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THE MILL NEWS LETTER

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This issue's Milliana is taken from the debates of the Canadian House of Commons and is a portion of the discussion of a private member's bill regarding the banning of smoking in public conveyances. For Mill's own view (of which Mr. Whiteway apparently knows nothing), see MNL, X:2, 16-17. The attention of readers is also called to the attractive spelling of Mill's name--and of some others.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Turner): Order, please. I suggest that the hon. member get back to the subject under discussion.

Mr. Whiteway: I am getting to that, Mr. Speaker. Had you given me the opportunity I am sure you would have seen the relationship of my previous remarks to the legislation.

I looked back in history to see what the various philosophers, and this is basically a philosophical question, had to say about this matter of liberty of smoking. I looked at Kiergagaard and the existentialists. I had to bypase him. I looked at Hegel with the cyclic history concept and his emphasis on the thesis and the antithesis and the synthesis, and I had to pass over him. I looked at John Locke, and the state of nature and the noble savage idea, and I thought that was not applicable.

I looked at Furebach and his concept on materialism, and I looked at Jefferson on democracy. I looked at Marx and his concept of relations of production, and that was not applicable. I looked at Eugene V. Debbs and Norman Thomas for the sake of my friends here on my left, and I thought perbaps they had no more to say than they had to say on the economic theory of the country.

I looked at the Bible to see whether the biblical Christian concept had anything to say about this whole idea of smoking. I looked at the Decalogue, the dispensationalists and the escatalogical ontologists and I felt they did not warrant this kind of consideration.

At last I did come across a man, John Stewart Mills, and his essay of 1859 "On Liberty". Although the flame of that essay was written 100 years ago, it burns as brightly today as the day it was lit. I want to bring to the attention of the House some quotes from that essay. I quote:

"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

I believe that this bill, in terms of the liberty of one to smoke in public places or not, has some deep implications in so far as if it would become law it would become part of our constitution, and we know that some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the Ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched. However, I know that laws and institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of the human mind.

This is the point that I want to make. The progress of the minds of Canadians is far ahead of the progress of the government and of the progress of the member opposite who is introducing this legislation. In substance, and in the spirit of this proposed legislation, I would not disagree. However, he is introducing legislation that in fact puts into place that which has already been done, accepted, and implemented by most Canadians.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

(Hansard, June 4, 1976, 1488-9)

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The issue continues with an article by Louis B. Zimmer (Department of History, Montclair State College, Montclair, New Jersey) which examines attitudes to the Second Reform Bill of 1867 and, after citing current and contradictory opinion, argues that, on the basis of the historical evidence, Mill must be seen as a democrat in nineteenth-century and not in twentieth-century terms. We continue with a paper by Martha S. Vogler (Department of English, California State University, Fullerton) discussing the part that Bain and Miss Taylor played in the publication of the Mill-Comte correspondence. This is followed by a short article by Ann Robson (Department of History, University of

Toronto) outlining through the correspondence the part that Eliza Orme, who was perhaps the first woman lawyer in England, played in the proof-reading of Dissertations and Discussions. Next there is a note on an odd cross-referrence in an edition of Plato's Republic referring to Considerations on Representative Government, followed by announcements of a BBC series on Mill and of the publication of The Waterloo Directory of Victorian Periodicals. Recent Publications and a review of Bruce Mazlish's book on the two Mills close the number.

We should like to announce that James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference has now been published by the University of Toronto Press. We understand that Professors Yamashita and Sugihara will be translating the papers into Japanese. Readers are reminded that the editors of the MNL welcome papers on relevant subjects and that we should like to cast our net a bit wider; please remember our permanent request for offprints, news of work in progress, and Milliana.

We should also like to announce that Essays on Politics and Society (Vols. XVIII and XIX of the Collected Works) are in revised pages, and will be released before the end of the year. (Formerly these essays were to appear as Vol. VI, but there proved to be too much material for one volume.) The Canada Council has given a generous grant to the edition, aiding very materially both the preparation and publication of the remaining volumes. The intention is to accelerate the rate of publication, so that one volume a year will appear, with the edition concluding in the mid-1980s (rather than the mid-2000s). So readers can confidently expect Essays on Philosophy (Vol. XI) to be published in 1977, and An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy in 1978. Further, more detailed information will appear in subsequent issues of MNL.

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JOHN STUART MILL AND DEMOCRACY, 1866-7

Louis B. Zimmer

To begin with an understatement, critics, both past and present, are not at all in agreement concerning the question: "Was John Stuart Mill a Democrat?" To cite just a few examples: Maurice Cranston has argued in several places[1] that Mill was no democrat categorically, that his political philosophy embraced no "immediate program" for the advancement of democracy and that Mill's comprehensive summary of his entire political philosophy contained in Considerations on Representative Government reveals a greater propensity for aristocracy than for democracy.[2] Similarly, Currin V. Shields has concluded that Representative Government is an attempt by Mill to "discredit democracy as a form of government." Shields is convinced that Mill thought the common people incapable of self-government and best suited for rule by an elite corps of the "specially trained and experienced few."[3]

On the other side, there are those who see Mill as a vigorous proponent of pronounced democratic sentiments. W.L. Courtney has referred to Mill as a "Radical" and a "Democrat for Europe."[4] Bernard Semmel has called Mill the "foremost philosophic champion of democracy."[5] Edward Alexander has written that nothing could be further from the truth than the assertion that Mill wished to restore an aristocratic elite in England. Rather, according to Alexander, Mill wanted to prepare England for democracy and did not compromise his "belief in democratic government."[6] Alexander also quotes the labour leader and contemporary of J.S. Mill, George Jacob Holyoake, who wrote: "Of all the publie men whom I can recall, there have been none, certainly no philosophers who personally cared for the people as he did."[7] Yet these views of the friendly critics are all seriously challenged by the conclusions of J.H. Burns' admirable study of Mill's political thought during the years 1829-61. Professor Burns writes: "A consistent viewpoint unites Mill's thought from start to finish; but it is not, in the strict sense he would himself have adopted, the viewpoint of a democrat."[8] But, as late as 1867, six years before his death in 1873, Mill claimed to have held "eminently democratic opinions . . . for a great number of years."[9]

What then is to be made of these widely opposing views? Is it possible, given such conflicting testimony by such eminent witnesses, to confirm or deny that J.S. Mill was a democrat? In this paper, I shall argue that within the strict and narrow confines of English parliamentary politics at the time of the passage of the Second Reform Bill in 1867, and on the basis of evidence hitherto ignored, Mill may be called a democrat as democracy was understood and defined in his own day. I shall also suggest that the critics who view Mill as anti-democratic in the absolute sense do so from a pronounced twentieth-century egalitarian perspective which regards anything but the upholding of the absolute value of democracy as, at best, the manifestation of bad manners. I shall maintain that at a time when democracy was slowly legislated into existence in the United Kingdom, such pronounced egalitarianism necessarily overlooks the limitations coincidental with the ebb and flow of historical circumstances and political possibilities. Conversely, I shall contend that those critics who view Mill as an unqualified champion of democracy in the twentieth-century sense of the term, go beyond the evidence. The truth, as Mill was fond of saying, rests somewhere in the middle.

I wish to reopen the debate on Mill and democracy by adding the singular historical dimension of Mill's parliamentary politics during the years 1866 and 1867 to the discussion. From this perspective J.S. Mill's estimate of himself as a man of "eminent democratic opinions" is not at variance with the public record of those years.

That public record begins when J.S. Mill, in July of 1865, was elected to the House of Commons as representative from Westminster. Two years later, on 15 July, 1867, the House of Commons passed the Representation of the People Bill, usually known as the Reform Bill of 1867. The basic details of the measure are well known.[10] Passage of the bill, which resulted in an increase in the national electorate to 2,470,000, had been engineered by the leader of the Tory party in the House of Commons, Benjamin Disraeli, an individual who had been

notably unenthusiastic about suffrage extension in all previous debates on the reform question. The bill which had been introduced the year before by William Gladstone had provided for no more than a total increase in the national electorate of 400,000 electors.[11] Judging from this figure, it is safe to conclude that Gladstone wanted limited, but not wide, suffrage extension in 1866. But as it turned out, the Reform measure legislated in 1867 under the auspices of the Derby-Disraeli Government enfranchised close to a million new voters, or more than double the number of new voters they had kept unenfranchised the year before.

