THE MILL NEWS LETTER

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This issue's Milliania is taken from Munby Man of Two Worlds, and explains itself.

Thursday, 8 November . . . Office 10.24 to 5.21--Home after dinner, and to my class at 8. Met Godfrey and Vernon Lushington in coming out. V. and I went upstairs to the drawing classes, and found Ruskin talking with Litchfield--telling him of a letter of sympathy which he has had from Carlyle, in reference to his articles on political economy in the Cornhill. No wonder the grand old prophet approves of any protest against that which appears to regard human souls simply as 'hands', and to rest on the sovereignty of dead laws rather than of living wills. But Ruskin continued preaching away at us, & especially at the incredulous L., reviling the science of Adam Smith and his successors as 'the damnedest devil's lie, my dear Litchfield' with huge emphasis and pointing of finger 'that ever was'! And so he went on, loud and selfsatisfied, assuming that the object of the science was to make men rich and that by setting them against each other; speaking approvingly of 'Plato, Aristotle and Solomon (!)', saying many harsh things, which he declared he would have said in the Cornhill, 'only Thackeray wouldn't let him': so he means to put them into his forthcoming book on the subject. He described J.S. Mill as 'a fine fellow, but whose brain was full of confused fancies (!): which I will show!' cried he conclusively, rising up & down on his toes, after his manner, with his hands in his tailpockets, and finally jaunting downstairs in the same springy fashion, with the prim smile of Sir Oracle upon his dry lips. Whether one agrees with him or not, nothing can be more offensive than his scornful selfsufficient manner--filliping away with his flippant abuse the careful work of three generations!

MAR 29 1977

(Ed. D. Hudson, [London: Gambit, 1972], 81-2.)

This issue begins with another of our series of Mill letters discovered since the publication of the Later Letters; this one, unearthed by Marcia Allentuck (Department of History of Art, CUNY), derives from the beginning of Mill's busy parliamentary career, when his range of correspondence was significantly enlarged. The next item is an essay by Jacques Kornberg (Department of History, Toronto) on Wilhelm Dilthey's reaction to and use of Mill's thought; little having been written on Mill's influence in Germany, this account has, we believe, special interest. Next follows a note on Mill's objection to Grote's use of "feminine" and "masculine," a set of queries concerning Mill's references in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics (Vol. XI of the Collected Works), a list of recent publications, an announcement, and a review. The issue closes with news about the Collected Works.

Apologies are owed to Charles Hanly (Philosophy, Toronto), whose name was inadvertedly omitted from his review of Bruce Mazlish's James and John Stuart Mill in the last number. May we again remind readers of the value to us of offprints, review copies, and news of publications.

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AN UNPUBLISHED LETTER FROM JOHN STUART MILL TO JOSHUA TOULMIN SMITH IN THE LILLY LIBRARY

Marcia Allentuck

The following unpublished letter from John Stuart Mill to Joshua Toulmin Smith (1816-1869) is in the Lilly Library[1] and is here reproduced (literatim) for the first time:

June 1. 1866

Dear Sir

Thank you for your note. I am aware that in this country and in all others whose laws were originally founded on the feudal principle, landed possessions were held subject to, and even as a provision for, public duties, and that the idea of absolute property in land is essentially modern. You, however, as a Constitutional lawyer, know infinitely more on the subject than I do, and I shall be very glad to have the opportunity of consulting you when I again have occasion to touch on the point.

The other fact you mention, that the expenses of elections were once a public charge, is new to me, and will be a most telling point to bring forward when that subject is before Parliament, which it is sure, very shortly, to be. When that time comes, I should be very glad indeed to be able to produce a copy of the writ and read parts of it to the House.

I am with many thanks
Dear Sir
Yours very truly
J.S. Mill

Toulmin Smith Esq

It is logical that Toulmin Smith, the great champion of the historic precedents for local government and democratic self-determination, should have approached Mill on these subjects, for Mill had in the previous year become M.P. for Westminster and thus was in a good position to advance the concepts which Toulmin Smith had developed in earlier publications such as Local Self-Government and Centralization (1851), The Parish: Its Obligations and Powers (1854), and the weekly Parliamentary Remembrancer (1857-1865).

NOTE:

[1] I am grateful for the permission granted in January, 1975, to publish it.

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JOHN STUART MILL: A VIEW FROM THE BISMARCKIAN REICH

Jacques Kornberg

I

Over the past few years I have been involved in research on the work of William Dilthey (1833-1911), the German philosopher-historian. Dilthey, whose productive years extended from the late 1860s till his death, worked in the centre of the German philosophic tradition. His major interest was in the history of ideas, especially the theory of knowledge, and so he studied carefully both British empiricism and French positivism.

Scrutinizing the vast range of Dilthey's writings in history, philosophy, psychology, aesthetics and other disciplines, I noticed many references to John Stuart Mill. It soon became apparent that John Stuart Mill's theories were a challenge to Dilthey, one that could not be denied if he was to clarify and round-off his own theoretical reflections.[1] Just as at the turn of the twentieth century, German sociologists could not avoid a dialogue with Marx, and, indeed, would measure their own theoretical contribution by its success in refuting or absorbing Marxian theory, so Dilthey measured his own theory by its successful refutation of Mill's reflections. Both Mill and Dilthey were nourished by intellectual traditions that combined the sweeping range of the generalist with the disciplined mastery of a vast number of specialized realms of thought. Dilthey's encounter with Mill moved from psychology to ethics, to a vexing debate about methodology in history.

In our own day Millian exegesis continues to prompt serious dialogue and brisk polemics. The Millian corpus has become a part of our history--the scripture of liberalism. Just as the Bible is ever interpreted anew, so scholars read ever new interpretations into the Millian canon, often motivated by the desire to wrap contemporary

views in the mantle of Mill's authority. But Mill's writings became a piece of history almost with their publication. Dilthey's view of Mill calls us back to the early history of Mill interpretation, and to the historic role of Mill's writings in nineteenth-century Europe.

Stimulated by the brilliant fund of contemporary scholarly argument about continuities and discontinuities in Mill's thought, including subtle distinctions drawn between the early and more mature Mill, and psychoanalytic studies, one can easily lose sight of what Mill meant to his contemporaries.[2] To members of the alienated intelligentsia in Tsarist Russia, groaning under the weight of religious obscurantism and political absolutism, or on the other hand to someone like Dilthey, a nineteenth-century German liberal, supporter of the Bismarckian Reich, Mill stood for drastic change, for the dissolution of the status quo. Mill's cautiously qualified support of the coming democracy, his sometimes ambivalent attitude towards progress and his view of its woeful cost, may be of minimal historical importance in this respect. How can we deny the striking fact that James Fitzjames Stephen would hardly have recognized his libertarian enemy, in Maurice Cowling's contemporary version of Mill as "moral totalitarian." As far as the Victorian Stephen was concerned, Mill was emasculating society's key role as the moral superintendent of human action.[3]

What Mill was taken to stand for was clear enough: political and intellectual freedom; the free market and the minimalist state; the triumph of science in the nineteenth-centnry positivist sense of the term, a science that was system-building, capable of erecting a modernistic Weltanschauung--and the demyetification of religious authority; a view of history that emphasized the progress of science and the emergence of liberal individualism; a humane view of penal punishment aiming at deterrence and rehabilitation and, of course, the dissolution of the male imperium over the family. This was--roughly speaking--Dilthey's view of Mill, and because Dilthey viewed some of these trends of thought with increasing alarm, Mill became for him an enemy to be exorcised.

II

There are some indications that, in the 1870s at least, Dilthey approved of Mill's view of the minimalist state, and the large scope given the individual to pursue self-interest in the economic and political realm and in other realms of human action.[4] But, during the 1880s, as Germany plunged into capitalist industrialization with accelerating speed, and as the German working class turned increasingly to socialism, Dilthey came to look to the monarchy for those paternalist initiatives that would bring to a standstill the political polarization that threatened Germany. Dilthey then viewed liberal doctrine, particularly the halo it cast over self-interested behaviour, as a dangerous social dissolvent.

