The case of
Rabat - Salé, Morocco

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CITY

A. THE URBAN CONTEXT

1. National Overview

Located in Northwest Africa, Morocco has both a Mediterranean and an Atlantic coast. The country is bordered by Algeria and Mauritania. Its total surface area is about 710,850 km², a large part being mountainous. The country is divided into 16 regions. According to the last census (1994), the total population was about 28 million, while the first post-independence census in 1960 registered only 11.5 million (Ministère de la prévision économique et du Plan, 1999, a).

Since the end of the 1990s, Morocco has undergone a process of democratisation after the political closure which had characterised the country since the 1960s. This process, among others, is linked with the fact that a so-called “alternative” government came to power, in which the left-wing political opposition holds several portfolios. However, four ministries are still sovereign ministries and the appointment of ministers depends on the palace. The process of democratisation has accelerated thanks to the new King (Mohamed VI) who has emphasised the importance of social issues, poverty, governance and equality between men and women. However smooth this transition, it entailed some difficulties, especially a slow process of decision-making in economic policy. The drought, which lasted several years, caused even more problems, especially in the development of agriculture. In 2001, the World Bank pointed out that economic growth is low, mainly because of agriculture’s poor contribution to overall growth (World Bank, 2001). Moreover, the manufacturing sector has not developed much, resulting in unemployment and poverty in urban areas. However, the tertiary sector has developed well (especially tourism and information technology). Poverty affects about 20 per cent of the population and urban unemployment 22 per cent.

There is still a huge gap between rural and urban areas. The female education rate in rural primary schools rose from 28 per cent to 47 per cent over the 1991-1998 period (World Bank, 2001). Nevertheless, the country is still lagging behind all comparable countries in the region. Still, gaps have been narrowed thanks to the efforts made in the framework of rural infrastructure programmes (electricity, drinking water and roads). The health system has remained much less developed than in most comparable countries in the region. Although life expectancy has extended to 67 years and most people benefit from vaccinations, many indicators remain low. Mother and infant mortality rates for example are higher than the overall average and here too, there is a great gap between urban and rural areas.
1.1 Urban Development Characteristics

The Maghreb in general is characterised by an urban history with traces of very old cities and urban cultures, together with an accelerated recent urbanisation process. At the beginning of the 20th century, city dwellers hardly formed 6 per cent of the total population. According to the most recent official estimates, the urban population is expected to reach 60 per cent around 2005 (Ministère chargé de la population, 1997). Initially, the urbanisation process resulted from an important process of rural depopulation. This still causes important variations in the suburbs of large cities, especially during the drought periods. However, it is generally thought, especially after the last general census of the population (1994), that the current growth of towns is principally due to the natural growth of their populations.

Furthermore, French colonisation made decisive choices regarding urban settlement, by setting up its focal points on the coast. The choices they made brought lasting changes to the development of the national territory by choosing Rabat as an administrative capital, strengthening Casablanca’s position as an economic capital and building a port in Kenitra (ex-Port Lyautey). Independence did not change these decisions, but only tried to reduce their negative effects. The Kenitra-Casablanca Atlantic axis is thus inhabited by 34 per cent of the total Moroccan urban population. It provides the country with 60 per cent of its national industrial turnover. The region drew in more than 40 per cent of the migrant population settled in the large towns of the kingdom.

After independence a policy for the development of the whole territory was adopted, whose aim was to bridge the gaps between the different regions. This development policy included among others the overall urbanisation of the territory and the strengthening of the urbanisation process including that of areas which were hardly urbanised. The effects of such a policy are quite different from one region to another. Recently concern for a more generalised and better balance has inspired a set of measures which are meant to encourage decentralisation and the development of the territory as a whole. However, there is a tendency to favour the development of activities and services in the Atlantic axis and of areas which are more open to trade and international exchange.

2. The History of Rabat-Sale

The first urban settlements on the site of the present city date to the Roman era and the Sala Colonia. The Romans did not settle on the right-bank of the Bouregreg River, the site of present day Salé, but on the left bank. However, the embryo of the present day twin-city only began to develop in he 12th century. The two cities, often presented as rivals, seem on the contrary, to have always been strongly complementary to each other. In the 12th century Rabat was a fortified town and a garrison - a ribat – used by the Almohad dynasty to launch the Holy War in Spain. It was later made a true city (Ribat el Fath) by Abou Youssef Yacoub, called Al Mansour, in the 13th century. It was already connected to Salé, a very active city in craft industries and commerce, by a wooden bridge. The arrival of morisco and andalous populations with the decline and collapse of the Andalous kingdom of Spain, led to the development of the left bank, of two distinct cores, the Kasbah (now called the “Oudaïas”), and the médina.

During the 17th century, these three entities (two on the left bank and one on the right bank) formed the "Republic
of Two Banks”, enjoying a true political autonomy. Even if the two banks’ functions were not exclusive, each one’s specific roles were clear. Rabat had the political and military functions as well as control of the territory. Salé had the port, the shipyard, economic activity, commerce, intense exchange relations with the rural world and piracy on the sea. The decline of this last activity later led the two cities to turn towards the interior of the country and to gradually lose their maritime activities.

By the end of the 19th century, just before colonisation, Rabat and Salé constituted a small, but quite dynamic urban centre of 30,000 inhabitants. The complementarity of the two cities and the increasing flux of the population and merchandise are attested to by the European traveller-observers of the time. However, they were of secondary importance, compared to Fez or Casablanca. The region’s future destiny was established in 1912, with Lyautey’s decision to use Rabat as the administrative capital. He entrusted Prost with the urban development plan. This plan, designed in 1914, remained until 1947 the only control tool for the city’s development. A city planned for Europeans, with a will to separate the “natives” from the Europeans, (even if this will was not always followed as predicted, to the great displeasure of Prost, (cf. J. Abu Lughod, 1980, p.196 and following). The consequences are well known: “the first bidonvilles had begun to form in Douar Doum in 1921, and in Douar Debbagh just one year later. By 1947, these shack towns would contain over 25,000 inhabitants, more than had occupied the entire médina of Rabat in 1913” (ibid p.200).

Moreover, from this time the demographic surplus tended to pour into Salé, where the slums of Douar Jedid and Douar Smala began to develop in the 30s (Naciri, 1965). Both médinas suffered, by the end of the 40s, from higher densities than ever before, climbing from 400 inhabitants/ha to 758 inhabitants/ha in Rabat, and 240 to 650 inhabitants/ha in Salé (Mauret, 1953). The peri-urban slum extensions absorbed part of this growth in the Moroccan population.

### 3. The Physical City

**Rabat - Salé** is part of the Rabat agglomeration, which also includes Témara.

The climate is temperate and the atmosphere is quite humid, due to the double influence of the ocean and the river. The mean annual temperature is 17°C. Rainfall varies widely. The annual mean for the last ten years is 559.8 mm, but large differences can be registered from year to year. The towns are located on two plateaux on
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Figure 3: Expansion of the City if Rabat-Sale

Figure 4: Urban structure of Rabat-Sale at the beginning of 1990s
either bank of the River Bouregreg. Rabat has an area of 9,526 ha, and Salé 15,095 ha (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme et de l’environnement, 2002d). According to the same study, population density is 67.8 inhabitants/ha for Rabat and 46.5 inhabitants/ha for Salé (figures based on the 1998 population estimates). The urbanised areas are situated on either side of the agricultural valley of Bourregreg (about 3,000 ha). A green belt of 1,200 ha is supposed to prevent urbanisation south of Rabat and to separate it from Témara. North of Salé, the agricultural zone of Bouknadel is supposed to ensure continuity between the Forest of Mamora and the coast (SDAU of Rabat – Salé, 1995).

Both towns are characterised by having their old districts on the sea, but turning their backs to it. The typology of the two cities is largely similar, but they differ in regard to the space occupied by each “type”. In Rabat, the initial development of the city beyond the médina consists of the beautiful, imposing colonial part. Beyond this there are villas and cheap modern housing. This development tendency continued after independence and the development of the legal town is mostly due to public building programmes meant for more or less well-off people as well as social housing more particularly developed since the 1950s. However, the city includes some poorly equipped districts, slums and illegally built houses, mostly old. All attempts at building new illegal districts inside the city have been severely repressed. In Salé, the colonial town only consists of a few residential districts which formed the first urban extensions around the médina. Most of the town’s development after independence consists of legally-built social housing and slums and illegally-built houses. In the last 20 years the latter comprised more than half of urban growth. Both legal and illegal developments give Salé the role of Rabat’s dormitory town. Last of all in that assignment is the so-called “new town” of Sala Al Jadida, which is actually very similar to some European suburbs.

4. Demographics

According to the last census, 1994 (Ministère chargé de la population, 1996), Rabat had 623,457 inhabitants and Salé 579,850 inhabitants. The whole population is now estimated at about 1,350,000. With an annual rate of growth of 3.2 per cent, the growth of the Wilaya has been the highest in the country since 1982. But *these dynamics should be put in perspective; in fact, they should be understood within the new administrative divisions. Thus, it seems difficult to distinguish the annexed population –the one that was already there in 1982 (…) and that newly counted in the urban area. In the Salé préfecture, the Layada council creation will now include the inhabitants of irregular settlements such as Oued-Dehheb, that were at the edge of the previous urban limits.* (Allain-Mansouri, 2001, p23). The mean household size is lower than the national mean (5.87 in 1994), with quite important variations since Salé's mean is 5.5 and Rabat's is 4.8. Rabat’s population structure by sex and age shows almost equal figures between men and women, and a predominance of the 15-59 age group. This group, including students and the economically active population is over-represented compared to the national situation (66.4 per cent versus 55.9 per cent). In Salé, the gender structure is quite similar, with a light predominance of men (50.4 per cent), though the age structure shows a smaller 15-59 age group of 60 per cent. Conversely, the under 15 age group is lower than the national level (33.8 percent versus 37 percent) (Ministère de la prévision économique et du plan, 1999, b).

