

THE MILL NEWS LETTER

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The Editors of the *Amex Bank Review*, in sending Season's Greetings to the friends of *American Express*, had, instead of a traditional scene, the following message:

"There cannot be intrinsically a more insignificant thing in the economy of society than money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it: and like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.

John Stuart Mill, 1848"

[*Principles of Political Economy*, III, vii, 3 (*Collected Works*, III, 506); slightly modified.]

In sending us this bit of Milliana, Dr. Ruth Borchard comments: "Where doesn't one find him?!"

The Editors are delighted to announce that Dr. Bruce L. Kinzer has agreed to become Book Review Editor. Among our more obvious failures has been our inability to get all the best books reviewed when they should be; Dr. Kinzer will do his best (which is very good) to make up for past deficiencies by noticing the more important works that have not been treated, and to ensure that there are no similar gaps in the future. May we, in this good cause, again ask that review copies (or at least notices) of all your books be sent to us, as well as offprints of articles.

We are sorry to announce that Elizabeth MacGregor, who has from our inception typed and corrected the copy with intelligence, patience, and unfailing good humour, has retired from Victoria College and her connection with us, taking with her our affectionate fond wishes. Rea Wilmshurst, we are immensely pleased to say, has taken over her function as mediator between your needs and our incapacities.

This issue contains a pair of articles, by Bruce Kinzer and Marion Filipiuk, arising from Mill's reviews of Tocqueville (which are in Vol. XVIII of the *Collected Works*), and dealing with Mill as trans-

lator and interpreter of Tocqueville. We include also some notes, and queries having to do with Mill's references, a state-of-the-edition notice, the usual section on recent publications, a review by Jane Millgate of Joseph Hamburger's Macaulay, and a progress report on the Collected Works.

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TOCQUEVILLE AND HIS ENGLISH INTERPRETERS, J. S. MILL AND HENRY REEVE

Bruce L. Kinzer

Alexis de Tocqueville's subtle and complex analysis of American democracy, published in two parts (1835 and 1840), was immediately recognized as a work of great importance by European and English intellectuals. Two Englishmen in particular were directly affected by the appearance of De la Démocratie en Amérique. One of these, Henry Reeve, was responsible for the first English translation of Tocqueville's work. The other, J. S. Mill, wrote two lengthy and brilliant reviews of Democracy in America, the first appearing in the London Review in 1835 and the second in the Edinburgh Review five years later.¹ An exploration of the response of these two men to Tocqueville's work suggests the ways in which the political disposition of each affected that response. Also of interest are the relations between Mill and Reeve. Though not friends, the two came into contact at various times in their lives and in a variety of contexts. The political framework within which Mill and Reeve functioned determined in large measure both their response to Tocqueville and their response to one another. In Mill's case, that framework helps one understand his deliberate omission of certain paragraphs in his quotations from Tocqueville (such quotations form a substantial part of the first review and a not insignificant part of the second).

Although he has received little attention from twentieth-century students of Victorian England, Henry Reeve (1813-95) was a man of considerable distinction in his own time. Editor of the Edinburgh Review from 1855 until his death forty years later, Reeve gave eloquent and consistent expression to the Whig political line during both the heyday and the decline of nineteenth-century Whiggery. A highly cultured man, Reeve knew the Continent well (he had been educated at Geneva), and, over the course of his life, he enjoyed the friendship of many distinguished European intellectuals, diplomats, and politicians. One of these friendships was with Tocqueville, whom Reeve first came to know in 1835, shortly after the publication of the first part of De la Démocratie en Amérique.

Reeve's initial response to De la Démocratie en Amérique, based on a partial reading, had not been entirely favourable. Respecting the quality and importance of Tocqueville's treatise, he had no doubts. But at first he declined to translate the work, for he considered Tocqueville's analysis far too sympathetic to democracy. He admired Tocqueville "as a philosophical opponent, as a man infinitely valuable to me, because he forces me to furbish all my powers in the great debate which he propounds; but I will not promulgate an errone-

ous doctrine, nor enter the world with a list of articles in my hand which my hand refuses to subscribe."²

Less than a month later, having nearly completed his reading of the first part of *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, Reeve dined with Tocqueville and admitted that his first impression regarding the book's "democratic tendency was entirely erroneous." Tocqueville now appeared to Reeve as something other than an advocate of the democratic cause. It was true that the former viewed "Democracy as the inevitable lot of Europe" but the prospect was one which Tocqueville did not relish. Rather the coming of democracy was to be seen, according to Reeve's understanding of Tocqueville, "as an evil which we had best prepare to meet, since we cannot escape it."³ Reeve therefore agreed to translate the first part of Tocqueville's work, a task which he completed in 1835, prior to his twenty-second birthday.

The evidence suggests, however, that a considerable measure of fluctuation characterized Reeve's response to *Democracy in America*. In 1856 we find him referring to the work as an "apology for American Democracy."⁴ In the end, Reeve seemed to have accepted that his own reservations regarding *Democracy in America* derived from the author's determination to present an objective, impartial, and scientific analysis of democracy, a purpose which Reeve appreciated and respected but, given his polemical bent, found difficult to assimilate. In an 1861 *Edinburgh* article, occasioned by the publication of Tocqueville's *Memoirs*, Reeve asserted that "no party objects entered into the mind of M. de Tocqueville himself. Even in this controversy . . . he maintained an inviolable impartiality, the more difficult and meritorious that his personal sympathies inclined to the cause of aristocracy, although the result of his profound political observations led him to believe that the cause of aristocratic government was irreparably lost, and that democracy must hereafter be mistress of the world."⁵

Reeve may have accepted the validity of Tocqueville's view concerning the inevitability of democracy, but it was not a position to which he could ever wholly reconcile himself. For Reeve the outstanding characteristic of democracy was "the tyranny of the majority." What is more, it seems that Reeve had even less faith than Tocqueville in the possibility of moderating, controlling, or mitigating the tyrannical influence of such a majority. He wrote: "The modern theory of democracy is not so much a love of freedom as the love of a particular kind of power. Democratic power differs in its origin, but not at all in its nature, from other forms of absolutism. It is as impatient of control, as liable to overleap the restraint of law, as much addicted to flatterers and abuses, as the most arbitrary monarchy or the corruptest oligarchy."⁶

In opposition to government by a tyrannical majority, Reeve expounded a Whig conception of aristocratic government, one more reminiscent of Edmund Burke than of Charles James Fox. As late as 1874 Reeve could speak of an existing "Whig party" and present a formulation of the principles guiding that party. It was the desire of the Whig party, Reeve declared,

"to see the government of the country carried on by those who most faithfully represent the intelligence, the property, and the highest honour and culture of the nation: we desire to see it carried on by men who look to the interests of the whole community and not to those of a class: we believe that the true liberty and progress of the people owe infinitely more to the gradual and measured advance of the leaders of the Whig party than to the wild schemes and agitation of pure democracy; and if we wish to measure the progress of countries in which the aristocratic element has been eliminated and destroyed, we have only to contrast the state of France and Spain at the present moment with our own."⁷

Reeve's observations of Tocqueville the man and writer, doubtless coloured by his own intense political convictions, led him to claim Tocqueville for English Whiggery.

