London Judgment and Decision Making Seminar Series

Academic Year 2024/25

Term 3 

• Wednesday April 30, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Romy Froemer, University of Birmingham. 

Title: Getting what we need to know: Attention prioritization in decision-making

Abstract: Dominant models of decision-making implicitly assume that all information required to make a decision is available and merely needs to be integrated to reduce the impact of concomitant noise, which is done perfectly over time. This notion is challenged by intuition, as well as empirical data showing strong links between decision-making and attention, such as the canonical finding that people are more likely to choose what they look at more. Dominant models that do account for attention, assume that it has a downstream effect on decision-making by biasing integration in favor of attended options, but they don’t explain how attention is allocated in the first place. Recent models of decision-making have bridged this gap and shown that people allocate attention near optimally in a way that reduces uncertainty about options in a goal-directed way. Building on this work, I will present a set of studies showing that 1) when attention is experimentally manipulated, the impact of attention on choice depends on options’ values, 2) compared to experimentally manipulated attention, free viewing is characterized by attention prioritization and as a consequence greater choice efficiency, and 3) how attention is allocated and relates to choice depends on one’s choice goal. In a second part of my talk, I will show that people learn about information sources and strategically and dynamically prioritize information content and sources that are more likely to help them achieve their goals. Taken together, these studies unveil the richness of decision-making processes and open new avenues for understanding aberrant decision-making and how to improve it.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 305, 26 Bedford Way.

Zoom: A Zoom option will not be available for this talk. 

• Wednesday May 7, 2025 

Speaker: Prof Stefano Palminteri, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale & École Normale Supérieure. 

Title: Feedback-induced attitudinal changes in risk preferences

Abstract: According to the normative standpoint, decision-making under risk, as it is traditionally instantiated in choice among fully described probabilistic lotteries, should not be affected by the disclosure of outcomes (feedback). Yet, contrary to this normative prescription, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by immediate presentation of choice outcomes. The consensual and intuitive hypothesis is that feedback affects risk preferences via a learning process, whereby experienced outcomes alter the representation of subjective values. However, despite a relatively large body of published studies, available evidence does not allow robustly establishing the direction and the impact of feedback on key decision variables, namely risk propensity and expected value maximization, limiting our ability to establish a clear cognitive mechanism. Here, we ran seven behavioral experiments, tailored to address this gap and found that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, without any detectable impact on expected value maximization. Crucially, fine-grained analyses of the temporal dynamics of the effect of feedback directly falsified one of the currently most influential models of the role of experience in decisions under risk, and challenges any instantiation of the learning hypotheses. These results rather favor of an attitudinal effect, induced by the anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 305, 26 Bedford Way.

• Prof Stefano Palminteri will be presenting remotely via zoom (which you can access at the time of the presentation via the Zoom Link below), but all are welcome to come to the assigned room to watch the seminar as usual.  

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday May 14, 2025 

NO LJDM TALK 

• Wednesday May 21, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Marlene Batzke, Royal Holloway. 

Title: Combining Agent-Based Modeling and Experiments to Study Decision-Making and Norm Change  

Abstract: Agent-based modeling (ABM) provides a powerful simulation method for investigating social and psychological processes that unfold over time or emerge from individual interactions. This talk introduces ABM with a focus on its potential to complement experimental research in the study of decision-making and norm change. I begin by outlining the basic principles of ABM, the types of questions it can help address, and how it can extend insights from behavioral experiments. I then illustrate these points with a research example on norm dynamics, structured around three parts: a psychologically grounded theory of norm change, an agent-based simulation implementing key assumptions of this theory, and a comparison of simulation results with experimental data. I argue that combining ABM with experimental work enables more precise theory-building and the exploration of temporal and social dimensions of decision-making. I highlight how ABM can uncover mechanisms that are difficult to detect with experiments alone. 
 

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 305, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498 

• Wednesday May 28, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Sudeep Bhatia, University College London. 

Title: Information representation in everyday cognition and behavior

Abstract: I discuss how insights from artificial intelligence can be used to build computational cognitive models with realistic knowledge representations about the world. In addition to specifying the information processing mechanisms people use to form beliefs and preferences, these models also represent the information on which these mechanisms operate. Subsequently, they are able to deliberate over and respond to naturalistic decision making and reasoning problems, and moreover, mimic human responses to these problems. These models shed light on how people think and decide in their everyday lives, and illustrate a powerful new approach to predicting and influencing real-world behavior.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 305, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom: A Zoom option will not be available for this talk. 