The rate of illiteracy is lower than (Rabat, 26.4 per cent) or equal to (Salé, 37 per cent) the national level (37 per cent in urban areas, 55 per cent global), but it shows significant differences between men and women, and between the different municipalities. Women remain behind, with 35.9 per cent illiteracy in Rabat (men, 16.6 per cent) and 49.5 per cent in Salé (Men, 24.5 per cent). The municipalities where slums are concentrated (Yacoub el Mansour and Youssoufia in Rabat, Layada in Salé) show much higher rates. This is particularly true in Salé, where the Layada rate is 53.4 per cent (38.8 for men and 68.9 for women). As far as the percentage of children in full-time education is concerned, the rates are higher in Rabat (69.7) and lower in Salé (72.8 per cent), the urban national rate being 83.9 per cent (idem).

5. The Urban Economy

As a capital, the prefecture of Rabat has an original situation within the Wilaya. In fact, almost 75 per cent of the working population are employed in the tertiary sector. The administrative function predominates (39.4 per cent). It is followed by services (17 per cent) and commerce (14.7 per cent). In fact, the economic activity of Rabat is centred upon the public departments that reinforce the majority of other activities (commerce, services). This characteristic means the state is the biggest employee in the region of Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer with an administrative staff representing 19 per cent of the total number of Moroccan civil servants. In 1998, the staff working in the public sector in the city of Rabat numbered 66,323 - 40,047 being male. (Ministère de la prévision économique et du plan, 1999, b).

The economic activity of Salé is mainly based on industry, commerce and services. In fact, Salé city appears to be the first city at the regional level as regards employment (about 15,860 permanent workers), turnover and production. However, the majority of its working population is employed in Rabat, essentially
in the administrative sector (*Ministère de la prévision économique et du plan*, 1999, b).

In general terms, levels of economic activity in Rabat are higher than the national average. In fact, the activity rate, defined as the relationship between the working population and the total population, is 42.6 per cent in Rabat, according to the 1994 census, compared to a national urban average of 34.2 per cent, and with an unemployment rate of 19 per cent. If this unemployment rate is higher than the national average (16 per cent), it still remains inferior to the national urban rate (20.3 per cent). In Salé, the occupation rate is 37 per cent. However, this occupation rate includes an important gap between the sexes. Men represent 52.8 per cent compared to 21.4 per cent for women.

In Rabat, the working population is basically divided into the salaried class (81 per cent) and the self-employed workers (13 per cent). The remaining 6 per cent includes other statutes. In Salé, the division of working population shows a predominance of salaried employees with a proportion of 73.7 per cent followed by self-employed workers at 20 per cent of the active population. The presence of clothing and carpet manufactures and a very active craft industry explains the important proportion of salaried people (*Ministère chargé de la population*, 1996).

6. Governance

Rabat and Salé form part of the Wilaya of Rabat-Salé which consists of four *préfectures*. The urban part of the cities is administered by three *préfectures*, two of which (Rabat and Salé-médina) consist solely of urban districts, whereas the third (Sala Al Jadida) comprises both urban and rural districts (see Map 3).

The particularly important authority structure, supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, (a so-called Sovereign Ministry - directly appointed by the King), relates to the city’s capital status. In addition the urban territory is divided into municipalities whose counsellors and presidents are elected and are relatively autonomous - especially as far as urban management is concerned.

Division into districts thus favours decentralisation to a certain extent and brings districts quite close to the population. There are five districts in Rabat and five in Salé. In terms of urban development, important decisions are made by Urban Agencies which, before the new government was set up, were directly supervised by the Ministry of Interior. However since the introduction of the new government, they have been managed by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, Housing and the Environment.

Civil society is relatively uninvolved in the urban development and management except - paradoxically - in some illegally built districts. This is particularly the case in the illegal parts of Salé where legalisation has, since the 1980s, been based on the obligatory creation of district associations and committees. The objective of such a set-up is twofold: for the association to take care of the development tasks, and to be involved in the process of "urban adjustment". The association itself must formulate the terms by resorting to a private architectural and town planning agency. In such districts, these associations’ growing strength can affect life in the district, for the associations have become breeding grounds for those who want to participate in district management as well as groups which, though loosely structured, are seen by local representatives as intermediaries and hence, are greatly "wooed" by them. But this situation is peculiar to districts which are being legalised. Legally built districts, illegal ones and slums are less affected by these organisations, and as such, civil society only expresses its will through municipal elections (Abouhani, 1988, 1997 a et b; El Adlouni, 1994; Navez-Bouchanine, 2000).
II. SLUMS AND POVERTY

B. Types of Slums in Rabat-Sale

1. Slum Typologies

The Rabat agglomeration has more or less the same kinds of slums as at the national level: shantytowns, illegal settlements (currently called “clandestine”) and the old city centres (médinas). These will be presented in accordance with their chronological appearance. As will be shown below, the most important sector is the illegal settlements with a total of 80,466 households. The shantytowns come next with 15,279 households (1998 estimations) and finally the médinas with 1,233 households (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, 2002, d).

1.1 The Médinas

The médinas of Rabat and in Salé cannot be said to be deteriorated. In fact, compared to other médinas such as in Fès, these two médinas are comparatively well-preserved. Parts of them are damaged, and recently built, and the old parts of them have already been partially rearranged. For some districts, the only problem is one of urban development since the quality of housing is fair. The damaged houses cannot be delimited geographically speaking. For example, there is a particular type of construction - the fondouks - which used to be places for transit and trade and which have been inhabited. Some are highly populated and deteriorated. People living there are of different kinds: some are rural migrants, but there are fewer and fewer of them, and some are urban dwellers who have become poor.

1.2 Intra-Muros Old Shantytowns

These are slums - precarious buildings made of sheet metal or adobe - on rented or squatted plots of land which usually date back to the 1960s. In Salé, Sehb el Caïd is the best example, and in Rabat Douar Kora and Douar el Graa. At the time they were created, they were relatively peripheral and should have been integrated into the city as it developed, but this did not happen. In the meantime, they have evolved. These slums have been gradually and partially built with permanent materials. They generally have benefited from some urban integration, with services which were not necessarily meant for them. Sehb el Caïd for instance has benefited from cleaning-up. Moreover, the population itself has improved many tertiary roads, rail and waterways and has organised garbage collection. Slums which have existed for a long time - however illegal - have often been tolerated.

More serious are the cases of Douar and Koraa. These are places which are completely unplanned. Non-continuation of the integration policy has made these into highly populated and difficult to suppress slums. People living in these slums are of diverse origins but they are mostly from the countryside. The great majority of them have lived in the same slums for a long time.

1.3 Peripheral Shantytowns

Oued Akreuch and Douar Diss in Rabat, Karyane el Oued in Salé, though initially nearly the same as the above-mentioned slums (precarious buildings made of sheet-metal or adobe, on rented or squatted plots of land), have more recently been consolidated and extended. Their peculiarity lies in the fact that they are less well serviced and their urban integration is lower than that of the other settlements. However, the populations of these slums have tried hard to bring improvements and organise garbage collection. However different their origins, the majority of inhabitants come from rural areas. Karyane el Oued is a rural district which has been absorbed the city.

1.4 Illegal Districts

These have a complex status. They consist of concrete buildings which more or less resemble traditional buildings, or cheap houses, but the difference is that they have been built on purchased plots of land but without any permits. Because they are illegal, these districts are also often deprived of basic collective services and infrastructure. However, depending on how old they are and on whether they are going through a legalisation process, their situations vary greatly. This is why they cannot be thought of as similar to the previous categories or to the slum category in general. In addition to old housing estates which gradually occupied gardens and market gardens, without an overall development plan (for instance Hajja and Maadid in Rabat), there are more recent, large-scale settlements. These, though, have been more clearly “designed” in terms of anticipatory attempts at legality, and they are similar from every point of view to legal housing (street networks, division into blocks, size and homogeneity of plots of land). An example is Sidi Taibi, a huge housing estate which so far has not gone through the process of legal urbanisation. Meanwhile, most of the settlements which began the legalisation process 15 years ago have not attained their objectives yet. Most of them are still considered districts with problems of inefficient or non-extensive cleaning services, narrow streets and over-population.

Legalisation has often led to vertical extensions of the houses. The inhabitants of the illegal districts are even more heterogeneous than in the other areas discussed, both in terms of origins and in socio-economic terms, because these illegal settlements have been a way of acceding to property for the middle classes who did not benefit from distributions made by the state.
2. Official Definitions of Slums

There are five categories of housing officially recognised for the design of different policy approaches.

2.1 Shantytowns and the Eradication / Reduction Policy

This was the first category of slums to be recognised, and the one which resulted in the greatest public efforts. The term refers to any settlement of precarious housing (corrugated iron, adobe, wood, mixture) on private plots of land, or with the settlers being provisionally tolerated on state or district-owned land. The main policy aimed at the inhabitants of these settlements consists in resettling them in public housing estates. Restructuring policies are much rarer. Until quite recently no difference was made between intra-muros highly urbanised slums and peripheral slums.

2.2 Illegal Housing Districts and the Legalisation Policy

From the point of view of its importance, the time it appeared, the name it was given and the political actions taken, this is the second category of housing. What is meant by illegal housing districts is any settlement which has been built without a permit on a privately acquired plot of land. This implies that the illegal divisions of plots of land has occurred, as they were in zones which were either in areas prohibited for urbanisation, or beyond zones which were urbanised at the time of settlement. Demolition operations are actually rather rare, and these districts are mostly going through the legalisation process. This process consists of urban adjustments, standardising infrastructures and setting up urban services.

2.3 Deteriorated Central Areas (Médinas) and Urban Renewal

These districts have been overlooked by the ideal of “saving” the médinas. It was only much later that they were recognised as a category for which slum policies should be made. There was greater concern for the conservation of the historical heritage than for the inhabitants’ miserable housing. After the original idea of depopulating the districts, the authorities realised the importance of the socio-economic aspect, and of letting part of the médina population remain there for the sake of their survival. There are ideas of renovation, but they are still undeveloped.

2.4 Rural Douars Integrated into the Urban Area

A fourth category is that of the peri-urban douars. These are often dealt with in the same way as the illegal housing areas, but in terms of definition, the douars are more similar to the shantytowns. In the particular context of the South of Morocco - with a hot and dry climate - this category forms a peculiar local type. Buildings are not made of precarious materials but with earth, which is a traditional material in the region, and include rather luxurious houses.