The bill proposed by the Liberals was actually a conservative measure, designed specifically to give just a little. One could argue, as J.S. Mill did in a speech to the House of Commons on 13 April, 1866, that the proposal was far too moderate to be called democratic and that the debates in parliament did not call for a discussion of the principle of democracy.[12] Yet the Gladstone bill was precisely so debated. M.H. Marsh, M.P. for Salisbury, called Gladstone's bill the "beginning of the end," the "drift into democracy," a measure which could lead to universal suffrage.[13] Similar fears were raised by Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer-Lytton who opposed the bill because: 1) it would "widen the circle of democracy," and 2) the goal of the measure, by instalment, was the acceptance of the principle of absolute democracy.[14] Then there were the persistent, articulate and forceful arguments voiced again and again in the debates by Robert Lowe, M.P. for Calne, for example in this well known passage: "If you want venality, if you want ignorance, if you want drunkenness, and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other hand, you want impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do you look for them in the constituencies? Do you go to the top or to the bottom? . . . With respect to the £10 franchise . . . we know what those persons are who live in small houses--we have had experience of them under the name of "freemen"--and no better law, I think, could have been passed than that which disfranchised them altogether."[15]

In the end, the anti-reform elements won out. Three months after the introduction of the bill, the Russell-Gladstone ministry, which had pledged to stand or fall on the outcome of this particular measure, resigned from office. On 26, June 1866, Gladstone addressed the House of Commons and explained the reasons for the demise of his government, eulogistically recapitulating the strategy of the opposition which, as he said, destroyed the framework of the measure and the basic principle on which that measure rested. The bill had succumbed to the process of debate over amendments, seven in all, the last of which, on 18 June, had damaged irreparably any hope for passage of a reform bill that year.[16]

In brief summary fashion, here follows the catalogue of amendments: On 27 April, the government turned back a proposal to take up the question of redistribution of seats before debating franchise extension. On 28 May, a motion under discussion for three nights which would have set aside any further consideration of the bill for the remainder of the year was eventually withdrawn without a vote. On the same evening, the government was overruled when an amendment to include in the reform measure the necessary procedures to prevent bribery and

corruption at elections--which the ministry called a diversionary tactic designed to subvert attention to the measure as it had been structured by the government--was accepted by parliament. On 7 June, the government was challenged by two anti-reform motions. Again, another amendment to take up the redistribution of seats before the debate on suffrage extension was concluded was defeated by the reformers. A motion to increase the county rental franchise from £14 to £20 was also defeated by the government. Four days later, on 11 June, another attempt to raise the county franchise qualification to £16 was frustrated by the supporters of reform.[17] And on 18 June, the government lost all when the House of Commons accepted, by 315 to 304 votes, the amendment proposed by Lord Dunkellin.

What position was adopted by J.S. Mill on the reform bill before parliament in 1866? It is highly instructive for those critics who view Mill as an unqualified democrat to see that for any serious and critically responsible political thinker to uphold such a position then seems not at all in the realm of the possible. For the leadership, property was still the fundamental qualification for the vote. Annual household rentals, ratepaying and taxation were the criteria which determined the suffrage, and not even John Bright, the most insistent partisan of a larger bill, wanted universal male suffrage. "I think it fair," Bright remarked, "that they who never pay poor's rate, and who are in fact virtually receivers if they do not pay their share, should be excluded."[18]

On the other hand, for those critics who view Mill as an elitist, it is well to bring to light several portions of his speech on behalf of the Gladstone bill. On the evening of 13 April Mill endorsed enthusiastically expanded working-class enfranchisement. There was one class of people, more numerous than all the others, Mill said, which was virtually without any representation at all. He called for a "large and liberal," though not a preponderant, representation of working-class people, and he based this position on the conservative theory which required the representation of all classes in English society.[19]

In answer to critics, he ridiculed the notion that the government's bill would make the working classes a significant power in parliament, since the bill was designed to make that prospect impossible. Hypothesizing for a moment on the unlikely development of some 200 decidedly and distinctively working-class representatives being returned to parliament, Mill chided his colleagues with the indisputable observation that there was still no known method of parliamentary procedure by which a minority of one-third could outnumber a majority of two-thirds.[20]

There was also a touch of idealism in this speech. Urging the expanded suffrage which the Gladstone bill would confer, Mill argued that it was not only fair for working-class representatives to have the same opportunities as others to plead their own cause, but it would serve the House of Commons well to listen to those intimately familiar with labour's view of strikes, working conditions, apprenticeships and hours of work.[21] Strikingly different in tone and substance from a genuine elitist such as Robert Lowe, Mill wanted working-class representation as one means by which the human condition could

be improved. In Mill's words, "if those who are the chief sufferers by the great chronic evils of our civilization had representatives among us to stimulate our zeal, as well as to inform us by their experience . . .," the work of government, which was to confront those "great chronic evils," the curse of ignorance, disease, of a "population born and nurtured in crime," would be that much accelerated.[22] These are not the words of an elitist, and furthermore, Mill's voting record shows consistent support for the Gladstone bill in 1866.[23]

To return for a moment to those who see Mill as an unqualified democrat, it must be repeated that Gladstone's moderate proposal for suffrage extension put no one to the test of absolute democracy, for or against. What the majority of the legislators feared in 1866 was what they thought the Gladstone bill forecast. And Mill, too, shared the apprehensions of those who contemplated the results of an indiscriminate franchise extension to an illiterate and unthinking body of electors. These views, contained in several of Mill's published works,[24] were well-known and were cited in the course of the debates as indicative of Mill's genuine attitude toward the question of expanded working-class enfranchisement. It is beyond the purview of this paper to prove the compatibility of Mill's parliamentary politics with his written political philosophy.[25] But it is safe to conclude that Mill did not champion unqualified democracy, and neither did he oppose democracy's gradual expansion in 1866, nor, as it will be seen, in 1867. Though Mill supported the Gladstone bill totally and unequivocally, such support, in itself, does not make him a spokesman for democracy.

In the course of the debates in the following year when a Reform Bill was finally enacted, the political situation in parliament was reversed. Whereas a year earlier Gladstone had provided the House of Commons with a specific set of provisions which would have enfranchised only 400,000 new electors, the Derby-Disraeli government began with no definite plan. Hesitant and uncertain about the procedure it would adopt, the Conservative Government actually stumbled[26] into the necessity of introducing a bill and then, through the process of amendment, found itself the politcal sponsor of an act of parliament which enlarged the national electorate byond all expectations. There is even greater irony in this development when one reflects upon the tone of anti-reform and anti-democratic sentiment contained in several of the speeches of both Derby and Disraeli before and even after the debates began.

On 11 February, 1867, when Disraeli formally reopened the question of reform in parliament, he announced that the government would proceed "by way of resolutions," a euphemistic explanation of the absence of any specific proposals. These "resolutions," he said, were to serve as the means whereby the main principles were to be obtained on which a reform measure was to be based. At best, the "resolutions" comprised the vaguest of generalities[27] and, at worst, suggested that the government was engaged in the subterfuge of killing reform while pretending to advocate it. Eventually, the government, forced to abandon this procedure because of the constant prodding of those who saw through Disraeli's lack of purpose and scruple, hastily concocted a more

specific proposal which Disraeli introduced to the House of Commons on 25 February. Whereas the Gladstone bill of 1866 was based on a rental standard, the Disraeli proposal incorporated a ratal principle. But far more significantly, the Derby-Disraeli government introduced a new means by which to preserve the aristocratic composition of parliament and the national electorate: plural voting.

In essence, the bill called for a ₤16 ratable qualification in the boroughs, a ₤20 ratable qualification in the counties, a redistribution of thirty seats, and the introduction of four "fancy" franchises.[28] These would include an extended or additional vote to university graduates and members of the learned professions, to those holding savings bank deposits of ₤30 or more, to those paying 20s. in direct taxes and to any person "who has ₤50 in . . . the public funds." The plurality scheme had been the brain child of Lord Derby, but it had been thoroughly and seriously discussed by political theorists, Mill included,[29] outside parliament for several years. As a way of resolving the reform question, Lord Derby had suggested in December, 1866, "Of all possible hares, I do not know a better than the extension to household suffrage coupled with plurality of voting."[30] Initially, Derby speculated about the possibility of safely going "as low as household suffrage for single voting," provided electors of ₤10 and upwards were given two votes, while electors of ₤20 and upwards were eligible to cast three votes.[31]

In short, the franchise was to be extended, but not too far, and the propertied and the educated were to have twice as many votes as the simple ratepayers. "We do not . . . live . . . and I trust it will never be the fate of this country to live . . . under a democracy,"[32] Disraeli told the House on 18 March. The government's bill, he emphasized, has no tendency in the direction of democracy. Yet, in actuality, the Derby-Disraeli government was in a quandary about its basic position concerning the reform question. By 18 March it had arrived at the stage where it recognized that some extension of the franchise, very limited and carefully restricted with protective clauses and plurality voting, would have to be proposed. But it had to appear to be giving more. Its task was two-fold: to settle the question of reform and, at the same time, to preserve as much of the status quo as was possible. In addition, parliamentary procedure required the government to explicate and provide a full account of its real intentions, which the government had been unable to do when Disraeli addressed parliament on 11 and 25 February. Thus, throughout these proceedings, it appeared that the government wished to do no more than obfuscate the question of reform.

From this perspective, nothing could have been more astonishing than the ultimate fate of the Derby-Disraeli measure. What actually happened was the gradual surrender by Disraeli of the numerous safeguards with which the bill had been encumbered, in several instances without a vote or a clear motive, a surrender not so much forced by as conjoined with the strategy of those Liberal members of parliament who sought to broaden the government's bill through amendment. The net result was the Representation of the People Act of 1867 with close to a million new voters added to the national electorate.