"In the polished circles of Lansdowne House and Holland House, his manners and his powers of conversation ensured him a cordial reception; he found there not only the easy-citizenship of good-breeding, but the same deep interest in the progress of mankind, and the same ardent attachment to every great and free object which had become the ruling passion of his life. His own ideal of social excellence and political greatness lay precisely in the combination of aristocratic tastes with popular interests, and in that independence of position and character which is never more complete than when it is united to a high sense of the duties and obligations of property and station. That is what he found in the Whig society of this country."⁸

Certainly these were the characteristics Reeve found in Whig society, but as a description of Tocqueville's response this passage is slightly misleading. It is true that Tocqueville had a relatively high opinion of the Whig aristocracy, but at the same time he had serious reservations about their political perspicacity. In May of 1835, while on a visit to England, he recorded the following remarks:

"For a century and a half the Whigs have played with the British constitution; they believe that the game can continue, but the machine is worn and should be handled with discretion. They have talked of equality and freedom at a time when the people had a vague instinct, not a clear practical, idea of these two things; they used it to come to power, and then left society almost in the state in which they found it. This experience of the past deceives them, and they believe that they can do the same thing in a century when these same conceptions of freedom and liberty have taken clear shape in the idea of certain laws. After all the Whigs are only a fragment of the aristocratic party; they have long used democracy as a tool, but the tool has become stronger than the hand that guides it."⁹

It is probable that Tocqueville, fully cognizant of Reeve's strong partisanship, approached such subjects with a measure of discretion when conversing with his English friend.

Reeve and Mill differed markedly in their assessment of the Whigs,

yet each held Tocqueville in high esteem. Both considered his study of American democracy of profound importance for the future political and social development of England and the nations of Europe. Although Reeve's relations with Tocqueville were of a far more personal nature than Mill's, both shared a keen appreciation of Tocqueville as an individual. Yet, beyond their joint admiration for Tocqueville, Mill and Reeve had little in common.

Mill's acquaintance with Reeve went back to the latter's childhood (Mill was sixteen years old when they met, Reeve eight).¹⁰ Reeve was the nephew of Sarah Austin, wife of John Austin, a Benthamite who had tutored the young John Mill in Roman law. That early acquaintance, however, never blossomed into friendship; men of vastly different political outlooks, neither was inclined to seek out the other on a personal level. When Reeve was appointed editor of the Edinburgh in 1855, Mill concluded that no further contributions from his pen would appear in that influential periodical. In a letter to Harriet, Mill remarked that "it [the Edinburgh] is indeed fallen. Who will consent to have his writings judged of, & cut & carved by Reeve? For us it is again a complete exclusion."¹¹ As it happened, Mill was mistaken. Reeve showed himself quite ready to accept articles by Mill, and between 1859 and 1866 several reviews by Mill were published in the Edinburgh. These were "Bain's Psychology" (110 [1859], 287-321); "Centralisation" (115 [1862], 323-58); "Austin on Jurisprudence" (118 [1863], 439-82); and "Grote's Plato" (123 [1866], 297-364). Most readers of the Edinburgh would see nothing in these reviews incompatible with their political convictions. After 1866 Mill transferred his allegiance to John Morley's recently established Fortnightly Review. There is no reason to believe that the move away from the Edinburgh was the result of any personal disagreement with Reeve. Throughout the 1859-66 period, relations between the two remained correctly professional; if the few letters exchanged between them reveal little warmth, neither is there any suggestion of hostility.

That such hostility did exist, at least on Reeve's part, with an intensity which conveys the impression of a motivation not entirely political, was demonstrated after Mill's death. What purported to be a review of Mill's Autobiography was included in the January 1874 issue of the Edinburgh.¹² Reeve wrote this review, which he used as a vehicle for a vitriolic and passionate assault on the principles and tendencies which he associated with Mill's philosophical and political speculations. According to Reeve, Mill's infirm judgment "landed him . . . in conclusions which the common sense of a child would have rejected."¹³ Mill's morality "was very uncommon, not from wickedness, but from a false standard of right and wrong."¹⁴ In a quite extraordinary passage Reeve compares Mill with Rousseau (for whom the editor of the Edinburgh certainly had no use) to the former's disadvantage! Both "were apostles of modern democracy, animated by a fierce hatred of existing institutions and beliefs, and intent upon the overthrow of existing society. . . . Indeed, in the avowed objects of his speculations Mill was by far the more destructive of the two, for he would have subverted the eternal truths which are the basis of society, by denying to man the rights of property in this world and the hope of existence hereafter."¹⁵

What lies behind Reeve's harsh denunciation of Mill? An aversion to Mill's politics certainly played a significant part, but the virulent tone of the piece suggests that there may have been other factors at work. One possibility concerns Sarah Austin, from whom Mill and Harriet had been estranged for a good many years preceding Harriet's death. Politics had something to do with the estrangement, for the Austins had become increasingly conservative over the years, but bad feeling between Harriet and Sarah also had much to do with it.¹⁶ As Harriet undoubtedly influenced Mill in his judgment of Mrs. Austin, it is not unlikely that Sarah's observations affected her nephew's judgment of Mill. But if the character of Reeve's response to Mill was in part determined by politics and personality, there was an additional component which, perhaps more than any other, informed Reeve's evaluation of Mill.