• Wednesday June 4, 2025 

NO LJDM TALK 

• Wednesday June 11, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Marco Wittmann, University College London. 

Title: Social basis functions

Abstract: Navigating social environments is a fundamental challenge for the brain. It is established that the brain solves this challenge, in part, by representing social information in an “agent-centric” manner; knowledge about others’ abilities or attitudes is “tagged” to individuals such as “oneself” or the “other” person with whom we are interacting. This intuitive approach has informed our understanding of dorsomedial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex (dmPFC and ACC), key nodes of the social brain. However, the patterns or combinations in which the individuals might interact with one another is as important as the identities of the individuals themselves. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a social group-decision making task, I show dmPFC and ACC represent the combinatorial possibilities for social interaction afforded by a given situation and that they do so in a compressed format resembling the basis functions employed in spatial, visual, and motor domains. Critically, basis functions predict specific choice patterns such as counterintuitive effects where decision-irrelevant players systematically influence choice. These findings suggest that medial prefrontal cortex compresses complex social information along the basis functions to enable both computational efficiency and behavioural flexibility. 

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 305, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

Previous lectures this academic year 

Term 2

• Wednesday January 15, 2025 

Speaker: Prof David Comerford, Stirling Management School. 

Title: Overthinking

Abstract: Conceptually, there can be three types of people: those who overrely on their gut feelings; those who overrely on deliberation; and those who are well calibrated. The first type has been identified by the heuristics and biases research program. The current research investigates the second. I start my search from the following premise: evolutionary psychology posits that gut feelings have evolved to help us navigate the complexities of living in social groups. If this is so, then suppressing these instincts in favour of deliberation ought to be especially costly in the social domain. I hypothesize that individuals with high numeracy scores—reflecting a tendency to engage cognitive effort—will report lower social satisfaction. Analyses of five large national datasets (one preregistered) find that respondents who score in the top decile for numeracy report lower social satisfaction than those who scored lower on numeracy. This effect is robust to controls for sociodemographic characteristics, Big-5 personality traits and verbal intelligence. A preregistered analysis demonstrates the effect is driven by items measuring cognitive reflection. In sum, respondents who demonstrate a tendency to stop and think experience less satisfying social lives.   

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 541, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

• Prof. David Comerford will be presenting remotely via zoom (which you can access at the time of the presentation via the Zoom Link below), but all are welcome to come to the assigned room to watch the seminar as usual.  

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday January 22, 2025 

Speaker: Prof Renato Frey, University of Zurich. 

Title: Decision making in a world full of risk and uncertainty: From the lab to real life with an integrated modeling framework

Abstract: One of the key goals of the behavioral sciences has been to model how people make decisions under risk and uncertainty, to thus understand and predict consequential real-life behaviors and, if necessary, help people make better choices through pre- and interventions. In this overview talk, I will argue that previous research with this goal might have been limited by adopting (1) a strong focus on measuring and modeling stable interindividual differences in people's risk preferences rather than modeling dynamic psychological mechanisms, and (2) primarily conducting behavioral research in the lab as opposed to in real-life settings. I will illustrate our ongoing efforts to overcome these hurdles, such as mapping the current "ecology of risk", developing a taxonomy of state-specific psychological mechanism, and deploying ecological momentary assessments paired with large language modeling.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room G03 in Bedford Way (26).

Zoom: A Zoom option will not be available for this talk. 

• Wednesday January 29, 2025 

Speaker: Prof Pedro Bordalo, University of Oxford. 

Title: A cognitive theory of reasoning and choice

Abstract: We offer a theory of decisions in which attention to the features of choice options is determined by the DM's categorization of the current choice problem in a set of problems she solved in the past. Categorization depends on goal-relevant as well as contextual problem-level features. The model yields systematic heterogeneity in attention and choice in a given problem based on different past experiences, rigidity of choices when categorization does not change despite new data, and discontinuous shifts when changes in bottom-up salient features cause re-categorization. The model unifies major puzzles and framing effects in riskless, statistical, and lottery choice based on heterogenous and unstable mental representations.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room G.03, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: A Zoom option will not be available for this talk. 

• Wednesday February 5, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Manos Konstantinidis, University of Warwick. 

