Role of Courts in Enforcing Competition Laws: A Comparative Analysis of India and Pakistan

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ROLE OF COURTS IN ENFORCING COMPETITION LAWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Amber Darr*

Developing countries often adopt modern competition laws based on international blueprints for motivations ranging from gaining international legitimacy to achieving domestic economic goals. However, whilst adopting such laws confers some legitimacy on these countries, it does not automatically translate into the realization of their economic goals unless the laws are also meaningfully enforced. Comparative law literature, viewed in the light of development economics, suggests that meaningful enforcement entails, among other things, a productive interaction between the adopted laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the countries. In this article, I identify possible interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal systems in India and Pakistan and compare the interactions that actually occur in the two countries. I observe that although India and Pakistan have nearly identical pre-existing legal systems and adopted similar competition laws within five years of each other their interactions with their pre-existing legal systems are remarkably different. I argue that that the nature of interactions in a country is substantially due to the strategy, mechanisms and legal and political institutions through which it adopted is competition law. I also demonstrate that the type of interaction has an observable impact on the enforcement of competition law in that country.

F42, F54, K21, K40, K41, K42, L40, L49, N45, O1

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

In 2002 and 2007 respectively, India and Pakistan replaced nearly 40 year old anti-monopoly legislation with modern competition laws.1 Although the Indian Competition Act 2002 (ICA 2002) and the Pakistan Competition Ordinance 2007 (PCO 2007) were both based on foreign models, the processes, mechanisms and legal and political institutions through which these had been adopted were remarkably different. Whilst India established the indigenous Raghavan Committee, to discuss the parameters of the proposed law, Pakistan outsourced the discussion and drafting exercise to a World Bank led team. Further, whilst India enacted ICA 2002 after extensive debate in Parliament, Pakistan promulgated PCO 2007 as a temporary ordinance signed into law by the President. The law was enacted through Parliament, as the Competition Act 2010 (PCA 2010), only after three years and considerable legal uncertainty.2

Although ICA 2002 was enacted five years before PCO 2007, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), proposed to be established by the Act, was not fully constituted until 2009,3 nearly two years after its Pakistani counterpart, the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), established in pursuance of PCO 2007, had commenced operations. The delay was due to the ICA 2002 being challenged before the Indian Supreme Court soon after its enactment on the ground that its provisions were contrary to the principle of separation of powers provided in the Indian constitution.4 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the basis of an undertaking given by the Indian government that it would

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1 I refer here to the Indian Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 and the Pakistani Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 both of which were repealed by ICA 2002 and PCO 2007 respectively.
2 In October 2007 the President of Pakistan promulgated PCO 2007 in exercise of his powers under Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. In terms of Article 89, an ordinance lapses four months after its enactment unless ratified by the Parliament before the expiry of this period. However, less than two months after the promulgation of PCO 2007, the President declared an emergency throughout the country and issued an executive order, which ‘saved’ certain ordinances from lapsing—PCO 2007 was one of these. This meant that instead of lapsing after four months of its promulgation, PCO 2007 survived until July 2009 when the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Sindh High Court Bar Association v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 879 declared the President’s order of 2007 to be void. In this order, the Supreme Court allowed four months to the government to place all saved ordinances before the Parliament for ratification. However, instead of complying with this order the government promulgated Competition Ordinance 2009 in November 2009, when the four months were due to expire. When this ordinance lapsed in March 2010 the government promulgated yet another ordinance, the Competition Ordinance 2010. Finally, in October 2010, the Parliament enacted PCA 2010.
3 On 14.10.2003 the Indian government issued notification no. S.O. 1198 (E), to establish CCI. However, ICA 2002 was challenged after only one member had been appointed.
4 Brahmin Dutt v. Union of India (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 431. The petition argued that rules for appointment of members in ICA 2002 violated the principle of separation of powers. It further argued that given CCI’s adjudicatory powers, its members should be appointed according to the procedure prescribed in the Constitution for appointment of judges.
amp ICA 2002 to address the concerns. These amendments were enacted as the Competition (Amendment) Act 2007 and CCI commenced operations shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{5}

Since commencement of operations nearly a decade ago, the Indian and Pakistani competition laws have evolved along different paths and at different paces. In both countries, however, the implementation of these laws has been shaped by two distinct factors: first, by the decisions taken by the CCI and CCP in their capacity as the first tier competition institutions and second, by their interactions with the general high courts pre-existing in the legal systems of the countries. The ICA 2002 and PCO 2007 (and PCA 2010) do not factor in the possible impact of high courts exercising their inherent constitutional jurisdiction in respect of competition matters. However, in this article I demonstrate that interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal systems are a substantial part of competition related litigation in both India and Pakistan. I argue that these interactions between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems are shaped in part by the strategies, mechanisms and institutions\textsuperscript{6} through which the countries had initially adopted their respective competition laws. I further argue that the nature of these interactions has a discernible impact on the direction and pace of evolution and enforcement of competition laws in the countries.

This article is, therefore, organised as follows: In section 2, I outline the theoretical links between the interactions and the performance of the competition laws. In section 3, I identify the framework within which the interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal systems are likely to take place. I identify possible legal bases on which these interactions may be initiated. I also indicate the Indian and Pakistani institutions that are likely to engage in these interactions. In section 4, I examine and compare two different categories of interactions: those that emanate from interim orders of the NCAs, and those initiated on the basis of final orders of the NCAs. In section 5, I examine the impact of the strategies, mechanisms and legal and political institutions engaged by India and Pakistan in adopting the competition laws on the nature of these interactions. In section 6, I consider the effects of these interactions on the development and enforcement of the competition laws. In the final section I conclude. For the purposes of this article I focus only on enforcement orders of CCI from 2009 to 2017 and of CCP from 2008 to 2017 i.e orders in cases of abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements.\textsuperscript{7}

**Chapter 2 THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERACTIONS**

Both the Indian and Pakistani competition laws are modelled on international precedents and may, therefore, be deemed to be ‘legal transplants’ within the meaning given to the term in comparative law literature.\textsuperscript{8} Whilst comparative law scholars recognise legal transplants as an important source of laws, they urge the importance of compatibility and warn countries against adopting laws without considering the contexts from which the laws originate and the contexts for which they are intended. Interestingly, however, the scholars are not often in agreement about the specific features of the contexts of the adopting and originating countries that in their view must be compatible with each other and the likely impact of the compatibility.

Whilst Montesquieu and Kahn-Freund are of the view that the legal transplant must be compatible with the institutions, political law, social and political context of the adopting country,\textsuperscript{9} Trebilcock and Iacobucci, writing specifically about competition law transplants, emphasize the need for commonalities between ‘particularities of history, initial conditions, institutional traditions, and political economy considerations’ of the originating and adopting countries.\textsuperscript{10} For Gal, the ‘commonality’

\textsuperscript{5} On 20\textsuperscript{th} May 2009 the government, by notification nos. S.O. 1241(E) and S.O. 1242(E) brought into force provisions relating to anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant position in ICA 2002. Provisions related to mergers did not come into force until 2011.

\textsuperscript{6} The term ‘institutions’ includes both formal and informal systems of rules as well as organizations to the extent that they are engaged in implementing the Laws. See Douglass C North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge University Press 1990).

\textsuperscript{7} I focus on orders for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position only because CCI’s merger regime did not become operational until 2011 and at present the data is not sufficient to provide a basis for comparison with Pakistan’s merger regime.

\textsuperscript{8} Alan Watson, *Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law* (2\textsuperscript{nd} edn.) University of Georgia Press 1993) 21.


between the contexts of the originating and adopting countries encompasses ‘almost all issues which relate to the relationship between law and society’ whereas Shahein underscores the importance of examining the ‘specific political, economic and social environment’ of the two countries. \(^{11}\) Mattei, somewhat fine-tunes this discussion by referring particularly to the need for the legal transplant to be compatible with the ‘machinery of justice’ in the adopting country. \(^{12}\) However, he does not explain what exactly he means by this machinery of justice.

