commitments

Initiative interrupted with the shift of administration in 1993.

4.2 Policy commitments

There was monitoring at the end of the administration with questionnaires conducted in four favelas. The initiative was also evaluated outside the government, through academic studies, especially “Parâmetros técnicos para reurbanização de favelas” (“Technical parameters for favela upgrading”), conducted by the University of São Paulo’s Housing and Human Settlement Lab, with technical co-ordination by Laura Bueno and financing from FINEP (Caixa Econômica Federal)

4.3 Commitment of NGOs to monitoring slum conditions

When the programme was implemented, social movements and church organisations followed closely the definition of criteria to select slums to be upgraded. According to Geraldo Juncals Jr. there were few NGOs involved in monitoring public housing policies compared to the current situation. FASE – Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional (Federation of Agencies for Social and Educational Assistance) was an NGO concerned with this matter that produced some researches on slum upgrading and house policies programmes.

4.4 Commitment of international technical co-operation agencies

– Not applicable

Source:
* MDF: Movement for the Defense of the Favelados (favela dwellers), Social movement founded in 1978 to promote the favelado’s rights and unite local favelas community organizations.
### Table 9: Lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programme officers, government officials</th>
<th>Residents, community leaders</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Importance of context (political, social, economic, cultural, legal)</td>
<td>The positive social context produced understanding between public authorities and slum residents to execute the programme and hire professionals and companies to carry out the project and construction jobs. The adverse political context prevented any legislation or land tenure legalisation action to be approved by the City Council, nor state or federal financing.</td>
<td>The programme occurred in a moment of great organisation of the favela dwellers for their rights and for better living conditions. At that moment they had three people highly involved in community organisation, and their work, motivation and dedication were very important for the selection of that favela for upgrading, and for the organisation of the dwellers for the self-help system (mutirão).</td>
<td>In the 1980s there was an increase in social movements. Housing social movements started to have a great presence on the social scene. The 1989-92 municipal government was the first one to include their claims in a public policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Importance of enablement</td>
<td>The programme's prerogative was to strengthen local organisations, which was important in implementing projects and forming consciousness of civil rights and social change.</td>
<td>The people had to work in self-help system to implement the infrastructure project. Without their enablement, the work could not have been done.</td>
<td>The enablement of people to work just in self-help system is criticised nowadays. People should be enabled to participate in public policies and for self-management. The self-management guarantees a better use of capital and better results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Importance of leadership</td>
<td>The programme's aim was to structure forms of local management and the population's leadership in the upgrading process. The project's sustainability depends on this.</td>
<td>The community leaders were responsible for motivating and organising the favela dwellers to work in self-help system.</td>
<td>The residents' leader is the main agent in the process. The problem comes afterwards. Many of them realised the political power they had and stopped working only for the social movement's cause. Some went to work with politicians. The municipal government worked on leadership enablement and afterwards did not know how to deal with them. There was a lack of specific social programmes for community enablement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Importance of various types of capital</td>
<td>The need for using other funds was recognised. State and federal funding would be allocated for a municipal urban policy, but they were not passed on.</td>
<td>The favelas included in the programme upgrading were suggested by MDF*. It was also necessary to have a local residents' organisation. The improvements in the selected favelas have been done successfully in self-help system due to that kind of organisation.</td>
<td>Not applicable It is necessary to gather as much capital as possible, but it is also important to have subsidies to implement infrastructure projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Importance of correct targeting</td>
<td>To evaluate if the goal were correctly defined, it is essential to check whether there was a real improvement in the population's living conditions and not just the physical result of the construction jobs. However, this is not a common practice in governments.</td>
<td>The social movements defined those who would be included in the programme. We had to negotiate with social movements and church community organisations to define the target. Today we see that technical goals should be more carefully considered.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Other lessons</td>
<td>The absence of technology and technical standards in the area of environmental sanitation to approach actions in favelas correctly.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>We were not able to achieve the land tenure, because there was strong political opposition against us. Nowadays, with the City's Statute (Estatuto da Cidade)** we can go further in this matter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MDF*: Municipal Development Foundation.

**Estatuto da Cidade**: City's Statute.


Resident: Leni Miranda Rocha and Salomé Brito de Barros community leaders and dwellers of Casarão (Celso Garcia Housing Project)

NGO: Francisco Comaru, technical advising engineer in Ação Direta (AD)

1. Description of the initiative and its impacts

The Cortiço intervention programme worked through co-management with public authorities, popular movement and technical advisors to meet the cortiço population's housing needs, by financing associated families or upgrading the cortiço property. It is the first programme aiming to maintain cortiço residents in their place of origin, in the central region of São Paulo. It calls for rejoining plots and producing new housing units, or renovating old buildings and cortiços. Its application, however, was restricted to two pilot projects, conducted in a self-managed joint effort and supported by NGOs. They served a total of 227 families, with an approximate cost of US$ 10,000 per family.