The root of Reeve's objections to Mill may be located in his fundamental antagonism to Mill's religious opinions. The erroneous and pernicious nature of Mill's speculations, Reeve implies, derived in large measure from his failure to comprehend that civilization rested upon an essentially religious foundation. Reeve condemns the Philosophic Radicals for "their fundamental divergence from the beliefs and ethical principles of the Christian world" and "their absolute rejection of the principle of religious faith and of the accountability of man to God, which are the rules of life throughout the civilised world."¹⁷ This religious theme is more fully developed in Reeve's 1875 review of Mill's Three Essays on Religion, published posthumously.¹⁸ In this review Reeve attempted to refute what he perceived as the central tenets of Mill's theological position. Mill's challenge to religious orthodoxy is scornfully dismissed by the editor of the Edinburgh. "Mr. Mill does not appear to have perceived that the limited knowledge of a finite being renders it impossible for him to conceive and apprehend all the elements of the question."¹⁹ In the same vein, Reeve argues that "it is surely more consistent with reason and probability to suppose that there are limits to the faculties and philosophy of Mr. Mill, than to the power and benevolence of God."²⁰ The importance of religion in the maintenance of a stable and civilized social order is again emphasized by Reeve, and Mill is once more treated as an enemy of that which holds society together. "Not only religious creeds, but the entire fabric of society, of morals, and of law, would be subverted and overthrown if mankind were really persuaded to renounce its faith in the creation and moral government of the world, in the freedom of the will of man, and in the immortality of the soul."²¹ That Reeve viewed with especial animus this aspect of Mill's thought may be inferred from this review, where he applies in full measure his talent for polemic.

There is no indication in his Memoirs that Reeve's strongly negative feelings about Mill were in any way connected with Mill's reviews of Democracy in America. Considering that when the reviews were written Mill was actively engaged in promoting the democratization of British society, his articles on Tocqueville are generally well balanced. Tocqueville, after all, had much of a positive nature to say about democracy. But Mill also takes very seriously Tocque-

ville's analysis of the dangers and disadvantages of a democratic state of society. That democracy possessed within itself tendencies hostile to a rational system of representation, to individuality, and to freedom of thought was admitted by Mill.²² But although he shared a number of Tocqueville's concerns, the articles also reveal significant differences between the two men, differences which also separated Mill and Reeve.

A number of matters might be referred to in this context. For one thing, Mill argued that many of the potential evils which Tocqueville associated with a democratic society were not unique to democracy, but could be equally characteristic of other types of society.²³ Related to this position is Mill's determination to challenge those portions of Tocqueville's assessment of aristocratic government which Mill considers far too generous.²⁴ As for those dangerous tendencies which are indeed peculiar to democracy, Mill shows himself to be a good deal more confident than Tocqueville that the will and the means exist to prevent such tendencies from obstructing the evolution of a rational and progressive democratic society.²⁵ Another important difference is to be found in Mill's failure, doubtless deliberate, to reflect adequately the distinctively religious flavour of Tocqueville's analysis. It is perhaps the religious dimension of the work which at certain moments gives to Tocqueville's vision of democracy a frightening, nightmarish quality--a quality which Mill naturally tends to suppress in his reviews. These differences between Mill and Tocqueville are apparent not only in Mill's analytical paragraphs, but also in some of the numerous lengthy passages quoted from Tocqueville. What is most interesting about these passages, for our purposes, is Mill's omission of key sections.

The first omission of consequence occurs in the 1835 review within a long quotation²⁶ which Mill cites as Tocqueville's "statement of the question between democracy and aristocracy." The central point made in these paragraphs is that, despite the superiority of aristocratic government in the art of legislation (an assertion which Mill is not prepared to accept), the general interest, for reasons elucidated by Tocqueville, is more likely to be better served by a democratic government. The quotation is very nearly complete, incorporating what amounts to nearly five pages of analysis in Reeve's translation.²⁷ Near the end of the quotation, however, Mill omits a paragraph which he probably would have been happy to retain had it not been for the opening sentence.

"The English aristocracy is perhaps the most liberal which ever existed, and no body of men has ever, uninterruptedly, furnished so many honourable and enlightened individuals to the government of a country. It cannot, however, escape observation, that in the legislation of England the good of the poor has been sacrificed to the advantage of the rich, and the rights of the majority to the privileges of the few. The consequence is, that England, at the present day, combines the extremes of fortune in the bosom of her society; and her perils and calamities are almost equal to her power and renown."²⁸

The second and third sentences of the paragraph must have been viewed with approval by Mill, but his respect for the integrity of Tocqueville's work forbade his excluding the introductory sentence only. Holding the opinions that he did in 1835, Mill preferred to drop the paragraph altogether rather than have anything so complimentary to the English aristocracy appear in his review of a work which he greatly admired.

A more significant omission occurs in another lengthy quotation, in which Tocqueville examines the dangers posed by democracy to individuality and freedom of opinion.²⁹ Mill excludes from the quoted passage the paragraph which most forcefully conveys the intensity of Tocqueville's fear respecting the oppression of the soul under democracy.

"Fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments which tyranny formerly employed; but the civilization of our age has refined the arts of despotism, which seemed however to have been sufficiently perfected before. The excesses of monarchical power had devised a variety of physical means of oppression: the democratic republics of the present day have rendered it as entirely an affair of the mind, as that will which it is intended to coerce. Under the absolute sway of an individual despot, the body was attacked in order to subdue the soul; and the soul escaped the blows which were directed against it, and rose superior to the attempt; but such is not the course adopted by tyranny in democratic republics; there the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved. The sovereign can no longer say, 'You shall think as I do on pain of death;' but he says 'You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people. You may retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to you, for you will never be chosen by your fellow-citizens if you solicit their esteem. You will remain among men, but you will be deprived of the rights of mankind. Your fellow-creatures will shun you like an impure being; and those who are most persuaded of your innocence will abandon you too, lest they should be shunned in their turn. Go in peace! I have given you your dream, but it is an existence incomparably worse than death.'"³⁰

One can imagine the English foes of democracy (Henry Reeve among them) nodding their heads in agreement while reading such a paragraph. It must be admitted, however, that Mill is quite prepared to include in his reviews other quoted material tending towards similar conclusions. Probably it was the prophetic tone of this particular paragraph which made it so difficult for Mill to digest. Its emotionally charged language leaves it lingering in the mind, and Mill surely must have preferred that paragraphs of a rather different sort should remain with the reader.

Perhaps the most revealing omission occurs in Mill's second review of Democracy in America. The first major quotation³¹ is taken from Tocqueville's discussion of the course of French history and its manifestation of an "irresistible tendency to equality of conditions." The two closing paragraphs of the quoted passage refer to the provi-

dential nature of this tendency and convey Tocqueville's sense of alarm that the "Christian nations of our age" will fail to recognize and appreciate the forces which confront them and will therefore neglect to make the appropriate responses necessary to guide those forces into constructive channels. The distance between Tocqueville and Mill is nowhere better exemplified than in the following paragraph, omitted by Mill, who did not even employ an ellipsis to indicate that an omission had taken place.