Whilst discussing the likely impact of compatibility (or lack thereof), scholars link it with the ‘success’ of the legal transplant, however, they do not appear to fully explore the concept of success or its precise links with compatibility. Kahn-Freund speaks of the legal transplant being ‘rejected’ in the adopting country if certain contextual features in that country are not compatible with those in the originating country. However, he does not explain what he means by ‘rejection’ or how and when it may occur. \(^{13}\) Similarly, whilst Watson argues that for a transplant to be successful, it must continue to ‘grow in’ and become ‘a part of the borrowing country’ and that ‘ascribing a different meaning to the legal transplant should not be confused with its rejection in the country’, he neither explains what ‘growing’ means nor explores the factors that may contribute to (or hinder) this growth in the adopting country. \(^{14}\)

Although Mattei implies that compatibility of the legal transplant with the ‘machinery of justice’ in the adopting country is a pre-condition of its success, \(^{15}\) he does not identify possible points at which the transplant and the machinery of justice may interact with other or the legal bases on which the interaction may take place. Teubner and Berkowitz et al add further dimensions to this dynamic: Teubner indicates that the success of a legal transplant lies in its ability to interact productively with other elements in the legal organism in which it is transplanted, \(^{16}\) whilst Berkowitz et al suggest that the performance of a transplant may be judged by the extent to which actors (including legal actors) in the adopting country are able to understand, apply and utilize it. \(^{17}\)

This discussion suggests that the nature of the interaction between an adopted law and the pre-existing legal system of the adopting country is an important indicator of the success of the borrowed law. It further indicates that the more ‘productive’ this interaction the greater the likelihood of success of the adopted law and that although productivity is not defined, it may be understood as the extent to which the adopted law is understood, applied and utilised by actors in the pre-existing legal system.

Chapter 3 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK & LEGAL BASIS OF INTERACTIONS

Chapter 4 The institutional framework

The interaction between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the two countries takes place through the agency of the institutions they establish. Institutions envisaged under both Indian and Pakistani competition laws are the first-tier CCI and CCP (collectively the NCAs) and the second-tier tribunals. Both laws also confer a competition appellate jurisdiction on their Supreme Courts, thereby making these third (and final) institutions in the competition stream. Institutions representing the pre-existing legal systems of the two countries are the high courts established under the Constitutions of the two countries and the Supreme Courts sitting in their constitutional appellate jurisdiction. Possible interactions between the competition institutions and the courts may be outlined as in Figure 1 below.

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13. Kahn-Freund (n 9).
14. Watson (n 8).
Amongst these interactions, I am interested primarily in the interactions depicted in Figure 1 by the solid black lines. These interactions are activated when an aggrieved person invokes constitutional grounds to file a petition before the high court and the high court exercises its inherent constitutional jurisdiction to respond to the petition. The decision of the high court either returns the matter to the NCA or is appealed before the Supreme Court sitting in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court decision may return the matter to the high court for further action, before it is finally returned to the NCA or it may return it directly to the NCA. This stream of interactions may be initiated from interim orders of the NCAs (i.e., orders passed by the NCAs whilst proceedings are still pending before them) and/or final orders of the NCAs (i.e., orders passed at the conclusion of the proceedings before the NCAs).

The red lines in this figure represent the path that a competition matter would take if it was appealed through the institutions envisaged in the competition laws of the two countries. Juxtaposing the black and red lines in this figure reveals the extent to which the neat red implementation structure may veer off course each time a matter is challenged before the courts in their constitutional jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that constitutional petitions should not be filed—indeed filing these petitions is the right of the aggrieved parties and they may not be prevented from availing it—but to highlight that whilst some petitions may only temporarily change the direction of competition enforcement in the country (such as when a petition from an order of the NCA is filed to a high court and the high court returns it to the NCA) others may derail it almost entirely (such as when the high court issues interim orders restraining the NCA or when the petitioners become embroiled in appeals before the Supreme Courts even from these interim orders).

Chapter 5 Reasons for not addressing petitions against orders tribunals

The reason for focusing only on actions emanating from orders of NCAs as opposed to those of tribunals is the lack of comparable data on orders of tribunals, which derives from erratic history of the tribunals in India and Pakistan. The Indian government established the tribunal with the mandate to hear appeals from CCI’s interim as well as final orders almost simultaneously with the CCI. The tribunal remained in operation for the next eight years except for a period of approximately one year, when it had a Chairperson but no members, and was, therefore, unable to hear any appeals. On 31st March 2017 the

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18 The Indian government established the tribunal on 15. 05. 2009 by notification number S.O.1240 (E). On 20.05.2009 it appointed the first Chairperson of the tribunal.
19 See http://compat.nc.in/FormerChairman.aspx (accessed 9 September 2017).
Indian Parliament amended ICA 2002 to replace the tribunal with a ‘National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’. 20

In Pakistan on the other hand, the very concept of a tribunal was only introduced in PCA 2010. 21 Under PCO 2007 and the 2009 Ordinance appeals from orders passed by a single member or authorized officer of CCP, lay to CCP’s appellate bench and appeals from all other orders of CCP and those of the appellate bench lay directly to the Supreme Court. 22 and in the few months that the 2010 Ordinance remained in force, appeals from orders passed by more than one CCP member or by the appellate bench were directed to the high courts and from the orders of the high courts to the Supreme Court. 23 However, even after the PCA 2010 had stipulated that a tribunal be established, the government waited until 2011 to appoint the first member and Chairman of the tribunal 24 and until 2012 to appoint the technical members. 25 The tribunal had been functioning for only five months and had decided only one appeal 26 when in April 2013 one member resigned and the other retired due to having reached retirement age. The tribunal remained dysfunctional until 2015 when the government re-constituted it by appointing the requisite number of members. Also, in 2015 the tribunal first formulated rules to regulate its conduct and proceedings. 27 At present, the tribunal has passed no more than 20 orders.

Chapter 6 The legal bases for these interactions

The legal grounds on which these interactions may be initiated derive from the Indian and Pakistani Constitutions. In terms of article 226 of the Indian Constitution and its counterpart, article 199 of the Pakistani Constitution, in order to avail of Constitutional remedies, persons aggrieved by the orders or actions of competition institutions must demonstrate before the courts that the actions or orders of the competition institutions have infringed one or more of their fundamental rights guaranteed under the respective Constitutions. Further, in terms of Articles 226 (read with article 32) of the Indian Constitution and 199 (read with article 184(3)) of the Pakistani Constitution, if the courts are satisfied that fundamental rights have been violated, they have the inherent jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition;28 certiorari;29 habeas corpus;30 and quo warranto31 to enforce these rights. The courts may also issue interim orders in any petitions filed on these grounds.

Chapter 7 THE NATURE OF INTERACTIONS IN INDIA & PAKISTAN

In this section, I examine interactions that emanate from interim orders of the NCAs as well as their final orders. In examining the interactions I investigate and compare both the grounds on which persons aggrieved by actions or orders of the NCAs initiated petitions and the responses of the courts to these petitions.

Chapter 8 Interactions emanating from interim orders

India

20 See http://nclat.nic.in/about-nclat.html (accessed 22nd June 2017). On 26th May 2017, the government issued notification S.O. 1696(E) to bring into force the provisions amending ICA 2002 and from this date onwards all appeals from CCI’s orders were to lie to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.

22 Sections 41 and 42 PCO 2007 and of Ordinance 2009. Although some appeals were filed before the Supreme Court during this period, the endemnic delay at the Supreme Court none of these appeals were finally decided.

27 Section 42, Third Ordinance 2010.


29 Notification No. F.21(1)/2011-Admn-III dated 29.05.2012.

30 Section 6.3.2(b).


31 ie writs directing a person carrying out a function in connection with the affairs of the state to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted to do or to do anything he is required to do.

30 ie writs directing that any given act or proceeding performed by a person in connection with the affairs of the federation, has been done without lawful authority and is without legal effect.

31 ie writs requiring a person holding public office to show the authority of law under which he claims to hold that office.
From 2009 (when CCI commenced its enforcement actions) until December 2017, CCI passed 165 enforcement orders. However, petitions were filed in respect of only 20 of these orders (12.12%) while these were still pending before CCI. At times, aggrieved persons filed more than one petition in respect of a single proceeding, however, in the 24 petitions filed before courts throughout India during this period, courts issued final orders in 21 and interim orders in only four. Of these four interim orders, three were replaced by final orders whilst relevant proceedings were still pending before CCI.