2.5 Diffuse Substandard Housing

No policy has been defined for this category, which mainly relates to the occupancy of premises which are not meant for long term living, such as hotels.

3. Unofficial Definitions of Slums

The definitions, names, concepts of the different types of slums vary greatly according to the type of slums and the social categories which talk about them.

3.1 Bidonvilles

The most emblematic type of slums for all social groups, is the bidonville (French for shantytown). This word is used to refer to one particular category of housing in the framework of intervention policies. In literary Arabic there are different words used, but the most usual is mudun safi - literally metal towns. The inhabitants of the shantytowns call them brarék (huts, shacks) or karyan (quarries). The view the upper classes have on them is rather ambiguous. Although all agree on the fact that the populations of slums are poor, their rural origins - even though these are neither obvious nor recent - are recalled in order to deprive them of any form of urban benefits and above all, to account for the filthiness and urban disorder which are caused by the existence of these districts in the city.

Confusion between external appearance and internal arrangement is all the greater as most upper and middle class people have never actually entered a shack or zriba². Besides, the deteriorated housing is confused
with the mentality and behaviour of the slums dwellers, who are viewed as deviants, thieves, bandits - in a word, as dangerous people. Deteriorated housing and deteriorated morality are considered as one. In the same line, these people are regarded by the upper and middle classes "savages", uneducated and uncivil. As a result, there are rather strong terms such as lahbach (in dialect Arabic, "to be erased from the map"). There is another aspect especially among public agents: they have doubts about the poverty of the slums dwellers and are convinced that many of the latter live in these districts only with a view to benefiting from measures taken to provide access to housing. Although a small percentage of households are in the above-described situation, that is they have two dwellings just in case, it is evident that such a situation is far from relevant for the majority of slum inhabitants.

Newspapers relay this type of vision, but also sometimes develop an "objective" discourse, occasionally closer to the official vision. Moreover, some newspapers adopt a protest position and denounce the stagnation and the failure of interventions.

As for the shantytown populations themselves, their views vary from one town to another and from one slum to another. It is thus difficult to generalise, except for a few common features:

Most slum dwellers have ambiguous feelings. On the one hand they are afraid of being ousted. This is justified by their past experience, or by experiences they have heard of. On the other hand, they have a feeling of legitimacy, which may be based on a wide range of factors such as merely belonging to the nation or town concerned - "we are citizens", "we are Moroccans as well", "we are citizens like the others" (thereby meaning "we have the right of having what the others have"). In some cases, legitimacy may mean more: participation in the struggle for independence (especially in Casablanca), the fact of tilling a plot of land which was neither inhabited nor appropriate for living on (Tetouan), or because of the explicit intentions of the initial owner of the land (who wanted to donate them some land), proximity to the workplace, or even more recently, the fact of being on one's own territory (the case of Karyan el Oued in Salé). Besides, this council estate has served to provide housing for other displaced slums dwellers - which makes its inhabitants think that it should serve first and foremost the people living in the district.

3.2. The Habitat Clandestin

The second most discussed form of slum is illegal housing which is called in French habitat clandestin (clandestine housing), quite a euphemistic term considering the great visibility of these districts. In Arabic, they are called médina achouaïa (literally, non-organised, messy town). Although composition of these districts, in socio-economic terms, and in terms of the inhabitants' origins is more easily accepted by upper and middle class people, there are still many fantasies about such types of housing, which are associated with "urban abnormality" - they are inhabited by undisciplined, wild, filthy and uneducated people.

Newspapers, which for a long time mostly pointed out the disorder of these districts, seem to have diversified their point of view. They recently shifted to a new approach, putting the emphasis on the reprehensible behaviour of the other stakeholders (owners, informal developers, elected people, authorities), arguing that they derive a maximum benefit from the critical situation of disadvantaged inhabitants.

As far as the inhabitants are concerned, they are confident they are legitimate owners of the land and that they are full citizens who have not found any other decent solution to access to property. Their precarious status does not matter as much as the bad living conditions they suffer from. However, their commitment to looking for a solution (lobby or direct action) varies very much from one case to another.

3.3 The Médinas

Contrary to expectations, there is much less vocabulary for the médina districts. The only specific term for slums here is the word fondouks (see above). But there is still an automatic link made between the deterioration of housing and rural depopulation. For most middle and upper class people, the only valid reason for the decline of the médina seems to be related to the urban families leaving it and being replaced by rural migrants. No matter that studies have shown the impact on deterioration of the division of jointly-held property and of multi-rent - including to poor urban families (Megzari, 1984).

Households affected by the deterioration of the médina feel themselves quite legitimate as far as their status is concerned, whether as owners or tenants. Although the latter usually pay very low rents, they do not accept that, because of the lack of real common management, maintenance is not ensured by the joint owners, whom they think are responsible for it. In the particular case of multiple rents, they think that the owners, despite rents which indeed may be low, still have an important general income and should thus somehow contribute to maintenance. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that buildings are very old and that it is difficult to renovate traditional houses with modern materials and techniques. The lack of public assistance - including from the technical point of view - as far as maintenance and improvement of traditional buildings are concerned is also a recurrent theme.
C. OFFICIAL DEFINITION OF POVERTY

1. The Bases of Official Definitions

Definitions of poverty began to be the subject to specific discussions at the national level from the end of the 80s. A double approach existed. As far as direct action towards poor people was concerned, the local authorities issued an “indigence certificate” (to give poor people free access public services). This certificate was delivered to the people considered poor, a heterogeneous group. In terms of government analysis, definitions and thresholds assessed by the World Bank were accepted or criticised. The standards of living survey carried out by the Department of Statistics (Ministère chargé de l’incitation de l’économie, 1993; Ministère de la Prévision Economique et du Plan, 2001) may be considered as one of the first steps in a more complex approach to poverty, refuting the approach based on the analysis of spending levels. The new approach reached its zenith after the second standards of living survey 1998-1999, from which the following analyses are summarized:

The determination of the food poverty threshold aims at estimating the cost of a food basket that guarantees the nutritional energy level of 2,000 kilo-calories, per person per day, taking into account the national habits of food consumption. At 1990/91 prices, the cost of this basket was estimated at DH 1,442 (10 dh = ca. 0.9 euro) per person per year. Based on the evolution of the living index cost in urban and rural areas, since 1991, we note that the food poverty threshold has risen in 1998, to DH 1,962 per person per year in the cities and to DH 1,878 in the countries(…).

The estimation of the global poverty threshold is equivalent to the food poverty threshold increased with non-food expenses of those who effectively reach the food poverty threshold. The estimation of the poverty threshold obtained through the present method was established in 1998/99 at DH 3,922 in urban areas and DH 3,037 in rural areas.

(…) as the thresholds are expressed per person per year, a household is said to be poor when it has an average annual total expense per person inferior to the determined poverty threshold. As to the rate of poverty, it corresponds to the percentage of the population living below both the urban and rural thresholds as so drawn.

In the cities, the poverty rate in 1998/99 was 12 per cent compared to 7.6 per cent in 1990/91 and 13.8 per cent in 1984/85. In rural areas, the poverty rate was estimated at 27.2 per cent in 1998/99 against 18 per cent in 1990/91 and 26.7 per cent in 1984/85 (Ministère de la Prévision Economique et du Plan, 2001, pp.27-37).

These progresses in analysis have gradually resulted in approaches in which degrees of poverty are distinguished, with exclusion, precariousness and insufficiency of incomes being increasingly dealt with separately. The elaboration of the Social Development Strategy, in 1993, still had a very restrictive definition of poverty. But during the 1990s, different departments have also attempted to find more acute and operational definitions. The recent creation of the Social Development Agency (2000) has relaunched the debate and pointed to the need for an approach in operational terms.

2. Unofficial Definitions of Poverty

2.1 Popular Understandings of Poverty

The theme of poverty has not been treated by the press for long. It is only during the 1990s that a discourse was developed on the issue. The press is ambiguous, but we may say that it has been characterised by a double discourse: on the one hand, relaying the official discourse on poverty, on the other hand, letting out occasional aggressive comments towards the poor, and considering poverty as deviance, and even social decay.

At the middle and well-off social levels, poverty is often reduced to the level of lack of money and resources. Other shortages such as difficult access to urban services, discrimination and so on are not understood as components of poverty. On the other hand, considering poverty as anomie or deviancy is very frequent and it is relatively common that poor people are held responsible for their situation.

2.2 The Poor’s Understanding of their Own Poverty

Among the poor people themselves, it is difficult to give a dominant assessment of what poverty represents, since definitions vary according to the populations’ objective living conditions. In Morocco, a few approaches, mainly qualitative, have paid attention to these issues, in slums (F. Navez-Bouchanine, 1982, 1983, 1997, 2002) or peri-urban settlements (S. Abousalam, 1992), or in the médinas (but see N. Lahbil-Tagemouati, 1995, 1996, 2002). On the other hand, some interesting approaches are to be found in post-evaluations devoted to resettling or rehousing operations. We will resume here a set of themes associated with poverty in these qualitative studies.

The most current definition describes poor as people having no financial means because they have no job or stable occupation, irregular activity being badly remunerative. Precariousness, instability, fear of tomorrow are the dominant elements of this picture. Moreover, these conditions constitute one of the principal motivations to settle in slums because this latter guarantees even social decay.

A dimension widely developed by the oldest intra-muros slum dwellers is lack of access to urban serv-
ices. This is particularly perceptible in the discourse of those who are waiting for an intervention and by those who have been moved to the peripheries. The reasoning is quite complex, but very logical. Poor people need proximity and are incapable of assuming the urban mobility.

There is also a social helplessness linked directly to poverty (N. Lahbil-Tagemouati, to appear in 2003), which is a consequence but also an indicator of poverty. “Contempt” (hogra) is experienced both with public actors and with the social environment. A woman from Doum said for instance that she feels a stranger in her own country: she does not understand the procedures and does not know to whom she can address herself, since she always meets impatience and contempt to her repeated requests. With regard to the environment, the populations of the neighbouring houses are reputed to have a disdainful and a hostile behaviour: the slum dwellers accuse them of throwing their excess garbage on the slum side of the road. Two remarks are recurrently underlined: “we do not want our children to play with theirs, because in case of a problem, we will not be able to save face with their parents” and “if it goes to the authorities, we will never win the case”.