"The whole book which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced in the author's mind by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made."¹²

This is a paragraph with which Reeve would have had complete sympathy. Mill chose to ignore it entirely.

One may conclude by saying that Mill's reviews of Democracy in America tell us a good deal about the nature and achievement of Tocqueville's work. They also tell us much about the reviewer himself. What a reader of the reviews could not be expected to appreciate is that had Mill included the paragraphs which he consciously omitted from the Tocqueville quotations, more would have been learned about the author of Democracy in America. An awareness of those omissions, on the other hand, while not adding significantly to our knowledge of Mill's opinions at the time, suggests that, as in his reading of Coleridge, Mill took from Tocqueville what suited his purposes and rejected what he found uncongenial.

NOTES

¹Both articles are included in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Politics and Society, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XVIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 49-90, 155-204.

²John Knox Laughton, ed., Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve (London: Longmans, Green, 1898), I, 42-3.

³Ibid., 47.

⁴Ibid., 366.

⁵Reeve, "Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville," Edinburgh Review, 113 (1861), 220.

⁶Ibid., 225.

⁷Reeve, "Autobiography of John Stuart Mill," Edinburgh Review, 139 (1874), 108.

⁸Reeve, "Remains," 226.

⁹Tocqueville, Journeys to England and Ireland, trans. George Lawrence and K. P. Mayer, ed. J. P. Mayer (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), 70.

¹⁰In his Memoirs Reeve says: "I spent the summer holiday [of 1822] with the Austins at Yarmouth and Cromer. They had John Mill with them. He and I went to collect seaweeds, dry them, and Mill knew their names." (Laughton, ed., Memoirs, I, 6.)

¹¹Francis Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, eds., The Later Letters of

John Stuart Mill, in Collected Works, XIV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 421 (14-18 April, 1855).

¹²Reeve, "Autobiography," 91-129.

¹³Ibid., 91.

¹⁴Ibid., 92.

¹⁵Ibid., 93.

¹⁶In the early draft of the Autobiography, Mill included a long paragraph highly critical of Sarah Austin. See Jack Stillinger, ed., The Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 147-8.

¹⁷Reeve, "Autobiography," 94.

¹⁸Reeve, "J. S. Mill's Essays on Theism," Edinburgh Review, 141 (1875), 1-31.

¹⁹Ibid., 16.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., 2.

²²Mill, "Democracy in America [II]," Collected Works, XVIII, 173-90.

²³Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," ibid., 86.

²⁴Ibid., 77-9.

²⁵Ibid., 83-6.

²⁶Ibid., 68-70.

²⁷Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve, new ed. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), I, 277-81.

²⁸Ibid., 281.

²⁹Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 81-2.

³⁰Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 310-11. It might be held that the opening pages of On Liberty owe something to this (and similar) passages.

³¹Mill, "Democracy in America [II]," 159-62.

³²Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, lii.

* * * * *

TOCQUEVILLE IN TRANSLATION IN MILL'S REVIEWS OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

Marion Filipiuk

When Mill reviewed the first two volumes of Democracy in America in 1835, he clearly felt great enthusiasm at introducing this major work on a favourite theme to an English public. Obviously he also believed that Tocqueville's own eloquence would encourage that public to share his enthusiasm both for the writer and the subject; for the latter Mill was admittedly more ardent than Tocqueville himself. A month before the review appeared, Mill wrote to him: "The chief merit of it will be in the extracts: if I [have] succeeded in introducing them so as to excite attention to them I have done all I have aimed at. My article will be, as you [will] see, a shade or two more favourable to democracy than your book. . . ."¹

There are twenty extracts in the article, eleven from the first volume, nine from the second. Mill had, we know not why, only the first of Reeve's two-volume translation to hand. He would use it, reserving the right, however, to correct and alter extensively, for reasons personal and political, as well as for those he admits to: "we follow, as far as possible, Mr. Reeve's translation. We have used, however, very freely, the privilege of alteration, when, even at the expense of elegance, we deemed it possible to render the meaning more intelligible, or to keep closer than Mr. Reeve has done to the spirit of the original."² In a footnote, Mill's readers were thus given a summary review of a translation that, as we shall see, he thought a shade too unfavourable to democracy.

Mill's credentials as critic of any translation from French or as translator were, of course, impeccable. Though his stay on the Continent had been considerably shorter than Reeve's, in the course of a year he had acquired a truly impressive command of the language and had retained it. (At the age of fourteen, after six months in France, he was fully capable of commenting in French, for his father's benefit, on the performance of his professor of logic at Montpellier both as to *fond* and to *forme*.)³ In his alterations to Reeve and in his own translations, Mill demonstrates, albeit with some pro-democratic shading in some places, a passion for precision in the use of terms and a remarkable fidelity to structure and prose rhythm.

A comparison of the Reeve and Mill versions of Tocqueville's call for control and enlightened guidance of democratic forces (Mill's second quotation in the review), will show Mill attempting both to render the meaning more intelligible, and to keep closer to the spirit, as he perceives it, of the original.⁴

Reeve's enthusiasm for the trip on the democratic current is clearly not so great as Mill's. The "effrayant spectacle" (Mill, "fearful spectacle") that the nations of the age present is, to him, "a most alarming spectacle." Mill, on the contrary, says that "le mouvement qui les emporte" "is bearing them forward," adding a touch of his own positive thinking to the verb "emporter." In Reeve, the impulse is merely bearing them "along." Tocqueville asserts that the leaders of democracy must "réanimer ses croyances" (Mill, "reanimate its faith"). Reeve will have them "warm" it. He alters the "aveugles instincts" of democracy (Mill, "blind instincts") to blind "propensities," ignoring the implied association of "instincts" and "intérêts" that Mill is careful to bring out; but he retains the order of the original which Mill, exceptionally, reverses, putting the negative phrases ahead of the objects for a more affirmative emphasis: "to substitute for its inexperience a knowledge of business, and for its blind instincts an acquaintance with its true interests."

In the following paragraph, Tocqueville develops an image in which we are swept along on a river of change, whose current "nous pousse à reculons vers des abîmes." Reeve's version, "drives us backward toward the gulf," with its literal translation of "à reculons," and the unfortunate choice of "gulf," is less "intelligible" than Mill's freer rendering, "drives us toward an unseen abyss."

Mill did, however, use "abyss," the closest English equivalent to "abîmes," as he chose "reanimate," "instincts," and "fearful," above.