In 1866, as has been noted, Mill voted for every amendment in

defence of the Gladstone bill; here follows the catalogue of amendments in 1867 and Mill's voting record and participation in the debate. On 11 April, Gladstone's motion to provide the compound householder--one who paid his tax, poor rate and rent in one lump sum to his landlord, and who was thus qualified to vote, but who often found that his name was not on the electoral register--greater ease in getting his name on the register of eligible voters, was defeated by the anti-reformers. Mill's vote is recorded in favour of the amendment.[33] Another attempt to ease the process whereby the compounder's name could get on the rate books and then on the electoral register was introduced by J.T. Hibbert and immediately countered by a motion of Disraeli's which would have provided a financial penalty as the cost of registration. A vote on the Hibbert proposal was nullified when parliament accepted the Disraeli motion. Again, Mill's vote was cast in opposition to the anti-reform proposal contained in the Disraeli amendment.[34] On 17 May, eight days after the vote on the Disraeli motion, and after much time had been spent clarifying and disentangling the vast complexities of the compounding system, a rather strange and curious event was witnessed by the members of parliament: Grosvenor Hodgkinson proposed the abolition of the compounding system in its entirety. And more surprisingly, Disraeli appeared before the House of Commons on 20 May and accepted without a vote so much more than that which he had successfully obstructed with his opposition to both the Gladstone and Hibbert proposals. To repeat: there was no vote on this very important proposal, which added some 300,000 voters to the borough franchise.

To address the critics once again, it is important to note that Mill did not, in any way, champion the cause of the compound householders. But as is well known, he was far more preoccupied with the cause of female enfranchisement, which makes Mill no less an avid proponent of a more democratic bill, and it was on 20 May, when Disraeli accepted the Hodgkinson proposal, that Mill delivered his lengthy speech and his own amendment for the enfranchisement of women.[35] That amendment lost by 123 votes though Mill was not entirely displeased by the general reaction and support it had received.[36] Space does not permit me to explore the democratic sentiment and motivation which inspired Mill to propose this amendment but his action, itself, damages the notion that he was an elitist. In addition, Mill voted on 6 May for the Ayrton amendment to reduce the residence requirement of eligible voters from a period of two years to one, which Disraeli had opposed.[37] And on 17 June, Mill again voted with the reformers and against the government, in support of the Laing proposal to assign a third representative to those boroughs having a population of 150,000 or more.[39] Thus, to recapitulate briefly, on these five divisions, Mill consistently supported and voted for measures which led to a broader franchise or which led to an enlarged democratic representation in the urban areas. He spoke on behalf of his own amendment to enfranchise women, and in the light of this evidence, it is quite probable that had the Hodgkinson proposal come to a vote, Mill would have supported it. He made no lengthy statement of substance on behalf of either the compounder or the lodger franchise, though he did

inject a procedural point into the debates which perhaps helped nudge Disraeli into acceptance of the motion to abolish the compounding system.

His intervention occurred on 17 May. Immediately following the introduction of the Hodgkinson motion, Gladstone took the floor and called on Disraeli to accept the motion, though he also expressed some reservation about the "original and naked" proposal as moved by Hodgkinson, and suggested that perhaps a rider could be added whereby the compounding acts might be retained to satisfy the occupiers and the owners who still wished to adhere to the old system.[40] In actuality, Gladstone was still having second thoughts about "every man" coming "within the pale of the constitution." The next speaker was Disraeli, who turned the entire debate around to make it appear that the Hodgkinson motion, because it meant that anyone who paid his poor rate was entitled to vote, devoid of the encumbrances of the compounding system, was thoroughly consonant with the government's position. In actuality it was not, since 1) the government still had no clearly consistent policy other than that of Derby's vaguely defined principle of household suffrage but only combined with plural voting, and 2) it had opposed vigorously any easy accessibility for the compounders to the electoral registers. Disraeli then continued, with amazing political legerdemain, to inform the House that while he accepted the spirit of the motion, he was unsure about how the substance of the principle could be included in the bill through specific and actual provisions.[41]

Again, it appeared that Disraeli was playing a waiting and vacillating game. He told the House that it should proceed with the utmost caution and prudence; he said "at first glance" he saw a significant omission, namely that of a saving clause for the many arrangements which still existed. As Gladstone anticipated unfavourably a torrent of some 300,000 new working-class voters through the hasty adoption of so "original and naked" a proposal, so, too, did Disraeli caution the parliament not to "hurry the House on a decision on this matter."[42] But what was one to make of Disraeli's sudden acceptance of the spirit of the motion to abolish compounding after resisting so many attempts to enfranchise the compounder? As. H.C.E. Childers noted in a critical speech, the parliament had just witnessed the "third change of policy" which the Derby-Disraeli government had exhibited in the course of the debates.[43]

It was at this point, when the issue of whether the abolition of the compounding system would be included in the present bill or in a future measure, that Mill entered the discussion. The basic point in his statement was that the question had to be resolved immediately. As Mill put it, the parliament simply could not chance the possibility of a general election which would expose in full view the enormous defects in that part of the electoral system which the House of Commons had brought to light in the course of the debates on reform and had tried to rectify.[44] In answering Disraeli, Mill advised the government to go on with the discussion of the other provisions of the measure until the "practical difficulties" of framing the provisions of the Hodgkinson amendment could be prepared and submitted to the House. Moreover, he told the legislature that he did not accept

Disraeli's contention that the Hodgkinson proposal was of a piece with the government's original proposals. In Mill's words, Disraeli had made a large and "splendid concession," but nothing more. Still more emphatically, Mill said that it was time for Disraeli to produce and "give effect" to his words; to offer specific collateral instead of the mere rhetoric by which Disraeli had accepted the "spirit" but not the "proviso" of the Hodgkinson amendment.[45]

As noted above, on 20 May, Disraeli accepted the full text of the Hodgkinson motion without going to a vote. While it cannot be denied that Mill caught Disraeli in a moment of ambivalence and vacillation, there is no evidence to conclude anything more. But it is a fact that an elitist would not have taken Disraeli to task as Mill did on this occasion. At the same time, an unqualified democrat would not have expressed such hesitancy as Mill did in that very same speech when he said that the discussion of clauses relating to the compound householder should not be regarded as simply "preparatory to doing away with compound householders altogether."[46] Indeed, in answer to those critics who view Mill as a champion of democracy, Mill opposed household suffrage, pure and simple, in his speech to parliament of 9 May, though the major part of this address concerned the subject of honest and uncorrupt enfranchisement.[47] But as the public record indicates, he cannot be charged with an attempt either to promote elitism or to conserve the aristocratic character of the electoral system since he supported by vote and by speech every amendment in 1866 and 1867 which would have and which did increase the electoral franchise. And he did this within a climate of opinion prevalent in the national legislature which jealously and steadfastly regarded that franchise as a privilege--perhaps best examplified in 1867 by the Tory obsession with plural voting--and not as a fundamental right to be exercised by all male citizens over twenty-one years of age.

Mill's record in parliament thus demonstrates consistent support for a more democratically broadened representative system of government which is not substantially marred by the one occasion when he voted with the anti-reformers. So important is this particular episode in the evaluation of Mill's position on democracy, that a detailed but necessarily condensed account of the event follows. On 4 July, 1867, eleven days before the Reform Bill was passed, Robert Lowe proposed the following amendment: "At any contested election for a county or borough represented by more than two members, and having more than one seat vacant, every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of vacant seats, and may give all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit."[48] The essential thrust of Lowe's amendment and his argument for its adoption was that in the event of an electoral contest for three seats, the minority party usually did not put forward as many candidates as did the majority. As Lowe put it, the majority proposed three candidates, the minority only one. The elector, then, if he supported the majority party, voted three times for three different majority candidates, to hold three seats, to represent the majority position. The elector voting for the minority candidate voted only once for the one minority candidate put forward by the minority party, and only a sufficient number of split votes among the

majority candidates could result in the election of the minority candidate. The power to vote cumulatively for one candidate would have been conferred by Lowe's proposal on any and all, on an equal basis, and not have been determined by property or monetary qualifications as in those earlier recommendations of the Disraeli bill which had been surrendered by the government six weeks earlier. Yet it cannot be denied that Lowe's purpose in promoting his motion was clearly to limit and restrain what appeared to be the movement towards greater participation in politics by the urbanized working classes. His was a last-ditch attempt to provide some means for those of anti-democratic sentiment to retain at least the possibility of some political control at a time when it looked as though that control was passing to the soon-to-be enfranchised working classes. As Lowe put it, speaking to the House in words of quiet desperation, this was "the last and only chance" to avoid the catastrophe: "All our other arrows have been shot; not one remains in the quiver; so that if this does not hit, there will be nothing left" but one kind of franchise "entrusted to, and left in the hands of the lowest class in society."[49]

Though Mill did not endorse the rhetoric, he did support the amendment. As he noted in his speech of 5 July, in which he gently chided John Bright for opposing Lowe's amendment, it was quite possible, he said, in practical matters to draw nearly the same conclusions from widely different premises. This comment was directed at Bright, who, with Mill, had voted repeatedly for amendments to broaden and democratize the bill before parliament in 1867, but who opposed the Lowe amendment on conservative grounds, "by standing by old things, and resisting new-fangled notions."[50] Mill's comment was not directed at Lowe whose premises on this one occasion were not at all different from Mill's. The purpose of Lowe's amendment was to frustrate the leveling effect which he thought would result from passage of the bill; Mill, too, feared the prospect that a minority of educated persons, those who are "likely to be weakest" in getting their views heard, would be "outnumbered and subjected to the tyranny of the majority."[51]