Poverty as a gap between the poor and the well-off (relative poverty) concerns more and more people. The spread of consumption models and commercial advertisements on TV increases the dissatisfactions and frustrations of the poor households. They wish to gain access to modern consumption patterns from which they are deprived (F. Navez-Bouchanine, 2001).

D. ORIGIN OF THE SLUMS IDENTIFIED IN RABAT-SALE

1. Médinas

The deterioration of some parts of the two médinas (old neighbourhoods of the pre-colonial city) originated, as in other Moroccan cities, in the abandonment of a housing model by middle and well-off classes, who wanted to migrate to new neighbourhoods, and the exodus of economic activities and craft workers. This double loss impoverished some neighbourhoods. Lack of maintenance of houses subsequently rented room by room lead to a rapid deterioration, whereas renewal movements, private or public, have not appeared as yet. However, commercial and service activities, as well as a number of craft activities have remained important. Thus, the médinas continue to constitute a source of informal, irregular and provisional employment allowing underprivileged populations to live and work there. Médinas have attracted poor external populations, but have been widely supplanted in this function by the illegally-built neighbourhoods.

2. Intra-Muros Old Slums

These have existed for at least thirty years. The result of rural immigration and voluntary or forced interurban movements, they should have been integrated to the city, but this has not been done yet. The history of each one is specific, but generally the first embryos developed with the spontaneous settlement either of the only land available for ownership access, or because of proximity to industrial occupations. In some cases, the first embryo was not spontaneous, but was a reception network created by the state to gather various slums that should have developed.

3. Peripheral Slums

The original settlement of these followed the same logic as the previous category – access to land ownership or economic activities (such as the quarry and municipal garbage dump of Oued Akreuch). However, their history is less “marked” by the authorities and they have a less “stable” situation, but are still able to accommodate new populations because they are less dense. The heterogeneity of both the households and of economic activities, is marked.

4. Illegally Built or Clandestine Neighbourhoods

The oldest of these are today completely integrated into the urban fabric, and most people are ignorant of their origins. The first settlements were on lands with particular legal statutes, and the use of the land was let
(the inhabitants were designated as *zinataries* of *zina* law, a statute facilitated through a land transfer or particular property statutes). The most recent settlements (since the 70s) began either as large agricultural properties that owners have divided up clandestinely, into plots (Bled Cheikh Lemfaddel, in Salé), or small truck farming plots let mostly to “retail” by small farmers (Sidi Moussa in Salé is a good a example). The origins of purchasers are very varied, but with a majority of lower middle class occupiers who found that these neighbourhoods were the only opportunity of becoming owners and building a house. A number of minor officials and servicemen are in the same situation.

### E. DATA AVAILABLE CITY’S SLUMS

Official as well as unofficial data are limited. Most recent estimates show that one third of the region’s population lives in the main forms of substandard or irregular housing.

Geographical distribution is far from being homogenous: shantytowns are present everywhere but are particularly concentrated at the edges of the urban area (Shkirat-Témara, Salé), while the irregular settlements are mainly in Salé and its northern region (Sidi Taïbi). The médinas are in the urban core of Rabat and Salé.

1. **Shantytowns**

   The Local plan for housing and urban development the most recent official tool and basis (Ministère de l’Aménagement du territoire, de l’urbanisme, de l’environnement et du développement urbain, 2002, d) for the new housing policy admits that the estimation of the number of shantytowns and their evolution in the whole region is difficult because this type of housing is dynamic. Besides, there are no academic works that have addressed the issue in depth. Comparisons of different public departments’ estimations and with the National Census (1992) give an approximate approach.

2. **Irregular Settlements**

   As mentioned before, these only exist in Salé where more than 62 per cent of the total population actually lives in irregular settlements, that is to say 436,000 inhabitants, distributed in 4 large neighbourhoods.

### III. SLUMS: THE PEOPLE

The discussion in this section will stress the case of shantytowns, as these are considered to be the heart of the slum issue. The aim is also to put the irregular settlement issue in perspective and to highlight their differences from the shantytowns in terms of urban and policy problems. This approach indicates a certain scepticism towards a systematic integration of illegal housing categories within the “slums” category. The case of médinas seems only occasionally problematic in Rabat and Salé.

   The case chosen to illustrate the issue is a “remainder”, that is to say, what was left after an intra-muros slum was partially resettled.

**The Case of Tabriquet**

### History and Population

Tabriquet is an old slum in Salé that was supposed to be integrated into the resettlement programme of Hay Rahma, a big public urban development. When the project was already underway, an important number of households had not yet paid the
first instalment that would have allowed them to be considered legal beneficiaries (DH 7,000). To explain their failure to pay this instalment, most of the inhabitants referred either to their poverty, or to an accident (illness, death). The last group to remain on the initial site was estimated at 66 households in 1990. These households were gathered and removed from their neighbourhood to a different block, the "Bloc Souk", so called because of an informal market. They were allowed to occupy the shacks emptied by the previous owners who had gone to Hay Rahma, though their own shacks were destroyed. This group increased to 500 households in 2000. This growth of the "remainder" slums is a common phenomenon in Morocco.

**Socio-Economic Characteristics**

No serious enquiries have been undertaken on the "remainder" slums of Salé. The following data are taken from a 100 household survey carried out within the scope of the post-evaluation of urban policies (F.Navez-Bouchanine, 2001, a).

Thanks to the newcomers, the Tabriquet "remainder" is a little less homogeneous than other slums. The dominant household is the nuclear form (78 per cent, 57 per cent being couples without children). 1 household in 5 is incomplete (widowed or divorced, single brothers and sisters, people without family relationships) and less than 2 per cent are extended families with more than one conjugal family (poly-nuclear households).

The household sizes vary greatly, from 3 people or less (20 per cent) to households with 7 people and more (25 per cent). The mean household size is 5.01. The age of the household head also varies. 2 out of 5 are less than 40 years old, and 1 out of 5 is more than 50 years old. If illiteracy dominates among the heads of households (50 per cent), almost 25 per cent have only primary school education, and only 5 per cent have secondary education.

Incomes of the household heads are low, but almost 30 per cent earn more than DH 1,000 (the guaranteed minimum wage is about DH 1,500). Women work in almost 40 per cent of households, but their incomes are generally less than DH 500 a month. Typical activities are mint seller, porter at the local souk, snail seller, sweet seller, washerwoman, occasional maid.

Household goods are limited. 75 per cent have black and white TV, only 2 per cent have colour TV. 40 per cent of households have a radio cassette player and 12 per cent a cooker. From 55 per cent to 80 per cent of the total income is devoted to food according to the households (the national mean is 43 per cent, and 57.5 per cent for the poorest 10 per cent, (Ministère de la Prévision Economique et du Plan, 2000) Housing expenditure is conversely weaker, from 5 per cent to 15 per cent, compared to the national mean of 23.4 per cent.

Sixty per cent of households are originally from rural areas, but for the majority, Tabriquet was not their first urban settlement. The others are often born in Rabat-Salé, and even in the same neighbourhood. More than half the migrants came to town more than 20 years ago.

Time spent in the housing and neighbourhood confirms the differences in the residents "stories": only 2 per cent have lived there for more than 35 years, and nearly 75 per cent have been in the settlement for less than 10 years. Those who have recently come have generally rented in other neighbourhoods of the city. They came in Tabriquet after having searched in other slums, and finding them financially inaccessible. Uncertainty regarding the future of the site has caused prices to drop.

**Housing Conditions**

The environmental conditions have declined. For example, a public tap was closed, and there is only one left, although the population has increased during the last ten years, and it is also the one used by people related to the souk. However, all the inhabitants stress the urban quality of the district, their only problem being access to "good" products and services, discrimination, other users' behaviour in the public services and financial possibilities.

**Cost of Living**

Transport costs do not affect every household and introduce a large diversity between inhabitants. Most of them work in the neighbourhood and just walk. This is the case of most people in Salé. The others take buses, or collective taxis, which both stop nearby. To go to Rabat, costs between 5 and 10 DH a day. Bicycles are a few, because of the topography. Less than 10 per cent of household heads have mopeds (only men), which cost approximately 250 DH/month. Women walk more than men, but if their job is in Rabat, then they also commute by bus.

Water is free, but inhabitants are supposed pay 1.50 DH/week/household to the watchman as well as to replace taps when they are broken. On the other hand, they do not pay to occupy the land, as they used to. Public lighting is also free. No private electricity is available. In the past, some households had tried to connect directly to public lighting pylons but they were severely repressed; besides, the general opinion in the slum is that those illegal connections are a real danger for all the inhabitants. Most people use gas and/or candles for lighting. They use car batteries for the TV. Altogether, these electricity substitutes cost them between 50 and 150 DH/month.

Households headed by women are amongst the poorest, so they are in the lowest category as far as expenses are concerned. When they are really poor and recognised as such by their neighbours, they do not necessarily pay collective charges.

Tenants are rare, and it is not very significant to speak about rental rates; the ones we found are lodgers and
are paying 150/200 DH/month for a room.

Like all the inhabitants of the slums, people in Tabriquet have no access to formal credit, except for the ones who are civil servants, but they are very few. In case of death or serious illness, they can hope for some help from the community: informal collections are usually organised. Private lenders are of two kinds, patrons, employers, acquaintances on the one hand, professional lenders on the other. In the first case, loans are repaid as such, while in the second case, the lenders practise usurious rates (15 to 18 per cent). The most frequent resource remains the extended family, but as already noticed at the beginning of the 90s, in many cases, all the related households are as poor as the borrower. When this is not the case, a certain suspicion seems to appear because the lender knows the exact financial situation of the borrower and expects difficulties in recovering his money. In some cases, a sort of “guarantee” is even required (jewellery for instance) which is a totally new situation among the family network.

Health Problems
Most inhabitants relate specific health problems to lack of sewage and appropriate rubbish collection, (with a special emphasis put on insects and rats) and quite secondarily to an insufficient access to water. But the majority do not indicate any specific relation to the place and its poor conditions, but consider that the basic problem is poverty and lack of access to medical care. Medical insurance still covers only 13.5 per cent of the total population, but only 2.3 per cent for poorest 20 per cent of the population. In this kind of neighbourhood, mutual insurance covers only civil servants, and they constitute less than 2 per cent of the population in Tabriquet. Public health services, theoretically free, are insufficient at the local level, and are often difficult to access at the higher level (hospitals). In any case, if people manage to see a doctor, they mostly do not have money to buy drugs. Children are probably the ones who benefit most, thanks to vaccination campaigns.