It is characteristic of him as translator to prefer the cognate, not merely because its meaning is usually closer to the French, but also I think, because he chooses to keep the sound of the original whenever possible.

Differences in attitude between the translators toward the great social revolution, as well as Mill's greater fidelity to Tocqueville's language, emerge in subsequent sentences. (*Italics added in the Reeve and Mill versions.*)

Tocqueville: "Jamais les chefs de l'Etat n'ont pensé à rien préparer d'avance pour elle; elle s'est faite malgré eux ou à leur insu."

Reeve: "The heads of the State have never had any forethought for its exigencies, and its victories have been without their consent, or without their knowledge."

Mill: "The heads of the State have never thought of making any preparation for it and its victories have been in spite of their resistance or without their knowledge."

Tocqueville: "La démocratie a donc été abandonnée à ses instincts sauvages."

Reeve: "The people have consequently been abandoned to its wild propensities."

Mill: "Democracy has consequently been abandoned to its untutored instincts."

The "moindres désirs" of democracy are Reeve's "caprices," but Mill's "smallest wishes." And "ses vices," which Reeve renders literally, are softened by Mill to its "bad tendencies."

There are many similar alterations in quotations dealing with the differences between aristocratic and democratic society (Mill, [1], pp. 52-3), and the attitudes of the American people toward their society and their government (pp. 61-3). A most interesting contrast occurs, however, in Mill's treatment of two quotations which come between these passages. The first is the long explanation of the details of administration in New England (pp. 58-60), the second, the general consideration of the commune (pp. 60-1).

Mill quotes the whole chapter entitled "Authorities of the Township in New England,"⁵ with the exception of the introductory two-sentence paragraph (which in Reeve's version declares, "In America, the people is a master whose exigencies demand obedience to the utmost limit of possibility"),⁶ and makes only twenty-seven minor adjustments in Reeve's text, mostly word changes, e.g., "duties" changed to "functions" (for "fonctions"), "subject" changed to "governed" (for "gouvernés"), "citizens" changed to "landed proprietors" (for "propriétaires"). He also brings down to lower case in three instances the initial letters of Tocqueville's and Reeve's "Etat, State." But he lets Reeve recount the facts of the administrative organization.

Not so the tale of the commune. Here Mill departs completely from Reeve and does his own translation, as he tells the reader in a footnote, with a reference to Vol. I, pp. 95-7 of the original, instead of a parenthetical reference to both Reeve and Tocqueville, as had been his practice up to that point. This passage affords a good example of Mill at work on his own as translator, borrowing occasionally from Reeve (but clearly dissatisfied with his version), and aiming at conveying the eloquence of Tocqueville's prose.

The term "commune" troubled Reeve, and though he rarely resorted to a footnote to explain a concept, on this he felt obliged to comment.⁷ He treated the problem in a matter-of-fact manner, using "township" and "municipal bodies" for "commune" and "système communal," and expanded the explanation in the text with "the town, or tithing, as the smallest division of a community." Indeed, in his note, he tried to define the technical differences in the use of such terms in England and in France.

Mill makes no attempt at definition. He naturalizes the word "commune," "because there is no English word which expresses the unity of the body politic, whether that unit be a town or a village," rightly feeling that, in a general description of the association, "township" lacked sufficient spirit to render "something which has so completely its foundation in nature, that wherever a number of human beings are collected, a commune arises of itself."⁸

The following paragraphs provide examples of Mill's exactness in handling Tocqueville's structure as well as individual words and imagery, by contrast with Reeve's much freer and less forceful rendering.

Tocqueville: "C'est pourtant dans la commune que réside la force des peuples libres. Les institutions communales sont à la liberté ce que les écoles primaires sont à la science; elles la mettent à la portée du peuple; elles lui en font goûter l'usage paisible et l'habituent à s'en servir. Sans institutions communales, une nation peut se donner un gouvernement libre, mais elle n'a pas l'esprit de la liberté. Des passions passagères, des intérêts d'un moment, le hasard des circonstances, peuvent lui donner les formes extérieures de l'indépendance; mais le despotisme refoulé dans l'intérieur du corps social reparaît tôt ou tard à la surface."⁹

Mill: "Nevertheless it is in the commune that the strength of a free people resides. Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to knowledge; they bring it within the reach of the people, give them a taste for its peaceable exercise, and practice in its use. Without municipal institutions, a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not the spirit of freedom. Transient passions, momentary interests, or the chance of circumstances, may give it the outward forms of independence; but the despotic principle, which has been driven back into the interior of the body politic, will sooner or later re-appear at the surface."¹⁰

Reeve: "Nevertheless local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they

teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. The transient passions and the interests of an hour, or the chance of circumstances, may have created the external forms of independence, but the despotic tendency which has been repelled will, sooner or later, inevitably re-appear on the surface."¹¹

With a seeming lack of effort, Mill follows Tocqueville's syntax most faithfully. There are only three minor variations. At the end of the second sentence, he uses a noun plus a phrase (practice in its use) instead of the verbal structure (*l'habitué à s'en servir*), but the result is a pleasing balance in the English (peaceable exercise, and practice in its use). He alters the adjective phrase (*d'un moment*) to a single word (momentary), but again achieves a balance with what immediately precedes (transient passions, momentary interests). And, finally, in the last sentence, he adds the partial clause (which has been), understood in the French, before the adjective (*refoulé*). The structure is less compressed, but the force of the image, which Mill develops carefully, and Reeve ignores, is in no way weakened. Tocqueville's eloquence could not be better conveyed in English.

There are two isolated moments of interest in the review where a comparison with the other texts reveals Mill deliberately abandoning his policy of fidelity and precision for personal reasons. He is more above a bit of bowdlerizing. At the end of a short paragraph on the weakness of society, Tocqueville concludes: "on a des désirs, des regrets, des chagrins et des joies qui ne produisent rien de visible ni de durable, semblables à des passions de vieillards qui n'aboutissent qu'à l'impuissance."¹² Mill says that "the desires, the regrets, the sorrows and the joys of the time produce no visible or permanent fruits,"¹³ omitting the concluding simile.

His distaste for sexist language appears in his treatment of Tocqueville's characterization of Americans in contemporary politics. Tocqueville describes them as deficient in "cette virile candeur, cette mâle indépendance de la pensée, qui a souvent distingué les Américains dans les temps antérieurs. . . ." ¹⁴ Mill (without benefit of Reeve) is prepared to concede that candour may be "manly," but independence of thought he modifies as "vigorous," not "masculine."

