

**Populism or Pluralism?
New Labour and the
Constitution**

Mishcon Lecture

by
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The accursed power that stands on Privilege,
(And goes with Women, and Champagne, and Bridge)
Broke - and Democracy resumed her reign:
(Which goes with Bridge, and Women and Champagne).

Two years after the second greatest centre-left electoral victory in twentieth century British history it seems appropriate to recall Hilaire Belloc's mordant comment on its greater predecessor, the Liberal triumph of 1906. Belloc's lines remind us that it is foolish to take politicians' protestations at face value, no matter who the politicians may be; that the arrogance of power afflicts the righteous as well as the unrighteous; that there is more to democracy than the pieties of democratic rhetoric. They make an ideal epigraph for the argument I shall offer this evening.

My theme is the tension between two approaches to democratic governance in modern societies - approaches which I shall call pluralist and populist respectively. My subject is the paradox-laden constitutional revolution on which the present Government has nervously embarked. It is very British, this revolution. It is a revolution without a theory. It is the muddled, messy work of practical men and women, unintellectual when not positively anti-intellectual, apparently oblivious of the long tradition of political and constitutional reflection of which they are the heirs, responding piecemeal and *ad hoc* to conflicting pressures - a revolution of sleepwalkers who don't know quite where they are going or quite why. It points towards a politics of deliberative and pluralistic democracy, yet its authors seem terrified by the slightest challenge to their authority. In some of their moods, the revolutionaries are power-sharers. In most, they are power-hoggers. Parts of their programme might have been designed to preserve as much as possible of the old, pre-revolutionary constitution in the face of new demands. Others have given extra impetus to the changes which were undermining the old constitution before the revolution started.

But muddle and mess are often the midwives of change. Sleepwalkers can be as revolutionary as the wide-awake. New Labour's constitutional changes may be confused and ambiguous, but they are also dynamic and open-ended. The architecture of British democracy; the structure of the British state; the relationship between that state and the nations it purports to embody; the web of understandings and assumptions that tell its managers who they are and how they ought to behave

are back on the agenda, as they have not been since the lights went out in 1914. The outcome will depend on the interplay of forces whose scope and power no one can predict.

Despite ingenious attempts to minimise its impact, the Human Rights Act has further shaken the already shaky doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty, which Dicey once called the 'keystone of the Constitution'. It marks the death of the traditional British assumption that civil liberties are better protected through the informal conventions of a liberty-loving political class than through any formal code. Scottish devolution has revised the terms on which the independent nation-states of England and Scotland came together to form the multi-national British state nearly 300 years ago. In doing so, it has engendered pressures for further change, almost certainly uncontrollable. The demand for a Scottish Parliament became irresistible in the first place because Scotland's moral economy and political values differ from their southern English counterparts. Those differences will now be focused and articulated more powerfully than ever before. In the long term, even if not immediately, tensions between Edinburgh and London are inevitable. They can perfectly well be fruitful; tensions often are. But they will not be fruitful - and may well be destructive - unless Edinburgh gets more freedom of action than the devolution legislation envisages. The settlement in Northern Ireland is a fudge. But it is a fluid fudge, which events are sure to re-shape. The one certainty is that the frontier between the two sovereign states of Ireland and the United Kingdom - already porous enough, like all the frontiers in the European Union - will be even more porous in future, and that, in their dealings with each other, the whole concept of sovereignty will be even more problematic. Welsh Devolution, though less far-reaching than Scottish, has also created an alternative power-centre, speaking to and for a nation whose values differ sharply from those of the focus groups of middle England.

The three great undecided questions - entry into the European single currency; reform of the House of Lords; and partial proportional representation - carry even heavier freight. The launch of the Euro marks a step change in the European Union's slow, but inexorable evolution into a unique form of federalism, looser than those of the United States or Germany, but tighter than mainstream British politicians have so far acknowledged. The long-term constitutional implications for the United Kingdom are as immense as they are unpredictable. Even in the medium term, the fiscal constitution will be transformed, as the pressure for tax harmonisation becomes irresistible and the Chancellor of the Exchequer finds himself sharing power with his counterparts in the rest of the Union in a way which would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Depending on the form it takes, House of Lords reform may entail a marked shift away from the *de facto* unicameralism which has been a central feature of the British constitution since the Parliament Act. If they come to pass, the Jenkins Commission's proposals on the electoral system will spell the demise not just of the present party system but of the peculiar British system of adversarial majoritarian democracy through which we have been governed for more than a century.