Discrimination and Insecurity
The main discrimination indicated by informants concern two difficulties: on the one hand getting a job in a surrounding dominated by such a scarcity as far as formal jobs are concerned, and on the other hand, dealing with the authorities’ behaviour which is at best unpredictable, and very often totally repressive as far as informal jobs are concerned.

As far as general insecurity is concerned, the inhabitants complain a lot about robbery and about the gatherings of "strange and/or dangerous" people around the souk: drunks, drug addicts, crooks. But this kind of insecurity is nothing compared to the one experienced about their residential status.

Residential Insecurity and Stigmatisation
The most remarkable problems in this settlement are a conflictive atmosphere within the social environment and a deep feeling of insecurity about the future. The rapid evolution of legal urbanisation around the slum has generated various phenomena, among them, a strong pressure from the inhabitants of legally built houses for the eradication of the slum. This pressure is sharply felt by the inhabitants. It deepens the feeling of otherness and of extreme marginalisation vis-à-vis the inhabitants of the legally built houses. Forms of expression are concentrated around three themes: pressures and petitions for the slum's destruction; inequality and injustice of treatment; contempt, disagreeable remarks and insults.

The Future: Assets and Constraints
The current situation in Tabriquet, as in other “remainders”, seems to be at an impasse; it is moreover all the more complex to resolve since in this particular case, the land occupied by the settlement was the subject of an agreement with a private promoter who is impatiently waiting for a "clean up". The price paid for the land is said to be DH 150/m² (although we were unable to confirm this) - a price that made the inhabitants very angry. "For such a price, why haven’t the authorities
Habiba’s Story

Habiba is 38 years old. There are 5 people living in the household – Habiba and 4 children. She has an irregular income of 800 to 2,000 DH/month.

“I’m the second spouse, I’ve three children with me, and my husband. I don’t know how you count him because he’s going from here to his first wife’s house. He’s too old and sick, and doesn’t work anymore. We lived all together for a while, years ago, but when they gathered us all here, near the souk, the place was too small for all of us, because she has 7 children. So he was forced to find another place for her. (…) I was born here in Salé, in Bettana, in a real house, but one day my father got sick; he was unable to continue to work. I was 12 at that time. He was forced to sell the house and bought a place in Douar Jedid. (…) I married at 18 and came directly here to Tabriquet. So, I’ve been living here more than twenty years now. But my husband lived in Tabriquet before, maybe 40 years. The first place we were was nice, not like here, in the souk; three big rooms, kitchen, wc, a courtyard. But when they moved us, we took this one because even though it’s small, it was well arranged, the owner left it in a good state, the walls were built, not just sheet iron ones. (…) When they asked us to go to Hay Rahma, my husband was already old and sick, we couldn’t gather the 7,000 DH they asked for. The children were too small to help. The first spouse was living just with the money that one of her daughters was earning in a carpet factory. For myself, I had already taken the responsibility to feed my children by making carpets at home. I did it for years, I just stopped four years ago, now one of my daughters sold contraband goods. She stopped college at 13, I couldn’t face the food and the clothing, she really wanted to study but she was too demanding for clothing; my second daughter has already left school after primary school; she got a certificate in sewing but she couldn’t find any job and I’m unable to buy a sewing machine for her. (…) The problem is that they didn’t tell us the truth when we moved, the caïd (local authority, district) and the moqqa-dem (local authority, neighbourhood) said that they would just move us for one or two months until they found a solution: it’s been more than 12 years now that we’ve been here! Every day we think maybe they will tell us something. And you know, more than that, some families (not me, unfortunately) finally gathered the 7,000 DH but when they came to claim their plot, they were told that there were no more left, that they had already been sold. How could they change the attribution without our agreement?

Some people said that it is a paper that they let us sign at that time but who knows how to read here to know what they asked us to sign? (…) In fact, Tabriquet is well situated; everything is here or very near: public offices, schools, hospitals, the souk, hammam, public oven, roads, everything is alright, if they only let us build here, on our places, it could be fantastic. But I don’t think they will. (…) I don’t feel like a normal human being, because we have no real house, no water, no electricity, no colour TV, like all the others have…we’re short of the basics and we feel inferior. In the winter, rain invades every place, in the summer, we are cooked in our tin boxes, and we are forced to go outside to get some fresh air while the other people quietly relax in their homes. If they are going to leave us here, without anything, at least, they should give us a water-tap. Why did they suppress one at a time where people have got more and more? (…) If they take us away, I pray to God that they won’t take us too far away, I’m used to Salé, to the urban life, and I’m afraid of being thrown away outside the urban limits. (…) All that time, we’ve been thinking what to do, trying to find a solution by ourselves but look, if we sell it, the best price we could ever find for it –and we’re not sure to find at that price – is 25,000 DH; that amount doesn’t give you any plot anywhere, or even simple key money for a rented low-price house. All we would do then is to spend the money and find ourselves in the street soon… In any case, now, we’re tired of waiting, we need stability (…) They said that MC (the developer who has been given the place) is going to leave us some apartments, specially for the 66 long term residents but who will be able to pay the price of these flats? Private developers don’t work for the poor, do they?”

Omar’s Story

Omar is 36 years old, there are 2 people in the household, Omar and his grandmother. He sells vegetables and fruits. He has an irregular income of 1,000 to 1,500 DH/month.

“I’m living here with my grandmother; I was supposed to get married but my fiancée has left me because of the problems -
unemployment, bad housing, no future.- I was born in the Gharb region, in the countryside, I moved to Kenitra as a boarder at the time of college, after that to Salé to finish secondary school but I quit before the end, I didn’t get the final examination. Now it’s been 12 years since I came to Salé (…) When I first came to Salé, I looked for a rented room, in Hay Al Inbiat (an irregular settlement). But it was too expensive, the landlord was always asking for his money, telling me that he found a new renter for twice or three times the price I was paying myself. But I always lacked money, I was sick, I always needed money to pay doctors and drugs. People told me about a cheikh who was very generous, I went to see him, told him about my health and housing problems and he gave me 3,000 DH (…) It’s only here in Tabriquet that I could find a place for the low price I could afford. In fact, the shack cost me 6,000 DH, I paid half the money and tried to get the rest of the money progressively, asking for other "mohcinins", (benefactor) and saving from my job (…) I have a cart and I sell vegetables and fruits. It’s not a business that pays well (…) As soon as I bought here, I brought my grandmother to live with me. She is the only one who cared for me since my parents died, and today we try to manage together. (…) Thank God, I found people from my region who have been living here for years and know the neighbourhood. I met them when I came to the souk to sell my vegetables and fruits, when I was still renting in Hay Inbiat. They searched for a shack, actually, they found it for me (…) The caïd (local authority, district), was informed of my coming; both me and the seller went to see him, I gave him 200 DH. For me everything seemed to be OK. But then just when I replaced one iron wall with a brick wall, he changed his mind. I began to work, I didn’t enlarge it, just replace it, he came in a hurry and destroyed it. At the end, after many discussions, he accepted it but he’s always on my back. He doesn’t want to sign the certificate I need to renew my identity card. (…) Some months ago the authorities made a new census, I was away: I was at the Royal Palace trying to give a letter to the King. The caïd heard about it and he disliked the fact that I tried to see the King. (…) It is not the only problem we have had here with the authorities. Once we decided to gather and create an association, gathering money in case of problems. At the third meeting, they came with the "mokhaznis" (polices) to disperse the meeting, they took the papers of all those present, they even took our fingerprints! We were so frightened that never we met again, we are afraid (…) My feelings when I’m going outside are "normal"; but it is the way the other people look at us that makes the difference between us and them. They really show us that we are not normal. I mean people from the buildings in front of us. If they could show us just a little respect, maybe we could feel OK here, because the place is well equipped. (…) Everything is here, you can find anything you need, but you still need to have access; you need bribing to get there, for instance at the hospital, or in the clubs where women can learn to sew, or even at the police station: if you go there for a problem, for instance if there is a quarrel with a building’s inhabitants, you’ll always been in trouble: you’re never right, they are always right. That’s why we feel isolated, cut off from the other world (…) Before, I was thinking that the Makhzen (The State) were supposed to defend people’s rights. But when I came here, I understood that there are no rights for us. Look at this man who "bought "us with the place, like animals, is he a citizen and we’re not? Wouldn’t it be normal for the authorities to first solve our problem and then sell the plot? People say that he bought the land for only 1500DH/m², I don’t know if its true but for that price, why didn’t they sell to us, the inhabitants?"

IV. SLUMS AND POVERTY: THE POLICIES

F. PAST AND PRESENT POLICIES

At the national level, as well as at the local level, various policy approaches have been deployed that can be summarised as follows:

1. Shantytowns

1.1 “Urban Order” Policies

The objective of these has never been to improve the slum dwellers’ space and/or social conditions, but to either to get rid of a slum that gets in the way of urban development, or to introduce an aesthetic treatment to minimise its impact on the urban landscape. In other words these are means by which the normalised urban society protects itself from the society perceived as being below standard by keeping them at a distance. In this broad policy approach we may two main types:

“Clean Up” Operations

These tend to be justified by political or security imperatives. The need to undertake big infrastructure works, “modernisation” or improvements, land or property pressures, accidents or natural catastrophes, are the reasons that lead public agents to “clean up” an urban site. The populations are forced to move to “provisional” settlements. The reception sites are generally less central than the primary settlements (often outside the urban area) and quite often lack adequate services for additional inhabitants.

“Urban Cosmetics”

These operations aim to dissimulate the unsightly or disturbing effects of the slums, but also to surround them, limiting their potential for growth. This technique is well known throughout the world and adopts various forms: the “landscape vision” puts trees in front of the shantytowns. A more aggressive version surrounds them with an outer wall. The most flagrant case in Rabat is that of Douar Koraa. Nevertheless, these interventions seem to be more or less disowned now.