In 1840, reviewing all four volumes for the *Edinburgh*, Mill uses considerably fewer extracts, eight in all, and his attitude to Reeve's translation appears to have altered somewhat. With Tocqueville now an established presence in England, the earlier object of "exciting attention" to *Democracy in America* had been achieved, and Mill was free to deal generally with the whole work and his own related concerns. Volumes I and II, in the Reeve version, had been widely read, and Mill hoped that III and IV would encourage further discussion of the issues. But, by 1840, Mill had, indeed, become more keenly aware of the difficulties to be encountered on the democratic odyssey. And at a time of cautious *rapprochement* between those of Radical and Whig persuasions, why overly censure or edit a standard text in one's first contribution to the Whigs' great pa-

organ?

At the end of the single long quotation from Volume I, Mill notes: "In this, and our other extracts, we have followed generally, though not implicitly, Mr. Reeve's translation. Though not always unexceptionable, it is spirited, and sometimes felicitous."¹⁶ He has indeed followed Reeve much more closely than in any passage of the first article, except that on the administration of New England. There is only one alteration of structure, to make it parallel to the French, though there are many places where, one feels, Mill earlier would have improved on Reeve's version. The word changes for greater precision are similar to those we have already seen: for example, "s'étendre" is altered from "exert" to "extend;" "la science" is again corrected in context from "science" to "knowledge;" "les arts" are properly designated "the arts," rather than "art." There are also shifts from upper to lower case for the first letters of "church," "state," "government," and "crown." (Tocqueville consistently used "Eglise," and "Etat," but "gouvernement." Reeve promoted "autorité royale" to "Crown.") It is noteworthy that when Reeve translates "communes" as "communities," Mill justifiably corrects it to "corporate towns": "the erection of corporate towns introduced an element of democratic liberty into the bosom of feudal monarchy. . . ."¹⁷ Mill also retains the French "bourgeois," with all its commercial as well as civic overtones, in preference to Reeve's "citizen": "Is it credible that the democracy which has annihilated the feudal system, and vanquished kings, will respect the bourgeois and the capitalist?"¹⁸ Though interesting, the changes are minor and relatively few in number.

The two passages cited from the second volume had been previously quoted in 1835, but Mill seems not to have consulted his own translations. In the first, on the enlightening effect of participation in the governing process, a pro-democratic shading can still be seen in a refusal to let Reeve's "lower orders" stand for "le peuple." But it is notable that Mill did not tone down the element of deceit to which the people are subjected by those who solicit their support until a revision in 1859 for *Dissertations and Discussions*: "The humblest individual is canvassed by a multitude of claimants who need his support; and who seeking to deceive him in a thousand different ways, instruct him in their deceit"; in 1859 the final three words are replaced by "during the process."¹⁹ Tocqueville and Mill in his 1835 version both sounded more positive: "en cherchant à le tromper de mille manières différentes, on l'éclaire";²⁰ "in seeming to deceive him in a thousand ways, they enlighten him."²¹

In the following paragraph, which contrasts the character of governments by one and by the many, Mill makes an uncharacteristic departure from both his sources to declare: "Not what is done by a democratic government, but what is done under a democratic government by private agency, is really great."²² How different in effect from his own earlier version, which was closer to the French and to Reeve: "Under its empire, what is truly great is, not what the public administration does, but what is done without it, and independently of its aid."²³

Volumes III and IV provide five passages, and Mill continues a

policy of general adherence to Reeve, tidying up, and altering whenever the translation really is exceptionable. For example, Mill clearly felt that Reeve had failed at one point, in the last, and only, quotation from Volume IV. "In olden society everything was different [says Reeve]; unity and uniformity were nowhere to be met with."²⁴ "The general character of olden society was diversity,"²⁵ says Mill, certain that such was the real intent of "Tout était différent dans les anciennes sociétés."²⁶

In 1840, Mill felt that the Reeve translation in general would serve; but when he made revisions for Dissertations and Discussions in 1859, though he still used Reeve's translation, he removed all mention of Reeve and his version, and altered the references to lead the reader straight back to Tocqueville. The other changes, indicated in the variants in the Collected Works, are mostly minor.

We have, unfortunately, no record of Reeve's reaction to his treatment at Mill's hands, but it is not too fanciful to imagine that it might have contributed to the hostility revealed in his review of the Autobiography. Reeve might, justifiably, have felt that some of the changes merely indicated a personal preference, but he could not fail to be struck by how often Mill managed to point up his inadequacies, and how maddeningly correct Mill always was. Had Reeve set out to get revenge by finding faux pas in Mill's work, he would have been sadly disappointed. The omission of a word, very occasionally, is all that he would have been able to discover. But the re-writing of the "commune" passage might very well have caused him to explode: "Spirit of the original, indeed!"

NOTES

¹Sept., 1835, in The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, ed. F. E. Mineka, Collected Works, XII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 272.

²J. S. Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I]," Collected Works, XVIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 49. Subsequently referred to as Mill, "Democracy in America [I]."

³See Anne Jean Mill, John Mill's Boyhood Visit to France (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 86, 90-1.

⁴Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve, new ed., 2 vols. (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1862), I, lii-liv (subsequently referred to as Reeve); Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 51-2.

⁵Reeve, I, 56-9.

⁶*Ibid.*, 56.

⁷*Ibid.*, 53.

⁸Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 60.

⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, 2 vols., 2^e ed. (Paris: Gosselin, 1835), I, 96-7. Subsequently referred to as Tocqueville.

¹⁰Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 61.

¹¹Reeve, I, 55.

¹²Tocqueville, I, 17.

¹³Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 54.

¹⁴Tocqueville, II, 156.

¹⁵Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 82. Cf. J. M. Robson, "'Feminine and Masculine': Mill vs. Grote," Mill News Letter, XII (Winter, 1977), 18-22.

¹⁶J. S. Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II]," Collected Works, XVIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 162. Subsequently referred to as Mill, "Democracy in America [II]."

¹⁷Ibid., 161.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 170-1.

²⁰Tocqueville, II, 130.

²¹Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 89.

²²Mill, "Democracy in America [II]," 171.

²³Mill, "Democracy in America [I]," 89. Cf. Tocqueville: "Sous son empire, ce n'est pas surtout ce qu'exécute l'administration publique qui est grand, c'est ce qu'on exécute sans elle et en dehors d'elle" (II, 132).

²⁴Reeve, II, 393.

²⁵Mill, "Democracy in America [II]," 190.

²⁶Tocqueville, IV, 271.