The implications are stark. The old constitution was never the crystalline monolith of Dicey's imagining. It was a palimpsest of sometimes discordant myths, understandings, and expectations, reflecting the changing values and preoccupations of succeeding generations. On some key points - the role of the Member of Parliament, the meaning of ministerial accountability, the functions of the monarch - it was ambiguous. Still, certain broad principles were reasonably clear: the absolute and inalienable sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament; autonomous executive power; no fundamental law, amendable only by some special procedure; collective and individual ministerial responsibility; an adversarial party system buttressed by a first-past-the-post electoral system; majoritarian democracy achieved through responsible party government.

That constitution was showing signs of disarray when Tony Blair was an undergraduate. The Thatcher and Major governments undermined many of its underpinning institutions and tacit understandings. The 1972 European Communities Act and the Single European Act of 1985 undermined more. New Labour's constitutional agenda goes much further. If the undecided questions on that agenda are answered in a maximalist fashion - if Britain enters the single currency; if House of Lords reform produces a second chamber with the authority and legitimacy to challenge the executive-dominated House of Commons; if the proposals put forward by the Jenkins Commission are enacted - the old constitution will no longer exist. Responsible party government, of the sort we have known since the Second Reform Act, will be a thing of the past. But even if the answers are minimalist, even if we stay out of the single currency, establish an entirely nominated second chamber and stick to the present electoral system, New Labour has already changed the old constitution so fundamentally that a return to the status quo ante is impossible.

At this point, however, we confront an oddity. Britain's slow, crab-like, late nineteenth and early twentieth-century progress towards democracy and the associated struggles over the future of the Union with Ireland were the subjects of intense, passionate, and intellectually impressive debate. Dicey, Bagehot, Mill, Leslie Stephen, Henry Maine, L.T. Hobhouse and J.A. Hobson were only some of the debaters. And the debate was not confined to intellectuals. Active politicians at or near the summit of power - Lowe, Salisbury, Gladstone, Chamberlain, Dilke, Asquith - contributed to it as well. It was a debate about ends as well as about means: about the nature and responsibilities of citizenship; about the relationship between democratic governance and the capitalist free market; about the problems of sharing power by area; about what it was to be British and the kind of political community that Britain was to be. The same, of course, was true of the great American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century. But it is conspicuously untrue of the constitutional revolution now underway. A few academics and commentators have tried to generate a debate. Charter 88 has done its bit. You, Mr Chairman, have done a lot. But with a few honourable exceptions, the political class on the national, British level has responded with a deafening silence. (The political classes of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are a different matter.) As a result, there has been no great Britain-wide debate on the rationale, implications or ultimate goal of the changes now in progress. No political leader has offered a

vision of the end in view, or set out an ideal of good government, or political health or civic virtue which the changes are held to promote or alternatively to undermine.

The silence is especially deafening in the case of the Government whose agenda this is. Ministers have focused on means and ignored ends. They have made no attempt to link their constitutional measures with the rest of their so-called project. Their ruthlessly centralist approach to the management of their own party and to most of the social and economic issues which are the stuff of domestic politics runs directly counter to the de-centralist aspirations which their constitutional proposals appear to reflect and seem bound to encourage. Perhaps because they are dimly aware of this contradiction and do not wish to face the implications, they have not described what they want to put in the place of the old constitution which they are busily dismantling. Above all, they have said virtually nothing about the moral and philosophical issues at stake. Yet these issues go deep - as deep as did the issues that preoccupied Mill, Bagehot, Gladstone, Salisbury and Dicey in the late-nineteenth century; as deep, in some ways, as did the issues that concerned the authors of the Federalist papers two hundred years ago.