The interactions were initiated on a range of legal grounds. One ground repeatedly raised was that CCI did not have the jurisdiction to hear matters that had initially been taken up by its predecessor anti-monopoly authority, particularly if the authority had initiated an investigation but failed to complete it. However, all courts before which this ground was raised unequivocally declared it to be without merit and directed the petitioners to submit to CCI’s jurisdiction. A further related ground raised before the courts was that CCI could not exercise its jurisdiction in respect of practices that had commenced before the coming into force of the relevant provisions of ICA 2002. However, in each of these petitions, the courts clarified that CCI had the jurisdiction to examine such conduct if it continued even after the provisions had come into force.

In at least one petition, an aggrieved party challenged CCI’s powers to issue a show cause notice on the ground that doing so was tantamount to pre-judging the case. However, the courts clarified that CCI had the jurisdiction to form a preliminary view of a case at the time of issuing a show cause notice. In other cases, parties challenged CCI’s jurisdiction to initiate investigations. However, the courts did not entertain any petitions filed on this ground. In certain petitions filed before them, the response of the courts varied from expressly endorsing CCI; to refusing to restrain it; to directing it to take certain actions; to restraining it from pursuing the matter against one or more of the parties to the proceedings pending before CCI, and very rarely, to restraining it from continuing with the proceedings altogether. Where the courts actually restrained CCI, they did so only for a finite period.

In a few proceedings pending before CCI, the complainant itself appeared before the court. In one instance the complainant sought interim relief against the defendants, however, the court dismissed the petition and directed it to approach CCI. In another instance, the complainant prayed that the court direct CCI to hear an application on an urgent basis. In at least one recent case, CCI voluntarily gave an undertaking to the court that it would not to take adverse action against the defendants whilst proceedings were pending before the courts.

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32 For the purposes of this discussion I only refer to those proceedings in which CCI subsequently passed final orders for the reason that this is the only data available in this regard. These orders include orders under section 26(6) in which CCI disposes of a complaint without finding a contravention and under section 27 in which CCI establishes a violation of the ICA 2002 and sanctions the contravening party.
35 See in this regard, the litigation history of Case 4/2009 MP Merhotra v. Kingfisher Airlines Limited & others.
36 See WP 358/2010 Amir Khan Productions (Pvt.) Limited v. Union of India filed before the Bombay High Court and decided on 18.08.2010.
37 See petitions referred to in CCI’s orders in Case RTPE 3/2008 Federation of Indian Airlines & others decided 2.12.2010 (para 8), and Case 3/2011 Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars Limited India & others (Hyundai) decided 27.7.2015 (paras 1.5, 7.4.4). Also see WP (C) 2471/2016 Arun Kumar Bajoria v. Competition Commission of India and another decided by the Delhi High Court on 21.03.2016, and WP No. 1006 of 2014 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Competition Commission of India & others dismissed by the Delhi High Court on 16.04.2016.
39 To this end, the courts had clearly decided in the course of these proceedings that the said order was nothing more nor less than an order for the purpose of enforcem
Pakistan

In Pakistan as in India, entities aggrieved by proceedings pending before CCP exercised their right to file petitions before the high courts. And, as in India, aggrieved parties filed petitions before the courts in respect of only a fraction of proceedings pending before CCP. Between 2008 and 2016, of the 37 proceedings, which culminated in CCP issuing a final order, petitions were filed in respect of only 6 or 16.2% of proceedings. However, the data reveals that often more than one petition was filed in respect of a single proceeding. Of the nine petitions filed before different high courts throughout the country, the courts issued final orders in only five, and interim orders in all nine. These interim orders often gave rise to appeals before the Supreme Court and these five final orders merely remanded matters from the Supreme Court to the high courts or decided miscellaneous applications that had been filed along with the main petitions. None of the final orders addressed the merits of let alone finally decide the main petitions before them.

The petitions filed before the courts whilst proceedings were pending before CCP may be organised in two groups. The first group comprises petitions filed in the period when PCO 2007 was in force and the second group comprises petitions filed in the period after PCO 2007 had lapsed and includes petitions filed after the enactment of PCA 2010.

Some of the grounds in raised in petitions filed when PCO 2007 was in force were that (i) CCP had not issued the show cause notice in accordance with PCO 2007; (ii) certain sections of PCO 2007 and, therefore, CCP’s actions in exercise of these sections, were ultra vires the Constitution and contrary to the fundamental rights stipulated in it; (iii) the President had promulgated PCO 2007 without legal authority because the subject of competition was not within the legislative competence of the Parliament or the President; and (iv) PCO 2007 did not confer jurisdiction upon CCP to exercise its powers against the petitioners. The courts accepted the majority of these petitions without investigating the specific grounds raised in them and issued interim orders restraining CCP from proceeding against the petitioners.

An important petition from the first group arose from proceedings in relation to the All Pakistan Cement Manufacturers’ Association (APCMA) & its members (the APCMA Case). On 28th October 2008, CCP had issued a show cause notice to APCMA and its members. The defendants challenged the show cause notice before the Islamabad High Court and the High Court, by its order dated 10th November 2008, restrained CCP from passing a final order against the defendants. However, by a further order dated 5th December 2008, the High Court dismissed the defendants’ petitions as ‘premature’. Given this reprieve from the High Court, CCP scheduled a hearing for APCMA and its members for 3rd August 2009, however, in the meantime, the defendants approached the Lahore High Court and obtained another restraining order against CCP. This second restraining order was lifted by Lahore High Court’s order dated 24th August 2009 and CCP was allowed to continue with the proceedings, which culminated in its final order dated 27th August 2009.

A ground repeatedly raised in petitions from the second group especially whilst the 2009 and 2010 Ordinances were in force) was that CCP did not have the power to issue show cause notices until the Delhi High Court on 27.04.2015.

42 There were 20 parties to the Cement Manufacturers Case pending before CCP who filed individual petitions before high courts. However, the high courts disposed these by a single order.

43 See particularly sections 41 and 42 PCO 2007.

44 For instance orders of the Sindh High Court in CP 786/2008 (Karachi Stock Exchange & another v. Federation of Pakistan and others) filed in respect of the Karachi Stock Exchange Case decided 02.05.2008; and CP 938/2008 filed in respect of Pakistan Banking Association Case decided 07.11.2008. CCP appealed both these orders before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court by its order dated 13.11.2008 in CPs 759, 760/2008 and order dated 23.10.2008 in CP 715/2008, set aside the orders of the Sindh High Court on CCP’s undertaking that it will not recover any fines from the petitioners whilst the petitions remained pending.


46 For example see CCP’s order dated 27.08.2009 in File 4/2/sec.4/CCP/2008 (paras 11-13).
the Parliament had ratified the Ordinance then in force.47 In case of at least one petition the court granted
an injunction on this ground and this injunction was relied upon in subsequent petitions to obtain similar
injunctions.48

The most notable petition of this period was filed by Liquefied Petroleum Gas Association of
Pakistan (LPGAP) in which the courts not only granted an interim injunction in favour of LPGAP and
suspended the operation of the show cause notice issued by CCP, but also held that petitions against
actions or orders of CCP could validly be filed before any high court in the jurisdiction of which the
petitioner carried on its business or in which the effect of CCP’s actions was most likely to be felt. CCP
challenged this order before the Supreme Court. However, instead of deciding the issue on merits, the
Supreme Court simply remanded it to the high court for a decision on jurisdiction. Although the Supreme
Court set aside the interim injunction issued by the high court, it did so on CCP’s undertaking that it
would not take any adverse action against the aggrieved parties them until the petitions pending before
the high court were finally decided. Nearly eight years later, this matter is still pending before the high
court and although CCP has passed final orders in the proceedings before it, it is restricted by law from
enforcing its decision against the petitioners.49

Comparing the Indian and Pakistani interactions emanating from interim orders

The interactions between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws (as represented by CCI and CCP
respectively) and the pre-existing legal systems of the countries (as represented by the courts) differ not
only in the grounds on which petitions were filed against proceedings pending before CCI and CCP but
also in the manner in which the Courts responded to the petitions filed before them.