German moral philosophy, from the late eighteenth century to the period ending with World War II, had always displayed a strong animosity towards English utilitarianism. This hostility was shared by Kant, Fichte and Hegel, by Schopenhauer and Nietzche. Fritz Ringer,

in his study of the German professoriate, has shown that by the end of the nineteenth century--when old social classes saw their economic base weakened by industrialization, when pressures for a full-fledged parliamentary regime (a regime of parties ruled by self-interest) were felt, when socialism became a political force--those hostile to these developments came to see English utilitarianism as the ideological vanguard of these threatening pressures. Utilitarianism became the great bugbear of those who viewed modernization with alarm. Dilthey was no exception. In 1890, preparing lecture notes on ethics, he focussed his concern upon utilitarianism, a moral theory gaining increasing adherence in Germany. A large section of these notes was devoted to an examination of Mill's utilitarianism. Mill loomed large in Dilthey's mind as a symbol--even scapegoat--for a host of alarming trends.[5]

In Dilthey's appraisal, Mill's utilitarianism had three major faults: it rested upon a foundation of theoretical egoism or "atomism"; it spawned a dialectic of ideas culminating in socialism; it was hopelessly superficial and reductionist, an insult to human nature. To begin with the first of these faults: the theoretical egotism that Dilthey saw writ large in utilitarianism was the stalking horse of the capitalist economic imperium. The view that the pursuit of self-interest enhanced the good of all was "a smug Rentier's philosophy," a blank cheque for the abdication of paternalist social responsibility towards the working class, a recipe for political polarization.[6]

The last word on Mill's political stance has yet to be uttered. Mill's endorsement of the economics of classical liberalism must be weighed against his support of trade unionism, his cautious endorsement of socialist experiments in producers' co-operatives, his reluctant acceptance (but acceptance nonetheless) of universal suffrage--as he saw it, shifting political power to the working class--and his view of his own mission as an intellectual mandarin, transcending the particular interests of class and party. Moreover, Mill went further than probably any utilitarian in introducing motives other than self-interest, such as sympathy, into the utilitarian canon. Dilthey's view of Mill was innocent of these considerations.

Within a year or two of his salvo, Dilthey placed new sins at Mill's doorstep, of a quite opposite kind. Dilthey's claim was that though utilitarianism once crowned the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, the dialectic of utilitarianism bears the seeds of socialism.[7] Claiming to translate pleasures into quantifiable units, measuring pleasurable and painful states on a scale of intensity, duration, purity, etc., utilitarianism injected a radical levelling principle into political thought and action. Dilthey belonged to a German tradition that stressed that some states of mind and heart are, by definition, accessible only to the favoured few. (One may mention Schopenhauer's notion of will-lessness, and Nietzsche's conception of joy, an emotion open only to those living at the highest reaches of the will to power.) As the utilitarian conceived pleasure, linked as it was to a more mundane experience--to peace, security, the expectation of reward, sociability and the approbation of one's fellows--it was, by definition, open to all. Since all are capable of these pleasures, and

since there are no differences in value among the pleasures, maximalization of pleasure implies, simply, its widest distribution, or the greatest good of the greatest number. A social policy ruled by the canons of utilitarianism would divide humanity up into equally valuable "statistical units," among whom the means of happiness were fairly equally distributed.

Utilitarianism, Dilthey concluded, can be made to sanction egalitarianism, and so require coercive social levelling. Egalitarian social policy, in the face of the natural inequality of things, necessitated a high degree of political regimentation.

To compound the argument, Dilthey pointed to the utilitarian imperative to pursue self-interest in the belief that doing so would add to the good of all. Since this belief, Dilthey believed, is a pious fiction, a society organized around the universal pursuit of self-interest would find itself increasingly compelled to regulate and supervise human action to bring about the general good.

Dilthey insisted that the inner dialectic of Mill's utilitarianism belied the liberal strictures of On Liberty. If self-interest was the rock-bottom, irreducible centre of human action, then social necessities required that society employ powerful institutional sanctions to wed self-interest to motives of sympathy and to a decent regard for the interest of others. Dilthey seems to read (or rather misread) Mill as saying: "this feeling of unity [among humans, is] to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and by the practice of it. . . ."[8] In this, he finds a side of utilitarianism, hostile to spontaneity and diversity, relying heavily upon close social controls. The paths cleared by utilitarianism led to socialism.

As Dilthey saw it, these tendencies in utilitarianism, unacknowledged though they were, and never faced squarely, were confirmed by Mill's fervent admiration for Comte. Dilthey exaggerated all out of proportion Mill's favourable references to Comte. Mill, he held, was spellbound by Comte, the secular disciple of de Maistre; the all-encompassing social controls mapped out in the Positive Polity were simply "a superior form of the utilitarian principle. . . ."[9]

The final part of Dilthey's critique of utilitarianism had to do with the way many Germans saw the meaning of German Kultur, setting it off from English or French culture. In this view, the utilitarian ethic was a mediocre one, and made life a bookkeeping operation in prudence and calculation. Measuring action through common sense to ensure a maximum of happiness, utilitarianism devalued heroism, spontaneity, strong passions, and no longer understood the profound necessities of human suffering. Utilitarianism bred a superficial optimism. Oriented to institutional gimmickry and problem-solving, utilitarianism turned its face away from the brute existential facts of life--the powerful dominion of evil, chance and accident, illness and death--the great unsolvable problems of life, demanding stoic fortitude. Suffering fostered inner strength; it was studiously avoided only at our peril.[10]

Dilthey argued that the partial truth of utilitarianism lay in the fact that it did reflect some realities of human interaction. Altruistic behaviour usually has its rewards; it prompts the same behaviour in return. However, this rule only applies among equals, where a solidarity of interests prevails. In any case, it applies only to "average moral behaviour." There is a "higher life" reflected in religion and in personal ethics, transcending the social rules of utilitarianism. We learn soon enough that moral action does not necessarily reward us with happiness, that self-sacrifice is often repaid with ingratitude, that the good are often defeated, while the evil triumph. Ethics must rest on the base of categorical imperatives; human action must be innocent of the calculation of consequences, of the arithmetic of happiness.[11] Dilthey was aware of Mill's efforts to refine utilitarianism by establishing a qualitative hierarchy in the realm of human action. Mill put a high value on self-renunciation and self-sacrifice, and considered civilization a triumph over instinct. But as a utilitarian, Mill was locked into a passivist and, Dilthey believed, mechanistic model of human nature, shrinking the sphere of human moral freedom to almost microscopic size. In Mill's theory, the higher moral traits were the outcome of early associations linked to pleasurable experiences--to rewards, to approbation. When such actions became habitual, rewards could be dispensed with, and these actions would become self-sustaining. Mill vainly tried to carve out a respectable niche for the will's autonomy, for activity stirred by the intrinsic value of certain "higher" actions; he appreciated the phenomenology of ethical experience--that the moral itself becomes an "intrinsic aim, an object of the feelings of pleasure and pain." But he was locked into the eudaemonological assumptions of utilitarianism and was forced into the anomalous position of tracing the source of higher moral acts to the dull mechanistic reflexes of habit.[12]