Title: Decision under risk: A tale of two sources of information 

Abstract: Information about risky or uncertain situations typically comes in two forms. In some cases, we have access to complete descriptive summaries of risky outcomes and their associated probabilities (e.g., a physician may rely on published literature and success likelihoods to recommend a risky course of treatment). In other situations, we rely on our own experiences to form estimates of outcomes and probabilities (e.g., a physician drawing on their own prior experience with a particular treatment). Real-life decision-making often involves integrating both descriptive summaries and personal experience. However, previous research in risky choice has largely studied these sources separately. In this talk, I will present empirical and computational modelling results that explore how descriptive and experiential information are combined in studies of risky decision making. I will also discuss ongoing empirical work investigating whether people naturally prefer one type of information over the other (description vs. experience) and the factors that moderate this preference. Finally, I will address the theoretical, practical, and computational implications of these findings.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 728, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: A Zoom option will not be available for this talk. 

• Wednesday February 12, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Greta Mohr, University College London. 

Title: Biases in Causal Reasoning: The Perceived Influence of Good and Bad Actions in Everyday Medical Decision-Making

Abstract: Causal counterfactual reasoning is fundamental to everyday medical decision-making, where individuals must evaluate whether specific actions (e.g., gentle yoga to alleviate muscle soreness) contribute to health outcomes. This study investigates how performing good or bad actions, their consistency with each other, and alignment with the outcome influence causal strength judgments. Participants were presented with everyday medical scenarios where agents took 2 actions (good or bad) and judged how much each action contributed to a health outcome (improvement or worsening). They then made a series of counterfactual judgements, were then asked to rate how the outcome may have differed if the actions taken had been different.

Results revealed systematic biases in causal attribution. Actions consistent with the outcome but inconsistent with the other action were perceived as having stronger causal strength, than those with consistent other actions.  Additionally, bad actions (e.g., skipping hydration to alleviate a headache) were judged as having greater causal strength than good actions, though this effect was more pronounced for the second action. Notably, when both actions were taken bad actions were perceived as contributing more to the outcome than good actions. Overall, these findings suggest a bias in causal reasoning, where harmful or unexpected actions are perceived as more influential in determining health outcomes. This bias could lead people to overemphasise the negative consequences of bad actions while underestimating the benefits of good decisions. Recognising these biases can help improve public health messaging and encourage more accurate causal reasoning in everyday healthcare decisions.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room C3.12, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday February 19, 2025 - Reading Week - No seminar
• Wednesday February 26, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Kevin O'Neill, University College London. 

Title: Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation During Retrospective Causal Judgment 

Abstract: How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just consider what actually happened, or do they also consider what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game and then—while looking at a blank screen—mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b) what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur, participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of counterfactual possibilities. These results favor counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room G.03, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday March 5, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Jason Burton, Copenhagen Business School. 

Title: Simple changes to content curation algorithms affect the beliefs people form in a collaborative filtering experiment 

Abstract: Content-curating algorithms provide a crucial service for social media users by surfacing relevant content, but they can also bring about harms when their objectives are misaligned with user values and welfare. Yet, potential behavioral consequences of this alignment problem remain understudied in controlled experiments. In a preregistered, two-wave, collaborative filtering experiment (total N = 1, 500), we demonstrate that simple changes to the metrics used for sampling and ranking posts affect the beliefs people form. Our results show observable differences in two types of outcomes within statisticized groups: belief accuracy and consensus. We find partial support for hypotheses that the recently proposed approaches of “bridging-based ranking” and “intelligence-based ranking” promote consensus and belief accuracy, respectively. We also find that while personalized, engagement-based ranking promotes posts that participants perceive favorably, it simultaneously leads those participants to form more polarized and less accurate beliefs than any of the other algorithms considered.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 822, IoE, 20 Bedford Way.

• Dr Jason Burton will be presenting remotely via zoom (which you can access at the time of the presentation via the Zoom Link below), but all are welcome to come to the assigned room to watch the seminar as usual.  

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday March 12, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Jens Koed Madsen,  London School of Economics. 

Title:  A view of polarisation built on dependencies

Abstract: Issue polarisation describes a state where citizens in a society move away from each other on a particular issue – for example, people may harden their views in both directions on abortion rights, economic policy, and more. In this talk, we first consider whether issue polarisation is occurring, as this is a subject of debate within the field. Across 247 samples from 105 countries, we show that issue polarisation is a contextual challenge. That is, while there is no global increase from 1999 to 2022, we see an increase in issue polarisation in some countries, such as the USA (typically driven by disagreement between culturally-conservative majorities and culturally-liberal minorities).