The grounds on which persons aggrieved by proceedings pending before CCI filed petitions
before the Indian courts generally either call into question CCI’s authority to take notice of allegedly
anti-competitive practices or the manner in which CCI takes such notice. These may be referred to as
‘procedural’ grounds. In Pakistan, only a small fraction of petitions filed against proceedings pending
before CCP invoked procedural grounds. The majority of these petitions called into question the
constitutionality of the particular iteration of the Pakistani competition law these were challenging;
CCP’s legal basis for existing and its power to initiate and pursue proceedings. These additional grounds
may be referred to as ‘substantive’ grounds.

On the whole, Indian courts responded to the petitions filed before them with reasonable alacrity
and clarity. Whilst the courts issued a range of orders none of these indefinitely and fully restrained the
proceedings pending before CCI. In fact, in a number of cases the response of the courts not only
supported CCI but also brought proceedings pending before it into greater conformity with due process
norms prevalent in the country.

Pakistani courts, on the other hand, adopted a somewhat hesitant strategy in respect of petitions
filed before them. In the majority of petitions, Pakistani courts admitted the petitions for hearing and
granted interim orders either restraining CCP from continuing with the proceedings before it altogether
or restraining it from enforcing any orders it may pass at the end of these proceedings. The courts issued

47 See n. 2.
48 By its order dated 14.01.2010, Sindh High Court granted an injunction on this ground in CP D-110/2010 (Mirpurkhas
Sugar Mills). This order was relied upon in several other petitions and Sindh High Court granted injunctions in all of these. CCP
challenged a number of orders of the high courts before the Supreme Court (eg in CPs 1065, 1066 and 1067/2010). However, CCP
was unable to explain its delay in filing these CPs and, therefore, the Supreme Court only directed the high courts to hear the
petitions expeditiously rather than directing that these may be dismissed altogether. Similarly, the Supreme Court dismissed CPs
521, 522, 523, 524 and 525/2010 filed by CCP in respect of orders of the High Courts in WPs 1175, 1174 and 1122/2010 and in
CP D.164 and 196/2010 with only an observation that the high courts should expeditiously decide the petitions pending before
them.
49 The Lahore High Court decided LPGAP’s petition (WP 9518/2009) on 27.05.2009 and CCP challenged this before
the Supreme Court (in CP 1022/2009). By its order dated 26.05.2009 the Supreme Court set aside the interim injunction on CCP’s
undertaking that it would not take adverse action and remanded the matter to the high court. In a related petition filed by Jambhore
Joint Venture Limited, a member of LPGAP (W.P 15493/2009) Lahore High Court had passed an interim order against CCP. CCP
appealed this before the Supreme Court, however, it withdrew the appeal when the Supreme Court set aside the interim injunction
on CCP’s undertaking that it would not implement an adverse order whilst the petitions remained pending (Order of Supreme Court
the majority of these restraining orders in the very first hearing and often without provided CCP an
opportunity of hearing.

The few petitions against interim orders that were finally decided were decided on purely
technical grounds such as those filed by the APCMA and its members before the Islamabad High Court,
which were dismissed for being premature50 and the petition filed by Attock Cement Limited before the
Sindh High Court51 against CCP’s show cause notice in the APCMA Case which was dismissed on the
basis that the petitioner already had one appeal pending on this matter before the Supreme Court and
another before the Lahore High Court.52 The Pakistani courts did not pass any decisions on merits in any
petitions filed before them.

Chapter 9 Interactions in respect of final orders of NCAs

India

In India no constitutional petitions were filed against CCI’s final orders. This is due to the establishment
of the tribunal concurrently with CCI, which provided aggrieved persons ‘an adequate alternate remedy’
to approaching the courts in their constitutional jurisdiction.53

Pakistan

The fact that for the greater portion of the first three years of its operation in Pakistan, the only right
available to persons aggrieved by CCP’s final orders was to appeal directly to the Supreme Court and
after 2010, the delay and hesitation in establishing the tribunal meant that aggrieved persons had little
choice but to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts to seek redress for their grievances.

One of the first petitions against a final order of the CCP was filed in the APCMA Case.54 From
the moment CCP had issued show cause notices to APCMA and its members, the APCMA Case had
provoked considerable litigation, however, when the courts allowed CCP to pass a final order in this
matter, it appeared that the on-going tussle between CCP and the high courts had been resolved in CCP’s
favour. However, before CCP could enforce its final order, the Lahore High Court, by its order dated 31st
August 2009, once again restrained CCP from taking any adverse action against the defendants.
However, the Lahore High Court acknowledged that important constitutional and jurisdictional issues
pertaining to CCP remained undecided, including whether the federal legislature was competent to enact
PCO 2007; whether the provision for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court was unconstitutional, and
whether the adjudicatory powers conferred on CCP by PCO 2007 were contrary to the constitutional
principles of separation of powers. The only concession the Lahore High Court allowed the CCP in this
regard was to allow it to publish its order on its official website. The Lahore High Court’s order remains
in force and to date, and CCP has still not enforced its final order against APCMA or any of its members.

A number of petitions against CCP’s final orders raised procedural and substantive grounds
similar to those that had been raised in petitions filed against CCP’s interim orders.55 These included
grounds that CCP was not properly constituted; it lacked the requisite quorum at the time of passing the
final order to pass the order; the order was not in accordance with the version of the competition law then
in force in the country; that CCP had passed the order with mala fide intent and by exercising powers
beyond its jurisdiction;56 competition law could not retrospectively apply to agreements entered into

50 See n. 46 and text thereto.
51 Order of Sindh High Court dated 31.08.2012 in CP 2086/2009 (Attock Cement Limited v. Competition Commission
of Pakistan and others).
52 Ibid.
53 It is a long standing principle of the Indian legal system that a constitutional petition does not lie in situations where
there is ‘an adequate alternate remedy’ available to aggrieved persons. In its decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v.
Chhabil Dass Agrawal(2014) 1 SCC 603 the Supreme Court of India reiterated the established legal position in the country that
when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, then subject to certain exceptions, the high court should not entertain
a writ petition by ignoring such statutory dispensation.
54 See section 4.1(b) above.
55 See 4.1(b) above.
56 Examples of petitions in which CCP’s jurisdiction was challenged include: (1) WPs filed in respect of CCP’s final
Wateen Telecom Limited in which Islamabad High Court passed an interim order on 14.04.2011; and WP 1465/2011 Defence
before its coming into force;\(^{57}\) and that certain actions of CCP were tantamount to judicial review of subordinate legislation and, therefore, not in accordance with the law.\(^{58}\) Some petitions urged questions of law as well as of fact in their grounds including that CCP’s order was contrary to government policy and, therefore, exposed the petitioner to possible adverse governmental action,\(^{59}\) and that CCP had not fully appreciated the facts of the matter in arriving at its final order.\(^{60}\)

In a majority of cases, and regardless of the grounds being realised in them, the court simply admitted the petitions and granted a restraining order to the petitioners. Nearly all these petitions are still pending and the interim injunctions granted by the courts against CCP have been allowed to continue from one date of hearing to the next with the result that a majority of these remain in force. As in the case of petitions filed in respect of interim orders, the Pakistani courts have not decided any petition filed against final orders on its merits.

The decision of the Supreme Court in a petition against CCI’s decision in a merger case was hailed as an important breakthrough for Pakistan because it endorsed the status of CCP as a first tier competition institution. However, it is likely that this petition was decided because it did not raise important constitutional questions.\(^{61}\) The petitioner had challenged before the Islamabad High Court, the conditions imposed by CCP in a second phase merger review of two fertilizer companies on the ground that CCP had acted in excess of its statutory powers. The high court had upheld CCP’s order and declared that CCP had validly imposed conditions on the proposed merger. The petitioner appealed the order of the high court before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court granted relief to the petitioner on the ground that CCP had not provided it a right of hearing before determining the conditions of the merger and remanded the matter to CCP with the direction to re-hear the parties in respect of each of the conditions.\(^{62}\)

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**Chapter 10** THE IMPACT OF ADOPTION PROCESSES ON INTERACTIONS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The divergence in the nature of interactions in India and Pakistan and the fact that whilst in India these interactions emanate only from CCI’s interim orders whilst in Pakistan these emanate from both interim and final orders may be traced to the processes through which India and Pakistan adopted their respective competition laws. The adoption processes have a direct impact on the nature of the interactions, which stems broadly from the extent to which the judiciary was engaged in the process and affects the judiciary’s response to competition related petitions. These processes also have an important indirect impact, which derives from the extent to which the processes engage pre-existing institutions from different branches of the state, which then has a bearing on the attitude of these pre-existing institutions towards the competition laws.