Dilthey argued that Mill's atomistic or egoistic and eudaemonological assumptions dogged his footsteps, as he tried to open up utilitarianism to a more complex vision of human action. Dilthey documented Mill's effort to introduce qualitative distinctions among feelings of pleasure and pain. Mill argued that no one would wish to trade off "lower" pleasures for the intellectual and social feelings. Here we are in a sphere where the arithmetic of prudence no longer applies, where a brief "higher" pleasure counts more than "lower" pleasures, no matter what the cost in painful ramifications.[13] Mill refined utilitarianism even further. Psychological egotism was checked by a theory of sympathy, positing a native concern for the interests and the welfare of others. But Mill was reintroducing into his ethics an intuitive moral feeling, after having declared his strong opposition to such an approach, as the great theoretical prop of religious and political absolutism.[14] In On Liberty Mill posited another native drive, further diluting eudaemonological principles. This was the drive towards self-development--as much a duty as a drive. The famous third chapter of On Liberty is eloquent in its demand that individuality entail a fundamental resistance to the pressures of socialization, that the individual follow his inner genius, develop all his capacities to the full. Happiness or pleasure may be a

by-product, but it is not the end striven for. Individuality is the end pursued, irrespective of consequences, of eudaemonological arithmetic. According to Dilthey, Mill's efforts to refine utilitarianism heaped masses of contradictions upon a eudaemonological base. What Mill achieved was not the refinement of utilitarianism, but its "self-dissolution."[15] Dilthey's analysis of this issue anticipated some of the main lines of scholarly argument about Mill's utilitarianism for years to come. Dilthey's motive was, of course, to cast doubt upon the viability of Benthamite egoism and eudaemonism, a principle that, as he saw it, threatened the political and moral fabric of Imperial Germany.

III

Dilthey's understanding of Mill was filtered through an a priori schema. He was a child of German historicism, but there was a great tension in his thought between the historicist's emphasis upon the sheer variety of particular world-views dotting the paths of Western history, and the need to reduce this variety to a system, to find some abiding meaning to it all.

In his Weltanschauungslehre or theory of world-views, Dilthey posited three basic world-views as ideal types; the world-views to be found in the history of the West belonged to one or another of these types.[16] The ideal type was a heuristic concept; any given world-view only approximated very roughly to its ideal type. Dilthey meant to classify world-views only loosely, while emphasizing at the same time the irreducible individuality and uniqueness of each. However, sometimes Dilthey writes as if these three ideal types have a life of their own; he sometimes saw history as a field of combat between world-views embodying idealism and those embodying naturalism. This perspective was nourished by the view that his own age was implicated in a severe crisis, in which influences stemming from what Dilthey called naturalism threatened the moral and political fabric of Germany. Dilthey put Mill squarely in the camp of naturalism. Mill's view was not then a unique constellation of ideas characterized by inner tensions, even contradictions, not a complex eclectic synthesis, but a piece of artillery in the historic struggle between naturalism and Idealism. One of the chief forms of modern naturalism was positivism and, as indicated above, Dilthey assimilated Mill's theories to positivism. Mill was part of the advance-guard of a Weltanschauung striving to assert its imperium upon modern culture.[17]

Since Mill was the spokesman of a definite Weltanschauung, Dilthey had no trouble in deducing his stand on a whole range of issues. Positivism was determinist: it aspired to place all of reality, including human action, under a regime of strict causality. Dilthey then accused Mill of excluding free-will and responsibility from another realm--the realm of criminal law--and introducing, instead, a soft-headed environmentalism that would mitigate punishment and blame that abstraction, "society," for the behaviour of individuals. Society, not the criminal, was to be called before the bar of justice.[18] Dilthey argued this point without referring to Mill's discussion of free-will in the Logic,

a discussion Dilthey surely read, since he cited the Logic extensively.

Interestingly enough, Mill's views on criminal justice are just the opposite of what Dilthey thought. During his term in Parliament Mill delivered himself of a militant defence of capital punishment, during debate on a bill to abolish the death penalty.[19] Mill argued, in part, from a deterrence theory of punishment. Based upon utilitarian presuppositions, criminal punishment follows from the right of all to self-defence. Since action is guided by the calculation of consequences, the threat of drastic punishment is a powerful restraint on thought and action.

What is more interesting is that at a certain point in the speech, Mill shed the utilitarian argument and moved in a wholly different direction. His argument became shaded by a terrible moral absolutism, informed by a highly emotional affirmation of the sacredness of life. He who takes a life, Mill declared, is "unworthy to live among mankind." Moreover, in the case of brutal assault, particularly against women, Mill advocated flogging. This view suggests that Mill believed--though he could not say so explicitly--that he who visits humiliation upon another human must in turn be humiliated. It may not be too much to say that Mill affirmed the dark and ancient wisdom of vengeance, and its power to heal a radical imbalance in pain and suffering. Mill's arguments were controlled by the image of a mean and pitiable human nature perched precariously on the edge of sadism. The note of moral outrage--of rage against the criminal--points to a more ominous understanding of punishment than that suggested by the utilitarian notion of deterrence. Indeed in the area of criminal law, Mill went so far as to moderate the traditional liberal preoccupation with juridical rights. He complained that judges and juries too often gave the accused the benefit of the doubt, and leaned too far on the side of mildness in apportioning punishment. Penalties, he insisted, were, "so ludicrously inadequate, as to be almost an encouragement to crime."

Mill himself was not able to face up to this more ominous note in his thinking without contradicting certain treasured liberal assumptions. Indeed, Mill's other writings document a different, more predictable, attitude towards crime. In the "Chapters on Socialism," Mill reminds us that the cause of crime lies in "failures in social arrangements."[20] Poverty and lack of education were the sources of crime. Here Mill returned to the environmentalism so central to Associationist Psychology, an environmentalism that formed the keystone of his arguments about "women's nature" in the Subjection of Women, and his polemics against Comte's theory of innate traits in human nature.

We can often chart, in the history of ideas, a dialectic of ideas independent of what is actually expressed by a writer, who brings to his work the tensions and ambiguities native to human thought and feeling. Associationist Psychology was heavily environmentalist and led to the conclusion that crime was the result of botched learning experience in childhood. This view tended to read free-will and responsibility out of the picture, or at the very least, it mitigated moral condemnation. In this sense Dilthey was right about Mill's position on criminal justice, even if Mill's own words suggest a less

univocal interpretation. If Mill's tensions and contradictions are the meat and drink of modern Mill scholarship, they may not be very important in evaluating the thrust of Mill's thought one hundred years ago. Even if he was misunderstood, it was precisely these misunderstandings that carried the day in the ideological struggles of the nineteenth century.

IV

Positivism, according to Dilthey, had taken the offensive in another realm--history--and here too Mill had to be confronted and his influence short-circuited. The positivist view of history was wedded to a special brand of historical methodology and Dilthey's attack moved against both these fronts. The key work Dilthey dealt with was Mill's Logic: in his 1875 treatise "On the Study of the History of the Science of Man, Society and the State," Dilthey states: "Our whole presentation will be a confrontation with Mill's standpoint, with the arguments of the last book of the Logic, now adopted in England and France by a series of outstanding investigators."[21]

Of all Mill's works the Logic had by far the greatest impact upon German intellectual life. An abridged translation had appeared as early as 1849; it was the first translation of Mill's writings to appear in German. The translation subsequently included the whole of the Logic, and went through four editions in twenty-eight years. The Logic armed the practitioners of the natural sciences in Germany for their intellectual assault against the speculative philosophy of nature. It helped lay to rest the strong influence of German Idealism over the natural sciences, and cleared the ground for modern empiricism and the hegemony of impersonal law over the realm of nature.[22] Dilthey had no quarrel with this aspect of the Logic.