Mill voted for the Lowe amendment because it would have enhanced the possibility of minority representation. It cannot be said that Mill opposed majority rule,[52] but his conception of democracy included the proposition that out-voted minorities should not be totally unrepresented in the parliament. In Mill's words: "I wish to maintain the just ascendancy of majorities, but this cannot be done unless minorities are represented. The majority in this House is got at by the elimination of two minorities. You first eliminate at the election the minority out of the House, and then upon a division you eliminate the minority in the House. Now, it may very well happen that those combined minorities would greatly out-number the majority which prevails in this House. . . . The true majority can only be maintained if all minorities are counted."[53]

It is important to emphasize that Lowe had not proposed his motion on behalf of the representation of minorities. "I demand no protection for the minority," Lowe had said, but no man should be placed in a "worse position" because he adhered to the minority position.[54] But where Lowe was fearful of any kind or degree of working-class enfranchisement, Mill had supported and had spoken for a "large and liberal,"

though not preponderant enfranchisement of the working class. Lowe had been the foremost opponent of any kind of electoral reform; Mill had consistently supported reform. But there was one point of agreement in Lowe's cumulative voting proposal; Mill reminded the House that this motion rested "in part upon the same principles upon which Mr. Hare's system of personal representation is founded,"[55] and which Mill, himself, had offered parliament in an amendment proposed on 30 May. In essence, Mill's speech on behalf of the Lowe amendment on 5 July was significantly reminiscent of his address in support of personal representation on 30 May.[56] That, too, was designed to insure that out-voted minorities should not be entirely unrepresented or misrepresented. But the chief point perhaps to be made for the purposes of this paper, is that Mill voted with the anti-reformers on 5 July, 1867, for the first and only time in the course of the reform bill debates. It is also very important to note, that in the very narrow and technical sense, the Lowe amendment--in terms of the actual machinery by which it would have worked had it been adopted--did not violate any of the basic tenets associated with democratic government. Ten days following the vote on the Lowe amendment which was defeated the Representation of the People Bill became law.

In summarizing, I have attempted to resolve the question: "Was John Stuart Mill a Democrat?" by reference to the actual politics employed by Mill during the course of the debates preceding the passage of the Reform Bill of 1867. By altering the perspective from that of Mill's published writings which are well known and about which much discussion continues unabated, to that of the national legislature where Mill was an actual participant and where, in fact, democratic government was extended substantially in 1867, I have sought to examine the question in a new light. In short, I have attempted to answer the question not in vacuo, but against the historicity of the actual and concrete events by which democracy was extended in the give-and-take of parliamentary politics which comprise the historical perspective. And the historical perspective of 1866 and 1867 reflects a society as it is represented in a national parliament still and emphatically unsure about how it intended to organize and structure the democratic process of counting votes and determining majorities and minorities. Moreover, and far more importantly, the basis of this indecision was the profound uncertainty about just what it was that gave an elector that necessary quality of "fitness" to exercise the franchise responsibly. The tone and substance of the debates indicate that Mill's fellow parliamentarians, liberals and radicals included, had no intention to alter in any fundamental way the electoral system of the United Kingdom.

One man, one vote; rule by simple numerical majority; women's suffrage: those criteria by which we today, define democracy in the narrow, quantitative sense, have little bearing on the England of Mill's day, which had not yet seriously contemplated the organization of the electoral system along the more advanced democratic lines of a later time. In a society still very much aristocratic in the composition of its national legislature, still very much aristocratic in the disposition and temperament of the leadership of both major parties, theories of plural voting, cumulative voting and proportional

representation were the natural consequences of any debate in which property was still regarded as the predominant criterion by which the suffrage was to be partially extended to those yet untested and untried in the responsibilities of self-government.

Through the whole debate, J.S. Mill's position is not that of opposing greater self-government. His motion to extend the franchise to women, his speech of 13 April, 1866 on behalf of working-class enfranchisement, his admonition to Disraeli to make a decision on the compounding question on 17 May, 1867 (though he did not favour household suffrage, pure and simple), and his speech on the Lowe amendment --all warrant the conclusion that Mill, within the context of his time, which is the most equitable manner of judging, was a person of "eminent democratic opinions," as he put it himself. There is no evidence to suggest that, in 1866-7, he opposed or attempted to discredit democracy, as the process of democracy came to be organized, defined and structured in his own day. Yet it is also clear that he was no champion of democracy in the sense in which it is defined today.

NOTES:

[1] John Stuart Mill (London, 1958), 22-3, and "J.S. Mill as a Political Philosopher," History Today, 8 (January, 1958), 43.

[2] John Stuart Mill, 23.

[3] Currin V. Shields, ed., John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York, 1958), xxii.

[4] Life of John Stuart Mill (London, 1889), 67-8.

[5] Jamaican Blood and Victorian Conscience (Boston, 1963), 63.

[6] "Mill's Theory of Culture: The Wedding of Literature and Democracy," University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXV (October, 1965), 77.

[7] Ibid., 78-9.

[8] "J.S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-61," in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J.B. Schneewind (New York, 1968), 322.

[9] Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, 188 (1867), 1102, in the first part of Mill's speech during the closing days of the Reform Bill debates.

[10] Homersham Cox, The Reform Bills of 1866 and 1867 (London, 1868) and Joseph H. Park, The English Reform Bill of 1867 (London, 1920) are now greatly surpassed in the rich detail of the behind-the-scenes politics by which reform was legislated in two brilliantly narrated recent books, F.B. Smith, The Making of the Second Reform Bill (London, 1966), and Maurice Cowling, 1867--Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution (London, 1967), both of which were very helpful in the preparation of this paper.

[11] The details and rationale for this figure may be found in Gladstone's speech, Hansard, 182 (1866), 30-52.

[12] Ibid., 1255.

[13] Ibid., 61.

[14] Ibid., 1244-6.

[15] Ibid., 147-8.

[16] Ibid., 184 (1866), 687-9.

[17] Ibid. The account and summary of these amendments are taken from Gladstone's speech of 26 June, 1866.

[18]Quoted in Donald Read, Cobden and Bright--A Victorian Political Partnership (New York, 1968), 161.

[19]Hansard, 182 (1866), 1255-6.

[20]Ibid., 1256-7.

[21]Ibid., 1260-1.

[22]Ibid., 1262.

[23]Hansard, 183 (1866) for Mill's votes on these amendments; 153 on the Grosvenor motion of 27 April; 1347 on the Knightly motion of 28 May; 2071 on Lord Stanley's redistribution proposal of 7 June; 2130 on the Walpole amendment to increase the county rental franchise of 7 June; Hansard, 184 (1866), 409 for Hunt's motion to raise the county rental franchise of 11 June; 640 for Mill's vote in opposition to the Dunkellin motion of 18 June.

[24]Mill's attitude toward reform and working-class enfranchisement contained in his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (1859), Considerations on Representative Government (1861) and Principles of Political Economy (1848 and subsequent editions) were cited and given much attention by several members of parliament. Messrs. Beresford-Hope, Lowe, Liddell, Gathorne-Hardy, Whiteside, and Pakington referred sharply to what they thought were "inconsistencies" as they read passages from these works in answer to Mill's speech of 13 April. See, for example, Hansard, 183 (1866), 1505-8, which contain eight paragraphs from Mill's Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform.

[25]This entirely different subject would require the composition of another paper. Mill, however, responded quite humorously to these charges in a speech delivered to parliament on 31 May, 1866 (ibid., 1590), saying that no matter how pleased he might have been by having his "writings so much referred to and quoted . . . [this] pleasure had been dashed by observing that hon. Gentlemen's knowledge of my writings is strictly limited to the particular passages which they quote. . . . [I]f they had done me the honour to read on, they would have learnt a little more about my opinions than they seem to know."

[26]This is clearly reflected in the debates and is the conclusion offered by Professor Smith, Second Reform Bill, 148-61.

[27]The text of the Resolutions may be found in the Table of Contents for 11 February, Hansard, 185 (1867) and in Smith, 138-9, and Cowling, 137-41. To cite just a few: the first Resolution declared that the number of voters in the counties and boroughs "ought to be increased"; the second said that such an increase could be achieved by reducing the value of the qualifying rate as well as by adding other franchises; the next one recognized the need for a more direct representation of the labouring classes, but noted that it was contrary to the constitution of the realm to give one class a predominant power over another class; number six called for a redistribution of seats, and number eight affirmed the need to supply representation to "places not at present represented." All of these questions had been discussed thoroughly during the debates of 1866.

[28]Hansard, 185 (1867), 939-47; also summarized in Smith, Second Reform Bill, 157.

[29]J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York, 1862), 174-186. It is also worth noting that Mill, asked by Earl Grey

to propose an amendment for cumulative voting declined to do so but said he would support such a proposal if applied to constituencies which returned three members. See Letter to Earl Grey, 21 May, 1866, Collected Works, XVI (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1169-70, and Mill's reaction to the cumulative voting proposal of Robert Lowe discussed below.