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\(^{58}\) Petitions claiming that CCP was carrying out judicial review include WP 4412/2013 Institute of Chartered Accountants against CCP’s order dated 10.01.2013 in Case 1(52)/ICAP/C&TA/CCP/2012 (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan). Lahore High Court passed an order on 07.09.2012.

\(^{59}\) Petitions claiming that CCP was carrying out judicial review include CP D-2494/2011 Pakistan Ship’s Agents Association against CCP’s final order dated 22.06.2011 in File No. 8/APPMA/CMTA/CCP/10/1709 (Pakistan Ship’s Agents Association). Sindh High Court passed an order dated 15.07.2011.

\(^{60}\) Petitions on facts include WP 20280/2012 GCC Approved Medical Centres against CCP’s final order dated 29.06.2012 in Case 6/LP/PDEPA/CCP/2011 (Employment Promoters Association v. GCC Approved Medical Centres), Lahore High Court passed an order dated 13.08.2012. This order was also relied upon by petitioners in WP 20729/2012 (Canal View Diagnostic Centre), WP 20729/2102 (GCC Approved Medical Diagnostic Centre & others), and WP 21106/2012 (Urgent Medical Diagnostic Centre & others) and was used as a basis for securing from the Lahore High Court injunctions restraining the Pakistani Tribunal from hearing appeals in relevant matters. LHC granted this by order dated 04.01.2013.

\(^{61}\) Order of Islamabad High Court dated 16.05.2011 in WP 543/2011 (Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited v. Competition Commission of Pakistan) in which Fauji Fertilizer challenged CCP’s order dated 26.01.2011 granting conditional approval of its proposed merger with Agritech Limited.

In order to understand the direct as well as the indirect impact it is important to first outline the adoption processes followed in either country. Whilst India had engaged a wide range of bottom-up, participatory and inclusive domestic institutions in the adoption process including different levels of the executive, the Parliament and the judiciary over a two-year period, Pakistan had engaged only the upper echelons of the executive and selected stakeholders at the time of introducing the law and that too for a relatively brief period.

Chapter 11 The direct impact of the adoption process on the interactions

The adoption process had a direct impact on the grounds on which petitions were filed before the courts as well as on the responses of the courts to these petitions. The fact that ICA 2002 had been passed through the long form legislative procedure provided in the Constitution that attempted to meaningfully engage a range of institutions at different levels meant that the petitions filed before the courts urged more procedural rather than substantive grounds. Whereas, the preponderance of substantive grounds raised in petitions filed before courts in Pakistan reveals the impact of the more limited engagement with institutions of the Pakistani adoption process and the fact that the process failed to address concerns of stakeholders let alone gain their support in the process.

The responses of the courts in India and Pakistan may be attributed to the extent to which the adoption processes engaged the judiciaries of their respective countries. Judiciary in India first became involved in the adoption process when the Indian Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of ICA 2002 in the Brahm Dutt Case. Even though the Indian Supreme Court disposed of the Brahm Dutt Case on the basis of an undertaking given to it by the Indian government, its decision had an important impact on the subsequent implementation of ICA 2002. The intervention of the Supreme Court required ICA 2002 to be amended to reflect the constitutional principle of separation of powers. This was to be achieved by separating CCI’s regulatory and adjudicatory functions by vesting the latter in the tribunal. This amendment not only brought the ICA 2002 into conformity with the Indian Constitution and thereby enhanced its compatibility with the country’s pre-existing legal system, it also acquainted the Indian superior judiciary, the legal community, and the interested segment of the public with the fundamentals of the implementation scheme envisaged in ICA 2002. Most importantly, the engagement of the Supreme Court in amending ICA 2002 endorsed the legality and authority of competition law, and thereby bolstered its legitimacy in the country.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s use of a small number of top-down exclusive institutions in the adoption process was further complicated by the fact that in 2007, when PCO 2007 was promulgated, the Pakistani judiciary already weakened by years of deference to the executive, was embroiled in an unprecedented battle with the executive for its very survival. The combination of these factors had a twofold negative effect on subsequent interactions between CCP and the Pakistani courts: first, the judiciary remained largely unaware of competition principles and implementation scheme envisaged in the Pakistani competition law and second, and more damagingly, that it harboured a distrust for competition law because it belonged to the set of laws promulgated by the President soon before he turned against the judiciary and because it was one of the laws ‘saved’ from lapsing by the President by an amendment to the Constitution. Whilst the second issue was somewhat ameliorated by the enactment of PCA 2010 because it demonstrated that the executive had placed the competition law before the Parliament in compliance of the order of the Supreme Court, it did not lead to an accelerated pace at which the judiciary responded to competition matters.

Given the commonalities in the Indian and Pakistani legal systems and legal cultures and the endemic delay in deciding cases in both systems, it is tempting, indeed appropriate, to consider whether

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63 See n. 4 and text thereto.
64 Thrice in Pakistan’s 70 year history, military dictators had asked the judiciary to take oaths of office on extra constitutional instruments. This not only prevented the judiciary from taking action against the military led executive, but also made it deferential to the executive.
65 See n. 2.
66 The order of the Pakistani Supreme Court dated 21.02.2013 in CP 102-L/2013 (ADG LDI (Pvt.) Limited v. Brain Telecommunications Limited) is the only instance in which the Supreme Court expressly endorsed CCP by referring a case to it even though the entity filing the case before the Supreme Court, had not impleaded CCP as a party to the proceedings.
67 India and Pakistan share a common legal history until their independence from British Rule in 1947 and have since, largely retained the legal system introduced by the British.
68 As per the data contained in Annual Reports of the Supreme Court of India 2015-2016 and the Annual Report of the
the delay in the responses of the courts to the petitions filed before them may be rooted in their inherent natures. However, if the response of the courts to competition related matters challenges filed before them had been rooted only in the dilatory tendencies inherent in the pre-existing Indian and Pakistani legal systems, then it is unlikely that Indian courts would have disposed of a significant number of competition related challenges filed before them.

Chapter 12 The indirect impact of the adoption processes

In addition to the direct impact, the adoption processes in India and Pakistan also had an indirect impact on the interactions. In the case of India this indirect impact was largely positive. By engaging the Parliament in the adoption process over a period of time India had generated greater familiarity and perhaps even ownership and understanding of competition principles amongst members of Parliament. Further, by creating the Raghavan Committee and engaging institutions at different tiers of the executive, India had also ensured the ownership of the competition law by the executive. Both these factors are likely to have been important in ensuring that the government took seriously its responsibility to establish the tribunal. This had the impact of providing aggrieved persons with the necessary forum for addressing their grievances against CCI and thereby limited the scope as well as the number of interactions with the courts and almost entirely eliminated petitions from CCI’s final orders.

In Pakistan, the indirect impact of the adoption process was almost entirely opposite to that in India. By keeping the Parliament at a distance throughout the already short adoption process the Pakistani government not only weakened the compatibility of PCO 2007 (and its subsequent iterations) with Pakistan’s pre-existing legal system and cast a doubt on its legitimacy in the country but also failed to acquaint the Parliament with purpose of the competition law and to convince it that it was needed. Further, by outsourcing the deliberating and drafting process, the government had even kept the purpose of and need for the law confined to the highest echelons of the government populated by nominees of the government then in power. This had led to a lack of broad based ownership of the law in the government itself.

The exclusion of the Parliament from the adoption process meant that the Parliament was not particularly interested in urging the government to establish the tribunal and the confinement of the discussion on the law to the highest echelons of the government meant that successive governments were not particularly interested in establishing the institutions required for fully implementing the competition law.

The lack of Parliamentary oversight in passing the law meant that these petitions were brought on a broader range of procedural as well as substantive issues whereas the government’s leisurely approach towards initially setting up and then maintaining the tribunal significantly increased the traffic of constitutional petitions in respect of competition matters before the Pakistani courts both from interim as well as final orders because aggrieved persons did not have an alternate remedy available to them for the redressal of their grievances.