The great threat came instead from the famous Book Six, "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences," where Mill proposed applying the methods of the physical sciences to the disciplines of psychology, social science, and history. Contemporary scholarship is divided in its interpretation of this part of the Logic. Some scholars point to the sceptical and provisional spirit with which Mill couched the claims of science in the human studies. Others have argued that Mill was an orthodox positivist, not an eclectic, and that the Logic was to be the foundation stone of a scientific system meant to overarch psychology and social science, history and ethics. Dilthey's view was closer to the latter. What he read into the Logic was a "passion for system."[23] He counted Mill among those who wished to yoke science to a new social order, one whose binding beliefs about human nature, and the norms that ought to rule human action, all rested upon a foundation of "hard" science. Dilthey ranked Mill with Cordorcet, Saint Simon and Comte, militant prophets of a new social consensus and of a new religion of Humanity. If Comte was the founder of the new science of society, Mill was "its logician."[24] Dilthey's tendency to over-schematize, to divide the world into Idealists and naturalists, prompted him to place Mill's thought under the rubric of militant naturalism. There can be nothing more dissimilar than Cordorcet's or Mill's liberal understanding of the

uses of science, and Comte's authoritarian one. What united them, according to Dilthey, was their commitment to the hegemony of science, and this was enough to place them under the same "naturalistic" roof.

Mill's abiding sin, according to Dilthey, lay in his resolve to seek laws in the historical process. The German Historical School, earlier in the nineteenth century, had rescued the writing of history from its tutelage to Enlightenment rationalism. Rationalism lacked a developed historical sense and parcelled out praise or condemnation to the various epochs of history, measuring their ruling doctrines according to the present-minded criterion of reason. History had but just been emancipated from Mediaeval theology with its devaluation of the profane life, only to fall under the sway of a new anti-historical metaphysics, that of the Enlightenment. The German Historical School had pushed its competing claims for the autonomy of history, viewing nations and institutions in the perspective of a kind of organic historic continuity. But now positivism--whose chief spokesmen were Comte, Mill, and Buckle--had emerged as a powerful rival, for its ahistorical approach rested upon the formidable base of a scientific method gaining increasing status in an age more and more dominated by science.[25]

Dilthey's quarrel with Mill was a quarrel with that brand of history of which Thomas Buckle and George Grote were the most eminent English practitioners, for Dilthey was convinced that Grote's History of Greece and Buckle's History of Civilisation in England were written under the spell of Mill's Logic. The first volume of Buckle's History of Civilisation in England had appeared in German in 1860, in a translation by Arnold Ruge--the former Left-Hegelian and early colleague of Marx. Buckle's work had become a cause célèbre in Germany, and prompted a famous programmatic reply by the historian of the "Prussian School," Gustav Droysen.[26] It was Droysen who initiated a new self-consciousness about methodology among the practitioners of the German Historical School, a new militancy in the face of positivism. Unalterably opposed to reshaping history in the image of physical science, this new movement found its most developed expression in the work of Dilthey and in the writings of the Neo-Kantians Rickert and Windelband--among whom the concept of ideographic and nomothetic sciences, historical Verstehen and the notion of Weltanschauungen were elaborated. Mill's Logic had helped unleash this methodological self-consciousness.

Dilthey critized Mill for holding the view that historical development has moved through stages, the most significant of which has been the shift from pre-scientific modes of knowledge to the modern scientific mode of knowledge, the so-called positivist stage. As Dilthey saw it, Mill's historical views had a political intent and were just as threatening to the social and doctrinal foundations of Bismarckian Germany as his ethical theories.[27]

One of the chief bases of the German Historical School was its historically oriented social theory. Institutions were viewed in Burkean fashion, as the centuries-old organic crystallizations of collective social wisdom, tampered with at great peril, not to be abandoned in favour of blueprints and nostrums concocted by those with overweening pride in their reason. On the other hand, the new era proclaimed by

positivism involved a root-and-branch rejection of the past. All these beliefs had political implications. By the 1890s Dilthey had moved toward a stance of political defensiveness. His image of German politics included a strong monarchy and bureaucracy representing the interests of the State, balanced by the Reichstag representing the sphere of private interests. By the 1890s, Dilthey believed that it was most important to uphold the power of the State against the onslaught of rival private interests. This defensive posture involved sustaining the Monarchy, and the traditions of the German Historical School were key weapons in this struggle. As Dilthey put it: a "lengthy and profound familiarity with the great forms of the past," would help reaffirm the status quo.[28]

Positivist history, of the sort written by Buckle, and as Dilthey believed, embraced by Mill, saw the rise of science and scepticism, the loosening of the "protective" spirit in Church and State, and the rise of laissez-faire as the key agencies of historical progress. In the modern world the abstract individual, loosened from all social ties, moved by self-interest, was to be the primary social unit. In history as in ethics, Mill's theories culminated in social egoism and atomism. If liberal positivism celebrated the loosened hold of the family, the state, or the nation on the individual, Dilthey was to insist that these institutions moralize humanity by taking men beyond egotism to a sphere of duty, to a subordination of self to great collectivities.

Moreover, positivist history, in its search for the laws of history, stressed the importance of long-range factors in the historical process as opposed to short-range contingent factors such as the efficacy of great men. Mill had wrestled with this problem in the Logic and concluded that though general causes--such as the rise of scientific thought--control the "manner and order" of progress, contingent causes--such as the actions of great men--control, in any case, the "celerity" of progress. Mill nevertheless insisted upon the crucial role of the great man in history, and even claimed that without Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the birth of rational philosophy would have been delayed 2000 years. But then Mill went on to argue that, with time, mankind "en masse" emerges as the overriding factor in history. The progress of thought extends its writ over whole civilizations and creates a permanent acquisition no longer affected by short-range contingencies.[29]

As far as Dilthey was concerned, this view undercut the importance of the great man in history. Even in the modern age world-views are ineffectual until they are given living unity in the personality of the great man, who becomes a model for his own contemporaries. The nineteenth-century German adulation of the great man in both politics and culture is a well-known phenomenon. Whatever varied roles it played in German life, this adulation was part and parcel of a deep-seated élitism and disdain for democracy, a position that positivism seemed to be undermining. Dilthey believed that positivist determinism denied the efficacy of freedom in history. The freedom he had in mind was not a political one so much as a "creative" one. What shone through history was the unpredictable work of a Goethe or a Luther, forging a new

creation out of the scattered, uncoordinated elements of their times. To seek laws in history was to turn to the average behaviour of the masses of mankind and to turn away from great historical acts that were rare, but just because they were so rare, raised norms to which the best among mankind could aspire.

Dilthey's conception of history was tied to humanistic educational ideals; history provided models for a classically educated élite. Positivist history seemed more interested in mapping the laws of mankind's collective action and collective destiny. Exceptional behaviour undermined the goal of scientific predictability. Seeking laws in history created a bias for the more uniform modes of human action, those in which men were less free, more ruled by necessity.[30]

In linking progress to the rise of science, positivist history judged the great theological and metaphysical systems of the past to be outmoded survivals of an earlier pre-scientific mode of knowledge. Mill's position here was unequivocal: speculative metaphysics rested on an intuitionist base inimical to the scientific attitude, and was "the greatest speculative hindrance to the regeneration so urgently required of man and society. . . ."[31] Dilthey's own position reflected a special brand of empiricism that was to gain currency towards the end of the nineteenth century in the work of such men as William James. Dilthey agreed that speculative metaphysics had become outmoded, but he insisted that the husk of traditional metaphysics hid an experiential kernel that was eternal and abiding, and that had to be reaffirmed in a world increasingly given over to the canons of self-interest. Dilthey spoke of a "metaphysical consciousness"--an experiential awareness of the inner freedom of personality, of the human capacity for self-overcoming, for self-sacrifice--as the vital core of all metaphysical systems. The theological tradition, with its doctrines of theism, of a creation <u>ex nihilo</u>, were human projections. But Dilthey did not understand these projections, as did Feuerbach or Marx, as the expressions of human powerlessness. These projections represented plateaus of human self-awareness. Monotheism, for example, the notion of a God who was no longer part of the natural process, but who was indeed the creator of the natural realm, belonged to a stage when men discovered in themselves the inner freedom to transcend their natural drives and urges.[32] The question about the relevance of metaphysics had political implications. What Dilthey read into the abiding core of Western metaphysics was the act of self-transcendence, the overcoming of egotism. With this notion Dilthey meant to exorcise what he saw as the affirmation of egotism that ruled positivist history. The world was divided between those who wished to tear apart traditional institutions in the name of the will-o-the-wisp "happiness," and those who emphasized that social institutions were moralizing agencies meant to curb the anarchic press of human drives and desires. Dilthey's vindication of metaphysics was meant to affirm the latter position.