Having set the scene, we present a Bayesian model that builds on perceived dependencies. According to the model, when presented with conflicting testimony from two source groups, Bayesian agents should update towards the position of the group they deem to be more independent in terms of the factors that influence their testimony, meaning those who disagree about which group that is should polarize. In a pre-registered experiment, we find support for this model, as we can experimentally create polarisation by manipulating dependency perceptions.

To see if the intuitions of the model are appropriate, we survey citizens from the UK and the USA to gauge their dependency perceptions of in- and out-group members. In both countries, we find that, using a novel scale instrument, real-world partisans (Labour, Conservative, Republican, and Democrat) perceive their party’s supporters to be more independent than the opposing party’s supporters, with large average effect sizes (d = 0.87 UK, d = 0.82 US), suggesting the conditions are in place for such polarization to occur in the real world. We conclude the talk by considering limitations to the current work and future directions for the polarisation project.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room G03 in Bedford Way (26). 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday March 19, 2025  - NO LJDM TALK
• Wednesday March 26, 2025 

Speaker: Dr Elinor Abado, University of Göttingen

Title: Cognitive Biases in Fear and Anxiety: Through the EEG/ERP Lens 

Abstract: In this talk, I will present EEG/ERP data from various studies on cognitive biases in fear and anxiety. First, I will discuss a study examining expectancy bias toward spiders in an unselected sample, focusing on the CNV component. Next, I will present data from a study investigating interpretation bias in individuals with high social anxiety, with an emphasis on the N400 component and machine learning analysis. Lastly, I will outline a planned study exploring the interaction between expectancy and interpretation biases across different levels of trait intolerance of uncertainty, focusing on the CNV and N400 components. This talk will highlight three key aspects: methodologically, I will demonstrate the added value of EEG/ERP data in studying cognitive biases. Analytically, I will showcase machine learning techniques and their potential to enhance our understanding of emotional stimuli. Theoretically, I will emphasize the importance of the combined cognitive biases hypothesis and the integrated study of cognitive mechanisms in understanding maladaptive emotional and cognitive processes.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room G.03, 26 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

Term 1

• Wednesday September 25, 2024 

Speaker: Prof Benedetto De Martino, University College London. 

Title: Value, Goals and Abstractions in Decision Making 

Abstract: In the fields of neuroscience and machine learning, “value” has often been used interchangeably with “reward,” emphasising its hedonic aspect while neglecting its functional, concept-like nature. However, in real life, we rarely receive discrete numerical rewards at the end of our actions and need to build our own values. In this talk, I will present some work from our lab that challenges the canonical view that equates value and reward by showing how the brain is able to construct the value of an option or action on-the-fly by building abstractions that flexibly adapt to changing goals. I will demonstrate how this mechanism can facilitate learning and foster generalisation. Overall, I will discuss how rethinking the true nature of value is both feasible and necessary.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 421, Roberts Building. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday October 2, 2024 

No seminar this week. Our next seminar will be next week on Wednesday October 9th 2024.

• Wednesday October 9, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Konstantinos Tsetsos, University of Bristol.

Title:  The timescale and form of context-dependence during human value-learning

Abstract: The way humans and other animals represent the values of alternatives can be systematically distorted by the presence of inferior or unavailable alternatives in the immediate choice-set (immediate context); or by the values of alternatives that were encountered in previous episodes (temporal context). Yet, the extent to which the immediate and temporal context (co-) shape such context-dependent value coding remains unclear. I will present data from experiments where we asked human participants to learn the reward values associated with three alternatives and to explicitly report their learned values before making binary and ternary choices. Context-dependent value distortions appeared in the pre-choice reports and were indistinguishable in binary (inferior decoy absent) and ternary (inferior decoy present) choice trials. These findings suggest that value representations are modulated by the temporal, rather than the immediate, context. Interestingly, the form of distortion cannot be explained by existing value normalization theories but is best captured by a mechanism that constructs value through memory-based binary comparisons.
 

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 421, Roberts Building. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday October 16, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Tim Mullett, Warwick Business School. 