The programme's team has also formulated new legislation for intervention in cortiços and urbanism plans for intervention in neighbourhoods in the central region (begun with the neighbourhood of Pari). It sought to speed up real estate purchasing, passing on resources to homeless associations, who have legal and technical advice to assess the feasibility of new projects.

2. Reasons for successes and failures

The programme was successful in showing interesting paths to produce housing in central regions and formulate a policy with broader bases. Until then there was no experience in this area in São Paulo. Nevertheless, the change in administration interrupted the initiative. The following two administrations did not adopt any housing policy in the central areas, almost exclusively carrying out the Cingapura-PROVER programme. With that, the municipal cortiço programme did not manage to consolidate itself on a relevant scale.

For the population that the programme reached, the improvement in living conditions was evident. The eight-year interruption produced a great deal of stress, but strengthened the struggle both by the populations that were already in the projects and by the cortiço residents' movements for new programmes.

3. Lessons learned

See Table 10

4. Commitment to regular monitoring, feedback and adjustment of policies and programmes

4.1 Budget commitments

The programme had a lot of good will from technical advisors, movements and NGOs, but did not have enough funding. The programme vied for funding with collective work forces in the periphery and favelas (priorities for the new administration). Only in the PT's new administration (2001-present) did a special line of financing for action in cortiços come into existence, within the "Morar Perto" programme.

4.2 Policy commitments

At the end of the first PT administration, a compilation of the cortiços programme's actions was made (1992). Assessments and monitoring, however, were not conducted by the government. Cláudio Manetti affirmed that an assessment of the programme was requested by the University of Hamburg, under the coordination of Maura Bicudo Veras.

AD's evaluation is that, in self-managed policies, monitoring is a practice that is intrinsic to the process.

4.3 Commitment of NGOs to monitoring slum conditions

AD has this concern: post-occupation and housing project cost evaluations that were produced resulted in two master's theses by technical advisors. Advisors continue to monitor the projects in which they participate.

4.4 Commitment of international technical co-operation agencies

– Not applicable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f) Other lessons</th>
<th>Programme officers, government officials</th>
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<td>- A great deal of pressure was put on the team that formulated the policy, due to the short timeframe available for the entire process to be formulated and carried out. Complex public policies such as this one should be able to survive new administrations, but their nature (participatory and strengthening social movements) is contrary to a conservative government.</td>
<td>- The negative social context motivated them to join the social movement that fought for housing rights in their neighbourhood. When the political party PT started the programme and began the first project, the social movement grew. People started to believe they could have some results in their fight.</td>
<td>- Working in conjunction with the population, in a social context of consolidating social movements, the struggle for housing, which was a great learning experience about how to seek adequate solutions for each case. This proximity of the population also resulted in better technical results.</td>
<td></td>
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Table 10: Lessons learned