One can object to Dilthey's judgment of Mill on several grounds. His reading ignores the scrupulous complexity of Mill's writings. Mill was no Robert Owen, no simplistic monomaniac. He argued strenuously and persuasively in the <u>Logic</u> that the existence of general laws of

human action neither cancels out free will nor rules out the efficacy of great men in history. He was also easily able to dispose of the argument that Buckle's use of statistics in history negated free will. Mill insisted that the project of establishing general laws in history had to take into account the enormous complexity of historical data, the criss-crossing of a multitude of contingent causes that could at times counter the operation of general laws. Abstract law did not annul the uniqueness of historical situations. Most so-called laws of history--for example, that with social advance mental qualities become more important than physical ones, and masses become more important than individuals, or that history moves from a military to an industrial social stage--are not causal laws but empirical generalizations, based on a very few cases. They must be taken to be provisional truths; they are statements about general tendencies given the presence of certain constants; they lack predictive force.[33]

If Dilthey neglected the subtleties of Millian dialectics, it was an error he shared with his age. Subtleties and qualifications were generally ignored in the struggle of ideologies, and both those in Mill's camp and those on the other side read Mill's Logic as an unequivocal defence of positivism. George Grote, a leading utilitarian, and author of the widely-read History of Greece, claimed the Logic was "constantly present to our mind when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether scientific or historical." Buckle believed the Logic was among those works that "mark an epoch in the history of the human mind." Theodor Gomperz, an Austrian admirer of Mill and editor of the German edition of Mill's collected works, and author of The Greek Thinkers, claimed that no other work, "had a greater or more clarifying effect" upon him than the Logic. We may take these testimonies with a grain of salt, if only because the Logic was as much the product as the molder of its intellectual climate.[34]

In spite of Mill's equivocations, the Logic did place its stamp of approval upon a definite view of history, one that measured progress by "the state of the speculative faculties of mankind"; Mill had insisted that the Comtean law of three stages possessed "a high degree of scientific evidence," since it rested both on a posteriori generalizations from history and upon evidence from human nature. If this restrained claim was as close as Mill came to defining a genuine causal law in history with predictive value, practically speaking this guiding idea was the core of positivist historiography and gained increasing support from the Logic. Mill's approving review of Grote's History of Greece provides the evidence for this judgment. For here all complexity is set aside; provisional and tentative claims cede the ground to the Weltanschauung of liberal positivism.[35]

Reading Mill's approving review of the History of Greece, we find Athens made over into the image of nineteenth-century England: the agora has become "the marketplace of ideas"; there are no slaves in sight; Socrates' execution is embarrassingly avoided; laissez-faire and the minimal state reign supreme; the work ethic rules the "free artisans" of Athens; self-regarding action lies outside the writ of social sanction; "tolerance toward social dissent" is the rule; Athenian imperialism is a force for progress against "the priest-led

and despot-governed Asiatics"; Pericles is the type of Mill himself (or more probably his father), and Socrates is recast in the image of Bentham ("He exposed the loose, vague, confused, and misleading character of the common notions of mankind on the most familiar subjects"). Athens was the home of empirical philosophy, the only cultural centre in those ancient times where reason had risen above a fearful and terrible supernatural religion. As such, Athens was the agent of historical progress. If Periclean Athens had lasted another century, "human improvement" would be in a far more advanced stage than it is.

When Mill reflected upon the History of Greece he abandoned the cautionary tone of the Logic. Historical development according to the "English model" became the norm, and cultures that did not conform to this model were judged harshly. History became a stage upon which the friends and foes of progress were locked in combat. Empirical laws--tentative as they might be in theory--rode roughshod over history. Dilthey's one-sided evaluation of Mill's views of history and methodology reflected not only nineteenth-century ideological polemics, but found support in the Millian text.

V

Dilthey's image of Mill is striking in its lack of ambiguity. We are in the presence of a far more single-minded figure than the Mill most often resurrected by contemporary scholarship. We seek in vain for the Mill deeply touched by Coleridgean conservatism, or the Mill that speaks to us in "Nature" or "Utility of Religion" of the salutary work of social institutions; the Mill of "The Spirit of the Age" expressing his profound appreciation for the historic mission of the Mediaeval clerisy and for the benefits of the doctrinal consensus of the Middle Ages; or the Mill of "Civilization" raising questions about the terrible costs of historical progress.

Theoretical reflections are often accompanied by a multitude of inner tensions and ambivalences. The logic of theory and the illogic of life are very often at odds. We have seen this dramatically illustrated in the case of Mill's views on capital punishment. But textual interpretation has its own dialectic, overriding the intentions of its subject. Textual interpretation is in part an intuitive act. Faced with a body of texts written over a lifetime, reflecting a host of different experiences and moods--even when the author is striving for systematic clarity--the interpreter seeks an Archimedian point in the texts, the vital core of presuppositions and assumptions that rule the whole. However, interpretation involves a circular process; we reach the essence--the vital core--by beginning from the parts of the text, though an understanding of the parts requires a prior grasp of the whole.[36] Interpretations tend to be closed systems, imposing upon the texts interlocking structures of part and whole.

Once an important work is published, it no longer belongs to its author; it is loosened from its author's intention, and becomes a piece of history. Dilthey's interpretation of Mill, so different from most interpretations in our own day, was "correct" on two counts: it documented the role Mill's writings played in the clash of nineteenth-

century ideologies; and it pinpointed implications that could be drawn--and that many would draw--from Mill's writings, irrespective of Mill's own intent, even contrary to his intent. A contemporary scholar may well look elsewhere for Mill's greatness, for example, to his complexity and intellectual honesty. Mill's thought harboured agonizing tensions; he was never content to paper-over intellectual difficulties. The cause of reason would not be served by dogmatic programmes. Mill drove many of his theories almost to the breaking-point by introducing complexities and qualifications, difficult--sometimes impossible--to reconcile with his original assumptions. At the same time, intellectual honesty did not beget paralysis. Mill remained an intellectual and political activist, discriminate in choosing the issues that merited his support. It may be that the view of Mill that stresses his complexity serves us best in the second half of the twentieth century. For liberalism has been educated by history, and some of its most treasured assumptions are now in doubt. It is a view that would not have served the nineteenth century nearly so well. Great thinkers are remade in the image of their interpreters. We may well wish that this were not the case, until we realize that this is the condition of their efficacy.

NOTES

[1]In 1874, Dilthey reviewed Gomperz's ambitious German edition of Mill's collected works. See Dilthey, Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts, Gesammelte Schriften, XV (Gottingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1972), 456-7. Between 1869 and 1873 six of Mill's works had been translated: On Liberty, Utilitarianism, the Inaugural Address, the System of Logic, the Principles of Political Economy, and the Considerations on Representative Government. Dilthey noted that the Principles of Political Economy had appeared as early as 1851, in a translation by Adolf Soetbeer. J. Schiel had translated the Logic in 1849 and by 1877 his translation had gone through four editions. Gomperz had translated the Logic when it first appeared in 1843. The translation had Mill's approval, but no publisher was to be found at that early date. As we shall see, of all Mill's works, the Logic probably had the greatest impact upon German intellectual life. A translation of On Liberty by C. Pickford was published in Frankfurt in 1860, and a translation of Representative Government by F.A. Wille appeared in 1862. It was probably in the 1860s that Mill's works began to loom large in the consciousness of German intellectuals. In 1861 and 1862 the Preussische Jahrbücher, the leading organ of Germany' National Liberals--a party largely recruited from the liberal professions and a key political force in the 1860s and 1870s--carried two lengthy and approving articles on On Liberty and Representative Government.