Because the issues go deep, because they have to do with the fundamentals of democratic governance and national identity, because they are, in consequence, profoundly controversial, they can be settled satisfactorily only through debate and negotiation. Sooner or later, the revolution will end. A new constitution of some sort will presumably emerge. If it is to endure it must be rooted in consent. In the jargon of management theory, it must be 'owned' by the society which will live by it. 'Ownership' is impossible without understanding; and understanding has to be built on wide-ranging, uninhibited discussion. For a constitution is more than a legal text or collection of texts. For good or ill, it encapsulates a moral vision: a conception of the ends of political life, of the way in which the members of a political community should relate to each other and settle their differences, of the nature and limits of the public realm, of the sources of authority and power and of the way in which they should be distributed. As well as formal texts, it covers the informal understandings and operational codes that make up the warp and woof of the political culture. If the formal texts say one thing and the informal understandings another, the result will be confusion or breakdown. But the informal understandings cannot be changed by Acts of Parliament alone. They can be changed only through a process of social learning, which only the political class can begin, but which it cannot control.

So what should the British debate be about? As I implied a moment ago, New Labour's constitutional agenda did not suddenly emerge from a clear sky. Under the Wilson Government of 1964-1970 we saw an abortive scheme of House of Lords reform and the establishment of the Crowther (later Kilbrandon) Commission on the Constitution. The Heath Government passed the European Communities Act and transformed the pattern of local government. The Callaghan Government embarked on a hugely-time-consuming, if abortive, project for Scottish and Welsh devolution. The Thatcher and Major governments transferred a wide range of public functions from elected local councils to nominated bodies, and re-shaped the relationship between the core executive in Whitehall and the agencies that deliver services to the

public in a way that punched huge holes in the fundamental doctrine of ministerial accountability. By signing the Single European Act they also did more to water down the sovereignty of the British state than any previous British Government. But these changes were not the products of caprice or even of ideology. They too were the work of sleepwalkers. They were made because responsible party government was no longer delivering the goods; because the Westminster Model was becoming, at one and the same time, less legitimate and less effective; and because the governments of the time were trying to improvise their way out of the consequences.

New Labour's constitutional agenda can be understood only against that background. It is a response to a creeping crisis of legitimacy which has been in progress for thirty years. The sources of this creeping crisis are manifold, but one stands out. The old constitution was the constitution of a pre-democratic ancien regime on which democratic flesh had been grafted. It was also an imperial constitution, embodying an imperial identity. The end of empire fatally undermined it. But the obvious question, 'What is to replace it?', went unanswered. As a result, the experiments of the 1960s and 1970s were half-hearted, makeshift and transitory, while the changes brought by the Thatcher Revolution still further eroded the moral foundations of the institutions through which they were procured. So the grand question for the twenty-first century is this: What should succeed the busted flush of the ancien regime? It goes without saying that it must be a democratic constitution, close enough to the traditions of this particular political community to command assent, yet appropriate to a medium-sized Member State of a federalising European Union. But democracy comes in many guises. My question therefore implies another: What sort of democracy?

At this point, I return to my opening dichotomy of pluralism and populism. I do so by way of two intriguing comments by Professor Robert Hazell, of this College. The first is that the United Kingdom is developing a form of government 'with greater checks and balances and greater separation of powers'. The second is that 'popular sovereignty is replacing parliamentary sovereignty.'¹ On both these points, Professor Hazell is right. But they encapsulate a paradox, which he does not discuss. Implicit in the notion of constitutional checks and balances are a pluralist logic and a pluralist approach to the relationship between the state and civil society. The notion of popular sovereignty, on the other hand, is quintessentially populist. Now, pluralism and populism are not natural bedfellows. They spring from different moral visions and point in different directions. The greatest pluralists in political history were the founding fathers of the American Republic. Populists hark back to Rousseau, perhaps to the Jacobins. Most democratic constitutions combine elements of both. No one should be surprised if the new constitution which results from the Government's sleepwalking does so too. But they are bound to be in tension. It is on that tension, and on the understandings which will be needed to resolve it, that debate should focus.

As I shall use the term, pluralism is not a doctrine. It is a disposition, a mentality, an approach. Like most approaches to politics it is a matter of feelings as well as of beliefs. Pluralists rejoice in variety. They relish difference. They are suspicious of