1.2 Improvements of Existing Slums

In contrast to the previous approaches, these actions are characterised by the public formulation of direct improvement objectives both for the sites and their populations’ housing conditions. They are prompted by the conviction that improvements on the spot will resolve the problems of the poor in a more efficient way, because they are adapted to their real needs. We may distinguish two different categories:

Limited Improvements

These interventions are much more numerous than is often imagined, because they are neither part of
“programmes” nor written or visible policies. They are mainly the result of a daily political management: negotiations on an ad hoc basis involving the elected representatives, local authorities, or private agencies and populations. They range from tap stand installation to consolidation of informal markets, sewerage, garbage collection and electricity connections. These actions have a serious qualitative impact on the housing conditions.

Restructurings
Restructurings are upgrading projects on a large scale, decided and displayed at the national level as a policy. They were popularised in Morocco by the end of the 70s and during the 80s. The interventions bring to the existing shanty-towns the basic infrastructure and services they are lacking. They regularise occupational status, restructure the parceling and allow the occupants to build on their plots. From then on, the site is considered as integrated into the “urbanised” and formal city. The best known examples are the ones carried out under the World Bank’s instigation, called “UDP” (urban development projects). They associated spatial and physical upgrading on one hand and social, economic or institutional improvements on the other hand. In Morocco, restructurings were finally abandoned at the end of the 80s. The central issue was the poor quality of the “final product”.

1.3 Creation of New Urban Settlements
In this approach, urban policies try to combine two objectives: to eradicate the slums from the urban fabric and to improve the housing conditions of the populations affected, by resettling them in new urban settlements. In contrast to the previous approach, they are characterised by a strong voluntarism, based on the conviction that the solution to all urban classes’ problems, including those of the poorest, depends on access to house ownership. Within this approach, resettlement has been the most widespread mode of intervention, and the one that has most contributed to reducing the proportion of slum populations, particularly in the medium cities. This approach has deeply marked the urban policy to such an extent that people tend to consider it as the only possible policy.

Numerous resettlements have taken place in Rabat-Salé. The most famous is the Hay Rahma project partly funded by the EEC. This project was supposed to eradicate all of Salé’s remaining slums. If this objective was not reached, at least it has given access to more than 4,000 plots to households coming mainly from a shantytown.

A related approach is that of rehousing, in which, instead of being resettled on plots, the inhabitants are moved towards built houses either in core units as Jebel Raïssi, also called La Butte, in Rabat (but no more operations of the sort occurred after the end of the 80s) or in flat buildings. Reasons for this policy are mainly urban and aesthetic: on the one hand, criticism of the urban sprawl generated by the resettlement policy; on the other hand, criticism of the buildings’ heterogeneity and the weak urban landscape quality of the resettlements.

2. Other Substandard Districts
2.1 Clandestine or Illegal Neighbourhoods
These are less analysed, because the interventions are more recent, and began to be the targets of policies only in the 1970s. Previously these areas existed, but were gradually absorbed into the urban fabric. The official posture regarding these districts has oscillated from indifference through destruction to a posteriori efforts to integrate, regularise and equip them (Abouhani, 1988; Ameur and Nacir, 1985; Ameur 1993; Ameur and Filali, 1997). As a result, most of these neighbourhoods are a sort of intermediate product, between the médinas and the legal low-income housing estates, as in Karya Ouled Moussa, Hay Inbiat or Sidi Moussa in Salé.

Principles governing the actions have been more or less the same everywhere during the last twenty years. Regularisation consists of, on the one hand the addition of the lacking infrastructure and small-scale services, both the responsibility of the inhabitants, gathered in associations. On the other hand, the state promises to regularise and integrate the district by introducing all the conveniences and collective services, which will guarantee a “normal” urban life.

2.2 Médinas and Deteriorated Inner City Areas
It was only at the end of the 80s that the housing problem in these areas was tackled as a major issue. At first, the only vision was to reduce densities and to resettle the households living in the most deteriorated parts. However, the project in the Fez Médina set a pattern which was followed elsewhere. In this perspective, a pilot project is today being studied in the médina of Rabat, (Diour Debbagh) in a new perspective, taking into account the inhabitants and their participation in the process. Besides these large scale projects, we should underline, however, that in the small and less deteriorated médinas (Rabat, Salé, Meknès), current improvements and urban management interventions have occurred over the last 20 years, to level these urban areas. This had the positive effects on stopping the deterioration of some neighbourhoods. Sewerage, public spaces improvements and paving have improved some districts. Moreover, in most médinas, there exists a spontaneous and longstanding movement of housing transformation and adaptation by private individuals. Unfortunately, this has not retained the public agents’ attention. Up to now, these initiatives did not inspire any kind of programme or project and everything is still to be done.
G. POLICIES IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACTS

Little has been written about the real impacts of urban policies apart from the usual technical or financial assessments, regularly presented at the end of planning periods. Social, economic, political and even urban issues still remain widely ignored. However, when the alternative government came to power in 1998, the secretary of state for housing undertook a systematic review of the policies. The following comments are taken from the different studies that have been made within this tendency (Altius, 2000; Ministère de l’Aménagement du territoire, de l’Urbanisme de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, 2002 a, b, c, d, e et f; Navez-Bouchanine, 2002)

1. Shantytowns

As far as “clean up” interventions are concerned, except for the space recovered for new urban developments, they fail to achieve any sort of improvement in housing conditions for the previous inhabitants. Conversely, there are many (possibly unintentional) effects on social as well spatial processes. The most important is the legitimisation of the site by this authoritarian move and the attraction it offers to newcomers. The result is the postponement of the initial problem as well as its displacement towards an urban periphery, susceptible itself to being caught up by the city. The case of Sehb el Caïd in Salé illustrates the legitimisation process that slowly transformed it into an irremovable slum. Regarding social and economic plans, these moves destroy the daily lives of the inhabitants, mainly when distance makes access to services, activities and social networks difficult.

Upgrading gives a range of quite different results according to the nature and the range of the interventions. In the most usual cases, brought about by the local authorities or by NGOs, associations or inhabitants themselves, different points of view lead to different assessments. With regard to technical, urban and economic plans, these actions share a partial character and their limited effects on urban development. Moreover, many proved to be very provisional, and even rapidly obsolete (sewage systems that are blocked, road systems that do with drainage). In some cases, a rapid estimation of what the inhabitants or the community may have invested leads to a feeling of waste and suggests a strong need for better structuring efforts. In other cases, however, the improvement is notable (for example, the installation of tap stands). Finally, these actions may be contradictory to the global planning options, or more simply with current regulations, rarely taking account of the real local context. From a social viewpoint, in many cases, they contribute to upgrading housing conditions, improving the inhabitants’ daily life, and lessening the impact of lack of services. However the difficulty of their implementation, their temporary or palliative character, and their functional fragility are well understood by the inhabitants. The feeling of their precariousness is always present and their aspirations for more satisfactory solutions is real.

As far as more structured interventions are concerned, the UDP is the main experience known in Morocco. The first UDP was introduced in Rabat (in the 7th district, including the Doum shantytown and the Hajja/Maadid illegal neighbourhoods). Since it was the first one, it has been exhaustively analysed, compared with the following ones (INAU, 1984; Touhami, 1985; Guiri, 1986; Altius, 1997). Some converging results are stressed thanks to these analyses. The spatial effects (architectural, urban, technical) are judged negatively: excessive density, lack of public spaces, minimal garbage dumps, “slummy” and even “ruralised” aesthetics and landscape, sometimes aggravated by tortuous or difficult sites. Numerous observers agree however on the need to distinguish between the effects due to the conception or implementation and the effects generated by subsequent urban management.

Concerning resettlements on plots (sites and services and such like), opinions are balanced. Some are defi-
naturally against this type of intervention in itself, while others stress the impact of particular conditions (linked with specific sites or implementations) on the final result. Altogether, it seems however that confidence in resettlement as the unique and best answer to the slum issue – which has been the case during the last 15 years - is now gone.

From an urban viewpoint, resettlements have played an important role in the urban development of the city, and have allowed the implementation of planning options particularly in the middle size towns. However, even with important differences between sites and cities, there is a huge gap between technical performance and the backwardness of collective services, that means generally that inhabitants who have been moved get access to a level of services which is weaker than in the previous urban neighbourhood. Another urban argument opposed to resettlements is their low density compared to that achieved in collective building. But it is often start ratios that are compared and not end ratios, taking no account of the subsequent densification process (through cellular division of households, or rental).

As far as social issues are concerned, the analyses (formal or informal) emphasise a quite good accessibility to plots and the suitability of “self-building” for the inhabitants’ means and possibilities. These effects may in fact be considered as positive in many cases. True reservations can be reported though. For example, the inhabitants’ inability to carrying out the building work, the great effort required, standard plans imposed by technicians unfitted to household or economic organisation, negative effects on other aspects of social life, negative impacts on the status and/or the personal projects of some households members (in particular women and children), peripheral location and weak urban quality that means exile, and affects the economic and social life of the residents, as well as their daily life. Finally, evaluations stress the cases of non-beneficiaries, the “forgotten” of the urban policies, a case that we have dealt with through the examination of Tabriquet.

As for the rehousing option (resettling the slum dwellers in collective buildings), this has been presented as the ideal end solution. However a number of these projects, initiated in Casablanca, have raised a lot of questions. Firstly the impact was very limited compared to the importance of the slum population. But the issue of correct targeting has also been raised, particularly since a real opposition emerged (to moving or to paying) from the inhabitants who blocked some projects. Finally, it became evident that poverty and family problems led, in some cases, to the subdivision of flats and conflictive cohabitation. The problems raised are not isolated either in time or place. For example Sala Al Jadida, a large rehousing project aimed at moving 6,000 slum and foundouk families from Salé has largely proved its inefficiency (F.Navez-Bouchanine, 1998). But these past...
lessons seem quite useless, as they did not prevent a change in the Douar el Koraa project from a restructur-
ing option to a rehousing in buildings option. Last but
not least, our own analyses on Attacharouk (F.Navez-
Bouchanine, 2002) or Sala Al Jadida, (which also show
that only a small part of the target population supports
this kind of projects, mainly young people, nuclear and
small-sized households and salaried workers) stress
their inadequacy in terms of activities, services and
accessibility to commerce in a context where the rigid-
ity of the built environment and the rules prevent any
easy and progressive adaptation to needs (D. Hauw,
1997; F. Navez-Bouchanine, 2002). Finally, compared
to the urban objectives – well-ordered and dense urban
structures - no studies tackle posterior evaluations.
Very little mention is made of the rapid deterioration of
the buildings, maintenance difficulties in time, the
subdivision of housing or the large empty spaces sepa-
rating the buildings, more similar to wasteland than to
managed public space.