[30] Jones, Derby and Conservatism, 301; Woodward, Age of Reform, 178; Smith, Second Reform Bill, 139.

[31] Jones, Derby and Conservatism, 300.

[32] Hansard, 186 (1867), 7.

[33] Ibid., 1512-14; Mill's vote is recorded on 1700.

[34] Ibid., 361.

[35] Ibid., 187 (1867), 817-29, for the complete text of Mill's speech.

[36] "You will have seen the debate on the representation of women. The minority of 73 (which would have been near 100 if the division had not taken place unexpectedly at a bad time of the evening) is most encouraging, and has put its members and many other supporters in great spirits. The greatest triumph of all is getting Bright's vote: ten days before, he was decidedly against us." (Letter to John Elliot Cairnes, 26 May, 1867, Collected Works, XVI, 1271-2.)

[37] Hansard, 186 (1867), 1882, 1886; Mill's vote is recorded on 1911.

[38] Ibid., 187 (1867), 469-70; Mill's vote is recorded on 470.

[39] Ibid., 1942; Mill's vote is recorded on 1970.

[40] Ibid., 712.

[41] Ibid., 724-5.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 726.

[44] Ibid., 738-9.

[45] Ibid., 739.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., 282.

[48] Ibid., 188 (1867), 1037é

[49] Ibid., 1037, 1091.

[50] Ibid., 1102.

[51] Ibid., 1103.

[52] To my knowledge, there is no record of any statement in any of Mill's writings by which majority rule is violated or compromised. Of course Mill insisted that those who vote must be qualified, i.e., be able to read, write and compute figures as well as pay their taxes and rates. The following passages from Representative Government are taken from this context: "The ascendancy of the numerical majority is less unjust, and, on the whole, less mischievous than many others" (163); "The minority must yield to the majority, the smaller to the greater" (145); "No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or class is peremptorily excluded--in which the electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it" (174); "In all human affairs, every person directly interested . . . has an admitted claim to a voice, and when his exercise of it is not inconsistent with the safety of the whole, can not justly be excluded from it" (179).

[53] Hansard, 188 (1867), 1103.

[54] Ibid., 1038.

[55]Ibid., 1102.

[56]Following four brief reactions to the address which Mill delivered to the House of Commons in explanation of his motion, he again took the floor and said he would obey what appeared to be the general wishes of the assembly and not call for a vote on his proposal. See ibid., 187 (1867), 1357-62. For details of Hare's plan of personal representation, see Mill, Representative Government, 153-8. Mill's speech to parliament on the Hare plan is in Hansard, 187 (1867), 1343-56.

[57]To repeat for emphasis, the right to vote cumulatively was not restricted by property, educational or monetary qualifications but was conferred on every elector, equally. A glimpse of Mill's thinking on cumulative voting is this response to George L. Craik's pamphlet on the Representation of Minorities in a letter to Edwin Chadwick, 10 March, 1859: "Craik is entirely wrong in his arithmetic. If anything is as plain as that 2 + 2 = 4, it is that with three persons to be elected, and cumulative voting, it would require a third plus one of the electors to be sure of returning one member. Craik's error is in supposing that while the one third concentrate all their votes on one candidate the two thirds will split theirs among three. Of course they would know better than to do that. They would only divide theirs between two, which would give them exactly the same power of carrying two candidates as the one third would have of carrying one. If either the two thirds or the one third aimed at more than they could do, while the other party did not, they would fail of doing the whole of what they could do. But this liability would be common to both sides, & to both in the same degree." (Collected Works, XV, 605).

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COMTE AND MILL: THE EARLY PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THEIR CORRESPONDENCE

Martha S. Vogeler

The winter 1975 Mill News Letter announcement that Bernard Semmel and Oscar A. Haac have undertaken to translate the Comte-Mill correspondence into English coincides with the appearance of Volume II of Auguste Comte: Correspondance générale et Confessions, edited by Paulo E. de Barrêdo Carniero and Pierre Arnaud and published by Mouton in Paris and the Hague. The subtitle gives the period covered: avril 1841-mars 1845. The volume contains 32 of the 45 letters Comte wrote to Mill between 1841 and 1846, when the correspondence ended; and the Notes generously provide the text of 32 of the 44 letters Mill wrote to Comte. Volume III of the Correspondance will complete their exchange of letters and provide the epistolary evidence of Comte's extraordinary devotion to Clotilde de Vaux, who figured in his life somewhat as Harriet Taylor did in Mill's. The similarities and differences in the lives and works of the two men have often been discussed, but the publishing history of their correspondence, which

offers fascinating insights into the vicissitudes and exasperating complexities of Mill's literary legacy, has not received the attention it deserves.

It begins in September 1873, when John Morley, who had written one of the most moving of all the tributes to Mill upon his death the previous spring,[1] entertained three disciples of Comte at his house in Tunbridge Wells: Pierre Laffitte, leader of the French Positivists, whose headquarters was in Comte's former rooms at 10 rue Monsieur-le-Prince in Paris; James Cotter Morison, an Oxford friend of Morley's who had inherited a fortune made in medical nostrums and lived much in France; and Richard Congreve, of an older Oxford generation, leader of the English Positivists, whose centre was in Chapel Street, Bloomsbury.[2] By Morley's own amused calculation a month earlier, a single gig would hold all the Positivists in England, but they would quarrel over who took the reins;[3] yet the visit of his guests apparently went off without dissension. At least on 8 January, 1874, he was telling Congreve about a correspondence he had initiated, at Laffitte's request, with Helen Taylor, Mill's stepdaughter and literary executor. The French Positivists wished to acquire Comte's letters to Mill from her and to publish them along with Mill's to Comte, which they held.[4] A method of exchange was worked out by June. Miss Taylor would bring Comte's letters from Avignon, Mill's last residence, and put them into Morley's hands. Morley would give them to Congreve for copying, with the understanding that they be returned to him for collating with the published version, whenever it appeared. Then they would go into the Positivist archives in Paris. Mill's letters, transcribed in Paris, would be brought from the Positivist archives by Morison to England and given to Morley to hold until the final exchange. This would leave Miss Taylor in permanent possession of Mill's letters, and the Paris Positivists with Comte's.[5]

Morley, who considered himself an impartial go-between in the matter, had for some years been variously identified as a follower of Comte and of Mill; but in fact he was not entirely in either camp. As editor of the Fortnightly Review he had published so much work by English Positivists that many readers thought him and the review Comtist; but just about the time he was beginning negotiations on the Comte-Mill letters, his own published strictures on Comte led Frederic Harrison, a close friend and Positivist, to chide him for seeming "desperately anxious to rub off the label of Positivism."[6] Morley's rather negative estimate of Comte for the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1876 would virtually remove that label, but by then he would also be somewhat disillusioned about Mill because of the posthumous publication of the essays on religion.[7] In the letter to Congreve of 8 January, 1874, Morley said, by way of continuing a discussion they had been having, that he found sects "evil." Though he did not say so in this letter, he certainly shared the objections to the sectarian character of Comte's Religion of Humanity that Mill had formulated so cogently in Auguste Comte and Positivism in 1865, just a few months before Morley became a member of Mill's circle. Yet Morley asked Congreve if the evil of sectarianism was "worse than the comparative impotence of unorganised efforts," and if there were "no instrument more powerful for moving society" than Mill's philosophy. Standing

between Comte and Mill philosophically, though undoubtedly closer to Mill, Morley was determined to act with the scrupulous honesty he advocated in On Compromise, published early in 1874 explicitly as an extension of Mill's thought.

Given the importance of Mill's ideas of intellectual freedom, it is ironic that for some time his literary executor interfered with liberty of thought and discussion about his relations with Comte. Fiercely defensive of her stepfather's reputation, and vaguely considering publishing his letters herself, Helen Taylor at first procrastinated and then modified the original arrangements. She had brought Comte's letters from Avignon to her London residence by early June of 1874, but when Morley appeared there to take them she was "invisible" due to the death the previous day of her great friend Lady Amberley (whose son, Bertrand Russell, was Mill's and her godchild). Miss Taylor probably would not have given over the letters in any case, since Morison had not yet shown up with Mill's from Paris.[8] And on 22 July, when she finally did turn Comte's letters over to Morley, it was with a "memorandum of points" for Congreve to agree to before receiving them. She stipulated that she would have to read Mill's letters before publication to decide if she thought any omissions were necessary, and that she alone should make deletions.[9] Conveying this news to Congreve, Morley noted that "as a matter of fact Miss Taylor is sure not to suppress a line--but as Mr. Mill made this a condition when he spoke of the matter with Morison, she thinks it right to follow his precedent."[10] Her memorandum also asked that the copies of Comte's letters made by Congreve, along with their originals, which Morley held, be given to her so that she as well as Morley could establish the veracity of the text for publication.