uniformity and sceptical about theories - Marxism, economic liberalism, globalisation - that presuppose uniformity. The notion that it is possible to strip away the accretions of history and locality that clothe real people in real societies, in order to lay bare an essential human nature from which universally valid laws of behaviour can be derived, seems to them misconceived and dangerous. The accretions of history and locality are what make us human. Pluralists know that people are not all the same; and believe that life would be less rich and satisfying if they were. They like the clash and clang of argument, and would detest a world where everyone agreed with them. The monochrome sameness of the big battalions horrifies them, and so does the sugary conformism of the politically correct. Instinctively, they are for the 'little platoons' that Edmund Burke saw as the nurseries of 'public affections', and they want to protect them from the homogenising pressures of state, market and opinion. They don't want all groups to have the same values or to live the same lives. For them, a good society is a mosaic of various and vibrant smaller collectivities - trade unions, universities, business associations, cricket clubs, local authorities, miners' welfares, churches, mosques, Women's Institutes, NGOs - each with its own identity, tradition, values and rituals. Thomas Hobbes, the great philosopher of absolute sovereignty, famously compared such collectivities to 'worms in the entrails of a natural man'. Pluralists see them as antibodies protecting the culture of democracy from infection.

They approach politics in the same spirit. For pluralists, constitutional checks and balances are essential to the Open Society. They have at least two reasons. The Open Society is quintessentially democratic, but democratic citizenship has a price tag. Part of the price is fortitude, self-discipline, a willingness to make hard choices in the public interest and a capacity to stick with them. The disciplines of democracy - the arts of self-government - do not come naturally. They have to be learned; and it is in the little platoons, in the intermediate institutions that stand between the state and the individual, that we learn them. It is worth remembering that, in this country, trade unions, co-operatives and dissenting churches were schools for citizenship long before the coming of universal suffrage. But the little platoons are vulnerable as well as precious. Totalitarian states colonise or cripple them, but even well-intentioned democratic states, acting in the supposed interests of their peoples, and responding to what they see as the imperatives of social justice or the free market or economic efficiency, have a strong propensity to encroach on them, to curb their freedom of action and to impose alien norms on them. That has been a leitmotiv of post-war British history, under governments of both parties. Aneurin Bevan nationalising the local authority hospitals; Anthony Crosland trying to abolish the grammar schools; Peter Walker sweeping away ancient counties; Margaret Thatcher handbagging universities, trade unions and local councils; David Blunkett naming and shaming schools that his inspectors decree to be failures all thought (or think) that they were acting for the best. But as a result of their ministrations, British civil society, which was one of the strongest in the world in the nineteenth century, is now one of the weakest in the democratic west. Pluralists draw a stern moral. If self-government is to be more than a pious hope, if the civility on which it depends is to flourish, the little platoons must be protected from the inevitably intrusive and potentially over-mighty state. They cannot be protected effectively without constitutional checks and balances.

That leads on to the second reason why checks and balances matter to pluralists. It was put best by the founding fathers of American federalism more than 200 years ago. 'Ambition', said James Madison, 'must be made to counter ambition'. The best defence against the arrogance and self-aggrandisement of power is power. No rulers, not even the most virtuous, not even those chosen by and in theory representative of the 'sovereign people' can be trusted not to abuse their positions. Power is addictive. It is a magnet for toadies. It drowns out awkward questions. It encourages delusions of infallibility, and fosters the bunker mentality. All rulers, even democratic ones, even those who honestly believe themselves to be pluralists, are tempted to stifle criticism, to surround themselves with yes-men and to extend their power in potentially damaging or corrupting ways. So checks and balances are essential, not to abolish power - that is a utopian impossibility and attempts to achieve it usually lead in practice to tyranny - but to tame it.

The implications are harder, sharper and, for some, less palatable than they appear at first sight. Pluralism is not a soft option. It does not dissolve all conflicts of value in a warm bath of moral relativism. It says that the conflicts have to be faced and argued out, and that incompatible goods have to be traded off against each other. It does not deny the need for leadership or pretend that difficult choices can be fudged. It says that leaders should argue and persuade rather than manipulate or command, and that choices should be made openly and after deliberation. For pluralists, democratic self-government is a testing and strenuous experiment, not an easy-going panacea. Success is not guaranteed. The classical writers who warned that democracy is inherently prone to self-destruction have not yet been proved wrong. It depends on personal growth, on a willingness to learn, on the development of judgement. To some, all this will smack - dread word - of elitism, and perhaps rightly so. The language of 'growth', 'learning' and 'judgement' clearly implies that some preferences are better than others. But pluralists will not apologise for that. The alternative power centres on which they rely to check the power of the intrusive state must have a capacity for self defence. This means that they cannot be anarchistic communes. They too must be led, and leadership is elitist by definition. For pluralists, the notion that we can live in a world without elites is as fatuous and as dangerous as the notion that we can live in a world without power. If power checks power, elites countervail elites.