These are the common impacts generally noted for
the policies and projects carried out in Morocco in the
last twenty years. The following paragraphs will look at
policy implementation in the Rabat-Salé case as
analysed by the most recent planning document, the
PLHDU (Local plan for housing and urban develop-
ment; Ministère de l’Aménagement du territoire, de
l’Urbanisme, de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, 2002
d) for the agglomeration.

2. Recent Policy Initiatives

Actions initiated or encouraged by the state in the
agglomeration have affected 45 per cent of the slum
households. The most important operations have been
initiated by the Prefectoral Council of Skhirat-Témara:
11,080 plots and 1,836 houses. In Salé, ERAC/North
West, one of the agencies of the Secretariat of State for
Housing, was the major actor, with 2,500 plots in
progress. But the impact of these projects remains
limited as compared with the existing needs, to which
the new ones must be added. Besides, some of these
are incremental resettlements, imposed without any
kind of negotiation with the population, and as such
they have not really gained the adhesion of the inhabi-
tants, especially in Ard Ben Acher (unpublished survey,
analyses in process). Moreover, shantytowns continued
to develop in the prefecture. Up to now, these actions
affected about 600 hectares. To solve the whole prob-
lem with the same approach 1,350 hectares would be
necessary.

3. Illegal Settlements

Analyses of what has been done are not numerous,
because the interventions are recent (as discussed
previously). These operations have met with various
successes and have sometimes generated insurmount-
able blockages (the impossibility of organising the
population or on the contrary, a strong resistance by the
population to normalisation when it meant house
destruction, difficulties in funding and co-ordination etc).

As far as Rabat and Salé are concerned, regularisa-
tion of illegal settlements is still in process. The
commune of Layada is the most affected, even if the
problem extends much more to the north, in Sidi Taibi,
a really illegal city. In general terms, the public interven-
tions have remained weak. If about 20 per cent of the
total agglomeration’s shantytowns have finally been
“cleared”, only 2 per cent of the illegal settlements
founded after the 70s have been able to achieve regu-
larisation.

It is true that it is a long-term process. The recent
introduction of adapted improvement plans opens the
way to restructuring and full servicing of these neigh-
bourhoods, which may be considered as a real and
promising progress. Regularisation requirements in a
number of neighbourhoods highlight this “inverted
process” of informal urban development, in which the
state equips and regularises a posteriori. Restructuring
is thus mainly implemented by residents’ associations,
initially under the state’s tutelage, now in a more spon-
taneous way, since the inhabitants have understood its
importance. It affects about 90 per cent of the illegally
built neighbourhoods. It seems that these actions
should lead to standards sometimes very near the legal
economic neighbourhoods’ standards, with respect to
services and infrastructure. However, the most difficult
obstacle is to reach a compromise between the existing
parcels and blocks and the norms.

The local association is supposed to deal directly with
private architecture and urbanism agencies and to
come to an acceptable consensus between the urban
norms and the necessary destruction of certain plots.
These “negotiations” frequently move towards a coun-
teroffensive defence of the status quo by the inhabitants
and the private agencies are often truly “sandwiched”
between the clients’ pressures, and their own responsi-
bility, which is mainly to apply the law. This processual
complexity justifies the long period of time necessary to
carry out the projects.

H. COMMITMENT AND
PERSPECTIVES

When the alternative government came to power in
1998, the Secretary of State for Housing largely
confirmed the informal analyses that many people were
already carrying out in public departments. These
suggested that instead of improving, the slum situation
was deteriorating. The programmed resettlements had
not been achieved, a so-called 200,000 houses
programme had hardly realised 20 per cent of its ambi-
tious objectives. On the other hand, due to economic problems and endemic drought in the rural areas, the percentage of newcomers and new slums, particularly in the peri-urban areas, had increased. Despite the removal of 45,000 shacks during the 80s (at a national level), the percentage of people living in slums, after an apparent decrease probably related to the fact that some peri-urban areas had not been considered, climbed again and to levels never seen before. At the same time irregular settlements developed in all the urban or peri-urban areas without exception and with some records, in Tetouan, Tanger and Salé. Next to Salé, for instance, the birth and growth of Sidi Taïbi surprised all observers. A strong commitment to evaluation and analysis of the situation became imperative.

As far as shantytowns are concerned, a socio-economic survey was carried out by independent researchers. It comprised a critical review of all the previous post-evaluations, showing their strong and serious interest in material results and very low commitment to socio-economic issues, particularly the social impacts of the projects. The study involved reviews of the different stakeholders affected by the projects, notably NGOs, elected people and community based representative. Journalists were invited to express their opinions together with civil servants, experts, researchers, authorities and others. As well as this, an empirical survey of ten settlements (resettlements or shantytowns) was undertaken, mostly to hear what the main affected groups had to say about their situation and about urban policies (F.Navez-Bouchanine, 2002). One of the main results was to show the diversity of situations and to recognise the interest of diversified methods in working at the local level and with the people affected. It also reintroduced upgrading as an appropriate method, which was not really the case as a policy (except for the 80s PDU), even if it was practised in some places.

As far as irregular settlements are concerned, the extremely complex dimensions of the issue (Altius 2000) encouraged the department to introduce a deep change in three directions: to better consider the general framework of urban development in every decision (this gave birth to the PLHDU (Local plan for housing and urban development) studied at the city level); to decentralise the projects and establish a sort of contract between the state and the municipalities or urban communities; to legislate incentives and repressive measures to regularise the existing irregular settlements and to prevent new ones from developing.

These reforms were in progress when the King made an important speech on the issue. He called for very large-scale programmes and particularly insisted on the legal aspects of the irregular settlements policy. This has in a way confirmed the previous perspectives but has also modified the way it was to be undertaken. Technical and programmatic habits tend to have

<table>
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<th>Table 6. Sources of Public Subsidies (Next 10 Years)</th>
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<td><strong>Solidarity Fund (annual subsidy from the General Budget and from a new tax on cement sales)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hassan II Fund for Social and Economic Development</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Local communities’ contributions</strong></td>
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Photo: Alleyway
already been substituted for democratic, social and delocalised processes. As will be seen, the new programme is ambitious, but it is too early to say if it is going to be correctly implemented. Numerous previous programmes had a good level of ambition too, and didn't succeed. Civil servants are very confident though.

1. National Level Policies: The PARHI (Programme d'action pour la résorption de l'habitat insalubre)

The Royal speech of August 20, 2001 placed social housing in general and the struggle against substandard housing in particular among the national priorities and has given the interventions on substandard housing a more global dimension, leading to a legal framework that is supposed to apply in all substandard situations. This programme has neither been implemented nor has it formed a subject for critical approaches due to its recent character. We will limit ourselves here to a brief definition of its features. The PARHI (Programme d'action pour la résorption de l'habitat insalubre) is based on three components:

1. **National Substandard Housing Programme**

Considering the different forms of substandard housing, the programmed interventions are of three types: restructuring operations, resettlements on plots and rehousing projects.

- **Restructuring**: The objective is to provide illegal settlements as well as large and medium shantytowns with the necessary infrastructure and services (mainly sewerage and tertiary roads) and to regularise their urban situations. This intervention type will deal with 7,800 ha (of which 4,816 ha are affected by the land regularisation) and 470,140 households of which 418,556 are in illegal settlements and 51,584 in shantytowns.

- **Resettlements on plots**: This will affect households in small slums and those that cannot be integrated into the urban fabric. It allows the populations that live in the slums to have access to housing plots and to "self-build", based on incremental development principles, services being introduced later on and progressively. This should affect about 2,500 ha, that it to say 94,392 plots.

- **Re-housing projects**: The others slum households will have access to social housing through a form of hire-purchase. This programme concerns all the sites where the above mentioned programmes are unenforceable. The total number of households benefiting from these social housing programmes will be 65,252.

The total cost of this national programme will be about DH 28.86 million, of which DH 17.21 million will go on the illegal settlements and DH 11.65 million will be spent on the slums. The division of costs is expected to be as follows:

- restructuring (including land regularisation): DH 17.93 million
- resettlements on plots: DH 4.72 million
- re-housing: DH 6.21 million

The funding of these costs is programmed as follows:

- participation of the beneficiaries: DH 12.67 millions
- credit (social housing programme): DH 2.67 millions
- public subsidies: DH 13.52 million

2. The Partnership and Solidarity Action for the Struggle against Substandard Housing Bill

The bill in process puts the emphasis on two tools: substandard housing perimeters, and perimeters aimed at their absorption. Both are supposed to allow the implementation of specific measures as far as urbanism, expropriation, land regularisation, services and building processes are affected. The creation of substandard housing perimeters is accompanied by a census of the affected households, administrative measures with a preventive character to stop the proliferation of housing, as well as the creation of a local committee that will ensure the supervision and follow-up of the process. With regard to urban perimeters and their peripheral areas, the PLHDU (local plan for housing and urban development) will constitute a basis for public interventions in the struggle against substandard housing.

The interventions, led within a conventional framework of the state, local communities and the public and private sectors, will attach importance to preventive actions. Many cities have already been provided with these local plans, including Rabat-Salé. The bill also stresses the revision of the legal approaches to sanctions - widening their applications in order to cover property transactions in the substandard housing neighbourhoods, bringing back the purchase and renting process within the regular procedures - but also offering an urban amnesty (for a period of 5 years) in order to clean up the existing slums.

3. **Supporting Measures**

These measures are supposed to facilitate the implementation of the programmes through the definition of preferential conditions for land mobilisation, participation of administrations in charge of land management, tax benefits for all programmes dealing with substandard housing, creation of regional agencies for substan-
standard housings (shared by the state, local communities and public organisms, and civil society organisms). There are also preventive measures such as the development of newly urbanisable areas, special procedures for primary and external services funding, introduction of new procedures of incremental and concerted urban development, new institutional tools allowing the landowners to set up property development programmes within a framework of solidarity, reform of public aid aimed at social housing and personal direct aid, and the promulgation of tools against offenders.