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Note:

Professor Satoshi Yamasaki of the Faculty of Economics, Kagawa University, Takamatsu, Japan, informs us that his library has acquired a note in JSM's hand, dated at Avignon, 22 December, 1872, subscribing to the Journal des Economistes for the year 1873. The Journal des Economistes was a monthly review, begun in 1841, dealing with political economy and agricultural and commercial questions. It ceased publication in 1940.

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Announcement:

SIXTH JAPAN MILL CONFERENCE

The sixth Japan Mill Conference was held on 10 October, 1977 at Konan University, Kobe. It was the first time that the conference had been held outside of Tokyo; it was followed on 11 October by a meeting of the Japan Political Science Association. At the Mill conference, Professor Nishiguchi of Kumamoto University delivered a paper on Bentham's plan for parliamentary reform, and Professor Kumagai of Momoyamagakuin University spoke on JSM's colonial theory.

* * * * *

Queries:

The copy-text for Vol. IX of the Collected Works, Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy is the 4th edition (1872). In this edition there exist two "states" of Gathering K (pp. 129-44), which are most easily identified by two variant readings on pp. 129 and 130. (There are other indications of resetting throughout this gathering, but not elsewhere in the edition.) In the last line of p. 129, one state reads, "But if what I am told . . ."; the other (incorrectly) reads, "But if what am I told. . . ." The first state reads, on the ninth line from the bottom of p. 130, "Is it unfair . . ."; the other (again incorrectly, in view of the terminal question mark) reads, "It is unfair. . . ." I should greatly appreciate hearing, from those of you who have access to copies of the 4th edition, which state is in your (or your library's) possession.

JMR

In his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (4th ed., 1872, p. 97), Mill, somewhat surprisingly, writes: "If any one says to me, Humpty Dumpty is an Abracadabra, I neither knowing what is meant by an Abracadabra, nor what is meant by Humpty Dumpty, I may, if I have confidence in my informant, believe that he means something, and that the something which he means is probably true: but I do not believe the very thing which he means, since I am entirely ignorant of what is is." But, he continues, "unmeaning propositions," as commonly understood, are of a different kind: "That the same thing is and is not--that it did and did not rain at the same time and place, that a man is both alive and not alive, are forms of words which carry no signification to my mind. . . . The unmeaningness here resides in the copula. The word is has no meaning, except as exclusive of is not. The case is more hopeless than that of Humpty Dumpty, for no explanation by the speaker of what the words mean can make the assertion intelligible."

Some readers may well anticipate what comes next: i.e., Humpty Dumpty's own "explanation" of what "words mean":

"I don't know what you mean by "glory,"" Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't--till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'

'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice objected.

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less.'

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master--that's all.'" (Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, Chap. vi; in The Annotated Alice, ed. Martin Gardner [Penguin, 1965], 268-9.)

What one most wants (or at least what would most please me) is evidence of Carroll's influence on Mill--but, alas, the passage in Mill is unchanged from 1865 (the 1st ed. of the Examination), while Through the Looking-Glass dates from 1871 (1872 on the title-page). There is, however, quite good evidence that Carroll read Mill, at

least his System of Logic, and commentators on Humpty Dumpty's views commonly cite Mill's Logic as a source. (See, e.g., Peter Heath's comments, with reference to Humpty Dumpty, on Mill's view of nominal definitions, in The Philosopher's Alice [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974], 191, and the other sources there cited.) And Gardner, in the edition of Carroll cited above, includes in his commentary on this very passage a quotation from Carroll's Symbolic Logic which says, in part, that logicians "speak of the Copula of a Proposition 'with bated breath'; almost as if it were a living, conscious entity, capable of declaring for itself what it chose to mean, and that we, poor human creatures, had nothing to do but to ascertain what was its sovereign will and pleasure, and submit to it."

It seems far from improbable that Carroll read Mill's Examination, and, at least to me, it seems probable that, if he did, Mill's almost innocently silly example would have induced in his fertile and curious mind the thoughts that led to Humpty Dumpty's bold position. But does anyone have evidence that he did read the Examination? Or does anyone have further thoughts on the matter?

JMR

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Recent Publications:

- Burnham, R. Peter. "Plato in Victorian England: The Response of Matthew Arnold, John Stuart Mill and John Ruskin." Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1977.
- Day, J. P. "Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty," American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (Oct., 1977), 252-72.
- Gray, J. N. "John Stuart Mill and the Future of Liberalism," Contemporary Review, 229 (Sept., 1976), 138-45.
- Hagman, Richard H. "John Stuart Mill on Higher Learning." Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1977.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude. "Reply to Louis B. Zimmer on Mill's 'Negative Argument,'" Journal of British Studies, 17 (Fall, 1977), 138-40.
- Long, Douglas. Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Liberty in Relation to his Utilitarianism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Peterfreund, Sheldon P. "On Mill's Higher and Lower Pleasures," The Personalist, 57 (Autumn, 1976), 411-12.
- Ratcliffe, Barrie M. and W. H. Chaloner, eds. A French Sociologist Looks at Britain: Gustave D'Eichthal and British Society in 1828. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977. (A translation of D'Eichthal's notes and an intellectual portrait by Ratcliffe.)
- Rees, John. "The Thesis of the Two Mills," Political Studies, 25 (Sept., 1977), 369-82.
- Robbins, Lionel. Political Economy Past and Present. London: Macmillan, 1976.
- Robson, J. M. "The Rhetoric of J. S. Mill's Periodical Articles," Victorian Periodicals Newsletter, 10 (Sept., 1977), 122-9.

- Singer, M. G. "Actual Consequence Utilitarianism," Mind, 86 (Jan., 1977), 67-77.
- Steintrager, James. Bentham. London: Allen and Unwin, 1977.
- Ten, C. L. "Self-Regarding Conduct and Utilitarianism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 55 (August, 1977), 105-13.
- Walton, Douglas. "Mill and De Morgan on Whether the Syllogism is a Peritio," International Logic Review, 15 (June, 1977), 57-67.
- West, Henry. "Mill's Qualitative Hedonism," Philosophy, 51 (Jan., 1976), 97-101. (Reply to Rex Martin, "A Defense of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism," Philosophy, 47 [April, 1972], 140-51.)
- Yamashita, Shigekazu. "J. S. Mill and the July Revolution in France (Part I)," Kokugakuin Hogaku, 15 (July, 1977), 64-98. (In Japanese.)
- Zimmer, Louis B. "The 'Negative Argument' in J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism," Journal of British Studies, 17 (Fall, 1977), 119-37.

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Macaulay and the Whig Tradition. By Joseph Hamburger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. xiii + 274.