There was more to come. When Morley took Miss Taylor the Comte letters early in October, 1874, she announced that she wished Alexander Bain, the Scottish philosopher and psychologist who as a young man had helped Mill with his System of Logic, to go through Mill's side of the correspondence to see if there were references to himself to which he objected. Since she declined to let Mill's original letters out of her possession, now that she had at last obtained them, and was returning to Avignon for an indefinite stay, Morley suggested to Congreve that he provide Bain with a set of copies made from the originals in Paris before Morison had brought them over. Informing Congreve of this new requirement, Morley complained that Miss Taylor was making his role as negotiator "irksome."[11]

So must the role have been that Congreve found himself playing on behalf of his French co-religionists at the end of October. Miss Taylor sent him a letter (through Morley) admonishing him for having asked Bain to return the copies to himself, instead of directly to her. She alone held the copyright, which had enough "pecuniary value" to make it worth her while to recover damages if the letters were ever published without her permission; and if Congreve allowed copies to circulate, he would be responsible should the "negligence of others" lead to a "breach" of her rights. Although she had the grace to add that she felt confident Congreve himself would not knowingly be a party to such a development,[12] Morley noted in his covering letter to Congreve

that "Miss Taylor never means to be other than just and courteous, but her tone is often intensely disagreeable, and I think it is so in the enclosed."[13] In November, having received the Mill letters from Bain, and having learned that he wished "the entire omission of the whole of every paragraph in which his name is mentioned throughout the letters," Miss Taylor declared herself unable to let the Positivists proceed with the publication. Bain's request seemed to her unreasonable, but she could not dismiss it lightly, since he thought others whose names appeared in the letters would make a similar request, and she feared they might do so as a result of his influence. The omissions he called for would "completely alter the character of the letters," which she wanted "published substantially as they were written." That she thought was the Positivists' desire also. She remined Congreve that they now held Comte's side of the correspondence and the right to publish it; but as for Mill's letters, she would take them with her to Avignon and there consider the matter further.[14]

A year later, on 3 November, 1875, Miss Taylor informed Congreve that time had confirmed her belief that the letters should be published only without omissions--and that was tantamount to doing nothing. She perhaps raised his hopes, however, by suggesting enigmatically that "a few more years' time" might remove all objections to their appearance "intact." When that happened, she said, she wished a note added to the text stating "up to what date Mr Mill continued to assist M. Comte with money." And she disclosed that she had arranged for Congreve to have the publishing rights in the event of her death.[15] Still later, when, apparently, Congreve pressed her for permission to publish, she again cited Bain's objections to verbatim publication as the reason for further delay.[16] Perhaps out of a nice delicacy about wounding Congreve's sensibilities she did not call his attention to the obvious cause of Bain's objections--his embarrassment over the evidence in the letters of his youthful enthusiasm for Comte.[17] Miss Taylor was later completely alienated from Bain whom she held responsible for the release of a pre-publication review of Three Essays on Religion. Yet she showed little concern for Positivist sensibilities when she explained why she herself wished to see the letters printed in their entirety: "[because] not only do I as a general rule prefer to furnish ample materials for history, but also because the publication of the correspondence as a whole seems to me better calculated to do honour to Mr Mill than the publication of M. Comte's portion of it alone."[18]

Since honouring Mill was not the Positivists' chief aim, they regarded their bird in the hand as worth two in the bush, and in 1877 an edition of Comte's letters to Mill was published in Paris.[19] The Saturday Review almost seemed privy to Miss Taylor's communication to Congreve, for, in regretting the absence of Mill's letters, it said that, judging by Comte's, they would seem to "do nothing but honour to Mill's memory," which was "more than we can say of the present publication with regard to Comte."[20] But the Saturday Review was always hostile to Positivism. Not until 1899, the year of Congreve's death, and eight years before Miss Taylor's, was the complete Comte-Mill correspondence published, again in Paris. It was edited by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, who the following year produced the first objective analysis of Comte's philosophy. In it he

stressed the unity of Comte's career, always insisted upon by the Positivists in opposition to Mill's division of it into two periods, the second of which was beginning about the time Mill broke off the correspondence.[21]

It is to Lévy-Bruhl's edition that Francis E. Mineka, editor of The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill in the Collected Works of Mill, refers us for Comte's letters. In F.A. Hayek's Introduction to that edition we learn that even as a newly-formed committee was deliberating in 1961 how to preserve Mill's house in Avignon, it was torn down.[22] In contrast, despite internecine strife, the English and French disciples of Comte, fearing what Morley had called the "impotence of unorganised efforts," managed to form a corporation in 1893 to purchase the building in which Comte had lived, and in 1928 it was classified as an historical monument.[23] One floor contains the rooms as Comte occupied them, except for exhibits of his works and memorabilia, and another the archives out of which are presently coming new editions of his works, including the Correspondance. Students of Mill will wish to see that their university libraries order the seven volumes already published in this venture, undertaken by M. Carniero, the curator of the Maison d'Auguste Comte, who has had a distinguished career as Brazil's representative to UNESCO, and his younger colleague, Professeur Arnaud. They will, of course, especially look for Tome II, with its bright red wrapping strip bearing the words "COMTE ET STUART MILL."[24]

NOTES:

[1]"The Death of Mr. Mill," Fortnightly Review, n.s. 13 (June, 1873), 669-76.

[2]Morley to Harrison, 26 Sept., 1873, Harrison Collection, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School of Economics; in F.W. Hirst, Early Life and Letters of John Morley, 2 vols. (London, 1927), I, 289. Selections from Congreve's Journal, British Library, Add. MS. 45261, entry for 30 Sept., 1873.

[3]Morley to Harrison, 22 Aug., 1873, Harrison Collection; alluded to in Hirst, I, 284.

[4]Morley to Congreve, 8 Jan., 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 61-2.

[5]Morley to Congreve, 1 June, 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 68-9.

[6]Harrison to Morley, 7 Jan., [1874], Harrison Collection. See D.A. Hamer, John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics (Oxford, 1968), 16-32, on Morley's divergence from Positivism under Mill's influence.

[7]Edward Alexander, John Morley, Twayne English Authors Series (New York, 1972), 25.

[8]Morley to Congreve, 11 July, 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 72-3.

[9]Helen Taylor, MS [Memorandum of Points], British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fol. 76, with a pencil note "received from Mr Congreve, July 23, 1874."

[10]Morley to Congreve, 22 July, 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 74-5.

[11]Morley to Congreve, 7 Oct., 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fol. 82.
[12]Helen Taylor to Congreve, 30 Oct., 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 84-7.
[13]Morley to Congreve, undated, British Library, Add. MS. 45341, fol. 83.
[14]Helen Taylor to Congreve, 17 and 20 Nov., 1874, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 88-90.
[15]Helen Taylor to Congreve, 13 Nov., 1875, British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 92-3.
[16]Helen Taylor to Congreve, 5 Nov., 1876, British Library, Add. MS. 45341, fols. 94-5.
[17]This explanation is given by the Positivist J.H. Bridges, in his review of *Lettres Inédites de John Stuart Mill à Auguste Comte, publiées avec les réponses de Comte et une Introduction par L. Lévy-Bruhl* (Paris, 1899), reprinted in Bridges, *Illustrations of Positivism*, 2nd ed., ed. H. Gordon Jones (London, 1915), 425-31.
[18]Helen Taylor to Congreve, 5 Nov., [1876?], British Library, Add. MS. 45241, fols. 94-5.
[19]Auguste Comte, *Lettres à J.S. Mill 1841-1846* (Paris, 1877).
[20]*Saturday Review*, 43 (23 June, 1877), 773-4.
[21]Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, trans. Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein with an introduction by Frederic Harrison.
[22]F.A. Hayek, "Introduction," *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812-1848*, in *Collected Works*, XII (Toronto, 1963), xviii, n2.
[23]*Statuts de la Maison d'Auguste Comte Association Internationale* (Paris, 1954). I am indebted to M. Carniero for my copy. See W.M. Simon, "Comte's Orthodox Disciples: The Rise and Fall of a Cénacle," *French Historical Studies*, 4 (Spring, 1965), 42-62.
[24]The ordering addresses are: Mouton Editor, P.O. Box 482, The Hague 2076, Netherlands; or Librairie de la Nouvelle Faculté, 30 rue des Saintes-Pères, 75007 Paris, France.

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LEGAL PROOF OF DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

Ann Robson

On 7 December 1872, Helen Taylor, Mill's step-daughter, received a letter from Miss Eliza Orme.[1] Miss Orme apologized for presuming to write when she was unknown to Miss Taylor but explained that Professor and Mrs. Cairnes had approved her seeking Miss Taylor's advice. She had always felt that nothing could assist the advancement of women as much as practical work done by women; in this view she had been supported by Mr. Cairnes, Mr. Fawcett and "my brother-in-law," Mr. Masson. Consequently she had resigned as secretary of the Executive Committee of the London National Society for Women's Suffrage to attempt to gain admittance to the legal profession:

"I see work to be done in explaining to women their real position from

the legal point of view [and] it is a lucrative profession which ought to be open to women. . . . I am prepared to work steadily at the subject, quite independently of whether I am admitted as a student, and to gather support and sympathy as I go along. In 1869 I passed the General Exam. at the Univ. of London and in 1870 took a Special Certificate in Physics and Chemistry. I intend taking similar certificates in Mathematics and Mechanics and in Political Economy next May, if possible. I am 24 years of age and am strong enough to work hard without its doing me any harm. I tell you these particulars because it seems unfair to ask your advice without giving you full information."