Title: Attentional Dilution in Multi-Attribute Choice

Abstract: Many choices require comparing complex options with multiple attributes. In such choices, integrating the information together requires attending to each attribute in turn, and distributing the total attention time in an efficient manner. One potential approach is attentional dilution. This describes a mechanism whereby any attributes with the same value for all available options are non-differentiating and therefore receive zero attention other than that to determine they are equal. Attention is instead split between only those attributes that differentiate between the available options in a given choice. The consequence of this is that in choices with only one, or few differentiating attributes, attention is concentrated, and in choices with many differentiating attributes, attention is diluted. A series of experimental results show that the influence of an attribute upon choice is significantly larger when it is the only, or one of few differentiating attributes. This influence reduces as there are more differentiating attributes, in proportion to that predicted by attentional dilution. Eye-tracking results also show that this pattern is mirrored in the proportion of visual attention given to each attribute as the number of differentiating attributes changes.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 421, Roberts Building. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday October 23, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Tom Reader, London School of Economics. 

Title: Stakeholder safety action: patients and families intervening to prevent medical errors in hospitals.

Abstract: Research in healthcare finds that patients and families frequently intercede in the decision-making and work of clinicians in order to prevent adverse events (e.g., wrong diagnosis). This is significant for research on safety and risk, because it suggests that external stakeholders (e.g., service-users) can act as form of ‘safety net’ for catching errors and addressing problems in decision-making within organisations. I explored this idea by theorizing the concept of ‘stakeholder safety action’: this relates to stakeholders engaging in voicing (e.g., speaking-up) and correcting (e.g., fixing mistakes) behaviours in order to resolve perceived errors within an organisation and prevent them from causing harm. I investigated safety action by undertaking a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 1,857 written complaints sent by patients and families to UK hospitals about experiences of unsafe treatments. The analysis found patients routinely reported engaging in voicing and correcting behaviours, with these being elicited by concerns about decision-making (e.g., in making diagnoses, dispensing medicines) being missed or not resolved by staff. Through these behaviours, and depending on how staff responded to them, patients described trying to prevent accidents in three escalating ways: helping staff to avoid errors (e.g., during diagnoses), pushing into clinical work to resolve perceived mistakes (by changing medications), and bypassing teams and hospitals judged irredeemably unsafe. I surmise that stakeholder safety action contributes to organizational safety by acting as an important – yet external and often unrecognised – source of resilience within organisations.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 421, Roberts Building. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday October 30, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Nicolette Sullivan, London School of Economics. 

Title: Contextual sensitivity of pro-social behavioral associated with neural response to giving

Abstract: One pillar of behavioral economics is that context matters.  The key support for this pillar revolves around hundreds of choice experiments, whereby individuals make choices over economically-identical sets that only vary the context.  We move this literature in a new direction by exploring whether results from fMRI neuroimaging can predict which individuals are responsive to contextual changes.  Our study revolves around the motivations for prosocial behavior.  We find that neural responses in several cognitive control and valuation regions, estimated during a standard dictator game task, are predictive of the magnitude of shifts in altruistic giving in modified dictator game tasks. This finding demonstrates how neural data can identify individual differences in processes that underlie observed altruism related to specific theories of altruistic behavior. Importantly, we find that activation in the DLPFC, mPFC, striatum, ACC, and insula distinguish those who continue to give across multiple contexts that differ in demands on the giver, from those whose giving is sensitive to contextual modulation and may be driven by impure altruistic motivations.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 421, Roberts Building. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday November 6, 2024 - Reading Week - No talk
• Wednesday November 13, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Claire Heard, King’s College London. 

Title: Understanding Scam Susceptibility: The Role of Affective Content in Persuasive Messages

Abstract: 

Fraud, accounting for approximately 40% of all crime in England and Wales, presents a significant societal issue with an estimated 3.2 million offences annually, resulting in an approximate cost of £6.8 billion (Home Office, 2024). This crime not only has profound financial implications but also inflicts substantial emotional distress on victims. Despite these severe impacts, the current body of research provides an incomplete picture of the factors influencing scam susceptibility. Prior studies have produced mixed results regarding the role of demographic characteristics and personality variables (e.g., age, risk-taking propensity) in scam susceptibility. 

Furthermore, the influence of specific scam design elements on an individual’s likelihood of victimisation is more limited. Initial investigations in this domain have examined persuasive elements within scams, such as scarcity cues (“don’t delay, call now to claim your prize”) and authority indicators (Wood et al., 2018). However, these studies have not conclusively established their impact, instead such studies emphasise the role of risk and benefit perceptions in likelihood of responding.