[2]The most recent contributions to this literature are Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill (New York: Knopf, 1974), and Bruce Mazlish, James and John Stuart Mill (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[3]James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1967); Stephen's book was first published in 1873. Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

[4]In his 1874 review of the German edition of Mill, Dilthey approved Mill's view: "Laissez-faire must be the rule, the burden of proof lies with the exceptions" (Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts, 457).

[5]Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), Chap. iii. Dilthey, System der Ethik, Gesammelte Schriften, X (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958), 9-12.

[6]Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und Der Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg: 1877-1897, ed. Erich Rothacker (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923), 75-7.

[7]Ethik, 39-41.

[8]Ibid., 38-9. Utilitarianism, in Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, Collected Works, X (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 232.

[9]Ethik, 41

[10]Ibid.

[11]Briefwechsel, 76-7.

[12]Ethik, 36-8.

[13]Ibid., 35.

[14]Ibid., 39.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Dilthey, "Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den Metaphysischen Systemen," Weltanschauungslehre (2nd ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, VIII (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1960).

[17]Weltanschauungslehre, 158; Briefwechsel, 156-7; Die Geistige Welt, Part 1 (3rd ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, V (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958), lxxv.

[18]Die Geistige Welt, 192.

[19]Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., CXCI (21 April, 1868), 1047-55. Mill never seems to have deviated from the views expressed in this speech, having expressed the same views some thirty-four years earlier (see "On Punishment," Monthly Repository, n.s. VIII [1834], 734-6). (See also Wayne Sumner, "Mill and the Death Penalty," Mill News Letter, XI [Winter, 1976], 2-7.)

[20]"Chapters on Socialism," Essays on Economics and Society, in Collected Works, V (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 715.

[21]Die Geistige Welt, 57.

[22]See Die Inductive Logik, trans. J. Schiel (Braunschweig, 1849). Later editions appeared in 1863, 1868 and 1877. Subsequent editions included the deductive portion of the Logic. It was Schiel who first gave currency to the term Geisteswissenschaft. The term came to be widely used in Germany to mark off the so-called "human studies" from the natural sciences. Geisteswissenschaft was Schiel's translation of Mill's "moral sciences." See Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 5th ed., Gesammelte Schriften, I (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1959), 5. Gomperz wrote Mill that the Logic had become a favoured textbook among German scientists (Adelaide Weinberg, Theodor Gomperz and John Stuart Mill [Geneve: Droz, 1963], 12). Dilthey thought the

Logic Mill's most important work ("John Stuart Mill," Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts, 248). Another testimony to the importance of the Logic in Germany is to be found in S. Saenger, John Stuart Mill: Sein Leben und Lebenswerk (Stuttgart: Fromann, 1901), 65-8.

[23]Einleitung, 23. For contemporary views, see John M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), Chap. vi; Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill (New York: Random House, 1970), Introduction.

[24]Einleitung, 90.

[25]Ibid., xv-xvi.

[26]Dilthey, Die Geistige Welt, 57, 163. Henry Thomas Buckle, Geschichte der Civilisation in England, trans. Arnold Ruge (Heidelberg and Leipzig, 1860). Dilthey reviewed the translation in 1861. See Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts, 51-6. Droysen's piece first appeared in 1863, "The Elevation of History to the Rank of a Science," Outline of the Principles of History, trans. E.B. Andrews (Boston: Ginn, 1893).

[27]Die Geistige Welt, Part I, 54; Einleitung, 105-7.

[28]"Wohl Niederschrift einer Diskussions-bemerkung für die Schulkonferenz von 1900," Über die Möglichkeit einer Allgemeingültigen Pädagogischer Wissenschaft (Weinheim: Betz, 1930), 83-6.

[29]A System of Logic, in Collected Works (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), VIII, 937-8, 942.

[30]Die Geistige Welt, Part II, Gesammelte Schriften, VI (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958), 229-31.

[31]Die Geistige Welt, Part I, 52; Theodor Gomperz and John Stuart Mill, 14.

[32]Einleitung, 384-6.

[33]Logic, CW, VIII, 840, 931-5, 913-14, 924-5.

[34]Theodor Gomperz and John Stuart Mill, 15, for Grote's statement; 11 for Gomperz's; Alfred Huth, The Life and Writings of Thomas Henry Buckle (New York: Appleton, 1880), 318.

[35]Logic, CW, 926-8; "Grote's History of Greece," Dissertations and Discussions, II (London: Parker, 1859), 511-47.

[36]Die Geistige Welt, Part I, 330.

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"FEMININE" AND "MASCULINE": MILL VS. GROTE

John M. Robson

The best known of Mill's protests against the habitual distinction between feminine and masculine characteristics is probably that contained in his letter to Carlyle of 5 October, 1833. Carlyle had written (24 September, 1833): "I spent yesterday with Madame Roland; a most remarkable woman; one of the clearest, bravest, perhaps as you say best of her age and country; tho' (as indeed her time

prescribed) almost rather a man than a woman." Mill responded:

"There was one thing in what you said of Madame Roland which I did not quite like--it was, that she was almost rather a man than a woman: I believe that I quite agree in all that you really meant, but is there really any distinction between the highest masculine & the highest feminine character? I do not mean the mechanical acquirements; those, of course, will very commonly be different. But the women, of all I have known, who possessed the highest measure of what are considered feminine qualities, have combined with them more of the highest masculine qualities than I have ever seen in any but one or two men, & those one or two men were also in many respects almost women. I suspect it is the second-rate people of the two sexes that are unlike--the first-rate are alike in both--except--no, I do not think I can except anything--but then, in this respect, my position has been and is, what you say every human being's is in many respects 'a peculiar one.'"[1]

Another comment, equally interesting, has not to my knowledge been mentioned in the literature. George Grote, in the Preface to his History of Greece, commenting on the difference between the legendary basis of the material that occupies most of his first two volumes, and the better authenticated record of the rest of the work, says:

"it must be confessed that what may be called the feminine attributes of the Greek mind--their religious and poetical vein--here [in Volumes I and II] appear in disproportionate relief, as compared with the masculine capacities--with those powers of acting, organising, judging, and speculating, which will be revealed in the forthcoming volumes."[2]

In his review of Grote's first two volumes, Mill, in a note, takes exception to this comment, saying:

"Mr. Grote gives to the first two of these contrasted attributes the epithet of 'feminine,' and to the four latter that of 'masculine.' We regret that he should have unguardedly countenanced a commonplace notion which we do not believe that he would intentionally recommend, on a subject on which just opinions are extremely important; and we reply to him in the words of the Rev. Sydney Smith, originally printed in this Journal:-

'A great deal has been said of the original difference of capacity between men and women, as if women were more quick, and men more judicious--as if women were more remarkable for delicacy of association, and men for stronger powers of attention. All this, we confess, appears to us very fanciful. That there is a difference in the understandings of the men and the women we every day meet with, every body, we suppose, must perceive; but there is none surely which may not be accounted for by the difference of circumstances in which they have been placed, without referring to any conjectural difference of original conformation of mind. As long as boys and girls run about in the

dirt, and trundle hoops together, they are both precisely alike. If you catch up one-half of these creatures, and train them to a particular set of actions and opinions, and the other half to a perfectly opposite set, of course their understandings will differ, as one or the other sort of occupations has called this or that talent into action. There is surely no occasion to go into any deeper or more abstruse reasoning, in order to explain so very simple a phenomenon.'"[3]

Mill's disapprobation is signalled in the presentation copy of Grote's History in Mill's library, Somerville College, Oxford, where he has heavily underscored in pencil "what may be called the feminine attributes of the Greek mind" and "with the masculine capacities" and written "untenable distinction" in the margin.