The populist alternative stands in stark contrast to all this. Like pluralism, populism is best seen as an approach rather than as a doctrine. Like pluralists, populists challenge the underlying assumptions of the ancien regime. But there the resemblance ends. For populists, wisdom and virtue - an intuitive, unschooled wisdom all the more profound for being unschooled, and an instinctive, innocent virtue, uncorrupted by excessive ratiocination - reside in the people, and not in any elite or institution. 'Rumania?' said an anonymous Rumanian philosopher at an international conference. 'My country's contribution to philosophy is the immemorial wisdom of the Rumanian peasant.'² As a kind of counterpoint, here is David Owen on his experiences on a building site in 1956 before going up to Cambridge.

In 1956, when the Suez crisis broke, there was Gaitskell on television and in the House of Commons criticising Eden, and here were these men working alongside me, who should have been his natural supporters, furious with him. The Daily Mirror backed Gaitskell, but these men were tearing up their Daily Mirrors every day in the little hut where we had our tea and sandwiches during our break. The main subject of conversation was 'this bloody rag, the Mirror', and the Mirror writers were 'bastards, Commie-lovers!' My working mates were solidly in favour of Eden. It was not only that they taught me how people like them think.; they also opened my eyes to how I should think myself. From then on I never identified with the liberal - with a small 'l' - establishment.³

That is the populist mentality in a nutshell. Peasants are wiser than philosophers. The people are right and the establishment is wrong. Pluralists inhabit a world of dilemmas, of tensions between conflicting and incommensurable goods, and of negotiation between the bearers of different values. For populists dilemmas are impermissible. The people know best. Values are not in tension with each other, and there is no need for negotiation. The people decide which values are to prevail. In extreme versions of the populist approach, they even decide what is scientifically valid, as when that archetypal American populist, William Jennings Bryan, insisted that evolution should not be taught in the public school system because '[n]ot one in ten of those who accept the Bible as the Word of God' believed it to be true.

By the same token, legitimate power springs from the uncorrupted people, and only from the people. Checks and balances are therefore suspect. They impede the expression of the popular will, and chop up the power which emanates from the people into self-stultifying bits. Besides, there is no need for them. Oppression by power-hungry rulers is indeed a danger, but the solution is simple: empower the people. Moreover, the people are a homogeneous and monolithic whole. There is no need to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Minorities are either part of the whole, in which case they don't need protection, or self-excluded from it, in which case they don't deserve to be protected. Apparent differences of interest or value that cut across the body of the people, that divide the collective sovereign against itself, are products of elite manipulation or, in Mrs Thatcher's immortal phrase, of the 'enemy within'. For there is a strong paranoid streak in the populist mentality. Against the pure, virtuous people stand corrupt, privileged elites and sinister, conspiratorial subversives. The latter are forever plotting to do down the former. Intermediate institutions and so-called 'special interests' are therefore suspect - one of the reasons why New Right neo-liberalism, which also views intermediate institutions and special interests as conspiracies against the public interest, can so easily be given a populist flavour. So far from seeking to protect the little platoons with checks and balances, populists would ideally like to sweep them away.

The implications for leadership are particularly striking. Populist leaders appeal to the emotions I have tried to describe, and usually share them. But there is a large element of humbug in that. Even leaders who originally sprang from the ranks of the people no longer belong to the ranks once they start to lead. Populist leaders

have to come to terms with this awkward fact. Characteristically, they do so by laying claim to a special, intuitive, supra-rational understanding of the people and of their true values and beliefs. Charles de Gaulle, Enoch Powell, Adolf Hitler, Margaret Thatcher, Joe McCarthy, David Lloyd George did not need to find out what the people thought. They knew. They knew because their heart-beats chimed with the people's. Sometimes the results are ludicrous, as when Tony Benn demanded and got a referendum on European Community membership, only to see his side of the argument crushingly defeated. Sometimes they are evil, as with Hitler. Sometimes they are magnificent, as with de Gaulle. For the purposes of this lecture, however, what matters is the psychic mechanism through which the results are achieved. Populist leaders believe that they embody the popular will, that they have a private line to that will, that they can and should appeal to it directly without going through intermediaries. Buoyed up by that belief, they offer certainty, security, glamour in place of the drab and confusing greys of the ordinary politician. While the magic lasts, the rewards are great. The German socialist, Egon Wertheimer, once described Ramsay MacDonald, in his day a heroic figure, as 'the focus for the mute hopes of a class.' Substitute 'people' for 'class' and that is the essence of populist leadership.