Chapter 13 THE EFFECT OF INTERACTIONS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS

The effect of interactions between the NCAs and the courts whilst small in itself (given the small percentages in respect of which aggrieved persons invoked the constitutional jurisdictions of the Indian and Pakistani courts, becomes more meaningful when examined in the broader context of actual competition enforcement in India and Pakistan. For the purposes of this section, I examine the effects of the interactions on two aspects of enforcement of the competition laws in India and Pakistan, the development of competition jurisprudence in the two countries and on the ability of the NCAs to impose and recover penalties. 69

69 The focus on recovery is not intended to detract from the greater discussion about the appropriateness of the quantum of penalties imposed by CCI which is beyond the remit of this article.
Chapter 14 Effect of interactions on development of competition jurisprudence

India

In India persons aggrieved by the orders (whether interim or final) of the CCI had the option to approach either the courts in their constitutional jurisdictions or the tribunal depending on whether the grounds of the challenge were more appropriate for one jurisdiction or the other. The courts, the tribunal and the Supreme Court exercising its competition jurisdiction issued several decisions, which supported the development of competition jurisprudence in the country.

Several decisions of the courts formed valuable precedents for CCI in subsequent proceedings. For instance, CCI cited the decision of the Delhi High Court in the Interlodge Case and the Gujarat Guardian Case in several subsequent orders including orders in Varca Druggist & Chemists & Druggists Association Goa; Cartelization by Cement Manufacturers Case, and Shree Cement Limited Case. Similarly, CCI cited the order of the Bombay High Court in the Kingfisher Case in a number of its orders, including orders in Varca Druggist & Chemists & Druggists Association Goa; Cartelization by Cement Manufacturers Case; Shree Cement Case; Shri Sonam Sharma v. Apple Inc. USA & others; Steel Producers Case; cases filed in respect of Jaiprakash Associates Limited, and the Cement Manufacturers Association Case.

Decisions of the tribunal and the Supreme Court similarly contributed to the development of competition jurisprudence. Perhaps the most significant appeal filed before the tribunal was against an interim order of CCI in Case 11/2009 Jindal Steel and Power Limited v. Steel Authority of India. CCI had initiated proceedings against the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) upon receipt of information (or complaint) from Jindal Steel, and had sought comments from it. However, rather than filing its comments, SAIL filed an application before CCI seeking an extension in the time in which it was to file its comments. CCI denied SAIL’s application and through an interim order, directed the DG to investigate the allegations and directed SAIL to file its comments directly before the DG.

SAIL filed an appeal against CCI’s interim order before the tribunal. By its order dated 11th January 2010, the tribunal allowed SAIL’s appeal and granted it time to file its reply before CCI. The tribunal also directed CCI to take a fresh decision, taking SAIL’s reply into consideration. Through a further order dated 15th February 2010, the tribunal also held that whilst there was no requirement for CCI to invite comments from parties to proceedings pending before it, once it had invited such comments it was not open to it to withdraw the opportunity. The tribunal also clarified that it was incumbent upon CCI to indicate reasons for having formed the view that a particular case was fit for further investigation and indeed for issuing any other order.

CCI appealed the order of the tribunal before the Supreme Court. On 9th September 2010, the Supreme Court passed on order which clarified a number of important procedural points for CCI: appeals before the tribunal may only be filed in respect of CCI orders listed in section 53(A)(1)(a) of ICA 2002; CCI had no statutory duty to issue a notice or grant a hearing to a person alleged to be in vi...
within a reasonable time; in any matter in which CCI passed an interim order, it was bound to pass a final order within 60 days of the date of the interim order.\textsuperscript{84} The Supreme Court’s decision in this case not only helped CCI to respond to similar objections in subsequent cases\textsuperscript{85} but also deterred potential litigants from repeatedly raising the same objections before CCI.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{Pakistan}

In Pakistan, from 2007 to 2011 and then from 2013 to 2015, persons aggrieved by the orders of the CCP (and in the first period, unwilling to exhaust there single right of appeal by appealing directly to the Supreme Court) had little option but to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts.

Whilst the interaction between CCP and the courts in Pakistan also had a considerable impact on subsequent proceedings before CCP, this impact was largely adverse. Instead of CCP drawing support from decisions of the courts, these decisions formed the basis for further petitions against CCP. For example, persons aggrieved by proceedings initiated by CCP against the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and its members, relied upon the interim order of the Sindh High Court in a petition filed by Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills, to obtain further restraining orders against CCP in proceedings pending before other courts in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{87}

Similarly, the Lahore High Court’s decision in the \textit{LPGAP Case}\textsuperscript{88} opened floodgates of interim injunctions against show cause notices issued by CCP. Often, the courts granted these injunctions at the first hearing and after only a cursory examination of issues and mostly because "other constitutional petitions raising similar issues have already been heard by the this Court."\textsuperscript{89} Although CCP challenged a number of interim injunctions before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court preferred not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the high courts. At best, the Supreme Court allowed CCP to continue with the proceedings whilst restraining it from taking any adverse action against the petitioners. In the majority of appeals, the Supreme Court simply directed the high courts to hear and dispose of the matters expeditiously without making them specifically accountable in this regard. The only impact of these decisions on the development of competition proceedings was to stall it.

Between 2011 and 2013 when the Pakistani tribunal was operational it decided one appeal on 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2013 in the matter of \textit{J-Link Guarantee Ltd} in which it dismissed CCP’s final order. After being reconstituted in 2015, the tribunal decided at least six further appeals against CCP\textsuperscript{90} and eight appeals in favour of CCP.\textsuperscript{91} However, none of these orders established principles to develop competition

\textsuperscript{84} Competition Commission of India Annual Report 2010-11.

\textsuperscript{85} CCI cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the SAIL Case in several final orders including orders in: \textit{Shri Shamsher Kataria Case} (n. 37), (paras 18.30.6 & 20.3.3); Case 59/2011 \textit{Shri Jyoti Swaroop Arora v. Tulip Infratech Limited & others} decided 03.02.2015 (para 60); \textit{Cement Cartelization Case} (n. 34) (para 27); \textit{RTPE 20/2008 All India Tyre Dealers Federation v. Tyre Manufacturers} decided 16.01.2013 (para 115); and Case 15/2010 \textit{Jupiter Gaming Solutions Private Limited v. Government of Goa & others} decided 12.05.2011 (para 6.1).

\textsuperscript{86} See n. 83 and text thereto.


\textsuperscript{88} See n. 49.

\textsuperscript{89} A petitioner from the electronics sector (name not provided) made this statement in WP 3530/2010. The High Court by its order dated 23.02.2010 allowed an injunction on this basis and also relied on the decision in its orders in subsequent petitions, including: WP 22575/2011 \textit{Transgowers} decided 12.10.2011; WP 23640/2011 \textit{AB Ampere (Pvt.) Limited} decided 21.01.2011; WP 23743/2011 \textit{Pak Electron} decided 25.10.2011; and WP 27488/2011 \textit{KBK Electronics} decided 08.12.2011. The high court also granted injunctions against CCP in its orders dated 16.06.2011 in: WP 13499/2011 \textit{Amin Brothers Limited}; WP 13496/2011 \textit{Creative Engineering}; WP 13497/2011 \textit{M.R Electric}; WP 13500/2011 \textit{Nam International}; and WP 13498/2011 \textit{Redeco Pakistan Limited}. Further, the Sindh High Court, by its orders dated 06.06.12 and 08.08.12 in CP D 2125/2012 \textit{Schneider Electric Pakistan} and CP D 2871/2012 \textit{Medical Diagnostics Centre and others}, restrained CCP from taking coercive action against the petitioners and suspended the operation of the notice until the next date of hearing of the petitioners. (As per general practice of Courts, this injunction was extended at each date of hearing). CCP filed appeals before the Supreme Court (CPs 1938,1939, 1988, 1989, 2008 and 2009/2011 against orders of the High Court in WPs 22575, 22633, 23640, 22965, 23743 and 23860(2011). The Supreme Court disposed of these CPs by order dated 22.12.2011 in terms of which it refused to interfere with interlocutory orders of the High Court and merely directed the High Court to hear and dispose of the matters expeditiously.