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<td>- The creation of the first PT administration provided a climate of formulating new projects in partnership with social movements. In the case of cortiços, the housing team was responsible for implementing a policy for this demand for the first time.</td>
<td>- The programme demanded registered community organisation. It is the community leader that organises meetings, negotiates with the responsible for public administration, and prepares conferences for people to understand the housing problem and the programme. These actions prepare them to deal with the public sector and to achieve their goals. They also motivate participation to create new leaderships for the movement to grow.</td>
<td>- The leadership of the process has always been shared between the administration, movements and NGOs. This does not mean there was a lack of conflicts and positions, but a will for open dialogue in formulating a policy. Public experts noticed that leaders in social movements (instead of the government's social workers) were the best actors to mobilise families in different cortiços.</td>
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<td>- Since the beginning, the administration had organised the movement as one of its main discussion partners. The administration sought to ensure access to technical and legal advice for the population, as a form of validating their demands.</td>
<td>- A great deal of pressure was put on the team that formulated the policy, due to the short timeframe available for the entire project. Work with diverse agents - public officials, popular movements and NGOs - contributed to ensuring the programme's sustainability and provide continuity.</td>
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<td>- The programme only had city funds. At the end of the administration a partnership with the state housing company was tried. The federal government withheld municipal funds in retaliation towards the PT and hampered international funding.</td>
<td>- The leaders interviewed did not have information about this.</td>
<td>- During this period, they worked with one main source of funds - projects with public authorities. Having a single source of funding makes the continuity of AO's actions difficult. Currently, contracts are signed by project and not in the form of partnerships, which makes the work's continuity and the entity's survival hard.</td>
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<td>- The two pilot projects can be considered a success, simultaneously combining the formulation of public policy, new legal instruments, popular participation and good architectural designs. The initiative was still restricted because it was the first time a policy for the city's cortiços was formulated and funding was scarce.</td>
<td>- The leaders interviewed did not have information about this.</td>
<td>- Having the strengthening of the population and forming of leaders a priority is an important target for the programme. This is one of the bases for its continuity.</td>
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<td>- The negative social context motivated them to join the social movement that fought for housing rights in their neighbourhood. When the political party PT started the programme and began the first project, the social movement grew. People started to believe they could have some results in their fight.</td>
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<th>g) Importance of partnerships, which makes the work's continuity and the entity's survival hard.</th>
<th>Programme officers, government officials</th>
<th>Residents, community leaders</th>
<th>NGO</th>
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<td>- Since the beginning, the administration had organised the movement as one of its main discussion partners. The administration sought to ensure access to technical and legal advice for the population, as a form of validating their demands.</td>
<td>- The programme demanded registered community organisation. It is the community leader that organises meetings, negotiates with the responsible for public administration, and prepares conferences for people to understand the housing problem and the programme. These actions prepare them to deal with the public sector and to achieve their goals. They also motivate participation to create new leaderships for the movement to grow.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Government official: Elma Gomes, director of the HABI-South division of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo (Sehab) and Maria Lúcia Salum D’Alessandro, co-ordinator of the slum upgrading programme, HABI division of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo (Sehab)

Residents: José Rolim, president of Paraisópolis residents’ association, and Cláudio Fernandes da Costa, director of the Paraisópolis residents’ association (União dos moradores).

NGO: Cristina Peres, Pio XII Social Work (Obra Social Pio XII)

1. Description of initiative and its impacts

The Multi-entities Forum is an initiative of NGOs that work in a dispersed manner in the same favela and decided to form a space for networking in 1994. The aim is to create better conditions for the population in the Paraisópolis, Jardim Colombo and Porto Seguro favelas.

The Forum was created when a new doctor at the region’s health post called the entities together to create a community health agency programme, in 1993. In these meetings, they exchanged experiences about other issues and realised that it would be good for them to meet periodically.

It does not have a political, religious or business nature; it does not have its own funding or formal structure for operation. It is made up of NGOs, government agencies and representatives of the residents of the Paraisópolis favela. The main participants in monthly meetings are the Paraisópolis Residents’ Union, the Morumbi Boys’ Association, the São Geral Monastery’s Paraisópolis Community Centre, Pio XII Social Work, Albert Einstein Hospital in the Community Programme, Family Guidance Post (Jewish Federation), the Arquinhá Day Care Centre (partnership with the city government), Trajetória Casa da Amizade Project, Always Growing Association, Conselho Tutelar Santo Amaro, Paulo Freire Municipal School, Paraisópolis Municipal School, NAE (education nucleus) and the Ponteo Project. It enjoys the occasional participation of city government representatives and the support of a city councillor.

Paraisópolis is the second-largest favela in São Paulo, with an estimated population of 42,900 residents, in an area of 150 hectares (see picture 19). It is located in one of the areas of greatest interest to the city’s real estate market, near the business district and elite residential neighbourhoods. Proposals and projects to remove it have been made over the last few decades. However, intervention attempts have not been feasible due to the fact that the area has numerous small owners, which makes both negotiations for removal and real estate regularisation difficult (see map 9). In addition, legislation on the use and occupation of land (zoning) is very restric-

tive in the region (PMSP, 2001).

With the Forum, the entities began working in a more integrated manner, favouring each one’s work, obtaining better dialogue with public officials, increasing their power to pressurise for improvements and public services.

One of the main initiatives was the “taking an X-ray” of the community’s problems regarding public agencies, and taking the main problems to public agencies in a consistent manner, with figures and arguments. Its actions include drafting an extensive report on the favela’s demand for schooling, which served to apply pressure for expanding a municipal school. According to the community leader Cláudio, the politicians started to make promises just when they are able to implement them, because they realise that the leaders are well informed and cannot be easily tricked. The forum has been gaining recognition and representation.

2. Reasons for successes and failures

The forum is considered a successful initiative for the reasons cited above. Everyone agrees that the main merit is having managed to congregate numerous initiatives, overcoming the former situation of isolation, improving the flow of information on the services provided by the various entities. The reasons for its success, according to Elma Gomes, are the good organisation of actions, the commitment and seriousness among the Forum’s components, periodical meetings, and the participation of representatives from the community. According to Cristina, the Forum has not had good responses to several of the favela’s problems, such as provisional schools, with low quality facilities.