Reflecting on theoretical research that highlights the key role that affect can play in perception of risk and benefit perceptions (Slovic et al. 2011), as well as research highlighting how affect can lead to heuristic processing and suboptional decision making in persuasive contexts (Kircanski et al., 2018), this study extends the existing literature by investigating the influence of increasing the affective content of scam-style messages on individuals’ intentions to respond.

In an online experimental study involving 280 participants, we randomly assigned participants to receive either a low affect or high affect message. Participants rated their response intentions (1 question), perceptions of the message (14 items), and their perceptions of the associated risks (2 questions) and benefits (2 questions). Given that scams can evoke different emotional valences – either positive (joy/excitement) or negative (fear/worry), each participant was exposed to, and answered the above questions for two different messages presented in their assigned affect level (low or high). This consisted of a lottery scenario (e.g. you are the winner of our prize giveaway.... call to claim your winnings) for the positive valence scenario and a bank fraud scenario (e.g. Your debit card was recently used..... get in touch as soon as possible if you didn't make this purchase) for the negative valence scenario. We also collected a range of exploratory individual difference and demographic variables.

Our results indicate that exposure to high-affect messages does increase participants’ response intentions. However, this was only in the positive emotion (lottery) scenario, not in the negative emotion (bank) scenario. These findings suggest that the affect level of a scam message could play a critical role in influencing susceptibility to scams. However, the impacts may not be universal and may depend on the specific message presented. These findings underscore the need for future research into the influence of affect on susceptibility to scam messages and call for investigations considering a wide range of message types to gain a nuanced understanding of how people react to different types of messages.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 780, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday November 20, 2024 

Speaker: Dr Tim Rakow, King’s College London. 

Title: A programmatic investigation of the possible impulses that drive binary choices with full feedback

Abstract: Building on research exploring repeated risky choice and strategic decisions, we tested what constitutes a sufficiently satisfactory outcome to prompt people to repeat their actions. Our programmatic investigation (total N > 1400) examined incentivised choices between pairs of binary-outcome options, with immediate feedback for obtained and forgone outcomes. Across experiments, we varied the payoff structure for the possible outcomes, whereby (1) both options had identical possible outcomes; or (2) one option was safer than the other, e.g., possible outcomes {2,3} vs. {1,4}; or (3) the possible outcomes from the two options were ‘interleaved’, i.e., {4,2} vs. {3,1}. Within experiments, we manipulated the probabilities associated with each outcome, either across choice tasks (Experiments 1-3) or unannounced within a task (Experiments 4-6). These designs allowed us to compare the roles of implied disappointment (receiving the lower outcome from an option), implied regret (receiving a lower outcome than the forgone payoff), and the relative average value of the options, as possible drivers of choice. Across all experiments and most tasks and conditions, implied regret exerted a stronger influence on subsequent choices than implied disappointment, the ratio of options’ average values, or the absolute magnitude of losses or gains. Moreover, the explanatory power of ‘mere regret’ was good – it only minimally improved the prediction of choice to take account of the size of regret over and above coding which option ‘won’ on a given round. Our findings illustrate how responding to implied regret might help people choose well and can also indicate which potential inputs are more (or less) important for descriptive models of repeated choice.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room W2.06, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday November 27, 2024 

Speaker: Prof Ulrike Hahn, Birkbeck, University of London. 

Title: What Rational Agent-Based Models Tell Us About Social Networks

Abstract: The talk will review work using agent-based models with rational actors to model communication across social networks. This illustrates the depth of the challenge posed by testimony and our attempts to gauge the reliability of our sources. It highlights ways in which the accuracy of our beliefs is fundamentally beyond our (individual) control, and draws out implications for the (re)design of online social networks.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 731, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498

• Wednesday December 4, 2024 

No seminar this week. Our next seminar will be next week on Wednesday December 11th 2024.

• Wednesday December 11, 2024 

Speaker: Prof Sophie Scott, University College London. 

Title: What's the point of studying laughter

Abstract: In this talk I will consider evolutionary, psychological and neuroscientific evidence about the importance and role of laughter in humans and other animals. I will argue that studying laughter allows us to explore an intensely social positive emotional expression, and that laughter is a highly complex behaviour in humans. I will also draw some distinctions with humour.

Time & Location:  17:15-18:15 UK time. Room 639, IoE, 20 Bedford Way. 

Zoom Link: https://ucl.zoom.us/j/99605138498