What has this to do with New Labour's constitutional revolution? Simply this. Ours is a populist age - resentful of excellence and hostile to any suggestion that the voice of the people may not always be the voice of God. To be sure, it is also a hyper-individualistic age. But despite appearances to the contrary, populism and hyper-individualism go together. A mass of disaggregated individuals, in a society where intermediate institutions have been crippled or hollowed out, is more likely to respond to a populist appeal than to any other. Populist languages make no demands on their listeners; they flatter the emotions; they promise the isolated and alienated the warm glow of membership of a greater whole; they place the burdens of freedom on someone else's shoulders. For the present Government, they have other attractions as well. When institutions are in disarray, when norms point in different directions, when the old constitution has become a messy jumble of bits and pieces and there is no coherent alternative in sight, the easiest way to cut through the resulting contradictions is to appeal directly to the sovereign people, over the heads of such intermediaries as remain, having first found out what the people want to hear.

But the attractions are outweighed by the dangers. Populists speak of 'the people', but who are the 'people'? The current reconstruction of the territorial constitution makes this question painfully urgent. Are the Scots part of the uncorrupted, monolithic and homogeneous British people, to whom, in the populist vision, sovereignty should now be made over? Or are they a different people, also uncorrupted, homogeneous and monolithic, and also sovereign? If the former, then how can there be a populist justification for devolution? But if the latter, what is wrong with the SNP's conclusion that the sovereign Scottish people deserve a state of their own? In practice, the case for devolution has been argued in populist language, but only with reference to Scotland. No one has answered the embarrassing questions, 'What about the English?' 'Are they also a people?' I don't claim that populists cannot answer those questions. Plainly, they can. The trouble is

that their answers point unmistakably towards a Balkanised Britain. The pluralist case for devolution, by contrast, has nothing to do with popular sovereignty. It is that, in a country of Britain's size, the power of the central state should, as a matter of principle, be checked with elected sub-national assemblies - not only in Scotland and Wales, but in the English regions. The obvious conclusion is that the emerging new territorial constitution is likely to unravel unless it is advocated, justified and understood in pluralist terms.

That leads on to a more general point. The reconstruction of the British state raises two questions, not one: not just, 'Who are the people?' but 'Can I belong to more than one people at the same time?' Can I be Scottish and British? Can I be English and British? Can I be a Londoner, or a Yorkshireman, and English and British? If the answer is 'yes' as it surely must be, how do these identities, and the loyalties they involve, relate to each other? These questions, or their equivalents, reverberate throughout the territory of the European Union (and, as Kosovo reminds us, beyond). The closer the Union gets to federation, the more urgent they will become. Here too the populist answers are sterile and destructive. For populists, identity is identity: British or European, not both. Britain cannot come to terms with the European destiny that every British Government since the early 1960s has believed to be essential until we, as a political community, accept that identities are multiple, not singular; that overlapping loyalties are the stuff of social life. And to accept that is to accept a crucial element in the pluralist approach.

In the last resort, however, the case against the populist mentality is moral, not practical. It has to do with the case for and nature of democracy. The pluralist argument for democracy is that it is better - morally better, not just pleasanter or more convenient - to be a free citizen, bearing the burdens of freedom, than a slave. The pluralist vision of democracy implies a deliberative, reflective politics of power-sharing and mutual education. Absolute popular sovereignty is therefore as alien to it as absolute parliamentary sovereignty. In a pluralist polity, sovereignty would be shared - another way of saying that the traditional British concept of sovereignty would have no meaning. It is not difficult to set out the essential elements in a pluralist constitutional settlement: proportional representation, an elected second chamber, regional assemblies, revitalised local government, freedom of information, a federal Britain in a federal Europe. But no such settlement could work without a change of mentality and culture. So let debate commence!

¹ Robert Hazell (ed) Constitutional Futures, A History of the Next Ten Years, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 6.

² Quoted in Peter Wiles, 'A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism' in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (eds), Populism, Its National Characteristics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 166.

³ Kenneth Harris, David Owen Speaking Personally to Kenneth Harris, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987, p. 17.