2. The Local Level: Perspectives for Rabat-Salé

The objectives of the Rabat-Salé PLHDU are huge and may even seem terribly ambitious considering the achievements of past programmes. They deal with the cleaning up of shantytowns and illegal settlements, restructuring and normalisation, promotion of social housing, and the opening up of new areas to urbanisation and environmental improvement. Moreover, the awareness of the gap between Rabat and Salé regarding services leads to a more global approach, at the Wilaya scale, in an attempt to provide a new equilibrium.

Three major points emerge from this global approach:
- improving Salé and Témara through urban renewal and ambitious social policies aimed at employment, education, health, security and public services.
- supporting the efforts of “the struggle against the illegal housing” (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, PLHDU, 2002, d p.31 and following (see below).
- developing a strong preventative approach, notably through the creation of ZUN (New Urbanisation Areas) and ZAP (Progressive Development Areas). Many of these ZUN are planned in the urban areas in Temara, Sale, Bouknadel and Ain el Aouda. These ZUN (without Bouknadel, still under study) should put into circulation 10,000 plots, for an estimated 18,000 housing units, at a total cost of DH 873 billion. The funding mode is not detailed in the PLHDU but we presume that the PARHI principles, described above, will be applicable. With regard to the ZAP areas, they should provide 5,000 plots at a cost of DH 185 million. In the case of Ard ben Acher, where the majority of plots are aimed at the shantytown dwellers, the transfer cost will be DH 650/m². This last estimation (much higher than all the previous programs aimed at the same kind of beneficiaries) stresses the need to grant funds to reduce the price.

3. Actions Programmed for Existing Substandard Housing

Shantytowns

Rabat

The last big slums of Rabat –El Koraa, El Graa, El Kheir- house 3,437 households and occupy 15 ha. All the three of them have been programmed for restructuring. It seems that only the last two will be restructured. After many fluctuations, Koraa will be the subject of a contract with a public developer (CGI), that will, for the first time, carry out such an operation, having been more involved up to now with middle-class housing. It is thus very important to oversee the financial arrangements for the project and its true adaptation to demand. All the other shantytowns will be included in the programme planned by the SNEC, ERAC and ANHI, three agencies of the Secretary of State for Housing. These operations will affect about 2,050 households. The documents do not give any financial estimations of these different arrangements. Regarding Oued Akreuch, the resettlement forms part of the Ain Aouda ZUN programme.
Salé

Four sites are still problematic: Sehb el Caïd, Ras el Ma, Karyane el Oued and Sidi Moussa. The total number of affected households is about 7,000. Varied solutions for each context have been studied. Sehb el Caïd, for example, will be restructured, but part of its households will be resettled in a housing project. However, considering that the inhabitants of Sehb el Caïd have in the past strongly opposed rehousing in Sala Al Jadida, a project with exceptionally good financial conditions, it is unclear how they will react to the new project where the cost per built square meter is DH 2,800. The PLHDU official document clearly emphasises the unsuitability of this price (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, PLHDU, 2002, d . , p.64 In Karyane el Oued, the restructuring (66 per cent of households) will be accompanied by resettling to reduce density. The cost is estimated by the ANHi at DH 56 billion. The transfer cost (DH 860) is too high, compared with the residents’ possibilities (the transfer cost should not exceed DH 400 for plots of 50 m²). The deficit seems to be in the range of 55 per cent and should be subject to a grant. In Ras el Ma, the resettlement of 1,351 households should be achieved in association with the landowner and the urban community. The land, assigned by the plan to a five floor flat building should produce a strong added value. The total cost of this operation is estimated at DH 88.3 billion, which would be partially funded by this increase in value. Finally, in Sidi Moussa 11 small slums will be, according to each case, resettled or restructured. Some of them are already in a process of informal upgrading, such as Basra, and it would be counter productive to destroy them, although this was the previous plan, which intended to substitute it for an urban park. Others will be resettled all together in a single site, still to be decided. The cost of these operations does not appear in the PLHDU.

Illegal Settlements

Restructuring and regularisation actions will continue. Most of the areas are already in the process of more or less formal upgrading, mainly funded by the inhabitants, but some sites need supported action by the State. The PLHDU (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, PLHDU, 2002, d) distinguishes several situations that call upon different upgrading processes.

- Sites considered to be almost restructured: in spite of tertiary roads to be completed and cleaning up of the land, they have already integrated and may be considered “normal” urban districts, for example, Sidi Moussa, Hay Inbict, Cheik Lemfaddel, Kharouba. These affect about 40,000 households.

- Sites where restructuring processes have already been launched: the objective here is to prompt this process through financial and technical framing actions for tertiary roads, electricity and water ducts, for example Oued Dehab, and Karyan Oulad Moussa (an approximate total of 42,000 households).

- Sites where no action has begun - with or without the presence of associations - and that continue to increase, as well as the new under-equipped housing cores. In these two categories, particular attention will be paid to preventing uncontrollable expansions that are prejudicial to urban development. These cores are in fact located in areas where urbanisation is imminent or in strategic urban axes (Salé- Bouknadel), on the road to the air base and in wooded reserve areas, connected to Layayda. It is in these last categories that priority choices have been made. Three sites have been selected for urgent action: Molizza, because it has considerably expanded in a few years; since 1998, 14 associations have asked for regularisation, a total area of almost 31 hectares and 1,930 plots. Guezzara and Mika, are close to each other, (6 ha and 7 ha respectively, 1,800 households) and should also be treated rapidly to safeguard the urbanisation potentialities of the area against new irregular settlements (Mika is located in one of the programmed ZUN, that of Sidi Abdallah). The restructuring costs estimated for these three sites have risen to
DH 32 million. The total effort that should be provided by the households within the framework of a service tax to finance the totality of the restructuring was estimated at about DH 11,500.

Médinas

The relatively low number of affected households is considered to be an incentive in launching rapid actions. Two operations could mobilise all the stakeholders (municipality, local authorities, ANHI, urban agency, NGO, inhabitants):

- The systematic purchase by the municipalities of ruined houses and highly deteriorated fondouks, will provide these municipalities with a land bank in the heart of the old districts. An annual budget estimated at DH 8 million may be released over five years to allow the acquisition of this land.
- The setting up of a pilot project (already in process) in the médina of Rabat (Diour Debbagh) including deteriorated houses, fondouks and shacks. This is a neighbourhood characterised by absolute poverty and substandard conditions. For years, the municipality of Rabat Hassan (owner of more than 8,000 m² in this site) has expressed its intention to rehabilitate the sector. The urgency of the situation led the municipalities and ANHI to agree on a joint action of urban reconversion and rehabilitation on this site.

Two scenarios are possible. In one the project will be an urban project with the aim of showing that an important investment in services and upgrading may be conceived and achieved in the médina itself, may generate a successful process and generate attractive places. The difficulty will be, in this case, to ensure the social and cultural services necessary to the present inhabitants of the neighbourhood who state their wish to stay. The projected cost of such an operation is estimated at DH 80 million. The second scenario is more "social", and foresees a simple housing project aimed at substituting 200 substandard housing units. Less ambitious, but also less image-enhancing, it will have the advantage of a more rapid and more economic achievement, probably more accessible to the current inhabitants. Its approximate cost is evaluated at DH 40 million. As this programme is conceived moreover as a pilot project for the implementation of a new social-orientated planning approach (the so-called "Maîtrise d'ouvrage sociale", cf. Aourach 2001; Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme de l’Environnement et de l’Habitat, 2002, f), the final choice, which seems to favour the second scenario, gives the possibility of real change as far as the consideration of the inhabitants’ expectations and possibilities is concerned.

NOTES

1 The average development rate in this sector has dropped from 4.5 per cent a year at the end of the 80s to 2.6 per cent during the 90s, less than half that of other emerging economies. World Bank, 2001

2 Access to the sea has evidently always existed and the development of some coastal cities is incontestable, the case of Tangier or Sale being very illustrative in that respect. However, the dominance of interior cities and the traditional spreading of population through the national territory indicates a model with a very internal centre of gravity. For a more detailed approach, see J. Abu-Lughod (1980), R. Escalier (1981).

3 Some have been subject to private plot rental, but with time move to squatting. Meanwhile, the affected lands are sometimes repurchased by the state or local communities.

4 The small number of recent settlements can be explained by a more severe control that moves the new settlements to the extreme limits of the urban area, in Temara or Skhirat in the South or Sidi Bouknader in the North.

5 This word actually comes from the definition of the enclosure which characterised the first settlements, made of small hut parts assembled on a plot surrounded by fences made of vegetal or precarious materials. With time and densification, most fences have become totally closed and often built of solid materials.

6 Television is widespread, mostly as ancient "black and white" sets in the shantytowns

7 The true value of the terms chosen should be taken into account as well as the predominant character of the rules and statutory visions. All other considerations, among them social dimensions, appear as a secondary concern.
### ACRONYMS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARHI</td>
<td>Programme d'action pour la résorption de l'habitat insalubre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLHDU</td>
<td>Local plan for housing and urban development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Urban Development Project</td>
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<td>ZAP</td>
<td>Progressive Development Areas</td>
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<td>ZUN</td>
<td>New Urbanisation Areas</td>
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### GLOSSARY

- **Douar**: originally, rural village; in the urban context, the “douars” are either rural peripheries more or less integrated in the urban network, either peri-urban informal settlements
- **Caid**: Local authority, Head of district, civil servant at the Ministry of Interior
- **Moqqadem**: Local authority, Head of neighbourhood, under the caïd supervision
- **Médina**: Old city
- **Moriscos and Andalous**: Refugees from the Christian conquest of Spain
- **Fondouk**: Old structures, previously for trade, now inhabited
- **Souk**: Market
- **Wilaya**: administrative circonscription gathering several “provinces” or “prefectures”
- **Zina**: “zinataries” customary right of land’s use; inhabitants having this status
- **Zriba**: Shack

### MONEY AND CONVERSION RATE

Local money is the DIRHAM. 10 dh are approximately equivalent to 0.9 euro

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