In the draft of Helen's reply (in Mill's handwriting with an annotation "dictated by me Jan 4/73" at the top) Helen gave Eliza Orme her full approval and the promise that, although at present she and Mr. Mill could offer no advice as to which Inn of Court she should attempt to enter, they would make enquiries of their friends. In further correspondence it developed that Eliza was also being encouraged in her endeavours by Mrs. Westlake, the former Alice Hare, daughter of Thomas Hare. By 20 June 1873, Eliza would seem to have asked Helen for financial assistance, or perhaps Helen was reading between the lines, but in any case she offered to provide some, although "just at present I have many unusual demands on me & only my own resources to answer them; if however it is essential to completing the arrangement with Mr. Vairey [with whom Eliza was hoping to read] that the money should be paid at once I could better defer other things than that this should be broken off." Shortly thereafter Eliza Orme acknowledged the receipt of £50. Money and support continued to arrive from Helen at intervals and Miss Orme kept Helen informed of her progress and of news of the Cairnes.

But she also provided a return of another kind for Helen's assistance; on 16 December 1874 she wrote:

Dear Miss Taylor,

I sent back the last of the proofs yesterday to the printer. It was nothing but pleasure to read the Essays and I was able to do it at odd times so as not to put aside any of my other work. I hope therefore you will not insist upon my charging you for what I enjoyed; and that you will let me have a further opportunity of helping you whenever the occasion occurs.

Miss Taylor's undated draft reply read:

Dear Miss Orme

I have been a long time thanking you for your letter and the information contained in it. . . .

I am very much obliged to you also for your help in getting out the third volume of the Dissertations & Discussions.[2] I shall willingly have recourse to your assistance again if the work is not too much for you, and may perhaps often be glad to avail myself of it.

To a letter of 3 August 1875, Eliza Orme added the postscript:

"I am going to Cornwall on the 20th and shall have plenty of time if

you want any more proofs corrected. It is a great pleasure to read any of Mr. Mill's writings of course and I shall be really pleased if I can help you at the same time."

Whether or not Miss Orme contributed any more proof-reading, the correspondence does not reveal; in all likelihood not. In 1875 the attention of both women turned to the London School Board Elections and the correspondence is filled with possible women candidates and their qualifications and chances. Eventually Helen Taylor herself ran and in 1876 won a resounding victory in the Borough of Southwark. Eliza Orme continued to establish herself in the legal profession working first as a "devil" and then becoming "perhaps the first woman lawyer in England."[3] One unfortunate consequence of Helen Taylor's election was a disagreement between her and Eliza Orme, probably over Helen's anti-clerical campaign, and in December 1876 the following letter and Helen's somewhat incoherent draft reply indicate an acrimonious end to the relationship:

4 Dec 1876

Madam,

I have the honor of enclosing you a cheque for £100 the amount of money which three years ago, you forwarded to my friend Miss Eliza Orme to begin her legal studies with.

I understand that she received
£50 in November 1873
£25 in May 1874
and £25 about a year ago

When I first had the honor of meeting Miss Orme she told me in a way which left a deep impression on my mind of your having given her this money & spoke of you and of Mr. Mill in words of the deepest gratitude. For this the gratitude will ever remain, but after the events of the past 2 months I do not choose that she should longer remain indebted to you, for what, I can with no inconvenience send to you for her.--

I remain
Madam
Yr obedient Servant
Mary Eliza Richardson

5 Dec 1876

Miss Taylor presents her compliments to Miss M.E. Richardson and must decline to receive money from Miss to whom she has given M.E. Richardson's note [?] & who is such [?] a perfect stranger to her that Miss Taylor encloses Miss M.E.R.'s cheque.

NOTES:

[1]All the letters and drafts of letters cited are in the Mill-Taylor Collection of the London School of Economics.

[2]It is just possible that Helen Taylor meant "edition" rather than "volume." The first two volumes of Dissertations and Discussions were published in 1859; in 1867, a second edition of Volumes I and II appeared with a third volume, and in 1875, Helen authorized a third edition of Volumes I and II, a second edition of Volume III, and a fourth volume. Eliza Orme probably read the proof of Volume III only, but she might possibly have read the proof of all of the volumes in the "third" edition; there is no indication in Helen's correspondence of help from anyone else.

[3]Collected Works, XVII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1823, n.4.

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Notes:

A CURIOUS CROSS-REFERENCE

In the Collected Works, we have bluntly solved the problem of Classical references by normally using ("for ease of reference") the Loeb editions. So, pursuing Mill's unidentified citations in Representative Government of Plato's Republic, we consulted the edition translated with notes by Paul Shorey (2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam's Sons, 1930, 1935). After locating one relevant passage in Plato (347^{c-d}), we felt impelled by gratitude and curiosity to consult the note (Vol. I, p.81n), and were surprised and pleased to find Storey citing (apparently as evidence of modern uses of Plato) some of the very passages in Mill for which we were writing notes!

In part, Storey's note reads: ". . . Mill, On Representative Government . . . 'The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as consenting to undertake [the task of ruling] unless as a refuge from intolerable evils;' . . . 'Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it.'" The first of these passages, where there is no explicit reference to Plato, is on p.46 of the Library Edition (1865) of Representative Government; the second, on p.193. There is another reference to the same matter, mentioning Plato, on p.216. (And there is one further reference to Plato on a different issue on p.356.)

JMR

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Announcements:

BBC PROGRAMMES ON MILL

The British Broadcasting Corporation has planned two programmes on Mill. The first is a half-hour discussion between Alan Ryan and

Gertrude Himmelfarb about her book On Liberty and Liberalism. It is a sort of radio review of the book, with Miss Himmelfarb explaining what the book is about and why she wrote it, with occasional dissenting notes from Ryan. The other programme serves as a belated celebration of the centenary of Mill's death. It consists of an hour's discussion between Ryan and each of Sir Isaiah Berlin, Sir Peter Medawar, Pedro Schwartz and John Barrel. It ranges widely; Sir Isaiah comments on the conflict between freedom and happiness, John Barrel on what Mill did and did not learn from Coleridge, Sir Peter on Mill's philosophy of science, and Pedro Schwartz on Mill's economics with Ryan asking questions and providing the links from one commentary to the next. The programmes have already been recorded and should be released in the fall.

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WATERLOO DIRECTORY OF VICTORIAN PERIODICALS

The Waterloo Directory of Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900, Phase I has now been published. It makes available, in a single alphabetical listing, the newspaper and periodical titles in Great Britain between 1824 and 1900. There are some 29,000 entries which include all fields of publication, and publication histories give changes of title with an elaborate system of cross-referencing provided. The volume is sponsored by The Research Society for Victorian Periodicals and Waterloo Computing in the Humanities, and is published by Wilfrid Laurier Press, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

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Recent Publications:

Dailey, Harold E. "Mill's Essay on Liberty among his Contemporaries," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1975.

Ekelund, R.B. and R.D. Tollison. "The New Political Economy of J.S. Mill," Canadian Journal of Economics, 9 (May, 1976), 213-31.

Himmelfarb, Gertrude, ed. J.S. Mill. On Liberty. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974.

Hollander, S. "Attack the Best Defense," History of Political Economy, 7 (Spring, 1975), 115-22. (An appendix to Pedro Schwartz, "Teaching the History of Economic Thought: Report of a Symposium at Bristol 1973," ibid., 112-5. Hollander's outline discusses Mill's place in the curriculum.)

Pierce, Christine. "Hart on Paternalism," Analysis, 35 (June, 1975), 205-7. (Refers to H.L.A. Hart's Law, Liberty and Morality arguing that Hart's position in discussing Mill's anti-paternalistic view of liberty leads to contradiction.)

Quincy, Herbert K. "Orthodox Benthamite Utilitarianism: The Case of John Stuart Mill," Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1976.

Robson, J.M. and Michael Laine, eds. James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
Rockmore, Tom. "The Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill Revisited," The Personalist, 55 (Autumn, 1974), 380-7.
Rodgers, Brian. "John Stuart Mill - The Avignon Years," Memoirs & Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 117 (1974-5), 52-74.
Rohatyn, Dennis A. "Mill, Kant, and Negative Utility," Philosophia, 5 (October, 1975), 515-21.
Spitz, David, ed. J.S. Mill. On Liberty. New York: Norton, 1975. (A Norton Critical Edition, containing, inter alia, essays by Steples, Kendall, Cowling, Devlin, Levi, Spitz, Ten, and Hart.)
Stearns, J. Brenton. "Bentham on Public and Private Ethics," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (Dec., 1975), 583-94.
Struhl, P.R. "Mill's Notion of Social Responsibility," Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (Jan.-March, 1976), 155-62.
Thomas, William. "The Philosophic Radicals," in Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England. Ed. Patricia Hollis. London: Edward Arnold, 1974, 52-79.
Thompson, Kenneth. Auguste Comte: The Foundation of Sociology. London: Nelson, 1976. (Includes selections from the Comte-Mill correspondence.)
Thweatt, William. "James Mill and the Early Development of Comparative Advantage," History of Political Economy, 8 (Summer, 1976), 207-34.
Williams, G.L., ed. John Stuart Mill on Politics and Society. New York: International Publications Service, 1976.
Williams, G.L. "Mill's Principle of Liberty," Political Studies, 24 (June, 1976), 132-40.
Wolfe, Julian. "Mill on Causality," The Personalist, 57 (Winter, 1976), 96-7.