That Mill's criticism is not better known is due, in part, to its having been deleted by Mill in his reprinting of the review in Dissertations and Discussions.[4] Why did Mill delete it? Probably in part because he softened slightly his criticisms in the reprint, which appeared under his name, not wishing to perpetuate negative comments. A more significant reason for this deletion, however, is suggested by Alexander Bain, who says that Grote, in "deference to Mill, . . . made some slight changes" in the second edition of the History. "One, I remember," he continues, "was to leave out of the preface the words 'feminine' and 'masculine,' as a figurative expression of the contrast of the artistic and scientific sides of the Greek mind. Mill could never endure the differences of character between men and women to be treated as a matter of course."[5]

Unfortunately, when one looks at the second edition, Grote's rewording (maintained in subsequent editions) hardly seems designed to allay Mill's distress. Grote did remove "feminine," but he substituted "sentimental" for it, and added "more vigorous" to "masculine"! The passage, with other minor changes, then read: "it must be confessed that the sentimental attributes of the Greek mind--its religious and poetical vein--here appear in disproportionate relief, as compared with its more vigorous and masculine capacities--with those powers of acting, organising, judging, and speculating, which will be revealed in the forthcoming volumes."[6]

It is unlikely that any of Mill's other marginal comments on related matters would have produced more satisfactory results had Grote known of them. These included the emendation of "man" to "men" in the phrase "the vast mischief arising to man from women," and of "woman" to "women" in the phrase "the miseries arising from woman" (successive sentences, Vol. I, p. 106).[7] In the same passage, against Grote's reference to "the notorious misogynist Euripedês," Mill has written "quaere as to Euripedes." Mill considerably expands Grote's list (Vol. I, p. 113) of women who give a large portion of the romantic interest of Grecian legend by adding in the margin Antigone, Electra, Iphigenia, Merope, Melanippe, Polyxena, Phaedra, Deianeira, Cassandra, Medeia, Alkestis, Hypermnestra, Ariadne, and Canace. Concerning language transmission, he comments marginally (Vol. II, p. 316): "the exact reverse of what happened to the Normans, in Normandy & in Sicily: whose children adopted the language of their mothers." And finally, Grote's

discussion of the inheritance of property (Vol. II, p. 513) prompted two remarks: "Equality of treatment would do even more than give two fifths--since there must have been more daughters than sons, owing to deaths in war"; and "When all property is hereditary, none acquired, it will naturally in a warlike community, with a law or custom of equal division by inheritance, accumulate in the hands of women."

In fairness, it should be mentioned that these are a small proportion of the marginalia in Mill's copy of Grote's History, which is, for him, very heavily annotated. Actually the largest number of comments and corrections have to do with the geography of Greece, which Mill, unlike Grote, knew at first-hand. In unfairness, one may opine that their shared first-hand knowledge of Harriets is less significant--though not trivial--to interpreters of their works. And it is impossible to refrain from asking what Mill would have thought had Grote or anyone else said, as he himself does in "Civilization": "There has crept over the refined classes, over the whole class of gentlemen in England, a moral effeminacy, an inaptitude for every kind of struggle."[8]

NOTES

[1]Carlyle, Letters of Thomas Carlyle to John Stuart Mill, John Sterling, and Robert Browning, ed. Alexander Carlyle (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1923), 71; Mill, Earlier Letters, ed. Francis E. Mineka, Collected Works, XII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 184.

[2]History of Greece, I (London: Murray, 1848), xvii.

[3]Edinburgh Review, 84 (Oct., 1846), 346n. The quotation from Sydney Smith is from "Female Education," Edinburgh Review, 15 (Jan., 1810), 299.

[4]It appeared in Vol. II (London: Parker, 1859), 283-334. This review will appear (with the variants) in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, Vol. XI of the Collected Works, in late 1977 or early 1978.

[5]John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, Green, 1882), 86.

[6]Vol. I, p. xvii, 2nd ed. (London: Murray, 1849). I am indebted to John and Germaine Warkentin for checking the reading in the 2nd ed. of the first two volumes, which is comparatively rare. It should be noted that, because Murray kept releasing new issues of the earlier volumes as later volumes were published, it is hard to find a set that is not a mixture of several editions.

[7]That these changes are not prompted merely by a desire for consistency is suggested by John and Harriet Mill's vehemence when chastizing George Jacob Holyoake for reprinting her "Enfranchisement of Women" without permission and with errors. "One particularly offensive" error, he says, "is the excessive vulgarity of substituting 'woman' for 'Women'; this occurs in several places and in the first paragraph. One of the purposes of writing the article was to warn the American women to disunite their cause from the feeble sentimentality which exposes it to contempt & of which the stuff continually talked & written about 'woman' may be taken as a symbol & test,--& it is therefore very disagreeable to the writer to see this piece of

vulgarity prominent on the face of the article itself." (21 Sept., 1856; Later Letters, ed. Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, Collected Works, XV [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972], 510.)

[8]Essays on Politics and Society, Collected Works, XVIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 131.

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As Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, Volume XI of the Collected Works, is about to go to press, we find that our search for relevant references has proved fruitful, except for the following:

1. We have yet to discover who it was that called Plato the "Attic Bee."

2. In his "Bailey on Berkeley's Theory of Vision," JSM attributes to Locke the view that of two persons, perhaps equal in intellectual powers, one may possess the capacity for "seizing the scope" of a speculation whereas the other will "stick in the incidents." Although we have found the latter phrase in a passage from a letter written by Locke (Works, Vol. X, p. 285), we have been unable to come up with "seizing the scope."

3. In his review of Grote's Plato, JSM remarks on Grote's view that Plato, as he advanced in life, became increasingly sceptical of the Socratic dialectical method, and attributes to Grote the expression that Plato consequently "ceased to be leader of opposition, and passed over to the ministerial benches." Our examination of Grote's Plato and his History of Greece has not uncovered this metaphor which continues to elude us.

4. In his concluding remarks on Plato's Gorgias, Mill refers to "the old monk in Rabelais," and his "notion of worldly wisdom: To perform your appointed task indifferently well; never to speak ill of your superiors; and to let the mad world go its own way, for it will go its own way." The Latin equivalent is given in a footnote: "Fungi officio taliter qualiter; nunquam male loqui de superioribus; sinere insanum mundum vadere quò vult; nam vult vadere quò vult."

Diderot, too, early in Le Neveu de Rameau, mentions "la sagesse du moine de Rabelais . . .: faire son devoir, tellement quellement; toujours dire du bien de monsieur le prieur; et laisser aller le monde à sa fantaisie." He also gives a Latin version, in two letters, one to Sophie Volland (21 September, 1768), the other, written in imitation of the style of Rabelais, to General Betzky (21 March, 1774).

Voltaire provides a variation in the opening sentence of a pamphlet on the lack of maintenance of the streets of Paris, Ce qu'on ne fait pas et ce qu'on pourrait faire (1742): "Laisser aller le monde comme il va, faire son devoir tellement quellement, et dire toujours du bien de monsieur le prieur est une ancienne maxime de moine; mais elle

peut laisser le couvent dans la médiocrité, le relâchement et le mépris. . . ."

A letter from Paul-Louis Courier "à Messieurs de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres" (20 March, 1819) gives us a shorter Latin version with a different word order, while retaining the "vadit" emphasis of Voltaire rather than the "vult" of Diderot and Mill.

There is no monk, young or old, in Rabelais or elsewhere that we can find handing out such advice, in any language. Mill's Latin (and we prefer his insanum mundum to the other versions) makes us believe that there is a written source (from which Diderot and others also drew) rather than a mere oral tradition.

Any information that will reduce our distress and bewilderment will be very greatly appreciated.

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Recent Publications:

Dinwiddy, J.R. "Bentham's Transition to Radicalism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 36 (Oct.-Dec., 1975), 683-700.