\textsuperscript{91} The Tribunal issued the following orders in favour of CCP: 30.11.2016, Appeal 2/2015 \textit{Tara Crop Sciences (Pvt.)}
jurisprudence in the country. All these orders are in any event under appeal before the Supreme Court that has not yet decided any of them.\textsuperscript{92} As in the case of the courts, the CCP has had no support from the tribunal or the Supreme Court in developing competition jurisprudence.

Chapter 15 Enforcement of competition laws: imposition and recovery of penalties

In this section I examine whether the interactions have supported or stalled the NCAs in the imposition and recovery of penalties. I consider the interactions to have supported the imposition of penalties if they have provided clarity to the NCAs in determining substantive issues related to penalties including reasonableness and proportionality and have facilitated the recovery of penalties by the NCAs. Once again I examine these effects in the broader context of implementation of the competition laws in the countries.

India

The greater majority of petitions filed in India have been against interim orders which only rarely impose penalties. It is, therefore, not possible to gauge whether the courts have directly supported CCI in the imposition and recovery of penalties. However, there is sufficient data and information to establish that the tribunal and the Supreme Court (sitting in its competition jurisdiction) have supported CCI in this regard.

In the course of the period under review in this article nearly half of CCI’s final orders that imposed penalties were challenged before the tribunal. However, the response of the tribunal varied from appeal to appeal. In certain appeals the tribunal facilitated the enforcement of CCI’s final orders by upholding them and dismissing the appeal(s).\textsuperscript{93} In others, the tribunal set aside CCI’s order and quashed

\textsuperscript{92} Entities aggrieved by orders of the Tribunal have filed appeals before the Supreme Court in: Case 3/2015 Tara Crop Sciences (Pvt.) Limited v. CCP and others; and Case 9/2016 Pakistan Poultry Association v. CCP. Both CCP and the appellant have filed an appeal before the Supreme Court in respect of Appeal No. 3/2016 Al- Rahim Foods (Pvt.) Limited v. CCP.

the penalty. In yet other matters the tribunal upheld CCI’s order but revised the quantum of penalty, whereas in others still, it remanded the case to CCI for re-hearing either in its entirety or on a specific question (including the question of quantum of penalty). Occasionally, appellants themselves withdrew the appeals they had filed before the tribunal in order to once again approach CCI, whilst in certain others the tribunal dismissed the appeals on technicalities. There was at least one occasion at which even though the Tribunal did not agree with the justification provided by CCI for imposing the penalty it chose not to interfere for the reason that the quantum of the penalty was insignificant. A number of persons aggrieved by the orders of the tribunal appealed these before the Supreme Court.

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95 Penalties were revised in CCI’s orders in: Case 6/2011 Coal India Limited v. GOCIL Hyderabad & others. On 18.04.2013 the Tribunal decided Appeals 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90/2012 and reduced the penalty imposed by 10%; Case 43/2010 A Foundation For Common Cause & People Awareness v. PES Installations Pvt. Limited & others. In Appeals 93, 94 and 95/2012, the Tribunal on 25.02.2013, modified the penalty from 5% to 3% of the turnover; Case 2/2011 Suo Motu Case re Aluminium Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers. In Appeals 79, 80 and 81/2012, the Tribunal on 29.10.2013 affirmed the order but revised the penalties; Suo Motu Case 2/2012 and Ref Case 1/2013. In Appeal 37/2014 Tribunal on 10.05.2016, revised the penalty from 10% to 1%; Suo Motu Case 2/2014 Cartelization in Public Sector Insurance Companies. In Appeals 94, 95, 96 and 97/2015, the Tribunal on 09.12.2016, reduced the penalty from 2% to 1%.

96 Tribunal remanded cases in respect of CCI’s orders in: Case 7/2010 Vijay Gupta v. Paper Merchants Association Delhi & others. The first respondent challenged CCI’s order before the Tribunal. The Tribunal on 29.08.2011 remanded the case to CCI for re-hearing. This led to CCI issuing a supplementary order on 10.01.2013; Case 19/2010 Beliacr Owners’ Association v. DLF Limited HUDA & others). The Tribunal on 29.03.2012 directed CCI to pass an order under section 27(d) for modification of the agreements between DLF and apartment owners; Cases 18, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 & 35/2010 DLF Park Place Residents v. DLF Limited (same as no. 2); Case 29/2010 Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers Association & others. By order dated 11.12.2015 in Appeals 105, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133 and 134/2012, the Tribunal revised CCI’s order; Case 61/2010 Shri Sarinder Singh Barni v. Board for Control of Cricket in India. The Tribunal on 23.02.2015 revised CCI’s order in Appeal 17/2013; Cases 3, 11, 59/2012 Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & others; Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd v. Western Coalfields Limited & others; and Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd. v. South Eastern Coalfields Limited & others. By its order dated 17.05.2016 in Appeals 1, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49 and 70/2014 and 52/2106 the Tribunal revised CCI’s order; Case 3/2011 Suo Motu case against LPG Cylinder Manufacturers. By its order dated 20.12.2013 in Appeals 21 to 65/2012 the Tribunal directed CCI to re-hear the case on the issue of penalty. CCI passed a further order on 06.08.2014 which was also appealed in Appeal 47/2015 and the Tribunal by its order dated 01.03.2016 once again directed CCI to re-hear the matter on penalty; Shri Shanmher Katura Case (n. 37). The Tribunal on 09.12.2016 in Appeals 60, 61 and 62/2014 revised the criteria for penalties and remanded the case to CCI for re-calculation; Case 30/2013 Express Industry Council of India v. Jet Airways (India) Limited & others. The Tribunal on 18.04.2016 in Appeals 7, 8 and 11/2016 remanded the case to CCI for re-hearing.

97 Appellants voluntarily withdrew Appeal 137/2012 against CCI’s order dated 03.07.2012 in Case 36/2011 Kansan News (Pvt.) Limited v. Fastway Transmission Pvt. Limited & others. The Tribunal allowed the withdrawal on 10.01.2013. For instance, the Tribunal dismissed nine Appeals against CCI’s order dated 16.02.2012 in Cases 52 & 56/2010 (Sunshine Pictures Private Limited v. Eros International Media Limited v. Central Circuit Cine Association Indore & others) for non-payment of Court fees. The aggrieved parties filed a further appeal (68/2012), however, the Tribunal refused to grant an interim injunction. By its order dated 03.01.2013 the Tribunal dismissed the appeal when the parties failed to comply with the Tribunal’s direction to deposit the amount of the penalty pending proceedings. Also see, Appeal 72/2012 in Cases 25, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50, 58, 69/2010 Reliance Big Entertainment Limited v. Karnataka Film Chamber of Commerce which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 03.01.2013 for non-prosecution.

98 See n.39 for several appeals filed in respect of the CCI’s order in Reliance Big Entertainment.

99 See n. 83 the SAIL Case and text thereto.
Whilst the orders of the tribunal (and/or the Supreme Court in this regard) may not have increased the quantum of penalties recovered by CCI, they have helped CCI rationalise its methodology for determining penalties. For instance:

(i) The order of the tribunal dated 29th October 2013 in respect of the appeal filed against CCI’s order dated 23rd April 2012 in Suo Motu Case 2/2011 Re Aluminum Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers reduced the penalty imposed by CCI from 9% of turnover to 1/10th of the amount. The tribunal’s reason for this downward revision was that CCI had failed to provide a justification for fixing the penalty at 9% and had acted arbitrarily in selecting turnover as the basis for this calculation. CCI appealed the order of the tribunal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in its order dated 8th May 2017 upheld the order of the tribunal and reiterated the significance and import of the concept of ‘relevant turnover’ for the purpose of calculating penalties.

In its order, the Supreme Court also stated that adopting the criteria of ‘relevant turnover’ would be ‘more in tune with ethos of ICA 2002 and the legal principles which surround matters pertaining to imposition of penalties’. It further stated that accepting CCI’s interpretation of the term ‘turnover’ as ‘total turnover’ in all situations would ‘bring about very inequitable results’. The Supreme Court noted a number of examples which demonstrated that the imposition of penalty on the basis of “total turnover” in all cases would inequitably discriminate against persons guilty of the same contravention simply on the basis that they had structured their product or business lines differently.