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Review:

James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century. By Bruce Mazlish. New York: Basic Books, 1975. Pp. xii, 484.

Bruce Mazlish's James and John Stuart Mill offers an exceedingly thorough account of the life and thought of the Mills. Its major interest is the theme of Turgenev's novel Father and Sons: the relation of a great son to a very considerable father and the influence of this relationship on the life and thought of the son. It is a work of psychohistory or, more precisely of psychobiography. Psychohistory thus defined is only one part of the application of psychoanalysis to history.

In addition to his biographical study of Leonardo da Vinci, Freud also wrote five major works which deal to a greater or lesser extent

with the psychology of macro-historical processes.[1] Other psychoanalysts, notably Sachs[2] and Eissler,[3] have advanced this type of application of psychoanalytic knowledge to the study of historical processes. Sachs has advanced the hypothesis that a contributing factor to the fall of the Roman Empire was a psychological inhibition in the use of machines to replace human labour caused by the body narcissism of ancient Romans. Eissler has postulated that the rapid westernization of Japan in the last part of the nineteenth century was produced by a partial identification with the aggressors occasioned by the traumatic, humiliating assaults by Americans and Europeans on their traditional insularity and leading to their military and commercial imperialism after the fashion of those who had assaulted them. One need not agree with these hypotheses. The point is that the application of psychoanalysis to history should not be thought of as being limited to the most obvious one--the construction of the biographies of historical figures. However, Mazlish's approach is a perfectly valid one. In approaching the general problem of historical change, he focuses attention on generational conflict as one of the motors that drives it. He then proposes to study the form and direction of generational conflict in a given epoch by developing detailed studies of individual lives which gave it impetus, aim and character in the context of the intellectual environment of the era. The choice of the Mills is surely an excellent one for Mazlish's purposes.

I propose to consider some of Mazlish's psychoanalytic interpretations in a spirit of constructive criticism because I wholeheartedly support the aim of his work. Mazlish takes Mill's "mental crisis" of 1826 to be a form of melancholia rather than one of simple neurotic depression. The hypothesis of melancholia is not required by Mazlish's subsequent interpretations, nor is it indicated by the available evidence. Characteristic of melancholia are suicidal wishes. These impulses in melancholia are not caused by the wish to find release from intolerable suffering which is the nature of the thoughts of death to which Mill was subject at the time. They are caused by a wish to take revenge against a disappointing love object which has been abandoned in reality only to be re-established psychologically through an identification with that object. To be sure Mill did not feel able to turn to his father for understanding, but a son who is suffering from a regression to Oedipal rivalry will not find it easy to turn to the man against whom unconscious murderous aims are directed. If Mazlish's hypothesis of a regression to Oedipal rivalry is correct, and he offers good evidence for it, Mill had more reason to be guilty about himself than to be disappointed in his father. His efforts to test the ideas and values he had received from his father which might otherwise have been accompanied by a sense of liberation precipitated a depression out of guilt.[4]

Evidently the instinctual roots of Mill's mental crisis were never resolved, although Mazlish speaks at times as though he thought they were. Mill took flight from his father's decline and death in hypochondriacal symptoms which continued throughout his life. He suffered what appears to have been a complete inhibition of his sexuality. He fell in love with a married woman, Harriet Taylor. When he was

eventually able to marry her, as a consequence of her husband's death, he quickly formed a subservient, dependent relation, not so much on her, but on his own idealized image of her. He unconsciously repeated with other men, notably Carlyle and Comte, the relation he had had with his father. This picture, which is one of an unusually neurotic person, makes me wonder what could be meant by Mazlish when he says that "out of Mill's mental crisis had come a true 'second birth,' with the umbilibcal cord loosely tied to the original parental creators" (279). The unconscious psychological "umbilical cords" were never broken. What is remarkable is that despite these neurotic afflictions Mill was able to carry on an outstandingly productive intellectual life. It is a basic issue in the biography of Mill that might have been profitably tackled head on. It would appear that Mill was able to overcome his depression and protect his intellectual creativity by accepting a permanent sexual inhibition supported by narcissistic defences (his hypochondria) and by submitting to periodic, less intense displaced re-enactments of his unresolved conflicts. A man who has experienced "true 'second birth'" by psychoanalytic standards does not have to take flight from his father's death into hypochondria.

Also, there is the question of the influence of Mill's neurotic conflicts on his ideas as distinct from his relationships. Much of the book is devoted to a straightforward, though neither original nor flawless, history of Mill's ideas. A selection of topics specifically related to Mill's neurosis would have given a sharper focus on what should be the central issues of a psychoanalytic study.

Mazlish is not a trained psychoanalyst. He has had no clinical experience. This very great limitation makes his achievement in the Mill biography all the more impressive. There is only one bit of wild analysis having to do with the name of Harriet Taylor. Mazlish attempts to show that Mill had an unconscious preference for women of this name. To answer that question it is really necessary to have access to Mill's free associations to the words "Harriet" and "Taylor." The grave bars access to them now, while during his life-time, repressions within Mill would have made them no less inaccessible to his own introspection. Mazlish with extraordinary aplomb says that "while realising the limitation of this sort of orthodox Freudian analysis, we cannot allow ourselves to dismiss it." Why not? This orthodox Freudian analyst would. Mazlish should have turned his scepticism against his own construction rather than against "orthodox Freudian analysis." Mazlish does not need this argument in any case. He is able to provide sufficient external evidence to show that Mill's choice of Harriet Taylor was unconsciously determined by positive and negative Oedipal wants.

Mazlish's attempts to invent new psychoanalytic hypotheses are not very convincing. Here Mazlish reverses the relationship between history and psychoanalysis and undertakes revisions of psychoanalysis on the basis of history. For example, he invents an "Iphigenia complex" to explain the character of Harriet Taylor. While he calls it the "Iphigenia complex," he appears to be talking about Clytemnestra, her mother. It was Clytemnestra who killed Agamemnon for sacrificing their daughter to ensure a safe passage to Troy. Iphigenia appears

to have been a gullible and willing victim.[5] Mazlish invents this complex to explain the pleasure Harriet Taylor took in dominating men, including Mill, and to "correct" the old-fashioned, conservative views of psychoanalysis about women. The psychoanalytic clinician would not need this confused, unanalytic hypothesis since the features of Harriet he describes are characteristic of a hysterical neurosis.

In the same context Mazlish berates Freud for emphasizing the libidinal elements of the Oedipus complex and down-playing the aggressive. I had always thought that a wish to kill a father was an aggression. The fact that it is motivated by a jealous, possessive love for the mother does not make a parricidal wish libidinal. The argument follows from Mazlish's desire to show that the Oedipus complex is historically relative which, of course, it is not. The existence and severity of the Oedipus complex does not depend on the social conventions that provide roles for authoritarian fathers. The outcome of the Oedipus complex will be affected by the conscious and unconscious relations both parents have with their child. But the complex itself is simply a part of nature. My own clinical experience has taught me that the most severe forms of the Oedipus complex occur in sons who have not had sufficiently strong, if you like, authoritarian, fathers. Mazlish wants to historicize the Oedipus complex to link it to his idea of generational conflict as the engine of social change. In doing so he has distorted, by exaggeration, the role of the authoritarian father in the formation of the Oedipus complex. Ironically such linkages are not necessary to his argument. The Oedipus complex, just because it is a natural part of individual growth, ensures that generational conflict will be an historical constant. The rebellious youth of today will be holding the fort against their off-spring tomorrow unless out of guilt or fear they do not dare to propagate. (It is uncertain how the great Kronos would have behaved had he enjoyed the benefits of contraception. Foresight would have strongly motivated a choice in favour of childlessness.) Just because life monotonously repeats this phase of development in each human life, it is, as Mazlish has claimed, one of the engines that drives history.

Despite these flaws, Mazlish's study is important for the contribution it makes to the understanding of the life of James and John Stuart Mill. It is also important as a step along the road toward the integration of psychoanalysis and social science.

NOTES:

[1]Freud's works include "Totem and Taboo," Standard Edition Vol. VIII; "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," Standard Edition, Vol. XVIII; "The Future of an Illusion," Standard Edition, Vol. XXI; "Civilization and its Discontents," Standard Edition, Vol. XXI; "Moses and Monotheism," Standard Edition, Vol. XXIII. One might also include the chapter on animism in the earlier "Psychopathology of Everyday Life," Standard Edition, Vol. VI.

[2]H. Sachs, "The Delay of the Machine Age," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2 (1933), 404-24.

[3]K.R. Eissler, Medical Orthodoxy and the Future of Psychoanalysis, Appendix 3 (New York: 1965).

[4]Cf. D. Beres, "Superego and Depression," in R. Lowenstein, L. Newman, M. Schur, A. Solnit, eds. Psychoanalysis: A General Psychology (New York, 1966), 479-98.

[5]A modern literary work bearing upon the psychology of masochistic surrender to sacrifice is D.H. Lawrence's short story, "The Woman Who Rode Away."

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