Halliday, R.J. John Stuart Mill. London: Allen and Unwin, 1976. ("Political Thinkers" series, no. 4.)

Hamburger, Joseph. "James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century. By Bruce Mazlish" (Review Essay), History and Theory, 15 (Oct., 1976), 328-41.

Lyons, David. "Mill's Theory of Morality," Nous, 10 (May, 1976), 101-20.

O'Brien, D.P. "The longevity of Adam Smith's Vision: Paradigms, Research Programmes and Falsifiability in the History of Economic Thought," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 23 (June, 1976), 133-51.

Phillips, Carol. "John Stuart Mill and Michael Oakeshott: A Case Study of Some Differences in Social Policy and Philosophical Theory." Ph.D. thesis, City University of New York, 1976.

Work in Progress:

Westholm, Carl-Johan. His doctral dissertation for the University of Uppsala on John Stuart Mill and the contemporary debate about democracy will be published in Swedish with an English summary.

Announcement:

FOURTH JAPAN MILL CONFERENCE

The fourth Japan Mill Conference was held on 10 October, 1976 in Tokyo. Thirteen Mill scholars attended. A paper was delivered by Professor Matsuzawa of Hokkaido University on Mill's influence on modern Japan; he referred to the classical Japanese translations of

Mill's On Liberty and Samuel Smiles's Self-Help. Professor Matsuzawa has published an article (in Japanese) on the same subject in Western Political Thoughts in Japan, The Annals of the Japanese Political Science Association (1975), wherein also appears Professor Yamashita's paper on the influences of Herbert Spencer on Early Meiji Japan. Professor Yamashita reported to the conference the results of his research in Canada, the U.S. and the U.K.

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John Stuart Mill and Representative Government. By Dennis F. Thompson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. 241.

Despite the vast number of books and articles on various aspects of Mill that have appeared over the last decade, this work by Professor Thompson is really the first attempt to analyze in detail the structure of Mill's political thought. That we have had to wait this long for such a study may be the result of a long-standing and widely held assumption that Mill's political essays, including the major work, Considerations on Representative Government, were of a practical and descriptive rather than theoretical and conceptual character. These writings appear to identify specific problems and suggest lines along which suitable solutions might be found; the understandable response to them has been a tendency to conclude that his political thought is not embraced by a systematic structural framework. Although J.M. Robson and Alan Ryan have pointed to the sweep and unifying elements of Mill's political vision, both have been concerned with broad issues and therefore do not pursue in any detail the structural character of that vision.

Professor Thompson has brought to his task a command of the methodological tools of political science, an extensive knowledge and acute appreciation of writings by and about Mill, and a perceptive intelligence. The result is a major contribution to Mill studies. His fundamental assertion is that the structure of Mill's political theory, as revealed in Considerations on Representative Government, "is remarkably comprehensive and systematic." What gives that theory its coherence and comprehensiveness are the two principles of participation and competence. According to Thompson, Mill's analysis of the institutions and processes of representative democracy rests on these two principles and their implications.

The value of a particular form of government, in Mill's view, should be defined in terms of its ability to promote the positive and inhibit the negative qualities present in a specific polity at a particular time. Taking this belief as his point of departure, Thompson goes on to argue that Mill perceived in the principles of participation and competence the necessary foundation for a progressive democratic polity (the ideal form of government). Thompson maintains that Mill's theoretical justification for adopting these elements as the structural pillars of his analysis is based on the protective and educative functions which both principles serve.

Policies beneficial to the public interest are far more likely to evolve where the political system provides for the expression of all interests in society. Extensive participation insures that no individual or group interest will be entirely ignored. Participation is therefore essential to protect individual interests, group interests, and the public interest. But the protective premise requires also that a sufficient degree of competence exist in the political system. If ignorance and incompetence are not to be the prime determinants in the formulation and implementation of policy, and if the influence of sinister interests, including those of a potentially tyrannous majority, is to be checked, then skilled and moral leadership is absolutely essential.

Mill's principles of participation and competence serve to educate as well as to protect. Participation in the political process permits individuals to gain an understanding of the social and political context within which they live, thereby better enabling them to respond intelligently and constructively to issues of public importance. A sense of personal responsibility for the welfare of the nation is also inculcated through participation. Thus institutions which foster participation contribute to the social and political education of the citizenry, and the entire community is the beneficiary. But the fulfilment of the educational objective depends nearly as much on competent leadership as on widespread popular participation. It is the obligation of that leadership to instruct the mass of citizens in the skills and qualities necessary for the creation and perpetuation of an efficient, public-spirited, and democratically constituted government. Therefore both participation and competence are indispensable for the development of a politically educated citizenry.

Thompson devotes a considerable amount of space to demonstrating how Mill's institutional preferences, with respect to the forms and substance of political organization, were the product of his concern to increase both participation and competence. He does this with much acumen and clarity.

But Thompson does not confine himself to an analysis of the structure of Mill's political thought and a consideration of the constitutional arrangements Mill designed for the fulfilment of his objectives. He is also very much interested in the question of the validity of Mill's assertions and their potential relevance to the problems confronted by contemporary democracies. Does extensive participation indeed encourage a greater concern for the general interest? Have Mill's apprehensions regarding the dangers of bureaucracy been borne out? Is it reasonable to believe that a competent minority, such as that postulated by Mill, actually exists? If so, could it possibly succeed, even within the institutional network he recommends, in acquiring the influence that he would like to see it possess? Citing numerous studies carried out by political scientists in recent years, Thompson suggests that Mill's insight into matters such as these, if sometimes defective, was in many cases remarkably accurate. One might legitimately question the conclusiveness of the research Thompson introduces in an effort to throw light on the contemporary relevance of Mill's judgments, but on the whole this approach proves to be both

useful and stimulating.

In an important chapter, Thompson relates Mill's theory of democracy to his philosophy of history or theory of development. Examining Mill's emphasis on the impact of ideas on the historical process, his identification of the crucial link between stability and improvement, and his perception of the character and implications of the trend towards equality, Thompson points out both the strengths and deficiencies of Mill's theory of development, once again having resort to modern studies bearing on the issues raised.

Although this is generally a highly sympathetic and favourable treatment of Mill's political thought, Thompson is nonetheless prepared in his conclusion to criticize Mill for not providing a satisfactory method for reconciling or resolving conflicts which might arise between the principles of participation and competence. Certainly when set within the context of Thompson's preceding analysis, his criticisms appear entirely logical and not unduly harsh. Still one may have reservations about them and about the basic thrust of Thompson's argument. Is it possible that Thompson has been too ambitious on Mill's behalf? Has Mill fallen short because Thompson has claimed too much for him in the way of a structured, comprehensive, and systematic political theory? In whatever manner each individual reader may choose to answer these questions after reading through Thompson's volume, his lively, intelligent, and original discussion of Mill's political thought is a most welcome addition to Mill studies.

Bruce Kinzer
University of Toronto

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As we hoped, the generous grant from the Canada Council has enabled us to move more quickly with the <u>Collected Works</u>. The General Editor has been joined in his labours by Dr. Bruce Kinzer and Marion Filipiuk (full-time) and John Carland, Martin Kreiswirth, and Rea Wilmshurst (part-time). <u>Essays on Politics and Society</u>, Vols. XVIII and XIX, with an Introduction by Alexander Brady, will be published by the time you read this. The text of Vol. XI, <u>Essays on Philosophy and the Classics</u>, is in the copy-editor's hands, and the Introduction by Francis Sparshott is completed; the volume should appear this year. And we are hard at work on Vol. IX, the <u>Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy</u> (Introduction by Alan Ryan), which we should submit to the press before the end of the year. John Robson, who is on leave this year, was able to spend a month in happy research in London during the Fall, and plans to go again in late Spring with Ann Robson who, with Francis Mineka, is well into the editing of Mill's newspaper writings (tentatively, Vol. XXIII of the edition).

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