This is an important book for anyone interested in the interconnections between historical awareness and political conduct in the nineteenth century. It throws fresh light on the continuing tradition which runs from Halifax in the seventeenth century on through Burke in the eighteenth and Macaulay in the nineteenth, until some of its dominant assumptions--especially the belief in trimming between extremes--are absorbed into those late nineteenth-century liberal attitudes which have become the common political property of Liberals and Conservatives alike.

Professor Hamburger shrewdly notes that at the time of the Reform Bill "the Whigs had a policy but needed a philosophy," and he is able to demonstrate the crucial role played by Macaulay's speeches at this period in formulating and systematizing Whig notions so as to supply an "authoritative rationale for reform." It is Professor Hamburger's contention, and one he ably sustains, that Macaulay's major commitment was to the achievement of balance and stability--that he was a trimmer before he was a Whig--and although as one of nature's partisans he was temperamentally unfitted for the equable and mediatory stance usually associated with the idea of trimming, Macaulay nevertheless remained a trimmer from principle, and sought to embody the tradition of political conduct he inherited from Halifax both in his parliamentary career and in his historical writings.

Professor Hamburger's study is organized thematically rather than chronologically, each chapter forming a relatively self-contained unit. This inevitably involves him a certain amount of repetition, but most of this is rhetorically justified, supplying the emphasis necessary for the replacement of the common Butterfieldian assumptions about Macaulay as the prince of Whig historians. Exemplification of Macaulay's commitment to principled moderation, his abhorrence of extremism, is everywhere extended and deepened by a fascinating exploration of the interconnections between his personal experi-

ence, his conceptions of history, and his political assumptions. Professor Hamburger demonstrates the reciprocal relation among all aspects of Macaulay's thought--the way, for example, his understanding of religious conflict in seventeenth-century England, and, by analogy, extremist conflict in other periods and places, was affected by his personal exposure to religious dogmatism as a child, so that a special colouration was given both to his presentation of rigidity and fanaticism in his History and to his response to political opponents who seemed too exclusively theoretical in their attitudes.

It is within the context of his presentation of Macaulay's revision--emotional and intellectual--from the doctrinaire that Professor Hamburger treats of the relation to the two Mills. He balances a just assessment of Macaulay's acceptance of some of the policies advocated by the Benthamites, and his particular debts as Indian administrator and legislator to James Mill, against a clear presentation of his fundamental distrust of the Radicals as "philosophers," and therefore doubtful guides in the realm of practical politics. Macaulay is shown as flirting in the 1830s with the idea of some kind of centre gauche coalition, but moving away from this and into greater sympathy with certain Peelite positions in the 1840s. This rightward shift is seen as the product of that fundamental commitment to trimming as the wisest mode of political conduct, but we are also given a vivid sense of Macaulay's growing fear of a combination of Radical philosophy with Chartist fervour.

Through examples from all periods of Macaulay's career Professor Hamburger is able to show convincingly that his interpretation of contemporary developments "in the light of his understanding of historical change" shaped his conception of the duties of the historian: patterns of change in the past must be presented in such a way as to give his readers a fuller understanding of contemporary events--persuade men to right judgment and hence to right action. This educational impulse behind the History is stressed throughout the present study, and in the process perhaps less than justice is done to Macaulay's narrative and stylistic achievements. The main concern is to demonstrate that a "deep and exclusive commitment to practical politics" underlay speeches, essays, and History alike, and there is a stalwart refusal to be deflected from this aim into consideration of the literary means by which Macaulay pursued his ends. This single-mindedness is matter for regret since Professor Hamburger shows himself to be a perceptive and attentive reader of Macaulay's text, sensitive to the complexities and nuances passed over by other commentators, so that one yearns for some comment on the structures and strategies by which the interpretations and lessons embodied in that text are articulated. But if the stress on Macaulay the political man seems at times too exclusive, the insistence on his role as trimmer a shade unyielding, that is, in the end, a small price to pay for all that is new and valuable in this book. No other treatment of Macaulay has confronted the full complexities of his intellectual heritage, identified the debts to mentors as various as Bacon, Halifax, Burke, Mankintosh, Jeffreys, and Bentham. Nor is Professor Hamburger content simply to register the influences: he confronts the problem of how they are combined, what part temperament

as well as intellect played in the process. By addressing himself to the ideas of a man who always distrusted philosophy, and the beliefs of one who feared dogma, Professor Hamburger has compelled us to re-examine not only our conception of Macanlay, but also our understanding of the forces shaping nineteenth-century political thought in general.

Jane Millgate
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Collected Works

The revised pages of Vol. XI, Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, have now been passed, and the volume should appear in the very near future. Starting with a comprehensive and stimulating Introduction by Francis E. Sparshott, it includes Mill's essays on Whately's Logic, on Bailey's works on Berkeley's Theory of Vision, on Bain's Psychology, and on Taine's De l'Intelligence, and, on the classical side, Mill's nine Platonic translations (five of them not previously published) plus a brief review of two Platonic works, and his great reviews of Grote's History, his Plato, and his Aristotle.

The text of Vol. IX, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, is in the experienced and most trustworthy hands of Rosemary Shipton, the copy-editor, and should move through its various stages towards publication about the end of 1978. So we (the same team as last year, except that Judith LeGoff has, after a year in France and England, rejoined us, replacing John Carland who has joined the History Department at the University of Kentucky) have now moved on to Vol. I, The Autobiography and Literary Essays, which will be edited by Jack Stillinger and John M. Robson.

The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill

Volume 11

ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE CLASSICS

Edited by John M. Robson

Introduction by Francis E. Sparshott

Mill's essays on philosophy and the classics, edited in the scholarly form that has won high acclaim for the earlier volumes of the Collected Works, provide eloquent testimony of his lifelong interest in the ideals that informed nineteenth-century intellectual life, and give context for an understanding not only of Mill's political, logical, and psychological thought, but also of the thought of his age.

John Stuart Mill's early education (he began Greek at the age of three) in the classics and philosophy is reflected in this collection which spans virtually his entire career as an author. Themes found in his major philosophical and political works are revealed in his discussions of Plato, Aristotle, and Greek history, as well as in his reviews of works on logic and psychology. His translations of nine of Plato's dialogues (five here published for the first time) illustrate, among other matters, his passion for dialectic. By stressing the connection between philosophic (including political) views and classical studies, the volume contributes to an understanding of how nineteenth-century authors developed their ideas; too often it is forgotten how pervasive and enduring the classical influence was.

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