3. Lessons learned

See Table 11

4. Commitment to regular monitoring, feedback and adjustment of policies and programmes

4.1 Budget commitments

Not applicable

4.2 Policy commitments

There is no periodical evaluation. They have already noticed the need to do so, but they lack available time because there are not people with exclusive dedication to the Forum (all of them participate in one of the entities).

4.3 Commitment of NGOs to monitoring slum conditions

They conduct surveys to seek and advocate better living conditions in various areas. They are participating in surveys by the Housing Secretariat. The Forum’s work of gathering information has been an important contribution to the surveys and to defining the city government’s policies.

4.4 Commitment of international technical co-operation agencies

– Not applicable
The description of some of the programmes is enough for us to notice the major differences that exist in formulating and carrying out policies between progressive and conservative administrations. What is interesting is that in the 1990s, both defined actions in favelas as a priority, even though their objectives were opposing. In general terms, the PT tried to carry out favela urbanisation actions, strengthening communities and seeking to tackle the housing deficit, while the PPB, with financial support from the IDB, produced a programme based on major construction projects, interventions located in areas with high visibility and marketing potential. The differences are enlightening and notable, when we observe with whom each party sought to establish dialogue. On the other hand, from the public opinion's point of view, the PT's programme was not highly recognised, while the PPB's had great appeal, became an icon of the conservative party's new "social" profile: Cingapura's colourful little buildings formed a powerful political image in the city.

Regarding action in cortiços, they were not very significant. As we have seen, cortiços were not the target of public policy in the city until the PT administration from 1989 to 1992. The programme was interrupted during the PPB’s administrations (1992-2000), which did not even manage to formulate a new proposal. Currently, however, cortiços, as well as the renovation of the historical central region, have become the centre...
of attention for all levels of government. Major lines of financing for action in cortiços exist or are being prepared, despite the difficulties for them to become reality. Therefore, they need forms of land price control and subsidies that ensure low-income housing in the city’s central region.

Initiatives by NGOs, however varied they may be and despite their reduced social impact (when not articulated by public policies), are closer to communities and have greater continuity. Although they have also suffered shortcomings with the change in administrations, NGOs have played a key role in strengthening popular groups and in expanding their rights. In addition, they also have a greater concern with documenting and monitoring their initiatives.

Finally, São Paulo has been the recipient of important financing projects by international agencies, such as the World Bank and the IDB, which produce a major impact on the city and public budgets. The European Union and Cities Alliance have also devised partnerships with the municipality, as well as dozens of international financing agencies that provide support for NGOs. It would be important for these agencies and organisations to recognise the significant differences between diverse policies and administrations - after all, considering the established goal of a less unequal “world without poverty”, it is necessary to have criteria in defining investments and partnerships.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Annex

List of Maps

Map 1 – Metropolitan Region, Highways and Population Density

Map 2 – São Paulo Main Road and Aerial View of Watersheds

Map 3 – Urban Sprawl in São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 1942-1992


Map 7 – Number of Cortiços and Cortiço Residents by Sectors. Source: CDHU


Map 9 – Paraisópolis Favela Plan on Top of Official Land Parcel Plan. Source: Sehab

List of Photos:

Photo 1 – São Paulo’s “Post Card”: 1st World City?

Photo 2 – Favela (Shantytown) Next to the Business District. Destiny: Eviction, 1995

Photo 3 – Favela (Shantytown) Eviction, 1995

Photo 4 – Favela (Shantytown) in an Area of Watershed Preservation

Photo 5 – Aerial View of Illegal Land Parcel in Watershed Preservation Area

Photo 6 – Children in the Cortiço (Slum Tenement), 2002

Photo 7 – Room in the Cortiço (Slum Tenement), 2002

Photo 8 – Alley in Favela Água Funda, 2002

Photo 9 – Josenilde Dias Da Silva, Slum Resident, Favela Água Funda, 2002

Photo 10 – Josenilde Dias Da Silva and her Children, Favela Água Funda, 2002

Photo 11 – Márcia Aparecida Dos Santos De Souza, Slum Resident and Community Leader of Favela Água Funda, 2002

Photo 12 – Divided Favela: Cingapura Building antttd Shacks, 2002

Photo 13 – Caravan for Housing in Brasília, 2001

Photo 14 – Demonstration Against Cortiço Eviction, 2001

Photo 15 – Empty Building Occupied by the Pro-Housing Social Movement, 2002

Photo 16 – Upgrading Favela (Guarapiranga Programme)

Photo 17 – Upgrading Cortiço: Celso Garcia Project, 2002

Photo 18 – Cingapura Project, 1995

Photo 19 – Aerial View of Paraisópolis Favela, 2001

Pictures by Mariana Fix (1 to 7, 14, 15, 18), Pedro Arantes (8 to 13), Giselle Tanaka (17), Luiz Chiozzotto (1) João Urban (16), Base S.A. (5), PMSP (19)
**List of interviewees:**

Agnaldo Henrique de Mello, slum resident (Vila Flávia favela) and community leader.