As regards CCI’s arguments that penalties were designed to act as a deterrent to anti-competitive practices, the Supreme Court held, that nevertheless ‘the penalty cannot be disproportionate to the violation and it should not lead to shocking results”. The Supreme Court also held that the aim of deterrence cannot justify an interpretation of ICA 2002 that may lead to “the death of the entity” itself. The Supreme Court emphasized that the doctrine of proportionality, which is based on equality and rationality, is a “constitutionally protected right, which can be traced to Article 14 as well as Article 21 of the Constitution”. Finally, the Supreme Court outlined a step-wise methodology for CCI to follow in imposing penalties.

(ii) In another order dated 9th December 2016 in appeals filed against CCI’s order dated 25th August 2014 in Case 3/2011 Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Limited & others, the tribunal revised the criteria on the basis of which CCI had calculated the penalty. CCI had imposed a penalty of 2% of average annual turnover of the appellant companies in the spare parts aftermarket. However, the tribunal took the view that CCI should re-calculate penalties on the basis of relevant turnover of the spare parts aftermarket. The tribunal also stated that as a matter of policy, it was not in favour of heavy penalties and preferred that CCI imposed penalties in the sprit of a ‘transitory reform process’.

(iii) In certain other cases, the tribunal did not hesitate to quash a penalty if it believed it to be unjustified. For instance in its order dated 10th May 2016 in appeals against CCI’s order dated 1st December 2015 in P K Krishnan v. Paul Madavena Al kem Laboratories & others, the tribunal quashed the penalty imposed by CCI on the grounds that it had been imposed in violation of the principles of natural justice because the aggrieved persons had not been given an opportunity of hearing in respect of the penalties imposed.

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101 From commencement of operations in 2009 to 31st March 2016, CCI had imposed penalty in the sum of Indian Rupees 13,981 crore (Rs. 139,810,000,000.00 or Indian Rupees One hundred and thirty-nine billion, eight hundred and million only). However, as of 31st March 2016, CCI had only recovered penalties in the sum of Indian Rupees 80.47 crore (Rs. 804,700,000.00 or Indian Rupees Eight hundred and four million, seven hundred thousand only) or a mere 0.57% of the total penalties imposed by it.


103 Joint order of the Tribunal dated 29.10.2013 in Appeals 79, 80 and 81/2012 (paras 43-70 and para 69 in particular).


105 Order of Tribunal dated 10.05.2016 in Appeal 5/2016, para 34.
In Pakistan aggrieved parties filed constitutional petitions in respect of all final orders of the CCP that had imposed penalties. In the majority of these petitions the courts passed interim orders restraining CCP from recovering penalties. At the time of writing this, the Pakistani courts had not decided any of the petitions pending before them. Consequently, even after conducting extensive hearings and passing numerous final orders, CCP remains unable to enforce these orders and to recover penalties and the only penalties it has recovered are those that were voluntarily paid by the parties.

CCP’s inability to realize penalties imposed by it is not the only adverse effect of the multiple constitutional petitions against its final orders. Another, and perhaps more fundamentally negative aspect of the situation is that, to date, CCP has received little or no support from the courts in aligning its procedures let alone its substance with the pre-existing Pakistani legal system and thereby enhancing its compatibility with and legitimacy in this system. Given that none of CCP’s final orders have attained finality under the Pakistani legal system, the Pakistani competition law rather than increasingly integrating with the Pakistani legal system, remains at least as peripheral and alien to it today as it was when it was first enacted.

So far the recent establishment of the tribunal in Pakistan has done little to counter the adverse effects of these interactions. The tribunal has decided less than 20 appeals to date in none of which it has provided guidance in respect of penalties. Further, its orders in nearly all these matters are pending before Supreme Court (sitting in its competition jurisdiction). Consequently, CCP has had no support from the Supreme Court either in refining its methodology for imposing penalties or in recovering these penalties.

Chapter 16 The effects of interactions in a broader perspective

The effect of the interactions in India and Pakistan varies according to the broader implementation context of the two countries. In India, the constitutional system (represented by the courts exercising their inherent jurisdiction) and the competition system (represented by the tribunal and the Supreme Court in its competition jurisdiction) appear to have operated in support of each other particularly in the development of competition jurisprudence in the country. Orders of the tribunal had the effect of narrowing possible grounds on which CCI’s orders could be challenged before the courts, whilst orders of the courts clarified due process and constitutional norms for CCI and the tribunal. The clarity provided by the decisions of the courts and the tribunal not only reduced the number of challenges filed on similar issues but also the precedents set by these orders enabled the tribunal and the courts to deal with any such challenges more effectively and expeditiously.

Conversely, the absence of a functioning competition system in Pakistan directed all challenges against orders of the CCP towards the courts and created interactions between the NCAs and the courts at more than one level. The sheer numbers of petitions and applications and appeals emanating from these petitions and the breadth of grounds that these raised, appear to have choked the legal system and prevented CCP from obtaining clarity or support on substantive and procedural issues, and more importantly, brought competition enforcement in the country to a halt.

It is tempting to dismiss the effect of the interactions on the ability of the NCAs to recover penalties as negligible due to the fact that CCI’s recovery of penalties, even with a functioning competition system, is almost as low as that of the CCP, which has been mired in proceedings before the constitutional system. To do so, however, would be to fail to appreciate that even when CCI has not been able to realize penalties, it has benefited from the dialogue that between the tribunal and the Supreme Court in the competition system, whilst CCP has been deprived of this advantage. The Pakistani tribunal is still in early stages of operation and Pakistani courts have failed to decide any matters before them let alone prescribing any guidelines in support of CCP’s actions.

Therefore, whilst in India the disadvantage of limited recoveries is offset by the strengthening and rationalising of India’s competition system, there is no such corresponding advantage in Pakistan. Going forward, this productive and supportive interaction within the competition system is likely to play

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106 See section 4.2 above.
107 CCP has not published an Annual Report since 2012, therefore it is not possible to get accurate data on the total quantum of penalties imposed.
a positive role in the pace at which the Indian competition law develops and integrates with India’s pre-existing legal system as well as the extent to which it is understood, utilised and applied in the country, which in turn, is likely to the law being implemented with greater consistency and transparency.

On the other hand, the impact of the hitherto erratic interactions between CCP, the tribunal and the courts (including the Supreme Court in its competition jurisdiction) in Pakistan remains uncertain at best. The absence of a dialogue between CCP and the tribunal or with the courts suggests that the country has still some way to go before competition law may be integrated into Pakistan’s pre-existing legal system or be appropriately understood, utilised and applied in the country, and before CCP may be recognised as a significant regulatory body in the country.

Chapter 17 Conclusion

The manner in which borrowed competition laws interact with the pre-existing legal systems of the countries in which they are injected is an important indicator of the quality of performance and indeed ‘success’ of these laws in the countries. Comparing these interactions in the Indian and Pakistani contexts suggests that the process through which a country acquires its competition law directly and indirectly affects the quantum, nature and effect of interactions between the borrowed competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the country.

A country, such as India, which employs a more inclusive, bottom-up and participatory process for adopting its competition law succeeds in developing a more productive interaction between the law and the pre-existing legal system by incorporating domestic legal considerations in the law and by sufficiently engaging political institutions so that they are more invested in ensuring that the institutions necessary for meaningfully implementing the law are duly established. However, a country like Pakistan, that adopts the law through an exclusive and top-down process and keeps legal and political institutions at a distance in the adoption process, ends up with a law that falls short of domestic legal requirements and which fails to harness support from political institutions for its meaningful implementation.

The nature and effect of these interactions is linked to and varies with the broader competition implementation context of the country and therefore to the adoption process which establishes this context. It appears that effects of these interactions may be managed and be generally supportive in a country, which, like India, establishes a functioning competition system, and where aggrieved persons have the option to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts or to approach the competition system for the redress of their grievances. However, in countries like Pakistan, which fail to establish or maintain competition systems, these interactions have the power to overwhelm and frustrate the implementation of competition laws.

However, whilst the adoption process employed by a country may have shaped the interactions and their effects it does not prevent the countries, once they understand the hindering factors, from re-charting their implementation trajectories and meaningfully enforcing the competition laws. Therefore, in countries like Pakistan it is still open to institutions to take ownership of the law and thereby to mitigate the impact of their earlier exclusion: for the judiciary this means clearing the backlog of competition matters pending before the courts, and for the Parliament and the government it means committing themselves to maintaining a competition system.