Antônio Fernandes de Oliveira, slum tenement resident and community leader.

Cicero Petrica, director of the technical project and construction division of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo, and co-ordinator of PROVER.

Cláudio Fernandes da Costa, director of the Paraisópolis slum residents' association (União dos moradores).


Cristina Peres, co-ordinator of Pio XII Social Work (Obra Social Pio XII).

Eduardo Trani, urban planning director of the Housing and Urban Development State Company (Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de São Paulo, CDHU).

Elma Gomes, director of the HABI-South division of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo (Sehab).

Francisco Comaru, technical advising engineer in Ação Direta (AD).


José Rolim, president of residents' association (União de Moradores), Favela Paraisópolis.

Josenilde Dias da Silva, slum resident, Favela Água Funda.

Laura Bueno, urban planning professor, Univerisity of Campinas, and co-ordinator of the executive group on favela action of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo (1989-1992).

Leni Miranda Rocha, slum resident and community leader of Casarão housing project.

Luiz Kohara, researcher, homeless programme co-ordinator, Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo.

ACRONYMS

Public Agencies and Departments:

CEF – Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal bank)

CDHU – Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de São Paulo (Housing)

CMSP – Câmara Municipal de São Paulo (São Paulo City Council)

FINEP – Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (Studies and Projects Financer of CEF and Urban Development Company of São Paulo State Government)

HABI – Superintendência de Habitação Popular da SEHAB (division of the Urban and Housing Development Department of the City of São Paulo - SEHAB)

PMSP - Prefeitura do Município de São Paulo (São Paulo City Government)

PRO-AIM – Programa de Aprimoramento das Informações de Mortalidade no Município de São Paulo (Improvement Programme for Mortality Information in the Municipality of São Paulo of the Health Department of São Paulo City Government)

SEHAB– Secretaria de Habitação e Desenvolvimento Urbano da Prefeitura do Município de São Paulo (Housing and Urban Development Department of São Paulo City Government)

SEEMPLA – Secretaria de Planejamento do Município de São Paulo (Planning Department of São Paulo City Government)

Research Institutes:

DIEESE – Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos (Inter-Trade Union Department of Statistic and Socio Economic Studies)

FGV-RJ – Fundação Getúlio Vargas – Rio de Janeiro (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)

FIPE – Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômica (Economic Research Institute Foundation)

IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute)

IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada do Ministério do Planejamento do Governo Federal (Institute for Research on Applied Economics of the Federal Government’s Planning Department)

SEADE – Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (State Data Analysis Foundation)

Programmes and Public Policies:

PAC – Programa de Atuação em Cortiços (Action on Cortiços Programme)

PAR – Programa de Arrendamento Residencial (Residential Leasing Programme)

Political Parties:

PC do B – Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)

PDT – Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Workers’ Party)

PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)

PPB – Partido Progressista Brasileiro (Brazilian Progressive Party)

PPS – Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party)

PSB – Partido Socialista do Brasil (Brazilian Socialist Party)

PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party)

PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)

PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party)

University:

FAU-USP – Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo da Universidade de São Paulo (School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of São Paulo)

FFLCH-USP – Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo (Languages and Social Sciences School of the University of São Paulo)
NGOs and Social Movements:

AD – Ação Direta Assessoria em Habitação (Direct Action, Technical Support on Housing - NGO)

GTA – Grupo Técnico de Apoio (Technical Support Group - NGO)

MDF – Movimento de defesa dos favelados (Movement for the Defense of Favela Dwellers)

Others:

HDI – human development index

IDB – Inter-American Development Bank

IPTU – Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano (Land Use Tax)

ISS – Imposto Sobre Serviços (Service tax)

SECOVI – Sindicato das Empresas de Compra, Venda, Locação, Administração e Loteamentos de Imóveis e dos Edifícios em Condomínios Residenciais e Comerciais (Association that represents the Sales, Purchasing, Rental and Administration of Residential and Commercial Real Estate Companies of São Paulo)

SM – Salário Mínimo (minimum monthly wage)